Chapter XVI: The Battle of Waterloo (1)

Napoleon, as we have seen, took up his headquarters on the evening of the 17th at the Caillou house on the Brussels road, about a mile and a half south of the little tavern known then and now as La Belle Alliance. All the afternoon and night it rained hard. We may suppose that, as his custom was, he slept during the evening. At 1 A.M. of the 18th, he mounted his horse, and, with Bertrand, rode out to the front.[671] Here he rode or walked along the line of the pickets until he had satisfied himself that Wellington’s army was in position, awaiting battle. The fires at which the soldiers of the English and Dutch army were drying and warming themselves left no doubt of this. He must have been occupied in this way more than two hours, as he was near the wood of Hougomont at half-past two in the morning.

After returning, various reports came in. Between 7 and 8 A.M. he received from an officer who had been sent to the advanced posts, word that the enemy were retiring. This information he at once communicated to d’Erlon,[672] whose corps was in the first line,—that of Reille not having got fully up,—and ordered him to put his troops in march and to pursue the enemy with vigor. But d’Erlon having judged the enemy’s movement quite differently, sent his chief-of-staff to the Emperor to tell him that he, d’Erlon, thought that the English were making their dispositions to receive battle. D’Erlon proceeds:—

“The Emperor came immediately to the advanced posts. I accompanied
him; we dismounted in order to get near the enemy’s vedettes, and to
examine more closely the movements of the English army. He perceived
that I was right, and being convinced that the English army was
taking position, he said to me:—

‘Order the men to make their soup, to get their pieces in order, and
we will determine what is to be done towards noon.’”

Napoleon seems in fact not to have spared himself any trouble, and there evidently was no very conspicuous deficiency in the physical energy of a man who, after a good afternoon’s work in the saddle in directing the march of an army, was able to go out twice in the deep mud during a rainy night and morning to visit the outer pickets of his line of battle, nearly two miles from the house where he had established his headquarters.

The reason of this apparently rather unnecessary solicitude is really not far to seek. Napoleon felt as confident of beating Wellington’s army that day as he had felt of beating Blücher’s army on the day but one before, provided only that it would accept battle. He believed, and he was justified in believing, that his army was superior to that opposed to him, in fighting capacity certainly, and even, possibly, in numbers. He trusted to Grouchy to keep the Prussians off, as he had on the day of Ligny trusted to Ney to protect him against the English, and he may also have thought it possible that Grouchy would arrive on the field in time to make the victory more crushing,—playing, in this way, much the same _rôle_ which Napoleon had marked out for Ney at Ligny. He accordingly feared nothing so much as the retreat of the English.

That he supposed that Grouchy would cross the Dyle at Moustier is certainly a fair inference from Marbot’s report and letter, from which we have made extracts above.[673] That he should have been so certain about it, however, is remarkable, as he had given Grouchy no instructions[674] of any kind whatsoever since he had sent him the Bertrand order, and that left him entire freedom of action.

Another very remarkable thing is that Napoleon should not have drawn from the fact that Wellington was awaiting battle the inference that he was expecting the assistance, and the powerful assistance, of Blücher.[675] At least it would seem pretty certain that he did not draw this inference, for he took neither of the steps which, if he had come to that conclusion, would seem to be dictated by common sense,—he neither attacked Wellington as early as he possibly could, nor did he do anything to make sure of Grouchy’s intervention until 10 A.M., when he sent him the order which we have given above.[676] If, on his return to the Caillou house at half-past three or thereabouts in the morning, he had sent an officer to order Grouchy to march towards the main army by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, he would have done only what the fact of Wellington’s confronting him, which he had just ascertained with his own eyes, should have led him to do.

The rain ceased, according to Charras,[677] at 6 A.M.; Vaudoncourt,[678] a much earlier authority, puts it at 8 o’clock; Van Loben Sels[679] says that the rain had diminished at break of day, but it was not until 10 o’clock that the atmosphere became clear; Baudus,[680] who was at the battle on Soult’s staff, says the rain ceased towards 9 o’clock. We may probably assume that the rain had ceased by 8 o’clock, and that in another hour, had Napoleon so chosen, he might have begun the battle.

This, in point of fact, he originally intended to do. He had issued an order in good season to the corps-commanders, that they should see that the soldiers cleaned their guns and got their breakfasts, so that at 9 o’clock precisely they should be ready to commence the battle.[681] Drouot, who was a distinguished artillery-officer, and was then acting as adjutant-general of the Guard, tells us[682] that Napoleon intended to begin the battle by 8 or 9 at the latest. But Drouot advised a delay of two to three hours on account of the condition of the ground, which the heavy rain of the past afternoon and night had rendered too soft for the rapid and effective movements of artillery; and Napoleon, who was himself an artillery officer, and always made great use of this arm, yielded to the suggestion, and determined to put off the main attack till towards one o’clock P.M.

About 8 A.M. the Emperor rode along the lines,[683] examining the enemy’s position, which he had already, as we have seen, inspected twice since midnight. He then dictated an order of battle, or, rather, an order of movement, the result of which would be that the army would be arranged in three lines, ready for the attack. This marshalling of the army was, according to all accounts, a magnificent and imposing spectacle; the bands played; the men shouted “Vive l’Empereur!”; the movement was skilfully designed and beautifully executed; but, except as a way of occupying the time, it would probably never have been thought of. It began shortly before nine and was over by half-past ten.[684] It showed at any rate that had it been thought advisable, the battle might have been begun at 9 A.M.

After this pageant “Napoleon passed before the lines and was received by immense, by enthusiastic acclamations.”[685] He then, shortly before eleven o’clock, dictated his plan of attack. Of this we shall speak later on.

One cannot but be struck with a recurrence here of the same error to which we have had occasion to call attention before,—namely, the error of acting on the probabilities of the situation when it is admitted that a different state of things may nevertheless, in spite of the probabilities, exist, and that, if it does exist, a wholly different course of action must be taken, or a fatal result will inevitably follow. Napoleon was, very likely, warranted in thinking it probable that morning that, what with the loss and demoralization consequent on their defeat at Ligny, and what with the interference with their plans which Grouchy with his 33,000 men could reasonably be expected to make, he himself was safe against any intervention on the part of the Prussians. But he did not and could not know where the Prussians were; in fact, he had great reason to believe that a large part of them had gone to Wavre; and at that very moment he thought it very likely that their action in going to Wavre would induce Grouchy to come to him by way of Moustier. If, then, the exigency called in the Emperor’s mind for this course on the part of Grouchy, why did it not equally demand from Napoleon the promptest action against Wellington, and the exertion of every means to make sure of Grouchy’s intervention? This criticism is, in fact, only an extension of that made in reference to the step taken by Napoleon in detaching Grouchy’s large force when he felt it necessary at the same time to warn Grouchy expressly that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English.

However we may explain these apparent contradictions, they certainly existed in Napoleon’s mind and also in his actions. He was so sure of having only the Anglo-Dutch army to fight that he deliberately postponed attacking it until he could do so in the most approved style; he was confident that if the Prussians had gone in the direction of Wavre with the intention of joining the English or of attacking the French, Grouchy would return to him by the bridge of Moustier. And yet, from 1 P.M. of the afternoon of the 17th to 10 A.M. of the 18th, he sent Grouchy no orders, and no information. Where such is the lack of ordinary care on the part of the commanding general, a great deal surely must depend upon the energy and capacity of the subordinate.

While this was the general situation at the French headquarters, the Duke of Wellington, having with his customary carefulness set his army in battle array, was quietly waiting until it should suit his adversary to assault his lines. Every hour’s delay was a distinct gain to him; and he knew it. He knew, what Napoleon of course could not know, that the Prussians were on their way to attack the French and to join the English.

At the same time, it must not be supposed that the Duke had no cause for anxiety. Of the defects of his army he was well aware. No one knew better than he that such a conglomerate mass of troops as that which he commanded, consisting, too, in great part of raw and untried soldiers, could not possibly be equal to the well-appointed army of Napoleon’s veterans whose blows he was soon to receive. His only reliance, therefore, was on Blücher’s promised support. As Sir James Shaw-Kennedy well says:—[686]

“In order at all to understand the views of the Duke of Wellington
as to accepting battle on the field of Waterloo, it is essential
to keep this arrangement [_i.e._, with Blücher] fully in view;
otherwise the Duke might justly be accused of the utmost temerity
and folly in accepting battle, as much the greater portion of his
army consisted of mere Landwehr and of Dutch-Belgian troops. The
latter, from political and other causes, could not be depended upon;
which, in fact, had been already proved on the 16th. It would be
an error to suppose that it was from any want of courage that the
Dutch-Belgian troops could not be depended upon; proof enough exists
that the people of those countries are capable of the most heroic
and persevering exertions when engaged in a cause that they care to
support; but under the circumstances in which they were placed on
this occasion, they were without confidence, were not acting in a
cause which they cordially supported, and showed that it was not one
in which they wished to oppose themselves seriously to French troops.”

But Wellington felt that he could rely on Blücher’s promise, and he took his chance that Blücher would be able to fulfil his promise, and that he himself would be able to hold out until the promise should be fulfilled. These risks, however, were by no means small.

In the first place, the Duke not only did not know that Napoleon had given Grouchy two whole corps; he even supposed that he had given him but one, and that Napoleon was confronting him on the morning of the battle with his whole army, “with the exception of the 3d Corps, which had been sent to observe Marshal Blücher.”[687] This risk, fortunately for the Duke of Wellington, was not actually incurred. But, all the same, Wellington is entitled to the credit of having faced it with his eyes open.

Secondly, there was the chance that Grouchy might intervene, and prevent the Prussians from fulfilling their promise. We have already shown what Grouchy could have done in this way had he either acted of his own motion in accordance with the demands of the situation by marching at daybreak for the bridge of Moustier, or had followed the counsel of Gérard at noon.

The issue of the battle of Waterloo, in fact, might have been entirely changed if the movements of troops not under the control of either of the commanding generals had been other than they were; it is this fact among others which gives the battle a peculiar interest.

The position to the south of the villages of Mont St. Jean and Waterloo, known as the field of Waterloo, had been, some time before the campaign opened, reconnoitred by the English engineers; “the several sketches of the officers had been put together, and one fair copy made for the Prince of Orange; a second had been commenced for the Duke.”[688] The chief-of-engineers, Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth, who was present at the action of Quatre Bras, sent back to Brussels during the afternoon, presumably by the Duke’s direction, for a plan of this position; and the original sketches, which, together, constituted a plan, were forwarded to him by Captain Oldfield, the brigade-major of engineers.[689] The next morning, “upon the receipt of a communication from Blücher,”[690] the Duke obtained from Colonel Smyth these sketches, and gave them to Sir William De Lancey, his Deputy-Quartermaster-General, or chief-of-staff, “with orders” (as Major Oldfield states)[691] “to take up the ground on which we fought the next day. Colonel Smyth was at the same time desired to take the necessary measures for entrenching the village of Braine-la-Leud.”

To this position, then, well understood and mapped out, the Duke of Wellington fell back on the afternoon of the 17th from Quatre Bras with that part of his army which was under his immediate command, and to it also he directed the greater part of the troops which were at Nivelles and other places. (See Map 13.)

The position was a strong one. The first or main line of battle crossed the Charleroi-Brussels pike at right angles where the road from Ohain and Wavre strikes into it, nearly three-quarters of a mile south of the hamlet of Mont St. Jean, where the _chaussée_ to Nivelles branches off from the pike. To the east of this pike the English left extended for a mile or so,—for more than half this distance on the crest of a gentle slope; but the little villages of Smohain, Papelotte and La Haye, lying from a quarter to a half a mile in front, were occupied. To the west of the pike the line ran along the same ridge for nearly a third of a mile, when it turned somewhat towards the southwest, but still ran along the crest of the ridge, and so continued for nearly a half a mile farther. Here the line was covered by a garden and a considerable wood enclosing a solid old building, known as the Chateau of Hougomont. This building and its enclosures lay about 350 yards in front of the main line of battle, at its extreme right, and they were occupied in force. The ridge was admirably suited for defensive purposes. The reverse slope offered excellent protection for infantry lying behind it; and in front, there were no trees or other impediments; every movement of the enemy was plainly to be seen, and was exposed to fire. Moreover the ground over which the enemy must advance for the attack was so moist and muddy, that all rapidity of movement, even of cavalry, was out of the question.

Wellington had on the field the whole of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th and 6th British divisions, one brigade (Mitchell’s) of the 4th division, the 2d and 3d Dutch-Belgian divisions, and the contingents from Brunswick and Nassau,—numbering in all 49,608 infantry, 12,408 cavalry and 5,645 artillery, with 156 guns,—a total of 67,661 men.[692]

These troops, as we have before observed,[693] were stationed on the field without reference to the corps to which they belonged. The reason for this probably was that the Duke desired to distribute his foreign troops, on some, at any rate, of whom he placed no great reliance, among his British troops and those of the King’s German Legion, which were his main dependence. Then, inasmuch as the army had never before acted by corps, or, in fact, at all, in the field, no special inconvenience was to be apprehended from this arrangement.

The army of the Duke was composed as follows:—[694]

British troops:—
Infantry 15,181
Cavalry 5,843
Artillery 2,967
------
23,991

King’s German Legion:—
Infantry 3,301
Cavalry 1,997
Artillery 526
------
5,824

Total British and King’s
German Legion ------ 29,815 Men

Hanoverians:—
Infantry 10,258
Cavalry 497
Artillery 465
------
11,220 „

Brunswickers:—
Infantry 4,586
Cavalry 866
Artillery 510
5,962 „

Nassauers:—
Infantry 2,880 „

Dutch-Belgians:—
Infantry 13,402
Cavalry 3,205
Artillery 1,177 17,784 „

Total as above. 67,661 „

To the eastward, or English left, of the turnpike, were stationed in the first line the 5th and 6th British divisions, the 2d Dutch-Belgian division, and the British cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur. This part of the line seems to have been commanded by Sir Thomas Picton,[695] although it is not clear whether he had any authority except over his own division, the 5th. Of these troops the cavalry were stationed on the extreme left. One brigade of Dutch-Belgians, that of Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, occupied the villages of Smohain, Papelotte and La Haye. The English infantry were placed on the reverse of the slope of the ridge, so as to be sheltered from the enemy’s fire. But the other Dutch-Belgian brigade, Bylandt’s, was, as Sir James Shaw-Kennedy says,[696] “posted, most unaccountably, in front of the Wavre road, on the slope. * * * In this position, it was jutted forward in front of the real line of battle, which was mainly the Wavre road. It was directly exposed to the fire of the greatest French battery that was on the field, and singly exposed to the first onset of the French attacking columns.” Who was responsible for this inconsiderate and dangerous measure we do not know. In rear of the left wing, and protected from the French fire, stood the Union brigade, so called, of Major General Sir William Ponsonby, composed of the Royal Dragoons, the Scots Greys, and the Inniskilling Dragoons.

The right of the left wing rested on the Charleroi turnpike. The 3d British division, Alten’s, continued the line to the west of the turnpike. On the westerly side of the pike, and about 300 yards to the south of the point where the Wavre road crosses it, was the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, which was strongly occupied by a battalion of the King’s German Legion under Major Baring. An _abatis_ was formed across the road at the south end of the boundary wall of the house,[697] but it was broken up during the course of the battle.

Beyond the third division, on the allied right, were stationed the two brigades constituting the 1st division, Cooke’s,—a part of the 2d brigade, Byng’s, occupying, with some Nassau and other foreign troops, the Chateau and enclosures of Hougomont.

The 2d division, Clinton’s, was in reserve near Merbe Braine, as was also the Brunswick contingent. The 3d Dutch-Belgian division, Chassé’s, was on the extreme right, and partly in the village of Braine-la-Leud. The heavy cavalry brigade of Lord Edward Somerset was stationed in the rear, near the Charleroi pike; the Dutch-Belgian cavalry were farther to the right.

It is plain from the foregoing that, with the exception of the unfortunate brigade of Bylandt, the army was skilfully arranged so as to escape as far as was possible the fire of the enemy’s artillery, which was known to be extremely formidable. The occupation of Hougomont was most carefully attended to; the walls were loop-holed,—not only of the house, but of the garden; and, surrounded, as it was, on the sides nearest the French by a considerable wood, it was a really strong place. So long as it was held, the right of Wellington’s line was practically unassailable.[698] The farmhouse of La Haye Sainte on the Brussels road was also made very strong, although, owing to some oversight, no adequate mode of reinforcing the defenders, or of supplying them with ammunition, was provided. No earth-works had been thrown up anywhere.[699] An _abatis_ had, as has been observed, been placed across the Charleroi road, and another was thrown across the Nivelles road in rear of Hougomont.

Napoleon brought to the field of Waterloo the 1st, 2d, and 6th Corps (_minus_ the division of Teste), the Imperial Guard, the heavy cavalry of Kellermann and Milhaud, the light cavalry of Domon, detached from the 3d Corps, and of Subervie, detached from the cavalry-corps of Pajol,—a total of 71,947 men, of whom 48,950 were infantry, 15,765 cavalry, and 7,232 artillery. There were 246 guns.[700]

The 1st Corps constituted the right of the first line. Its left rested on the Charleroi turnpike near the inn of La Belle Alliance, and its light cavalry observed the villages of La Haye and Papelotte on the extreme right. The 2d Corps continued the first line to the west, the cavalry of Piré being stationed beyond the Nivelles road. The 6th Corps and the Guard, with the cavalry of Kellermann and Milhaud, were in reserve.

Of the three divisions of the 2d Corps present at the battle,—that of Girard having been left at Ligny,—the division of Jerome was on the left, that of Foy in the centre, and that of Bachelu on the right,—its right resting on the Charleroi road.

Of the four divisions of the 1st Corps, that of Donzelot was the left, and its left rested on the Charleroi road; then came that of Allix, commanded by Quiot; then that of Marcognet, and then that of Durutte. This last was opposite Papelotte and La Haye.

The two armies were nearly equal in numbers; and had that of the Duke of Wellington been equal in point of material to that of the Emperor, the advantage of position which it possessed would have fully made up for the slight superiority in numbers possessed by the French. As it was, however, the superiority of the French, not only in artillery and cavalry, but so far as a large part of the Anglo-Dutch army was concerned, in _moral_, was unquestionable, and Wellington’s only justification for receiving battle lay, as Kennedy points out above, in his expectation of receiving help from Blücher.

Napoleon, as we have seen, dictated his plan of battle before eleven o’clock. It provided that,[701] as soon as the whole army should be ranged in order of battle, about 1 P.M., and the Emperor should give the order to Marshal Ney, the attack should commence, having for its object to get possession of the village of Mont St. Jean, where the road from Nivelles strikes into the Charleroi turnpike. This attack was to be made by the 1st Corps, supported on the left by the 2d Corps. To aid this attack a formidable battery of seventy-eight guns, many of them twelve-pounders, was to be moved forward on the east side of the road to a ridge which ran in front of and parallel to the French line of battle, and only 600 yards from the English position.

The Emperor had then definitely decided before eleven o’clock to defer the principal move of the day till about one in the afternoon. In this decision he was mainly, if not wholly, influenced by the difficulties which he saw would be caused by the deep mud of the fields over which his troops would have to manœuvre.

The determination of Napoleon to make his main effort against the village of Mont St. Jean, so as to possess himself of the principal avenue of retreat open to the enemy,—the road to Brussels,—has always elicited the commendation of military men. The Emperor undoubtedly intended to aid the attack of the 1st Corps by advancing the 6th Corps in its support; but this, as we shall see, owing to the intervention of the Prussians, he did not attempt. Whether, in case the attack had succeeded, so far as to give to the French the possession of the Brussels road, the Forest of Soignes would have afforded cover to Wellington’s retreating army, as English writers have always maintained, or would have necessitated the abandonment of the greater part of their artillery, as Napoleon contended, is a question which we will not undertake to discuss here.

At 11.30 A.M., before the time arrived for beginning the main operation of the day, Napoleon ordered Reille to attack Hougomont with his left division, that of Prince Jerome.[702] This movement, intended only as a diversion, was undertaken without any sufficient examination of the enemy’s position, and in the most inconsiderate manner.[703] Neither Jerome, who commanded the division, nor Guilleminot, who, Charras maintains, really controlled its operations, took the pains to direct the boiling courage and superfluous energy of the men, which, skilfully used, might have resulted in obtaining at least partial success. For example, the western entrance of the Chateau was perfectly open to artillery fire, and, had a few heavy guns been employed, the doors and adjacent wall would have been demolished, and the building would probably have been taken,[704] although it is doubtful if it could have been held. Bags of powder, also, would have destroyed the garden wall, but no one thought of supplying them to the men.[705] In consequence of these neglects, the soldiers of Jerome’s division, after possessing themselves of the wood and orchard, were shot down by their opponents from behind the garden wall, and from the loopholes in the house and its outbuildings, and could make no further progress. This, of itself, was, perhaps, of no great consequence; but Reille, impatient of being thwarted, and still neglecting to ascertain the precise reasons of the ill-success of the attack, sent in the division of Foy to support that of Jerome. In fact, later in the day, the division of Bachelu was also employed in this useless and most costly attempt to get possession of Hougomont. When it is considered that the 2d Corps contained on this morning not far from 12,000 foot soldiers, and that very few of them assisted in the attacks on the main line of the English army, one gets an idea of the wasteful, and, in fact, inexcusable mismanagement of the resources of the French army on this day. Not more than half the above number of men were employed to maintain the position.

The main operation of the day was to be, as we have said, an advance by the 1st Corps under d’Erlon to break the centre of the English line at and near the junction of the Wavre road with the turnpike. The great battery of seventy-eight pieces of cannon continued firing for an hour and a half at a distance of less than a third of a mile from the crest in front of which lay the brigade of Bylandt, and behind which lay the brigades of Kempt and Pack and Best of Picton’s division. At half-past one Napoleon ordered d’Erlon forward.

His attack was to be made in four columns, marching in _échelon_, the left in advance. The formation of these columns was so extraordinary, and so ill-suited for the work to be done, that it has always excited the comment of military men. We owe to Charras[706] a clear explanation of this formation. The first, or left, column consisted of the brigade of Bourgeois of the division of Allix,—the other brigade of this division, that of Quiot, being assigned to the special task of capturing La Haye Sainte. This brigade of Bourgeois contained four battalions, one behind another; each battalion stood in three ranks, one behind the other; and there was a distance of five paces between the battalions. The front of this column, therefore, consisted of one-third of the number of men in the leading battalion; and there being four battalions in the brigade, there were of course twelve ranks in the column. It was the same, _mutatis mutandis_, with the other columns. Donzelot’s division, which contained nine battalions, had, therefore, twenty-seven ranks in its column; the divisions of Marcognet and Durutte, which had only eight battalions each, had each twenty-four ranks. This formation was quite an exceptional one. A column very generally in use at that day consisted of a battalion in the centre, in line,—that is, in three ranks,—flanked on either side, by battalions in column of divisions, capable of promptly forming line or square. And then there were other convenient formations in frequent use. But these formations of d’Erlon’s divisions were unwieldy,—they lacked mobility. Why Ney and d’Erlon should have departed from the usual practice on this occasion, no one knows.[707]

The story of d’Erlon’s charge has been often told.[708] How the soldiers of the unfortunate brigade of Bylandt, utterly unable, as they were, after having been exposed to the fire of the great battery for an hour and a half, to resist alone the impact of such an enormous force, broke in confusion and fell to the rear amid the undeserved curses of their English allies;[709] how the French in their unwieldy masses pressed forward to the crest of the ridge to receive the fire at short range of the brigades of Pack and Kempt, which only the leading battalions were able, owing to the faulty formation of the columns, to return at all; and how, when staggered by the fire, and while endeavoring to disengage their closely following ranks, Ponsonby’s brigade of heavy cavalry charged them furiously, riding down between the columns, throwing them into confusion, cutting down the exposed foot-soldiers, capturing two eagles, and many prisoners, disabling some 15 guns, and forcing the three left columns to fall back in disorder,—all this is familiar to all readers of the story of Waterloo. It is difficult to find a parallel to this clumsily executed movement of d’Erlon’s. At the same time, faulty as the formation of the columns was, the troops got actually on the crest of the British position; and had there been any timidity or hesitation on the part of their adversaries, the columns would undoubtedly have forced their way through the British line. But the necessary time was not allowed them. Sir Thomas Picton was alive to the danger; he was prompt to seize the opportunity; his troops by their close and deadly fire threw the heads of the columns into confusion, and then charged them with the bayonet. Lord Uxbridge, who commanded the cavalry, rode over from his own position on the other side of the turnpike, and ordered Ponsonby to charge. He then returned to lead Somerset’s cavalry brigade in a successful charge on the west of the pike. The whole affair was a great and deserved success for the English. Their cavalry, however, was very severely handled on returning to its original positions.

Shortly before d’Erlon moved out, Napoleon had seen a body of troops on the heights of St. Lambert, far off on his right. It was soon ascertained that they were Prussians. He then sent off the 1 P.M. order to Grouchy.[710] By the time that the unfortunate charge of the 1st Corps had resulted in the repulse narrated above, certainly before 3 P.M., Napoleon had decided that he must employ the 6th Corps in resisting the Prussians, and not in supporting the 1st Corps in further operations against the English, as he had originally intended to do. But whatever shape the next movement might assume, the first thing to be done was evidently to carry the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, which had just been unsuccessfully attempted.

This was undertaken in the same reckless and careless manner which had characterized the assault on Hougomont. Although the French had an abundance of heavy guns, none were used to batter down the doors and walls, in front of which the bravest officers and men could accomplish but little, and were sacrificed to no purpose.[711] The place was finally taken shortly before 4 P.M.[712]

But the capture of La Haye Sainte was only a necessary preliminary to a serious attack on the enemy’s main line. Napoleon (or perhaps Ney) seems to have thought that the troops of d’Erlon had been too severely handled to warrant the expectation of any immediate aid from them. They would require an hour or two, perhaps, to recover. At any rate, it was determined to assail the English centre to the west of the Charleroi road, and as the infantry of the 1st Corps were not for the moment available, and as that of the 2d Corps, or at least, the greater part of it, was engaged in attacking Hougomont, it was decided to make the assault this time with cavalry alone.

The troops on this portion of Wellington’s line,—between the Charleroi road and Hougomont,—had been subjected only to artillery fire, and even that had not been anything like as severe as that sustained by the troops exposed to the great French battery on the opposite side of the road. They consequently were in good condition to resist cavalry,[713] especially considering that the bad ground over which the cavalry must pass would be certain to diminish the force of their assaults. Sir James Shaw-Kennedy, who was on this part of the line, tells us that the opinion at the time among the English officers was that the attack was premature.

This was also Napoleon’s own opinion; he seems to have yielded to Ney’s solicitations against his own judgment. But at this time, shortly after 4 P.M., the advance of Bülow’s Corps occupied the constant attention of the Emperor; he was constrained to leave the conduct of the battle against Wellington to Marshal Ney, in whose tactical skill and management he had great confidence, and to devote himself mainly to the task of directing the movements of the 6th Corps and of those portions of the Guard, which from time to time he was obliged to detach for its support, so as to prevent the Prussians from seizing the village of Planchenoit and thus menacing the communications of the army. Napoleon’s neglect of the conduct of the operations against the English has often been the subject of comment and severe criticism; but we imagine that he was far more anxious to hinder the Prussians, who were aiming, so to speak, at a vital part, from succeeding, than even to defeat the English. To fend off the Prussians was an absolute necessity; to drive the English from the field, a thing no doubt very desirable; but as there was no fear that they would take the offensive, and as, if they did, the army, or, at least, the great bulk of it, was in line of battle opposed to them, no great danger was to be apprehended from them. Whereas the Prussians were striking at the flank and rear, aiming to get control of the Charleroi road, and thus of the line of communications and retreat of the army. To prevent their succeeding in this was, therefore, of vital importance. Hence Napoleon attended to this himself, and left to Ney the conduct of the fight against Wellington’s army.

Marshal Ney, then, determined to carry the allied centre by charges of cavalry. He seems to have made no effort to support this attack by the infantry of the 2d Corps, although it would certainly have been quite possible to have withdrawn at least Bachelu’s division from the wood of Hougomont and to have used it with good effect. But Ney was originally an officer of cavalry; this fact may have made him think it possible to accomplish more with cavalry alone than to others would seem practicable. At any rate, from 4 to 6 P.M. the splendid divisions of Milhaud, Lefebvre-Desnouettes, Kellermann and Guyot were successively launched against the English lines. Every one has heard of the magnificent gallantry of these fine troops; every one knows the indomitable steadiness with which their repeated onsets were borne. At the close of these assaults the French cavalry had become wellnigh exhausted; and they had not broken a single square. Nevertheless, the English, Hanoverian, Nassau and Brunswick troops had suffered severely; obliged to remain in squares for fear of the repeated irruptions of the French cavalry, they presented an easy mark to the French infantry skirmishers of Donzelot’s division, which with a portion of Quiot’s was finally brought over from the east side of the turnpike, as well as to the artillery from the French main position, which, necessarily silent while the cavalry were on the plateau, constantly recommenced its fire as soon as the cavalry retired down the slope, as was done many times during these two hours. In fact this part of the allied line was finally weakened so much that it was very near giving way, as we shall shortly see. At one time, all the troops for nearly half a mile to the west of the Brussels pike had retired from exhaustion, and in disorder, and the Duke himself had to lead up fresh troops to take their places.[714]

More, however, might have been accomplished by the French. For instance, the enfilading batteries, which towards the close of the day, dismounted Mercer’s guns[715] and practically destroyed several squares of infantry, might have been employed quite as easily two hours before, and more of them might well have been used.[716]

But no use whatever was made, except as above stated, of the very great advantage afforded by the position of La Haye Sainte for the posting of batteries which should sweep the whole line of the allies, dismount their guns, riddle their squares, and render their infantry unable to resist the shock of cavalry. Nor was the infantry of the 1st Corps brought up in season. As for that of the 2d Corps, Ney hardly made any use of it at all; he suffered it to remain in the wood and enclosures of Hougomont.

Napoleon said, and it cannot be seriously disputed, that the heavy cavalry of the Guard, the division of Guyot, went in without his orders. Whether Ney ordered it in is, however, doubtful. His chief-of-staff, Colonel Heymès, denies that he did. He says that the cavalry of the Guard went in of its own accord. (Doc. Inéd., pp. 16, 17.) At any rate, it was a great mistake, whoever committed it, as all the authorities freely say. It destroyed the last cavalry-reserve of the army.

While these operations were going on in front, Napoleon was personally superintending the desperate and gallant fight made by the two divisions of the 6th Corps under Lobau against Bülow’s advance. The two leading divisions of the IVth Corps, which moved out about 4.30 P.M., were easily checked at first; but they rallied, and were reinforced by the rest of the corps; and, between 5 and 6 P.M., Lobau was driven back, and Planchenoit itself was threatened. The Emperor was obliged to put in the Young Guard, which, with three batteries, occupied Planchenoit, while the 6th Corps extended on its left so as to connect with the right of the 1st Corps. But the Prussians drove the Young Guard out of the village; and the Emperor had to order in three battalions of the Old and Middle Guard with two batteries. These troops, gallantly supported by the Young Guard, retook the town, and the Prussians fell back some distance. Napoleon then seems to have thought that the attack of the Prussians was exhausted. It was nearly seven o’clock.[717] In this action the fighting on both sides was very obstinate. The French troops were superior in point of experience to those of Bülow,—those of the 6th Corps were led by a very able officer, Lobau, and the regiments of the Guard were the _élite_ of the army. Hence, though much inferior in numbers, they obtained this success, which under other circumstances, would have been decisive. But in this case their enemies had reinforcements at hand. Pirch I., at the head of the IId Corps, was only two miles in rear.

This, however, Napoleon of course could not know. Hence, thinking that the danger from the Prussians was practically over, he hastened towards the front, where for the last hour, ever since the conclusion of the cavalry attacks, the battle had languished. It had in fact consisted during this period only of a general skirmish firing along the centre of the English position to the west of the Brussels pike, the result of which, however, was, undoubtedly, to weaken perceptibly the strength and _moral_ of the allied troops. This part of the English line was in fact in a bad way at this period of the battle.[718] As Sir James Shaw-Kennedy, who was on this part of the line on the staff of the 3d division, says:—[719]

“La Haye Sainte was in the hands of the enemy; also the knoll on
the opposite side of the road; also the garden and ground on the
Anglo-Allied side of it; Ompteda’s brigade was nearly annihilated,
and Kielmansegge’s so thinned, that those two brigades could not
hold their position. That part of the field of battle, therefore,
which was between Halkett’s[720] left and Kempt’s[721] right, was
unprotected; and being the very centre of the Duke’s line of battle,
was consequently that point, above all others, which the enemy
wished to gain. The danger was imminent; and at no other period of
the action was the result so precarious as at this moment. Most
fortunately Napoleon did not support the advantage his troops had
gained at this point by bringing forward his reserve; proving that
he did not exert that activity and personal energy in superintending
and conforming to the progress of the action, which he ought to have
done.”

As to this last observation, we have just seen how the Emperor was employed during this critical period of the action. He was in truth fighting another battle with inferior forces against the Prussians, and this, too, at a distance of a mile and a half from the English line of battle.[722] The criticism on Napoleon is therefore unfounded; it is due simply to the fact that his occupation during this period of the battle was not borne in mind by General Shaw-Kennedy. But the fact remains; if there had been no other battle to fight,—no desperate action at Planchenoit, requiring the presence and personal direction of the Emperor,—if the attack upon the allied lines could have been made under the eye and direct orders of Napoleon himself,—in the opinion of Kennedy, whose account of the battle is one of the best we have, it would have gone hard with Wellington’s army. Add to this, that if there had been no other battle to fight, the Emperor could have brought 16,000 fresh men to bear upon this exhausted force of Wellington’s. It should be added, also, that the English heavy cavalry of Somerset and Ponsonby, which had been well nigh exhausted by their charges at the beginning of the action, and had suffered more or less during the afternoon, were not able to render efficient service at the close of the day.

Napoleon, as we have seen, as soon as he had, as he supposed, definitely repulsed the Prussians in the neighborhood of Planchenoit, hastened to the front, where he must have arrived somewhere about seven o’clock. His absence from the field during this time was, as we have seen, not due to any fault or neglect of his, but nevertheless it was most unfortunate for the success of his army.[723] Marshal Ney had exhausted, as he supposed,[724] all the resources available to him. Over the Imperial Guard he had no authority; and the only infantry in the army that had not been put in belonged to the Guard. Meanwhile Wellington had exerted himself to the utmost to restore at least a semblance of strength to his line of battle west of the turnpike; he had rallied the men of Alten’s division, who had been shaken by the fall of that officer, who was severely wounded; he had brought forward some Brunswick troops; he had ordered Chassé’s (3d) Dutch-Belgian division from its position near Merbe Braine to a position in rear of the guards; he had brought over to the centre the light cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur from the extreme left. He had, in fact, done all that could be done, and he was now awaiting the next move of his antagonist with a coolness, vigilance and alertness which the discouraging aspects of the fight did not in the least affect. But his situation was a perilous one. His losses had been very great. His English troops were much exhausted; the patience and confidence of most of his foreign allies were nearly worn out; and on that part of his line lying to the west of the turnpike his artillery was mostly dismounted. He had, however, in reserve some of his best troops, and one or two batteries.

Maitland’s brigade of guards and Adam’s brigade of Clinton’s division had suffered but little, and were troops of the best quality.

Ney had acquainted the Emperor with the state of things in his front, and had been informed that, as soon as he could, the Emperor would sustain him with a part of the Guard. Meantime, he was to collect as much of the cavalry, and of Reille’s infantry, as he could, to support the attack which might soon be expected to be made by the Guard, supported by the infantry of the 1st Corps.

It was, as must be sufficiently apparent to the reader, out of the question at this period of the action for Napoleon to organize an attack against the English lines with the Imperial Guard, in any such fashion as that which he employed with such crushing effect on the day but one before, at Ligny. To begin with, the cavalry of the Guard, both the light and the heavy, had been shattered, and virtually ruined for the time being, by their repeated, ineffectual and costly efforts to carry the plateau during the previous few hours. Then, but a fraction of the infantry and artillery of the Guard was disposable. The Young Guard, consisting of eight battalions, organized in four regiments, with twenty-four guns, was in Planchenoit,[725] where, also, was one of the eight battalions of the Old Guard (grenadiers), two battalions of the Middle Guard (chasseurs), and two batteries.[726] Two more battalions[727] of the Old Guard and one battery were on the road which, leading from Planchenoit to the Charleroi pike, comes out near the Maison du Roi, and one battalion of the Middle Guard was at the farm of Chantelet, in the neighborhood of the Caillou house, where were the headquarters-baggage and trains. As each of the divisions of the Guard consisted of eight battalions, there were therefore but ten battalions left which could be employed against the English.[728] But, in addition to these detachments, for which we have the authority of Charras, we learn from Damitz,[729] who states with more minuteness than any other author the disposition made of the Imperial Guard, that one battalion of grenadiers and one of chasseurs were brought forward from Rossomme and stationed near La Belle Alliance. This left but eight battalions disposable for the projected attack.

These eight battalions[730] constituted four regiments, namely, the 3d and 4th grenadiers (Old Guard) and the 3d and 4th chasseurs (Middle Guard). The 3d and 4th regiments of grenadiers constituted the brigade of General Roguet; the 3d regiment was commanded by General Poret de Morvan, the 4th by General Harlet. The 3d and 4th regiments of chasseurs constituted the brigade of General Michel; the 3d regiment was commanded by General Mallet, the 4th by General Henrion.[731] The whole force, which could not have much exceeded 3,000 men, was under the command of General Friant, a very distinguished officer, titular colonel of the 1st regiment of foot-grenadiers of the Guard.

The Imperial Guard, which consisted of 24 battalions, organized into 12 regiments, of which 4 belonged to the Old Guard, 4 to the Middle Guard, and 4 to the Young Guard, had been stationed at the beginning of the day just in front of the farm of Rossomme, and on either side of the Charleroi turnpike. From this point 16 battalions had been detached to various points, as we have seen. The Emperor in person now took the remaining 8 battalions[732] from this position to the front, and handed them over to Ney just to the south of La Haye Sainte. This was about 7 P.M. Here he addressed them; he encouraged them, and urged them to make their best efforts. These eight (or, probably, only six battalions) were then formed in as many columns, each of a front of two companies, and arranged in _échelon_,[733] the right battalion in front.[734] This was the 1st battalion of the 3d regiment of grenadiers, commanded by General Poret de Morvan. Two batteries of horse-artillery, placed on the left flank, accompanied the infantry. There seems to have been no arrangement for the proper support of the movement by cavalry, although a body of cuirassiers did, shortly before the main shock took place, charge Napier’s battery. They were, however, easily and speedily driven off. The French cavalry was, in fact, nearly exhausted. Protection on the left of the advancing column, however, the Guard imperatively needed, as, in its march towards the enemy, its left flank would inevitably be exposed to all the troops stationed between the north end of Hougomont and the main British line. On its right, the column was protected from a flank attack by the troops of the 1st Corps. (See Map 14.)

It was, according to all the accounts, Napoleon’s intention that Reille should disengage at least one division of his corps from the enclosures of Hougomont, and support this charge of the Guard on the left; but this does not seem to have been even attempted. D’Erlon, on the other hand, must have exerted himself to the utmost to support the Guard; for the divisions of Donzelot and Quiot most gallantly and forcibly attacked the Anglo-Allied line for about a third of a mile to the west of the turnpike, overthrowing and driving back the Brunswick and Nassau troops, and even the Hanoverians and English, so that the personal interposition of the Duke was required to reëstablish the line. These attacks were made about the time when the Guard began its forward movement, and they had the effect of shaking the allied troops on this part of the field so much that they certainly could not have stood another serious and well-sustained assault, such as might have been delivered by the Imperial Guard.

But the movement of the column[735] of the Imperial Guard was not made in this direction, but diagonally across the field towards the enemy’s right centre, where Wellington had stationed his reserves, and where he had at least one battery, Bolton’s, then commanded by Napier, in good condition.

The English, as soon as they perceived the famous bearskin caps of the Imperial Guard, directed all their disposable guns upon their approaching foes; but, whether it was owing to the smoke, or to the inequalities of the ground, the Guard does not seem to have suffered until it got to close quarters with the 1st (Maitland’s) brigade of the English guards.[736]

The leading battalion of the Guard was, as we have seen, formed in column with a front of two companies in three ranks. As each battalion had four companies,[737] and consisted of about 500 men,[738] there would be about 75 men in the front rank of the leading battalion, allowing for the file-closers. To its left and rear, marching in _échelon_, were the other battalions which constituted the attacking force, accompanied by two batteries of horse artillery of six pieces each, which kept up a destructive fire as the infantry advanced. We quote from the journal of an officer[739] in the English guards:—