Chapter XXIII: Protagoras (2)

_Sokr._--Now let us examine what sort of thing each of these parts is. Tell me--is justice some thing, or no thing? I think it is some thing: are you of the same opinion?[60] _Prot._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now this thing which you call _justice_: is it itself just or unjust? I should say that it was just: what do you say?[61] _Prot._--I think so too. _Sokr._--Holiness also is some thing: is the thing called _holiness_, itself holy or unholy? As for me, if any one were to ask me the question, I should reply--Of course it is: nothing else can well be holy, if holiness itself be not holy. Would you say the same? _Prot._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--Justice being admitted to be just, and holiness to be holy--do not you think that justice also is holy, and that holiness is just? If so, how can you reconcile that with your former declaration, that no one of the parts of virtue is like any other part? _Prot._--I do not altogether admit that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. But the matter is of little moment: if you please, let both of them stand as admitted. _Sokr._--Not so:[62] I do not want the debate to turn upon an "If you please": You and I are the debaters, and we shall determine the debate best without "Ifs". _Prot._--I say then that justice and holiness are indeed, in a certain way, like each other; so also there is a point of analogy between white and black,[63] hard and soft, and between many other things which no one would pronounce to be like generally. _Sokr._--Do you think then that justice and holiness have only a small point of analogy between them? _Prot._--Not exactly so: but I do not concur with you when you declare that one is like the other. _Sokr._--Well then! since you seem to follow with some repugnance this line of argument, let us enter upon another.[64]

[Footnote 60: Plato, Protag. p. 330 B. [Greek: koinê=| skepsô/metha _poi=o/n ti au)tô=n e)stin e(/kaston_. prô=ton me\n to\ toio/nde; ê( dikaiosu/nê pra=gma/ ti/ e)stin? ê)\ ou)de\n pra=gma? e)moi\ me\n ga\r dokei=; ti/ de\ soi/?]]

[Footnote 61: Plato, Protag. p. 330 C. [Greek: tou=to to\ pra=gma o(/ ô)noma/sate a)/rti, ê( dikaiosu/nê, au)to\ tou=to di/kaio/n e)stin ê)\ a)/dikon?]]

[Footnote 62: Plato, Protag. p. 331 C. [Greek: ei) ga\r bou/lei, e)/stô ê(mi=n kai\ dikaiosu/nê o(/sion kai\ o(sio/tês di/kaion. Mê/ moi, ê(=n d' e)gô/; ou)de\n ga\r de/omai to\ "ei/ bou/lei" tou=to kai\ "_ei) soi dokei=_" e)le/gchesthai, a)ll' e)me/ te kai\ se/.]

This passage seems intended to illustrate the indifference of Protagoras for dialectic forms and strict accuracy of discussion. The [Greek: a)kribologi/a] of Sokrates and Plato was not merely unfamiliar but even distasteful to rhetorical and practical men. Protagoras is made to exhibit himself as thinking the distinctions drawn by Sokrates too nice, not worth attending to. Many of the contemporaries of both shared this opinion. One purpose of our dialogue is to bring such antitheses into view.]

[Footnote 63: Plat. Prot. p. 331 D.]

[Footnote 64: Plat. Prot. p. 332 A.]

[Side-note: Intelligence and moderation are identical, because they have the same contrary.]

Sokrates then attempts to show that intelligence and moderation are identical with each other ([Greek: sophi/a] and [Greek: sôphrosu/nê]). The proof which he produces, elicited by several questions, is--that both the one and the other are contrary to folly ([Greek: a)phrosu/nê]), and, that as a general rule, nothing can have more than one single contrary.[65]

[Footnote 65: Plat. Protag. p. 332.]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term.]

Sokrates thus seems to himself to have made much progress in proving all the names of different virtues to be names of one and the same thing. Moderation and intelligence are shown to be the same: justice and holiness had before been shown to be nearly the same:[66] though we must recollect that this last point had not been admitted by Protagoras. It must be confessed however that neither the one nor the other is proved by any conclusive reasons. In laying down the maxim--that nothing can have more than one single contrary--Plato seems to have forgotten that the same term may be used in two different senses. Because the term folly ([Greek: a)phrosu/nê]), is used sometimes to denote the opposite of moderation ([Greek: sôphrosu/nê]), sometimes the opposite of intelligence ([Greek: sophi/a]), it does not follow that moderation and intelligence are the same thing.[67] Nor does he furnish more satisfactory proof of the other point, _viz._: That holiness and justice are the same, or as much alike as possible. The intermediate position which is assumed to form the proof, _viz._: That holiness is holy, and that justice is just--is either tautological, or unmeaning; and cannot serve as a real proof of any thing. It is indeed so futile, that if it were found in the mouth of Protagoras and not in that of Sokrates, commentators would probably have cited it as an illustration of the futilities of the Sophists. As yet therefore little has been done to elucidate the important question to which Sokrates addresses himself--What is the extent of analogy between the different virtues? Are they at bottom one and the same thing under different names? In what does the analogy or the sameness consist?

[Footnote 66: Plato, Protag. p. 338 B. [Greek: sche/don ti tau)to\n o)/n.]]

[Footnote 67: Aristotle would probably have avoided such a mistake as this. One important point (as I have already remarked, vol. ii. p. 170) in which he is superior to Plato is, in being far more careful to distinguish the different meanings of the same word--[Greek: ta\ pollachô=s lego/mena]. Plato rarely troubles himself to notice such distinction, and seems indeed generally unaware of it. He constantly ridicules Prodikus, who tried to distinguish words apparently synonymous.]

[Side-note: Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated.]

But though little progress has been made in determining the question mooted by Sokrates, enough has been done to discompose and mortify Protagoras. The general tenor of the dialogue is, to depict this man, so eloquent in popular and continuous exposition, as destitute of the analytical acumen requisite to meet cross-examination, and of promptitude for dealing with new aspects of the case, on the very subjects which form the theme of his eloquence. He finds himself brought round, by a series of short questions, to a conclusion which--whether conclusively proved or not--is proved in a manner binding upon him, since he has admitted all the antecedent premisses. He becomes dissatisfied with himself, answers with increasing reluctance,[68] and is at last so provoked as to break out of the limits imposed upon a respondent.

[Footnote 68: Plato, Protag. pp. 333 B, 335 A.]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry prolixity.]

Meanwhile Sokrates pursues his examination, with intent to prove that justice ([Greek: dikaiosu/nê]) and moderation ([Greek: sôphrosu/nê]) are identical. Does a man who acts unjustly conduct himself with moderation? I should be ashamed (replies Protagoras) to answer in the affirmative, though many people say so. _Sokr._--It is indifferent to me whether you yourself think so or not, provided only you consent to make answer. What I principally examine is the opinion itself: though it follows perhaps as a consequence, that I the questioner, and the respondent along with me, undergo examination at the same time.[69] You answer then (though without adopting the opinion) that men who act unjustly sometimes behave with moderation, or with intelligence: that is, that they follow a wise policy in committing injustice. _Prot._--Be it so. _Sokr._--You admit too that there exist certain things called good things. Are those things good, which are profitable to mankind? _Prot._--By Zeus, I call some things good, even though they be not profitable to men (replies Protagoras, with increasing acrimony).[70] _Sokr._--Do you mean those things which are not profitable to any _man_, or those which are not profitable to any creature whatever? Do you call these latter _good_ also? _Prot._--Not at all: but there are many things profitable to men, yet unprofitable or hurtful to different animals. Good is of a character exceedingly diversified and heterogeneous.[71]

[Footnote 69: Plato, Protag. p. 333 C. [Greek: to\n ga\r lo/gon e)/gôge ma/lista e)xeta/zô, sumbai/nei me/ntoi i)/sôs kai\ e)me\ to\n e)rôtô=nta kai\ to\n e)rôtô/menon e)xeta/zesthai.]

Here again we find Plato drawing special attention to the conditions of dialectic debate.]

[Footnote 70: Plato, Protag. p. 333 E.]

[Footnote 71: Plato, Protag. p. 334 B. [Greek: Ou(/tô de\ poiki/lon ti/ e)sti to\ a)gatho\n kai\ pantodapo/n], &c.

The explanation here given by Protagoras of _good_ is the same as that which is given by the historical Sokrates himself in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (iii. 8). Things called good are diverse in the highest degree; but they are all called _good_ because they all contribute in some way to human security, relief, comfort, or prosperity. To one or other of these ends _good_, in all its multifarious forms, is relative.]

[Side-note: Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates rises to depart.]

Protagoras is represented as giving this answer at considerable length, and in a rhetorical manner, so as to elicit applause from the hearers.[72] Upon this Sokrates replies, "I am a man of short memory, and if any one speaks at length, I forget what he has said. If you wish me to follow you, I must entreat you to make shorter answers." _Prot._--What do you mean by asking me to make shorter answers? Do you mean shorter than the case requires? _Sokr._--No, certainly not. _Prot._--But who is to be judge of the brevity necessary, you or I? _Sokr._--I have understood that you profess to be master and teacher both of long speech and of short speech: what I beg is, that you will employ only short speech, if you expect me to follow you. _Prot._--Why, Sokrates, I have carried on many debates in my time; and if, as you ask me now, I had always talked just as my opponent wished, I should never have acquired any reputation at all. _Sokr._--Be it so: in that case I must retire; for as to long speaking, I am incompetent: I can neither make long speeches, nor follow them.[73]

[Footnote 72: Plato, Protag. p. 334 D.]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Prot. pp. 334 E, 335 A-C.]

[Side-note: Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue.]

Here Sokrates rises to depart; but Kallias, the master of the house, detains him, and expresses an earnest wish that the debate may be continued. A promiscuous conversation ensues, in which most persons present take part. Alkibiades, as the champion of Sokrates, gives, what seems really to be the key of the dialogue, when he says--"Sokrates admits that he has no capacity for long speaking, and that he is no match therein for Protagoras. But as to dialectic debate, or administering and resisting cross-examination, I should be surprised if any one were a match for him. If Protagoras admits that on this point he is inferior, Sokrates requires no more: if he does not, let him continue the debate: but he must not lengthen his answers so that hearers lose the thread of the subject."

[Side-note: Claim of a special _locus standi_ and professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric.]

This remark of Alkibiades, speaking altogether as a vehement partisan of Sokrates, brings to view at least one purpose--if not the main purpose--of Plato in the dialogue. "Sokrates acknowledges the superiority of Protagoras in rhetoric: if Protagoras acknowledges the superiority of Sokrates in dialectic, Sokrates is satisfied."[74] An express _locus standi_ is here claimed for dialectic, and a recognised superiority for its professors on their own ground. Protagoras professes to be master both of long speech and of short speech: but in the last he must recognise a superior.

[Footnote 74: Plat. Prot. p. 336 C-D.]

[Side-note: Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites Protagoras to question him.]

Kritias, Prodikus, and Hippias all speak (each in a manner of his own) deprecating marked partisanship on either side, exhorting both parties to moderation, and insisting that the conversation shall be continued. At length Sokrates consents to remain, yet on condition that Protagoras shall confine himself within the limits of the dialectic procedure. Protagoras (he says) shall first question me as long as he pleases: when he has finished, I will question him. The Sophist, though at first reluctant, is constrained, by the instance of those around, to accede to this proposition.[75]

[Footnote 75: Plat. Prot. pp. 337-338.]

[Side-note: Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides. Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song.]

For the purpose of questioning, Protagoras selects a song of Simonides: prefacing it with a remark, that the most important accomplishment of a cultivated man consists in being thorough master of the works of the poets, so as to understand and appreciate them correctly, and answer all questions respecting them.[76] Sokrates intimates that he knows and admires the song: upon which Protagoras proceeds to point out two passages in it which contradict each other, and asks how Sokrates can explain or justify such contradiction.[77] The latter is at first embarrassed, and invokes the aid of Prodikus; who interferes to uphold the consistency of his fellow-citizen Simonides, but is made to speak (as elsewhere by Plato) in a stupid and ridiculous manner. After a desultory string of remarks,[78] with disputed interpretation of particular phrases and passages of the song, but without promise of any result--Sokrates offers to give an exposition of the general purpose of the whole song, in order that the company may see how far he has advanced in that accomplishment which Protagoras had so emphatically extolled--complete mastery of the works of the poets.[79]

[Footnote 76: Plat. Prot. p. 339 A. [Greek: ê(gou=mai e)gô\ a)ndri\ paidei/as me/giston me/ros ei)=nai, peri\ e)pô=n deino\n ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 77: Plat. Prot. p. 339 C-D.]

[Footnote 78: Plat. Prot. pp. 340-341.]

[Footnote 79: Plat. Prot. p. 342 A. [Greek: ei) bou/lei labei=n mou pei=ran o(/pôs e)/chô, o(\ su\ le/geis tou=to, peri\ e)pô=n.]]

[Side-note: Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech.]

He then proceeds to deliver a long harangue, the commencement of which appears to be a sort of counter-part and parody of the first speech delivered by Protagoras in this dialogue. That Sophist had represented that the sophistical art was ancient:[80] and that the poets, from Homer downward, were Sophists, but dreaded the odium of the name, and professed a different avocation with another title. Sokrates here tells us that philosophy was more ancient still in Krete and Sparta, and that there were more Sophists (he does not distinguish between the Sophist and the philosopher), female as well as male, in those regions, than anywhere else: but that they concealed their name and profession, for fear that others should copy them and acquire the like eminence:[81] that they pretended to devote themselves altogether to arms and gymnastic--a pretence whereby (he says) all the other Greeks were really deluded. The special characteristic of these philosophers or Sophists was, short and emphatic speech--epigram shot in at the seasonable moment, and thoroughly prostrating an opponent.[82] The Seven Wise Men, among whom Pittakus was one, were philosophers on this type, of supreme excellence: which they showed by inscribing their memorable brief aphorisms at Delphi. So great was the celebrity which Pittakus acquired by his aphorism, that Simonides the poet became jealous, and composed this song altogether for the purpose of discrediting him. Having stated this general view, Sokrates illustrates it by going through the song, with exposition and criticism of several different passages.[83] As soon as Sokrates has concluded, Hippias[84] compliments him, and says that he too has a lecture ready prepared on the same song: which he would willingly deliver: but Alkibiades and the rest beg him to postpone it.

[Footnote 80: Plat. Prot. pp. 316-317.]

[Footnote 81: Plat. Prot. p. 342.]

[Footnote 82: Plat. Prot. p. 342 E, 343 B-C. [Greek: O(/ti ou(=tos o( tro/pos ê)=n tô=n palaiô=n tê=s philosophi/as, brachulogi/a tis Lakônikê/.]]

[Footnote 83: Plat. Prot. pp. 344-347.]

[Footnote 84: Plat. Prot. p. 347.]

[Side-note: Character of this speech--its connection with the dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in continuous speech.]

No remark is made by any one present, either upon the circumstance that Sokrates, after protesting against long speeches, has here delivered one longer by far than the first speech of Protagoras, and more than half as long as the second, which contains a large theory--nor upon the sort of interpretation that he bestows upon the Simonidean song. That interpretation is so strange and forced--so violent in distorting the meaning of the poet--so evidently predetermined by the resolution to find Platonic metaphysics in a lyric effusion addressed to a Thessalian prince[85]--that if such an exposition had been found under the name of Protagoras, critics would have dwelt upon it as an additional proof of dishonest perversions by the Sophists.[86] It appears as if Plato, intending in this dialogue to set out the contrast between long or continuous speech (sophistical, rhetorical, poetical) represented by Protagoras, and short, interrogatory speech (dialectical) represented by Sokrates--having moreover composed for Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue, an harangue claiming venerable antiquity for his own accomplishment--has thought it right to compose for Sokrates a pleading with like purpose, to put the two accomplishments on a par. And if that pleading includes both pointless irony and misplaced comparisons (especially what is said about the Spartans)--we must remember that Sokrates has expressly renounced all competition with Protagoras in continuous speech, and that he is here handling the weapon in which he is confessedly inferior. Plato secures a decisive triumph to dialectic, and to Sokrates as representing it: but he seems content here to leave Sokrates on the lower ground as a rhetorician.

[Footnote 85: Especially his explanation of [Greek: e(kô\n e)rdê=|] (p. 345 D.). Heyne (Opuscula, i. p. 160) remarks upon the strange interpretation given by Sokrates of the Simonidean song. Compare Plato in Lysis, p. 212 E, and in Alkib. ii. p. 147 D. In both these cases, Sokrates cites passages of poetry, assigning to them a sense which their authors plainly did not intend them to bear. Heindorf in his note on the Lysis (l. c.) observes--"Videlicet, ut exeat sententia, quam Solon ne somniavit quidem, versuum horum structuram, neglecto plané sermonis usu, hanc statuit.--Cujusmodi interpretationis aliud est luculentum exemplum in Alcib. ii. p. 147 D."

See also Heindorf's notes on the Charmidês, p. 163 B; Lachês, p. 191 B; and Lysis, p. 214 D.

M. Boeckh observes (ad Pindar. Isthm. v. p. 528) respecting an allusion made by Pindar to Hesiod--

"Num malé intellexit poeta intelligentissimus perspicua verba Hesiodi? Non credo: sed bene sciens, consulto alium sensum intulit, suo consilio accommodatum! Simile exemplum offert gravissimus auctor Plato Theætet. p. 155 D." Stallbaum in his note on the Theætêtus adopts this remark of Boeckh. Groen van Prinsterer gives a similar opinion. (Prosopographia Platonica, p. 17.)]

[Footnote 86: K. F. Hermann observes (Gesch. der Plat. Philos, p. 460) that Sokrates, in his interpretation of the Simonidean song, shows that he can play the Sophist as well as other people can.]

[Side-note: Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering.]

Moreover, when Sokrates intends to show himself off as a master of poetical lore ([Greek: peri\ e)pô=n deino\s]), he at the same time claims a right of interpreting the poets in his own way. He considers the poets either as persons divinely inspired, who speak fine things without rational understanding (we have seen this in the Apology and the Ion)--or as men of superior wisdom, who deliver valuable truth lying beneath the surface, and not discernible by vulgar eyes. Both these views differ from that of literal interpretation, which is here represented by Protagoras and Prodikus. And these two Sophists are here contrasted with Sokrates as interpreters of the poets. Protagoras and Prodikus look upon poetical compositions as sources of instruction: and seek to interpret them literally, as an intelligent hearer would have understood them when they were sung or recited for the first time. Towards that end, discrimination of the usual or grammatical meaning of words was indispensable. Sokrates, on the contrary, disregards the literal interpretation, derides verbal distinctions as useless, or twists them into harmony with his own purpose: Simonides and other poets are considered as superior men, and even as inspired men in whose verses wisdom and virtue must be embodied and discoverable[87]--only that they are given in an obscure and enigmatical manner: requiring to be extracted by the divination of the philosopher, who alone knows what wisdom and virtue are. It is for the philosopher to show his ingenuity by detecting the traces of them. This is what Sokrates does with the song of Simonides. He discovers in it supposed underlying thoughts ([Greek: u(ponoi/as]):[88] distinctions of Platonic Metaphysics (between [Greek: ei)=nai] and [Greek: gene/sthai]), and principles of Platonic Ethics ([Greek: ou)dei\s e(/kô kako/s])--he proceeds to point out passages in which they are to be found, and explains the song conformably to them, in spite of much violence to the obvious meaning and verbal structure.[89] But though Sokrates accepts, when required, the task of discussing what is said by the poets, and deals with them according to his own point of view--yet he presently lets us see that they are witnesses called into court by his opponent and not by himself. Alkibiades urges that the debate which had been interrupted shall be resumed and Sokrates himself requests Protagoras to consent. "To debate about the compositions of poets" (says Sokrates), "is to proceed as silly and common-place men do at their banquets: where they cannot pass the time without hiring musical or dancing girls. Noble and well-educated guests, on the contrary, can find enough to interest them in their own conversation, even if they drink ever so much wine.[90] Men such as we are, do not require to be amused by singers nor to talk about the poets, whom no one can ask what they mean; and who, when cited by different speakers, are affirmed by one to mean one thing, and by another to mean something else, without any decisive authority to appeal to. Such men as you and I ought to lay aside the poets, and test each other by colloquy of our own. If you wish to persist in questioning, I am ready to answer: if not, consent to answer me, and let us bring the interrupted debate to a close."[91]

[Footnote 87: See Plato, Phædrus, p. 245 A-B; Apol. p. 22 B-C; Ion, pp. 533-534.

Compare the distinction drawn in Timæus, p. 72 A-B, between the [Greek: ma/ntis] and the [Greek: prophê/tês].]

[Footnote 88: About the [Greek: u(po/noiai] ascribed to the poets, see Repub. ii. p. 378 D.; Xen. Sympos. iii. 6; and F. A. Wolf, Prolegom. Homer. p. clxii.-clxiv.

F. A. Wolf remarks, respecting the various allegorical interpretations of Homer and other Greek poets--

"Sed nec prioribus illis, sive allegorica et anagogica somnia sua ipsi crediderunt, sive ab aliis duntaxat credi voluerunt, idonea deest excusatio. Ita enim ratio comparata est, ut libris, quos a teneris statim annis cognoscimus, omnes propé nostras nostræque ætatis opiniones subjiciamus: ac si illi jampridem populari usu consecrati sunt, ipsa obstat veneratio, quominus in iis absurda et ridicula inesse credamus. Lenimus ergo atque adeo ornamus interpretando, quicquid proprio sensu non ferendum videtur. Atque ita factum est omni tempore in libris iis, qui pro sacris habiti sunt."

The distinction was similar in character, and even more marked in respect of earnest reciprocal antipathy, between the different schools of the Jews in Alexandria and Palestine about the interpretation of the Pentateuch. 1. Those who interpreted literally, [Greek: kata\ tê\n r(êtê\n dia/noian]. 2. Those who set aside the literal interpretation, and explained the text upon a philosophy of their own, above the reach of the vulgar (Eusebius, Præp. Ev. viii. 10). Some admitted both the two interpretations, side by side.

Respecting these allegorising schools of the Hellenistic Jews, from Aristobulus (150 B.C.) down to Philo, see the learned and valuable work of Gfrörer--_Philo und die Jüdisch.-Alexandr. Theosophie_, vol. i. pp. 84-86, ii. p. 356 seq.]

[Footnote 89: Plat. Prot. p. 345.]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Prot. p. 347 D. [Greek: ka)\n ma/nu polu\n oi)=non pi/ôsin]--a phrase which will be found suitably illustrated by the persistent dialectic of Sokrates, even at the close of the Platonic Symposion, after he has swallowed an incredible quantity of wine.]

[Footnote 91: Plat. Prot. pp. 347-348. This remark--that the poet may be interpreted in many different ways, and that you cannot produce him in court to declare or defend his own meaning--is highly significant, in regard to the value set by Sokrates on living conversation and dialectic.]

[Side-note: Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose.]

In spite of this appeal, Protagoras is still unwilling to resume, and is only forced to do so by a stinging taunt from Alkibiades, enforced by requests from Kallias and others. He is depicted as afraid of Sokrates, who, as soon as consent is given, recommences the discussion by saying--"Do not think, Protagoras, that I have any other purpose in debating, except to sift through and through, in conjunction with you, difficulties which puzzle my own mind. Two of us together can do more in this way than any one singly.[92]

[Footnote 92: Plat. Prot. p. 348 C. [Greek: mê\ oi)/ou diale/gesthai me/ soi a)/llo ti boulo/menon ê)\ a)\ au)to\s a)porô=, e(ka/stote tau=ta diaske/psasthai.]

The remark here given should be carefully noted in appreciating the Sokratic frame of mind. The cross-examination which he bestows, is not that of one who himself knows--and who only gets up artificial difficulties to ascertain whether others know as much as he does. On the contrary, it proceeds from one who is himself puzzled; and that which puzzles him he states to others, and debates with others, as affording the best chance of clearing up his own ideas and obtaining a solution.

The grand purpose with Sokrates is to bring into clear daylight the difficulties which impede the construction of philosophy or "reasoned truth," and to sift them thoroughly, instead of slurring them over or hiding them.]

"We are all more fertile and suggestive, with regard to thought, word, and deed, when we act in couples. If a man strikes out anything new by himself, he immediately goes about looking for a companion to whom he can communicate it, and with whom he can jointly review it. Moreover, you are the best man that I know for this purpose, especially on the subject of virtue: for you are not only virtuous yourself, but you can make others so likewise, and you proclaim yourself a teacher of virtue more publicly than any one has ever done before. Whom can I find so competent as you, for questioning and communication on these very subjects?"[93]

[Footnote 93: Plato, Protag. pp. 348-349.]

[Side-note: The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue.]

After this eulogy on dialectic conversation (illustrating still farther the main purpose of the dialogue), Sokrates resumes the argument as it stood when interrupted. _Sokr._--You, Protagoras, said that intelligence, moderation, justice, holiness, courage, were all parts of virtue; but each different from the others, and each having a separate essence and properties of its own. Do you still adhere to that opinion? _Prot._--I now think that the first four are tolerably like and akin to each other, but that courage is very greatly different from all the four. The proof is, that you will find many men pre-eminent for courage, but thoroughly unjust, unholy, intemperate, and stupid.[94] _Sokr._--Do you consider that all virtue, and each separate part of it, is fine and honourable? _Prot._--I consider it in the highest degree fine and honourable: I must be mad to think otherwise.[95]

[Footnote 94: Plato, Protag. p, 349 D. [Greek: ta\ me\n te/ttara au)tô=n e)pieikô=s paraplê/sia a)llê/lois e)sti/n, ê( de\ a)ndrei/a pa/nu polu\ diaphe/ron pa/ntôn tou/tôn.]]

[Footnote 95: Plato, Protag. p. 349 E. [Greek: ka/lliston me\n ou)=n, ei) mê\ mai/nomai/ ge. o(/lon pou kalo\n ô(s oi(=o/n te ma/lista.]

It is not unimportant to notice such declarations as this, put by Plato into the mouth of Protagoras. They tend to show that Plato did not seek (as many of his commentators do) to depict Protagoras as a corruptor of the public mind.]

[Side-note: Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates changes his attack.]

Sokrates then shows that the courageous men are confident men, forward in dashing at dangers, which people in general will not affront: that men who dive with confidence into the water, are those who know how to swim; men who go into battle with confidence as horse-soldiers or light infantry, are those who understand their profession as such. If any men embark in these dangers, without such preliminary knowledge, do you consider them men of courage? Not at all (says Protagoras), they are madmen: courage would be a dishonourable thing, if _they_ were reckoned courageous.[96] Then (replies Sokrates) upon this reasoning, those who face dangers confidently, with preliminary knowledge, are courageous: those who do so without it, are madmen. Courage therefore must consist in knowledge or intelligence?[97] Protagoras declines to admit this, drawing a distinction somewhat confused:[98] upon which Sokrates approaches the same argument from a different point.

[Footnote 96: Plato, Protag. p. 350 B. [Greek: Ai)schro\n me/nt' a)\n, e)/phê, ei)/ê, ê( a)ndrei/a; e)pei\ ou(=toi/ ge maino/menoi/ ei)sin.]]

[Footnote 97: Plato, Protag. p. 350 C.]

[Footnote 98: Plato, Protag. pp. 350-351.]

[Side-note: Identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate.]

_Sokr._--You say that some men live well, others badly. Do you think that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress? _Prot._--No. _Sokr._--But if he passes his life pleasurably until its close, does he not then appear to you to have lived well? _Prot._--I think so. _Sokr._--To live pleasurably therefore is good: to live disagreeably is evil. _Prot._--Yes: at least provided he lives taking pleasure in fine or honourable things.[99] _Sokr._--What! do you concur with the generality of people in calling some pleasurable things evil, and some painful things good? _Prot._--That is my opinion. _Sokr._--But are not all pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, to that extent good, unless some consequences of a different sort result from them? And again, subject to the like limitation, are not all painful things evil, so far forth as they are painful? _Prot._--To that question, absolutely as you put it, I do not know whether I can reply affirmatively--that all pleasurable things are good, and all painful things evil. I think it safer--with reference not merely to the present answer, but to my manner of life generally--to say, that there are some pleasurable things which are good, others which are not good--some painful things which are evil, others which are not evil: again, some which are neither, neither good nor evil.[100] _Sokr._--You call those things pleasurable, which either partake of the nature of pleasure, or cause pleasure? _ Prot._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--When I ask whether pleasurable things are not good, in so far forth as pleasurable--I ask in other words, whether pleasure itself be not good? _Prot._--As you observed before, Sokrates,[101] let us examine the question on each side, to see whether the pleasurable and the good be really the same.

[Footnote 99: Plat. Prot. p. 351 C. [Greek: To\ me\n a)/ra ê(de/ôs zê=n, a)gatho/n, to\ d' a)êdô=s, kako/n? Ei)/per toi=s kaloi=s g', e)/phê, zô/|ê ê(do/menos.]]

[Footnote 100: Plato, Protag. p. 351 D. [Greek: a)lla/ moi dokei= ou) mo/non pro\s tê\n nu=n a)po/krisin e)moi\ a)sphale/steron ei)=nai a)pokri/nasthtai, _a)lla\ kai\ pro\s pa/nta to\n a)/llon bi/on to\n e)mo/n_, o(/ti e)/sti me\n a)\ tô=n ê(de/ôn ou)k e)/stin a)gatha/, e)/sti d' au)= kai\ a(\ tô=n a)niarô=n ou)k e)sti kaka/, e)/sti d' a(\ e)/sti, kai\ tri/ton a(\ ou)de/tera, ou)/te kaka\ ou)/t' a)gatha/.]

These words strengthen farther what I remarked in a recent note, about the character which Plato wished to depict in Protagoras, so different from what is imputed to that Sophist by the Platonic commentators.]

[Footnote 101: Plato, Protag. p. 351 E. [Greek: ô(/sper su\ le/geis, e(ka/stote, ô)= Sô/krates, skopô/metha au)to/.]

This is an allusion to the words used by Sokrates not long before,--[Greek: a(\ au)to\s a)porô= e(ka/stote tau=ta diaske/psasthai], p. 348 C.]

[Side-note: Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant.]

_Sokr._--Let us penetrate from the surface to the interior of the question.[102] What is your opinion about knowledge? Do you share the opinion of mankind generally about it, as you do about pleasure and pain? Mankind regard knowledge as something neither strong nor directive nor dominant. Often (they say), when knowledge is in a man, it is not knowledge which governs him, but something else--passion, pleasure, pain, love, fear--all or any of which overpower knowledge, and drag it round about in their train like a slave. Are you of the common opinion on this point also?[103] Or do you believe that knowledge is an honourable thing, and made to govern man: and that when once a man knows what good and evil things are, he will not be over-ruled by any other motive whatever, so as to do other things than what are enjoined by such knowledge--his own intelligence being a sufficient defence to him?[104] _Prot._--The last opinion is what I hold. To me, above all others, it would be disgraceful not to proclaim that knowledge or intelligence was the governing element of human affairs.

[Footnote 102: Plato, Protag. p. 352 A.]

[Footnote 103: Plato, Protag. p. 352 B-C. [Greek: po/teron kai\ tou=to/ soi dokei= ô(/sper toi=s polloi=s a)nthrô/pois ê)\ a)/llôs? . . . dianoou/menoi peri\ tê=s e)pistê/mês ô(/sper peri\ a)ndrapo/don, perielkome/nês u(po\ tô=n a)/llôn a(pa/ntôn.] Aristotle in the Nikomachean Ethics cites and criticises the opinion of Sokrates, wherein the latter affirmed the irresistible supremacy of knowledge, when really possessed, over all passions and desires. Aristotle cites it with the express phraseology and illustration contained in this passage of the Protagoras. [Greek: E)pista/menon me\n ou)=n ou)/ phasi/ tines oi(=o/n te ei)=nai [a)krateu/esthai]. deino\n ga/r, e)pistê/mês e)nou/sês, ô(s ô)/|eto Sôkra/tês, a)/llo ti kratei=n, kai\ perie/lkein au)tê\n ô(/sper a)ndra/podon. Sôkra/tês me\n ga\r o(/lôs e)ma/cheto pro\s to\n lo/gon, ô(s ou)k ou)/sês a)krasi/as; ou)the/na ga\r u(polamba/nonta, pra/ttein para\ to\ be/ltiston, a)lla\ di' a)/gnoian] (Ethic. N. vii. 2, vii. 3, p. 1145, b. 24). The same metaphor [Greek: perie/lketai e)pistê/mê] is again ascribed to Sokrates by Aristotle, a little farther on in the same treatise, p. 1147, b. 15.

We see from hence that when Aristotle comments upon _the doctrine of Sokrates_, what he here means is, the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras; the citation of this particular metaphor establishes the identity.

In another passage of the Nikom. Eth., Aristotle also cites a fact respecting the Sophist Protagoras, which fact is mentioned in the Platonic dialogue Protagoras--respecting the manner in which that Sophist allowed his pupils to assess their own fee for his teaching (Ethic. Nik. ix. 1, 1164, a. 25).]

[Footnote 104: Plato, Protag. p. 352 C. [Greek: a)ll' i(kanê\n ei)=nai tê\n phro/nêsin boêthei=n tô=| a)nthrô/pô|.]]

[Side-note: Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures.]

_Sokr._--You speak well and truly. But you are aware that most men are of a different opinion. They affirm that many who know what is best, act against their own knowledge, overcome by pleasure or by pain. _Prot._--Most men think so: incorrectly, in my judgment, as they say many other things besides.[105] _Sokr._--When they say that a man, being overcome by food or drink or other temptations, will do things which he knows to be evil, we must ask them, On what ground do you call these things evil? Is it because they impart pleasure at the moment, or because they prepare disease, poverty, and other such things, for the future?[106] Most men would reply, I think, that they called these things evil not on account of the present pleasure which the things produced, but on account of their ulterior consequences--poverty and disease being both of them distressing? _Prot._--Most men would say this. _Sokr._--It would be admitted then that these things were evil for no other reason, than because they ended in pain and in privation of pleasure.[107] _Prot._--Certainly. _Sokr._--Again, when it is said that some good things are painful, such things are meant as gymnastic exercises, military expeditions, medical treatment. Now no one will say that these things are good because of the immediate suffering which they occasion, but because of the ulterior results of health, wealth, and security, which we obtain by them. Thus, these also are good for no other reason, than because they end in pleasures, or in relief or prevention of pain.[108] Or can you indicate any other end, to which men look when they call these matters evil? _Prot._--No other end can be indicated.

[Footnote 105: Plato, Protag. pp. 352-353.]

[Footnote 106: Plato, Protag. p. 353 D. [Greek: ponêra\ de\ au)ta\ pê=| phate ei)=nai? po/teron o(/ti tê\n ê(donê\n tau/tên e)n tô=| parachrê=ma pare/chei kai\ ê(du/ e)stin e(/kaston au)tô=n, ê)\ o(/ti ei)s to\n u(/steron chro/non no/sous te poiei= kai\ peni/as kai\ a)/lla toiau=ta polla\ paraskeua/zei?]]

[Footnote 107: Plato, Protag. p. 353 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n phai/netai. . . . di' ou)de\n a)/llo tau=ta kaka\ o)/nta, ê)\ dio/ti ei)s a)ni/as te a)poteleuta=| kai\ a)/llôn ê(donô=n a)posterei=?]]

[Footnote 108: Plato, Protag. p. 354 B-C. [Greek: Tau=ta de\ a)gatha/ e)sti di' a)/llo ti ê)\ o(/ti ei)s ê(dona\s a)poteleuta=| kai\ lupô=n a)pallaga\s kai\ a)potropa/s? ê)\ e)/chete/ ti a)/llo te/los le/gein, ei)s o(\ a)poble/psantes au)ta\ a)gatha\ kalei=te, a)ll' ê)\ ê(dona/s te kai\ lu/pas? ou)k a)\n phai=en, ô(s e)gô)=|mai. . . . Ou)kou=n tê\n me\n ê(donê\n diô/kete ô(s a)gatho\n o)/n, tê\n de\ lu/pên pheu/gete ô(s kako/n?]]

[Side-note: Pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil. No man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and pain.]

_Sokr._--It thus appears that you pursue pleasure as good, and avoid pain as evil. Pleasure is what you think good: pain is what you think evil: for even pleasure itself appears to you evil, when it either deprives you of pleasures greater than itself, or entails upon you pains outweighing itself. Is there any other reason, or any other ulterior end, to which you look when you pronounce pleasure to be evil? If there be any other between reason, or any other end, tell us what it is.[109] _Prot._--There is none whatever. _Sokr._--The case is similar about pains: you call pain good, when it preserves you from greater pains, or procures for you a future balance of pleasure. If there be any other end to which you look when you call pain good, tell us what it is. _Prot._--You speak truly. _Sokr._--If I am asked why I insist so much on the topic now before us, I shall reply, that it is no easy matter to explain what is meant by being overcome by pleasure; and that the whole proof hinges upon this point--whether there is any other good than pleasure, or any other evil than pain; and whether it be not sufficient, that we should go through life pleasurably and without pains.[110] If this be sufficient, and if no other good or evil can be pointed out, which does not end in pleasures and pains, mark the consequences. Good and evil being identical with pleasurable and painful, it is ridiculous to say that a man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil, under the overpowering influence of pleasure: that is, under the overpowering influence of good.[111] How can it be wrong, that a man should yield to the influence of good? It never can be wrong, except in this case--when the good obtained is of smaller amount than the consequent good forfeited or the consequent evil entailed. What other exchangeable value can there be between pleasures and pains, except in the ratio of quantity--greater or less, more or fewer?[112] If an objector tells me that there is a material difference between pleasures and pains of the moment, and pleasures and pains postponed to a future time, I ask him in reply, Is there any other difference, except in pleasure and pain? An intelligent man ought to put them both in the scale, the pleasures and the pains, the present and the future, so as to determine the balance. Weighing pleasures against pleasures, he ought to prefer the more and the greater: weighing pains against pains, the fewer and the less. If pleasures against pains, then when the latter outweigh the former, reckoning distant as well as near, he ought to abstain from the act: when the pleasures outweigh, he ought to do it. _Prot._--The objectors could have nothing to say against this.[113]

[Footnote 109: Plato, Protag, p. 354 D. [Greek: e)pei\ ei) kat' a)/llo ti au)to\ to\ chai/rein kako\n kalei=te kai\ ei)s a)/llo ti te/los a)poble/psantes, e)/choite a)\n kai\ ê(mi=n ei)pei=n; a)ll' ou)ch e(/xete. Ou)d' e)moi\ dokou=sin, e)/phê o( Prôtago/ras.]]

[Footnote 110: Plato, Protag. p. 354 E. [Greek: e)/peita e)n tou/tô| ei)si\ pa=sai ai( a)podei/xeis; a)ll' e)/ti kai\ nu=n a)nathe/sthai e)/xestin, ei) pê| e)/chete a)/llo ti pha/nai ei)=nai to\ a)gatho\n ê)\ tê\n ê(donê/n, ê)\ to\ kako\n a)/llo ti ê)\ tê\n a)ni/an, ê)\ a)rkei= u(mi=n to\ ê(de/ôs katabiô=nai to\n bi/on a)/neu lupô=n?]]

[Footnote 111: Plato, Protag. p. 355 C.]

[Footnote 112: Plato, Protag. p. 356 A. [Greek: kai\ ti/s a)/llê a)xi/a ê(donê=| pro\s lu/pôn e)sti\n a)ll' ê)\ u(perbolê\ a)llê/lôn kai\ e)/lleipsis? tau=ta d' e)sti\ mei/zô te kai\ smikro/tera gigno/mena a)llê/lôn, kai\ plei/ô kai\ e)la/ttô, kai\ ma=llon kai\ ê(=tton.]]

[Footnote 113: Plato, Protag. p. 356 C.]

[Side-note: Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it.]

_Sokr._--Well then--I shall tell them farther--you know that the same magnitude, and the same voice, appears to you greater when near than when distant. Now, if all our well-doing depended upon our choosing the magnitudes really greater and avoiding those really less, where would the security of our life be found? In the art of mensuration, or in the apparent impression?[114] Would not the latter lead us astray, causing us to vacillate and judge badly in our choice between great and little, with frequent repentance afterwards? Would not the art of mensuration set aside these false appearances, and by revealing to us the truth, impart tranquillity to our minds and security to our lives? Would not the objectors themselves acknowledge that there was no other safety, except in the art of mensuration? _Prot._--They would acknowledge it. _Sokr._--Again, If the good conduct of our lives depended on the choice of odd and even, and in distinguishing rightly the greater from the less, whether far or near, would not our safety reside in knowledge, and in a certain knowledge of mensuration too, in Arithmetic? _Prot._--They would concede to you that also. _Sokr._--Well then, my friends, since the security of our lives has been found to depend on the right choice of pleasure and pain--between the more and fewer, greater and less, nearer and farther--does it not come to a simple estimate of excess, deficiency, and equality between them? in other words, to mensuration, art, or science?[115] What kind of art or science it is, we will enquire another time: for the purpose of our argument, enough has been done when we have shown that it _is_ science.

[Footnote 114: Plato, Protag. p. 356 D. [Greek: ei) ou)=n e)n tou/tô| ê(mi=n ê)=n to\ eu)= pra/ttein, e)n tô=| ta\ me\n mega/la mê/kê kai\ pra/ttein kai\ lamba/nein, ta\ de\ smikra\ kai\ pheu/gein kai\ mê\ pra/ttein, ti/s a)\n ê(mi=n sôtêri/a e)pha/nê tou= bi/ou? a)=ra ê( metrêtikê\ te/chnê, ê)\ ê( tou= phainome/nou du/namis? . . . A)=r' a)\n o(mologoi=en oi( a)/nthrôpoi pro\s tau=ta ê(ma=s tê\n metrêtikê\n sô/zein a)\n te/chnên, ê)\ a)/llên?]]

[Footnote 115: Plato, Protag. p. 357 A-v. [Greek: e)peidê\ de\ ê(donê=s te kai\ lu/pês e)n o)rthê=| tê=| ai(re/sei e)pha/nê _ê(mi=n ê( sôtêri/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa, tou= te ple/onos_ kai\ e(la/ttonos kai\ mei/zonos kai\ smikrote/ron kai\ por)r(ôte/rô kai\ e)ggute/rô, a)=ra prô=ton me\n ou) metrêtikê\ phai/netai, u(perbolê=s te kai\ e)ndei/as ou)=sa kai\ i)so/têtos pro\s a)llê/las ske/psis? A)ll' a)na/gkê. E)pei\ de\ metrêtikê/, a)na/gkê| dê/pou te/chnê kai\ e)pistê/mê.]]

[Side-note: To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance.]

For when _we_ (Protagoras and Sokrates) affirmed, that nothing was more powerful than science or knowledge, and that this, in whatsoever minds it existed, prevailed over pleasure and every thing else--_you_ (the supposed objectors) maintained, on the contrary, that pleasure often prevailed over knowledge even in the instructed man: and you called upon us to explain, upon our principles, what that mental affection was, which people called, being overcome by the seduction of pleasure. We have now shown you that this mental affection is nothing else but ignorance, and the gravest ignorance. You have admitted that those who go wrong in the choice of pleasures and pains--that is, in the choice of good and evil things--go wrong from want of knowledge, of the knowledge or science of mensuration. The wrong deed done from want of knowledge, is done through ignorance. What you call being overcome by pleasure is thus, the gravest ignorance; which these Sophists, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias, engage to cure: but you (the objectors whom we now address) not believing it to be ignorance, or perhaps unwilling to pay them their fees, refuse to visit them, and therefore go on doing ill, both privately and publicly.[116]

[Footnote 116: Plato, Protag. p. 357 E.]

[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable.]

Now then, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias (continues Sokrates), I turn to you, and ask, whether you account my reasoning true or false? (All of them pronounced it to be surpassingly true.) _Sokr._--You all agree, then, all three, that the pleasurable is good, and that the painful is evil:[117] for I take no account at present of the verbal distinctions of Prodikus, discriminating between the _pleasurable_, the _delightful_, and the _enjoyable_. If this be so, are not all those actions, which conduct to a life of pleasure or to a life free from pain, honourable? and is not the honourable deed, good and profitable?[118] (In this, all persons present concurred.) If then the pleasurable is good, no one ever does anything, when he either knows or believes other things in his power to be better. To be inferior to yourself is nothing else than ignorance: to be superior to yourself, is nothing else than wisdom. Ignorance consists in holding false opinions, and in being deceived respecting matters of high importance. (Agreed by all.) Accordingly, no one willingly enters upon courses which are evil, or which he believes to be evil; nor is it in the nature of man to enter upon what he thinks evil courses, in preference to good. When a man is compelled to make choice between two evils, no one will take the greater when he might take the less.[119] (Agreed to by all three.) Farther, no one will affront things of which he is afraid, when other things are open to him, of which he is not afraid: for fear is an expectation of evil, so that what a man fears, he of course thinks to be an evil,--and will not approach it willingly. (Agreed.)[120]

[Footnote 117: Plato, Protag. p. 358 A. [Greek: u(perphuô=s e)do/kei a(/pasin a)lêthê= ei)=nai ta\ ei)rême/na. O(mologei=te a)/ra, ê)=n d' e)gô/, to\ me\n ê(du\ a)gatho\n ei)=nai, to\ de\ a)niaro\n kako/n.]]

[Footnote 118: Plato, Protag. p. 358 B. [Greek: ai( e)pi\ tou/tou pra/xeis a(/pasai e)pi\ tou= a)lu/pôs zê=n kai\ ê)de/ôs, a)=r' ou) kalai/? kai\ to\ kalo\n e)/rgon, a)gatho/n te kai\ ô)phe/limon?]]

[Footnote 119: Plato, Protag. p. 358 C-D. [Greek: e)pi/ ge ta\ kaka\ ou)dei\s e(kô\n e)/rchetai, ou)de\ e)pi\ a(\ oi)/etai kaka\ ei)=nai, ou)d' e)sti\ tou=to, ô(s e)/oiken, e)n a)nthrô/pou phu/sei, e)pi\ a(\ oi)/etai kaka\ ei)=nai e)the/lein i)e/nai a)nti\ tô=n a)gathô=n; o(/tan te a)nagka/sthê| duoi=n kakoi=n to\ e(/teron ai)rei=sthai, ou)dei\s to\ mei=zon ai(rê/setai, e)xo\n to\ e)/latton.]]

[Footnote 120: Plato, Protag. p. 358 E.]

[Side-note: Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible.]

_Sokr._--Let us now revert to the explanation of courage, given by Protagoras. He said that four out of the five parts of virtue were tolerably similar; but that courage differed greatly from all of them. And he affirmed that there were men distinguished for courage; yet at the same time eminently unjust, immoderate, unholy, and stupid. He said, too, that the courageous men were men to attempt things which timid men would not approach. Now, Protagoras, what are these things which the courageous men alone are prepared to attempt? Will they attempt terrible things, believing them to be terrible? _Prot._--That is impossible, as you have shown just now. _Sokr._--No one will enter upon that which he believes to be terrible,--or, in other words, will go into evil knowing it to be evil: a man who does so is inferior to himself--and this, as we have agreed, is ignorance, or the contrary of knowledge. All men, both timid and brave, attempt things upon which they have a good heart: in this respect, the things which the timid and the brave go at, are the same.[121] _Prot._--How can this be? The things which the timid and the brave go at or affront, are quite contrary: for example, the latter are willing to go to war, which the former are not. _Sokr._--Is it honourable to go to war, or dishonourable? _Prot._--Honourable. _Sokr._--If it be honourable, it must also be good:[122] for we have agreed, in the preceding debate, that all honourable things were good. _Prot._--You speak truly.[123] I at least always persist in thinking so. _Sokr._--Which of the two is it, who (you say) are unwilling to go into war; it being an honourable and good thing? _Prot._--The cowards. _Sokr._--But if going to war be an honourable and good thing, it is also pleasurable? _Prot._--Certainly that has been admitted.[124] _Sokr._--Is it then knowingly that cowards refuse to go into war, which is both more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? _Prot._--We cannot say so, without contradicting our preceding admissions. _Sokr._--What about the courageous man? does not he affront or go at what is more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? _Prot._--It cannot be denied. _Sokr._--Courageous men then, generally, are those whose fears, when they are afraid, are honourable and good--not dishonourable or bad: and whose confidence, when they feel confident, is also honourable and good?[125] On the contrary, cowards, impudent men, and madmen, both fear, and feel confidence, on dishonourable occasions? _Prot._--Agreed. _Sokr._--When they thus view with confidence things dishonourable and evil, is it from any other reason than from ignorance and stupidity? Are they not cowards from stupidity, or a stupid estimate of things terrible? And is it not in this ignorance, or stupid estimate of things terrible, and things not terrible--that cowardice consists? Lastly,[126]--courage being the opposite of cowardice--is it not in the knowledge, or wise estimate, of things terrible and things not terrible, that courage consists?

[Footnote 121: Plato, Protag. p. 359 D. [Greek: e)pi\ me\n a(\ deina\ ê(gei=tai ei)=nai ou)dei\s e)/rchetai, e)peidê\ to\ ê(/ttô ei)=nai e(autou= eu(re/thê a)mathi/a ou)=sa. Ô(molo/gei. A)lla\ mê\n e)pi\ a(/ ge thar)r(ou=si pa/ntes au)= e)/rchontai, kai\ deiloi\ kai\ a)ndrei=oi, kai\ tau/tê| ge e)pi\ ta\ au)ta\ e)/rchontai oi( deiloi/ te kai\ oi( a)ndrei=oi.]]

[Footnote 122: Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. [Greek: po/teron kalo\n o(\n i)e/nai (ei)s to\n po/lemon) ê)\ ai)schro/n? Kalo/n, e)/phê. Ou)kou=n, ei)/per kalo/n, kai\ a)gatho\n ô(mologê/samen e)n toi=s e)/mprosthen; ta\s ga\r kala\s pra/xeis a(pa/sas a)gatha\s ô(mologê/samen?]]

[Footnote 123: Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. [Greek: A)lêthê= le/geis, kai\ a)ei\ e)/moige dokei= ou(/tôs.]

This answer, put into the mouth of Protagoras, affords another proof that Plato did not intend to impute to him the character which many commentators impute.]

[Footnote 124: Plato, Protag. p. 360 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n, ê)\n d' e)gô/, ei)/per kalo\n kai\ a)gatho/n, kai\ ê(du/? Ô(molo/gêtai gou=n, e)/phê.]]

[Footnote 125: Plato, Protag. p. 360 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n o(/lôs oi( a)ndrei=oi ou)k ai)schrou\s pho/bous phobou=ntai, o(/tav phobô=ntai, ou)de\ ai)schra\ tha/r)r(ê tha/r)r(ou=sin? . . . Ei) de\ mê\ ai)schra/, a)=r' ou) kala/? . . . Ei) de\ kala/, kai\ a)gatha/?]]

[Footnote 126: Plato, Protag. p. 360 D. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ê( tô=n deinôn kai\ mê\ deinô=n a)mathi/a deili/a a)\n ei)/ê? . . . Ê( sophi/a a)/ra tô=n deinô=n kai\ mê\ deinô=n, a)ndrei/a e)sti/n, e)nanti/a ou)=sa tê=| tou/tôn a)mathi/a|?]]

[Side-note: Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras. Amicable reply of Protagoras.]