Chapter XXIII: Protagoras (3)

Protagoras is described as answering the last few questions with increasing reluctance. But at this final question, he declines altogether to answer, or even to imply assent by a gesture.[127] _Sokr._--Why will you not answer my question, either affirmatively or negatively? _Prot._--Finish the exposition by yourself. _Sokr._--I will only ask you one more question. Do you still think, as you said before, that there are some men extremely stupid, but extremely courageous? _Prot._--You seem to be obstinately bent on making me answer: I will therefore comply with your wish: I say that according to our previous admissions, it appears to me impossible. _Sokr._--I have no other motive for questioning you thus, except the wish to investigate how the truth stands respecting virtue and what virtue is in itself.[128] To determine this, is the way to elucidate the question which you and I first debated at length:--I, affirming that virtue was not teachable--you, that it was teachable. The issue of our conversation renders both of us ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be teachable, have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things: while Protagoras, who affirmed that it was teachable, has tried to show that it consisted in every thing rather than knowledge: on which supposition it would be hardly teachable at all. I therefore, seeing all these questions sadly confused and turned upside down, am beyond measure anxious to clear them up;[129] and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through the whole investigation--First, what Virtue is,--Next, whether it is teachable or not. It is with a provident anxiety for the conduct of my own life that I undertake this research, and I should be delighted to have you as a coadjutor.[130] _Prot._--I commend your earnestness, Sokrates, and your manner of conducting discussion. I think myself not a bad man in other respects: and as to jealousy, I have as little of it as any one. For I have always said of you, that I admire you much more than any man of my acquaintance--decidedly more than any man of your own age. It would not surprise me, if you became one day illustrious for wisdom.

[Footnote 127: Plato, Protag. p. 360 D. [Greek: ou)ke/ti e)ntau=tha ou)/t' e)pineu=sai ê)the/lêsen, e)si/ga te.]]

[Footnote 128: Plato, Protag. p. 360-361. [Greek: Ou)/toi a)/llou e(/neka e)rôtô= pa/nta tau=ta, ê)\ ske/psasthai boulo/menos pô=s pot' e)/chei ta\ peri\ tê=s a)retê=s, kai\ _ti/ pot' e)sti\n au)to\ ê( a)retê/_. Oi)=da ga\r o(/ti tou/tou phanerou= genome/nou ma/list' a)\n kata/dêlon ge/noito e)kei=no, peri\ ou)= e)gô/ te kai\ su\ makro\n lo/gon e(ka/teros a)petei/namen, e)gô\ me\n le/gôn, ô(s ou) didakto\n a)retê/, su\ d', ô(s didakto/n.]]

[Footnote 129: Plato, Protag. p. 361 C. [Greek: e)gô\ ou)=n pa/nta tau=ta kathorô=n a)/nô ka/tô taratto/mena deinô=s, pa=san prothumi/an e)/chô kataphanê= au)ta\ gene/sthai, kai\ bouloi/mên a)\n _tau=ta diexeltho/ntas ê(ma=s e)xelthei=n kai\ e)pi\ tê\n a)retê\n o(/ ti e)/stin_.]]

[Footnote 130: Plato, Protag. p. 361 D. [Greek: promêthou/menos u(pe\r tou= bi/ou tou= e)mautou= panto/s.]]

* * * * *

[Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least allusion to Hippokrates.]

Such is the end of this long and interesting dialogue.[131] We remark with some surprise that it closes without any mention of Hippokrates, and without a word addressed to him respecting his anxious request for admission to the society of Protagoras: though such request had been presented at the beginning, with much emphasis, as the sole motive for the intervention of Sokrates. Upon this point[132] the dialogue is open to the same criticism as that which Plato (in the Phædrus) bestows on the discourse of Lysias: requiring that every discourse shall be like a living organism, neither headless nor footless, but having extremities and a middle piece adapted to each other.

[Footnote 131: Most critics treat the Protagoras as a composition of Plato's younger years--what they call his _first period_--before the death of Sokrates. They fix different years, from 407 B.C. (Ast) down to 402 B.C. I do not agree with this view. I can admit no dialogue earlier than 399 B.C.: and I consider the Protagoras to belong to Plato's full maturity.]

[Footnote 132: Plato, Phædrus, p. 264 C. [Greek: dei=n pa/nta lo/gon ô(/sper zô=on sunesta/nai, sô=ma/ ti e)/chonta au)to\n au(tou=, ô/ste mê/te a)ke/phalon ei)=nai mê/te a)/poun], &c.]

[Side-note: Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates.]

In our review of this dialogue, we have found first, towards the beginning, an expository discourse from Protagoras, describing the maintenance and propagation of virtue in an established community: next, towards the close, an expository string of interrogatories by Sokrates, destined to establish the identity of Good with Pleasurable, Evil with Painful; and the indispensable supremacy of the calculating or measuring science, as the tutelary guide of human life. Of the first, I speak (like other critics) as the discourse of Protagoras: of the second, as the theory of Sokrates. But I must again remind the reader, that both the one and the other are compositions of Plato; both alike are offspring of his ingenious and productive imagination. Protagoras is not the author of that which appears here under his name: and when we read the disparaging epithets which many critics affix to his discourse, we must recollect that these epithets, if they were well-founded, would have no real application to the historical Protagoras, but only to Plato himself. He has set forth two aspects, distinct and in part opposing, of ethics and politics: and he has provided a worthy champion for each. Philosophy, or "reasoned truth," if it be attainable at all, cannot most certainly be attained without such many-sided handling: still less can that which Plato calls knowledge be attained--or such command of philosophy as will enable a man to stand a Sokratic cross-examination in it.

[Side-note: Order of ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates.]

In the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue,[133] we find him proclaiming, that the first of all problems to be solved was, What virtue really is? upon which there prevails serious confusion of opinions. It was a second question--important, yet still second and presupposing the solution of the first--Whether virtue is teachable? We noticed the same judgment as to the order of the two questions delivered by Sokrates in the Menon.[134]

[Footnote 133: Plato, Protag. p. 361 C.]

[Footnote 134: See the last preceding chapter of this volume, p. 242.**

Upon this order, necessarily required, of the two questions, Schleiermacher has a pertinent remark in his general Einleitung to the works of Plato, p. 26. Eberhard (he says) affirms that the end proposed by Plato in his dialogues was to form the minds of the noble Athenian youth, so as to make them virtuous citizens. Schleiermacher controverts the position of Eberhard; maintaining "that this is far too subordinate a standing-point for philosophy,--besides that it is reasoning in a circle, since philosophy has first to determine what the virtue of a citizen is".]

[Side-note: Difference of method between him and Protagoras flows from this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without enquiry.]

Now the conception of ethical questions in this order--the reluctance to deal with the second until the first has been fully debated and settled--is one fundamental characteristic of Sokrates. The difference of method, between him and Protagoras, flows from this prior difference between them in fundamental conception. What virtue is, Protagoras neither defines nor analyses, nor submits to debate. He manifests no consciousness of the necessity of analysis: he accepts the ground already prepared for him by King Nomos: he thus proceeds as if the first step had been made sure, and takes his departure from hypotheses of which he renders no account--as the Platonic Sokrates complains of the geometers for doing.[135] To Protagoras, social or political virtue is a known and familiar datum, about which no one can mistake: which must be possessed, in greater or less measure, by every man, as a condition of the existence of society: which every individual has an interest in promoting in all his neighbours: and which every one therefore teaches and enforces upon every one else. It is a matter of common sense or common sentiment, and thus stands in contrast with the special professional accomplishments; which are confined only to a few--and the possessors, teachers, and learners of which are each an assignable section of the society. The parts or branches of virtue are, in like manner, assumed by him as known, in their relations to each other and to the whole. This persuasion of knowledge, without preliminary investigation, he adopts from the general public, with whom he is in communion of sentiment. What they accept and enforce as virtue, he accepts and enforces also.

[Footnote 135: See suprà, vol. i. ch. viii. p. 358 and ch. xvii.** p. 136, respecting these remarks of Plato on the geometers.]

[Side-note: Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in harmony.]

Again, the method pursued by Protagoras, is one suitable to a teacher who has jumped over this first step; who assumes virtue, as something fixed in the public sentiments--and addresses himself to those sentiments, ready-made as he finds them. He expands and illustrates them in continuous lectures of some length, which fill both the ears and minds of the listener--"Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna": he describes their growth, propagation, and working in the community: he gives interesting comments on the poets, eulogising the admired heroes who form the theme of their verses, and enlarging on their admonitions. Moreover, while resting altogether upon the authority of King Nomos, he points out the best jewel in the crown of that potentate; the great social fact of punishment prospective, rationally apportioned, and employed altogether for preventing and deterring--instead of being a mere retrospective impulse, vindictive or retributive for the past. He describes instructively the machinery operative in the community for ensuring obedience to what they think right: he teaches, in his eloquent expositions and interpretations, the same morality, public and private, that every one else teaches: while he can perform the work of teaching, somewhat more effectively than they. Lastly, his method is essentially showy and popular; intended for numerous assemblies, reproducing the established creeds and sentiments of those assemblies, to their satisfaction and admiration. He is prepared to be met and answered in his own way, by opposing speakers; and he conceives himself more than a match for such rivals. He professes also to possess the art of short conversation or discussion. But in the exercise of this art, he runs almost involuntarily into his more characteristic endowment of continuous speech: besides that the points which he raises for discussion assume all the fundamental principles, and turn only upon such applications of those principles as are admitted by most persons to be open questions, not foreclosed by a peremptory orthodoxy.

[Side-note: Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem which Protagoras had left out.]

Upon all these points, Sokrates is the formal antithesis of Protagoras. He disclaims altogether the capacities to which that Sophist lays claim. Not only he cannot teach virtue, but he professes not to know what it is, nor whether it be teachable at all, He starts from a different point of view: not considering virtue as a known datum, or as an universal postulate, but assimilating it to a special craft or accomplishment, in which a few practitioners suffice for the entire public: requiring that in this capacity it shall be defined, and its practitioners and teachers pointed out. He has no common ground with Protagoras; for the difficulties which he moots are just such as the common consciousness (and Protagoras along with it) overleaps or supposes to be settled. His first requirement, advanced under the modest guise of a small doubt[136] which Protagoras must certainly be competent to remove, is, to know--What virtue is? What are the separate parts of virtue--justice, moderation, holiness, &c.? What is the relation which they bear to each other and to the whole--virtue? Are they homogeneous, differing only in quantity or has each of them its own specific essence and peculiarity?[137] Respecting virtue as a whole, we must recollect, Protagoras had discoursed eloquently and confidently, as of a matter perfectly known. He is now called back as it were to meet an attack in the rear: to answer questions which he had never considered, and which had never even presented themselves to him as questions. At first he replies as if the questions offered no difficulty;[138] sometimes he does not feel their importance, so that it seems to him a matter of indifference whether he replies in the affirmative or negative.[139] But he finds himself brought round, by a series of questions, to assent to conclusions which he nevertheless thinks untrue, and which are certainly unwelcome. Accordingly, he becomes more and more disgusted with the process of analytical interrogation: and at length answers with such impatience and prolixity, that the interrogation can no longer be prosecuted. Here comes in the break--the remonstrance of Sokrates--and the mediation of the by-standers.

[Footnote 136: Plato, Protag. p. 328 E. [Greek: plê\n smikro/n ti/ moi e)mpodô/n, o(/ dê=lon o(/ti Prôtago/ras r(a|di/ôs e)pekdida/xei], &c.]

[Footnote 137: Respecting Ariston of Chios, Diogenes Laertius tells us--[Greek: A)reta\s d' ou)/te polla\s ei)sê=gen, ô(s o( Zê/nôn, ou)/te mi/an polloi=s o)no/masin kaloume/nên--a)lla\ kai\ to\ pro\s ti/ pôs e)/chein] (Diog. Laert. vii. 161).]

[Footnote 138: Plato, Protag. p. 329 D. [Greek: A)lla\ r(a/|dion tou=to/ g', e)/phê, a)pokri/nasthai], &c.]

[Footnote 139: Plato, Protag. p. 321 D. [Greek: ei) ga\r bou/lei, e)/stô ê(mi=n kai\ dikaiosu/nê o(/sion kai\ o(sio/tês di/kaion. Mê/ moi, ê)=n d' e)gô/; ou)de\n ga\r de/omai to\ "_ei) bou/lei_" tou=to kai\ "_ei) soi dokei=_" e)le/gchesthai, a)ll' e)me/ te kai\ se/.]]

[Side-note: Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner.]

It is this antithesis between the eloquent popular lecturer, and the analytical enquirer and cross-examiner, which the dialogue seems mainly intended to set forth. Protagoras professes to know that which he neither knows, nor has ever tried to probe to the bottom. Upon this false persuasion of knowledge, the Sokratic Elenchus is brought to bear. We are made to see how strange, repugnant, and perplexing, is the process of analysis to this eloquent expositor: how incompetent he is to go through it without confusion: how little he can define his own terms, or determine the limits of those notions on which he is perpetually descanting.

[Side-note: Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though he is described as brought to a contradiction.]

It is not that Protagoras is proved to be wrong (I speak now of this early part of the conversation, between chapters 51-62--pp. 329-335) in the substantive ground which he takes. I do not at all believe (as many critics either affirm or imply) that Plato intended all which he in the composed under the name of Protagoras to be vile perversion of truth, with nothing but empty words and exorbitant pretensions. I do not even believe that Plato intended all those observations, to which the name of Protagoras is prefixed, to be accounted silly--while all that is assigned to Sokrates,[140] is admirable sense and acuteness. It is by no means certain that Plato intended to be understood as himself endorsing the opinions which he ascribes everywhere to Sokrates: and it is quite certain that he does not always make the Sokrates of one dialogue consistent with the Sokrates of another. For the purpose of showing the incapacity of the respondent to satisfy the exigencies of analysis, we need not necessarily suppose that the conclusion to which the questions conduct should be a true one. If the respondent be brought, through his own admissions, to a contradiction, this is enough to prove that he did not know the subject deeply enough to make the proper answers and distinctions.

[Footnote 140: Schöne, in his Commentary on the Protagoras, is of opinion that a good part of Plato's own doctrine is given under the name of Protagoras (Ueber den Protag. von Platon, p. 180 seq.).]

[Side-note: Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by Plato himself elsewhere.]

But whatever may have been the intention of Plato, if we look at the fact, we shall find that what he has assigned to Sokrates is not always true, nor what he has given to Protagoras, always false. The positions laid down by the latter--That many men are courageous, but unjust: that various persons are just, without being wise and intelligent: that he who possesses one virtue, does not of necessity possess all:[141]--are not only in conformity with the common opinion, but are quite true, though Sokrates is made to dispute them. Moreover, the arguments employed by Sokrates (including in those arguments the strange propositions that justice is just, and that holiness is holy) are certainly noway conclusive.[142] Though Protagoras, becoming entangled in difficulties, and incapable of maintaining his consistency against an embarrassing cross-examination, is of course exhibited as ignorant of that which he professes to know--the doctrine which he maintains is neither untrue in itself, nor even shown to be apparently untrue.

[Footnote 141: Plato, Protag. p. 329 E. Protagoras is here made to affirm that many men are courageous who are neither just, nor temperate, nor virtuous in other respects. Sokrates contradicts the position. But in the Treatise De Legibus (i. p. 630 B), Plato himself says same thing as Protagoras is here made to say: at least assuming that the Athenian speaker in De Legg. represents the sentiment of Plato himself at the time when he composed that treatise.]

[Footnote 142: Plato, Protag. p. 330 C, p. 333 B.

To say "Justice is just," or "Holiness is holy," is indeed either mere tautology, or else an impropriety of speech. Dr. Hutcheson observes on an analogous case: "None can apply moral attributes to the very faculty of perceiving moral qualities: or call his moral Sense morally Good or Evil, any more than he calls the power of tasting, sweet or bitter--or the power of seeing, straight or crooked, white or black" (Hutcheson on the Passions, sect. i. p. 234).]

[Side-note: The harsh epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the common consciousness.]

As to the arrogant and exorbitant pretensions which the Platonic commentators ascribe to Protagoras, more is said than the reality justifies. He pretends to know what virtue, justice, moderation, courage, &c., are, and he is proved not to know. But this is what every one else pretends to know also, and what every body else teaches as well as he--"_Hæc Janus summus ab imo Perdocet: hæc recinunt juvenes dictata senesque_". What he pretends to do, beyond the general public, he really can do. He can discourse, learnedly and eloquently, upon these received doctrines and sentiments: he can enlist the feelings and sympathies of the public in favour of that which he, in common with the public, believes to be good--and against that which he and they believe to be bad: he can thus teach virtue more effectively than others. But whether that which is received as virtue, be really such--he has never analysed or verified: nor does he willingly submit to the process of analysis. Here again he is in harmony with the general public; for they hate, as much as he does, to be dragged back to fundamentals, and forced to explain, defend, revise, or modify, their established sentiments and maxims: which they apply as _principia_ for deduction to particular cases, and which they recognise as axioms whereby other things are to be tried, not as liable to be tried themselves. Protagoras is one of the general public, in dislike of, and inaptitude for, analysis and dialectic discussion: while he stands above them in his eloquence and his power of combining, illustrating, and adorning, received doctrines. These are points of superiority, not pretended, but real.

[Side-note: Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the song of Simonides.]

The aversion of Protagoras for dialectic discussion--after causing an interruption of the ethical argument, and an interlude of comment on the poet Simonides--is at length with difficulty overcome, and the argument is then resumed. The question still continues, What is virtue? What are the five different parts of virtue? Yet it is so far altered that Protagoras now admits that the four parts of virtue which Sokrates professed to have shown to be nearly identical, really are tolerably alike: but he nevertheless contends that courage is very different from all of them, repeating his declaration that many men are courageous, but unjust and stupid at the same time. This position Sokrates undertakes to refute. In doing so, he lays out one of the largest, most distinct, and most positive theories of virtue, which can be found in the Platonic writings.

[Side-note: Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at length clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of pleasures and pains of the agent.]

Virtue, according to this theory, consists in a right measurement and choice of pleasures and pains: in deciding correctly, wherever we have an alternative, on which side lies the largest pleasure or the least pain--and choosing the side which presents this balance. To live pleasurably, is pronounced to be good: to live without pleasure or in pain, is evil. Moreover, nothing but pleasure, or comparative mitigation of pain, is good: nothing but pain is evil.[143] Good, is identical with the greatest pleasure or least pain: evil, with greatest pain: meaning thereby each pleasure and each pain when looked at along with its consequences and concomitants. The grand determining cause and condition of virtue is knowledge: the knowledge, science, or art, of correctly measuring the comparative value of different pleasures and pains. Such knowledge (the theory affirms), wherever it is possessed, will be sure to command the whole man, to dictate all his conduct, and to prevail over every temptation of special appetite or aversion. To say that a man who knows on which side the greatest pleasure or the least pain lies, will act against his knowledge--is a mistake. If he acts in this way, it is plain that he does not possess the knowledge, and that he sins through ignorance.

[Footnote 143: The substantial identity of Good with Pleasure, of Evil with Pain, was the doctrine of the historical Sokrates as declared in Xenophon's Memorabilia. See, among other passages, i. 6, 8. [Greek: Tou= de\ mê\ douleu/ein gastri\ mêde\ u(/pnô| kai\ lagnei/a|, oi)/ei ti a)/llo ai)tiô/teron ei)=nai, ê)\ to\ e(/tera e)/chein tou/tôn ê(di/ô, a(\ ou) mo/non e)n chrei/a| o)/nta eu)phrai/nei, a)lla\ kai\ e)lpi/das pare/chonta ô)phelê/sein a)ei/? Kai\ mê\n tou=to/ ge oi)=stha, o(/ti oi( me\n oi)o/menoi mêde\n eu)= pra/ttein ou)k eu)phrai/nontai, oi( de\ ê(gou/menoi kalô=s prochôrei=n e(autoi=s, ê)\ geôrgi/an ê)\ nauklêri/an ê)\ a)/ll' o(/, ti a)\n tugcha/nôsin e)rgazo/menoi, ô(s eu)= pra/ttontes eu)phrai/nontai. Oi)/ei ou)=n a)po\ pa/ntôn tou/tôn tosau/tên ê(donê\n ei)=nai, o(/sên a)po\ tou= e(auto/n te ê(gei=sthai belti/ô gi/gnesthai kai\ phi/lous a)mei/nous kta=sthai? E)gô\ toi/nun diatelô= tau=ta nomi/zôn.]

Locke says, 'Essay on Human Understanding,' Book ii. ch. 28, "Good or Evil is nothing but pleasure or pain to us--or that which procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good or evil then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker; which good or evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the law, is that we call reward or punishment."

The formal distinction here taken by Locke between pleasure and that which procures pleasure--both the one and the other being called Good--(the like in regard to pain and evil) is not distinctly stated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, though he says nothing inconsistent with it: but it is distinctly stated in the Republic, ii. p. 357, where Good is distributed under three heads. 1. That which we desire immediately and for itself--such as Enjoyment, Innocuous pleasure. 2. That which we desire both for itself and for its consequences--health, intelligence, good sight or hearing, &c. 3. That which we do not desire (perhaps even shun) for itself, but which we accept by reason of its consequences in averting greater pains or procuring greater pleasures.

This discrimination of the varieties of Good, given in the Republic, is quite consistent with what is stated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, though it is more full and precise. But it is not consistent with what Sokrates says in the Gorgias, where he asserts a radical dissimilarity of nature between [Greek: ê(du\] and [Greek: a)gatho/n].]

[Side-note: Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory.]

Protagoras agrees with Sokrates in the encomiums bestowed on the paramount importance and ascendancy of knowledge: but does not at first agree with him in identifying good with pleasure, and evil with pain. Upon this point, too, he is represented as agreeing in opinion with the Many. He does not admit that to live pleasurably is good, unless where a man takes his pleasure in honourable things. He thinks it safer, and more consistent with his own whole life, to maintain--That pleasurable things, or painful things, may be either good, or evil, or indifferent, according to the particular case.

[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates.]

This doctrine Sokrates takes much pains to refute. He contends that pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, are always good--and painful things, so far forth as painful, always evil. When some pleasures are called evil, that is not on account of any thing belonging to the pleasure itself, but because of its ulterior consequences and concomitants, which are painful or distressing in a degree more than countervailing the pleasure. So too, when some pains are pronounced to be good, this is not from any peculiarity in the pain itself, but because of its consequences and concomitants: such pain being required as a condition to the attainment of health, security, wealth, and other pleasures or satisfactions more than counter-balancing. Sokrates challenges opponents to name any other end, with reference to which things are called _good_, except their tendency to prevent or relieve pains and to ensure a balance of pleasure: he challenges them to name any other end, with reference to which things are called _evil_, except their tendency to produce pains and to intercept or destroy pleasures. In measuring pleasures and pains against each other, there is no other difference to be reckoned except that of greater or less, more or fewer. The difference between near and distant, does indeed obtrude itself upon us as a misleading element. But it is the special task of the "measuring science" to correct this illusion--and to compare pleasures or pains, whether near or distant, according to their real worth: just as we learn to rectify the illusions of the sight in regard to near and distant objects.

[Side-note: Application of that reasoning to the case of courage.]

Sokrates proceeds to apply this general principle in correcting the explanation of courage given by Protagoras. He shows, or tries to show, that courage, like all the other branches of virtue, consists in acting on a just estimate of comparative pleasures and pains. No man affronts evil, or the alternative of greater pain, knowing it to be such: no man therefore adventures himself in any terrible enterprise, knowing it to be so: neither the brave nor the timid do this. Both the brave and the timid affront that which they think not terrible, or the least terrible of two alternatives: but they estimate differently what is such. The former go readily to war when required, the latter evade it. Now to go into war when required, is honourable: being honourable, it is good: being honourable and good, it is pleasurable. The brave know this, and enter upon it willingly: the timid not only do not know it, but entertain the contrary opinion, looking upon war as painful and terrible, and therefore keeping aloof. The brave men fear what it is honourable to fear, the cowards what it is dishonourable to fear: the former act upon the knowledge of what is really terrible, the latter are misled by their ignorance of it. Courage is thus, like the other virtues, a case of accurate knowledge of comparative pleasures and pains, or of good and evil.[144]

[Footnote 144: Compare, respecting Courage, a passage in the Republic, iv. pp. 429 C, 430 B, which is better stated there (though substantially the same opinion) than here in the Protagoras.

The opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be illustrated by a sentence from the funeral oration delivered by Periklês, Thucyd. ii. 43, fin. [Greek: A)lgeinote/ra ga\r a)ndri/ ge phro/nêma e)/chonti ê( e)n tô=| meta\ tou= malakisthê=nai ka/kôsis, ê)\ o( meta\ r(ô/mês kai\ koinê=s e)lpi/dos a(/ma gigno/menos a)nai/sthêtos tha/natos]--which Dr. Arnold thus translates in his note: "For more grievous to a man of noble mind is the misery which comes together with cowardice, than the unfelt death which befalls him in the midst of his strength and hopes for the common welfare."

So again in the Phædon (p. 68) Sokrates describes the courage of the ordinary unphilosophical citizen to consist in braving death from fear of greater evils (which is the same view as that of Sokrates in the Protagoras), while the philosopher is courageous on a different principle; aspiring only to reason and intelligence, with the pleasures attending it, he welcomes death as releasing his mind from the obstructive companionship of the body.

The fear of disgrace and dishonour, in his own eyes and in those of others, is more intolerable to the brave man than the fear of wounds and death in the service of his country. See Plato, Leg. i. pp. 646-647. He is [Greek: phobero\s meta\ no/mou, meta\ di/kês], p. 647 E. Such is the way in which both Plato and Thucydides conceive the character of the brave citizen as compared with the coward.

It is plain that this resolves itself ultimately into a different estimate of prospective pains; the case being one in which pleasure is not concerned. That the pains of self-reproach and infamy in the eyes of others are among the most agonising in the human bosom, need hardly be remarked. At the same time the sentiments here conceived embrace a wide field of sympathy, comprising the interests, honour, and security, of others as well as of the individual agent.]

[Side-note: The theory which Plato here lays down is more distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues.]

Such is the ethical theory which the Platonic Sokrates enunciates in this dialogue, and which Protagoras and others accept. It is positive and distinct, to a degree very unusual with Plato. We shall find that he theorises differently in other dialogues; whether for the better or the worse, will be hereafter seen. He declares here explicitly that pleasure, or happiness, is the end to be pursued; and pain, or misery, the end to be avoided: and that there is no other end, in reference to which things can be called good or evil, except as they tend to promote pleasure or mitigate suffering, on the one side--to entail pain or suffering on the other. He challenges objectors to assign any other end. And thus much is certain--that in those other dialogues where he himself departs from the present doctrine, he has not complied with his own challenge. Nowhere has he specified a different end. In other dialogues, as well as in the Protagoras, Plato has insisted on the necessity of a science or art of calculation: but in no other dialogue has he told us distinctly what are the items to be calculated.

[Side-note: Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is too narrow, and exclusively prudential.]

I perfectly agree with the doctrine laid down by Sokrates in the Protagoras, that pain or suffering is the End to be avoided or lessened as far as possible--and pleasure or happiness the End to be pursued as far as attainable--by intelligent forethought and comparison: that there is no other intelligible standard of reference, for application of the terms Good and Evil, except the tendency to produce happiness or misery: and that if this standard be rejected, ethical debate loses all standard for rational discussion, and becomes only an enunciation of the different sentiments, authoritative and self-justifying, prevalent in each community. But the End just mentioned is highly complex, and care must be taken to conceive it in its full comprehension. Herein I conceive the argument of Sokrates (in the Protagoras) to be incomplete. It carries attention only to a part of the truth, keeping out of sight, though not excluding, the remainder. It considers each man as an individual, determining good or evil for himself by calculating his own pleasures and pains: as a prudent, temperate, and courageous agent, but neither as just nor beneficent. It omits to take account of him as a member of a society, composed of many others akin or co-ordinate with himself. Now it is the purpose of an ethical or political reasoner (such as Plato both professes to be and really is) to study the means of happiness, not simply for the agent himself, but for that agent together with others around him--for the members of the community generally.[145] The Platonic Sokrates says this himself in the Republic: and accordingly, he there treats of other points which are not touched upon by Sokrates in the Protagoras. He proclaims that the happiness of each citizen must be sought only by means consistent with the security, and to a certain extent with the happiness, of others: he provides as far as practicable that all shall derive their pleasures and pains from the same causes: common pleasures, and common pains, to all.[146] The doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras requires to be enlarged so as to comprehend these other important elements. Since the conduct of every agent affects the happiness of others, he must be called upon to take account of its consequences under both aspects, especially where it goes to inflict hurt or privation upon others. Good and evil depend upon that scientific computation and comparison of pleasures and pains which Sokrates in the Protagoras prescribes: but the computation must include, to a certain extent, the pleasures and pains (security and rightful expectations) of others besides the agent himself, implicated in the consequences of his acts.[147]

[Footnote 145: Plato, Republ. iv. pp. 420-421, v. p. 466 A.]

[Footnote 146: Plato, Republ. v. pp. 462 A-B-D, 464 A-D.

Throughout the first of these passages we see [Greek: a)gatho\n] used as the equivalent of [Greek: ê(donê/], [Greek: kako\n] as the equivalent of [Greek: lu/pê].]

[Footnote 147: See, especially on this point, the brief but valuable Tract on Utilitarianism by Mr. John Stuart Mill. In page 16 of that work attention is called to the fact, that in Utilitarianism the standard is not the greatest happiness of the agent himself alone, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. So that we cannot with exactness call the doctrine of Sokrates, in his conversation with Protagoras, "the theory of Utilitarianism," as Mr. Mill calls it in page 1.]

[Side-note: Comparison with the Republic.]

As to this point, we shall find the Platonic Sokrates not always correct, nor even consistent with himself. This will appear especially when we come to see the account which he gives of Justice in the Republic. In that branch of the Ethical End, a direct regard to the security of others comes into the foreground. For in an act of injustice, the prominent characteristic is that of harm, done to others--though that is not the whole, since the security of the agent himself is implicated with that of others in the general fulfilment of these obligations. It is this primary regard to others, and secondary regard to self, implicated in one complex feeling--which distinguishes justice from prudence. The Platonic Sokrates in the Republic (though his language is not always clear) does not admit this; but considers justice as a branch of prudence, necessary to ensure the happiness of the individual agent himself.

[Side-note: The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates.]

Now in the Protagoras, what the Platonic Sokrates dwells upon (in the argument which I have been considering) is prudence, temperance, courage: little or nothing is said about justice: there was therefore the less necessity for insisting on that prominent reference to the security of others (besides the agent himself) which justice involves. If, however, we turn back to the earlier part of the dialogue, to the speech delivered by Protagoras, we see justice brought into the foreground. It is not indeed handled analytically (which is not the manner of that Sophist), nor is it resolved into regard to pleasure and pain, happiness and misery: but it is announced as a social sentiment indispensably and reciprocally necessary from every man towards every other ([Greek: di/kê--ai)dô\s]), distinguishable from those endowments which supply the wants and multiply the comforts of the individual himself. The very existence of the social union requires, that each man should feel a sentiment of duties on his part towards others, and duties on their parts towards him: or (in other words) of rights on his part to have his interests considered by others, and rights on their parts to have their interests considered by him. Unless this sentiment of reciprocity--reciprocal duty and right--exist in the bosom of each individual citizen, or at least in the large majority--no social union could subsist. There are doubtless different degrees of the sentiment: moreover the rights and duties may be apportioned better or worse, more or less fairly, among the individuals of a society; thus rendering the society more or less estimable and comfortable. But without a certain minimum of the sentiment in each individual bosom, even the worst constituted society could not hold together. And it is this sentiment of reciprocity which Protagoras (in the dialogue before us) is introduced as postulating in his declaration, that justice and the sense of shame (unlike to professional aptitudes) must be distributed universally and without exception among all the members of a community. Each man must feel them, in his conduct towards others: each man must also be able to reckon that others will feel the like, in their behaviour towards him.[148]

[Footnote 148: Professor Bain (in his work on the Emotions and the Will, ch. xv. On the Ethical Emotions, pp. 271-3) has given remarks extremely pertinent to the illustration of that doctrine which Plato has here placed under the name of Protagoras.

"The supposed uniformity of moral distinctions resolves itself into the two following particulars. First, the common end of _public security_, which is also individual preservation, demands certain precautions that are everywhere very much alike, and can in no case be dispensed with. Some sort of constituted authority to control the individual impulses and to protect each man's person and property, must exist wherever a number of human beings live together. The duties springing out of this necessary arrangement are essentially the same in all societies. . . They have a pretty uniform character all over the globe. If the sense of the common safety were not sufficiently strong to constitute the social tie of obedience to some common regulations, society could not exist. . . . It is no proof of the universal spread of a special innate faculty of moral distinctions, but of a certain rational appreciation of what is necessary for the very existence of every human being living in the company of others: Doubtless, if the sad history of the human race had been preserved in all its details, we _should have many examples of tribes that perished from being unequal to the conception of a social system, or to the restraints imposed by it_. We know enough of the records of anarchy, to see how difficult it is for human nature to comply in full with the social conditions of security; but if this were not complied with at all, the result would be mutual and swift destruction. . . . In the second place, mankind have been singularly unanimous in the practice of imposing upon individual members of societies some observances or restraints of purely _sentimental_ origin, having no reference, direct or indirect, to the maintenance of the social tie, with all the safeguards implied in it. Certain maxims founded in taste, liking, aversion, or fancy, have, in every community known to us, been raised to the dignity of authoritative morality; being rendered (so to speak) 'terms of communion,' and have been enforced by punishment. . . . In the rules, founded on men's sentiments, likings, aversions, and antipathies, there is nothing common but the fact that some one or other of these are carried to the length of public requirement, and mixed up in one code with the imperative duties that hold society together."

The postulate of the Platonic Protagoras--that [Greek: di/kê] and [Greek: ai)dô\s] must be felt to a certain extent in each man's bosom, as a condition to the very existence of society--agrees with the first of the two elements here distinguished by Mr. Bain, and does not necessarily go beyond it. But the unsystematic teaching and universal propagandism, which Protagoras describes as the agency whereby virtue is communicated, applies alike to both the two elements distinguished by Mr. Bain: to the factitious exigencies of King Nomos, as well as to his tutelary control. It is this mixed mass that the Sokratic analysis is brought to examine.]

[Side-note: The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of other persons besides the agent himself.]

If we thus compare the Ethical End, as implied, though not explicitly laid down, by Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue,--and as laid down by Sokrates in the later part--we shall see that while Sokrates restricts it to a true comparative estimate of the pains and pleasures of the agent himself, Protagoras enlarges it so as to include a direct reference to those of others also, coupled with an expectation of the like reference on the part of others.[149] Sokrates is satisfied with requiring from each person calculating prudence for his own pleasures and pains: while Protagoras proclaims that after this attribute had been obtained by man, and individual wants supplied, still there was a farther element necessary in the calculation--the social sentiment or reciprocity of regard implanted in every one's bosom: without this the human race would have perished. Prudence and skill will suffice for an isolated existence; but if men are to live and act in social communion, the services as well as the requirements of each man must be shaped, in a certain measure, with a direct view to the security of others as well as to his own.

[Footnote 149: Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322.]

In my judgment, the Ethical End, exclusively self-regarding, here laid down by Sokrates, is too narrow. And if we turn to other Platonic dialogues, we shall find Sokrates still represented as proclaiming a self-regarding Ethical End, though not the same as what we read in the Protagoras. In the Gorgias, Republic, Phædon, &c., we shall find him discountenancing the calculation (recommended in the Protagoras) of pleasures and pains against each other, as greater, more certain, durable, &c., and insisting that all shall be estimated according as they bear on the general condition or health of the mind, which he assimilates to the general condition or health of the body. The health of the body, considered as an End to be pursued, is essentially self-regarding: so also is the health of the mind. I shall touch upon this farther when I consider the above-mentioned dialogues: at present, I only remark that they agree with the Sokrates of the Protagoras in assuming a self-regarding Ethical End, though they do not agree with him in describing what that End should be.

[Side-note: Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or satisfactory, especially about courage.]

The application which Sokrates makes (in the Protagoras) of his own assumed Ethical End to the explanation of courage, is certainly confused and unsatisfactory. And indeed, we may farther remark that the general result at which Plato seems to be aiming in this dialogue, viz.: That all the different virtues are at the bottom one and the same, and that he who possesses one of them must also possess the remainder--cannot be made out even upon his own assumptions. Though it be true that all the virtues depend upon correct calculation, yet as each of them applies to a different set of circumstances and different disturbing and misleading causes, the same man who calculates well under one set of circumstances, may calculate badly under others. The position laid down by Protagoras, that men are often courageous but unjust--just, but not wise--is noway refuted by Plato. Nor is it even inconsistent with Plato's own theory, though he seems to think it so.

[Side-note: Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct. That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists.]

Some of the Platonic commentators maintain,[150] that the doctrine here explicitly laid down and illustrated by Sokrates, _viz._: the essential identity of the pleasurable with the good, of the painful with the evil--is to be regarded as not serious, but as taken up in jest for the purpose of mocking and humiliating Protagoras. Such an hypothesis appears to me untenable; contradicted by the whole tenor of the dialogue. Throughout all the Platonic compositions, there is nowhere to be found any train of argument more direct, more serious, and more elaborate, than that by which Sokrates here proves the identity of good with pleasure, of pain with evil (p. 351 to end). Protagoras begins by denying it, and is only compelled to accept the conclusion against his own will, by the series of questions which he cannot otherwise answer.[151] Sokrates admits that the bulk of mankind are also opposed to it: but he establishes it with an ingenuity which is pronounced to be triumphant by all the hearers around.[152] The commentators are at liberty to impeach the reasoning as unsound; but to set it aside as mere banter and mockery, is preposterous. Assume it even to be intended as mockery--assume that Sokrates is mystifying the hearers, by a string of delusive queries, to make out a thesis which he knows to be untrue and silly--how can the mockery fall upon Protagoras, who denies the thesis from the beginning?[153] The irony, if it were irony, would be misplaced and absurd.

[Footnote 150: See Brandis, Gesch. d. Griech.-Röm., Phil. Part ii. sect. 114, note 3 p. 458; Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Protag. pp. 15-33-34.

So too Ficinus says in his Argumentum to the Protagoras: (p. 765) "Tum vero de bono et malo multa tractantur. Siquidem prudentia est scientia eligendi boni, malique vitandi. Ambigitur autem utrum bonum malumque idem sit penitus quod et voluptas et dolor. _Neque affirmatur id quidem omnino, neque manifesté omnino negatur._ De hoc enim in Gorgiâ Phileboque et alibi," &c.

When a critic composes an Argument to the Protagoras, he is surely under obligation to report faithfully and exactly what is declared by Sokrates _in the Protagoras_, whether it be consistent or not with the Gorgias and Philêbus. Yet here we find Ficinus misrepresenting the Protagoras, in order to force it into harmony with the other two.]

[Footnote 151: This is so directly stated that I am surprised to find Zeller (among many other critics) announcing that Plato here accepts for the occasion the _Standpunkt_ of his enemies (Philos. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 380, ed. 2nd).]

[Footnote 152: Plato, Protag. p. 358 A. [Greek: u(perphuô=s e)do/kei a(/pasin a)lêthê= ei)=nai ta\ ei)rême/na.]]

[Footnote 153: When Stallbaum asserts that the thesis is taken up by Sokrates as one which was maintained by Protagoras and the other Sophists (Proleg. p. 33), he says what is distinctly at variance with the dialogue, p. 351.

Schleiermacher maintains that this same thesis (the fundamental identity of good with pleasure, evil with pain) is altogether "unsokratic and unplatonic"; that it is handled here by Sokrates in a manner visibly ironical (sichtbar ironisch); that the purpose of the argument is to show the stupidity of Protagoras, who is puzzled and imposed upon by such obvious fallacies (Einleitung zum Protag. 230, bottom of p. 232), and who is made to exhibit (so Schleiermacher says, Einl. zum Gorgias, p. 14) a string of ludicrous absurdities.

Upon this I have to remark first, that if the stupidity of Protagoras is intended to be shown up, that of all the other persons present must be equally manifested; for all of them assent emphatically, at the close, to the thesis as having been proved (Prot. p. 358 A): next, that I am unable to see either the absurdities of Protagoras or the irony of Sokrates, which Schleiermacher asserts to be so visible. The argument of Sokrates is as serious and elaborate as any thing which we read in Plato. Schleiermacher seems to me to misconceive altogether (not only here but also in his Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 10) the concluding argument of Sokrates in the Protagoras. To describe the identity between [Greek: ê(du\] and [Greek: a)gatho\n] as a "scheinbare Voraussetzung" is to depart from the plain meaning of words.

Again, Steinhart contends that Sokrates assumes this doctrine (identity of pleasure with good, pain with evil), "not as his own opinion, but only hypothetically, with a sarcastic side-glance at the absurd consequences which many deduced from it--only as the received world-morality, as the opinion of the majority" (Einleit. zum Protag. p. 419). How Steinhart can find proof of this in the dialogue, I am at a loss to understand. The dialogue presents to us Sokrates introducing the opinion as his own, against that of Protagoras and against that of the multitude (p. 351 C). On hearing this opposition from Protagoras, Sokrates invites him to an investigation, whether the opinion be just; Sokrates then conducts the investigation himself, along with Protagoras, at considerable length, and ultimately brings out the doctrine as proved, with the assent of all present.

These forced interpretations are resorted to, because the critics cannot bear to see the Platonic Sokrates maintaining a thesis substantially the same as that of Eudoxus and Epikurus. Upon this point, K. F. Hermann is more moderate than the others; he admits the thesis to be seriously maintained in the dialogue--states that it was really the opinion of the historical Sokrates--and adds that it was also the opinion of Plato himself during his early Sokratic stadium, when the Protagoras (as he thinks) was composed (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. pp. 462-463).

Most of the critics agree in considering the Protagoras to be one of Plato's earlier dialogues, about 403 B.C. Ast even refers it to 407 B.C. when Plato was about twenty-one years of age. I have already given my reasons for believing that none of the Platonic dialogues were composed before 399 B.C. The Protagoras belongs, in my opinion, to Plato's most perfect and mature period.]

[Side-note: Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency.]

The commentators resort to this hypothesis, partly because the doctrine in question is one which they disapprove--partly because doctrines inconsistent with it are maintained in other Platonic dialogues. These are the same two reasons upon which, in other cases, various dialogues have been rejected as not genuine works of Plato. The first of the two reasons is plainly irrelevant: we must accept what Plato gives us, whether we assent to it or not. The second reason also, I think, proves little. The dialogues are distinct compositions, written each with its own circumstances and purpose: we have no right to require that they shall be all consistent with each other in doctrine, especially when we look to the long philosophical career of Plato. To suppose that the elaborate reasoning of Sokrates in the latter portion of the Protagoras is mere irony, intended to mystify both Protagoras himself and all the by-standers, who accept it as earnest and convincing--appears to me far less reasonable than the admission, that the dialectic pleading ascribed to Sokrates in one dialogue is inconsistent with that assigned to him in another.

[Side-note: Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close of the dialogue.]

Though there is every mark of seriousness, and no mark of irony, in this reasoning of Sokrates, yet we must remember that he does not profess to leave the subject settled at the close of the dialogue. On the contrary, he declares himself to be in a state of puzzle and perplexity. The question, proposed at the outset, Whether virtue is teachable? remains undecided.