Chapter XVI: The Battle of Waterloo 289

Napoleon examines the allied position at 1 A.M. 289

Early in the morning he again goes to the front to
see if the English are there 290

His expectation of victory 290

The _rôle_ which he expected Grouchy to play 290

He does not seem to have drawn the very natural
inference that Wellington was expecting
Blücher; or, if he did, he certainly did not act
upon it 291

The rain ceased about 8 A.M. 291

The original intention was to begin the battle at
9 o’clock 292

But Drouot suggested delay and Napoleon acquiesced 292

Napoleon forms the army in three lines 292

His delay in beginning the action criticised 293

And his neglect to send word to Grouchy 294

Every hour’s delay a gain to Wellington 294

Whose army was unequal to the shock without the
assistance of the Prussians 294

Kennedy’s explanation of Wellington’s course 295

Risks that Wellington took 295

Wellington had had the field surveyed 296

Description of the English position 297

Composition and strength of Wellington’s army 298

Positions of the various troops 299

Hougomont and La Haye Sainte 300

Strength and composition of the French army 301

Positions of the corps 301

Napoleon’s plan of battle 302

Establishment of a great battery east of the Charleroi
turnpike 302

It has been universally commended 303

The attack on Hougomont, ordered as a preliminary
to the main attack, which was to be on the centre, very
rashly and carelessly conducted 303, 304

The assault by d’Erlon’s Corps 304-307

Formation of the troops 305

No assignable reason for such a peculiar and unwieldy
formation 305

The attack is made and repulsed 307

Napoleon sees the Prussians on the heights of St.
Lambert 307

Capture of La Haye Sainte 307

The great cavalry attacks on the English centre 308

They were made against troops in good condition to
stand them 308

Napoleon is called away at 4 P.M. to take charge
of the resistance to the Prussians 308

Necessity of maintaining the Charleroi road and
Planchenoit against their assaults 309

Napoleon’s personal supervision needed 309

The great cavalry charges 309

They accomplish little and the cavalry is ruined 310

French batteries placed to the south of La Haye
Sainte enfilade the English line west of the
turnpike 310

But this was only done to a limited extent 310

The attack by the heavy cavalry of the Guard 311

Napoleon succeeds in repulsing Bülow 311

The battle against the English not actively carried
on after the cessation of the cavalry attacks 312

But the English line at this period becomes from
various causes very weak. Kennedy’s description
of it 312

What Napoleon might have accomplished against
the English had he not been fighting the Prussians
at this time 313

The fight with the Prussians terminated, Napoleon
returns to the front 314

Wellington has made every effort to restore his
line; its condition to the west of the pike 314

Ney is ordered to make preparations for an attack
to be made by the Imperial Guard 315

Disposition at this time of the various battalions of
the Guard 315, 316

Strength and composition of the attacking force 316

The Emperor leads up and hands to Ney two regiments
of grenadiers and two of chasseurs 317

They are formed in columns of battalions and march
in _échelon_, the right in advance 317

Premature attack of a body of French horse on the
left of the Guard 317

No support furnished by Reille 318

Admirable conduct of d’Erlon 318

The leading battalions of the Guard strike Maitland’s
brigade of guards 319

Captain Powell’s account 319

The leading battalions of the Guard are beaten 320

General Maitland’s account 321

Skilful and gallant conduct of Sir C. Halkett 322

The left and rear battalions of the Guard continue
to advance 323

But are attacked in flank by the 52d regiment 324

And are completely overthrown 324

The failure of the attack largely due to the absence
of supports 324

Arrival of the van of Zieten’s Corps on the field 324

The French right wing retires in confusion 325

Charge of the cavalry-brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur 325

Exertions of Napoleon to restore order 325

He is finally forced to retire 326

The French retreat blocked at Genappe 326

The result of the battle due to the intervention of
the Prussians 327

Probable course of Zieten if Grouchy had detained
Bülow and Pirch I. 328

Grouchy, however, not solely responsible for the defeat 328

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI 329

1. The French tactics generally censured 329

Napoleon and Ney both to blame 329

Injurious effect on the French chances of success of
Napoleon’s absence at Planchenoit 330

The attack on Hougomont criticised 330

The defence of Planchenoit praised 331

2. The English tactics exceedingly good 331

3. The attack of the Imperial Guard 331

A. No foundation for the hypothesis of two columns 332

B. The claims of the 52d regiment considered 333

The notion that it was only the skirmishers of the
Imperial Guard who were driven off by Maitland’s
brigade refuted by the testimony of eye
witnesses 334

The great credit due to Colborne 335

4. Napoleon’s reasons for ordering the attack considered 336

Zieten’s intervention not anticipated 336

The English reported as growing weaker 337

Ney ordered and expected to support the attack by
Bachelu’s division and by cavalry on the left 337

Ney disappoints the Emperor’s expectations in both
respects 337

The charge of the Guard might have been properly
supported 338

Contrast between Ney and Wellington 338

Note on Ney’s state of mind 338, n. [777]

5. Wellington’s course in leaving 18,000 men at
Hal and Tubize, not to be defended 339

6. As to the effect upon the Prussians of the appearance
of Grouchy’s force marching from
the Dyle 339

7. The rout of the French army due to the irruption
of Zieten’s Corps 340

The comparative weakness of the Anglo-Dutch
army at the close of the action 341

8. Relative responsibility of Napoleon and Grouchy
for the intervention of the Prussians 341

Both are responsible for it 342

CHAPTER XVII: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 343

The principal points treated of in this book 343-350

APPENDIX A.

On some characteristics of Napoleon’s Memoirs 351

Injustice done Napoleon by Charras and others 351

Peculiarity of Napoleon’s memory 352

He recalls his expectations, but not the tenor of the
orders which he gave 352

Illustration from the orders sent to Ney on the afternoon
of the 16th 352

The same thing probably true as to the order sent
to Grouchy 353

The orders given in the “Memoirs” were probably
never sent 354

And the Bertrand order, which was sent, was forgotten 354

APPENDIX B.

On Marshal Grouchy and the Bertrand order 355

Denials by Marshal Grouchy in his pamphlets published
in Philadelphia that he received on the
17th any written order 355

He relied on the fact that no copy of the Bertrand
order was among the major-general’s papers 356

Publication of the order in 1842 357

It is now recognized in the Grouchy Memoirs 357

Original text of the Bertrand Order 358

Grouchy’s report to the Emperor dated Gembloux,
10 P.M., June 17, given in full 359

It is in reality a reply to the Bertrand order 360

Mutilation by Marshal Grouchy of the text of this
report 360

Object of the change 360

No doubt as to the correct reading 361