Chapter XXV: Phædon (1)

[Side-note: The Phædon is affirmative and expository.]

The Phædon is characterised by Proklus as a dialogue wherein Sokrates unfolds fully his own mental history, and communicates to his admirers the complete range of philosophical cognition.[1] This criticism is partly well founded. The dialogue generally is among the most affirmative and expository in the Platonic list. Sokrates undertakes to prove the immortality of the soul, delivers the various reasons which establish the doctrine to his satisfaction, and confutes some dissentient opinions entertained by others. In regard to the exposition, however, we must consider ourselves as listening to Plato under the name of Sokrates: and we find it so conducted as to specify both certain stages through which the mind of Plato had passed, and the logical process which (at that time) appeared to him to carry conviction.

[Footnote 1: Proklus, in Platon. Republ. p. 392. [Greek: e)n Phai/dôni me\n ga\r o(/pou diaphero/ntôs o( Sôkra/tês tê\n e(autou= zôê\n a)naploi=, kai\ pa=n to\ tê=s e)pistê/mês plê=thos a)noi/gei toi=s e(autou= zêlôtai=s], &c. Wyttenbach thinks (note, ad p. 108 E) that Plato was young when he composed the Phædon. But no sufficient grounds are given for this: and the concluding sentence of the dialogue affords good presumption that it was composed many years after the death of Sokrates--[Greek: ê)/de ê( teleutê/, ô)= E)che/krates, tou= e(tai/rou ê(mi=n e)ge/neto, a)ndro/s, ô(s ê(mei=s phai=men a)/n, _tô=n to/te_ ô(=n e)peira/thêmen a)ri/stou, kai\ a)/llôs phronimôta/tou kai\ dikaiota/tou.] The phrase [Greek: tô=n to/te] which may probably have slipped unconsciously from Plato, implies that Sokrates belonged to the past generation. The beginning of the dialogue undoubtedly shows that Plato intended to place it shortly after the death of Sokrates; but the word [Greek: to/te] at the end is inconsistent with this supposition, and comes out unconsciously as a mark of the real time.]

[Side-note: Situation and circumstances assumed in the Phædon. Pathetic interest which they inspire.]

The interest felt by most readers in the Phædon, however, depends, not so much on the argumentative exposition (which Wyttenbach[2] justly pronounces to be obscure and difficult as well as unsatisfactory) as on the personality of the expounding speaker, and the irresistible pathos of the situation. Sokrates had been condemned to death by the Dikastery on the day after the sacred ship, memorable in connection with the legendary voyage of Theseus to Krete, had been dispatched on her annual mission of religious sacrifice at the island of Delos. The Athenian magistrates considered themselves as precluded from putting any one to death by public authority, during the absence of the ship on this mission. Thirty days elapsed between her departure and her return: during all which interval, Sokrates remained in the prison, yet with full permission to his friends to visit him. They passed most of every day in the enjoyment of his conversation.[3] In the Phædon, we read the last of these conversations, after the sacred vessel had returned, and after the Eleven magistrates had announced to Sokrates that the draught of hemlock would be administered to him before sunset. On communicating this intelligence, the magistrates released Sokrates from the fetters with which he had hitherto been bound. It is shortly after such release that the friends enter the prison to see him for the last time. One of the number, Phædon, recounts to Echekratês not only the conduct and discourse of Sokrates during the closing hours of his life, but also the swallowing of the poison, and the manner of his death.

[Footnote 2: See the Prolegomena prefixed to Wyttenbach's edition of the Phædon, p. xxi. p. 10.]

[Footnote 3: Plato, Phædon, pp. 58-50.

It appears that Kriton became bail before the Dikasts, in a certain sum of money, that Sokrates should remain in prison and not escape (Plat. Phædon, p. 115 D; Kriton, 45 B). Kriton would have been obliged to pay this money if Sokrates had accepted his proposition to escape, noticed already in chap. x.]

[Side-note: Simmias and Kebês, the two collocutors with Sokrates. Their feelings and those of Sokrates.]

More than fifteen friends of the philosopher are noted as present at this last scene: but the only two who take an active part in the debate, are, two young Thebans named Kebês and Simmias.[4] These friends, though deeply attached to Sokrates, and full of sorrow at the irreparable loss impending over them, are represented as overawed and fascinated by his perfect fearlessness, serenity and dignity.[5] They are ashamed to give vent to their grief, when their master is seen to maintain his ordinary frame of mind, neither disquieted nor dissatisfied. The fundamental conception of the dialogue is, to represent Sokrates as the same man that he was before his trial; unmoved by the situation--not feeling that any misfortune is about to happen to him--equally delighting in intellectual debate--equally fertile in dialectic invention. So much does he care for debate, and so little for the impending catastrophe, that he persists in a great argumentative effort, notwithstanding the intimation conveyed by Kriton from the gaoler, that if he heated himself with talking, the poison might perhaps be languid in its operation, so that two or three draughts of it would be necessary instead of one.[6] Sokrates even advances the position that death appears to him as a benefit rather than a misfortune, and that every true philosopher ought to prefer death to life, assuming it to supervene without his own act--suicide being forbidden by the Gods. He is represented as "placidus ore, intrepidus verbis; intempestivas suorum lacrimas coercens"--to borrow a phrase from Tacitus's striking picture of the last hours of the Emperor Otho.[7] To see him thus undisturbed, and even welcoming his approaching end, somewhat hurts the feelings of his assembled friends, who are in the deepest affliction at the certainty of so soon losing him. Sokrates undertakes to defend himself before them as he had done before the Dikasts; and to show good grounds for his belief, that death is not a misfortune, but a benefit, to the philosopher.[8] Simmias and Kebês, though at first not satisfied with the reasonings, are nevertheless reluctant to produce their doubts, from fear of mortifying him in his last moments: but Sokrates protests against such reluctance as founded on a misconception of his existing frame of mind.[9] He is now the same man as he was before, and he calls upon them to keep up the freedom of debate unimpaired.

[Footnote 4: Plato, Phædon, pp. 59 B, 89 A. [Greek: tô=n neani/skôn to\n lo/gon], &c. (p. 89 A).]

[Footnote 5: Plato, Phædon, pp. 58-59.]

[Footnote 6: Plato, Phædon, p. 63 D.]

[Footnote 7: Tacitus, Hist. ii. 48.]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Phædon, p. 63.]

[Footnote 9: Plato, Phædon, p. 84 D-E.]

[Side-note: Emphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate, active exercise of reason, and independent judgment for each reasoner.]

Indeed this freedom of debate and fulness of search--the paramount value of "reasoned truth"--the necessity of keeping up the force of individual reason by constant argumentative exercise--and the right of independent judgment for hearer as well as speaker--stand emphatically proclaimed in these last words of the dying philosopher. He does not announce the immortality of the soul as a dogma of imperative orthodoxy; which men, whether satisfied with the proofs or not, must believe, or must make profession of believing, on pain of being shunned as a moral pestilence, and disqualified from giving testimony in a court of justice. He sets forth his own conviction, with the grounds on which he adopts it. But he expressly recognises the existence of dissentient opinions: he invites his companions to bring forward every objection: he disclaims all special purpose of impressing his own conclusions upon their minds: nay, he expressly warns them not to be biassed by their personal sympathies, then wound up to the highest pitch, towards himself. He entreats them to preserve themselves from becoming tinged with _misology_, or the hatred of free argumentative discussion: and he ascribes this mental vice to the early habit of easy, uninquiring, implicit, belief: since a man thus ready of faith, embracing opinions without any discriminative test, presently finds himself driven to abandon one opinion after another, until at last he mistrusts all opinions, and hates the process of discussing them, laying the blame upon philosophy instead of upon his own intellect.[10]

[Footnote 10: Plato, Phædon, pp. 89 C-D, 90.

[Greek: Prô=ton eu)labêthô=me/n ti pa/thos mê\ pa/thômen. To\ poi=on, ê)=n d' e)gô/? Mê\ genô/metha, ê)=| d' o(/s, miso/logoi, ô(/sper oi( misa/nthrôpoi gigno/menoi; ô(s ou)k e)/stin, e)/phê, o(/, ti a)/n tis mei=zon tou/tou kako\n pa/thoi ê)\ lo/gous misê/sas.] p. 90 B. [Greek: e)peida/n tis pisteu/sê| lo/gô| tini\ a)lêthei= ei)=nai, a)/neu tê=s peri\ tou\s lo/gous te/chnês, ka)/peita o)li/gon u(/steron au)tô=| do/xê| pseudê\s ei)=nai, e)ni/ote me\n ô)/n, e)ni/ote d' ou)k ô)/n, kai\ au)=this e(/teros kai\ e(/teros], &c.]

[Side-note: Anxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on their guard against being influenced by his authority--that they shall follow only the convictions of their own reason.]

"For myself" (says Sokrates) "I fear that in these my last hours I depart from the true spirit of philosophy--like unschooled men, who, when in debate, think scarcely at all how the real question stands, but care only to make their own views triumphant in the minds of the auditors. Between them and me there is only thus much of difference. I regard it as a matter of secondary consequence, whether my conclusions appear true to my hearers; but I shall do my best to make them appear as much as possible true to myself.[11] My calculation is as follows: mark how selfish it is. If my conclusion as to the immortality of the soul is true, I am better off by believing it: if I am in error, and death be the end of me, even then I shall avoid importuning my friends with grief, during these few remaining hours: moreover my error will not continue with me--which would have been a real misfortune--but will be extinguished very shortly. Such is the frame of mind, Simmias and Kebês, with which I approach the debate. Do you follow my advice: take little thought of Sokrates, but take much more thought of the truth. If I appear to you to affirm any thing truly, assent to me: but if not, oppose me with all your powers of reasoning: Be on your guard lest, through earnest zeal, I should deceive alike myself and you, and should leave the sting in you, like a bee, at this hour of departure."

[Footnote 11: Plato, Phædon, p. 91 A-C. [Greek: Ou) ga\r o(/pôs toi=s parou=sin a)\ e)gô\ le/gô do/xei a)lêthê= ei)=nai, prothumê/somai, ei) mê\ ei)/ê pa/rergon, a)/ll' o(/pôs au)tô=| e)moi\ o(/ ti ma/lista do/zei ou(/tôs e)/chein. logi/zomai ga/r, ô)= phi/le e(/taire--kai\ the/asai ô(s pleonektikô=s--ei) me\n tugcha/nei a)lêthê= o)/nta a(\ le/gô, kalô=s dê\ e)/chei to\ peisthê=nai; ei) de\ mêde/n e)sti teleutê/santi, a)ll' ou)=n tou=to/n ge to\n chro/non au)to\n to\n pro\ tou= thana/tou ê(=tton toi=s parou=sin a)êdê\s e)/somai o)duro/menos . . . u(mei=s me/ntoi, a)\n e)moi\ pei/thêsthe, _smikro\n phronti/santes Sôkra/tous, tê=s de\ a)lêthei/as polu\ ma=llon, e)a\n me/n ti u(mi=n dokô= a)lêthe\s le/gein, xunomologê/sate; ei) de\ mê/, panti\ lo/gô| a)ntitei/nete_, eu)labou/menoi o(/pôs mê\ e)gô\ u(po\ prothumi/as a(/ma e)mauto/n te kai\ u(ma=s e)xapatê/sas, ô(/sper me/litta to\ ke/ntron e)gkatalipô\n oi)chê/somai.]]

[Side-note: Remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned truth and the liberty of individual dissent.]

This is a remarkable passage, as illustrating the spirit and purpose of Platonic dialogues. In my preceding Chapters, I have already shown, that it is no part of the aim of Sokrates to thrust dogmas of his own into other men's minds as articles of faith. But then, most of these Chapters have dwelt upon Dialogues of Search, in which Sokrates has appeared as an interrogator, or enquirer jointly with others: scrutinising their opinions, but disclaiming knowledge or opinions of his own. Here, however, in the Phædon, the case is altogether different. Sokrates is depicted as having not only an affirmative opinion, but even strong conviction, on a subject of great moment: which conviction, moreover, he is especially desirous of preserving unimpaired, during his few remaining hours of life. Yet even here, he manifests no anxiety to get that conviction into the minds of his friends, except as a result of their own independent scrutiny and self-working reason. Not only he does not attempt to terrify them into believing, by menace of evil consequences if they do not--but he repudiates pointedly even the gentler machinery of conversion, which might work upon their minds through attachment to himself and reverence for his authority. His devotion is to "reasoned truth": he challenges his friends to the fullest scrutiny by their own independent reason: he recognises the sentence which they pronounce afterwards as valid _for them_, whether concurrent with himself or adverse. Their reason is for them, what his reason is for him: requiring, both alike (as Sokrates here proclaims), to be stimulated as well as controlled by all-searching debate--but postulating equal liberty of final decision for each one of the debaters. The stress laid by Plato upon the full liberty of dissenting reason, essential to philosophical debate--is one of the most memorable characteristics of the Phædon. When we come to the treatise De Legibus (where Sokrates does not appear), we shall find a totally opposite view of sentiment. In the tenth book of that treatise Plato enforces the rigid censorship of an orthodox persecutor, who makes his own reason binding and compulsory on all.

[Side-note: Phædon and Symposion--points of analogy and contrast.]

The natural counterpart and antithesis to the Phædon, is found in the Symposion.[12] In both, the personality of Sokrates stands out with peculiar force: in the one, he is in the fulness of life and enjoyment, along with festive comrades--in the other, he is on the verge of approaching death, surrounded by companions in deep affliction. The point common to both, is, the perfect self-command of Sokrates under a diversity of trying circumstances. In the Symposion, we read of him as triumphing over heat, cold, fatigue, danger, amorous temptation, unmeasured potations of wine, &c.:[13] in the Phædon, we discover him rising superior to the fear of death, and to the contagion of an afflicted company around him. Still, his resolute volition is occasionally overpowered by fits of absorbing meditation, which seize him at moments sudden and unaccountable, and chain him to the spot for a long time. There is moreover, in both dialogues, a streak of eccentricity in his character, which belongs to what Plato calls the philosophical inspiration and madness, rising above the measure of human temperance and prudence.[14] The Phædon depicts in Sokrates the same intense love of philosophy and dialectic debate, as the Symposion and Phædrus: but it makes no allusion to that personal attachment, and passionate admiration of youthful beauty, with which, according to those two dialogues, the mental fermentation of the philosophical aspirant is asserted to begin.[15] Sokrates in the Phædon describes the initial steps whereby he had been led to philosophical study:[16] but the process is one purely intellectual, without reference to personal converse with beloved companions, as a necessity of the case. His discourse is that of a man on the point of death--"abruptis vitæ blandimentis"[17]--and he already looks upon his body, not as furnishing the means of action and as requiring only to be trained by gymnastic discipline (as it appears in the Republic), but as an importunate and depraving companion, of which he is glad to get rid: so that the ethereal substance of the soul may be left to its free expansion and fellowship with the intelligible world, apart from sense and its solicitations.

[Footnote 12: Thus far I agree with Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Phædon, p. 9, &c.); though I do not think that he has shown sufficient ground for his theory regarding the Symposion and the Phædon, as jointly intended to depict the character of the philosopher, promised by Plato as a sequel to the Sophist and the Statesman. (Plato, Sophist. p. 217; Politic. p. 257.)]

[Footnote 13: Plato, Symposion, pp. 214 A, 219 D, 220-221-223 D: compare Phædon, p. 116, c. 117. Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) compares on this point his father Antoninus Pius to Sokrates: both were capable of enjoyment as well as of abstinence, without ever losing their self-command. [Greek: E)pharmo/seie d' a)\n au)tô=|] (Antoninus P.) [Greek: to\ peri\ tou= Sôkra/tous mnêmoneuo/menon, o(/ti kai\ a)pe/chesthai kai\ a)polau/ein e)du/nato tou/tôn, ô(=n polloi\ pro/s te ta\s a)pocha\s a)sthenô=s, kai\ pro\s ta\s a)polau/seis e)ndotikô=s, e)/chousin. To\ de\ i)schu/ein, kai\ e)/ti karterei=n kai\ e)nnê/phein e(kate/rô|, a)ndro\s e)/stin a)/rtion kai\ a)êttêton psuchê\n e)/chontos.]]

[Footnote 14: Plato, Symposion, pp. 174-175-220 C-D. Compare Phædon, pp. 84 C, 95 E.]

[Footnote 15: Plato, Sympos. p. 215 A, p. 221 D. [Greek: oi(=os de\ ou(tosi\ ge/gone tê\n _a)topi/an_ a)/nthrôpos, kai\ au)to\s kai\ oi( lo/goi au)tou=, ou)d' e)ggu\s a)\n eu(/roi tis zêtô=n], &c. p. 218 B: [Greek: pa/ntes ga\r kekoinônê/kate tê=s philoso/phou mani/as te kai\ bakchei/as], &c. About the [Greek: philo/sophos mani/a], compare Plato, Phædrus, pp. 245-250.

Plato, Phædrus, pp. 251-253. Symposion, pp. 210-211. [Greek: o(/tan tis a)po\ tô=nde dia\ to\ o)rthô=s paiderastei=n e)paniô\n e)kei=no to\ kalo\n a)/rchêtai kathora=|n], &c. (211 B).]

[Footnote 16: Plato, Phædon, p. 96 A. [Greek: e)gô\ ou)=n soi\ di/eimi peri\ au)tô=n ta/ g' e)ma\ pa/thê], &c.]

[Footnote 17: Tacitus, Hist. ii. 53. "Othonis libertus, habere se suprema ejus mandata respondit: ipsum viventem quidem relictum, sed solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis."]

[Side-note: Phædon--compared with Republic and Timæus. No recognition of the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul and body.]

We have here one peculiarity of the Phædon, whereby it stands distinguished both from the Republic and the Timæus. The antithesis on which it dwells is that of the soul or mind, on one hand--the body on the other. The soul or mind is spoken of as one and indivisible: as if it were an inmate unworthily lodged or imprisoned in the body. It is not distributed into distinct parts, kinds, or varieties: no mention is made of that tripartite distribution which is so much insisted on in the Republic and Timæus:--the rational or intellectual (encephalic) soul, located in the head--the courageous or passionate (thoracic), between the neck and the diaphragm--the appetitive (abdominal), between the diaphragm and the navel. In the Phædon, the soul is noted as the seat of reason, intellect, the love of wisdom or knowledge, exclusively: all that belongs to passion and appetite, is put to account of the body:[18] this is distinctly contrary to the Philêbus, in which dialogue Sokrates affirms that desire or appetite cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to the soul. In Phædon, nothing is said about the location of the rational soul, in the head,--nor about the analogy between its rotations in the cranium and the celestial rotations (a doctrine which we read both in the Timæus and in the Republic): on the contrary, the soul is affirmed to have lost, through its conjunction with the body, that wisdom or knowledge which it possessed during its state of pre-existence, while completely apart from the body, and while in commerce with those invisible Ideas to which its own separate nature was cognate.[19] That controul which in the Republic is exercised by the rational soul over the passionate and appetitive souls, is in the Phædon exercised (though imperfectly) by the one and only soul over the body.[20] In the Republic and Timæus, the soul is a tripartite aggregate, a community of parts, a compound: in the Phædon, Sokrates asserts it to be uncompounded, making this fact a point in his argument.[21] Again, in the Phædon, the soul is pronounced to be essentially uniform and incapable of change: as such, it is placed in antithesis with the body, which is perpetually changing: while we read, on the contrary, in the Symposion, that soul and body alike are in a constant and unremitting variation, neither one nor the other ever continuing in the same condition.[22]

[Footnote 18: Plato, Phædon, p. 66. Compare Plato, Philêbus, p. 35, C-D.]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Phædon, p. 76.]

[Footnote 20: Compare Phædon, p. 94 C-E, with Republic, iv. pp. 439 C, 440 A, 441 E, 442 C.]

[Footnote 21: Plato, Phædon, p. 78. [Greek: a)xu/ntheton, monoeide\s] (p. 80 B), contrasted with the [Greek: tri/a ei)dê tê=s psuchê=s] (Republic, p. 439). In the abstract given by Alkinous of the Platonic doctrine, we read in cap. 24 [Greek: o(/ti trimerê/s e)stin ê( psuchê\ kata\ ta\s duna/meis, kai\ kata\ lo/gon ta\ me/rê au)tê=s to/pois i)di/ois dianene/mêtai]: in cap. 25 that the [Greek: psuchê\] is [Greek: a)su/nthetos, a)dia/lutos, a)ske/dastos].]

[Footnote 22: Plato, Phædon, pp. 79-80; Symposion, pp. 207-208.]

[Side-note: Different doctrines of Plato about the soul. Whether all the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul alone.]

The difference which I have here noted shows how Plato modified his doctrine to suit the purpose of each dialogue. The tripartite soul would have been found inconvenient in the Phædon, where the argument required that soul and body should be as sharply distinguished as possible. Assuming passion and appetite to be attributes belonging to the soul, as well as reason--Sokrates will not shake them off when he becomes divorced from the body. He believes and expects that the post-existence of the soul will be, as its pre-existence has been, a rational existence--a life of intellectual contemplation and commerce with the eternal Ideas: in this there is no place for passion and appetite, which grow out of its conjunction with the body. The soul here represents Reason and Intellect, in commerce with their correlates, the objective Entia Rationis: the body represents passion and appetite as well as sense, in implication with their correlates, the objects of sensible perception.[23] Such is the doctrine of the Phædon; but Plato is not always consistent with himself on the point. His ancient as well as his modern commentators are not agreed, whether, when he vindicated the immortality of the soul, he meant to speak of the rational soul only, or of the aggregate soul with its three parts as above described. There are passages which countenance both suppositions.[24] Plato seems to have leaned sometimes to the one view, sometimes to the other: besides which, the view taken in the Phædon is a third, different from both--_viz._: That the two non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive, are not recognised as existing.

[Footnote 23: This is the same antithesis as we read in Xenophon, ascribed to Cyrus in his dying address to his sons--[Greek: o( a)/kratos kai\ katharo\s nou=s--to\ a)/phron sô=ma], Cyropæd. viii. 7, 20.]

[Footnote 24: Alkinous, Introduct. c. 25. [Greek: o(/ti me\n ou)=n ai( logikai\ psuchai\ a)tha/natoi u(pa/rchousi kata\ to\n a)/ndra tou=ton, bebaiô/sait' a)/n tis; ei) de\ kai\ ai( a)/logoi, tou=to tô=n a)mphisbêtoume/nôn u(pa/rchei.] Galen considers Plato as affirming that the two inferior souls are mortal--[Greek: Peri\ tô=n tê=s psuchê=s ê)thô=n], T. iv. p. 773, Kühn.

This subject is handled in an instructive Dissertation of K. F. Hermann--De Partibus Animæ Immortalibus secundum Platonem--delivered at Göttingen in the winter Session, 1850-1851. He inclines to the belief that Plato intended to represent only the rational soul as immortal, and the other two souls as mortal (p. 9). But the passages which he produces are quite sufficient to show, that Plato sometimes held one language, sometimes the other; and that Galen, who wrote an express treatise (now lost) to prove that Plato was inconsistent with himself in respect to the soul, might have produced good reasons for his opinion. The "inconstantia Platonis" (Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 12) must be admitted here as on other matters. We must take the different arguments and doctrines of Plato as we find them in their respective places. Hermann (p. 4) says about the commentators--"De irrationali animâ, alii ancipites hæserunt, alii claris verbis mortalem prædicarunt: quumque Neoplatonicæ sectæ principes, Numenius et Plotinus, non modo brutorum, sed ne plantarum quidem, animas immortalitate privare ausi sunt,--mox insequentes in alia omnia digressi aut plane perire irrationales partes affirmarunt, aut mediâ quâdam viâ ingressi, quamvis corporum fato exemptis, mortalitatem tamen et ipsi tribuerunt." It appears that the divergence of opinion on this subject began as early as Xenokrates and Speusippus--see Olympiodorus, Scholia in Phædonem, § 175. The large construction adopted by Numenius and Plotinus is completely borne out by a passage in the Phædon, p. 70 E.

I must here remark that Hermann does not note the full extent of discrepancy between the Phædon and Plato's other dialogues, consisting in this--That in the Phædon, Plato suppresses all mention of the two non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive: insomuch that if we had only the Phædon remaining, we should not have known that he had ever affirmed the triple partition of the soul, or the co-existence of the three souls.

I transcribe an interesting passage from M. Degérando, respecting the belief in different varieties of soul, and partial immortality.

Degérando--Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie, vol. i. p. 213.

"Les habitans du Thibet, du Gröenland, du nord de l'Amérique admettent deux âmes: les Caräibes en admettent trois, dont une, disent-ils, celle qui habite dans la tête, remonte seule au pays des âmes. Les habitans du Gröenland croient d'ailleurs les âmes des hommes semblables au principe de la vie des animaux: ils supposent que les divers individus peuvent changer d'âmes entre eux pendant la vie, et qu'après la vie ces âmes exécutent de grands voyages, avec toutes sortes de fatigues et de périls. Les peuples du Canada se représentent les âmes sous la forme d'ombres errantes: les Patagons, les habitans du Sud de l'Asie, croient entendre leurs voix dans l'écho: et les anciens Romains eux-mêmes n'étaient pas étrangers à cette opinion. Les Négres s'imaginent que la destinée de l'âme après la vie est encore liée à celle du corps, et fondent sur cette idée une foule de pratiques."]

[Side-note: The life and character of a philosopher is a constant struggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone enables him to do this completely.]

The philosopher (contends Sokrates) ought to rejoice when death comes to sever his soul altogether from his body: because he is, throughout all his life, struggling to sever himself from the passions, appetites, impulses and aspirations, which grow out of the body; and to withdraw himself from the perceptions of the corporeal senses, which teach no truth, and lead only to deceit or confusion: He is constantly attempting to do what the body hinders him from doing completely--to prosecute pure mental contemplation, as the only way of arriving at truth: to look at essences or things in themselves, by means of his mind or soul in itself apart from the body.[25] Until his mind be purified from all association with the body, it cannot be brought into contact with pure essence, nor can his aspirations for knowledge be satisfied.[26] Hence his whole life is really a training or approximative practice for death, which alone will enable him to realise such aspirations.[27] Knowledge or wisdom is the only money in which he computes, and which he seeks to receive in payment.[28] He is not courageous or temperate in the ordinary sense: for the courageous man, while holding death to be a great evil, braves it from fear of greater evils--and the temperate man abstains from various pleasures, because they either shut him out from greater pleasures, or entail upon him disease and poverty. The philosopher is courageous and temperate, but from a different motive: his philosophy purifies him from all these sensibilities, and makes him indifferent to all the pleasures and pains arising from the body: each of which, in proportion to its intensity, corrupts his perception of truth and falsehood, and misguides him in the search for wisdom or knowledge.[29] While in the body, he feels imprisoned, unable to look for knowledge except through a narrow grating and by the deceptive media of sense. From this durance philosophy partially liberates him,--purifying his mind, like the Orphic or Dionysiac religious mysteries, from the contagion of body[30] and sense: disengaging it, as far as may be during life, from sympathy with the body: and translating it out of the world of sense, uncertainty, and mere opinion, into the invisible region of truth and knowledge. If such purification has been fully achieved, the mind of the philosopher is at the moment of death thoroughly severed from the body, and passes clean away by itself, into commerce with the intelligible Entities or realities.

[Footnote 25: Plato, Phædon, p. 66 E. [Greek: ei) me/llome/n pote katharô=s ti ei)/sesthai, a)pallakte/on au)tou= (tou= sô/matos) kai\ au)tê=| tê=| psuchê=| theate/on au)ta\ ta\ pra/gmata.]]

[Footnote 26: Plato, Phædon, p. 67 B. [Greek: mê\ katharô=| ga\r katharou= e)pha/ptesthai mê\ ou) themito\n ê)=|.]]

[Footnote 27: Plato, Phædon, p. 64 A. [Greek: kinduneu/ousi ga\r o(/soi tugcha/nousin o)rthô=s a)pto/menoi philosophi/as lelêthe/nai tou\s a)/llous o(/ti ou)de\n a)/llo au)toi\ e)pitêdeu/ousin ê)\ a)pothnê/skein te kai\ tethna/nai.] P. 67 E [Greek: oi( o)rthô=s philosophou=ntes a)pothnê/skein meletô=sin.]]

[Footnote 28: Plato, Phædon, p. 69 A. [Greek: a)ll' ê)=| e)kei=no mo/non to\ no/misma o)rtho/n, a)nth' ou(= dei= a(/panta tau=ta katalla/ttesthai, phro/nêsis.]]

[Footnote 29: Plato, Phædon, p. 69-83-84.]

[Footnote 30: Plato, Phædon, p. 82 E.]

[Side-note: Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after death into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher alone is relieved from all communion with body.]

On the contrary, the soul or mind of the ordinary man, which has undergone no purification and remains in close implication with the body, cannot get completely separated even at the moment of death, but remains encrusted and weighed down by bodily accompaniments, so as to be unfit for those regions to which mind itself naturally belongs. Such impure minds or souls are the ghosts or shadows which haunt tombs; and which become visible, because they cling to the visible world, and hate the invisible.[31] Not being fit for separate existence, they return in process of time into conjunction with fresh bodies, of different species of men or animals, according to the particular temperament which they carry away with them.[32] The souls of despots, or of violent and rapacious men, will pass into the bodies of wolves or kites: those of the gluttonous and drunkards, into asses and such-like animals. A better fate will be reserved for the just and temperate men, who have been socially and politically virtuous, but simply by habit and disposition, without any philosophy or pure intellect: for their souls will pass into the bodies of other gentle and social animals, such as bees, ants, wasps,[33] &c., or perhaps they may again return into the human form, and may become moderate men. It is the privilege only of him who has undergone the purifying influence of philosophy, and who has spent his life in trying to detach himself as much as possible from communion with the body--to be relieved after death from the obligation of fresh embodiment, that his soul may dwell by itself in a region akin to its own separate nature: passing out of the world of sense, of transient phenomena, and of mere opinion, into a distinct world where it will be in full presence of the eternal Ideas, essences, and truth; in companionship with the Gods, and far away from the miseries of humanity.[34]

[Footnote 31: Plato, Phædon, p. 81 C-D. [Greek: o(\ dê\ kai\ e)/chousa ê( toiau/tê psuchê\ baru/netai/ te kai\ e(/lketai pa/lin ei)s to\n o(rato\n to/pon, pho/bô| tou= a)eidou=s te kai\ A(/idou, ô(/sper le/getai, peri\ ta\ mnê/mata/ te kai\ tou\s ta/phous kulindoume/nê, peri\ a(\ dê\ kai\ ô)/phthê a)/tta psuchô=n skotoeidê= pha/smata] [al. [Greek: skioeodê= phanta/smata]], [Greek: oi(=a pare/chontai ai( toiau=tai psuchai\ ei)/dôla, ai( mê\ katharô=s a)poluthei=sai a)lla\ tou= o(ratou= mete/chousai, dio\ kai\ o(rô=ntai.]]

[Footnote 32: Plato, Phædon, pp. 82-84.]

[Footnote 33: Plato, Phædon, pp. 82 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n eu)daimone/statoi kai\ tou/tôn ei)si\ kai\ ei)s be/ltiston to/pon i)o/ntes oi( tê\n dêmotikê\n te kai\ politikê\n a)retê\n e)pitetêdeuko/tes, ê(\n dê\ kalou=si sôphrosu/nên te kai\ dikaiosu/nên, e)x e)/thous te kai\ mele/tês gegonui=an a)/neu philosophi/as te kai\ nou=? . . . O(/ti tou/tous ei)ko/s e)stin ei)s toiou=ton pa/lin a)phiknei=sthai politiko/n te kai\ ê(/meron ge/nos, ê)/pou melittô=n ê)\ sphêkô=n ê)\ murmê/kôn], &c.]

[Footnote 34: Plato, Phædon, pp. 82 B, 83 B, 84 B. Compare p. 114 C: [Greek: tou/tôn de\ au)tô=n oi( philosophi/a| i(kanô=s kathêra/menoi a)/neu te sôma/tôn zô=si to\ para/pan ei)s to\n e)/peita chro/non], &c. Also p. 115 D.]

[Side-note: Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the Phædon apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers.]

Such is the creed which Sokrates announces to his friends in the Phædon, as supplying good reason for the readiness and satisfaction with which he welcomes death. It is upon the antithesis between soul (or mind) and body, that the main stress is laid. The partnership between the two is represented as the radical cause of mischief: and the only true relief to the soul consists in breaking up the partnership altogether, so as to attain a distinct, disembodied, existence. Conformably to this doctrine, the line is chiefly drawn between the philosopher, and the multitude who are not philosophers--not between good and bad agents, when the good agents are not philosophers. This last distinction is indeed noticed, but is kept subordinate. The unphilosophical man of social goodness is allowed to pass after death into the body of a bee, or an ant, instead of that of a kite or ass;[35] but he does not attain the privilege of dissolving connection altogether with body. Moreover the distinction is one not easily traceable: since Sokrates[36] expressly remarks that the large majority of mankind are middling persons, neither good nor bad in any marked degree. Philosophers stand in a category by themselves: apart from the virtuous citizens, as well as from the middling and the vicious. Their appetites and ambition are indeed deadened, so that they agree with the virtuous in abstaining from injustice: but this is not their characteristic feature. Philosophy is asserted to impart to them a special purification, like that of the Orphic mysteries to the initiated: detaching the soul from both the body and the world of sense, except in so far as is indispensable for purposes of life: replunging the soul, as much as possible, in the other world of intelligible essences, real forms or Ideas, which are its own natural kindred and antecedent companions. The process whereby this is accomplished is intellectual rather than ethical. It is the process of learning, or (in the sense of Sokrates) the revival in the mind of those essences or Ideas with which it had been familiar during its anterior and separate life: accompanied by the total abstinence from all other pleasures and temptations.[37] Only by such love of learning, which is identical with philosophy ([Greek: philo/sophon, philomathe\s]), is the mind rescued from the ignorance and illusions unavoidable in the world of sense.

[Footnote 35: Plato, Phædon, pp. 81-82.]

[Footnote 36: Plato, Phædon, p. 90 A.]

[Footnote 37: Plato, Phædon, pp. 82-115.--[Greek: ta\s de\ (ê(dona\s) peri\ to\ mantha/nein e)spou/dase], &c. (p. 114 E).

These doctrines, laid down by Plato in the Phædon, bear great analogy to the Sanskrit philosophy called _Sankhyâ_, founded by Kapila, as expounded and criticised in the treatise of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (Mémoire sur le Sankhyâ, Paris, 1852, pp. 273-278)--and the other work, Du Bouddhisme, by the same author (Paris, 1855), pp. 116-137, 187-194, &c.]

[Side-note: Simmias and Kebês do not admit readily the immortality of the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by asking for proof. Unabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate.]

In thus explaining his own creed, Sokrates announces a full conviction that the soul or mind is immortal, but he has not yet offered any proof of it: and Simmias as well as Kebês declare themselves to stand in need of proof. Both of them however are reluctant to obtrude upon him any doubts. An opportunity is thus provided, that Sokrates may exhibit his undisturbed equanimity--his unimpaired argumentative readiness--his keen anxiety not to relax the grasp of a subject until he has brought it to a satisfactory close--without the least reference to his speedily approaching death. This last-mentioned anxiety is made manifest in a turn of the dialogue, remarkable both for dramatic pathos and for originality.[38] We are thus brought to the more explicit statement of those reasons upon which Sokrates relies.

[Footnote 38: Plato, Phædon, p. 89 B-C,--the remark made by Sokrates, when stroking down the head and handling the abundant hair of Phædon, in allusion to the cutting off of all this hair, which would be among the acts of mourning performed by Phædon on the morrow, after the death of Sokrates: and the impressive turn given to this remark, in reference to the solution of the problem then in debate.]

[Side-note: Simmias and Kebês believe fully in the pre-existence of the soul, but not in its post-existence. Doctrine--That the soul is a sort of harmony--refuted by Sokrates.]

If the arguments whereby Sokrates proves the immortality of the soul are neither forcible nor conclusive, not fully satisfying even Simmias[39] to whom they are addressed--the adverse arguments, upon the faith of which the doctrine was denied (as we know it to have been by many philosophers of antiquity), cannot be said to be produced at all. Simmias and Kebês are represented as Sokratic companions, partly Pythagoreans; desirous to find the doctrine true, yet ignorant of the proofs. Both of them are earnest believers in the pre-existence of the soul, and in the objective reality of Ideas or intelligible essences. Simmias however adopts in part the opinion, not very clearly explained, "That the soul is a harmony or mixture": which opinion Sokrates refutes, partly by some other arguments, partly by pointing out that it is inconsistent with the supposition of the soul as pre-existent to the body, and that Simmias must make his election between the two. Simmias elects without hesitation, in favour of the pre-existence: which he affirms to be demonstrable upon premisses or assumptions perfectly worthy of trust: while the alleged harmony is at best only a probable analogy, not certified by conclusive reasons.[40] Kebês again, while admitting that the soul existed before its conjunction with the present body, and that it is sufficiently durable to last through conjunction with many different bodies--still expresses his apprehension that though durable, it is not eternal. Accordingly, no man can be sure that his present body is not the last with which his soul is destined to be linked; so that immediately on his death, it will pass away into nothing. The opinion of Kebês is remarkable, inasmuch as it shows how constantly the metempsychosis, or transition of the soul from one body to another, was included in all the varieties of ancient speculation on this subject.[41]

[Footnote 39: Plato, Phædon, p. 107 B.]

[Footnote 40: Plato, Phædon, p. 92.]

[Footnote 41: Plato, Phædon, pp. 86-95. [Greek: kra=sin kai\ a(rmoni/an], &c.

"Animam esse harmoniam complures quidem statuerant, sed aliam alii, et diversâ ratione," says Wyttenbach ad Phædon. p. 86. Lucretius as well as Plato impugns the doctrine, iii. 97.

Galen, a great admirer of Plato, though not pretending to determine positively wherein the essence of the soul consists, maintains a doctrine substantially the same as what is here impugned--that it depends upon a certain [Greek: kra=sis] of the elements and properties in the bodily organism--[Greek: Peri\ tô=n tê=s psuchê=s ê)thô=n], vol. iv. pp. 774-775, 779-782, ed. Kühn. He complains much of the unsatisfactory explanations of Plato on this point.]

[Side-note: Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings through which his mind had passed.]

Before replying to Simmias and Kebês, Sokrates is described as hesitating and reflecting for a long time. He then enters into a sketch of[42] his own intellectual history. How far the sketch as it stands depicts the real Sokrates, or Plato himself, or a supposed mind not exactly coincident with either--we cannot be certain: the final stage however must belong to Plato himself.

[Footnote 42: Plato, Phædon, pp. 96-102.

The following abstract is intended only to exhibit the train of thought and argument pursued by Sokrates; not adhering to the exact words, nor even preserving the interlocutory form. I could not have provided room for a literal translation.]

[Side-note: First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons why he rejected it.]

"You compel me (says Sokrates) to discuss thoroughly the cause of generation and destruction.[43] I will tell you, if you like, my own successive impressions on these subjects. When young, I was amazingly eager for that kind of knowledge which people call the investigation of Nature. I thought it matter of pride to know the causes of every thing--through what every thing is either generated, or destroyed, or continues to exist. I puzzled myself much to discover first of all such matters as these--Is it a certain putrefaction of the Hot and the Cold in the system (as some say), which brings about the nourishment of animals? Is it the blood through which we think--or air, or fire? Or is it neither one nor the other, but the brain, which affords to us sensations of sight, hearing, and smell, out of which memory and opinion are generated: then, by a like process, knowledge is generated out of opinion and memory when permanently fixed?[44] I tried to understand destructions as well as generations, celestial as well as terrestrial phenomena. But I accomplished nothing, and ended by fancying myself utterly unfit for the enquiry. Nay--I even lost all the knowledge of that which I had before believed myself to understand. For example--From what cause does a man grow? At first, I had looked upon this as evident--that it was through eating and drinking: flesh being thereby added to his flesh, bone to his bone, &c. So too, when a tall and a short man were standing together, it appeared to me that the former was taller than the latter by the head--that ten were more than eight because two were added to them[45]--that a rod of two cubits was greater than a rod of one cubit, because it projected beyond it by a half. Now--I am satisfied that I do not know the cause of any of these matters. I cannot explain why, when one is added to one, such addition makes them two; since in their separated state each was one. In this case, it is approximation or conjunction which is said to make the two: in another case, the opposite cause, _disjunction_, is said also to make two--when one body is bisected.[46] How two opposite causes can produce the same effect--and how either conjunction or disjunction can produce two, where there were not two before--I do not understand. In fact, I could not explain to myself, by this method of research, the generation, or destruction, or existence, of any thing; and I looked out for some other method.

[Footnote 43: Plato, Phædon, pp. 95 E--96. [Greek: Ou) phau=lon pra=gma zêtei=s; o(/lôs ga\r dei= peri\ gene/seôs kai\ phthora=s tê\n ai)ti/an diapragmateu/sasthai. e)gô\ ou)=n soi\ di/eimi, e)a\n bou/lê|, ta/ g' e)ma\ pa/thê], &c.]

[Footnote 44: Phædon, p. 96 B. [Greek: e)k de\ mnê/mês kai\ do/xês, labou/sês to\ ê)remei=n, kata\ tau=ta gi/gnesthai e)pistê/mên.]

This is the same distinction between [Greek: do/xa] and [Greek: e)pistê/mê], as that which Sokrates gives in the Menon, though not with full confidence (Menon, pp. 97-98). See suprà, chap. xxii. p. 241.]

[Footnote 45: Plato, Phædon, p. 96 E. [Greek: kai\ e)/ti ge tou/tôn e)narge/stera, ta\ de/ka moi e)do/kei tô=n o)ktô\ plei/ona ei)=nai, dia\ to\ du/o au)toi=s prosei=nai, kai\ to\ di/pêchu tou= pêchuai/ou mei=zon ei)=nai dia\ to\ ê(mi/sei au)tou= u(pere/chein.]]

[Footnote 46: Plato, Phædon, p. 97 B.]

[Side-note: Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of Anaxagoras.]

"It was at this time that I heard a man reading out of a book, which he told me was the work of Anaxagoras, the affirmation that Nous (Reason, Intelligence) was the regulator and cause of all things. I felt great satisfaction in this cause; and I was convinced, that if such were the fact, Reason would ordain every thing for the best: so that if I wanted to find out the cause of any generation, or destruction, or existence, I had only to enquire in what manner it was best that such generation or destruction should take place. Thus a man was only required to know, both respecting himself and respecting other things, what was the best: which knowledge, however, implied that he must also know what was worse--the knowledge of the one and of the other going together.[47] I thought I had thus found a master quite to my taste, who would tell me, first whether the earth was a disk or a sphere, and would proceed to explain the cause and the necessity why it must be so, by showing me how such arrangement was the best: next, if he said that the earth was in the centre, would proceed to show that it was best that the earth should be in the centre. Respecting the Sun, Moon, and Stars, I expected to hear the like explanation of their movements, rotations, and other phenomena: that is, how it was better that each should do and suffer exactly what the facts show. I never imagined that Anaxagoras, while affirming that they were regulated by Reason, would put upon them any other cause than this--that it was best for them to be exactly as they are. I presumed that, when giving account of the cause, both of each severally and all collectively, he would do it by setting forth what was best for each severally and for all in common. Such was my hope, and I would not have sold it for a large price.[48] I took up eagerly the book of Anaxagoras, and read it as quickly as I could, that I might at once come to the knowledge of the better and worse.

[Footnote 47: Plato, Phædon, p. 97 C-D. [Greek: ei) ou)=n tis bou/loito tê\n ai)ti/an eu(rei=n peri\ e(ka/stou, o(/pê| gi/gnetai ê)\ a)po/llutai ê)\ e)/sti, tou=to dei=n peri\ au)tou= eu(rei=n, o(/pê| be/ltiston au)tô=| e)stin ê)\ ei)=nai ê)\ a)/llo o(tiou=n pa/schein ê)\ poiei=n; e)k de\ dê\ tou= lo/gou tou/tou ou)de\n a)/llo skopei=n prosê/kein a)nthrô/pô| kai\ peri\ au(tou= kai\ peri\ tô=n a)/llôn, a)ll' ê)\ to\ a)/riston kai\ to\ be/ltiston; a)nagkai=on de\ ei)=nai to\n au)to\n tou=ton kai\ to\ chei=ron ei)de/nai; tê\n au)tê\n ga\r ei)=nai e)pistê/mên peri\ au)tô=n.]]

[Footnote 48: Plato, Phædon, p. 98 B. [Greek: kai\ ou)k a)\n a)pedo/mên pollou= ta\s e)lpi/das, a)lla\ pa/nu spoudê=| labô\n ta\s bi/blous ô(s ta/chista oi(=o/s t' ê)=n a)negi/gnôskon, i(/n' ô(s ta/chista ei)dei/ên to\ be/ltiston kai\ to\ chei=ron.]]

[Side-note: Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow out the optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes efficient and causes co-efficient.]

"Great indeed was my disappointment when, as I proceeded with the perusal, I discovered that the author never employed Reason at all, nor assigned any causes calculated to regulate things generally: that the causes which he indicated were, air, æther, water, and many other strange agencies. The case seemed to me the same as if any one, while announcing that Sokrates acts in all circumstances by reason, should next attempt to assign the causes of each of my proceedings severally:[49] As if he affirmed, for example, that the cause why I am now sitting here is, that my body is composed of bones and ligaments--that my bones are hard, and are held apart by commissures, and my ligaments such as to contract and relax, clothing the bones along with the flesh and the skin which keeps them together--that when the bones are lifted up at their points of junction, the contraction and relaxation of the ligaments makes me able to bend my limbs--and that this is the reason why I am now seated here in my present crumpled attitude: or again--as if, concerning the fact of my present conversation with you, he were to point to other causes of a like character--varieties of speech, air, and hearing, with numerous other similar facts--omitting all the while to notice the true causes, _viz._[50]--That inasmuch as the Athenians have deemed it best to condemn me, for that reason I too have deemed it best and most righteous to remain sitting here and to undergo the sentence which they impose. For, by the Dog, these bones and ligaments would have been long ago carried away to Thebes or Megara, by my judgment of what is best--if I had not deemed it more righteous and honourable to stay and affront my imposed sentence, rather than to run away. It is altogether absurd to call such agencies by the name of _causes_. Certainly, if a man affirms that unless I possessed such joints and ligaments and other members as now belong to me, I should not be able to execute what I have determined on, he will state no more than the truth. But to say that these are the causes why I, a rational agent, do what I am now doing, instead of saying that I do it from my choice of what is best--this would be great carelessness of speech: implying that a man cannot see the distinction between that which is the cause in reality, and that without which the cause can never be a cause.[51] It is this last which most men, groping as it were in the dark, call by a wrong name, as if it were itself the cause. Thus one man affirms that the earth is kept stationary in its place by the rotation of the heaven around it: another contends that the air underneath supports the earth, like a pedestal sustaining a broad kneading-trough: but none of them ever look out for a force such as this--That all these things now occupy that position which it is best that they should occupy. These enquirers set no great value upon this last-mentioned force, believing that they can find some other Atlas stronger, more everlasting, and more capable of holding all things together: they think that the Good and the Becoming have no power of binding or holding together any thing.

[Footnote 49: Plato, Phædon, p. 98 C. [Greek: kai\ moi\ e)/doxen o(moio/taton peponthe/nai ô(/sper a)\n ei)/ tis le/gôn o(/ti Sôkra/tês pa/nta o(/sa pra/ttei nô=| pra/ttei, ka)/peita e)picheirê/sas le/gein ta\s ai)ti/as e(ka/stôn ô(=n pra/ttô, le/goi prô=ton me\n o(/ti dia\ tau=ta nu=n e)ntha/de ka/thêmai, o(/ti xugkeitai/ mou to\ sô=ma e)x o)stô=n kai\ neu/rôn, kai\ ta\ me\n o)sta= e)sti sterea\ kai\ diaphua\s e)/chei chôri\s a)p' a)llê/lôn], &c.]

[Footnote 50: Plato, Phædon, p. 98 E. [Greek: a)melê/sas ta\s ô(s a)lêthô=s ai)ti/as le/gein, o(/ti e)pei/dê A)thênai/ois e)/doxe be/ltion ei)=nai e)mou= katapsêphi/sasthai, dia\ tau=ta dê\ kai\ e)moi\ be/ltion au)= de/doktai e)ntha/de kathê=sthai], &c.]

[Footnote 51: Plato, Phædon, p. 99 A. [Greek: a)ll' ai)/tia me\n ta\ toiau=ta kalei=n li/an a)/topon; ei) de/ tis le/goi, o(/ti a)/neu tou= ta\ toiau=ta e)/chein kai\ o(sta= kai\ neu=ra kai\ o(/sa a)/lla e)/chô, ou)k a)\n oi(=o/s t' ê)=n poiei=n ta\ do/xanta/ moi, a)lêthê= a)\n le/goi; ô(s me/ntoi dia\ tau=ta poiô=, kai\ tau/tê| nô=| pra/ttô, a)ll' ou) tê=| tou= belti/stou ai(re/sei, pollê\ a)\n kai\ makra\ r(athumi/a ei)/ê tou= lo/gou. to\ ga\r mê\ diele/sthai oi(=o/n t' ei)=nai, o(/ti a)/llo me/n ti/ e)sti to\ ai)/tion tô=| o)/nti, a)/llo d' e)kei=no a)/neu ou)= to\ ai)/tion ou)k a)/n pot' ei)/ê ai)/tion], &c.]

[Side-note: Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle for himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it, and embraced a third doctrine about cause.]

"Now, it is this sort of cause which I would gladly put myself under any one's teaching to learn. But I could neither find any teacher, nor make any way by myself. Having failed in this quarter, I took the second best course, and struck into a new path in search of causes.[52] Fatigued with studying objects through my eyes and perceptions of sense, I looked out for images or reflections of them, and turned my attention to words or discourses.[53] This comparison is indeed not altogether suitable: for I do not admit that he who investigates things through general words, has recourse to images, more than he who investigates sensible facts: but such, at all events, was the turn which my mind took. Laying down such general assumption or hypothesis as I considered to be the strongest, I accepted as truth whatever squared with it, respecting cause as well as all other matters. In this way I came upon the investigation of another sort of cause.[54]

[Footnote 52: Plato, Phædon, p. 99 C-D. [Greek: e)peidê\ de\ tau/tês e)sterê/thên, kai\ ou)/t' au)to\s eu(rei=n ou)/te par' a)/llou mathei=n oi(=o/s te e)geno/mên, to\n deu/teron plou=n e)pi\ tê\n tê=s ai)ti/as zê/têsin ê(=| pepragma/teumai, bou/lei soi\ e)pi/deixin poiê/sômai?]]

[Footnote 53: Plato, Phædon, p. 99 E. [Greek: i)/sôs me\n ou)=n ô(=| ei)ka/zô, tro/pon tina\ ou)k e)/oiken; ou) ga\r pa/nu xugchôrô= to\n e)n toi=s lo/gois skopou/menon ta\ o)/nta e)n ei)ko/si ma=llon skopei=n ê)\ to\n e)n toi=s e)/rgois.]]

[Footnote 54: Plato, Phædon, p. 100 B. [Greek: e)/rchomai ga\r dê\ e)picheirô=n soi\ e)pidei/xasthai tê=s ai)ti/as to\ ei)=dos o(\ pepragma/teumai], &c.]

[Side-note: He now assumes the separate existence of ideas. These ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain attributes.]