Chapter XXII: Appendix: Greek: To\ daimo/nion sêmei=on

Here is one of the points most insisted on by Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, as proving that the Theagês is not the work of Plato. These critics affirm (to use the language of Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 220) "Quam Plato alias de Socratis dæmonio prodidit sententiam, ea longissimè recedit ab illâ ratione, quæ in hoc sermone exposita est". He says that the representation of the Dæmon of Sokrates, given in the Theagês, has been copied from a passage in the Theætêtus, by an imitator who has not understood the passage, p. 150, D, E. But Socher (p. 97) appears to me to have shown satisfactorily, that there is no such material difference as these critics affirm between this passage of the Theætêtus and the Theagês. In the Theætêtus, Sokrates declares, that none of his companions learnt any thing from him, but that all of them [Greek: oi(=sper a)\n o( theo\s parei/kê|] (the very same term is used at the close of the Theagês--131 A, [Greek: e)a\n me\n parei/kê| ê(mi=n--to\ daimo/nion]) made astonishing progress and improvement in his company. Stallbaum says, "Itaque [Greek: o( theo\s], qui ibi memoratur, non est Socratis dæmonium, sed potius deus _i.e._ sors divina. Quod non perspiciens _noster tenebrio_ protenus illud dæmonium, quod Socrates sibi semper adesse dictitabat, ad eum dignitatis et potentiæ gradum evexit, ut, &c." I agree with Socher in thinking that the phrase [Greek: o( theo\s] in the Theætêtus has substantially the same meaning as [Greek: to\ daimo/nion] in the Theagês. Both Schleiermacher (Notes on the Apology, p. 432) and Ast (p. 482), have notes on the phrase [Greek: to\ daimo/nion]--and I think the note of Ast is the more instructive of the two. In Plato and Xenophon, the words [Greek: to\ daimo/nion], [Greek: to\ thei=on], are in many cases undistinguishable in meaning from [Greek: o( dai/môn], [Greek: o( theo/s]. Compare the Phædrus, 242 E, about [Greek: theo\s] and [Greek: thei=o/n ti]. Sokrates, in his argument against Meletus in the Apology (p. 27) emphatically argues that no man could believe in any thing [Greek: daimo/nion], without also believing in [Greek: daimo/nes]. The special [Greek: thei=o/n ti kai\ daimo/nion (Apol. p. 31 C), which presented itself in regard to him and his proceedings, was only one of the many modes in which (as he believed) [Greek: o( theo/s] commanded and stimulated him to work upon the minds of the Athenians:--[Greek: e)moi\ de\ tou=to, ô(s e)gô/ phêmi, proste/taktai u(po\ tou= theou= pra/ttein kai\ e)k manteiô=n kai\ e)x e)nupni/ôn kai\ panti\ tro/pô|, ô(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\ a)/llê thei/a moi=ra a)nthrô/pô| kai\ o(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein] (Apol. p. 33 C). So again in Apol. p. 40 A, B, [Greek: ê( ei)ôthui=a/ moi mantikê\ ê( tou= daimoni/ou]--and four lines afterwards we read the very same fact intimated in the words, [Greek: to\ tou= theou= sêmei=on], where Sokratis dæmonium--and Deus--are identified: thus refuting the argument above cited from Stallbaum. There is therefore no such discrepancy, in reference to [Greek: to\ daimo/nion], as Stallbaum and Schleiermacher contend for. We perceive indeed this difference between them--that in the Theætêtus, the simile of the obstetric art is largely employed, while it is not noticed in the Theagês. But we should impose an unwarrantable restriction upon Plato's fancy, if we hindered him from working out his variety and exuberance of metaphors, and from accommodating each dialogue to the metaphor predominant with him at the time.

Moreover, in respect to what is called the Dæmon of Sokrates, we ought hardly to expect that either Plato or Xenophon would always be consistent even with themselves. It is unsafe for a modern critic to determine beforehand, by reason or feelings of his own, in what manner either of them would speak upon this mysterious subject. The belief and feeling of a divine intervention was very real on the part of both, but their manner of conceiving it might naturally fluctuate: and there was, throughout all the proceedings of Sokrates, a mixture of the serious and the playful, of the sublime and the eccentric, of ratiocinative acuteness with impulsive superstition--which it is difficult to bring into harmonious interpretation. Such heterogeneous mixture is forcibly described in the Platonic Symposium, pp. 215-222. When we consider how undefined, and undefinable, the idea of this [Greek: daimo/nion] was, we cannot wonder if Plato ascribes to it different workings and manifestations at different times. Stallbaum affirms that it is made ridiculous in the Theagês: and Kühner declares that Plutarch makes it ridiculous, in his treatise De Genio Sokratia (Comm. ad. Xenoph. Memor. p. 23). But this is because its agency is described more in detail. You can easily present it in a ridiculous aspect, by introducing it as intervening on petty and insignificant matters. Now it is remarkable, that in the Apology, we are expressly told that it actually did intervene on the most trifling occasions--[Greek: pa/nu e)pi\ smikroi=s e)nantioume/nê]. The business of an historian of philosophy is, to describe it as it was really felt and believed by Sokrates and Plato--whether a modern critic may consider the description ridiculous or not.

When Schleiermacher says (Einleitung, p. 248), respecting the _falsarius_ whom he supposes to have written the Theagês--"Damit ist ihm begegnet, auf eine höchst verkehrte Art wunderbar zusammenzurühren diese göttliche Schickung, und jenes persönliche Vorgefühl welches dem Sokrates zur göttlichen Stimme ward".--I contend that the mistake is chargeable to Schleiermacher himself, for bisecting into two phenomena that which appears in the Apology as the same phenomenon under two different names--[Greek: to\ daimo/nion]--[Greek: to\ tou= theou= sêmei=on]. Besides, to treat the Dæmon as a mere "personal presentiment" of Sokrates, may be a true view:--but it is the view of one who does not inhale the same religious atmosphere as Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon. It cannot therefore be properly applied in explaining their sayings or doings. Kühner, who treats the Theagês as not composed by Plato, grounds this belief partly on the assertion, that the [Greek: daimo/nion] of Sokrates is described therein as something peculiar to Sokrates; which, according to Kühner, was the fiction of a subsequent time. By Sokrates and his contemporaries (Kühner says) it was considered "non sibi soli tanquam proprium quoddam beneficium a Diis tributum, sed commune sibi esse cum cæteris hominibus" (pp. 20-21). I dissent entirely from this view, which is contradicted by most of the passages noticed even by Kühner himself. It is at variance with the Platonic Apology, as well as with the Theætêtus (150 D), and Republic (vi. 496 C). Xenophon does indeed try, in the first Chapter of the Memorabilia, as the defender of Sokrates, to soften the _invidia_ against Sokrates, by intimating that other persons had communications from the Gods as well as he. But we see plainly, even from other passages of the Memorabilia, that this was not the persuasion of Sokrates himself, nor of his friends, nor of his enemies. They all considered it (as it is depicted in the Theagês also) to be a special privilege and revelation.