Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2

Chapter XXIV: Gorgias (1)

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[Side-note: Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the historical Gorgias.]

Aristotle, in one of his lost dialogues, made honourable mention of a Corinthian cultivator, who, on reading the Platonic Gorgias, was smitten with such vehement admiration, that he abandoned his fields and his vines, came to Athens forthwith, and committed himself to the tuition of Plato.[1] How much of reality there may be in this anecdote, we cannot say: but the Gorgias itself is well calculated to justify such warm admiration. It opens with a discussion on the nature and purpose of Rhetoric, but is gradually enlarged so as to include a comparison of the various schemes of life, and an outline of positive ethical theory. It is carried on by Sokrates with three distinct interlocutors--Gorgias, Polus, and Kalliklês; but I must again remind the reader that all the four are only spokesmen prompted by Plato himself.[2] It may indeed be considered almost as three distinct dialogues, connected by a loose thread. The historical Gorgias, a native of Leontini in Sicily, was the most celebrated of the Grecian rhetors; an elderly man during Plato's youth. He paid visits to different cities in all parts of Greece, and gave lessons in rhetoric to numerous pupils, chiefly young men of ambitious aspirations.[3]

[Footnote 2: Aristeides, Orat. xlvi. p. 387, Dindorf. [Greek: Ti/s ga\r ou)k oi)=den, o(/ti kai\ o( Sôkra/tês kai\ o( Kalliklê=s kai\ o( Gorgi/as kai\ o( Pô=los, pa/nta tau=t' e)sti\ Pla/tôn, pro\s to\ dokou=n au)tô=| tre/pôn tou\s lo/gous?] Though Aristeides asks reasonably enough, Who is ignorant of this?--the remarks of Stallbaum and others often imply forgetfulness of it.]

[Footnote 3: Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, vol. iii. p. 22) is of opinion that Plato composed the Gorgias shortly after returning from his first voyage to Sicily, 387 B.C.

I shall not contradict this: but I see nothing to prove it. At the same time, Schleiermacher assumes as certain that Aristophanes in the Ekklesiazusæ alludes to the doctrines published by Plato in his Republic (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 20). Putting these two statements together, the Gorgias would be later in date of composition than the Republic, which I hardly think probable. However, I do not at all believe that Aristophanes in the Ekklesiazusæ makes any allusion to the Republic of Plato. Nor shall I believe, until some evidence is produced, that the Republic was composed at so early a date as 390 B.C.]

[Side-note: Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and Kalliklês.]

Sokrates and Chærephon are described as intending to come to a rhetorical lecture of Gorgias, but as having been accidentally detained so as not to arrive until just after it has been finished, with brilliant success. Kalliklês, however, the host and friend of Gorgias, promises that the rhetor will readily answer any questions put by Sokrates; which Gorgias himself confirms, observing at the same time that no one had asked him any new question for many years past.[4] Sokrates accordingly asks Gorgias what his profession is? what it is that he teaches? what is the definition of rhetoric? Not receiving a satisfactory answer, Sokrates furnishes a definition of his own: out of which grow two arguments of wide ethical bearing: carried on by Sokrates, the first against Polus, the second against Kalliklês. Both these two are represented as voluble speakers, of confident temper, regarding the acquisition of political power and oratorical celebrity as the grand objects of life. Polus had even composed a work on Rhetoric, of which we know nothing: but the tone of this dialogue would seem to indicate (as far as we can judge from such evidence) that the style of the work was affected, and the temper of the author flippant.

[Footnote 4: Plato, Gorg. pp. 447-448 A. The dialogue is supposed to be carried on in the presence of many persons, seemingly belonging to the auditory of the lecture which Gorgias has just finished, p. 455 C.]

[Side-note: Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good definition.]

Here, as in the other dialogues above noticed, the avowed aim of Sokrates is--first, to exclude long speaking--next, to get the question accurately conceived, and answered in an appropriate manner. Specimens are given of unsuitable and inaccurate answers, which Sokrates corrects. The conditions of a good definition are made plain by contrast with bad ones; which either include much more than the thing defined, or set forth what is accessory and occasional in place of what is essential and constant. These tentatives and gropings to find a definition are always instructive, and must have been especially so in the Platonic age, when logical distinctions had never yet been made a subject of separate attention or analysis.

[Side-note: Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the artisan of persuasion.]

About what is Rhetoric as a cognition concerned, Gorgias? _Gorg._--About words or discourses. _Sokr._--About what discourses? such as inform sick men how they are to get well? _Gorg._--No. _Sokr._--It is not about all discourses? _Gorg._--It makes men competent to speak: of course therefore also to think, upon the matters on which they speak.[5] _Sokr._--But the medical and gymnastic arts do this likewise, each with reference to its respective subject: what then is the difference between them and Rhetoric? _Gorg._--The difference is, that each of these other arts tends mainly towards some actual work or performance, to which the discourses, when required at all, are subsidiary: but Rhetoric accomplishes every thing by discourses alone.[6] _Sokr._--But the same may be said about arithmetic, geometry, and other sciences. How are they distinguished from Rhetoric? You must tell me upon what matters the discourses with which Rhetoric is conversant turn; just as you would tell me, if I asked the like question about arithmetic or astronomy. _Gorg._--The discourses, with which Rhetoric is conversant, turn upon the greatest of all human affairs. _Sokr._--But this too, Gorgias, is indistinct and equivocal. Every man, the physician, the gymnast, the money-maker, thinks his own object and his own affairs the greatest of all.[7] _Gorg._--The function of Rhetoric, is to persuade assembled multitudes, and thus to secure what are in truth the greatest benefits: freedom to the city, political command to the speaker.[8] _Sokr._--Rhetoric is then the artisan of persuasion. Its single purpose is to produce persuasion in the minds of hearers? _Gorg._--It is so.

[Footnote 5: Plato, Gorgias, p. 449 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n peri\ ô(=nper le/gein, kai\ phronei=n? Pô=s ga\r ou)/?]]

[Footnote 6: Plato, Gorgias, p. 450 B-C. [Greek: tê=s r(êtorikê=s . . . . pa=sa ê( pra=xis kai\ ê( ku/rôsis dia\ lo/gôn e)sti/n . . . .]]

[Footnote 7: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 451-452.]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Gorgias, p. 452 D. [Greek: O(/per e)/sti tê=| a)lêthei/a| me/giston a)gatho/n, kai\ ai)/tion, a)/ma me\n e)leutheri/as au)toi=s toi=s a)nthrô/pois, a)/ma de\ tou= a)/llôn a)/rchein e)n tê=| au(tou= po/lei e(ka/stô|.]]

[Side-note: The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what matters is he competent to advise?]

_Sokr._--But are there not other persons besides the Rhetor, who produce persuasion? Does not the arithmetical teacher, and every other teacher, produce persuasion? How does the Rhetor differ from them? What mode of persuasion does he bring about? Persuasion about what? _Gorg._--I reply--it is that persuasion which is brought about in Dikasteries, and other assembled multitudes--and which relates to just and unjust.[9] _Sokr._--You recognise that to have learnt and to know any matter, is one thing--to believe it, is another: that knowledge and belief are different--knowledge being always true, belief sometimes false? _Gorg._--Yes. _Sokr._--We must then distinguish two sorts of persuasion: one carrying with it knowledge--the other belief without knowledge. Which of the two does the Rhetor bring about? _Gorg._--That which produces belief without knowledge. He can teach nothing. _Sokr._--Well, then, Gorgias, on what matters will the Rhetor be competent to advise? When the people are deliberating about the choice of generals or physicians, about the construction of docks, about practical questions of any kind--there will be in each case a special man informed and competent to teach or give counsel, while the Rhetor is not competent. Upon what then can the Rhetor advise--upon just and unjust--nothing else?[10]

[Footnote 9: Plato, Gorgias, p. 454 B.]

[Footnote 10: Plato, Gorgias, p. 455 D.]

[Side-note: The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among the ignorant.]

The Rhetor (says Gorgias) or accomplished public speaker, will give advice about all the matters that you name, and others besides. He will persuade the people and carry them along with him, even against the opinion of the special _Expert_. He will talk more persuasively than the craftsman about matters of the craftsman's own business. The power of the Rhetor is thus very great: but he ought to use it, like all other powers, for just and honest purposes; not to abuse it for wrong and oppression. If he does the latter, the misdeed is his own, and not the fault of his teacher, who gave his lessons with a view that they should be turned to proper use. If a man, who has learnt the use of arms, employs them to commit murder, this abuse ought not to be imputed to his master of arms.[11]

[Footnote 11: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 456-457.]

You mean (replies Sokrates) that he, who has learnt Rhetoric from you, will become competent not to teach, but to persuade the multitude:--that is, competent among the ignorant. He has acquired an engine of persuasion; so that he will appear, when addressing the ignorant, to know more than those who really do know.[12]

[Footnote 12: Plato, Gorgias, p. 459 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\ peri\ ta\s a)/llas a(pa/sas te/chnas ô(sau/tôs e)/chei o( r(ê/tôr kai\ ê( r(êtorikê/; au)ta\ me\n ta\ pra/gmata ou)de\n dei= au)tê\n ei)de/nai o(/pôs e)/chei, mêchanê\n de/ tina peithou=s eu(rêke/nai, ô(/ste phai/nesthai toi=s ou)k ei)do/si ma=llon ei)de/nai tô=n ei)do/tôn.]]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes up the debate with Sokrates.]

Thus far, the conversation is carried on between Sokrates and Gorgias. But the latter is now made to contradict himself--apparently rather than really--for the argument whereby Sokrates reduces him to a contradiction, is not tenable, unless we admit the Platonic doctrine that the man who has learnt just and unjust, may be relied on to act as a just man;[13] in other words, that virtue consists in knowledge.

[Footnote 13: Plato, Gorgias, p. 460 B. [Greek: o( ta\ di/kaia memathêkô/s, di/kaios]. Aristotle notices this confusion of Sokrates, who falls into it also in the conversation with Euthydemus, Xenoph. Memorab. iv. 2, 20, iii. 9, 5.]

[Side-note: Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to cookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery.]

Polus now interferes and takes up the conversation: challenging Sokrates to furnish what _he_ thinks the proper definition of Rhetoric. Sokrates obeys, in a tone of pungent polemic. Rhetoric (he says) is no art at all, but an empirical knack of catering for the pleasure and favour of hearers; analogous to cookery.[14] It is a talent falling under the general aptitude called Flattery; possessed by some bold spirits, who are forward in divining and adapting themselves to the temper of the public.[15] It is not honourable, but a mean pursuit, like cookery. It is the shadow or false imitation of a branch of the political art.[16] In reference both to the body and the mind, there are two different conditions: one, a condition really and truly good--the other, good only in fallacious appearance, and not so in reality. To produce, and to verify, the really good condition of the body, there are two specially qualified professions, the gymnast or trainer and the physician: in regard to the mind, the function of the trainer is performed by the law-giving power, that of the physician by the judicial power. Law-making, and adjudicating, are both branches of the political art, and when put together make up the whole of it. Gymnastic and medicine train and doctor the body towards its really best condition: law-making and adjudicating do the same in regard to the mind. To each of the four, there corresponds a sham counterpart or mimic, a branch under the general head _flattery_--taking no account of what is really best, but only of that which is most agreeable for the moment, and by this trick recommending itself to a fallacious esteem.[17] Thus Cosmetic, or Ornamental Trickery, is the counterfeit of Gymnastic; and Cookery the counterfeit of Medicine. Cookery studies only what is immediately agreeable to the body, without considering whether it be good or wholesome: and does this moreover, without any truly scientific process of observation or inference, but simply by an empirical process of memory or analogy. But Medicine examines, and that too by scientific method, only what is good and wholesome for the body, whether agreeable or not. Amidst ignorant men, Cookery slips in as the counterfeit of medicine; pretending to know what food is _good_ for the body, while it really knows only what food is _agreeable_. In like manner, the artifices of ornament dress up the body to a false appearance of that vigour and symmetry, which Gymnastics impart to it really and intrinsically.

[Footnote 14: Plato, Gorgias, p. 462 C. [Greek: e)mpeiri/a . . . . cha/rito/s tinos kai\ ê(donê=s a)pergasi/as]. In the Philêbus (pp. 55-56) Sokrates treats [Greek: i)atrikê\] differently, as falling short of the idea of [Greek: te/chnê], and coming much nearer to what is here called [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] or [Greek: stochastikê/]. Asklepiades was displeased with the Thracian Dionysius for calling [Greek: grammatikê\] by the name of [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] instead of [Greek: te/chnê]: see Sextus Empiric. adv. Grammat. s. 57-72, p. 615, Bekk.]

[Footnote 15: Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 A. [Greek: dokei= moi ei)=nai/ ti e)pitê/deuma, techniko\n me\n ou)/, psuchê=s de\ stochastikê=s kai\ a)ndrei/as kai\ phu/sei deinê=s prosomilei=n toi=s a)nthrô/pois; kalô= de\ au)tou= e)gô\ to\ kepha/laion _kolakei/an_.]]

[Footnote 16: Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 D. [Greek: politikê=s mori/ou ei)/dôlon].]

[Footnote 17: Plato, Gorgias, p. 464 C. [Greek: tetta/rôn dê\ tou/tôn ou)sô=n, kai\ a)ei\ pro\s to\ be/ltiston therapeuousô=n, tô=n me\n to\ sô=ma, tô=n de\ tê\n psuchê/n, ê( kolakeutikê\ ai)sthome/nê, ou) gnou=sa le/gô a)lla\ stochasame/nê, te/tracha e(autê\n dianei/masa, u(podu=sa u(po\ e(/kaston tô=n mori/ôn, prospoiei=tai ei)=nai tou=to o(/per u(pe/du; kai\ tou= me\n belti/stou ou)de\n phronti/zei, tô=| de\ a)ei\ ê(di/stô| thêreu/etai tê\n a)/noian kai\ e)xapata=|, ô(/ste dokei= plei/stou a)xi/a ei)=nai.]]

[Side-note: Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure.]

The same analogies hold in regard to the mind. Sophistic is the shadow or counterfeit of law-giving: Rhetoric, of judging or adjudicating. The lawgiver and the judge aim at what is good for the mind: the Sophist and the Rhetor aim at what is agreeable to it. This distinction between them (continues Sokrates) is true and real: though it often happens that the Sophist is, both by himself and by others, confounded with and mistaken for the lawgiver, because he deals with the same topics and occurrences: and the Rhetor, in the same manner, is confounded with the judge.[18] The Sophist and the Rhetor, addressing themselves to the present relish of an undiscerning public, are enabled to usurp the functions and the credit of their more severe and far-sighted rivals.

[Footnote 18: Plato, Gorgias, p. 465 C. [Greek: die/stêke me\n ou(/tô phu/sei; a(/te de\ e)ggu\s o)/ntôn, phu/rontai e)n tô=| au)tô=| kai\ peri\ tau)ta\ sophistai\ kai\ r(ê/tores, kai\ ou)k e)/chousin o(/, ti chrê/sôntai ou)/te au)toi\ e(autoi=s ou)/te oi( a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi tou/tois.]

It seems to me that the persons whom Plato here designates as being confounded together are, the Sophist with the lawgiver, the Rhetor with the judge or dikast; which is shown by the allusion, three lines farther on, to the confusion between the cook and the physician. Heindorf supposes that the persons designated as being confounded are, the Sophist with the Rhetor; which I cannot think to be the meaning of Plato.]

[Side-note: Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish.]

This is the definition given by Sokrates of Rhetoric and of the Rhetor. Polus then asks him: You say that Rhetoric is a branch of Flattery: Do you think that good Rhetors are considered as flatterers in their respective cities? _Sokr._--I do not think that[19] they are considered at all. _Polus._--How! not considered? Do not good Rhetors possess great power in their respective cities? _Sokr._--No: if you understand the possession of power as a good thing for the possessor. _Polus._--I do understand it so. _Sokr._--Then I say that the Rhetors possess nothing beyond the very minimum of power. _Polus._--How can that be? Do not they, like despots, kill, impoverish, and expel any one whom they please? _Sokr._--I admit that both Rhetors and Despots can do what seems good to themselves, and can bring penalties of death, poverty, or exile upon others: but I say that nevertheless they have no power, because they can do nothing which they really wish.[20]

[Footnote 19: Plat. Gorg. p. 466 B. _Polus._ [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n dokou=si/ soi ô(s ko/lakes e)n tai=s po/lesi phau=loi nomi/zesthai oi( a)gathoi\ r(ê/tores? . . . . ] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)de\ nomi/zesthai e)/moige dokou=sin.]

The play on words here--for I see nothing else in it--can be expressed in English as well as in Greek. It has very little pertinence; because, as a matter of fact, the Rhetors certainly had considerable importance, whether they deserved it or not. How little Plato cared to make his comparisons harmonise with the fact, may be seen by what immediately follows--where he compares the Rhetors to Despots? and puts in the mouth of Polus the assertion that they kill or banish any one whom they choose.]

[Footnote 20: Plato, Gorgias, p. 466 E. [Greek: ou)de\n ga\r poiei=n ô(=n bou/lontai, ô(s e)/pos ei)pei=n; poiei=n me/ntoi o(\, ti a)\n au)toi=s do/xê| be/ltiston ei)=nai.]]

[Side-note: All men wish for what is good for them. Despots and Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, and therefore have no real power.]

That which men wish (Sokrates lays down as a general proposition) is to obtain good, and to escape evil. Each separate act which they perform, is performed not with a view to its own special result, but with a view to these constant and paramount ends. Good things, or profitable things (for Sokrates alternates the phrases as equivalent), are wisdom, health, wealth, and other such things. Evil things are the contraries of these.[21] Many things are in themselves neither good nor evil, but may become one or the other, according to circumstances--such as stones, wood, the acts of sitting still or moving, &c. When we do any of these indifferent acts, it is with a view to the pursuit of good, or to the avoidance of evil: we do not wish for the act, we wish for its good or profitable results. We do every thing for the sake of good: and if the results are really good or profitable, we accomplish what we wish: if the contrary, not. Now, Despots and Rhetors, when they kill or banish or impoverish any one, do so because they think it will be better for them, or profitable.[22] If it be good for them, they do what they wish: if evil for them, they do the contrary of what they wish and therefore have no power.

[Footnote 21: Plato, Gorgias, p. 467 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n le/geis ei)=nai a)gatho\n me\n sophi/an te kai\ u(gi/eian kai\ plou=ton kai\ ta)/lla ta\ toiau=ta, kaka\ de\ ta)nanti/a tou/tôn? E)/gôge.]]

[Footnote 22: Plato, Gorgias, p. 468 B-C. [Greek: ou)kou=n kai\ a)pokti/nnumen, ei)/ tin' a)pokti/nnumen, . . . . oi)o/menoi a)/meinon ei)=nai ê(mi=n tau=ta ê)\ mê/? . . . e(/nek' a)/ra tou= a)gathou= a(/panta tau=ta poiou=sin oi( poiou=ntes . . . . e)a\n me\n ô)phe/lima ê)=| tau=ta, boulo/metha pra/ttein au)ta/; blabera\ de\ o)/nta, ou) boulo/metha. . . . . ta\ ga\r a)gatha\ boulo/metha, ô(=s phê\|s su/], &c.]

To do evil (continues Sokrates), is the worst thing that can happen to any one; the evil-doer is the most miserable and pitiable of men. The person who suffers evil is unfortunate, and is to be pitied; but much less unfortunate and less to be pitied than the evil-doer. If I have a concealed dagger in the public market-place, I can kill any one whom I choose: but this is no good to me, nor is it a proof of great power, because I shall be forthwith taken up and punished. The result is not profitable, but hurtful: therefore the act is not good, nor is the power to do it either good or desirable.[23] It is sometimes good to kill, banish, or impoverish--sometimes bad. It is good when you do it justly: bad, when you do it unjustly.[24]

[Footnote 23: Plato, Gorgias, p. 469-470.]

[Footnote 24: Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 C.]

[Side-note: Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia--Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it.]

_Polus._--A child can refute such doctrine. You have heard of Archelaus King of Macedonia. Is he, in your opinion, happy or miserable? _Sokr._--I do not know: I have never been in his society. _Polus._--Cannot you tell without that, whether he is happy or not? _Sokr._--No, certainly not. _Polus._--Then you will not call even the Great King happy? _Sokr._--No: I do not know how he stands in respect to education and justice. _Polus._--What! does all happiness consist in that? _Sokr._--I say that it does. I maintain that the good and honourable man or woman is happy: the unjust and wicked, miserable.[25] _Polus._--Then Archelaus is miserable, according to your doctrine? _Sokr._--Assuredly, if he is wicked. _Polus._--Wicked, of course; since he has committed enormous crimes: but he has obtained complete kingly power in Macedonia. Is there any Athenian, yourself included, who would not rather be Archelaus than any other man in Macedonia?[26] _Sokr._--All the public, with Nikias, Perikles, and the most eminent men among them, will agree with you in declaring Archelaus to be happy. I alone do not agree with you. You, like a Rhetor, intend to overwhelm me and gain your cause, by calling a multitude of witnesses: I shall prove my case without calling any other witness than yourself.[27] Do you think that Archelaus would have been a happy man, if he had been defeated in his conspiracy and punished? _Polus._--Certainly not: he would then have been very miserable. _Sokr._--Here again I differ from you: I think that Archelaus, or any other wicked man, is under all circumstances miserable; but he is less miserable, if afterwards punished, than he would be if unpunished and successful.[28] _Polus._--How say you? If a man, unjustly conspiring to become despot, be captured, subjected to torture, mutilated, with his eyes burnt out and with many other outrages inflicted, not only upon himself but upon his wife and children--do you say that he will be more happy than if he succeeded in his enterprise, and passed his life in possession of undisputed authority over his city--envied and extolled as happy, by citizens and strangers alike?[29] _Sokr._--More happy, I shall not say: for in both cases he will be miserable; but he will be less miserable on the former supposition.

[Footnote 25: Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 E.]

[Footnote 26: Plato, Gorgias, p. 471 B-C.]

[Footnote 27: Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 B. [Greek: A)ll' e)gô/ soi ei)=s ô)\n ou)ch o(mologô=. . . . e)gô\ de\ a)\n mê\ se\ au)to\n e(/na o)/nta ma/rtura para/schômai o(mologou=nta peri\ ô(=n le/gô, ou)de\n oi)=mai a)/xion lo/gou pepera/nthai peri\ ô(=n a)\n ê(mi=n o( lo/gos ê)=|; oi)=mai de\ ou)de\ soi/, e)a\n mê\ e)gô/ soi marturô= ei(=s ô)\n mo/nos, tou\s d' a)/llous pa/ntas tou/tous chai/rein e)a=|s.]]

[Footnote 28: Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 C.]

[Footnote 29: Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 D.]

[Side-note: Sokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished.]

_Sokr._--Which of the two is worst: to do wrong, or to suffer wrong? _Polus._--To suffer wrong. _Sokr._--Which of the two is the most disgraceful? _Polus._--To do wrong. _Sokr._--If more ugly and disgraceful, is it not then worse? _Polus._--By no means. _Sokr._--You do not think then that the good--and the fine or honourable--are one and the same; nor the bad--and the ugly or disgraceful? _Polus._--No: certainly not. _Sokr._--How is this? Are not all fine or honourable things, such as bodies, colours, figures, voices, pursuits, &c., so denominated from some common property? Are not fine bodies said to be fine, either from rendering some useful service, or from affording some pleasure to the spectator who contemplates them?[30] And are not figures, colours, voices, laws, sciences, &c., called fine or honourable for the same reason, either for their agreeableness or their usefulness, or both? _Polus._--Certainly: your definition of the fine or honourable, by reference to pleasure, or to good, is satisfactory. _Sokr._--Of course therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be defined by the contrary, by reference to pain or to evil? _Polus._--Doubtless.[31] _Sokr._--If therefore one thing be finer or more honourable than another, this is because it surpasses the other either in pleasure, or in profit: if one thing be more ugly or disgraceful than another, it must surpass that other either in pain, or in evil? _Polus._--Yes.

[Footnote 30: Plat. Gorg. p. 474 D. [Greek: e)a\n e)n tô=| theôrei=sthai chai/rein poiê=| tou\s theôrou=ntas?]]

[Footnote 31: Plato, Gorgias, p. 474 E. _Sokr._ [Greek: Kai\ mê\n ta/ ge kata\ tou\s no/mous kai\ ta\ e)pitêdeu/mata, ou) dê/pou e)kto\s tou/tôn e)sti\ ta\ kala/, tou= ê)\ _ô)phe/lima ei)=nai ê)\ ê(de/a ê)\_ a)mpho/tera.] _Pol._ [Greek: Ou)k e)/moige dokei=.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\ tô=n mathêma/tôn ka/llos ô(sau/tôs?] _Pol._ [Greek: Pa/nu ge; kai\ kalô=s ge nu=n o(rizei, _ê(donê=| te kai\ a)gathô=|_ o(rizo/menos to\ kalo/n.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n to\ ai)schro\n tô=| e)nanti/ô|, _lu/pê| te kai\ kakô=|_?] _Pol._ [Greek: A)na/gkê.]

A little farther on [Greek: blabê\] is used as equivalent to [Greek: kako/n]. These words--[Greek: kalo/n, ai)schro/n]--(very difficult to translate properly) introduce a reference to the feeling or judgment of spectators, or of an undefined public, not concerned either as agents or sufferers.]

[Side-note: Sokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and Turpe--Proof of the first point.]

_Sokr._--Well, then! what did you say about doing wrong and suffering wrong? You said that to suffer wrong was the worst of the two, but to do wrong was the most ugly or disgraceful. Now, if to do wrong be more disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be because it has a preponderance either of pain or of evil? _Polus._--Undoubtedly. _Sokr._--Has it a preponderance of pain? Does the doer of wrong endure more pain than the sufferer? _Polus._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--Then it must have a preponderance of evil? _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--To do wrong therefore is worse than to suffer wrong, as well as more disgraceful? _Polus._--It appears so. _Sokr._--Since therefore it is both worse and more disgraceful, I was right in affirming that neither you, nor I, nor any one else, would choose to do wrong in preference to suffering wrong. _Polus._--So it seems.[32]

[Footnote 32: Plato, Gorgias, p. 475 C-D.]

[Side-note: Proof of the second point.]

_Sokr._--Now let us take the second point--Whether it be the greatest evil for the wrong-doer to be punished, or whether it be not a still greater evil for him to remain unpunished. If punished, the wrong-doer is of course punished justly; and are not all just things fine or honourable, in so far as they are just? _Polus._--I think so. _Sokr._--When a man does anything, must there not be some correlate which suffers; and must it not suffer in a way corresponding to what the doer does? Thus if any one strikes, there must also be something stricken: and if he strikes quickly or violently, there must be something which is stricken quickly or violently. And so, if any one burns or cuts, there must be something burnt or cut. As the agent acts, so the patient suffers. _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now if a man be punished for wrong doing, he suffers what is just, and the punisher does what is just? _Polus._--He does. _Sokr._--You admitted that all just things were honourable: therefore the agent does what is honourable, the patient suffers what is honourable.[33] But if honourable, it must be either agreeable--or good and profitable. In this case, it is certainly not agreeable: it must therefore be good and profitable. The wrong-doer therefore, when punished, suffers what is good and is profited. _Polus._--Yes.[34] _Sokr._--In what manner is he profited? It is, as I presume, by becoming better in his mind--by being relieved from badness of mind. _Polus._--Probably. _Sokr._--Is not this badness of mind the greatest evil? In regard to wealth, the special badness is poverty: in regard to the body, it is weakness, sickness, deformity, &c.: in regard to the mind, it is ignorance, injustice, cowardice, &c. Is not injustice, and other badness of mind, the most disgraceful of the three? _Polus._--Decidedly. _Sokr._--If it be most disgraceful, it must therefore be the worst. _Polus._--How? _Sokr._--It must (as we before agreed) have the greatest preponderance either of pain, or of hurt and evil. But the preponderance is not in pain: for no one will say that the being unjust and intemperate and ignorant, is more painful than being poor and sick. The preponderance must therefore be great in hurt and evil. Mental badness is therefore a greater evil than either poverty, or disease and bodily deformity. It is the greatest of human evils. _Polus._--It appears so.[35]

[Footnote 33: See Aristotle, Rhet. i. 9, p. 1366, b. 30, where the contrary of this opinion is maintained, and maintained with truth.]

[Footnote 34: Plato, Gorgias, p. 476 D-E.]

[Footnote 35: Plato, Gorgias, p. 477 E.]

[Side-note: The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure for him. To be punished is best for him.]

_Sokr._--The money-making art is, that which relieves us from poverty: the medical art, from sickness and weakness: the judicial or punitory, from injustice and wickedness of mind. Of these three relieving forces, which is the most honourable? _Polus._--The last, by far. _Sokr._--If most honourable, it confers either most pleasure or most profit? _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now, to go through medical treatment is not agreeable; but it answers to a man to undergo the pain, in order to get rid of a great evil, and to become well. He would be a happier man, if he were never sick: he is less miserable by undergoing the painful treatment and becoming well, than if he underwent no treatment and remained sick. Just so the man who is mentally bad: the happiest man is he who never becomes so; but if a man has become so, the next best course for him is, to undergo punishment and to get rid of the evil. The worst lot of all is, that of him who remains mentally bad, without ever getting rid of badness.[36]

[Footnote 36: Plato, Gorgias, p. 478 D-E.]

[Side-note: Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our friend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought to keep him unpunished.]

This last, Polus (continues Sokrates), is the condition of Archelaus, and of despots and Rhetors generally. They possess power which enables them, after they have committed injustice, to guard themselves against being punished: which is just as if a sick man were to pride himself upon having taken precautions against being cured. They see the pain of the cure, but they are blind to the profit of it; they are ignorant how much more miserable it is to have an unhealthy and unjust mind than an unhealthy body.[37] There is therefore little use in Rhetoric: for our first object ought to be, to avoid doing wrong: our next object, if we have done wrong, not to resist or elude punishment by skilful defence, but to present ourselves voluntarily and invite it: and if our friends or relatives have done wrong, far from helping to defend them, we ought ourselves to accuse them, and to invoke punishment upon them also.[38] On the other hand, as to our enemy, we ought undoubtedly to take precautions against suffering any wrong from him ourselves: but if he has done wrong to others, we ought to do all we can, by word or deed, not to bring him to punishment, but to prevent him from suffering punishment or making compensation: so that he may live as long as possible in impunity.[39] These are the purposes towards which rhetoric is serviceable. For one who intends to do no wrong, it seems of no great use.[40]

[Footnote 38: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 480 C, 508 B. [Greek: katêgorête/on ei)/ê kai\ au(tou= kai\ ui(e/os kai\ e(tai/ron, e)a/n ti a)dikê=|], &c.

Plato might have put this argument into the mouth of Euthyphron as a reason for indicting his own father on the charge of murder: as I have already observed in reviewing the Euthyphron, which see above, vol. i. ch. xi., p. 442.]

[Footnote 39: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481 A. [Greek: e)a\n de\ a)/llon a)dikê=| o( e)chthro/s, panti\ tro/pô| paraskeuaste/on kai\ pra/ttonta kai\ le/gonta, o(/pôs mê\ dô=| di/kên. . . . e)a/n te chrusi/on ê(rpakô\s ê)=| polu/, mê\ a)podidô=| tou=to, a)ll' e)/chôn a)nali/skêtai . . . a)di/kôs kai\ a)the/ôs], &c.]

[Footnote 40: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.]

* * * * *

This dialogue between Sokrates and Polus exhibits a representation of Platonic Ethics longer and more continuous than is usual in the dialogues. I have therefore given a tolerably copious abridgment of it, and shall now proceed to comment upon its reasoning.

[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed by Kallikles whether he means it seriously.]

The whole tenor of its assumptions, as well as the conclusions in which it ends, are so repugnant to received opinions, that Polus, even while compelled to assent, treats it as a paradox: while Kallikles, who now takes up the argument, begins by asking from Chærephon--"Is Sokrates really in earnest, or is he only jesting?"[41] Sokrates himself admits that he stands almost alone. He has nothing to rely upon, except the consistency of his dialectics--and the verdict of philosophy.[42] This however is a matter of little moment, in discussing the truth and value of the reasoning, except in so far as it involves an appeal to the judgment of the public as a matter of fact. Plato follows out the train of reasoning--which at the time presents itself to his mind as conclusive, or at least as plausible--whether he may agree or disagree with others.

[Footnote 41: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.]

[Footnote 42: Plato, Gorgias, p. 482.]

[Side-note: Principle laid down by Sokrates--That every one acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery.]

Plato has ranked the Rhetor in the same category as the Despot: a classification upon which I shall say something presently. But throughout the part of the dialogue just extracted, he treats the original question about Rhetoric as part of a much larger ethical question.[43] Every one (argues Sokrates) wishes for the attainment of good and for the avoidance of evil. Every one performs each separate act with a view not to its own immediate end, but to one or other of these permanent ends. In so far as he attains them, he is happy: in so far as he either fails in attaining the good, or incurs the evil, he is unhappy or miserable. The good and honourable man or woman is happy, the unjust and wicked is miserable. Power acquired or employed unjustly, is no boon to the possessor: for he does not thereby obtain what he really wishes, good or happiness; but incurs the contrary, evil and misery. The man who does wrong is more miserable than he who suffers wrong: but the most miserable of all is he who does wrong and then remains unpunished for it.[44]

[Footnote 43: I may be told that this comparison is first made by Polus (p. 466 C), and that Sokrates only takes it up from him to comment upon. True, but the speech of Polus is just as much the composition of Plato as that of Sokrates. Many readers of Plato are apt to forget this.]

[Footnote 44: Isokrates, in his Panathenaic Oration (Or. xii. sect. 126, pp. 257-347), alludes to the same thesis as this here advanced by Plato, treating it as one which all men of sense would reject, and which none but a few men pretending to be wise would proclaim--[Greek: a(/per a(/pantes me\n a)\n oi( nou=n e)/chontes e)/lointo kai\ boulêthei=en, o)li/goi de/ tines tô=n prospoioume/nôn ei)=nai sophô=n, e)rôtêthe/ntes ou)k a)\n phê/saien.]

In this last phrase Isokrates probably has Plato in his mind, though without pronouncing the name.]

Polus, on the other hand, contends, that Archelaus, who has "waded through slaughter" to the throne of Macedonia, is a happy man both in his own feelings and in those of every one else, envied and admired by the world generally: That to say--Archelaus would have been more happy, or less miserable, if he had failed in his enterprise and had been put to death under cruel torture--is an untenable paradox.

[Side-note: Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness.]

The issue here turns, and the force of Plato's argument rests (assuming Sokrates to speak the real sentiments of Plato), upon the peculiar sense which he gives to the words Good--Evil--Happiness:--different from the sense in which they are conceived by mankind generally, and which is here followed by Polus. It is possible that to minds like Sokrates and Plato, the idea of themselves committing enormous crimes for ambitious purposes might be the most intolerable of all ideas, worse to contemplate than any amount of suffering: moreover, that if they could conceive themselves as having been thus guilty, the sequel the least intolerable for them to imagine would be one of expiatory pain. This, taken as the personal sentiment of Plato, admits of no reply. But when he attempts to convert this subjective judgment into an objective conclusion binding on all, he fails of success, and misleads himself by equivocal language.

[Side-note: Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the Platonic meaning.]

Plato distinguishes two general objects of human desire, and two of human aversion. 1. The immediate, and generally transient, object--Pleasure or the Pleasurable--Pain or the Painful. 2. The distant, ulterior, and more permanent object--Good or the profitable--Evil or the hurtful.--In the attainment of Good and avoidance of Evil consists happiness. But now comes the important question--In what sense are we to understand the words Good and Evil? What did Plato mean by them? Did he mean the same as mankind generally? Have mankind generally one uniform meaning? In answer to this question, we must say, that neither Plato, nor mankind generally, are consistent or unanimous in their use of the words: and that Plato sometimes approximates to, sometimes diverges from, the more usual meaning. Plato does not here tell us clearly what he himself means by Good and Evil: he specifies no objective or external mark by which we may know it: we learn only, that Good is a mental perfection--Evil a mental taint--answering to indescribable but characteristic sentiments in Plato's own mind, and only negatively determined by this circumstance--That they have no reference either to pleasure or pain. In the vulgar sense, Good stands distinguished from pleasure (or relief from pain), and Evil from pain (or loss of pleasure), as the remote, the causal, the lasting from the present, the product, the transient. Good and Evil are explained by enumerating all the things so called, of which enumeration Plato gives a partial specimen in this dialogue: elsewhere he dwells upon what he calls the Idea of Good, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. Having said that all men aim at good, he gives, as examples of good things--Wisdom, Health, Wealth, and other such things: while the contrary of these, Stupidity, Sickness, Poverty, are evil things: the list of course might be much enlarged. Taking Good and Evil generally to denote the common property of each of these lists, it is true that men perform a large portion of their acts with a view to attain the former and avoid the latter:--that the approach which they make to happiness depends, speaking generally, upon the success which attends their exertions for the attainment of and avoidance of these permanent ends: and moreover that these ends have their ultimate reference to each man's own feelings.

But this meaning of Good is no longer preserved, when Sokrates proceeds to prove that the triumphant usurper Archelaus is the most miserable of men, and that to do wrong with impunity is the greatest of all evils.

[Side-note: Examination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency between the general answer of Polus and his previous declarations--Law and Nature.]

Sokrates provides a basis for his intended proof by asking Polus,[45] which of the two is most disgraceful--To do wrong--or to suffer wrong? Polus answers--To do wrong: and this answer is inconsistent with what he had previously said about Archelaus. That prince, though a wrong-doer on the largest scale, has been declared by Polus to be an object of his supreme envy and admiration: while Sokrates also admits that this is the sentiment of almost all mankind, except himself. To be consistent with such an assertion, Polus ought to have answered the contrary of what he does answer, when the general question is afterwards put to him: or at least he ought to have said--"Sometimes the one, sometimes the other". But this he is ashamed to do, as we shall find Kallikles intimating at a subsequent stage of the dialogue:[46] because of King Nomos, or the established habit of the community--who feel that society rests upon a sentiment of reciprocal right and obligation animating every one, and require that violations of that sentiment shall be marked with censure in general words, however widely the critical feeling may depart from such censure in particular cases.[47] Polus is forced to make profession of a faith, which neither he nor others (except Sokrates with a few companions) universally or consistently apply. To bring such a force to bear upon the opponent, was one of the known artifices of dialecticians:[48] and Sokrates makes it his point of departure, to prove the unparalleled misery of Archelaus.

[Footnote 45: Plat. Gorg. p. 474 C.]

[Footnote 46: Plat. Gorg. p. 482 C. To maintain that [Greek: to\ a)dikei=n be/ltion tou= a)dikei=sthai] was an [Greek: a)/doxos u(po/thesis]--one which it was [Greek: chei/ronos ê)/thous e(le/sthai]: which therefore Aristotle advises the dialectician not to defend (Aristot. Topic. viii. 156, 6-15).]

[Footnote 47: This portion of the Gorgias may receive illustration from the third chapter (pp. 99-101) of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, entitled, "Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by the disposition to admire the rich and great, and to neglect or despise persons of poor and mean condition". He says--"The disposition to admire and almost to worship the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or at least to neglect, persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments. . . . They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly--a select, though I am afraid, a small party--who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers--and what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers--of wealth and greatness. . . . . It is scarce _agreeable to good morals_, or even to good language, perhaps, to say that mere wealth and greatness, abstracted from merit and virtue, deserve our respect. We must acknowledge, however, that they _almost constantly obtain it_: and _that they may therefore in a certain sense be considered as the natural objects of it_."

Now Archelaus is a most conspicuous example of this disposition of the mass of mankind to worship and admire, disinterestedly, power and greatness: and the language used by Adam Smith in the last sentence illustrates the conversation of Sokrates, Polus, and Kalliklês. Adam Smith admits that energetic proceedings, ending in great power, such as those of Archelaus, obtain honour and worship from the vast majority of disinterested spectators: and that, therefore they are in a certain sense the _natural objects_ of such a sentiment ([Greek: kata\ phu/sin]). But if the question be put to him, Whether such proceedings, with such a position, are _worthy of honour_, he is constrained by good morals ([Greek: kata\ no/mon]) to reply in the negative. It is true that Adam Smith numbers himself with the small minority, while Polus shares the opinion of the large majority. But what is required by King Nomos must be professed even by dissentients, unless they possess the unbending resolution of Sokrates.]

[Footnote 48: Aristot. De Soph. Elench. pp. 172-173, where he contrasts the opinions which men must make a show of holding, with those which they really do--[Greek: ai( phanerai\ do/xai--ai( a)phanei=s, a)pokekrumme/nai, do/xai.]]

[Side-note: The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates, will not hold.]

He proceeds to define Pulchrum and Turpe ([Greek: kalo\n-ai)schro/n]). When we recollect the Hippias Major, in which dialogue many definitions of Pulchrum were canvassed and all rejected, so that the search ended in total disappointment--we are surprised to see that Sokrates hits off at once a definition satisfactory both to himself and Polus: and we are the more surprised, because the definition here admitted without a remark, is in substance one of those shown to be untenable in the Hippias Major.[49] It depends upon the actual argumentative purpose which Plato has in hand, whether he chooses to multiply objections and give them effect--or to ignore them altogether. But the definition which he here proposes, even if assumed as incontestable, fails altogether to sustain the conclusion that he draws from it. He defines Pulchrum to be that which either confers pleasure upon the spectator when he contemplates it, or produces ulterior profit or good--we must presume profit to the spectator, or to him along with others--at any rate it is not said _to whom_. He next defines the ugly and disgraceful ([Greek: to\ ai)schro\n]) as comprehending both the painful and the hurtful or evil. If then (he argues) to do wrong is more ugly and disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be either because it is more painful--or because it is more hurtful, more evil (worse). It certainly is not more painful: therefore it must be worse.

[Footnote 49: Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 45-46. See above, vol. ii. ch. xiii.]

[Side-note: Worse or better--for whom? The argument of Sokrates does not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference, the definition would be inadmissible.]

But worse, for whom? For the spectators, who declare the proceedings of Archelaus to be disgraceful? For the persons who suffer by his proceedings? Or for Archelaus himself? It is the last of the three which Sokrates undertakes to prove: but his definition does not help him to the proof. Turpe is defined to be either what causes immediate pain to the spectator, or ulterior hurt--to whom? If we say to the spectator--the definition will not serve as a ground of inference to the condition of the agent contemplated. If on the other hand, we say--to the agent--the definition so understood becomes inadmissible: as well for other reasons, as because there are a great many Turpia which are not agents at all, and which the definition therefore would not include. Either therefore the definition given by Sokrates is a bad one--or it will not sustain his conclusion. And thus, on this very important argument, where Sokrates admits that he stands alone, and where therefore the proof would need to be doubly cogent--an argument too where the great cause (so Adam Smith terms it) of the corruption of men's moral sentiments has to be combated--Sokrates has nothing to produce except premisses alike far-fetched and irrelevant. What increases our regret is, that the real arguments establishing the turpitude of Archelaus and his acts are obvious enough, if you look for them in the right direction. You discover nothing while your eye is fixed on Archelaus himself: far from presenting any indications of misery, which Sokrates professes to discover, he has gained much of what men admire as good wherever they see it. But when you turn to the persons whom he has killed, banished, or ruined--to the mass of suffering which he has inflicted--and to the widespread insecurity which such acts of successful iniquity spread through all societies where they become known--there is no lack of argument to justify that sentiment which prompts a reflecting spectator to brand him as a disgraceful man. This argument however is here altogether neglected by Plato. Here, as elsewhere, he looks only at the self-regarding side of Ethics.

[Side-note: Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it.]

Sokrates proceeds next to prove--That the wrong-doer who remains unpunished is more miserable than if he were punished. The wrong-doer (he argues) when punished suffers what is just: but all just things are honourable: therefore he suffers what is honourable. But all honourable things are so called because they are either agreeable, or profitable, or both together. Punishment is certainly not agreeable: it must therefore be profitable or good. Accordingly the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good. He is benefited, by being relieved of mental evil or wickedness, which is a worse evil than either bodily sickness or poverty. In proportion to the magnitude of this evil, is the value of the relief which removes it, and the superior misery of the unpunished wrong-doer who continues to live under it.[50]

[Footnote 50: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 477-478.]

Upon this argument, I make the same remark as upon that immediately preceding. We are not expressly told, whether good, evil, happiness, misery, &c., refer to the agent alone or to others also: but the general tenor implies that the agent alone is meant. And in this sense, Plato does not make out his case. He establishes an arbitrary standard of his own, recognised only by a few followers, and altogether differing from the ordinary standard, to test and compare happiness and misery. The successful criminal, Archelaus himself, far from feeling any such intense misery as Plato describes, is satisfied and proud of his position, which most others also account an object of envy. This is not disputed by Plato himself. And in the face of this fact, it is fruitless as well as illogical to attempt to prove, by an elaborate process of deductive reasoning, that Archelaus _must_ be miserable. That step of Plato's reasoning, in which he asserts, that the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good--is only true if you take in (what Plato omits to mention) the interests of society as well as those of the agent. His punishment is certainly profitable to (conducive to the security and well being of) society: it may possibly be also profitable to himself, but very frequently it is not so. The conclusion brought out by Plato, therefore, while contradicted by the fact, involves also a fallacy in the reasoning process.

[Side-note: If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in which punishment is considered would be reversed.]

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Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2Chapter XXIV: Gorgias (1)

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