Chapter XIV: Hipparchus--Minos

In these two dialogues, Plato sets before us two farther specimens of that error and confusion which beset the enquirer during his search after "reasoned truth". Sokrates forces upon the attention of a companion two of the most familiar words of the market-place, to see whether a clear explanation of their meaning can be obtained.

[Side-note: Hipparchus--Question--What is the definition of Lover of Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in this sense, no man is a lover of gain.]

In the dialogue called Hipparchus, the debate turns on the definition of [Greek: to\ philokerde\s] or [Greek: o( philokerdê/s]--the love of gain or the lover of gain. Sokrates asks his Companion to define the word. The Companion replies--He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing.[1] Does he do this (asks Sokrates) knowing that the things are worth nothing? or not knowing? If the latter, he is simply ignorant. He knows it perfectly well (is the reply). He is cunning and wicked; and it is because he cannot resist the temptation of gain, that he has the impudence to make profit by such things, though well aware that they are worth nothing. _Sokr._--Suppose a husbandman, knowing that the plant which he is tending is worthless--and yet thinking that he ought to gain by it: does not that correspond to your description of the lover of gain? _Comp._--The lover of gain, Sokrates, thinks that he ought to gain from every thing. _Sokr._--Do not answer in that reckless manner,[2] as if you had been wronged by any one; but answer with attention. You agree that the lover of gain knows the value of that from which he intends to derive profit; and that the husbandman is the person cognizant of the value of plants. _Comp._--Yes: I agree. _Sokr._--Do not therefore attempt, you are so young, to deceive an old man like me, by giving answers not in conformity with your own admissions; but tell me plainly, Do you believe that the experienced husbandman, when he knows that he is planting a tree worth nothing, thinks that he shall gain by it? _Comp._--No, certainly: I do not believe it.

[Footnote 1: Plato, Hipparch. 225 A. [Greek: oi(\ a)\n kerdai/nein a)xiô=sin a)po\ tô=n mêdeno\s a)xi/ôn.]]

[Footnote 2: Plato, Hipparch. 225 C.]

Sokrates then proceeds to multiply illustrations to the same general point. The good horseman does not expect to gain by worthless food given to his horse: the good pilot, by worthless tackle put into his ship: the good commander, by worthless arms delivered to his soldiers: the good fifer, harper, bowman, by employing worthless instruments of their respective arts, if they know them to be worthless.

[Side-note: Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all men are lovers of gain.]

None of these persons (concludes Sokrates) correspond to your description of the lover of gain. Where then can you find a lover of gain? On your explanation, no man is so.[3] _Comp._--I mean, Sokrates, that the lovers of gain are those, who, through greediness, long eagerly for things altogether petty and worthless; and thus display a love of gain.[4] _Sokr._--Not surely knowing them to be worthless--for this we have shown to be impossible--but ignorant that they are worthless, and believing them to be valuable. _Comp._--It appears so. _Sokr._--Now gain is the opposite of loss: and loss is evil and hurt to every one: therefore gain (as the opposite of loss) is good. _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--It appears then that the lovers of good are those whom you call lovers of gain? _Comp._--Yes: it appears so. _Sokr._--Do not you yourself love good--all good things? _Comp._--Certainly. _Sokr._--And I too, and every one else. All men love good things, and hate evil. Now we agreed that gain was a good: so that by this reasoning, it appears that all men are lovers of gain while by the former reasoning, we made out that none were so.[5] Which of the two shall we adopt, to avoid error. _Comp._--We shall commit no error, Sokrates, if we rightly conceive the lover of gain. He is one who busies himself upon, and seeks to gain from, things from which good men do not venture to gain.

[Footnote 3: Plat. Hipparch. 226 D.]

[Footnote 4: Plat. Hipparch. 226 D. [Greek: A)ll' e)gô\, ô)= Sô/krates, bou/lomai le/gein tou/tous philokerdei=s ei)=nai, oi(\ e(ka/stote u(po\ a)plêsti/as kai\ panu\ smikra\ kai\ o)li/gou a)/xia kai\ ou)deno\s gli/chontai u(perphuô=s kai\ philokerdou=sin.]]

[Footnote 5: Plat. Hipparch. 227 C.]

[Side-note: Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of trying to deceive him. Accusation is retorted upon Sokrates.]

_Sokr._--But, my friend, we agreed just now, that gain was a good, and that all men always love good. It follows therefore, that good men as well as others love all gains, if gains are good things. _Comp._--Not, certainly, those gains by which they will afterwards be hurt. _Sokr._--Be hurt: you mean, by which they will become losers. _Comp._--I mean that and nothing else. _Sokr._--Do they become losers by gain, or by loss? _Comp._--By both: by loss, and by evil gain. _Sokr._--Does it appear to you that any useful and good thing is evil? _Comp._--No. _Sokr._--Well! we agreed just now that gain was the opposite of loss, which was evil; and that, being the opposite of evil, gain was good. _Comp._--That was what we agreed. _Sokr._--You see how it is: you are trying to deceive me: you purposely contradict what we just now agreed upon. _Comp._--Not at all, by Zeus: on the contrary, it is you, Sokrates, who deceive me, wriggling up and down in your talk, I cannot tell how.[6] _Sokr._--Be careful what you say: I should be very culpable, if I disobeyed a good and wise monitor. _Comp._--Whom do you mean: and what do you mean? _Sokr._--Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus.

[Footnote 6: Plat. Hipparch. 228 A. _Sokr._--[Greek: O(ra=|s ou)=n? e)picheirei=s me e)xapata=|n, e)pi/têdes e)nanti/a le/gôn oi(=s a)/rti ô(mologê/samen.] _Comp._ [Greek: Ou) ma\ Di/', ô)= Sô/krates; a)lla\ tou)nanti/on su\ e)me\ e)xapata=|s, kai\ ou)k oi)=da o(pê=| e)n toi=s lo/gois a)/nô kai\ ka/tô stre/pheis.]]

[Side-note: Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the Peisistratid--"Never deceive a friend". Eulogy of Hipparchus by Sokrates.]

Sokrates then describes at some length the excellent character of Hipparchus: his beneficent rule, his wisdom, his anxiety for the moral improvement of the Athenians: the causes, different from what was commonly believed, which led to his death; and the wholesome precepts which he during his life had caused to be inscribed on various busts of Hermes throughout Attica. One of these busts or Hermæ bore the words--Do not deceive a friend.[7]

[Footnote 7: Plat. Hipparch. 228 B-229 D.

The picture here given of Hipparchus deserves notice. We are informed that he was older than his brother Hippias, which was the general belief at Athens, as Thucydides (i. 20, vi. 58) affirms, though himself contradicting it, and affirming that Hippias was the elder brother. Plato however agrees with Thucydides in this point, that the three years after the assassination of Hipparchus, during which Hippias ruled alone, were years of oppression and tyranny; and that the hateful recollection of the Peisistratidæ, which always survived in the minds of the Athenians, was derived from these three last years.

The picture which Plato here gives of Hipparchus is such as we might expect from a philosopher. He dwells upon the pains which Hipparchus took to have the recitation of the Homeric poems made frequent and complete: also upon his intimacy with the poets Anakreon and Simonides. The colouring which Plato gives to the intimacy between Aristogeiton and Harmodius is also peculiar. The [Greek: e)rastê\s] is represented by Plato as eager for the education and improvement of the [Greek: e)rô/menos]; and the jealousy felt towards Hipparchus is described as arising from the distinguished knowledge and abilities of Hipparchus, which rendered him so much superior and more effective as an educator.]

The Companion resumes: Apparently, Sokrates, either you do not account me your friend, or you do not obey Hipparchus: for you are certainly deceiving me in some unaccountable way in your talk. You cannot persuade me to the contrary.

[Side-note: Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers. The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain is evil.]

_Sokr._--Well then! in order that you may not think yourself deceived, you may take back any move that you choose, as if we were playing at draughts. Which of your admissions do you wish to retract--That all men desire good things? That loss (to be a loser) is evil? That gain is the opposite of loss: that to gain is the opposite of to lose? That to gain, as being the opposite of evil is a good thing? _Comp._--No. I do not retract any one of these. _Sokr._--You think then, it appears, that some gain is good, other gain evil? _Comp._--Yes, that is what I do think.[8] _Sokr._--Well, I give you back that move: let it stand as you say. Some gain is good: other gain is bad. But surely the good gain is no more _gain_, than the bad gain: both are _gain_, alike and equally. _Comp._--How do you mean?

[Footnote 8: Plat. Hipparch. 229 E, 230 A.]

[Side-note: Questions by Sokrates--bad gain is _gain_, as much as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a smaller outlay, is gain. Objections--the acquisition may be evil--embarrassment confessed.]

Sokrates then illustrates his question by two or three analogies. Bad food is just as much _food_, as good food: bad drink, as much _drink_ as good drink: a good man is no more _man_ than a bad man.[9]

[Footnote 9: Plat. Hipparch. 230 C.]

_Sokr._--In like manner, bad gain, and good gain, are (both of them) _gain_ alike--neither of them more or less than the other. Such being the case, what is that common quality possessed by both, which induces you to call them by the same name _Gain_?[10] Would you call _Gain_ any acquisition which one makes either with a smaller outlay or with no outlay at all?[11] _Comp._--Yes. I should call that gain. _Sokr._--For example, if after being at a banquet, not only without any outlay, but receiving an excellent dinner, you acquire an illness? _Comp._--Not at all: that is no gain. _Sokr._--But if from the banquet you acquire health, would that be gain or loss? _Comp._--It would be gain. _Sokr._--Not every acquisition therefore is gain, but only such acquisitions as are good and not evil: if the acquisition be evil, it is loss. _Comp._--Exactly so. _Sokr._--Well, now, you see, you are come round again to the very same point: Gain is good. Loss is evil. _Comp._--I am puzzled what to say.[12] _Sokr._--You have good reason to be puzzled.

[Footnote 10: Plat. Hipparch. 230 E. [Greek: dia\ ti/ pote a)mpho/tera au)ta\ ke/rdos kalei=s? ti/ tau)to\n e)n a)mphote/rois o(rô=n?]]

[Footnote 11: Plat. Hipparch. 231 A.]

[Footnote 12: Plat. Hipparch. 231 C. _Sokr._ [Greek: O(ra=|s ou)=n, ô(s pa/lin au)= peritre/cheis ei)s to\ au)to\--to\ me\n ke/rdos a)gatho\n phai/netai, ê( de\ zêmi/a kako/n?] _Comp._ [Greek: A)porô= e)/gôge o(\, ti ei)/pô.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)k a)di/kôs ge su\ a)porô=n.]]

[Side-note: It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay. The valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good. Conclusion comes back. That Gain is Good.]

But tell me: you say that if a man lays out little and acquires much, that is gain? _Comp._--Yes: but not if it be evil: it is gain, if it be good, like gold or silver. _Sokr._--I will ask you about gold and silver. Suppose a man by laying out one pound of gold acquires two pounds of silver, is it gain or loss? _Comp._--It is loss, decidedly, Sokrates: gold is twelve times the value of silver. _Sokr._--Nevertheless he has acquired more: double is more than half. _Comp._--Not in value: double silver is not more than half gold. _Sokr._--It appears then that we must include value as essential to gain, not merely quantity. The valuable is gain: the valueless is no gain. The valuable is that which is valuable to possess: is that the profitable, or the unprofitable? _Comp._--It is the profitable. _Sokr._--But the profitable is good? _Comp._--Yes: it is. _Sokr._--Why then, here, the same conclusion comes back to us as agreed, for the third or fourth time. The gainful is good. _Comp._--It appears so.[13]

[Footnote 13: Plato, Hipparch. 231 D-E, 232 A.]

[Side-note: Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good, and that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no man ought to be reproached for being so. The companion is compelled to admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded.]

_Sokr._--Let me remind you of what has passed. You contended that good men did not wish to acquire all sorts of gain, but only such as were good, and not such as were evil. But now, the debate has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains are good, whether small or great. _Comp._--As for me, Sokrates, the debate has compelled me rather than persuaded me.[14] _Sokr._--Presently, perhaps, it may even persuade you. But now, whether you have been persuaded or not, you at least concur with me in affirming that all gains, whether small or great, are good. That all good men wish for all good things. _Comp._--I do concur. _Sokr._--But you yourself stated that evil men love all gains, small and great? _Comp._--I said so. _Sokr._--According to your doctrine then, all men are lovers of gain, the good men as well as the evil? _Comp._--Apparently so. _Sokr._--It is therefore wrong to reproach any man as a lover of gain: for the person who reproaches is himself a lover of gain, just as much.

[Footnote 14: Plat. Hipparch. 232 A-B. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n nu=n pa/nta ta\ ke/rdê o( lo/gos ê(ma=s ê)na/gkake kai\ smikra\ kai\ mega/la o(mologei=n a)gatha\ ei)=nai?] _Comp._ [Greek: Ê)na/gkake ga/r, ô)= Sô/krates, ma=llon e)me/ ge ê)\ pe/peiken.] _Sokr._ [Greek: A)ll' i)/sôs meta\ tou=to kai\ pei/seien a)\n.]]

[Side-note: Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion. What is Law, or The Law? All law is the same, _quatenus_ law: what is the common constituent attribute?]

The Minos, like the Hipparchus, is a dialogue carried on between Sokrates and a companion not named. It relates to Law, or The Law--

_Sokr._--What is Law (asks Sokrates)? _Comp._--Respecting what sort of Law do you enquire (replies the Companion)? _Sokr._--What! is there any difference between one law and another law, as to that identical circumstance, of being Law? Gold does not differ from gold, so far as the being gold is concerned--nor stone from stone, so far as being stone is concerned. In like manner, one law does not differ from another, all are the same, in so far as each is Law alike:--not, one of them more, and another less. It is about this as a whole that I ask you--What is Law?

[Side-note: Answer--Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding customs. 2. The decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion.]

_Comp._--What should Law be, Sokrates, other than the various assemblage of consecrated and binding customs and beliefs?[15] _Sokr._--Do you think, then, that discourse is, the things spoken: that sight is, the things seen? that hearing is, the things heard? Or are they not distinct, in each of the three cases--and is not Law also one thing, the various customs and beliefs another? _Comp._--Yes! I now think that they are distinct.[16] _Sokr._--Law is that whereby these binding customs become binding. What is it? _Comp._--Law can be nothing else than the public resolutions and decrees promulgated among us. Law is the decree of the city.[17] _Sokr._--You mean, that Law is social opinion. _Comp._--Yes I do.

[Footnote 15: Plato, Minos, 313 B. [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n a)/llo no/mos ei)/ê a)\n a)ll' ê)\ ta\ nomizo/mena?]]

[Footnote 16: Plato, Minos, 313 B-C.

I pass over here an analogy started by Sokrates in his next question; as [Greek: o)/psis] to [Greek: ta\ o(rô/mena], so [Greek: no/mos] to [Greek: ta\ nomizo/mena], &c.]

[Footnote 17: Plato, Minos, 814 A. [Greek: e)peidê\ no/mô| ta\ nomizo/mena nomi/zetai, ti/ni o)/nti tô=| no/mô| nomi/zetai?]]

[Side-note: Cross-examination by Sokrates--just and lawfully-behaving men are so through law; unjust and lawless men are so through the absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful: lawlessness is ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city--or bad social opinion--cannot be law.]

_Sokr._--Perhaps you are right: but let us examine. You call some persons wise:--they are wise through wisdom. You call some just:--they are just through justice. In like manner, the lawfully-behaving men are so through law: the lawless men are so through lawlessness. Now the lawfully-behaving men are just: the lawless men are unjust. _Comp._--It is so. _Sokr._--Justice and Law, are highly honourable: injustice and lawlessness, highly dishonourable: the former preserves cities, the latter ruins them. _Comp._--Yes--it does. _Sokr._--Well, then! we must consider law as something honourable; and seek after it, under the assumption that it is a good thing. You defined law to be the decree of the city: Are not some decrees good, others evil? _Comp._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--But we have already said that law is not evil. _Comp._--I admit it. _Sokr._--It is incorrect therefore to answer, as you did broadly, that law is the decree of the city. An evil decree cannot be law. _Comp._--I see that it is incorrect.[18]

[Footnote 18: Plato, Minos, 314 B-C-D.]

[Side-note: Suggestion by Sokrates--Law is the _good_ opinion of the city--but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding out of reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so.]

_Sokr._--Still--I think, myself, that law is opinion of some sort; and since it is not evil opinion, it must be good opinion. Now good opinion is true opinion: and true opinion is, the finding out of reality. _Comp._--I admit it. _Sokr._--Law therefore wishes or tends to be, the finding out of reality.[19] _Comp._--But, Sokrates, if law is the finding out of reality--if we have therein already found out realities--how comes it that all communities of men do not use the same laws respecting the same matters? _Sokr._--The law does not the less wish or tend to find out realities; but it is unable to do so. That is, if the fact be true as you state--that we change our laws, and do not all of us use the same. _Comp._--Surely, the fact as a fact is obvious enough.[20]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Minos, 315 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ê( a)lêthê\s do/xa tou= o)/ntos e)stin e)xeu/resis? . . . o( no/mos a)/ra bou/letai tou= o)/ntos ei)=nai e)xeu/resis?]]

[Footnote 20: Plato, Minos, 315 A-B.]

[Side-note: Objection taken by the Companion--That there is great discordance of laws in different places--he specifies several cases of such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity, and requests him to confine himself to question or answer.]

(The Companion here enumerates some remarkable local rites, venerable in one place, abhorrent in another, such as the human sacrifices at Carthage, &c., thus lengthening his answer much beyond what it had been before. Sokrates then continues):

_Sokr._--Perhaps you are right, and these matters have escaped me. But if you and I go on making long speeches each for ourselves, we shall never come to an agreement. If we are to carry on our research together, we must do so by question and answer. Question me, if you prefer:--if not, answer me. _Comp._--I am quite ready, Sokrates, to answer whatever you ask.

[Side-note: Farther questions by Sokrates--Things heavy and light, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so, and are accounted so everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful.]

_Sokr._--Well, then! do you think that just things are just and unjust things are unjust? _Comp._--I think they are. _Sokr._--Do not all men in all communities, among the Persians as well as here, now as well as formerly, think so too? _Comp._--Unquestionably they do. _Sokr._--Are not things which weigh more, accounted heavier; and things which weigh less, accounted lighter, here, at Carthage, and everywhere else?[21] _Comp._--Certainly. _Sokr._--It seems, then, that honourable things are accounted honourable everywhere, and dishonourable things dishonourable? not the reverse. _Comp._--Yes, it is so. _Sokr._--Then, speaking universally, existent things or realities (not non-existents) are accounted existent and real, among us as well as among all other men? _Comp._--I think they are. _Sokr._--Whoever therefore fails in attaining the real fails in attaining the lawful.[22] _Comp._--As you now put it, Sokrates, it would seem that the same things are accounted lawful both by us at all times, and by all the rest of mankind besides. But when I reflect that we are perpetually changing our laws, I cannot persuade myself of what you affirm.

[Footnote 21: Plato, Minos, 316 A. [Greek: Po/teron de\ ta\ plei=on e)/lkonta baru/tera nomi/zetai e)ntha/de, ta\ de\ e)/latton, koupho/tera, ê)\ tou)nanti/on?]

The verb [Greek: nomi/zetai] deserves attention here, being the same word as has been employed in regard to law, and derived from [Greek: no/mos].]

[Footnote 22: Plato, Minos, 316 B. [Greek: ou)kou=n, ô(s kata\ pa/ntôn ei)pei=n, ta\ o)/nta nomi/zetai ei)=nai, ou) ta\ mê\ o)/nta, kai\ par' ê(mi=n kai\ para\ toi=s a)/llois a(/pasin.] _Comp._ [Greek: E)/moige dokei=.] _Sokr._ [Greek: O(\s a)\n a)/ra tou= o)/ntos a(marta/nê|, tou= nomi/mou a(marta/nei.]]

[Side-note: There are laws of health and of cure, composed by the few physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who know how to rule.]

_Sokr._--Perhaps you do not reflect that pieces on the draught-board, when their position is changed, still remain the same. You know medical treatises: you know that physicians are the really knowing about matters of health: and that they agree with each other in writing about them. _Comp._--Yes--I know that. _Sokr._--The case is the same whether they be Greeks or not Greeks: Those who know, must of necessity hold the same opinion with each other, on matters which they know: always and everywhere. _Comp._--Yes--always and everywhere. _Sokr._--Physicians write respecting matters of health what they account to be true, and these writings of theirs are the medical laws? _Comp._--Certainly they are. _Sokr._--The like is true respecting the laws of farming--the laws of gardening--the laws of cookery. All these are the writings of persons, knowing in each of the respective pursuits? _Comp._--Yes.[23] _Sokr._--In like manner, what are the laws respecting the government of a city? Are they not the writings of those who know how to govern--kings, statesmen, and men of superior excellence? _Comp._--Truly so. _Sokr._--Knowing men like these will not write differently from each other about the same things, nor change what they have once written. If, then, we see some doing this, are we to declare them knowing or ignorant? _Comp._--Ignorant--undoubtedly.

[Footnote 23: Plato, Minos, 316 D-E.]

[Side-note: That which is right is the regal law, the only true and real law--that which is not right, is not law, but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant.]

_Sokr._--Whatever is right, therefore, we may pronounce to be lawful; in medicine, gardening, or cookery: whatever is not right, not to be lawful but lawless. And the like in treatises respecting just and unjust, prescribing how the city is to be administered: That which is right, is the regal law--that which is not right, is not so, but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant--being in truth lawless. _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--We were correct therefore in declaring Law to be the finding out of reality. _Comp._--It appears so.[24] _Sokr._--It is the skilful husbandman who gives right laws on the sowing of land: the skilful musician on the touching of instruments: the skilful trainer, respecting exercise of the body: the skilful king or governor, respecting the minds of the citizens. _Comp._--Yes--it is.[25]

[Footnote 24: Plato, Minos, 317 C. [Greek: to\ me\n o)rtho\n no/mos e)sti\ basiliko/s; to\ de\ mê\ o)rtho/n ou)/, o(\ dokei= no/mos ei)=nai toi=s ei)do/sin; e)/sti ga\r a)/nomon.]]

[Footnote 25: Plato, Minos, 318 A.]

[Side-note: Minos, King of Krete--his laws were divine and excellent, and have remained unchanged from time immemorial.]

_Sokr._--Can you tell me which of the ancient kings has the glory of having been a good lawgiver, so that his laws still remain in force as divine institutions? _Comp._--I cannot tell. _Sokr._--But can you not say which among the Greeks have the most ancient laws? _Comp._--Perhaps you mean the Lacedæmonians and Lykurgus? _Sokr._--Why, the Lacedæmonian laws are hardly more than three hundred years old: besides, whence is it that the best of them come? _Comp._--From Krete, they say. _Sokr._--Then it is the Kretans who have the most ancient laws in Greece? _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--Do you know those good kings of Krete, from whom these laws are derived--Minos and Rhadamanthus, sons of Zeus and Europa? _Comp._--Rhadamanthus certainly is said to have been a just man, Sokrates; but Minos quite the reverse--savage, ill-tempered, unjust. _Sokr._--What you affirm, my friend, is a fiction of the Attic tragedians. It is not stated either by Homer or Hesiod, who are far more worthy of credit than all the tragedians put together. _Comp._--What is it that Homer and Hesiod say about Minos?[26]

[Footnote 26: Plato, Minos, 318 E.]

[Side-note: Question about the character of Minos--Homer and Hesiod declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians defame him as a tyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens.]

Sokrates replies by citing, and commenting upon, the statements of Homer and Hesiod respecting Minos, as the cherished son, companion, and pupil, of Zeus; who bestowed upon him an admirable training, teaching him wisdom and justice, and thus rendering him consummate as a lawgiver and ruler of men. It was through these laws, divine as emanating from the teaching of Zeus, that Krete (and Sparta as the imitator of Krete) had been for so long a period happy and virtuous. As ruler of Krete, Minos had made war upon Athens, and compelled the Athenians to pay tribute. Hence he had become odious to the Athenians, and especially odious to the tragic poets who were the great teachers and charmers of the crowd. These poets, whom every one ought to be cautious of offending, had calumniated Minos as the old enemy of Athens.[27]

[Footnote 27: Plato, Minos, 319-320.]

[Side-note: That Minos was really admirable--and that he has found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the city--we may be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered.]

But that these tales are mere calumny (continues Sokrates), and that Minos was truly a good lawgiver, and a good shepherd ([Greek: nomeu\s a)gatho/s]) of his people--we have proof through the fact, that his laws still remain unchanged: which shows that he has really found out truth and reality respecting the administration of a city.[28] _Comp._--Your view seems plausible, Sokrates. _Sokr._--If I am right, then, you think that the Kretans have more ancient laws than any other Greeks? and that Minos and Rhadamanthus are the best of all ancient lawgivers, rulers, and shepherds of mankind? _Comp._--I think they are.

[Footnote 28: Plato, Minos, 321 B. [Greek: tou=to me/giston sêmei=on, o(/ti a)ki/nêtoi au)tou= oi( no/moi ei)si/n, a)/te tou= o)/ntos peri\ po/leôs oi)kê/seôs e)xeuro/ntos eu)= tê\n a)lê/theian.]]

[Side-note: The question is made more determinate--What is it that the good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the mind, as the physician measures out food and exercise for the body? Sokrates cannot tell. Close.]

_Sokr._--Now take the case of the good lawgiver and good shepherd for the body--If we were asked, what it is that he prescribes for the body, so as to render it better? we should answer, at once, briefly, and well, by saying--food and labour: the former to sustain the body, the latter to exercise and consolidate it. _Comp._--Quite correct. _Sokr._--And if after that we were asked, What are those things which the good lawgiver prescribes for the mind to make it better, what should we say, so as to avoid discrediting ourselves? _Comp._--I really cannot tell. _Sokr._--But surely it is discreditable enough both for your mind and mine--to confess, that we do not know upon what it is that good and evil for our minds depends, while we can define upon what it is that the good or evil of our bodies depends?[29]

[Footnote 29: Plato, Minos, 321 C-B.]

* * * * *

[Side-note: The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each other, and both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished.]

I have put together the two dialogues Hipparchus and Minos, partly because of the analogy which really exists between them, partly because that analogy is much insisted on by Boeckh, Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and other recent critics; who not only strike them both out of the list of Platonic works, but speak of them with contempt as compositions. On the first point, I dissent from them altogether: on the second, I agree with them thus far--that I consider the two dialogues inferior works of Plato:--much inferior to his greatest and best compositions,--certainly displaying both less genius and less careful elaboration--probably among his early performances--perhaps even unfinished projects, destined for a farther elaboration, which they never received, and not published until after his decease. Yet in Hipparchus as well as in Minos, the subjects debated are important as regards ethical theory. Several questions are raised and partially canvassed: no conclusion is finally attained. These characteristics they have in common with several of the best Platonic dialogues.

[Side-note: Hipparchus--Double meaning of [Greek: philokerdê\s] and [Greek: ke/rdos].]

In Hipparchus, the question put by Sokrates is, about the definition of [Greek: o( philokerdê\s] (the lover of gain), and of [Greek: ke/rdos] itself--gain. The first of these two words (like many in Greek as well as in English) is used in two senses. In its plain, etymological sense, it means an attribute belonging to all men: all men love gain, hate loss. But since this is predicable of all, there is seldom any necessity for predicating it of any one man or knot of men in particular. Accordingly, when you employ the epithet as a predicate of A or B, what you generally mean is, to assert something more than its strict etymological meaning: to declare that he has the attribute in unusual measure; or that he has shown himself, on various occasions, wanting in other attributes, which on those occasions ought, in your judgment, to have countervailed it. The epithet thus comes to connote a sentiment of blame or reproach, in the mind of the speaker.[30]

[Footnote 30: Aristotle adverts to this class of ethical epithets, connoting both an attribute in the person designated and an unfavourable sentiment in the speaker (Ethic. Nikom. ii. 6, p. 1107, a. 9). [Greek: Ou) pa=sa d' e)pide/chetai pra=xis, ou)de\ pa=n pa/thos, tê\n meso/têta; e)/nia ga\r eu)thu\s ô)no/mastai suneilêmme/na meta\ tê=s phaulo/têtos, oi)=on], &c.]

[Side-note: State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found.]

The Companion or Collocutor, being called upon by Sokrates to explain [Greek: to\ philokerde\s], defines it in this last sense, as conveying or connoting a reproach. He gives three different explanations of it (always in this sense), each of which Sokrates shows to be untenable. A variety of parallel cases are compared, and the question is put (so constantly recurring in Plato's writings), what is the state of the agent's mind as to knowledge? The cross-examination makes out, that if the agent be supposed to know,--then there is no man corresponding to the definition of a [Greek: philokerdê/s]: if the agent be supposed not to know--then, on the contrary, every man will come under the definition. The Companion is persuaded that there is such a thing as "love of gain" in the blamable sense. Yet he cannot find any tenable definition, to discriminate it from "love of gain" in the ordinary or innocent sense.

[Side-note: Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word _gain_? None is found.]

The same question comes back in another form, after Sokrates has given the liberty of retractation. The Collocutor maintains that there is bad _gain_, as well as good _gain_. But what is that common, generic, quality, designated well as good by the word _gain_, apart from these two distinctive epithets? He cannot find it out or describe it. He gives two definitions, each of which is torn up by Sokrates. To deserve the name of _gain_, that which a man acquires must be good; and it must surpass, in value as well as in quantity, the loss or outlay which he incurs in order to acquire it. But when thus understood, all gains are good. There is no meaning in the distinction between good and bad gains: all men are lovers of gain.

[Side-note: Purpose of Plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clearing it up.]

With this confusion, the dialogue closes. The Sokratic notion of _good_, as what every one loves--_evil_ as what every one hates--also of evil-doing, as performed by every evil-doer only through ignorance or mistake is brought out and applied to test the ethical phraseology of a common-place respondent. But it only serves to lay bare a state of confusion and perplexity, without clearing up any thing. Herein, so far as I can see, lies Plato's purpose in the dialogue. The respondent is made aware of the confusion, which he did not know before; and this, in Plato's view, is a progress. The respondent cannot avoid giving contradictory answers, under an acute cross-examination: but he does not adopt any new belief. He says to Sokrates at the close--"The debate has constrained rather than persuaded me".[31] This is a simple but instructive declaration of the force put by Sokrates upon his collocutors; and of the reactionary effort likely to be provoked in their minds, with a view to extricate themselves from a painful sense of contradiction. If such effort be provoked, Plato's purpose is attained.

[Footnote 31: Plato, Hipparch. 232 B. [Greek: ê)na/gkake ga\r (o( lo/gos) ma=llon e)me/ ge ê)\ pe/peiken.]]

One peculiarity there is, analogous to what we have already seen in the Hippias Major. It is not merely the Collocutor who charges Sokrates, but also Sokrates who accuses the Collocutor--each charging the other with attempts to deceive a friend.[32] This seems intended by Plato to create an occasion for introducing what he had to say about Hipparchus--_apropos_ of the motto on the Hipparchean Hermes--[Greek: mê\ phi/lon e)xapa/ta].

[Footnote 32: Plato, Hipparch. 225 E, 228 A.]

[Side-note: Historical narrative and comments given in the dialogue respecting Hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to be spurious.]

The modern critics, who proclaim the Hipparchus not to be the work of Plato, allege as one of the proofs of spuriousness, the occurrence of this long narrative and comment upon the historical Hipparchus and his behaviour; which narrative (the critics maintain) Plato would never have introduced, seeing that it contributes nothing to the settlement of the question debated. But to this we may reply, first, That there are other dialogues[33] (not to mention the Minos) in which Plato introduces recitals of considerable length, historical or quasi-historical recitals; bearing remotely, or hardly bearing at all, upon the precise question under discussion; next,--That even if no such analogies could be cited, and if the case stood single, no modern critic could fairly pretend to be so thoroughly acquainted with Plato's views and the surrounding circumstances, as to put a limit on the means which Plato might choose to take, for rendering his dialogues acceptable and interesting. Plato's political views made him disinclined to popular government generally, and to the democracy of Athens in particular. Conformably with such sentiment, he is disposed to surround the rule of the Peisistratidæ with an ethical and philosophical colouring: to depict Hipparchus as a wise man busied in instructing and elevating the citizens; and to discredit the renown of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, by affirming them to have been envious of Hipparchus, as a philosopher who surpassed themselves by his own mental worth. All this lay perfectly in the vein of Plato's sentiment; and we may say the same about the narrative in the Minos, respecting the divine parentage and teaching of Minos, giving rise to his superhuman efficacy as a lawgiver and ruler. It is surely very conceivable, that Plato, as a composer of ethical dialogues or dramas, might think that such recitals lent a charm or interest to some of them. Moreover, something like variety, or distinctive features as between one dialogue and another, was a point of no inconsiderable moment. I am of opinion that Plato did so conceive these narratives. But at any rate, what I here contend is, that no modern critics have a right to assume as certain that he did not.

[Footnote 33: See Alkibiad. ii. pp. 142-149-150; Alkibiad. i. pp. 121-122: Protagoras, 342-344; Politikus, 268 D., [Greek: schedo\n paidia\n e)gkerasame/nous] and the two or three pages which follow.

F. A. Wolf, and various critics after him, contend that the genuineness of the Hipparchus was doubted in antiquity, on the authority of Ælian, V. H. viii. 2. But I maintain that this is not the meaning of the passage, unless upon the supposition that the word [Greek: mathêtê\s] is struck out of the text conjecturally. The passage may be perfectly well construed, leaving [Greek: mathêtê\s] in the text: we must undoubtedly suppose the author to have made an assertion historically erroneous: but this is nowise impossible in the case of Ælian. If you construe the passage as it stands, without such conjectural alteration, it does not justify Wolf's inference.]

[Side-note: Minos. Question--What is the characteristic property connoted by the word [Greek: No/mos] or law?]

I now come to the Minos. The subject of this dialogue is, the explanation or definition of Law. Sokrates says to his Companion or Collocutor,--Tell me what is the generic constituent of Law: All Laws are alike _quatenus_ Law. Take no note of the difference between one law and another, but explain to me what characteristic property it is, which is common to all Law, and is implied in or connoted by the name Law.

This question is logically the same as that which Sokrates asks in the Hipparchus with reference to [Greek: ke/rdos] or gain.

[Side-note: This question was discussed by the historical Sokrates, Memorabilia of Xenophon.]

That the definition of [Greek: No/mos] or Law was discussed by Sokrates, we know, not only from the general description of his debates given in Xenophon, but also from the interesting description (in that author) of the conversation between the youthful Alkibiades and Perikles.[34] The interrogations employed by Alkibiades on that occasion are Sokratic, and must have been derived, directly or indirectly, from Sokrates. They are partially analogous to the questions of Sokrates in the dialogue Minos, and they end by driving Perikles into a confusion, left unexplained, between Law and Lawlessness.

[Footnote 34: Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16; i. 2, 42-46.]

[Side-note: Definitions of law--suggested and refuted. Law includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c. Bad decrees are not laws.]

Definitions of [Greek: No/mos] are here given by the Companion, who undergoes a cross-examination upon them. First, he says, that [Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena]. But this is rejected by Sokrates, who intimates that Law is not the aggregate of laws enacted or of customs held binding: but that which lies behind these laws and customs, imparting to them their binding force.[35] We are to enquire what this is. The Companion declares that it is the public decree of the city: political or social opinion. But this again Sokrates contests: putting questions to show that Law includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, beauty, and preservation of the city with its possessions; while lawlessness includes injustice, evil, ugliness, and destruction. There can be no such thing as bad or wicked law.[36] But among decrees of the city, some are bad, some are good. Therefore to define Law as a decree of the city, thus generally, is incorrect. It is only the good decree, not the bad decree, which is Law. Now the good decree or opinion, is the true opinion: that is, it is the finding out of reality. Law therefore wishes or aims to be the finding out of reality: and if there are differences between different nations, this is because the power to find out does not always accompany the wish to find out.

[Footnote 35: Plato, Minos, 314 A. [Greek: e)peidê\ no/mô| ta\ nomizo/mena nomi/zetai, ti/ni o)/nti tô=| no/mô| nomi/zetai?]]

[Footnote 36: Plato, Minos, 314 E. [Greek: kai\ mê\n no/mos ge ou)k ê)=n ponêro/s.]]

[Side-note: Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it is the declared judgment and command of the Wise man upon the subject to which it refers--it is truth and reality, found out and certified by him.]

As to the assertion--that Law is one thing here, another thing there, one thing at one time, another thing at another--Sokrates contests it. Just things are just (he says) everywhere and at all times; unjust things are unjust also. Heavy things are heavy, light things light, at one time, as well as at another. So also honourable things are everywhere honourable, base things everywhere base. In general phrase, existent things are everywhere existent,[37] non-existent things are not existent. Whoever therefore fails to attain the existent and real, fails to attain the lawful and just. It is only the man of art and knowledge, in this or that department, who attains the existent, the real, the right, true, lawful, just. Thus the authoritative rescripts or laws in matters of medicine, are those laid down by practitioners who know that subject, all of whom agree in what they lay down: the laws of cookery, the laws of agriculture and of gardening--are rescripts delivered by artists who know respectively each of those subjects. So also about Just and Unjust, about the political and social arrangements of the city--the authoritative rescripts or laws are, those laid down by the artists or men of knowledge in that department, all of whom agree in laying down the same: that is, all the men of art called kings or lawgivers. It is only the right, the true, the real--that which these artists attain--which is properly a law and is entitled to be so called. That which is not right is not a law,--ought not to be so called--and is only supposed to be a law by the error of ignorant men.[38]

[Footnote 37: M. Boeckh remarks justly in his note on this passage--"neque enim illud demonstratum est, eadem omnibus legitima esse--sed tantum, _notionem_" (rather the sentiment or emotion) "_legitimi_ omnibus eandem esse. Sed omnia scriptor hic confundit."]

[Footnote 38: Plato, Minos, 317 C.]

[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato--he acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought to _be_ Law.]

That the reasoning of Sokrates in this dialogue is confused and unsound (as M. Boeckh and other critics have remarked), I perfectly agree. But it is not the less completely Platonic; resting upon views and doctrines much cherished and often reproduced by Plato. The dialogue Minos presents, in a rude and awkward manner, without explanation or amplification, that worship of the Abstract and the Ideal, which Plato, in other and longer dialogues, seeks to diversify as well as to elaborate. The definitions of Law here combated and given by Sokrates, illustrate this. The good, the true, the right, the beautiful, the real--all coalesce in the mind of Plato. There is nothing (in his view) real, except _The_ Good, _The_ Just, &c. ([Greek: to\ au)to-a)gatho\n]; [Greek: au)to-di/kaion]--Absolute Goodness and Justice): particular good and just things have no reality, they are no more good and just than bad and unjust--they are one or the other, according to circumstances--they are ever variable, floating midway between the real and unreal.[39] The real alone is knowable, correlating with knowledge or with the knowing Intelligence [Greek: Nou=s]. As Sokrates distinguishes elsewhere [Greek: to\ di/kaion] or [Greek: au)to-di/kaion] from [Greek: ta\ di/kaia]--so here he distinguishes ([Greek: no/mos] from [Greek: ta\ nomizo/mena]) _Law_, from the assemblage of actual commands or customs received as _laws_ among mankind. These latter are variable according to time and place; but Law is always one and the same. Plato will acknowledge nothing to _be_ Law, except that which (he thinks) _ought to be_ Law: that which emanates from a lawgiver of consummate knowledge, who aims at the accomplishment of the good and the real, and knows how to discover and realise that end. So far as "the decree of the city" coincides with what would have been enacted by this lawgiver (_i. e._ so far as it is good and right), Sokrates admits it as a valid explanation of Law; but no farther. He considers the phrase _bad law_ to express a logical impossibility, involving a contradiction _in adjecto_.[40] What others call a bad law, he regards as being no real law, but only a fallacious image, mistaken for such by the ignorant. He does not consider such ignorant persons as qualified to judge: he recognises only the judgment of the knowing one or few, among whom he affirms that there can be no difference of opinion. Every one admits just things to be just,--unjust things to be unjust,--heavy things to be heavy,--the existent and the real, to be the existent and the real. If then the lawgiver in any of his laws fails to attain this reality, he fails in the very purpose essential to the conception of law:[41] _i. e._ his pretended law is no law at all.

[Footnote 39: See the remarkable passage in the fifth book of the Republic, pp. 479-480; compare vii. 538 E.]

[Footnote 40: Plato, Minos, 314 D.

The same argument is brought to bear by the Platonic Sokrates against Hippias in the Hippias Major, 284-285. If the laws are not really profitable, which is the only real purpose for which they were established, they are no laws at all. The Spartans are [Greek: para/nomoi]. Some of the answers assigned to Hippias (284 D) are pertinent enough; but he is overborne.]

[Footnote 41: Plato, Minos, 316 B. [Greek: O(\s a)\n a)/ra tou= o)/ntos a(marta/nê, tou= nomi/mou a(marta/nei.]]

[Side-note: Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind--the work of systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man.]

By _Law_ then, Plato means--not the assemblage of actual positive rules, nor any general property common to and characteristic of them, nor the free determination of an assembled Demos as distinguished from the mandates of a despot--but the Type of Law as it ought to be, and as it would be, if prescribed by a perfectly wise ruler, aiming at good and knowing how to realise it. This, which is the ideal of his own mind, Plato worships and reasons upon as if it were the only reality; as Law by nature, or natural Law, distinguished from actual positive laws: which last have either been set by some ill-qualified historical ruler, or have grown up insensibly. Knowledge, art, philosophy, systematic and constructive, applied by some one or few exalted individuals, is (in his view) the only cause capable of producing that typical result which is true, good, real, permanent, and worthy of the generic name.

[Side-note: Different applications of this general Platonic view, in the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. _Natural_ Rectitude of Law, Government, Names, &c.]

In the Minos, this general Platonic view is applied to Law: in the Politikus, to government and social administration: in the Kratylus, to naming or language. In the Politikus, we find the received classification of governments (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) discarded as improper; and the assertion advanced, That there is only one government right, true, genuine, really existing--government by the uncontrolled authority and superintendence of the man of exalted intelligence: he who is master in the art of governing, whether such man do in fact hold power anywhere or not. All other governments are degenerate substitutes for this type, some receding from it less, some more.[42] Again, in the Kratylus, where names and name-giving are discussed, Sokrates[43] maintains that things can only be named according to their true and real nature--that there is, belonging to each thing, one special and appropriate Name-Form, discernible only by the sagacity of the intelligent Lawgiver: who alone is competent to bestow upon each thing its right, true, genuine, real name, possessing rectitude by nature ([Greek: o)rtho/tês phu/sei]).[44] This Name-Form (according to Sokrates) is the same in all languages in so far as they are constructed by different intelligent Lawgivers, although the letters and syllables in which they may clothe the Form are very different.[45] If names be not thus apportioned by the systematic purpose of an intelligent Lawgiver, but raised up by insensible and unsystematic growth--they will be unworthy substitutes for the genuine type, though they are the best which actual societies possess; according to the opinion announced by Kratylus in that same dialogue, they will not be names at all.[46]

[Footnote 42: Plato, Politikus, 293 C-E. [Greek: tau/tên o)rthê\n diaphero/ntôs ei)=nai kai\ mo/nên politei/an, e)n ê(=| tis a)\n eu(/riskoi tou\s a)/rchontas a)lêthô=s e)pistê/monas kai\ ou) dokou=ntas mo/non . . . to/te kai\ kata\ tou\s toiou/tous o(/rous ê(mi=n mo/nên o)rthê\n politei/an ei)=nai r(ête/on. o(/sas de\ a)/llas le/gomen, _ou) gnêsi/as ou)d' o)/ntôs ou)/sas lekte/on_, a)lla\ memimême/nas tau/tên, a(/s me\n eu)no/mous le/gomen, e)pi\ ta\ kalli/ô, ta\s de\ a)/llas e)pi\ ta\ ai)schi/ona memimê=sthai.]

The historical (Xenophontic) Sokrates asserts this same position in Xenophon's Memorabilia (iii. 9, 10). "Sokrates said that Kings and Rulers were those who knew how to command, not those who held the sceptre or were chosen by election or lot, or had acquired power by force or fraud," &c.

The Kings of Sparta and Macedonia, the [Greek: Boulê\] and [Greek: Dê=mos] of Athens, the Despot of Syracuse or Pheræ are here declared to be not real rulers at all.]

[Footnote 43: Plato, Kratylus, 387 D.]

[Footnote 44: Plato, Kratyl. 388 A-E.]

[Footnote 45: Plato, Kratyl. 389 E, 390 A, 432 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ou)/tôs a)xiô/seis kai\ to\n nomothe/tên to/n te e)ntha/de kai\ to\n e)n toi=s barba/rois, e(/ôs a)\n to\ tou= o)no/matos ei)=dos a)podidô=| to\ prosê=kon e(ka/stô| e)n o(poiaisou=n sullabai=s, ou)de\n chei/rô nomothe/tên ei)=nai to\n e)ntha/de ê)\ to\n o(pouou=n a)/llothi?] Compare this with the Minos, 315 E, 316 D, where Sokrates evades, by an hypothesis very similar, the objection made by the collocutor, that the laws in one country are very different from those in another--[Greek: i)/sôs ga\r ou)k e)nnoei=s tau=ta metapetteuo/mena o(/ti tau)ta/ e)stin.]]

[Footnote 46: Plato, Kratyl. 430 A, 432 A, 433 D, 435 C.

Kratylus says that a name badly given is no name at all; just as Sokrates says in the Minos that a bad law is no law at all.]

[Side-note: Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on this divine type or natural rectitude.]

The Kretan Minos (we here find it affirmed), son, companion, and pupil of Zeus, has learnt to establish laws of this divine type or natural rectitude: the proof of which is, that the ancient Kretan laws have for immemorial ages remained, and still do remain,[47] unchanged. But when Sokrates tries to determine, Wherein consists this Law-Type? What is it that the wise Lawgiver prescribes for the minds of the citizens--as the wise gymnastic trainer prescribes proper measure of nourishment and exercise for their bodies?--the question is left unanswered. Sokrates confesses with shame that he cannot answer it: and the dialogue ends in a blank. The reader--according to Plato's manner--is to be piqued and shamed into the effort of meditating the question for himself.

[Footnote 47: Plato, Minos, 319 B, 321 A.]

[Side-note: The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a Trilogy along with the Leges.]

An attempt to answer this question will be found in Plato's Treatise De Legibus--in the projected Kretan colony, of which he there sketches the fundamental laws. Aristophanes of Byzantium very naturally placed this treatise as sequel to the Minos; second in the Trilogy of which the Minos was first.[48]

[Footnote 48: I reserve for an Appendix some further remarks upon the genuineness of Hipparchus and Minos.]

[Side-note: Explanations of the word Law--confusion in its meaning.]

Whoever has followed the abstract of the Minos, which I have just given, will remark the different explanations of the word Law--both those which are disallowed, and that which is preferred, though left incomplete, by Sokrates. On this same subject, there are in many writers, modern as well an ancient, two distinct modes of confusion traceable--pointed out by eminent recent jurists, such as Mr. Bentham, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Maine. 1. Between Law as it is, and Law as it ought to be. 2. Between Laws Imperative, set by intelligent rulers, and enforced by penal sanction--and Laws signifying uniformities of fact expressed in general terms, such as the Law of Gravitation, Crystallisation, &c.--We can hardly say that in the dialogue Minos, Plato falls into the first of these two modes of confusion: for he expressly says that he only recognises the Ideal of Law, or Law as it ought to be (actual Laws everywhere being disallowed, except in so far as they conform thereunto). But he does fall into the second, when he identifies the Lawful with the Real or Existent. His Ideal stands in place of generalisations of fact.

There is also much confusion, if we compare the Minos with other dialogues; wherein Plato frequently talks of Laws as the laws and customs actually existing or imperative in any given state--Athens, Sparta, or elsewhere ([Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena], according to the first words in the Minos). For example, in the harangue which he supposes to be addressed to Sokrates in the Kriton, and which he invests with so impressive a character--the Laws of Athens are introduced as speakers: but according to the principles laid down in the Minos, three-fourths of the Laws of Athens could not be regarded as laws at all. If therefore we take Plato's writings throughout, we shall not find that he is constant to one uniform sense of the word Law, or that he escapes the frequent confusion between Law as it actually exists and Law as it ought to be.[49]

[Footnote 49: The first explanation of [Greek: No/mos] advanced by the Companion in reply to Sokrates (viz. [Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena], coincides substantially with the meaning of [Greek: No/mos basileu\s] in Pindar and Herodotus (see above, chap. viii.), who is an imaginary ruler, occupying a given region, and enforcing [Greek: ta\ nomizo/mena]. It coincides also with the precept [Greek: No/mô| po/leôs], as prescribed by the Pythian priestess to applicants who asked advice about the proper forms of religious worship (Xen. Mem. i. 3, 1); though this precept, when Cicero comes to report it (Legg. ii. 16, 40), appears divested of its simplicity, and over-clouded with the very confusion touched upon in my text. Aristotle does not keep clear of the confusion (compare Ethic. Nikom. i. 1, 1094, b. 16, and v. 5, 1130, b. 24). I shall revert again to the distinction between [Greek: no/mos] and [Greek: phu/sis], in touching on other Platonic dialogues. Cicero expressly declares (Legg. ii. 5, 11), conformably to what is said by the Platonic Sokrates in the Minos, that a bad law, however passed in regular form, is no law at all; and this might be well if he adhered consistently to the same phraseology, but he perpetually uses, in other places, the words _Lex_ and _Leges_ to signify laws actually in force at Rome, good or bad.

Mr. Bentham gives an explanation of Law or The Law, which coincides with [Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena]. He says (Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. ii. ch. 17, p. 257, ed. 1823), "Now Law, or The Law, taken indefinitely, is an abstract and collective term, which, when it means anything, can mean neither more nor less than the sum total of a number of individual laws taken together".

Mr. Austin in his Lectures, 'The Province of Jurisprudence Determined', has explained more clearly and copiously than any antecedent author, the confused meanings of the word Law adverted to in my text. See especially his first lecture and his fifth, pp. 88 seq. and 171 seq., 4th ed.]

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