Chapter XII: The Battle of Quatre

BRAS 176

_Résumé_ of Marshal Ney’s doings in the forenoon
of the 16th 176

He should have ordered Jerome and Foy to Gosselies
in the early morning 177

He scattered his command instead of uniting it, as
he was ordered to do 177

He begins the action at 2 P.M., with the divisions
of Bachelu, Foy and Piré 178

Jerome’s division arrives at 3 P.M. 178

Wellington returns to Quatre Bras at 2.30 P.M. 178

Picton’s division arrives at 3.30 P.M. 178

Alten’s division arrives at 5 P.M. 179

At this hour Ney has only the 2d Corps on the field 179

Reasons for the non-arrival of the 1st Corps 179

Its delay in starting 180

Its leading division—Durutte’s—turned off by an
aide of the Emperor’s from Frasnes towards St.
Amand 180

The corps is seen approaching St. Amand about
5 P.M. 180

It must, therefore, have left the Charleroi road at
Frasnes about 4.30 P.M. 181

This was two hours and a half after Jerome’s division
had passed through Frasnes 181

Responsibility of Ney and d’Erlon for this extraordinary
state of things 181

Marshal Ney not to blame for recalling D’Erlon to
Quatre Bras 181

It was probably the staff-officer who carried the
2 P.M. order who turned the 1st Corps off from
the turnpike 182

For the non-arrival of Kellermann’s cavalry Ney
alone was responsible 182

He ordered it to remain in the rear at Frasnes and
Liberchies 182, 183

In this he deliberately disobeyed orders 183

He finally, at 6 P.M., puts in one brigade of
Kellermann’s Corps 183

Which is at first successful, but is afterwards driven
back with loss 184

The French retire to Frasnes 184

The casualties on both sides 184

If d’Erlon’s Corps had not been turned off, it is
probable that Wellington would have been
badly beaten 184, 185

If Ney had concentrated his whole command between
12 M. and 2 P.M., Quatre Bras would
probably have been evacuated 185, 186

In this case Ney could have spared 10,000 or 20,000
men to assist Napoleon 186

Criticism on Marshal Ney’s management 186

Wellington’s skilful handling of his troops 187, 188

NOTES TO CHAPTER XII 189

1. Charras’ erroneous statements as to Ney’s orders
in regard to the employment of Kellermann’s
cavalry 189

2. Napoleon’s mistakes in his account of the
matter in his Memoirs 190

But his principal censure on Ney for not having got
his command together and used it as a whole,
is fully borne out 191

3. Curious error of Siborne’s 191

4. Jomini’s defence of Reille’s delay to march to
Frasnes 192

It overlooks the necessity of occupying Frasnes in
any event, and therefore cannot be accepted 193

5. Baudus’ account of his carrying an order from
Soult to d’Erlon 193

Reasons for thinking that this order must have been
directed to Ney 194

Baudus probably carried the duplicate of the 3.15
P.M. order to Ney 195

The evidence on certain minor points conflicting 196