Chapter XXXIX: Appendix: A

ON SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF NAPOLEON’S MEMOIRS.

Probably no military narratives that ever were written have been subjected to more harsh and unjust criticism than the two accounts of the campaign of Waterloo, which, under the names of the Gourgaud Narrative and the Memoirs, were dictated or written by Napoleon at St. Helena. To read the remarks of Charras, Chesney, Hooper, and others, about these books, one would suppose that a military narrative is the easiest, plainest sort of narrative to write, and that if a general wished to compose it properly he would isolate himself from his fellow-officers and subordinates, and get into some secluded corner of the world thousands of miles from the records of the war-department. For if this is not the view of these writers and of others like them, they are either ignorant of the extreme difficulty which attends the composition of a military narrative, or else are bent upon treating the fallen Emperor with gross injustice.

For instance, Napoleon says in his “Memoirs”[811] that “on the 14th _in the evening_,”[812] General Bourmont deserted to the enemy. The whole army broke camp in the early hours of the 15th. When the 4th Corps moved at five o’clock, it was discovered that Bourmont had left. Charras states that the staff-records of the 4th Corps, to which Bourmont belonged, mention that he deserted on the 15th, and that he wrote a letter to Gérard announcing his desertion dated at Philippeville on the 15th. But Napoleon at St. Helena had neither the staff-records of the 4th Corps to go by, nor the letter of Bourmont to Gérard. Yet Charras[813] calls the Emperor’s statement a designed misstatement (_une inexactitude calculée_).

But we have no disposition to dwell on harsh criticisms of this kind. Our purpose at present is to call attention to a peculiarity of Napoleon’s which may serve to explain the existence in his Memoirs of very definite statements which are apparently very wide of the truth. This peculiarity is, that while his orders to his lieutenants were often very general in their character,—pointing out clearly enough, it is true, the thing to be aimed at, or the danger to be feared,—but leaving entirely to the officer the course to be adopted if the emergency should arise,—yet these orders never seem to have been retained in Napoleon’s memory in the shape in which they were given, but what he did recall about them was his expectation that, on receiving his order, his lieutenant would act in such or such a manner. This expectation, that such or such action would be taken by his lieutenant on receiving such or such an order, was all that was left of the order in his mind; and, when he came to write his narrative, he would often (at any rate) state that he had given definite instructions to such or such an effect, when all he had really done was to give a general order, from the giving of which he expected such or such a course of action to be taken by his subordinate.

Thus, take the orders to Ney, issued on the afternoon of the 16th, at 2 and 3.15 P.M.[814] They were, as we have seen, very general in character; Ney was directed, after he should have beaten, or, at least, checked, the English, to turn round, and manœuvre so as to take the Prussians in flank and rear. But the “Memoirs”[815] say:—

“He [Napoleon] reiterated the order for him to push on in front of
Quatre Bras; and, as soon as he should have taken position there,
to detach a column of 8,000 infantry, with the cavalry-division of
Lefebvre-Desnouettes, and 28 pieces of cannon, by the turnpike which
ran from Quatre Bras to Namur, which he was to leave at the village
of Marbais, in order to attack the heights of Brye, in the enemy’s
rear.”

It is to be observed that the Memoirs make no mention of the orders which were actually sent to Ney that afternoon. And Napoleon sent to Ney no such order as this. What he here calls an order was really what he expected Ney to do when he should get the 2 and 3.15 P.M. orders. That this was so, appears from what follows:—

“After having made this detachment, there would still remain to him
[Ney] in his position of Quatre Bras 32,000 men and 80 pieces of
cannon, which would be sufficient to hold in check all the English
troops which could be expected to arrive from their cantonments
during the day of the 16th.”

That is,—the Emperor had figured it all out in his own head, as if he were in Ney’s place. Ney could spare so many men and so many guns; he would have so many men and so many guns left. But, in fact, the orders to Ney left it to him to make these calculations for himself.

Let us apply now this mode of working of Napoleon’s mind to his statements in regard to the orders which he says in his “Memoirs” he sent to Grouchy.[816]

“At ten o’clock in the evening the Emperor sent an officer to Marshal
Grouchy, whom he supposed to be at Wavre, to inform him that there
would be a great battle the next day; that the Anglo-Dutch army was
in position in front of the Forest of Soignes, its left resting on
the village of La Haye; that he ordered him to detach before daybreak
from his camp at Wavre a division of 16,000 men of all arms and 16
pieces of cannon on St. Lambert, in order to connect with the main
army and operate with it; that as soon as he should be assured that
Blücher had evacuated Wavre, whether to continue his retreat on
Brussels or to move in any other direction, he (Grouchy) was to
march with the larger part of his troops to support the detachment
which he had sent to St. Lambert.”

Thiers[817] finds in the minuteness of detail in which this supposed order is stated in the Memoirs a proof that it could not have been invented. We do not so regard the matter. To our mind, the terms in which Napoleon has, in the extract given above, framed what he says was the order which he sent to Grouchy, simply express the expectations formed in his own mind of what Grouchy would do, when, after having received the Bertrand order, he found that Blücher had fallen back towards the English. We think the orders sent to Ney on the afternoon of the battle of Ligny should serve as a guide to us here. We do not believe that Napoleon sent to Grouchy any such order as that which he gives in his Memoirs; but then we do believe that he sent him the Bertrand order, which he does not even mention in his Memoirs, and which in fact he no doubt forgot all about. And we believe that, having a distinct recollection of having sent Grouchy an order, and also a very distinct recollection of what he expected Grouchy would do when he got the order, he has fused the two things in his mind, and has given us his order in the terms of his expectations.

There is nothing very uncommon about this. It is certainly to be distinguished from deliberate misrepresentation. It is partly, at any rate, the result of an active imagination working on facts imperfectly recollected, but which have been dwelt upon until the mind has become disturbed and warped.

FOOTNOTES:

[811] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 251.

[812] The italics are ours.

[813] Charras, vol. 1, p. 104, n. 1.

[814] Doc. Inéd., XIII., p. 40; XIV., p. 24; App. C, xxv., xxvi; _post_, pp 383, 384.

[815] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 204.

[816] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 216; see, also, p. 212.

[817] Thiers, vol. xx, p. 95, n.