Chapter XII: Alkibiades I. and II (1)

ALKIBIADES I.--ON THE NATURE OF MAN.

[Side-note: Situation supposed in the dialogue. Persons--Sokrates and Alkibiades.]

This dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Alkibiades. It introduces Alkibiades as about twenty years of age, having just passed through the period of youth, and about to enter on the privileges and duties of a citizen. The real dispositions and circumstances of the historical Alkibiades (magnificent personal beauty, stature, and strength, high family and connections, great wealth already possessed, since his father had died when he was a child,--a full measure of education and accomplishments--together with exorbitant ambition and insolence, derived from such accumulated advantages) are brought to view in the opening address of Sokrates. Alkibiades, during the years of youth which he had just passed, had been surrounded by admirers who tried to render themselves acceptable to him, but whom he repelled with indifference, and even with scorn. Sokrates had been among them, constantly present and near to Alkibiades, but without ever addressing a word to him. The youthful beauty being now exchanged for manhood, all these admirers had retired, and Sokrates alone remains. His attachment is to Alkibiades himself: to promise of mind rather than to attractions of person. Sokrates has been always hitherto restrained, by his divine sign or Dæmon, from speaking to Alkibiades. But this prohibition has now been removed; and he accosts him for the first time, in the full belief that he shall be able to give improving counsel, essential to the success of that political career upon which the youth is about to enter.[1]

[Footnote 1: Plato, Alkib. i. 103, 104, 105. Perikles is supposed to be still alive and political leader of Athens--104 B.

I have briefly sketched the imaginary situation to which this dialogue is made to apply. The circumstances of it belong to Athenian manners of the Platonic age.

Some of the critics, considering that the relation supposed between Sokrates and Alkibiades is absurd and unnatural, allege this among their reasons for denying the authenticity of the dialogue. But if any one reads the concluding part of the Symposion--the authenticity of which has never yet been denied by any critic--he will find something a great deal more abnormal in what is there recounted about Sokrates and Alkibiades.

In a dialogue composed by Æschines Socraticus (cited by the rhetor Aristeides--[Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s], Or. xlv. p. 23-24), expressions of intense love for Alkibiades are put into the mouth of Sokrates. Æschines was [Greek: gnê/sios e(tai=ros Sôkra/tous], not less than Plato. The different companions of Sokrates thus agreed in their picture of the relation between him and Alkibiades.]

[Side-note: Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of Alkibiades.]

You are about to enter on public life (says Sokrates to Alkibiades) with the most inordinate aspirations for glory and aggrandisement. You not only thirst for the acquisition of ascendancy such as Perikles possesses at Athens, but your ambition will not be satisfied unless you fill Asia with your renown, and put yourself upon a level with Cyrus and Xerxes. Now such aspirations cannot be gratified except through my assistance. I do not deal in long discourses such as you have been accustomed to hear from others: I shall put to you only some short interrogatories, requiring nothing more than answers to my questions.[2]

[Footnote 2: Plato, Alkib. i. 106 B. [Greek: A)=ra e)rôtta=|s ei)/ tina e)/chô ei)pei=n lo/gon makro/n, oi(/ous dê\ a)kou/ein ei)/thisai? ou) ga/r e)sti toiou=ton to\ e)mo/n.] I give here, as elsewhere, not an exact translation, but an abstract.]

[Side-note: Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What does he intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does he know?]

_Sokr._--You are about to step forward as adviser of the public assembly. Upon what points do you intend to advise them? Upon points which you know better than they? _Alk._--Of course. _Sokr._--All that you know, has been either learnt from others or found out by yourself. _Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--But you would neither have learnt any thing, nor found out any thing, without the desire to learn or find out: and you would have felt no such desire, in respect to that which you believed yourself to know already. That which you now know, therefore, there was a time when you believed yourself not to know? _Alk._--Necessarily so. _Sokr._--Now all that you have learnt, as I am well aware, consists of three things--letters, the harp, gymnastics. Do you intend to advise the Athenians when they are debating about letters, or about harp-playing, or about gymnastics? _Alk._--Neither of the three. _Sokr._--Upon what occasions, then, do you propose to give advice? Surely, not when the Athenians are debating about architecture, or prophetic warnings, or the public health: for to deliver opinions on each of these matters, belongs not to you but to professional men--architects, prophets, physicians; whether they be poor or rich, high-born or low-born? If not _then_, upon what other occasions will you tender your counsel? _Alk._--When they are debating about affairs of their own.

[Side-note: Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better refer? To just and unjust.]

_Sokr._--But about what affairs of their own? Not about affairs of shipbuilding: for of that you know nothing. _Alk._--When they are discussing war and peace, or any other business concerning the city. _Sokr._--You mean when they are discussing the question with whom they shall make war or peace, and in what manner? But it is certain that we must fight those whom it is best to fight--also _when_ it is best--and _as long as_ it is best. _Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--Now, if the Athenians wished to know whom it was best to wrestle with, and when or how long it was best which of the two would be most competent to advise them, you or the professional trainer? _Alk._--The trainer, undoubtedly. _Sokr._--So, too, about playing the harp or singing. But when you talk about _better_, in wrestling or singing, what standard do you refer to? Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art? _Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--Answer me in like manner about war or peace, the subjects on which you are going to advise your countrymen, whom, and at what periods, it is _better_ to fight, and _better_ not to fight? What in this last case do you mean by _better_? To what standard, or to what end, do you refer?[3] _Alk._--I cannot say. _Sokr._--But is it not a disgrace, since you profess to advise your countrymen when and against whom it is better for them to war,--not to be able to say to what end your _better_ refers? Do not you know what are the usual grounds and complaints urged when war is undertaken? _Alk._--Yes: complaints of having been cheated, or robbed, or injured. _Sokr._--Under what circumstances? _Alk._--You mean, whether justly or unjustly? That makes all the difference. _Sokr._--Do you mean to advise the Athenians to fight those who behave justly, or those who behave unjustly? _Alk._--The question is monstrous. Certainly not those who behave justly. It would be neither lawful nor honourable. _Sokr._--Then when you spoke about _better_, in reference to war or peace, what you meant was _juster_--you had in view justice and injustice? _Alk._--It seems so.

[Footnote 3: Plato, Alkib. i. 108 E--109 A. [Greek: i)/thi dê/, kai\ to\ en tô=| polemei=n be/ltion kai\ to\ en tô=| ei)rê/nên a)/gein, tou=to to\ be/ltion ti/ o)noma/zeis? ô(/sper e)kei= e)ph' e)ka/stô| e)/leges to\ a)/meinon, o(/ti mousikô/teron, kai\ e)pi\ tô=| e(terô|, o(/ti gumnastikô/teron; peirô= dê\ kai\ e)ntau=tha le/gein to\ be/ltion . . . . . pro\s ti/ teinei to\ e)n tô=| ei)rê/nên te a)/gein a)/meinon kai\ to\ e)n tô=| polemei=n oi(=s dei=?] _Alkib._ [Greek: A)lla\ skopô=n ou) du/namai e)nnoê=sai.]]

[Side-note: How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he always knew it, even as a boy.]

_Sokr._--How is this? How do you know, or where have you learnt, to distinguish just from unjust? Have you frequented some master, without my knowledge, to teach you this? If you have, pray introduce me to him, that I also may learn it from him. _Alk._--You are jesting. _Sokr._--Not at all: I love you too well to jest. _Alk._--But what if I had no master? Cannot I know about justice and injustice, without a master? _Sokr._--Certainly: you might find out for yourself, if you made search and investigated. But this you would not do, unless you were under the persuasion that you did not already know. _Alk._--Was there not a time when I really believed myself not to know it? _Sokr._--Perhaps there may have been: tell me _when_ that time was. Was it last year? _Alk._--No: last year I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--Well, then two years, three years, &c., ago? _Alk._--No: the case was the same then, also, I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--But before that, you were a mere boy; and during your boyhood you certainly believed yourself to know what was just and unjust; for I well recollect hearing you then complain confidently of other boys, for acting unjustly towards you. _Alk._--Certainly: I was not then ignorant on the point: I knew distinctly that they were acting unjustly towards me. _Sokr._--You knew, then, even in your boyhood, what was just and what was unjust? _Alk._--Certainly: I knew even then. _Sokr._--At what moment did you first find it out? Not when you already believed yourself to know: and what time was there when you did not believe yourself to know? _Alk._--Upon my word, I cannot say.

[Side-note: Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach just and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it. Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself.]

_Sokr._--Since, accordingly, you neither found it out for yourself, nor learnt it from others, how come you to know justice or injustice at all, or from what quarter? _Alk._--I was mistaken in saying that I had not learnt it. I learnt it, as others do, from the multitude.[4] _Sokr._--Your teachers are none of the best: no one can learn from them even such small matters as playing at draughts: much less, what is just and unjust. _Alk._--I learnt it from them as I learnt to speak Greek, in which, too, I never had any special teacher. _Sokr._--Of that the multitude are competent teachers, for they are all of one mind. Ask which is a tree or a stone,--a horse or a man,--you get the same answer from every one. But when you ask not simply which are _horses_, but also which horses are fit to run well in a race--when you ask not merely about which are _men_, but which men are healthy or unhealthy--are the multitude all of one mind, or all competent to answer? _Alk._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--When you see the multitude differing among themselves, that is a clear proof that they are not competent to teach others. _Alk._--It is so. _Sokr._--Now, about the question, What is just and unjust--are the multitude all of one mind, or do they differ among themselves? _Alk._--They differ prodigiously: they not only dispute, but quarrel and destroy each other, respecting justice and injustice, far more than about health and sickness.[5] _Sokr._ How, then, can we say that the multitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely dispute about it among themselves? _Alk._--I now perceive that we cannot say so. _Sokr._--How can we say, therefore, that they are fit to teach others: and how can you pretend to know, who have learnt from no other teachers? _Alk._--From what you say, it is impossible.

[Footnote 4: Plato, Alkib. i. 110 D-E. [Greek: e)/mathon, oi)=mai, kai\ e)gô\ ô(/sper kai\ oi( a)/lloi . . . . para\ tô=n pollô=n.]]

[Footnote 5: Plato, Alkib. i. 112 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de\ dê\? nu=n peri\ tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn a)nthrô/pôn kai\ pragma/tôn, oi( polloi\ dokou=si/ soi o(mologei=n au)toi\ e(autoi=s ê)\ a)llê/lois?] _Alkib._ [Greek: Ê(/kista, nê\ Di/', ô)= Sô/krates.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de/? ma/lista peri\ au)tô=n diaphe/resthai?] _Alkib._ [Greek: polu/ ge.]]

_Sokr._--No: not from what _I_ say, but from what _you_ say yourself. I merely ask questions: it is you who give all the answers.[6] And what you have said amounts to this--that Alkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust, but believes himself to know, and is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself?

[Footnote 6: Plato, Alkib. i. 112-113.]

[Side-note: Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to every one--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing but question.]

_Alk._--But, Sokrates, the Athenians do not often debate about what is just and unjust. They think that question self-evident; they debate generally about what is expedient or not expedient. Justice and expediency do not do not always coincide. Many persons commit great crimes, and are great gainers by doing so: others again behave justly, and suffer from it.[7] _Sokr_--Do you then profess to know what is expedient or inexpedient? From whom have you learnt--or when did you find out for yourself? I might ask you the same round of questions, and you would be compelled to answer in the same manner. But we will pass to a different point. You say that justice and expediency are not coincident. Persuade _me_ of this, by interrogating me as I interrogated you. _Alk._--That is beyond my power. _Sokr._--But when you rise to address the assembly, you will have to persuade _them_. If you can persuade them, you can persuade me. Assume _me_ to be the assembly, and practise upon me.[8] _Alk._--You are too hard upon me, Sokrates. It is for you to speak and prove the point. _Sokr_--No: I can only question: you must answer. You will be most surely persuaded when the point is determined by your own answers.[9]

[Footnote 7: Plato, Alkib. i. 113 D. [Greek: Oi)=mai me\n o)liga/kis A)thênai/ous bouleu/esthai po/tera dikaio/tera ê)\ a)dikôtera; ta\ me\n ga\r toiau=ta ê(gou=ntai dê=la ei)=nai], &c.]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 B-C. This same argument is addressed by Sokrates to Glaukon, in Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6, 14-15.]

[Footnote 9: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei) le/geis o(/ti tau=th' ou(/tôs e)/chei, ma/list' a)\n ei)/ês pepeisme/nos?]]

[Side-note: Comment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the respondent makes the discoveries for himself.]

Such is the commencing portion (abbreviated or abstracted) of Plato's First Alkibiadês. It exhibits a very characteristic specimen of the Sokratico-Platonic method: both in its negative and positive aspect. By the negative, false persuasion of knowledge is exposed. Alkibiades believes himself competent to advise about just and unjust, which he has neither learnt from any teacher nor investigated for himself--which he has picked up from the multitude, and supposes to be clear to every one, but about which nevertheless there is so much difference of appreciation among the multitude, that fierce and perpetual quarrels are going on. On the positive side, Sokrates restricts himself to the function of questioning: he neither affirms nor denies any thing. It is Alkibiades who affirms or denies every thing, and who makes all the discoveries for himself out of his own mind, instigated indeed, but not taught, by the questions of his companion.

[Side-note: Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both does well, and procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates.]

By a farther series of questions, Sokrates next brings Alkibiades to the admission that what is just, is also honourable, good, expedient--what is unjust, is dishonourable, evil, inexpedient: and that whoever acts justly, and honourably, thereby acquires happiness. Admitting, first, that an act which is good, honourable, just, expedient, &c., considered in one aspect or in reference to some of its conditions--may be at the same time bad, dishonourable, unjust, considered in another aspect or in reference to other conditions; Sokrates nevertheless brings his respondent to admit, that every act, _in so far as it is just and honourable_, is also good and expedient.[10] And he contends farther, that whoever acts honourably, does well: now every man who does well, becomes happy, or secures good things thereby: therefore the just, the honourable, and the good or expedient, coincide.[11] The argument, whereby this conclusion is here established, is pointed out by Heindorf, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, as not merely inconclusive, but as mere verbal equivocation and sophistry--the like of which, however, we find elsewhere in Plato.[12]

[Footnote 10: Plato, Alkib. i. 115 B--116 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n tê\n toiau/tên boêthei/an kalê\n me\n le/geis kata\ tê\n e)pichei/rêsin tou= sô=sai ou(=s e)/dei; tou=to d' e)sti\n a)ndri/a; . . . . kakê\n de/ ge kata\ tou\s thana/tous te kai\ ta\ e(/lkê. . . .

Ou)kou=n ô(=de di/kaion prosagoreu/ein e(ka/stên tô=n pra/xeôn; ei)/per ê)=| kako\n a)perga/zetai kakê\n kalei=s, kai\ ê)=| a)gatho\n a)gathê\n klête/on.

A)r' ou)=n kai\ ê)=| a)gatho\n kalo/n,--ê)=| de\ kako\n ai)schro/n? Nai/.]

Compare Plato, Republic, v. p. 479, where he maintains that in every particular case, what is just, honourable, virtuous, &c., is also unjust, dishonourable, vicious, &c. Nothing remains unchanged, nor excludes the contrary, except the pure, self-existent, Idea or general Concept.--[Greek: au)to\-dikaiosu/nê], &c.]

[Footnote 11: Plato, Alkib. i. 116 E.]

[Footnote 12: The words [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein--eu)pragi/a] have a double sense, like our "doing well". Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 175; Steinhart, Einl. p. 149.

We have, p. 116 B, the equivocation between [Greek: kalô=s pra/ttein] and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein], also with [Greek: kakô=s pra/ttein], p. 134 A, 135 A; compare Heindorf ad Platon. Charmid. p. 172 A, p. 174 B; also Platon. Gorgias, p. 507 C, where similar equivocal meanings occur.]

[Side-note: Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make himself as good as possible.]

Alkibiades is thus reduced to a state of humiliating embarrassment, and stands convicted, by his own contradictions and confession, of ignorance in its worst form: that is, of being ignorant, and yet believing himself to know.[13] But other Athenian statesmen are no wiser. Even Perikles is proved to be equally deficient--by the fact that he has never been able to teach or improve any one else, not even his own sons and those whom he loved best.[14] "At any rate" (contends Alkibiades) "I am as good as my competitors, and can hold my ground against them." But Sokrates reminds him that the real competitors with whom he ought to compare himself, are foreigners, liable to become the enemies of Athens, and against whom he, if he pretends to lead Athens, must be able to contend. In an harangue of unusual length, Sokrates shows that the kings of Sparta and Persia are of nobler breed, as well as more highly and carefully trained, than the Athenian statesmen.[15] Alkibiades must be rescued from his present ignorance, and exalted, so as to be capable of competing with these kings: which object cannot be attained except through the auxiliary interposition of Sokrates. Not that Sokrates professes to be himself already on this elevation, and to stand in need of no farther improvement. But he can, nevertheless, help others to attain it for themselves, through the discipline and stimulus of his interrogatories.[16]

[Footnote 13: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118.]

[Footnote 14: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-119.]

[Footnote 15: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 120-124.]

[Footnote 16: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124.]

[Side-note: But good--for what end, and under what circumstances? Abundant illustrative examples.]

The dialogue then continues. _Sokr._--We wish to become as good as possible. But in what sort of virtue? _Alk._--In that virtue which belongs to good men. _Sokr._--Yes, but _good_, in what matters? _Alk._--Evidently, to men who are good in transacting business. _Sokr._--Ay, but what kind of business? business relating to horses, or to navigation? If that be meant, we must go and consult horse-trainers or mariners? _Alk._--No, I mean such business as is transacted by the most esteemed leaders in Athens. _Sokr._--You mean the intelligent men. Every man is good, in reference to that which he understands: every man is bad, in reference to that which he does not understand. _Alk._--Of course. _Sokr._--The cobbler understands shoemaking, and is therefore good at _that_: he does not understand weaving, and is therefore bad at that. The same man thus, in your view, will be both good and bad?[17] _Alk._--No: that cannot be. _Sokr._--Whom then do you mean, when you talk of _the good_? _Alk._--I mean those who are competent to command in the city. _Sokr._--But to command whom or what--horses or men? _Alk._--To command men. _Sokr._--But what men, and under what circumstances? sick men, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in harvesting, or in what occupations? _Alk._--I mean, men living in social and commercial relation with each other, as we live here; men who live in common possession of the same laws and government. _Sokr._--When men are in communion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we name the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend? _Alk._--It is the art of the pilot; and the purpose towards which it tends, is, bringing them safely through the dangers of the sea. _Sokr._--When men are in social and political communion, to what purpose does the art of commanding them tend? _Alk._--Towards the better preservation and administration of the city.[18] _Sokr._--But what do you mean by _better_? What is that, the presence or absence of which makes _better_ or _worse_? If in regard to the management of the body, you put to me the same question, I should reply, that it is the presence of health, and the absence of disease. What reply will you make, in the case of the city? _Alk._--I should say, when friendship and unanimity among the citizens are present, and when discord and antipathy are absent. _Sokr._--This unanimity, of what nature is it? Respecting what subject? What is the art or science for realising it? If I ask you what brings about unanimity respecting numbers and measures, you will say the arithmetical and the metrêtic art. _Alk._--I mean that friendship and unanimity which prevails between near relatives, father and son, husband and wife. _Sokr._--But how can there be unanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of them knows, and the other does not know? For example, about spinning and weaving, which the husband does not know, or about military duties, which the wife does not know, how can there be unanimity between the two? _Alk._--No: there cannot be. _Sokr._--Nor friendship, if unanimity and friendship go together? _Alk._--Apparently there cannot. _Sokr._--Then when men and women each perform their own special duties, there can be no friendship between them. Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen performs his own special duties? or (which is the same thing) when each citizen acts justly? _Alk._--Not so: I think there may be friendship, when each person performs his or her own business. _Sokr._--Just now you said the reverse. What is this friendship or unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become good men?

[Footnote 17: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 125 B.

[Greek: O( au)to\s a)/ra tou/tô| ge tô=| lo/gô| kako/s te kai\ a)gatho/s.]

Plato slides unconsciously here, as in other parts of his reasonings, _à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter_.]

[Footnote 18: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 126 A. [Greek: ti/ de/? ê)\n su\ kalei=s eu)bouli/an, ei)s ti/ e)stin?] _Alk._ [Greek: Ei)s to\ a)/meinon tê\n po/lin dioikei=n kai\ sô/zesthai.] _Sokr._ [Greek: A)meinon de\ dioikei=tai kai\ sô/zetai ti/nos paragignome/nou ê)\ a)pogignomenou?]]

[Side-note: Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to make such discovery in youth.]

_Alk._--In truth, I am puzzled myself to say. I find myself in a state of disgraceful ignorance, of which I had no previous suspicion. _Sokr._--Do not be discouraged. If you had made this discovery when you were fifty years old, it would have been too late for taking care of yourself and applying a remedy: but at your age, it is the right time for making the discovery. _Alk._--What am I to do, now that I have made it? _Sokr._--You must answer my questions. If my auguries are just, we shall soon be both of us better for the process.[19]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Alkib. i. 127 D-E. _Alk._ [Greek: A)lla\ ma\ tou\s theou/s, ou)d' au)to\s oi)=da o(/ ti le/gô, kinduneu/ô de\ kai\ pa/lai lelêthe/nai e)mauto\n ai)/schist' e)/chôn.]

_Sokr._ [Greek: A)lla\ chrê\ thar)r(ei=n; ei) me\n ga\r au)to\ ê)=|sthou peponthô\s pentêkontae/tês, chalepo\n a)\n ê)=n soi e)pimelêthê=nai sautou=; nu=n de\ ê)\n e)/cheis ê(liki/an, au)/tê e)sti/n, e)n ê(=| dei= au)to\ ai)sthe/sthai.]

_Alk._ [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n to\n ai(stho/menon chrê\ poiei=n?]

_Sokr._ [Greek: _A)pokri/nesthai ta\ e)rôtô/mena_, kai\ e)a\n tou=to poiê=|s, a)\n theo\s e)the/lê|, ei)/ ti dei= kai\ tê=| e)mê=| mantei/a| pisteu/ein, su/ te ka)gô\ beltio/nôs schê/somen.]]

[Side-note: Platonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its anticipated effect--applicable to the season of youth.]

Here we have again, brought into prominent relief, the dialectic method of Plato, under two distinct aspects: 1. Its actual effects, in exposing the false supposition of knowledge, in forcing upon the respondent the humiliating conviction, that he does not know familiar topics which he supposed to be clear both to himself and to others. 2. Its anticipated effects, if continued, in remedying such defect: and in generating out of the mind of the respondent, real and living knowledge. Lastly, it is plainly intimated that this shock of humiliation and mistrust, painful but inevitable, must be undergone in youth.

[Side-note: Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent importance--What is myself? My mind is myself.]

The dialogue continues, in short questions and answers, of which the following is an abstract. _Sokr._--What is meant by a man _taking care of himself_? Before I can take care of myself, I must know what myself is: I must _know myself_, according to the Delphian motto. I cannot make myself better, without knowing what _myself_ is.[20] That which belongs to me is not _myself_: my body is not myself, but an instrument governed by myself.[21] My mind or soul only, is myself. To take care of myself is, to take care of my mind. At any rate, if this be not strictly true,[22] my mind is the most important and dominant element within me. The physician who knows his own body, does not for that reason know himself: much less do the husbandman or the tradesman, who know their own properties or crafts, know themselves, or perform what is truly their own business.

[Footnote 20: Plato, Alkib. i. 129 B. [Greek: ti/n' a)\n tro/pon eu(rethei/ê _au)to\ to\ au)to/_?]]

[Footnote 21: Plato, Alkib. i. 128-130. All this is greatly expanded in the dialogue--p. 128 D: [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra o)/tan tô=n sautou= e)pimelê=|, sautou= e)pime/lei?] This same antithesis is employed by Isokrates, De Permutatione, sect. 309, p. 492, Bekker. He recommends [Greek: au)tou= pro/teron ê)\ tô=n au)tou= poiei=sthai tê\n e)pime/leian].]

[Footnote 22: Plato considers this point to be not clearly made out. Alkib. i. 130.]

[Side-note: I cannot know myself, except by looking into another mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom.]

Since temperance consists in self-knowledge, neither of these professional men, as such, is temperate: their professions are of a vulgar cast, and do not belong to the virtuous life.[23] How are we to know our own minds? We know it by looking into another mind, and into the most rational and divine portion thereof: just as the eye can only know itself by looking into another eye, and seeing itself therein reflected.[24] It is only in this way that we can come to know ourselves, or become temperate: and if we do not know ourselves, we cannot even know what belongs to ourselves, or what belongs to others: all these are branches of one and the same cognition. We can have no knowledge of affairs, either public or private: we shall go wrong, and shall be unable to secure happiness either for ourselves or for others. It is not wealth or power which are the conditions of happiness, but justice and temperance. Both for ourselves individually, and for the public collectively, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth and power. The evil and unjust man ought to have no power, but to be the slave of those who are better than himself.[25] He is fit for nothing but to be a slave: none deserve freedom except the virtuous.

[Footnote 23: Plato, Alkib. i. 131 B.]

[Footnote 24: Plato, Alkib. i. 133.]

[Footnote 25: Plato, Alkib. i. 134-135 B-C.

[Greek: Pri\n de/ ge a)retê\n e)/chein, to\ a)/rchesthai a)/meinon u(po\ tou= belti/onos ê)\ to\ a)/rchein a)ndri\, ou) mo/non paidi/ . . . . Pre/pei a)/ra tô=| kakô=| douleu/ein; a)/meinon ga/r.]]

[Side-note: Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares that he will never quit Sokrates.]

_Sokr._--How do you feel your own condition now, Alkibiades. Are you worthy of freedom? _Alk._--I feel but too keenly that I am not. I cannot emerge from this degradation except by your society and help. From this time forward I shall never leave you.[26]

[Footnote 26: Plato, Alkib. i. 135.]

ALKIBIADES II.

[Side-note: Second Alkibiades--situation supposed.]

The other Platonic dialogue, termed the Second Alkibiades, introduces Alkibiades as about to offer prayer and sacrifice to the Gods.

[Side-note: Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic word: madmen, a particular variety under it.]

_Sokr._--You seem absorbed in thought, Alkibiades, and not unreasonably. In supplicating the Gods, caution is required not to pray for gifts which are really mischievous. The Gods sometimes grant men's prayers, even when ruinously destructive; as they granted the prayers of Oedipus, to the destruction of his own sons. _Alk._--Oedipus was mad: what man in his senses would put up such a prayer? _Sokr._--You think that madness is the opposite of good sense or wisdom. You recognise men wise and unwise: and you farther admit that every man must be one or other of the two,--just as every man must be either healthy or sick: there is no third alternative possible? _Alk._--I think so. _Sokr._--But each thing can have but one opposite:[27] to be unwise, and to be mad, are therefore identical? _Alk._--They are. _Sokr._--Wise men are only few, the majority of our citizens are unwise: but do you really think them mad? How could any of us live safely in the society of so many mad-men? _Alk._--No: it cannot be so: I was mistaken. _Sokr._--Here is the illustration of your mistake. All men who have gout, or fever, or ophthalmia are sick; but all sick men have not gout, or fever, or ophthalmia. So, too, all carpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors, are craftsmen; but all craftsmen are not carpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors. In like manner, all mad men are unwise; but all unwise men are not mad. _Unwise_ comprises many varieties and gradations of which the extreme is, being mad: but these varieties are different among themselves, as one disease differs from another, though all agree in being disease and one art differs from another, though all agree in being art.[28]

[Footnote 27: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139 B.

[Greek: Kai\ mê\n du/o ge u(penanti/a e(ni\ pra/gmati pô=s a)\n ei)/ê?]

That each thing has one opposite, and no more, is asserted in the Protagoras also, p. 192-193.]

[Footnote 28: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139-140 A-B.

[Greek: Kai\ ga\r oi( pure/ttontes pa/ntes nosou=sin, ou) me/nntoioi( nosou=ntes pa/ntes pure/ttousin ou)de\ podagrô=sin ou)de/ ge o)phthalmiô=sin; a)lla\ no/sos me\n pa=n to\ toiou=to/n e)sti, diaphe/rein de/ phasin ou(\s dê\ kalou=men i)atros tê\n a)pergasi/an au)tô=n; ou) ga\r pa=sai ou)/te o(/moiai ou)/te o(moi/ôs diapra/ttontai, a)lla\ kata\ tê\n au)tê=s du/namin e(ka/stê.]]

[Side-note: Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar.]

(We may remark that Plato here, as in the Euthyphron, brings under especial notice one of the most important distinctions in formal logic--that between a generic between a term and the various specific terms comprehended under it. Possessing as yet no technical language for characterising this distinction, he makes it understood by an induction of several separate but analogous cases. Because the distinction is familiar now to instructed men, we must not suppose that it was familiar then.)

[Side-note: Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance.]

_Sokr._--Whom do you call wise and unwise? Is not the wise man, he who knows what it is proper to say and do--and the unwise man, he who does not know? _Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--The unwise man will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or done? Though not mad like Oedipus, he will nevertheless pray to the Gods for gifts, which will be hurtful to him if obtained. You, for example, would be overjoyed if the Gods were to promise that you should become despot not only over Athens, but also over Greece. _Alk._--Doubtless I should: and every one else would feel as I do. _Sokr._--But what if you were to purchase it with your life, or to damage yourself by the employment of it? _Alk._--Not on those conditions.[29] _Sokr._--But you are aware that many ambitious aspirants, both at Athens and elsewhere (among them, the man who just now killed the Macedonian King Archelaus, and usurped his throne), have acquired power and aggrandisement, so as to be envied by every one: yet have presently found themselves brought to ruin and death by the acquisition. So, also, many persons pray that they may become fathers; but discover presently that their children are the source of so much grief to them, that they wish themselves again childless. Nevertheless, though such reverses are perpetually happening, every one is still not only eager to obtain these supposed benefits, but importunate with the Gods in asking for them. You see that it is not safe even to accept without reflection boons offered to you, much less to pray for boons to be conferred.[30] _Alk._--I see now how much mischief ignorance produces. Every one thinks himself competent to pray for what is beneficial to himself; but ignorance makes him unconsciously imprecate mischief on his own head.

[Footnote 29: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141.]

[Footnote 30: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141-142.]

[Side-note: Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must discriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always.]

_Sokr._--You ought not to denounce ignorance in this unqualified manner. You must distinguish and specify. Ignorance of what? and under what modifications of persons and circumstances? _Alk._--How? Are there _any_ matters or circumstances in which it is better for a man to be ignorant, than to know? _Sokr._--You will see that there are such. Ignorance of good, or ignorance of what is best, is always mischievous: moreover, assuming that a man knows what is best, then all other knowledge will be profitable to him. In his special case, ignorance on any subject cannot be otherwise than hurtful. But if a man be ignorant things of good, or of what is best, in his case knowledge on other subjects will be more often hurtful than profitable. To a man like Orestes, so misguided on the question, "What is good?" as to resolve to kill his mother, it would be a real benefit, if for the time he did not know his mother. Ignorance on that point, in his state of mind, would be better for him than knowledge.[31] _Alk._--It appears so.

[Footnote 31: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 144.]

[Side-note: Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used.]

_Sokr._--Follow the argument farther. When we come forward to say or do any thing, we either know what we are about to say and do, or at least believe ourselves to know it. Every statesman who gives counsel to the public, does so in the faith of such knowledge. Most citizens are unwise, and ignorant of good as well as of other things. The wise are but few, and by their advice the city is conducted. Now upon what ground do we call these few, wise and useful public counsellors? If a statesman knows war, but does not know whether it is best to go to war, or at what juncture it is best--should we call him wise? If he knows how to kill men, or dispossess them, or drive them into exile,--but does not know upon whom, or on what occasions, it is good to inflict this treatment--is he a useful counsellor? If he can ride, or shoot, or wrestle, well,--we give him an epithet derived from this special accomplishment: we do not call him wise. What would be the condition of a community composed of bowmen, horsemen, wrestlers, rhetors, &c., accomplished and excellent each in his own particular craft, yet none of them knowing what is good, nor when, nor on what occasions, it is good to employ their craft? When each man pushes forward his own art and speciality, without any knowledge whether it is good on the whole either for himself or for the city, will not affairs thus conducted be reckless and disastrous?[32] _Alk._--They will be very bad indeed.

[Footnote 32: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145.]

[Side-note: Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial.]

_Sokr._--If, then, a man has no knowledge of good or of the better--if upon this cardinal point he obeys fancy without reason--the possession of knowledge upon special subjects will be oftener hurtful than profitable to him; because it will make him more forward in action, without any good result. Possessing many arts and accomplishments, and prosecuting one after another, but without the knowledge of good,--he will only fall into greater trouble, like a ship sailing without a pilot. Knowledge of good is, in other words, knowledge of what is useful and profitable. In conjunction with this, all other knowledge is valuable, and goes to increase a man's competence as a counsellor: apart from this, all other knowledge will not render a man competent as a counsellor, but will be more frequently hurtful than beneficial.[33] Towards right living, what we need is, the knowledge of good: just as the sick stand in need of a physician, and the ship's crew of a pilot. _Alk._--I admit your reasoning. My opinion is changed. I no longer believe myself competent to determine what I ought to accept from the Gods, or what I ought to pray for. I incur serious danger of erring, and of asking for mischiefs, under the belief that they are benefits.

[Footnote 33: Plato, Alkib. ii. 145 C:

[Greek: O(/stis a)/ra ti tô=n toiou/tôn oi)=den, e)a\n me\n pare/pêtai au)tô=| ê( _tou= belti/stou e)pistê/mê--au(/tê d' ê)=n ê( au)tê\ dê/pou ê(/per kai\ ê( tou= ô)pheli/mou_--phro/nimo/n ge au)to\n phê/somen kai\ a)pochrô=nta xu/mboulou kai\ tê=| po/lei kai\ au)to\n au(tô=|; to\n de\ mê\ toiou=ton, ta)nanti/a tou/tôn.] ([Greek: Touou=ton] is Schneider's emendation for [Greek: poiou=nta].) Ibid. 146 C: [Greek: Ou)kou=n phame\n pa/lin tou\s pollou\s diêmartêke/nai tou= belti/stou, ô(s ta\ polla/ ge, oi)=mai, a)/neu nou= do/xê| pepisteuko/tas?] Ibid. 146 E: [Greek: O(ra=|s ou)=n, o(/te g' e)/phên kinduneu/ein to/ ge tô=n a)/llôn e)pistêmô=n ktê=ma, e)a/n tis a)/neu tê=s tou= belti/stou e)pistê/mês kektême/nos ê)=|, o)liga/kis me\n ô)phelei=n bla/ptein de\ ta\ plei/ô ton e)/chont' au)to/.] Ibid. 147 A: [Greek: O( de\ dê\ tê\n kaloume/nên poluma/theia/n te kai\ polutechni/an kektême/nos, o)rphano\s de\ ô)\n tau/tês tê=s e)pistê/mês, a)go/menos de\ u(po\ mia=s e(ka/stês tô=n a)/llôn, a)=r' ou)chi\ tô=| o)/nti dikai/ôs pollô=| cheimô=ni chrê/setai, a(/t', oi)=mai, a)/neu kubernê/tou diatelô=n e)n pela/gei], &c.]

[Side-note: It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel of Sokrates.]

_Sokr._--The Lacedæmonians, when they offer sacrifice, pray simply that they may obtain what is honourable and good, without farther specification. This language is acceptable to the Gods, more acceptable than the costly festivals of Athens. It has procured for the Spartans more continued prosperity than the Athenians have enjoyed.[34] The Gods honour wise and just men, that is, men who know what they ought to say and do both towards Gods and towards men--more than numerous and splendid offerings.[35] You see, therefore, that it is not safe for you to proceed with your sacrifice, until you have learnt what is the proper language to be used, and what are the really good gifts to be prayed for. Otherwise your sacrifice will not prove acceptable, and you may even bring upon yourself positive mischief.[36] _Alk._--When shall I be able to learn this, and who is there to teach me? I shall be delighted to meet him. _Sokr._--There is a person at hand most anxious for your improvement. What he must do is, first to disperse the darkness from your mind, next, to impart that which will teach you to discriminate evil from good, which at present you are unable to do. _Alk._--I shall shrink from no labour to accomplish this object. Until then, I postpone my intended sacrifice: and I tender my sacrificial wreath to you, in gratitude for your counsel.[37] _Sokr._--I accept the wreath as a welcome augury of future friendship and conversation between us, to help us out of the present embarrassment.

[Footnote 34: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 148.]

[Footnote 35: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.]

[Footnote 36: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.]

[Footnote 37: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 151.]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues.]

The two dialogues, called First and Second Alkibiadês, of which I have just given some account, resemble each other more than most of the Platonic dialogues, not merely in the personages introduced, but in general spirit, in subject, and even in illustrations. The First Alkibiadês was recognised as authentic by all critics without exception, until the days of Schleiermacher. Nay, it was not only recognised, but extolled as one of the most valuable and important of all the Platonic compositions; proper to be studied first, as a key to all the rest. Such was the view of Jamblichus and Proklus, transmitted to modern times; until it received a harsh contradiction from Schleiermacher, who declared the dialogue to be both worthless and spurious. The Second Alkibiadês was also admitted both by Thrasyllus, and by the general body of critics in ancient times: but there were some persons (as we learn from Athenæus)[38] who considered it to be a work of Xenophon; perceiving probably (what is the fact) that it bears much analogy to several conversations which Xenophon has set down. But those who held this opinion are not to be considered as of one mind with critics who reject the dialogue as a forgery or imitation of Plato. Compositions emanating from Xenophon are just as much Sokratic, probably even more Sokratic, than the most unquestioned Platonic dialogues, besides that they must of necessity be contemporary also. Schleiermacher has gone much farther: declaring the Second as well as the First to be an unworthy imitation of Plato.[39]

[Footnote 38: Athenæus, xi. p. 506.]

[Footnote 39: See the Einleitung of Schleiermacher to Alkib. i. part ii. vol. iii. p. 293 seq. Einleitung to Alkib. ii. part i. vol. ii. p. 365 seq. His notes on the two dialogues contain various additional reasons, besides what is urged in his Introduction.]

[Side-note: Grounds for disallowing them--less strong against the Second than against the First.]

Here Ast agrees with Schleiermacher fully, including both the First and Second Alkibiades in his large list of the spurious. Most of the subsequent critics go with Schleiermacher only half-way: Socher, Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, recognise the First Alkibiadês, but disallow the Second.[40] In my judgment, Schleiermacher and Ast are more consistently right, or more consistently wrong, in rejecting both, than the other critics who find or make so capital a distinction between the two. The similarity of tone and topics between the two is obvious, and is indeed admitted by all. Moreover, if I were compelled to make a choice, I should say that the grounds for suspicion are rather less strong against the Second than against the First; and that Schleiermacher, reasoning upon the objections admitted by his opponents as conclusive against the Second, would have no difficulty in showing that his own objections against the First were still more forcible. The long speech assigned in the First Alkibiadês to Sokrates, about the privileges of the Spartan and Persian kings,[41] including the mention of Zoroaster, son of Oromazes, and the Magian religion, appears to me more unusual with Plato than anything which I find in the Second Alkibiadês. It is more Xenophontic[42] than Platonic.

[Footnote 40: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 112. Stallbaum, Prolegg. to Alkib. i. and ii. vol. v. pp. 171-304. K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos. p. 420-439. Steinhart, Einleitungen to Alkib. i. and ii. in Hieronymus Müller's Uebersetzung des Platon's Werke, vol. i. pp. 135-509.]

[Footnote 41: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 121-124.

Whoever reads the objections in Steinhart's Einleitung (p. 148-150) against the First Alkibiadês, will see that they are quite as forcible as what he urges against the Second; only, that in the case of the First, he gives these objections their legitimate bearing, allowing them to tell against the merit of the dialogue, but not against its authenticity.]

[Footnote 42: See Xenoph. Oekonom. c. 4; Cyropæd. vii. 5, 58-64, viii. 1, 5-8-45; Laced. Repub. c. 15.]

[Side-note: The supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only marks of inferiority.]

But I must here repeat, that because I find, in this or any other dialogue, some peculiarities not usual with Plato, I do not feel warranted thereby in declaring the dialogue spurious. In my judgment, we must look for a large measure of diversity in the various dialogues; and I think it an injudicious novelty, introduced by Schleiermacher, to set up a canonical type of Platonism, all deviations from which are to be rejected as forgeries. Both the First and the Second Alkibiadês appear to me genuine, even upon the showing of those very critics who disallow them. Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, all admit that there is in both the dialogues a considerable proportion of Sokratic and Platonic ideas: but they maintain that there are also other ideas which are not Sokratic or Platonic, and that the texture, style, and prolixity of the Second Alkibiadês (Schleiermacher maintains this about the First also) are unworthy of Plato. But if we grant these premisses, the reasonable inference would be, not to disallow it altogether, but to admit it as a work by Plato, of inferior merit; perhaps of earlier days, before his powers of composition had attained their maturity. To presume that because Plato composed many excellent dialogues, therefore all that he composed must have been excellent, is a pretension formally disclaimed by many critics, and asserted by none.[42] Steinhart himself allows that the Second Alkibiadês, though not composed by Plato, is the work of some other author contemporary, an untrained Sokratic disciple attempting to imitate Plato.[44] But we do not know that there were any contemporaries who tried to imitate Plato: though Theopompus accused him of imitating others, and called most of his dialogues useless as well as false: while Plato himself, in his inferior works, will naturally appear like an imitator of his better self.

[Footnote 43: Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 186) makes this general statement very justly, but he as well as other critics are apt to forget it in particular cases.]

[Footnote 44: Steinhart, Einleitung, p. 516-519. Stallbaum and Boeckh indeed assign the dialogue to a later period. Heindorf (ad Lysin, p. 211) thinks it the work "antiqui auctoris, sed non Platonis".

Steinhart and others who disallow the authenticity of the Second Alkibiadês insist much (p. 518) upon the enormity of the chronological blunder, whereby Sokrates and Alkibiadês are introduced as talking about the death of Archelaus king of Macedonia, who was killed in 399 B.C., in the same year as Sokrates, and four years after Alkibiades. Such an anachronism (Steinhart urges) Plato could never allow himself to commit. But when we read the Symposion, we find Aristophanes in a company of which Sokrates, Alkibiades, and Agathon form a part, alluding to the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of Mantineia, which took place in 386 B.C. No one has ever made this glaring anachronism a ground for disallowing the Symposion. Steinhart says that the style of the Second Alkibiadês copies Plato too closely (die ängstlich platonisirende Sprache des Dialogs, p. 515), yet he agrees with Stallbaum that in several places it departs too widely from Plato.]

[Side-note: The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's earlier compositions.]

I agree with Schleiermacher and the other recent critics in considering the First and Second Alkibiadês to be inferior in merit to Plato's best dialogues; and I contend that their own premisses justify no more. They may probably be among his earlier productions, though I do not believe that the First Alkibiadês was composed during the lifetime of Sokrates, as Socher, Steinhart, and Stallbaum endeavour to show.[45] I have already given my reasons, in a previous chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of Sokrates; still less in that of Alkibiadês, who died four years earlier. There is certainly nothing in either Alkibiadês I. or II. to shake this belief.

[Footnote 45: Stallbaum refers the composition of Alkib. i. to a time not long before the accusation of Sokrates, when the enemies of Sokrates were calumniating him in consequence of his past intimacy with Alkibiades (who had before that time been killed in 404 B.C.) and when Plato was anxious to defend his master (Prolegg. p. 186). Socher and Steinhart (p. 210) remark that such writings would do little good to Sokrates under his accusation. They place the composition of the dialogue earlier, in 406 B.C. (Steinhart, p. 151-152), and they consider it the first exercise of Plato in the strict dialectic method. Both Steinhart and Hermann (Gesch. Plat. Phil. p. 440) think that the dialogue has not only a speculative but a political purpose; to warn and amend Alkibiades, and to prevent him from surrendering himself blindly to the democracy.

I cannot admit the hypothesis that the dialogue was written in 406 B.C. (when Plato was twenty-one years of age, at most twenty-two), nor that it had any intended bearing upon the real historical Alkibiades, who left Athens in 415 B.C. at the head of the armament against Syracuse, was banished three months afterwards, and never came back to Athens until May 407 B.C. (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 13; i. 5, 17). He then enjoyed four months of great ascendancy at Athens, left it at the head of the fleet to Asia in Oct. 407 B.C., remained in command of the fleet for about three months or so, then fell into disgrace and retired to Chersonese, never revisiting Athens. In 406 B.C. Alkibiades was again in banishment, out of the reach of all such warnings as Hermann and Steinhart suppose that Plato intended to address to him in Alkib. i.

Steinhart says (p. 152), "In dieser Zeit also, _wenige Jahre nach seiner triumphirenden Rückkehr_, wo Alkibiades," &c. Now Alkibiades left the Athenian service, irrevocably, within less _than one year_ after his triumphant return.

Steinhart has not realised in his mind the historical and chronological conditions of the period.]

[Side-note: Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men.]

If we compare various colloquies of Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, we shall find Alkibiadês I. and II. very analogous to them both in purpose and spirit. In Alkibiadês I. the situation conceived is the same as that of Sokrates and Glaukon, in the third book of the Memorabilia. Xenophon recounts how the presumptuous Glaukon, hardly twenty years of age, fancied himself already fit to play a conspicuous part in public affairs, and tried to force himself, in spite of rebuffs and humiliations, upon the notice of the assembly.[46] No remonstrances of friends could deter him, nor could anything, except the ingenious dialectic of Sokrates, convince him of his own impertinent forwardness and exaggerated self-estimation. Probably Plato (Glaukon's elder brother) had heard of this conversation, but whether the fact be so or not, we see the same situation idealised by him in Alkibiadês I., and worked out in a way of his own. Again, we find in the Xenophontic Memorabilia another colloquy, wherein Sokrates cross-questions, perplexes, and humiliates, the studious youth Euthydemus,[47] whom he regards as over-confident in his persuasions and too well satisfied with himself. It was among the specialties of Sokrates to humiliate confident young men, with a view to their future improvement. He made his conversation "an instrument of chastisement," in the language of Xenophon: or (to use a phrase of Plato himself in the Lysis) he conceived. "that the proper way of talking to youth whom you love, was, not to exalt and puff them up, but to subdue and humiliate them".[48]

[Footnote 46: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6.]

[Footnote 47: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2.]