Chapter XXVIII: Appendix: II (1)

A LIMITATION OF THE TRIBUNATE IN THE REIGN OF NERO

Tacitus in the _Annals_ (xiii. 28, 2), in describing certain limitations on the powers of tribunes and aediles which were introduced in the year 56 A.D., mentions one respecting the tribunate, the nature of which has never yet been explained. He expresses it in the words “prohibiti tribuni jus praetorum et consulum praeripere, aut vocare ex Italia cum quibus lege agi posset”—“the tribunes were forbidden to usurp the authority of praetors and consuls, or to summon out of Italy persons liable to legal proceedings.” It seems generally to be agreed that the _aut_ here is conjunctive, not disjunctive, i.e. that there is the closest connexion between “jus praetorum et consulum praeripere” and “vocare ex Italia,” and it seems that this must be the case; for Tacitus, vague as his references are in this chapter, could never have referred to anything so indeterminate as a “usurpation of the authority of praetors and consuls,” without some specification of the sphere or extent of this usurpation. I shall, therefore, assume that the second clause is explanatory of the first, and that the “summons from Italy” in some way defines the “usurpation”—although, as will be seen, this assumption is by no means necessary to my main argument, which will centre round the expression “vocare ex Italia.”

The remarks of commentators on this passage have been for the most part confined to expressions of bewilderment at the constitutional anomalies it displays. They make the inevitable comment that the tribune had properly no right of _vocatio_, although he sometimes exercised it (Varro ap. Gell. xiii. 12), and that, if even he possessed this right, it ought not to have been exercised outside the city walls. The only positive fact to be elicited from such statements is that the _vocatio_ here referred to is some kind of personal summons; who is summoned or for what purpose are questions which they seem to regard as incapable of an answer. The opinion of an eminent writer on Roman Law, who attempts to push his analysis deeper than this, exhibits only the desperate nature of the means which have to be applied to elicit a meaning from the passage. Karlowa (_Röm. Rechtsgesch._ i. p. 530) suggests that the tribunes had allowed accused persons to escape summonses in criminal trials which were to take place before the Senate—the initiation of such trials belonging properly only to the consuls and praetors. He does not seem to feel the obstacles that beset the path to this conclusion. He has to take _lege agere_ in the unusual sense of the legal fulfilment of a penal law; he does not show why Tacitus should have written “vocare ex Italia” in place of the more natural “vocare a senatu”; he fails to remember that the tribunician intercession in a criminal trial before the Senate was, even in the reign of Tiberius, becoming a power of pardon vested in the Princeps, and that its use by an ordinary tribune might bring death to the rash interceder (Tac. _Ann._ vi. 47; cf. xvi 26).

To discover the true sense of the passage we must seek for some sphere in which the tribunician veto continued unimpaired during the Principate; but, before doing this, we must ask whether the words used by Tacitus offer any suggestions of such a sphere. It is possible to translate the words “vocare ex Italia” as meaning “to summon from any part of Italy,” “to summon, i.e., from Rome and Italy”; but I venture to think that _ex Italia_ excludes the idea of Rome, and that the meaning of the words is “to summon from a municipal town of Italy to Rome.” On what grounds such a summons might be made is shown by the words “cum quibus lege agi posset.” The sphere of the summons is civil jurisdiction in the _municipia_ as divided between the Roman and the local authorities by statute on the settlement which gradually followed the close of the social war—a settlement known to us chiefly through the _lex Rubria_. The whole sentence, if literally though somewhat clumsily translated, would state that “the tribunes were prohibited from summoning litigants from an Italian town in cases where a civil action at law would have been possible in that town.”

On this hypothesis, the sphere of the tribune’s power referred to is the very familiar one of the veto on appeal in civil jurisdiction. How frequent the _appellatio_ to the tribunes in matters of civil jurisdiction was during the later Republic is shown by the fact that, out of the four private orations of Cicero, two—those for Quinctius and for Tullius—record the use of this appeal (Cic. _pro Quinct._ 7, 29; _pro Tullio_ 16, 38, 39); and that this appellate cognisance continued during the Principate is shown by the obvious interpretation of the well-known lines of Juvenal (vii. 228)—

Rara tamen merces quae cognitione tribuni
Non egeat—

words which almost certainly mean “it is seldom that such _merces_ does not lead to a court of appeal.”

It may seem strange that the veto of these purely city magistrates should be thought of in connexion with municipal jurisdiction, until we remember the anomalous nature of the settlement made after the social war. By that settlement jurisdiction in Italy is a mere annexe to jurisdiction in Rome; technically it is jurisdiction in Rome, as is shown by Gaius (iv. 103-105), who recognises no interval between the jurisdiction of law _intra primum miliarium_ and the jurisdiction of the _imperium_ in the provinces. The praetor’s formula and the praetor’s writ run through the whole of Italy, although the praetor himself cannot quit Rome for more than ten days during his year of office (Cic. _Phil._ ii. 13, 31); and, if the appellate power of the tribune was to be preserved, it had to be regarded as coextensive with the _imperium_, of the magistrate whom he vetoed. The intercession of the tribune in municipal jurisdiction required no creation by law; it was still the veto of one city magistrate by another within the walls of Rome. If even the tribune’s ordinances and his _coercitio_ were valid without the walls, it could be explained in accordance with the prevailing fiction; but the supposition of such an extension is not absolutely necessary, as the following pictures of what probably took place in a conflict between the central and the local courts will show.

Suppose Aulus Agerius brings an action against Numerius Negidius in the town of Arpinum. The local magistrate decides to take the case. Numerius Negidius denies the competence of the court and appeals; to whom? In the first instance, probably to the colleague of the local magistrate, for the _lex Rubria_ (c. xx.) forbids the intercession only in the case where the local court is admittedly competent. This colleague pronounces the veto, the _judicium_ is quashed; all that the local magistrate can now do is to compel the parties to enter into a _vadimonium_ to appear before the praetor, and the case moves to Rome. But supposing, when it has got there, that the praetor decides that it was really within the competence of the municipal magistrate and issues an order that it shall go back? Now Numerius appeals to the tribune. The veto is issued and, if the case is to be tried at all, the praetor is bound to take it.

We can also imagine a case with the same preliminaries in which Numerius appeals to the colleague of the local magistrate against the competence of the local court, but in which this colleague declines to interfere. Is Numerius left stranded? Unquestionably there must have been in such a case a further appeal to Rome, whether to the praetor or perhaps, in this case, to his higher colleague the consul. But the praetor or consul now decides against Numerius. The appeal is made to the tribune, and the decree of the consul or praetor may be quashed. The case, if it is to be tried at all, must be tried at Rome.

In both these instances the tribune pronounces his veto within the city, and yet in both, if his decision is improper, his position is one of “vocare ex Italia cum quibus lege agi posset.” In both cases it is not a true use of magisterial _vocatio_, and thus one of the difficulties discovered by commentators in this passage is removed; it is simply an illustration of the positive effects of a negative power. Just as the tribune can by a persistent veto force the praetor to alter his formula (Cic. _Acad. Prior._ ii. 30, 97; _pro Tullio_ 16, 38), so by a persistent denial of the praetor’s orders to the local magistrate he can force the praetor to judge. We do not know the method by which the positive effect of the veto was in this case secured, but it is clear that some means must have been provided for having a municipal action tried at Rome when the municipal court had been declared incompetent.

But, apart from the procedure springing from these rigid rules of competence, there is some evidence of a discretionary power of what is called _Romam revocatio_, which was exercised and abused by magistrates towards the close of the Republic. The _Fragmentum Atestinum_ (perhaps a part of the _lex Rubria_) enacts (l. 16 sq.) with reference to municipal jurisdiction—“ejus rei pequn[_iaeve_] quo magis privato Romae revocatio sit ... _ex hac lege nihilum rogatur_,” i.e. this law does not permit (or imply) a _revocatio_ to Rome in the specified cases. We do not know what magistrate effected this _revocatio_. With respect to criminal jurisdiction in the provinces, it was the duty of the consuls (Cic. _in Verr._ i. 33, 84); and, if they exercised this power in civil jurisdiction as well, the _jus consulum praeripere_ of our passage may refer to tribunician interference with this consular prerogative. It may be worth noting that Plutarch (_Caes._ 4) associates the power with the tribunes; his narrative of this trial of P. Antonius is almost unquestionably wrong, but it may be taken to show that in his belief (i.e. in a belief current during the Principate) the tribunes had something to do with summoning cases to Rome.

Hitherto we have been dealing with the praetor and the _judicia ordinaria_. Is it possible that the tribune also interfered with the extraordinary jurisdiction created daring the Principate, and thus with the judicial powers of the consuls? The consular jurisdiction in _fideicommissa_ had been given to praetors by Claudius (_Dig._ 1, 2, 2, 32), but not the whole of it. Quintilian shows that in greater matters it still belonged to the former (_Inst. Or._ iii. 6, 70 “non debes apud praetorem petere fideicommissum sed apud consules, major enim praetoria cognitione summa est”). If the consuls tried the case when the _fideicommissum_ was very large and the praetors when it was smaller, it is not altogether impossible that the municipal magistrates might have tried local cases when the sum, which was the subject of the trust, was insignificant It is thus possible that questions of the competence of local and Roman magistrates may have cropped up in reference to this question; although I should prefer to explain the _jus consulum praeripere_ of Tacitus on the already mentioned hypotheses of some consular right of _vocatio_ or _revocatio_ in matters of ordinary jurisdiction.

Much must remain obscure; we cannot get at the details of the procedure. All that we can do is to show that there is evidence for the tribune’s interference with the rights of magistrates in matters of municipal jurisdiction, and to suggest methods of interference. Nor can we determine the precise limitations of his authority introduced by the change of A.D. 56. But it clearly took from the tribune the final decision as to when a civil case should be summoned from a municipal town to Rome. Either his _intercessio_ in this matter of municipal jurisdiction was abolished, or his veto was made purely suspensory. In this very chapter of Tacitus we find that the enforcement of the tribunician _multa_ is subjected to the decision of the consul. Similarly, with reference to the power which we have discussed, the urban praetor or the consul may have been declared absolutely competent to decide, after cognisance, when a case should be tried in the local courts and when it should be reserved for the tribunals at Rome.

FOOTNOTES

[1] _Pagus_ (connected etymologically with πήγνυμι, _pago_, _pango_) implies the idea of “foundation” or “settlement.”

[2] Cf. Liv. ii. 62 “Incendiis deinde non villarum modo, sed etiam vicorum, quibus frequenter habitabatur, Sabini exciti.”

[3] So Servius Tullius is said, according to one account, to have divided the territory of Rome into twenty-six _pagi_. _Pagus_ is δῆμος in Greek (Festus p. 72), but this proves little as to its origin; it is the _pagus_ as part of a state that is thus translated. The δῆμος or δᾶμος in Greece had often been (as in Elis) a self-existent community.

[4] Liv. ii. 16. Yet even here the _Claudia gens_ is represented as expelled from a _civitas_.

[5] The ancients derived Palatine from the _balare_ or _palare_ of cattle (Festus p. 220) or from the shepherd’s god Pales (Solinus i. 15). It is perhaps derived from the root _pa_ (_pasco_). See O. Gilbert _Geschichte u. Topographie der Stadt Rom in Altertum_ i. p. 17.

[6] Tac. _Ann._ xii. 24.

[7] This tendency is best exhibited in Richter’s map showing the extension of Rome (Baumeister _Denkmäler_ art. “Rom” Karte v.).

[8] Festus pp. 340, 341. See Gilbert _Topographie_ i. pp. 38, 162.

[9] Varro _L.L._ v. 45 ff.

[10] i.e. in the four city tribes—_Palatina_ (Palatine, Cermalus, Velia), _Esquilina_ (Oppius, Cispius, Fagutal), _Suburana_ or _Sucusana_ (Coelius, Subura), _Collina_ (Quirinalis, Viminalis—a region outside the old Septimontium). See Belot _Histoire des Chevaliers Romains_ i. p. 401.

[11] The Sabine origin of the Tities rested perhaps on the Sabine _sacra_ of the _sodales Titii_ (Tac. _Ann._ i. 54). Cf. the Thracian origin ascribed to the Eumolpidae at Athens on account of the character of their cult.

[12] Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 8, 14 “populumque et suo et Tatii nomine et Lucumonis, qui Romuli socius in Sabino proelio occiderat, in tribus tris ... discripserat.”

[13] e.g. the manner in which the Ionic tribe-names were imposed at Athens after their primitive signification had been lost.

[14] Cf. Niese _Grundriss der röm. Gesch._ pp. 20 sq.

[15] Cincius ap. Festum p. 241 “Patricios Cincius ait in libro de comitiis eos appellari solitos, qui nunc ingenui vocentur.” Cf. Liv. x. 8 (300 B.C.; from the speech of Decius Mus) § 9 “Semper ista audita sunt eadem, penes vos auspicia esse, vos solos gentem habere, vos solos justum imperium et auspicium domi militiaeque”; § 10 “en unquam fando audistis, patricios primo esse factos non de coelo demissos sed qui patrem ciere possent, id est nihil ultra quam ingenuos?”

[16] Mr. Strachan-Davidson remarks (Smith _Dict. of Antiq._ ii. p. 354) that, on the evolution of the rights of the plebeians, these too should have been _patricii_, but that the word _patricius_ survived as a “token of an arrested development.”

[17] _Plebs_ is connected with the root which appears in _compleo_, _impleo_, πλῆυος.

[18] Liv. i. 28 “populum omnem Albanum Romam traducere in animo est, civitatem dare plebi, primores in patres legere.” Dionysius (ii. 35) represents the people of Caenina and Antemnae as being, after their subjection, enrolled εἰς φυλὰς καὶ φράτρας.

[19] Cf. Dionysius’ account of Romulus’ institution of clientship (ii. 9 παρακαταθήκας δὲ ἔδωκε τοῖς πατρικίοις τοὺς δημοτικούς, ἐπίτρεψας ἑκάστῳ ... ὃν αὐτὸς ἐβούλετο νέμειν προστάτην ... πατρωνείαν ὀνομάσας τὴν προστασίαν).

[20] The _jus commercii_ has been read into the relations of Rome with Carthage as depicted in Polybius’ second treaty [Polyb. iii. 24, 12 ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ἧς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσι, καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι πάντα καὶ ποιείτω καὶ πωλείτω (the Roman) ὅσα καὶ τῷ πολίτῃ (the Carthaginian) ἔξεστιν]. But jurisdiction here may have been the work of some international court, and the _jus commercii_, without the _jus exulandi_, would hardly have made a foreign immigrant a citizen of Rome.

[21] Cicero shows that there was a controversy whether _applicatio_ was consistent with _exilium_ (_de Orat._ i. 39, 177), “Quid? quod item in centumvirali judicio certatum esse accepimus, qui Romam in exilium venisset, cui Romae exulare jus esset, si se ad aliquem quasi patronum applicavisset intestatoque esset mortuus, nonne in ea causa jus applicationis, obscurum sane et ignotum, patefactum in judicio atque illustratum est a patrono?”

[22] Zonaras vii. 15. P. Clodius first tried this method; when it was opposed he resorted to the artifice of adoption. Courtly writers imagined a _transitio_ for the plebeian Octavii, Suet. _Aug._ 2 “Ea gens a Tarquinio Prisco rege inter minores gentes adlecta ... mox a Servio Tullio in patricias transducta, procedente tempore ad plebem se contulit.”

[23] Liv. ii. 16 (504 B.C.) “Attus Clausus (driven out from Regillum) magna clientium comitatus manu Romam transfugit. His civitas data agerque trans Anienem ... Appius inter patres (i.e. the Senate) lectus haud ita multo post in principum dignationem pervenit.” Cf. Suet. _Tib._ 1.

[24] Savigny _Recht des Besitzes_ (7th ed.) p. 202. On the general condition of the client see Ihering _Geist des röm. Rechts_ i. p. 237.

[25] Dionys. ii. 9, 10.

[26] ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὰ δίκαια ... δίκας λαγχάνειν ... τοῖς ἐγκαλοῦσιν ὑπέχειν (Dionys. ii. 10). If representation in the civil courts is meant, it must have resembled that of the _paterfamilias_, who sues in his own right, for procuratory was unknown in early Roman procedure (Just. _Inst._ iv. 10 “cum olim in usu fuisset alterius nomine agere non posse”).

[27] Verg. _Aen._ vi. 609 “fraus innexa clienti.” Cf. Servius ad loc.

[28] Gell. v. 13 “Conveniebat ... ex moribus populi Romani primum juxta parentes locum tenere pupillos debere, fidei tutelaeque nostrae creditos; secundum eos proximum locum clientes habere, qui sese itidem in fidem patrociniumque nostrum dediderunt.” The third place was filled by _hospites_, the fourth by _cognati_ and _adfines_.

[29] Liv. ii. 56.

[30] Suet. _Claud._ 24 “(Claudius) Appium Caecum censorem (312 B.C.) ... libertinorum filios in senatum allegisse docuit; ignarus temporibus Appii (312-280 B.C.) et deinceps aliquamdiu ‘libertinos’ dictos, non ipsos qui manu emitterentur, sed ingenuos ex his procreates.”

[31] Plut. _Mar._ 5.

[32] Festus p. 94 “gentilis dicitur ex eodem genere ortus et (?) is qui simili nomine appellatur.”

[33] p. 5.

[34] Cic. _Top._ 6, 29 “Gentiles sunt inter se, qui eodem nomine sunt; qui ab ingenuis oriundi sunt; quorum majorum nemo servitutem servivit; qui capite non sunt deminuti.”

[35] The test is illustrated by a controversy between the patrician Claudii and the plebeian Claudii Marcelli, Cic. _de Orat._ i. 39, 176 “Quid? qua de re inter Marcellos et Claudios patricios centumviri judicarunt, cum Marcelli ab liberti filio stirpe, Claudii patricii ejusdem hominis hereditatem gente ad se rediisse dicerent, nonne in ea causa fuit oratoribus de toto stirpis et gentilitatis jure dicendum.” Suetonius (_Tib._ 1) says of the clan of the Claudii Marcelli, as compared with their patrician namesakes, “nec potentia minor nec dignitate.”

[36] Liv. x. 8, quoted p. 5.

[37] p. 5.

[38] Cic. _in Verr._ i. 45, 115 “Minucius quidam mortuus est ante istum (Verrem) praetorem; ejus testamentum erat nullum. Lege hereditas ad gentem Minuciam veniebat”; _de Leg._ ii. 22, 55 “Jam tanta religio est sepulchrorum, ut extra sacra et gentem inferri fas negent esse; idque apud majores nostros A. Torquatus in gente Popilia judicavit.”

[39] The theory of the artificial origin of the _gens_ is based on the symmetrical figures given by tradition. The full numbers of the early _gentes_ are given as 300; these are symmetrically divided, ten into each of the thirty _curiae_, as the _curiae_ are divided into the three original tribes. Hence Niebuhr (_Hist. Rome_ i. p. 319) says, “The numerical scale of the _gentes_ is an irrefragable proof that they were not more ancient than the constitution, but corporations formed by a legislator in harmony with the rest of his scheme.”

[40] Niebuhr op. cit. p. 333; from Laelius Felix (ap. Gell. xv. 27) “Cum ex generibus hominum suffragium feratur, curiata comitia esse” (_genus_ because the assembly came to include Plebeians, some of whom had no _gentes_).

[41] Cic. _ad Fam._ ix. 21, 2.

[42] Momms. _Staatsr._ iii. p. 31.

[43] Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 20, 35 “(L. Tarquinius) duplicavit illum pristinum patrum numerum; et antiquos patres majorum gentium appellavit, quos priores sententiam rogabat; a se ascitos minorum”; Liv. i. 35 “(Tarquinius) centum in patres legit; qui deinde minorum gentium sunt appellati.”

[44] p. 3.

[45] The _gentes minores_ are sometimes identified with the _gentes_ of the last admitted of these tribes, the _Luceres_ (Ortolan _Hist. of Roman Law_ i. § 33).

[46] Momms. _Hist. of Rome_ bk. i. ch. v.

[47] Liv. i. 30; Dionys. iii. 29.

[48] Dionys. ii. 46.

[49] Liv. iv. 4 “nobilitatem vestram per cooptationem in patres habetis”; Suet. _Tib._ 1 “gens Claudia in patricios cooptata.” So Servius and Numa are said to have been transferred by the Populus from the ranks of the δῆμος to those of the πατρίκιοι.

[50] As is implied in Suet. _Aug._ 2 (quoted p. 7).

[51] Dionys. v. 13.

[52] Liv. ii. 2 “Brutus ad populum tulit ut omnes Tarquiniae gentis exsules essent”; Varro ap. Non. p. 222 “omnes Tarquinios ejicerent, ne quam reditionis per gentilitatem spem haberent.”

[53] Suet _Tib._ 1 “Patricia gens Claudia ... orta est ex Regillis, oppido Sabinorum ... post reges exactos sexto fere anno, in patricias cooptata. Agrum insuper trans Anienem clientibus, locumque sibi ad sepulturam sub Capitolio, publice accepit.” Cf. Liv. ii. 16 (cited p. 7).

[54] Dionys. v. 40.

[55] ib. ii. 7.

[56] Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 14, 26.

[57] Momms. _Staatsr._ iii. p. 23.

[58] Varro _R.R._ i. 10, 2; cf. Plin. _H.N._ xix. 4.

[59] Festus p. 53 “Centuriatus ager in ducena jugera definitus, quia Romulus centenis civibus ducena jugera tribuit.”

[60] It is possible, however, that _manus_ in such expressions is merely the symbol of power.

[61] “Si adgnatus nec escit gentiles familiam habento.”

[62] Suet. _Caes._ 1, of Caesar’s refusal to divorce Cornelia; as a consequence he was “uxoris dote, et gentiliciis haereditatibus multatus.”

[63] p. 10.

[64] “Si furiosus escit, ast ei custos nec escit, adgnatum gentiliumque in eo pecuniaque ejus potestas esto.”

[65] Cic. _pro Domo_ 13, 35.

[66] Suet. _Tib._ 1.

[67] Cic. _Phil._ i. 13, 32.

[68] Maine _Ancient Law_ pp. 6, 27.

[69] Cic. _pro Domo_ 13, 35 “Quas adoptiones (i.e. legal ones) ... hereditates nominis, pecuniae, sacrorum secutae sunt. Tu ... neque amissis sacris paternis in haec adoptiva venisti. Ita perturbatis sacris, contaminatis gentibus, et quam deseruisti et quam polluisti, etc.”; _de Leg._ ii. 19, 48 “haec jura pontificum auctoritate consecuta sunt, ut ne morte patris familias sacrorum memoria occideret, iis essent ea adjuncta, ad quos ejusdem morte pecunia venerit.” The transmission was thus a part of _jus pontificium_, not of _jus civile_. Cf. Serv. in _Aen._ ii. 156.

[70] Cf. the story of Verginia in Liv. x. 23 (296 B.C.) “Verginiam Auli filiam patriciam plebeio nuptam L. Volumnio consuli matronae, quod e patribus enupsisset, sacris arcuerant.” She then founds an altar to “Pudicitia plebeia,” in imitation of that to “Pudicitia patricia.”

[71] ἀνδρὶ κοινωνὸν ἁπάντων χρημάτων τε καὶ ἱερῶν (Dionys. ii. 25).

[72] Plut. _Qu. Rom._ 30 Διὰ τί τὴν νὺμφην εἰσάγοντες λέγειν κελεύουσιν· Ὃπου σὺ Γαΐος ἐγὼ Γαΐα;

[73] e.g. a testamentary adoption by a public act in the _comitia calata_.

[74] _Familia_ is etymologically a “household.” Cf. Sanskr. _dhâ_ “to settle,” _dhâman_ “settlement.”

[75] The original term was, perhaps, _manus_ signifying “power” (see p. 32), but this word came in course of time to be restricted to the control over the wife who had become a member of the _familia_.

[76] Plutarch (_Rom._ 22) quotes a law of Romulus allowing the divorce of the wife ἐπὶ φαρμακείᾳ τέκνων ἢ κλειδῶν ὑποβίλῃ καὶ μοιχευθεῖσαν.

[77] Dionys. ii. 15.

[78] This _jus noxae dationis_ first disappears finally in the law of Justinian (_Inst._ iv. 8, 7; _Dig._ 43, 29, 3, 4). Before its abolition a modification had been introduced by the rule that, when the child had acquired an equivalent for the damage he had caused (_quantum damni dedit_), the owner should be forced to manumit him.

[79] Even by Constantine the sale of new-born children (_sanguinolenti_) was permitted, but only _propter nimiam paupertatem_ (_Cod._ 4, 43, 2).

[80] “Pater si filium ter venum duuit, filius a patre liber esto.” It has been thought, however, that by the time of the Twelve Tables the sale had become merely fictitious.

[81] This _vindicatio filii_ was in later Roman law replaced by a writ issued by the praetor (_interdictum de liberis exhibendis_), the effects of which were like that of Habeas Corpus.

[82] Dionys. ii. 26, 27.

[83] Gell. v. 19, 9.

[84] Hadrian punished the killing of a son with deportation (_Dig._ 48, 8, 5); Constantine declared it _parricidium_.

[85] Instances are given in Voigt (_Zwölf Tafeln_ ii 94). M. Fabius Buteo (223-218 B.C.) put his son to death as a punishment for theft (Oros. iv. 13), and a certain Pontius Aufidianus his daughter for immorality (Val. Max. vi. 1, 3); there are also instances of banishment inflicted by the father, presumably under the threat of inflicting the death penalty if the children returned.

[86] We may cite two instances lying at the very extremes of Republican history, the semi-mythical one of L. Junius Brutus in 509 (Plut. _Popl._ 6, 7), and the historical one of A. Fulvius Nobilior, who in 63 B.C. put his son to death for partnership in the Catilinarian conspiracy (Sall. _Cat._ 39).

[87] Modern writers are inclined to reject the appeal made to the _sexus fragilitas_ by the Roman jurists, and to believe that the original motive lay in the desire to keep the property of the family together (cf. Czyhlarz _Inst._ p. 275); but, as this motive did not operate in the case of sons, it is difficult to see why it should have done so in the case of the wife or daughters, apart from a belief in the incapability of women to defend their own claims. For the motive underlying the _tutela mulierum_ see p. 31.

[88] p. 16.

[89] Ulp. _Reg._ 12, 2 “Lex xii. Tab. prodigum, cui bonis interdictum est, in curatione jubet esse agnatorum”; cf. Ulp. in _Dig._ 27, 10, 1 “Lege xii. Tab. prodigo interdicitur bonorum suorum administratio.” There can be no doubt of the antiquity of this interdiction of the “prodigus,” proceeding as it does from the theory that the property belongs to the family rather than to its head; but from what authority it proceeded in the earliest period of Roman history is uncertain.

[90] See the account in Val. Max. v. 8, 2 (p. 23) “adhibito propinquoram et amicoram consilio.”

[91] Val. Max. ii. 9, 2 “M. Val. Maximus et C. Junius Brutus Bubulcus censores ... L. Annium senatu moverunt, quod, quam virginem in matrimonium duxerat, repudiasset, nullo amicorum in consilio adhibito.” See Greenidge _Infamia in Roman Law_ p. 65.

[92] Dionys. ii. 26, 27.

[93] For the alleged lateness of divorce at Rome, even after the Twelve Tables had freely permitted it, see Gell. iv. 3 (_Infamia in Roman Law_ p. 65).

[94] _Dig._ i. 6, 9 (Pomponius) “filius familias in publicis causis loco patris familias habetur, veluti ut magistratum gerat, ut tutor detur.” Compare the story in Liv. xxiv. 44 (213 B.C.) “Pater filio legatus ad Suessulam in castra venit”—the consul went to meet him; and the old man on horseback passed eleven lictors—“ut consul animadvertere proximum lictorem jussit et is, ut descenderet ex equo, inclamavit, tum demum desiliens, ‘Experiri,’ inquit, ‘volui, fili, satin’ scires consulem te esse.” Cf. Gell. ii. 2.

[95] Festus s.v. _Duicensus_ (p. 66) “dicebatur cum altero, id est cum filio census.”

[96] Probably by a _mancipatio fiduciae causa_, one, i.e., by which he had formally transferred (_mancipavit_) his body on the condition that it was not to be seized for a certain time, and that the transfer should be dissolved (_solutio nexi_) if the debt were paid within this time.

[97] Ulpian Reg. 19, 1; Gaius ii. 15. _Res mancipi_ at a later period included lands in Italy (with their servitudes), slaves and _quadrupedes quae dorso collove domantur_. In the expression _familia pecuniaque_, “familia” probably denotes the slaves. Pierron (_Du sens des mots familia pecuniaque_) has shown the theory of Ihering and Cuq, that the former denotes _res mancipi_, the latter _res nec mancipi_, to be untenable.

[98] Plut. _Cato maj._ 3.

[99] Plut. _Cor._ 24.

[100] See the section on the censor.

[101] Paulus in _Dig._ 28, 2, 11 “in suis heredibus evidentius apparet continuationem dominii eo rem perducere, ut nulla videatur hereditas fuisse, quasi olim hi domini essent, qui etiam vivo patre quodammodo domini existimantur.” What the _filius familias_ acquires by the death of his father is merely _libera bonorum administratio_.

[102] Gell. i. 9 “Tamquam illud fuit anticum consortium, quod jure atque verbo Romano appellabatur ‘ercto non cito’”; Serv. in _Aen._ viii. 642 “‘citae’ divisae, ut est in jure ‘ercto non cito,’ id est patrimonis vel hereditate non divisa.”

[103] Gell. xv. 27 “Isdem comitiis, quae ‘calata’ appellari diximus, et sacrorum detestatio et testamenta fieri solebant. Tria enim genera testamentorum fuisse accepimus; unum, quod calatis comitiis in populi contione fieret, alterum in procinctu, cum viri ad proelium faciendum in aciem vocabantur, tertium per familiae emancipationem, cui aes et libra adhiberetur”; Gaius ii. 101 “aut calatis comitiis faciebant, quae comitia bis in anno testamentis faciendis destinata erant; aut in procinctu, id est, cum belli causa arma sumebant.” Cf. Ulpian (_Reg._ 20, 2) on the _testamentorum genera tria_.

[104] This testament is never associated with adrogation, although this took place before the same assembly.

[105] In Gell. (cited n. 1) it is associated with the _sacrorum detestatio_ (see p. 16), and perhaps this was its main object. The pontiffs and people had to be satisfied that the _sacra_ would be continued and the family not become extinct.

[106] See the passages of Gellius, Gaius, and Ulpian, cited n. 1, and compare Festus p. 225 “procincta classis dicebatur, cum exercitus cinctus erat Gabino cinctu confestim pugnaturus.” In the second century B.C. we find some kind of military testament, called by this name, made by Roman soldiers in Spain (Velleius ii. 5 “facientibus ... omnibus in procinctu testamenta, velut ad certam mortem eundum foret”).

[107] Gaius ii. 102 “Qui neque calatis comitiis, neque in procinctu testamentum fecerat, is, si subita morte urguebatur, amico familiam suam, id est, patrimonium suum mancipio dabat, eumque rogabat, quod cuique post mortem suam dari vellet.”

[108] Gaius ii. 104 “Familiam pecuniamque tuam endo mandatela tutela custodelaque mea, quo tu jure testamentum facere possis secundum legem publicam, hoc aere esto mihi empta.” For _familia pecuniaque_ see p. 24.

[109] The stipulation that it was a trust would still have taken the patrimony wholly from the testator during the remainder of his life. We hear nothing about the formal reservation of a life interest.

[110] “Cum nexum faciet mancipiumque, uti lingua nuncupassit ita jus esto.”

[111] Gaius ii. 104 “Haec ita, ut in his tabulis cerisque scripta sunt, ita do, ita lego, ita testor, itaque vos, quirites, testimonium mihi perhibetote.”

[112] Plut. _Comp. Lyc. c. Num._ 4 λέγεται γούν ποτε γυναικὸς εἰπούσης δίκην ἰδίαν ἐν ἀγορᾷ πέμψαι τὴν σύγκλητον εἰς θεοῦ, πυνθανομένην, τίνος ἅρα τῇ πόλει σημεῖον εἴη τὸ γεγενημένον.

[113] Such as the _lex Claudia_, which abolished the _legitima tutela agnatorum_ (Gaius i. 171).

[114] A trace of the old disability survives in the prohibition of advocacy to women; the praetors declined to grant them a formula on behalf of others. A certain Carfania (Gaia Afrania) “inverecunde postulans et magistratum inquietans” is said to have been the occasion of this rule (Ulp. in _Dig._ 3, 11, 5).

[115] This usage was preserved in the praetor’s edict; he spoke of “qui quaeve ... capite deminuti deminutaeve esse dicentur” (_Dig._ 4, 5, 2, 1), meaning what the later jurists call _cap. dem. minima_, i.e. loss of _familia_.

[116] See Eisele “Zur Natur u. Geschichte der capitis deminutio” in _Beiträge zur Römischen Rechtsgeschichte_ p. 160. He combats the counter view that _capitis dem._ meant an annihilation of personality. Mommsen (_Staatsr._ iii. 8) takes this latter view—a natural result of juristic refinement, but a conception that would have been quite unintelligible to a primitive community.

[117] Gaius i. 162 “Minima capitis deminutio est, cum et civitas et libertas retinetur, sed status hominis commutator; quod accidit in his qui adoptantur, item in his quae coemptionem faciunt, et in his qui mancipio dantur, quique ex mancipatione manumittuntur.”

[118] Liv. i. 32.

[119] Gell. i. 12, 14; x. 24, 3.

[120] Mommsen (_Staatsr._ iii. 3, n. 2) connects the word with _populari_. The _magister populi_ (i.e. the dictator) is master of the infantry host.

[121] Varro ap. Dionys. ii 48. Other views derived it from the Sabine town Cures (Varro _L.L._ v. 51; Strabo v. 3, 1) or connected it with _Curia_ (Lange _Röm. Alt._ i. p. 89; Belot _Hist. d. Chev. Rom._ i. p. 312).

[122] Suet. _Jul._ 70.

[123] Capito ap. Gell. i. 20 “Plebes ... in qua gentes civium patriciae non insunt: plebiscitum ... est ... lex, quam plebes, non populus, accipit.” Cf. Festus p. 233.

[124] According to the primitive conception private are dependent on public rights; see p. 31. But the growth of the Plebs, and alliances with other states, had effected many modifications in this conception.

[125] Nonius, s.v. _plebitas_, p. 101 “Hemina in annalibus, ‘Quicumque propter plebitatem agro publico ejecti sunt.’” Cf. Liv. iv. 48.

[126] p. 17.

[127] Cic. _de Leg._ ii. 13, 32 (on the question whether auspices were merely directed to the _utilitas_ of the state, or formed a true method of divination) “si enim deos esse concedimus ... et eosdem hominum consulere generi, et posse nobis signa rerum futurarum ostendere; non video cur esse divinationem negem.”

[128] Cic. _de Div._ ii. 33, 70 (the difficulty of answering for results may appeal to a _Marsus augur_ but not to a Roman) “non enim sumus ii nos augures, qui avium reliquorumve signorum observatione futura dicamus.” Cf. i. 58, 132 “Non habeo ... nauci Marsum augurem, non vicanos haruspices, non de circo astrologos, non Isiacos conjectores, non interpretes somniorum. Non enim sunt ii aut scientia aut arte divini.”

[129] See the treatment of the auspices in the section on the magistracy (p. 163).

[130] Strangely enough the Greek belief in oracular or prophetic power did not lead to the conception of a priesthood set apart from the people. But the Greek science of divination, though associated with oracles and prophecy, did not aim much higher than the Roman. Its object was generally to win approval for a contemplated course of action.

[131] Cic. _de Leg._ ii. 8, 21 “Quaeque augur injusta, nefasta, vitiosa, dira defixerit, inrita infectaque sunto; quique non paruerit, capital esto.”

[132] Serv. ad _Aen._ vi. 190 “auguria aut oblativa sunt, quae non poscuntur, aut impetrativa, quae optata veniunt.” For the categories of these two kinds of auspices see the discussion of the auspices in the section on the magistracy (p. 162).

[133] Liv. vi. 41 “Auspiciis hanc urbem conditam esse, auspiciis bello ac pace, domi militiaeque omnia geri, quis est qui ignoret?”

[134] This view is most fully expressed in the formalities of the _interregnum_. See the section which treats of this institution (p. 147).

[135] Cic. _de Div._ i. 16, 28 “Nihil fere quondam majoris rei, nisi auspicato, ne privatim quidem, gerebatur: quod etiam nunc nuptiarum auspices declarant, qui, re omissa, nomen tantum tenent.” In i. 17, 31 we have the story of Attus Navius taking auspices by _aves_ in a private matter. Cf. Liv. vi. 41.

[136] Cic. _de Div._ i. 16, 28 (see last note); Suet. _Claud._ 26; Tac. _Ann._ xi. 27.

[137] Liv. iv. 2 “Quas quantasque res C. Canuleium adgressum? Conluvionem gentium, perturbationem auspiciorum publicorum privatorumque adferre.” Yet this passage has only an indirect reference to the matrimonial _auspicia_. The argument is that intermarriage would cause the pure Patriciate to disappear, and with it the general right of taking _auspicia impetrativa_.

[138] Cic. _de Div._ ii. 36, 76 “a populo auspicia accepta habemus.” The relation of _auspicia habere_ to the _spectio_ is that the former denotes the abstract right of questioning the gods, the latter its exercise in a particular case (Momms. _Staatsr._ i. 89 n. 3). The specification by the magistrate of the signs which he wished to see was known as _legum dictio_ (Serv. ad _Aen._ iii. 89; cf. p. 43 n. 2).

[139] A similar confusion was at an earlier period introduced with reference to the givers of the auspices. They are said to be given by the people (Cic. _de Div._ ii. 36, 76; p. 39), but the great bulk of the people (i.e. the Plebs) did not possess them.

[140] p. 3.

[141] Dionys. iv. 14 (Servius Tullius) τὰς καταγραφὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ τὰς εἰσπράξεις τῶν χρημάτων ... οὐκέτι κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς φυλὰς τὰς γενικάς, ὡς πρότερον, κ.τ.λ. Varro _L.L._ v. 181 “Tributum dictum a tribubus, quod ea pecunia, quae populo imperata erat, tributim a singulis pro portione census exigebatur.”

[142] From _legere_, Varro _L.L._ v. 87.

[143] Varro _L.L._ v. 89 “milites quod trium milium primo legio fiebat, ac singulae tribus Titiensium, Ramnium, Lucerum milia singula militum mittebant.”

[144] ib. 81 “tribuni militum quod terni tribus tribubus Ramnium, Lucerum, Titium olim ad exercitum mittebantur.” On the other hand, Servius (in _Aen._ v. 560) says that the _tribuni_ were so called because they presided over one-third of the whole force.

[145] p. 12.

[146] Liv. i. 36.

[147] e.g. Calabra, Foriensis, Veliensis. Other names (such as Titia) may be eponymous.

[148] Festus p. 62 “curionia sacra, quae in curiis fiebant”; p. 64 “curiales flamines curiarum sacerdotes.”

[149] ib. p. 49 (s.v. _curia_) “locus est, ubi publicas curas gerebant.”

[150] See note 1.

[151] Festus p. 126; Liv. xxvii. 8.

[152] Festus p. 55 “Celeres antiqui dixerunt, quos nunc equites dicimus ... qui primitus electi fuerunt ex singulis curiis deni, ideoque omnino trecenti fuere.”

[153] Liv. i. 26; Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 31, 54.

[154] Dionys. ii. 14.

[155] “Generale jussum” (Capito ap. Gell. x. 20).

[156] _Lex_ is probably connected etymologically with the German _legen_ (Gothic _lagjan_) as θεσμός with τίθημι.

[157] In business we have _leges locationis, venditionis_, in the structure of corporations a _lex collegii_. On the other hand, in the _legum dictio_ of augury, which is the statement of the mode of the answer of the gods to a request, in the _lex data_ given to individuals by a magistrate (e.g. the _leges censoriae_) or granted by Rome as a charter to a subject state, there seems to be the idea of a purely one-sided ordinance.

[158] Dionys. iii. 62; Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 17, 31.

[159] Tac. _Ann._ xi. 22; Ulp. in _Dig._ i. 13.

[160] Varro _L.L._ v. 80 “Praetor dictus, qui praeiret jure et exercitu.” But the title is, perhaps, a purely military one (_prae-itor_, “the man who goes before the army”).

[161] Festus p. 198 “in magistro populi faciendo, qui vulgo Dictator appellatur.”

[162] Cic. _de Rep._ i. 26, 42. _Regnum_ denotes the position of the king as head of the state (ib. ii. 27), but not the regal power.

[163] _Lictor_ is probably derived from _licere_. For other attempts at derivation see Gell. xii. 8. They summon, not only to the assembly, but also to the courts, and are thus the chief mark of jurisdiction and coercive power (_coercitio_). The individual _curiae_ were probably summoned by the thirty _lictores curiatii_, who survive into the later Republic. See Momms. _Staatsr._ i. p. 392. For the number of lictors that accompanied the king see Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 17, 31; Liv. i. 8; Dionys. ii. 29; iii. 61, 62.

[164] Serv. in _Aen._ vii. 188, 612; xi. 334; Ov. _Fast._ ii. 503.

[165] Cic. _de Fin._ ii. 21, 69; Dionys. iii. 61.

[166] Festus p. 49 “currules magistrates appellati sunt, quia curru vehebantur.”

[167] Dionys. iv. 74.

[168] Festus p. 209 “Picta quae nunc toga dicitur purpurea ante vocitata est eaque erat sine pictura.” It was already _picta_ (διάχρυσος) in Polybius’ time (Polyb. vi. 53).

[169] Liv. i. 56.

[170] “Arvi et arbusta et pascui lati atque uberes” (Cic. _de Rep._ v. 2, 3). Cf. Liv. ii. 5.

[171] p. 8.

[172] Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 12, 24 “Nostri illi etiam turn agrestes viderunt virtutem et sapientiam regalem, non progeniem quaeri oportere.” Cf. App. _B.C._ i. 98.

[173] Liv. i. 7 and 18.

[174] Liv. i. 17; Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 17, 31.

[175] The _interregnum_, though only an occasional office in the Republic, is represented as an invariable part of the procedure in the transmission of the kingly power (Liv. i. 47).

[176] Dionys. v. 1; Liv. xl. 42.

[177] Tac. _Ann._ i. 14 and 81; Dio Cass. liii. 21, 7; lviii. 20, 3.

[178] Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 12, 23; Liv. i. 17; Dionys. ii. 57.

[179] [Cic.] _ad Brut._ i. 5, 4.

[180] Cf. Serv. in _Aen._ vi. 808 “Romulo mortuo cum ... Senatus ... regnasset per decurias.”

[181] Dionys. ii. 57 διακληρωσάμενοι.

[182] Dionys. ii. 57 τοῖς λαχοῦσι δέκα πρώτοις ἀπέδωκαν ἄρχειν τῆς πόλεως τὴν αὐτόκρατορ’ ἀρχήν: Liv. i. 17 “decem imperitabant, unus cum insignibus imperii et lictoribus erat.”

[183] In the accounts of this procedure an important element is probably omitted, i.e. that each individual _interrex_ nominated his successor. The first could not nominate the king, as he had not received the auspices in due form.

[184] Mommsen (_Staatsr._ i. pp. 213, 214) takes a different view, arguing that the king was in every case nominated, not by the _rex_, but by the _interrex_, on the legal ground that the appointment of a successor would have been one of those “actus legitimi qui non recipiunt diem vel condicionem” (such as _hereditatis aditio_, _tutoris datio_), and which “in totum vitiantur per temporis vel condicionis adjectionem” (Papin. in _Dig._ 50, 17, 77). But, even in the regal period, there may have been one condition which did not vitiate such acts, i.e. death (see p. 29).

[185] Liv. i. 17, 22, 32, 41, 47.

[186] Cic. _de Leg._ Agr. ii. 10, 26; ii. 11, 28; _ad Fam._ i. 9, 25.

[187] Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 13, 25 “Numam ... qui ... quamquam populus curiatis eum comitiis regem esse jusserat, tamen ipse de suo imperio curiatam legem tulit.”

[188] Liv. i. 41 “Servius, praesidio firmo munitus, primus injussu populi, voluntate patrum regnavit.”

[189] Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 17, 31 “Tullum Hostilium populus regem, interrege rogante, comitiis curiatis creavit, isque de imperio suo ... populum consuluit curiatim.”

[190] The last _injustus dominus_ of Rome ruled “neque populi jussu neque auctoribus patribus” (Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 24, 45; Liv. i. 49).

[191] Thus Romulus takes his own auspices on the Palatine (Liv. i. 6).

[192] p. 39.

[193] Liv. i. 18 “de se ... deos consuli jussit.”

[194] Labeo ap. Gell. xv. 27, 1; Liv. xl. 42, 8.

[195] Dionys. ii. 14; iv. 74; Plut. _Ti. Gracch._ 15.

[196] Festus p. 185; Labeo ap. Gell. xv. 27; Ov. _Fasti_ ii. 21.

[197] This is shown by his sacrifices on the Kalends and on the Nones (_sacra nonalia_) and his offering of a ram to Janus in the _regia_ on the _Agonalia_ (Jan. 9) (Festus p. 10; Varro _L.L._ vi. 12; Ov. _Fasti_ i. 317).

[198] Festus p. 113; Macrob. i. 15, 19.

[199] Liv. i. 20 “Numa Pontificem ... Numam Marcium M. f. ex patribus legit, eique sacra omnia exscripta exsignataque attribuit, quibus hostiis, quibus diebus, ad quae templa sacra fierent, atque unde in eos suraptus pecunia erogaretur. Cetera quoque omnia publica privataque sacra Pontificis scitis subjecit, ut esset, quo consultum plebes veniret: ne quid divini juris, negligendo patrios ritus, peregrinos que adsciscendo, turbaretur, etc.” But afterwards (in 449 B.C.) Livy (iii. 54) implies the existence of a college, without mentioning its institution. Cf. iv. 44.

[200] Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 14, 26.

[201] Liv. x. 6.

[202] Bouché-Leclercq _Les Pontifes de l’ancienne Rome_ p. 9. That the king was pontiff is stated by Plutarch (_Numa_ 9), Servius (ad _Aen._ iii. 81), and Zosimus (iv. 36), but the evidence may be vitiated by the position of the Princeps as _pontifex maximus_.

[203] Liv. i. 20 (p. 51 n. 5); cf. Ambrosch _Studien_ p. 22.

[204] Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 9, 16; _de Div._ i. 2, 3.

[205] Liv. i. 20 “Tum sacerdotibus creandis animum adjecit, quamquam ipse plurima sacra obibat, ea maxime quae nunc ad Dialem flaminem pertinent.”

[206] As, e.g., the nomination of Flamines belonged to the Latin dictator (Ascon. in _Milon._ p. 32).

[207] Gaius i. 130. The same was the case with the Vestal (Gell. i. 12).

[208] For the Flamen see Liv. xxxi. 50; Festus p. 104. For the Vestal, Gell. x. 15.

[209] Plut. _Numa_ 10.

[210] Liv. i. 20 (cited p. 51).

[211] _Supplicium_, from _sub-placo_, death as a sin-offering (Festus p. 308 “supplicia ... sacrificia a supplicando”); _castigatio_ (“castum agere”) purification through atonement. On the other hand _poena_, _multa_, _talio_ bear witness to a theory of compensation and private vengeance. See Rein _Criminalrecht_ p. 39.

[212] Liv. i. 26; Dionys. iii. 22; Festus pp. 297 and 307.

[213] Festus p. 222; Gell. iv. 3.

[214] Macrob. i. 16, 10 “prudentem expiare non posse.”

[215] Cic. _de Leg._ ii. 9, 22.

[216] Dionys. ii. 10; Serv. ad _Aen._ vi. 609.

[217] Festus p. 230.

[218] Dionys. ii. 74; Festus p. 368.

[219] Plin. _H.N._ xviii. 3, 12.

[220] Bouché-Leclercq _Les Pontifes_ p. 196. In the _lex sacrata_ which protected the tribunes we meet with this distinction (Liv. iii. 55).

[221] Festus p. 318 “At homo sacer is est, quem populus judicavit ob maleficium; neque fas est eum immolari, sed qui occidit, parricidi non damnatur.” This is the meaning of _sacer_ as employed in the _leges sacratae_ of the early Republic (Liv. ii. 8; iii. 55).

[222] The _sacramentum_ (literally “oath”) in the _actio sacramento_ is best explained as an atonement (_piaculum_) in the form of a money payment for the expiable, because involuntary, perjury of the litigant who has maintained a false claim. When the process was secularised, the _sacramentum_ came to be considered a simple wager. See Danz _Der sacrale Schutz_ pp. 151 ff.

[223] Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 17, 31 “constituitque jus, quo bella indicerentur; quod per se justissime inventum sanxit fetiali religione, ut omne bellum, quod denuntiatum indictumque non esset, id injustum esse atque impium judicaretur.”

[224] Varro _L.L._ v. 86 “Fetiales ... fidei publicae inter populos praeerant; nam per hos fiebat ut justum conciperetur bellum et inde desitum, ut foedere fides pacis constitueretur. Ex his mittebantur, antequam conciperetur, qui res repeterent, etc.”

[225] Cic. _de Leg._ ii. 9, 21 “Foederum, pacis, belli, indutiarum ratorum fetiales judices nuntii sunto; bella disceptanto.” The word _fetialis_ is probably connected with _fateri_ (and Oscan _fatium_). Thus the “Fetiales” are speakers (_oratores_), cf. Festus p. 182. Dionysius (ii. 72) ascribes the creation of the Fetiales to Numa; Livy (i. 32) speaks as if they were due to Ancus Martius, but in another passage (i. 24) implies their earlier existence. Cicero attributes them to Tullus Hostilius (Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 17, 31). The ceremonies of the college are described in Dionys. ii. 72 and Liv. i. 32.

[226] Sometimes, the better to secure divine assistance, the enemy, his cities, and his lands were all devoted to the gods. For the incantation see Macrob. iii. 9, 10 “Dis pater Vejovis Manes, sive quo alio nomine fas est nominare ... uti vos eas urbes agrosque capita aetatesque eorum devotas consecratasque habeatis ollis legibus, quibus quandoque sunt maxime hostes devoti; eosque ego ... do devoveo.” The site of such cities was cursed, as in Republican times that of Fregellae, Carthage, and Corinth.

[227] Macrob. iii. 9, 7 “Si deus, si dea est, cui populus civitasque ... est in tutela, teque maxime, ille qui urbis hujus populique tutelam recepisti ... a vobis peto ut vos populum civitatemque ... deseratis ... proditique Romam ad me meosque veniatis, nostraque vobis loca templa sacra urbs acceptior probatiorque sit.”

[228] Cincius ap. Arnob. iii. 38 “solere Romanos religiones urbium superatarum partim privatim per familias spargere, partim publice consecrare.”

[229] e.g. the _evocatio_ at the siege of Veii, the _devotio_ on the fall of Carthage.

[230] Plut. _Ti. Gracch._ 15; Tac. _Ann._ iii. 26. See next citation.

[231] Tac. _Ann._ iii. 26 “nobis Romulus, ut libitum, imperitaverat: dein Numa religionibus et divino jure populum devinxit, repertaque quaedam a Tullo et Anco. Sed praecipuus Servius Tullius sanctor legum fuit, quis etiam reges obtemperarent.”

[232] Pomponius in _Dig._ 1, 2, 2 “et ita leges quasdam et ipse (Romulus) curiatas ad populum tulit; tulerunt et sequentes reges. Quae omnes conscriptæ extant in libro Sexti Papirii, qui fuit illis temporibus, quibus Superbus Demarati Corinthii filius, ex principalibus viris. Is liber, ut diximus, appellatur jus civile Papirianum, non quia Papirius de suo quicquam ibi adjecit, sed quod leges sine ordine latas in unum composuit.” This code was commented on by Granius Flaccus (Paul. in _Dig._ 50, 16, 144), a contemporary of Julius Caesar. C. Papirius is said to have been _pontifex maximus_ (Dionys. iii. 36), and Mommsen (_Staatsr._ ii. p. 41) thinks that the _leges regiae_ were simply pontifical ordinances, specifying amongst other things such offences as we have mentioned as coming under _fas_ (p. 54).

[233] Sall. _Cat._ 6 “imperium legitimum, nomen imperii regium habebant.”

[234] “Regium consilium” (Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 8, 14). The function of the Senate was περὶ παντὸς ὃτου ἂν εἰσηγῆται βασιλεὺς διαγινὼσκειν (Dionys. ii. 14).

[235] Festus p. 246 “Praeteriti senatores quondam in opprobrio non erant, quod, ut reges sibi legebant sublegebantque, quos in consilio publico haberent, ita post exactos eos consules quoque et tribuni militum consulari potestate conjunctissimos sibi quosque patriciorum et deinde plebeiorum legebant.”

[236] p. 13.

[237] Liv. i. 8.

[238] ib. 17 and 35; ii. 1. On the nature of this increase see Willems _Le Sénat_ p. 21.

[239] p. 13.

[240] p. 12.

[241] Liv. i. 32.

[242] Dionys. ii. 14. One of the privileges of the people was περὶ πολέμου διαγινώσκειν ὃταν ὁ βασιλεύς ἐφῇ.

[243] Cic. _de Rep._ ii. 9, 15 “Cum ipse (Romulus) nihil ex praeda domum suam reportaret, locupletare cives non destitit”; ii. 14, 26 “ac primum agros, quos bello Romulus ceperat, divisit viritim civibus.” Cf. Dionys. ii. 28 and 62.

[244] Liv. i. 49 “cognitiones capitalium rerum sine consiliis per se solus exercebat.”

[245] ib. 59; see p. 41.

[246] Tac. _Ann._ vi. 11 “namque antea, profectis domo regibus ac mox magistratibus, ne urbs sine imperio foret, in tempus deligebatur qui jus redderet ac subitis mederetur ... duratque simulacrum, quotiens ob ferias Latinas praeficitur qui consulare munus usurpet.” Cf. Liv. i. 59; Dionys. ii. 12.

[247] Yet Livy and Dionysius represent the _tribunus celerum_ as summoning the assembly (Liv. i. 59; Dionys. iv. 71).

[248] Dionys. ii. 14 (amongst the powers of the king were) τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων τὰ μέγιστα μὲν αὐτὸν δικάζειν, τὰ δ’ ἐλάττονα τοῖς βουλευταῖς ἐπιτρέπειν. It is difficult, however, to determine whether the reference is to civil wrongs or to crimes.

[249] ib. iv. 25 ἐκεῖνος (Servius Tullius) διελὼν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν (ἐγκλημάτων) τὰ δημόσια, τῶν μὲν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φερόντων ἀδικημάτων αὐτὸς ἐποιεῖτο τὰς διαγνώσεις, τῶν δὲ ἰδιωτικῶν ἰδιώτας ἔταξεν εἶναι δικαστάς, ὅρους καὶ κανόνας αὐτοῖς τάξας, οὓς αὐτὸς ἔγραψε νόμους. The principle here described perhaps refers to delegation rather than to the distinction between _jus_ and _judicium_ in civil process.

[250] For derivations of _jus_ see Clark _Pract. Jurisprudence_ pp. 16-20; Bréal “Sur l’origine des mots designant le droit en Latin” in _Nouvelle Revue Historique de droit_ vol. vii. (1883) pp. 607 sq.

[251] Dionys. l.c.

[252] Liv. i 26.

[253] Zonaras vii. 13 (who attributes their institution to Publicola) identifies the _quaestores_ with the _quaestores parricidii_, οἷ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς θανασίμους δίκας ἐδίκαζον, ὄθεν καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν ταύτην διὰ τὰς ἀνακρίσεις ἐσχήκασι καὶ διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐκ τῶν ἀνακρίσεων ζήτησιν. Cf. Varro _L.L._ v. 81. Mommsen (_Staatsr._ ii. pp. 523 sq.) thinks the financial quaestors as standing officials originated with the Republic; but he believes (p. 539) that they had their origin in the criminal _quaestores_ (a word which bears the same relation to _quaesitores_ as _sartor_ to _sarcitor_ or _quaero_ to _quaesivi_, p. 537). Cf. Tac. _Ann._ xi. 22 (p. 81); Ulpian in _Dig._ i. 13.

[254] Liv. l.c.

[255] Cic. _pro Mil._ 3, 7; _de Rep._ ii. 31, 54; Festus p. 297.

[256] Liv. i 26 “Si a duumviris provocarit provocatione certato ... auctore Tullo, ... ‘provoco’ inquit.”

[257] ib. viii. 33.

[258] Cf. Ihering _Geist des röm. Rechts_ i. pp. 257 ff.

[259] _Provocatio_ seems to mean a challenge, i.e. a challenge by an accused to a magistrate to appear before another tribunal, on the ground that he is not acting within his own right; cf. Gaius iv. 93 (of the _actio per sponsionem_) “Provocamus adversarium tali sponsione.”

[260] “In this conflict of competence the position of the king was far more favourable than that of the people, since the people could only be summoned by the king. Hence the share of the people in criminal jurisdiction was reduced to a minimum” (Ihering _Geist des röm. Rechts_ i. p. 258).

[261] “Judiciis regiis” (Cic. _de Rep._ v. 2, 3).

[262] p. 56.

[263] Savigny _System_, vi. p. 287; Bernhöft _Staat und Recht der Königszeit_ p. 230. The idea of its being an innovation has sometimes been associated with Dionysius’s description (iv. 25, see p. 62) of a change in jurisdiction introduced by Servius Tullius.