Chapter XVI: The Battle of Waterloo (2)

“Suddenly the firing ceased, and, as the smoke cleared away, a most
superb sight opened on us. A close column of Grenadiers (about
seventies in front) of _la Moyenne Garde_,[740] about 6,000 strong,
led, as we have since heard, by Marshal Ney, were seen ascending
the rise, _au pas de charge_, shouting “_Vive l’Empereur_.” They
continued to advance till within fifty or sixty paces of our front,
when the brigade[741] were ordered to stand up. Whether it was from
the sudden and unexpected appearance of a corps so near them, which
must have seemed as starting out of the ground, or the tremendously
heavy fire we threw into them, _La Garde_, who had never before
failed in an attack, _suddenly_ stopped. Those, who from a distance
and more on the flank could see the affair, tell us that the effect
of our fire seemed to force the head of the column bodily back.

“In less than a minute above 300 were down. They now wavered, and
several of the rear divisions began to draw out as if to deploy,
whilst some of the men in their rear beginning to fire over the heads
of those in front was so evident a proof of their confusion that Lord
Saltoun * * * holloaed out, ‘_Now’s the time, my boys._’ Immediately
the brigade sprang forward. _La Garde_ turned, and gave us little
opportunity of trying the steel. We charged down the hill till we
had passed the end of the orchard of Hougomont, when our right flank
became exposed to another heavy column (as we afterwards understood,
of the chasseurs of the _Garde_) who were advancing in support of
the former column. This circumstance, besides that our charge was
isolated, obliged the brigade to retire towards their original
position.”

It is plain from this account that the head of the French column consisted of some 70 (or 75) men, as we have pointed out would be the case if the leading battalion was in column with a two company front; and that the fire of Maitland’s brigade, which must have had a front of about 450 men, added to that of a part of Halkett’s brigade, to that of Napier’s battery, and to that of the Dutch-Belgian battery of Van der Smissen,[742] which General Chassé had most opportunely brought up, destroyed this leading battalion and one or more of those in _échelon_ with it on its left and rear. It is also clear from this account that the pursuing troops soon found themselves flanked by the other battalions of the Imperial Guard, which they took to be a separate column, and were obliged to fall back. It is very unlikely, by the way, that they advanced as far as the end of the orchard of Hougomont, a quarter of a mile from their position.

It may be that the rear battalions of the Guard inclined in their advance, by accident or oversight, more to their left than they should have done, and thus presented the appearance of a separate column. General Maitland says:—[743]

“As the attacking force moved forward, it separated; the chasseurs
inclined to their left. The grenadiers ascended the acclivity towards
our position in a more direct course, leaving La Haye Sainte on their
right, and moving towards that part of the eminence occupied by the
1st brigade of Guards.”

He also speaks of the effect of the fire of the batteries which accompanied the Guard:—

“Numerous pieces of ordnance were distributed on the flanks of
this column. The brigade suffered by the enemy’s artillery, but it
withheld its fire for the nearer approach of the column. The latter,
after advancing steadily up the slope, halted about twenty paces from
the front rank of the brigade.

“The diminished range of the enemy’s artillery was now felt most
severely in our ranks; the men fell in great numbers before the
discharges of grape shot and the fire of the musketry distributed
among the guns.”

General Maitland goes on to describe the repulse of the French attack:—

“The smoke of the [French] artillery happily did not envelop the
hostile column, or serve to conceal it from our aim.

“With what view the enemy halted in a situation so perilous, and in a
position so comparatively helpless, he was not given time to evince.

“The fire of the brigade opened with terrible effect.

“The enemy’s column, crippled and broken, retreated with the utmost
rapidity, leaving only a heap of dead and dying men to mark the
ground which it had occupied.”

The attempt of some of the rear battalions to deploy, noticed by Captain Powell, is thus mentioned by Charras:—[744]

“Unhappily, whether by orders, or by the instinct of the soldier,
the Guard deploys, in order to reply to the musketry which decimates
it from moment to moment; and, by this movement, it masks the
two batteries which have followed it, which have taken position on
the crest of the plateau, and whose fire has, up to this instant,
protected its flanks.”

But what the leading battalions of the Guard needed at the moment when they were being destroyed by the superior fire of the brigade of English guards was not so much the continued effect of the fire of artillery upon the brigade as the prompt advance of cavalry, which would have compelled Maitland to throw his regiments into squares.

Failing this, the best thing for the Guard would have been a flank attack on Maitland’s brigade by troops of the 1st Corps; but this was averted by the gallant and skilful conduct of Sir Colin Halkett and Colonel Elphinstone in bringing the remains of Halkett’s brigade, which had suffered terribly during the past hour, to the left of the English guards, and thus protecting them in their contest with the Imperial Guard.[745] In fact the attack on Halkett’s brigade by Donzelot’s troops at this time was very sharp, and at one time caused great confusion. It was a critical moment; for, if Halkett had been beaten, Donzelot’s troops would have flanked Maitland’s brigade, and, attacked as it then would have been, on front and flank, it would have been forced to retire, and perhaps even routed. Donzelot’s troops did their best to gain a foothold on the plateau; they did gain a temporary success; they knew the importance of the task assigned to them, and gallantly strove to support the charge of the Guard. On the other hand, the intelligent appreciation of the emergency on the part of Halkett and his subordinates, and their obstinate and courageous maintenance of their exposed position deserve the highest commendation.

If this attack of the Imperial Guard had been supported on the right by cavalry, this resistance on the part of Halkett’s and Maitland’s commands could not have been encountered.

It seems probable that the failure of the attack of the Guard upon Maitland’s brigade involved in confusion both the 3d and 4th regiments of grenadiers (Old Guard), the four (or, more probably, three) battalions of which were the leading battalions in the whole column. This, however, is by no means certain. All we know is, that those troops which were not swept off the field by the charge of Maitland’s guards, among which assuredly were the 3d and 4th regiments of chasseurs (Middle Guard), ignorant, probably, of the fate which had befallen their comrades, steadily pursued their way towards the right centre of the English position. As the eight (or, more probably, six) battalions of the original column were formed in _échelon_, the right in advance, it is plain that the march of the four (or, more probably, three) rear battalions would bring them on a part of the English line to the English right of the position of Maitland’s brigade,—in fact, “towards that part of” the English “position which had been vacated by the second brigade of Guards, when it moved to Hougomont.”[746] In this direction, then, these remaining battalions of the Imperial Guard advanced. To all intents and purposes they now constituted a second column. As a second column they must have appeared not only to the men of Maitland’s brigade, when their pursuit of the leading and defeated battalions brought them on a line with the left _échelons_ of the original formation, but also to the troops of the brigade of Sir Frederick Adam, who, having been lying behind a ridge, a little to the north of Hougomont, were now advanced, and found the French guard in full march for the summit of the acclivity.

The initiative seems to have been assumed without a moment’s hesitation by Sir John Colborne, the lieutenant-colonel of the 52d regiment, who brought his command into line parallel to the flank of the Imperial Guard, and at once opened fire. This action was approved on the spot by General Adam, who ordered the other regiments of the brigade to support the 52d. The French column was obliged to halt, and to deploy to its left, in order to return the fire, and for a few minutes the action was very heavy on both sides.[747] But the other British regiments coming up, and the French, who were acting at a manifest disadvantage in being thus compelled to halt when half way up the slope, and resist an unexpected and resolute attack on their flank while they were exposed also to the fire from the enemy’s batteries in front, becoming evidently uneasy, Colborne ordered a charge, which broke the column up completely. He followed the disintegrated and demoralized battalions without an instant’s hesitation even across the Charleroi turnpike.

In this attack, the Imperial Guard was supported on its left flank neither by cavalry nor by the infantry of Reille’s Corps. Had either been employed, the disaster could not have happened. A charge of cavalry would have forced the 52d to form square; an advance of Bachelu’s division, or a part of it, would have engaged all the attention of Adam’s brigade, and permitted the Guard to pursue its way unmolested to the crest of the hill.

What would have succeeded the repulse and defeat of the Imperial Guard had the Prussians not interposed, no one of course can tell. But while these movements were going on, about 7.30 P.M., the van of Zieten’s Corps reached Papelotte;[748] and the division of Steinmetz, supported by cavalry and artillery, turning at once the right of the 1st Corps and the left of the 6th, advanced upon the field of battle, spreading terror and confusion throughout the right wing of the French army. Durutte’s and Marcognet’s divisions abandoned their positions; Lobau retired towards Planchenoit; while the immense success which the English had obtained over the French left in routing the Imperial Guard was instantly improved by Wellington in ordering his two remaining and as yet untouched cavalry brigades, those of Vivian and Vandeleur, to charge. These bodies of horse, which had been, in the latter part of the afternoon, brought over from the English left to the rear of their centre, were now launched upon the troops of Donzelot and Quiot, and the remains of the French cavalry; and then the Duke, seeing that the battle was won, ordered the whole line to advance. (See Map 12.)

There was no resistance of any consequence made, except by the scattered regiments of the Imperial Guard, and by the 6th Corps under the Count de Lobau, which held Planchenoit against the renewed assaults of Bülow’s Corps, supported now by two divisions of the corps of Pirch I. until the retreat of the army beyond that point was assured. The Emperor did what he could; he exerted himself in every way;[749] his headquarters-cavalry charged the English light horse; but the army was too much exhausted to make any extraordinary exertions; and, attacked both in front and flank as the French were, nothing but extraordinary exertions could possibly suffice to check the victorious enemy, superior in numbers as well as in position. Hence with the exception of the 6th Corps, whose task was a definite one, and undoubtedly comprehended by every soldier in it, and of which one of the most courageous and efficient officers in the French army had charge, no resistance on a large scale was offered. The 1st Corps was hopelessly disorganized, and necessarily so; the 2d Corps could no doubt have effected an orderly retreat on Nivelles,[750] but Reille did not see the necessity of this course, and perhaps could not have been expected to do so. Most of the battalions of the Guard preserved their organization, and resisted heroically to the last. The Emperor was finally forced to take refuge in one of the squares of the Guard, and in its midst he was safely borne off his last field of battle.[751]

The French army was routed; but its condition was made exceptionally bad because only one avenue of retreat was followed, and also because this avenue was practically blocked at Genappe by the supposed necessity of crossing the Dyle on a single bridge.[752] Had the army been able to spread itself over an open country, it is not likely that the rout would have been so complete, and it is quite certain that the captures of artillery would not have been so great. But the Prussian cavalry took up the pursuit which neither the Prussian nor the British infantry were sufficiently fresh to maintain; and in the exhausted condition of body and bewildered state of mind in which the mass of the French soldiers were when the catastrophe came, little was needed to complete their demoralization. At Genappe over a hundred pieces of cannon were abandoned, and from that point on no attempt was made to keep up even a semblance of order.

Such was the famous battle of Waterloo. It has become a synonym for hopeless and irremediable disaster. It is not, however, necessary here to review the causes of the catastrophe. What we have still to say on this head we shall put into the Notes to this chapter. But there is one subject that properly belongs here.

What would have been the effect if Grouchy had detained the corps of Bülow and Pirch I., so that they could not have taken part in the action?

In this discussion we shall assume the correctness of our conclusions, reached previously, that if Grouchy had started at daybreak for the bridge of Moustier, or even if he had followed the counsel of Gérard, he would almost certainly have prevented Bülow, Pirch I. and Thielemann from taking any part in the battle.[753] We shall not reargue these questions, for they have been already fully discussed.

Let us suppose, then, that Napoleon could have utilized his whole force against the army of Wellington during the whole afternoon; that he could have given his personal direction to the conduct of the action; that he could have followed up the repulse of the 1st Corps with a new attack in which Lobau should support d’Erlon, and in which the cavalry should take its proper part; that he had been on the spot when La Haye Sainte fell, and had improved that advantage as he well knew how to do; that he had had the whole of the Imperial Guard—infantry, cavalry, and artillery,—at his disposal for the carrying of Wellington’s position; it seems to us there can be no reasonable question as to the result; the Duke would have been badly beaten, and the action would in all probability have been over, or substantially so, by six o’clock. This question is not asked to gratify the imagination, or for purposes of speculation, but simply that we may form a judgment on the adequacy of Napoleon’s means to the end which he had in view; for, if military history cannot assist us in forming correct opinions on the adequacy of certain available means to the attainment of certain proposed objects, it is of no use whatever. The view we hold as to the necessity of Blüchers support to Wellington’s success is the same as that which we have seen[754] put forth by Sir James Shaw-Kennedy, where he is justifying the Duke for accepting battle at Waterloo.[755]

As for Zieten, he could not have come up till half-past seven o’clock, which would have been too late for him to be of any use to the English. The probability is that he would have joined the other corps that were fighting Grouchy. It is hardly likely that he would have pursued his intention of joining Wellington, after he had heard that the other three corps were not likely to interfere in the battle between Napoleon and Wellington. This would have been to run a great risk; and one that under the circumstances no prudent officer would run. We are supposing now that Zieten hears at Ohain, for instance, that the other corps are engaged with Grouchy at St. Lambert or Couture,—now, then, he must admit that if Grouchy shall be able, owing to obstinate or skilful fighting, or to the lateness of the hour, or to chance, to prevent Bülow, Pirch I. and Thielemann from attacking Napoleon that afternoon, the chances are that Napoleon will defeat Wellington before he, Zieten, can possibly arrive; and, therefore, for him to proceed further than Ohain will simply be to involve himself in the disaster of the Anglo-Dutch army.

But while we must state our conviction that Grouchy would have prevented the defeat of Napoleon had he crossed the Dyle, we certainly do not consider him the sole cause of the defeat.

FOOTNOTES:

[671] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 219; Charras, vol. 1, p. 263.

[672] Drouet, pp. 96, 97; Vaudoncourt, vol. 4, p. 24.

[673] _Ante_, pp. 268 _et seq._

[674] The question of the alleged orders sent to Grouchy during this night will be treated of in Appendix A; _post_, p. 353.

[675] Van Loben Sels, p. 319.

[676] _Ante_, p. 265.

[677] Charras, vol. 1, p. 265.

[678] Vaudoncourt, vol. 4, 24.

[679] Van Loben Sels, p. 270.

[680] Baudus, vol. 1, p. 225.

[681] Doc. Inéd., XVIII, p. 52; App. C, xxxi; _post_, p. 387.

[682] Thiers, vol. xx, p. 157, n.

[683] Charras, vol. 1, p. 270.

[684] Charras, vol. 1, p. 274.

[685] Ib., p. 275.

[686] Kennedy, p. 131.

[687] Wellington’s Official Report: Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 481.

[688] Oldfield MSS.; Porter’s Hist. Royal Engineers, vol. 1, p. 380. A copy of this sketch is inserted opposite page 565 of C. D. Yonge’s “Life of Wellington”; London: Chapman and Hall; 1860. See, also, p. 616 of the same work.

[689] Curiously enough they were very nearly lost in the action; the officer who had them in his keeping, Lieutenant Waters, being unhorsed in the _melée_.

[690] Probably the information brought by Lieutenant Massow; _ante_, p. 233.

[691] Oldfield MSS.

[692] Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 460, 461; App. xxx. Charras, vol. 1, p. 269, n. 2, raises the total to 70,187 men of all arms, of whom 13,432 were cavalry. He gives the number of guns as 159.

[693] _Ante_, p. 35, n. 3.

[694] Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 460, 461: App. xxx.

[695] Sir Lowry Cole, commanding the 6th British division, was not in the action.

[696] Kennedy, p. 61; Waterloo Letters, pp. 30, 31, Sir W. Gomm.

[697] Waterloo Letters, pp. 403, 404.

[698] Kennedy, p. 65.

[699] Oldfield MSS.

[700] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 461: App. xxxi. Charras (vol. 1. p. 238, n.) gives the total as 72,447 men and 240 guns.

[701] Doc. Inéd., XIX, pp. 53, 54; App. C, xxxii; _post_, p. 388.

[702] We shall not attempt to give a complete tactical description of the battle of Waterloo. The narratives of Siborne, Charras, Hooper, La Tour d’Auvergne, and others give all the facts. With the exception of two or three points, their accounts do not differ materially.

[703] The following extract from a letter by Baron Müffling written on June 24, 1815, is directly in point here:—

“Before we arrived there I said to the Duke, ‘If only there were an apparently weak point in the right flank of your position, so that Bonaparte might assail it right furiously, and neglect his own right wing to such an extent that he should fail to discover the march of the Prussians!’

“And see! when we arrived there, there lay the advanced post of Hougomont, upon which he (B.) indeed fell.” Militär Wochenblatt, Nov. 14, 1891.

[704] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 266; Charras, vol. 1, p. 281.

[705] Charras, vol. 2, p. 18.

[706] Charras, vol. 1, p. 288, and note 2.

[707] Charras, vol. 1, p. 288; La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 274. D’Erlon in his autobiography throws no light on the matter; Drouet, p. 97.

[708] Nowhere better, perhaps, than in Erckmann-Chatrian’s “Waterloo.”

[709] Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 5, 6.

[710] _Ante_, p. 270.

[711] Charras, vol. 2, p. 18. Colonel Heymès of Ney’s staff says that more than 2,000 men were killed in endeavoring to get possession of La Haye Sainte. Doc. Inéd., p. 17. This, however, must be an excessive estimate.

[712] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 302, 303; vol. 2, p. 18; Hooper, p. 213, n.; O’Connor Morris, p. 352. Other authorities put the capture of La Haye Sainte two hours later. Colonel Heymès of Ney’s staff places the hour between 6 and 7 P.M. Doc. Inéd., pp. 18, 19.

[713] Kennedy, pp. 114-116. Kennedy’s account of this part of the battle, as indeed of all parts of it, is most valuable; but we think he is in error in supposing that La Haye Sainte had not fallen before these cavalry attacks were made.

[714] Kennedy, pp. 127 _et seq._; Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 152 _et seq._

[715] Mercer, vol. 1, p. 325; Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 315; Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 154, 155. Mercer in his Diary seems to think these enfilading batteries were Prussian; but see his letter and plan in the Waterloo Letters, pp. 214 _et seq._ _Cf._ Waterloo Letters, p. 330.

[716] Van Loben Sels, p. 333.

[717] Charras, vol. 1, p. 318.

[718] Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 152 _et seq._; Van Loben Sels, p. 295. _Cf._ Porter’s Hist. Royal Engineers, vol. 1, p. 382: Waterloo Letters, p. 339, where the hour is fixed by Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson Kelly at “about half-past six.”

[719] Kennedy, p. 127.

[720] Halkett’s brigade was on the main line, nearly half of a mile west of the pike.

[721] Kempt’s brigade was on the east side of the Brussels pike; its right rested on it.

[722] It is almost exactly a mile and a half from the point of intersection of the Brussels turnpike with the Wavre road to the church in Planchenoit.

[723] See Napoléon à Waterloo, pp. 313, 318.

[724] The principal question as to this is in regard to the corps of Reille, a part of which, certainly, might have been more usefully employed in sustaining the cavalry attacks than in fighting in the wood of Hougomont, or on the Nivelles road on the west side of Hougomont. See Heymès’ statement in Doc. Inéd., pp. 17, 18.

[725] Charras, vol. 1, p. 316.

[726] Ib., p. 317.

[727] Ib., p. 321, n.; correcting the statement on p. 318, which speaks of only one battalion of grenadiers being on the road to the Maison du Roi.

[728] Charras, vol. 1, p. 321.

[729] Damitz, vol. 1, p. 285. Damitz gives a complete roster of the Guard, and, in fact, of the whole army, at the end of his first volume. He also gives the numbers of the regiments and battalions detached in and around Planchenoit.

[730] Damitz, vol. 1, p. 285, states that owing to the losses suffered at Ligny these eight battalions had been consolidated into six. Batty (pp. 106, 107) also says that the 4th regiment of grenadiers consisted of but one battalion, and that the same was true of the 4th regiment of chasseurs.

[731] At least this was the fact on the 16th of June, prior to the battle of Ligny. See the Roster at the end of Damitz’ first volume. All these officers, except Henrion, are mentioned by Charras (vol. 1, p. 322) as participating in this charge. _Cf._ Gore, p. 59. This work is an explanation, in 1817, of Craän’s Map of the Field.

[732] Ney: Letter to the Duke of Otranto; Jones, p. 387. But Drouot (Jones, p. 227) and Napoleon (Corresp., vol. 31, p. 238) say four battalions only, and the latter adds “of the Middle Guard.” It is not unlikely that the other battalions had previously been brought up to the neighborhood of La Haye Sainte.

[733] Charras, vol. 1, p. 321.

[734] This is implied in Damitz’ statement, vol. 1, p. 286, as well as from Charras’ statement that the horse-batteries were on the left flank of the column. It is distinctly so stated in Van Loben Sels, p. 295.

[735] We call the whole mass, consisting of columns of battalions,—division (or two company) front,—arranged in _échelon_,—a column, merely for convenience’ sake. It may be remarked that the French infantry were formed in three ranks.

[736] Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 257; _Contra_, Siborne, vol. 2, p. 166.

[737] St. Hilaire: Hist. de la Garde, p. 634.

[738] Charras, vol. 1, p. 67.

[739] Captain Powell, in Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 255.

[740] This is an error. “La Moyenne Garde” consisted solely of the chasseurs of the Guard; the grenadiers constituted the Old Guard, strictly so called. It is not uncommon to find the grenadiers and chasseurs spoken of as constituting the Old Guard; this is Charras’ usage. But it is an error to speak of the grenadiers of the Middle Guard. The grenadiers whom he saw were the 1st battalion of the 3d regiment,—_ante_, p. 317. See Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 315, n. 1; pp. 321, 325, 327, n. 1. _Contra_, Gore, p. 75.

[741] The 1st brigade of guards, about 1,800 strong,—Siborne, vol. 1, p. 460. App. xxx. They were formed in four ranks.

[742] Relation Belge, pp. 74 _et seq._

[743] Waterloo Letters, pp. 244, 245.

[744] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 325, 326.

[745] See Waterloo Letters, pp. 320, 321; Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 170, 171, n.; See, also, Waterloo Letters, pp. 330, 331, 339, 340.

[746] Waterloo Letters, p. 245; Maitland’s narrative.

[747] Waterloo Letters; Colborne’s narrative, pp. 284, 285; Gawler’s narrative, p. 293.

[748] Charras, vol. 1, p. 327, n.

[749] Charras, vol. 1, p. 331.

[750] Doc. Inéd., p. 62; Reille’s Statement.

[751] Hist. de l’Ex-Garde, pp. 538, 539.

[752] Charras, vol. 1, p. 334.

[753] _Ante_, pp. 261, 283.

[754] _Ante_, pp. 294, 295.

[755] _Cf._ Wellington’s Report (Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 484; App. C, xii; _post_, pp. 372, 373). where he says that _he attributes the successful result of the day to the assistance he received from the Prussians_.

_NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI._

1. That the tactics employed by the French at the battle of Waterloo in their operations against the army of the Duke of Wellington were unworthy of the experience and reputation of their commanders is almost universally admitted. The word “commanders” is used advisedly, because Ney seems to have had the immediate direction of the 1st and 2d Corps even when the Emperor was personally superintending the battle, and when Napoleon was called off to direct the defence of Planchenoit, Ney was certainly in sole control. But this does not fully exonerate the Emperor from responsibility for the dispositions which were made.

The faulty formation of d’Erlon’s Corps in its great assault on the English left was the first blunder. The employment of the whole of Reille’s Corps in the attack on Hougomont was the next. Then the negligent and wasteful way in which the attacks on both Hougomont and La Haye Sainte were conducted warrant severe criticism. The employment of all the reserve cavalry of the army was a most unheard of and uncalled for proceeding; they were all put in, and kept in until they were all exhausted. One would certainly suppose that Ney, who was responsible for this proceeding, must have seen, long before the close of the afternoon, that the cavalry were being completely ruined, and that no appreciable injury was being inflicted on the enemy.

We cannot but think that if Napoleon had personally directed the battle at this period, this useless and wasteful employment of the cavalry would not have been made. And we cannot help thinking, also, that the Emperor would have brought some at least of Reille’s troops out of the enclosures of Hougomont to support any attacks of cavalry which he might have ordered, either in conjunction with the divisions of Donzelot and Quiot, or with the Imperial Guard, which, but for the attack of the Prussians, he would no doubt have put in between 4 and 5 o’clock. We must bear in mind, that Napoleon was fighting the Prussians near Planchenoit during a large part of the afternoon, and, in fact during the critical period of the battle; and that he cannot fairly be held liable to the censure for the tactics used in the fight against the English, which some English writers, in forgetfulness of this fact, have undertaken to apply to him.

The 1st Corps, after its severe repulse, rallied well and did extremely good work. The persistent attacks of Quiot’s and Donzelot’s infantry showed great enterprise and daring, up to the very last; and these troops deserve all praise. No doubt the bravery of the men of the 2d Corps in their ineffectual attacks on Hougomont was equally commendable; but it was a great waste of material to employ the entire corps in such an operation as attacking Hougomont. Hougomont should have been attacked, undoubtedly, but only by a moderate force; very possibly it might have been carried, had proper means been employed.[756] But it was of far more importance to utilize the infantry of the 2d Corps in breaking the English lines to the eastward of Hougomont, in conjunction with cavalry or the Imperial Guard, than to persist in throwing fresh regiments against the brick walls of the house and garden. Hougomont might in fact have been turned; and, if the last charge had succeeded, it would have been. A notable exception to the unfavorable criticism on the French tactics on this day is made by all historians when speaking of the gallant, skilful and obstinate defence of Planchenoit against the Prussians by the 6th Corps under the Count de Lobau, assisted by the Young Guard and some regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs. No praise is too high for these troops.

2. The English tactics deserved, and have always received, the high commendation of historians. Not only was the Duke himself always watchful and alert, but his efforts were admirably seconded by his officers. The unfailing energy and enterprise shown even at the very close of this exhausting day by the Duke himself and his lieutenants is at least quite as remarkable as the obstinacy and courage displayed in resisting the repeated attacks of their antagonists. The conduct of Maitland, Halkett and Colborne in the last great emergency exhibits the tenacity, courage, presence of mind, and readiness to seize the opportunity, which are the great military virtues, existing in undiminished vigor at the close of a most bloody and doubtful contest.

3. The account given in the text of the charge of the Imperial Guard does not agree fully with any of the narratives, but will be found, on reflection, it is submitted, to harmonize most of the conflicting evidence. The subject is a large one, and the testimony is very confusing. It is impossible to reconcile all the statements. But it is believed that the view maintained in the text,—that the Imperial Guard advanced in one body, or column, not in two; that this column (as we may call it, for lack of a better term) consisted at most of eight, and probably of only six battalions, each formed in close column of grand divisions,—that is, with a front of two companies,—the usual practice in those days,—presenting about 75 men in the front rank,—that these battalions advanced in _échelon_, the right in advance,—explains most of the discrepancies, and accounts for all or nearly all the important statements contained in the different narratives. It was the leading battalions of this column which were met and defeated by Maitland’s guards; it was the rear battalions which were flanked and routed by the 52d and the other regiments of Adam’s (light) brigade.

A. There is, in our judgment, no foundation for the hypothesis of two columns, which, introduced by Siborne, has received the indorsement of Chesney, Kennedy and Hooper. It is opposed to the contemporaneous authorities of both nations. Napoleon’s report of the battle,[757]—Ney’s letter to the Duke of Otranto,[758]—Drouot’s speech in the chamber of Peers,[759]—speak but of one column,—of one attack,—of one repulse. Sir Digby Mackworth, who was on Lord Hill’s staff, in a position where he could observe everything, wrote in his journal at eleven o’clock at night, after the battle was over, as follows:—[760]

“A black mass of the grenadiers of the Imperial Guard, with music
playing and the great Napoleon at their head, came rolling onward
from the farm of La Belle Alliance. * * * The point at which the
enemy aimed was now evident. It was an angle formed by a brigade of
guards [Maitland’s] and the light brigade [Adam’s] of Lord Hill’s
Corps.”

Mackworth then goes on to describe the contest, and the rout of the enemy. There is not a word of there being two columns and two attacks.

This is true, it is believed, of all the early narratives by British officers.[761] It may fairly be deduced from this evidence that the repulse of the right and advanced battalions by the guards, and the attack on the left and rear ones by the light brigade were nearly synchronous,—the latter being probably a few minutes later than the former.

B. The claims put forward on behalf of the light brigade (Adam’s), and specially of the 52d regiment, next demand our consideration.

Gawler, a distinguished officer of the 52d, in his “Crisis and Close of the Action at Waterloo”[762] admits that “the headmost companies of the Imperial Guard * * * crowned the very summit of the position.” He says that “the fire of the brigade of guards then opened upon them, but they still pressed forward.” And he claims[763] that their attack was repulsed not “by a charge of General Maitland’s brigade of guards,” “but * * * by a charge of the 52d, covered by the 71st regiment, without the direct coöperation of any other portion of the allied army.”

Unfortunately for this claim, however, we have it from another officer of the 52d, Leeke, that Gawler was on the extreme right of the regiment.[764] In this position, as Leeke remarks, he could not have seen what took place at the head of the French column.[765] When he says, therefore, that the flank attack of the 52d alone overthrew the Imperial Guard, he is speaking without any personal knowledge of what took place in the front of that column, and we are thrown back on the evidence of the officers of Maitland’s brigade.

Leeke has a curious theory on this matter. He says that the advance of the Guard was preceded and covered by “a mass of skirmishers,”[766] and that it was these skirmishers and these only that were driven off by Maitland’s brigade.

In order to maintain this contention, Leeke is compelled to assume the presence in front of the main body of the Imperial Guard of “massed skirmishers” thrown out by the Guard, and also that the battalions of the Guard never got nearer to Maitland’s brigade than 300 yards.[767]

But this is mere guess work. Sharpin, an officer in Napier’s battery, which was stationed close to Maitland’s brigade, says:—[768]

“We saw the French bonnets just above the high corn and within 40 or
50 yards of our guns. I believe they were in close columns of grand
divisions.”

Says Captain Powell of the 1st Foot Guards:—[769]

“A close column of grenadiers (about seventies in front) * * * were
seen ascending the rise * * * They continued to advance till within
50 or 60 paces of our front.”

Says Captain Dirom of the same regiment:—[770]

“The Imperial Guard advanced in close column with ported arms, the
officers of the leading division in front waving their swords. The
French columns showed no appearance of having suffered on their
advance, but seemed as regularly formed as if at a field-day. When
they got within a short distance we were ordered to make ready,
present and fire.”

Leeke’s theory of “massed skirmishers” needs no further refutation. There can be no question that the officers of Maitland’s guards saw right before them the leading battalions of the Imperial Guard formed in the ordinary manner, in close columns of grand divisions. The skirmishers had all been withdrawn by the time the leading battalions reached the top of the acclivity.

It should, however, be added that the left and rear battalions which Colborne attacked in flank were entirely unaffected by the charge of Maitland’s brigade. The British guards did undoubtedly charge the troops in their front, and drove them down the hill a short distance, but on finding other troops, _i.e._, the four (or, more probably, three) rear and left battalions of the Imperial Guard, on their right flank, they retired to the crest of the hill, and certainly did not assist the 52d and the other regiments of Adam’s brigade in their brilliant flank attack. The credit of having overthrown the rear half of the column of the Imperial Guard is due entirely to that brigade; and it assuredly was a most skilfully designed and daringly executed movement. Colborne saw at a glance that the several battalions of the Guard could not be deployed in such a way as to return anything like as destructive a fire as that which the unbroken line of the 52d could deliver. The Guard undoubtedly did its best; the firing was very hot for a time; Gawler says[771] his regiment lost 150 officers and men in four or five minutes. But his men were perfectly steady; their fire was at very close range and well kept up; they had the advantage of position; the loss of the French columns was fearful;[772] and when Colborne, perceiving that the moment had come, ordered a charge, the Guard broke into a confused mass, and were pursued to and across the Charleroi road. The flank attack of Adam’s brigade was certainly a most brilliant, and yet a well-justified, manœuvre,—impossible to any but veteran troops, and which none but an experienced, vigilant and daring officer would ever have ordered. Colborne took, it must be admitted, great risks. He says himself[773] that, as his skirmishers opened fire on the Guards, his attention was completely drawn to his position and dangerous advance,—a large mass of cavalry having been seen on the right. Certainly it must have required some nerve to decide to run such a risk as this, and on his own responsibility too, for he advanced his regiment before receiving any order from General Adam. But success justified his decision.

4. Whether Napoleon was warranted in ordering the Guard forward, or rather that portion of it which could be mustered, is a question which has been much discussed, and, we are inclined to think, to no great profit. The answer must depend on the extent of the information possessed by Napoleon as to the actual condition of things at the time when he ordered the movement; and this, of course, must be mainly a matter of conjecture. The order was given somewhere about half-past six o’clock,—an hour before Zieten arrived at Papelotte; and Napoleon certainly did not expect him. Bülow had been forced to retire. The news from the front received by the Emperor when he was conducting the fight against the Prussian flank attack near Planchenoit had been decidedly favorable. The army of Wellington was reported as manifestly getting weaker and weaker. The guns placed near La Haye Sainte had done serious damage to the English squares and batteries. The activity and energy of Quiot’s and Donzelot’s infantry showed no abatement. It seems to us that the Emperor had good reason to think that the English lines would give way before a determined attack made by fresh troops, and those the veterans of the Imperial Guard. He told Ney to mass on the right of Hougomont all the troops of Reille’s Corps that he could collect, to concentrate the divisions of Quiot and Donzelot near La Haye Sainte, and to prepare to support the attack with cavalry.[774]

He must, however, have been grievously disappointed as to the execution of this order by Marshal Ney. When the Emperor brought up the Guard, Bachelu’s infantry had not been drawn out of the wood of Hougomont.[775] Piré’s cavalry, which were in perfectly good condition, had not been brought over from the Nivelles road.[776] No attempt apparently had been made to organize any cavalry force from the wrecks of the splendid divisions which Ney had so obstinately and blindly launched again and again upon the English squares. And the Emperor, who must have expected that an officer of the ability and experience of Marshal Ney would have made some at least of the necessary arrangements for the proper support of the charging column, must have experienced a disappointment as sudden as it must have been bitter, when he saw the battalions of the Guard ascend the plateau without a regiment of cavalry to protect their flanks, or any part of the 2d Corps supporting their attack.

The charge, such as it was, of the Imperial Guard at Waterloo was most firmly and gallantly met and repulsed. But it should never be forgotten that it was not the sort of charge which Napoleon was in the habit of making with his Guard; that it was, at best, a charge of 8 battalions out of 24,—of 12 guns out of 96,—and that no cavalry at all, light or heavy, supported the charging column. Made, as it was, without supports, except so far as Donzelot’s gallant infantry protected its right flank, it was a terrible mistake to make it. And it is all but certain that if proper care and skill had been expended on the preparations and accompaniments of the movement,—if, in a word, Ney had kept his head cool and his hand steady, as did the Duke,—Piré’s lancers and Bachelu’s division would have given abundant employment to the whole of Adam’s brigade, and a few squadrons of horse could have protected the advance on the right. This is not, we submit, going too far in the region of conjecture. Bachelu and Piré, at any rate, were close at hand, and under Ney’s command, and were, so far as we know, doing nothing at the time when the charge was ordered.

Ney, in fact, contributed apparently little, except his example of desperate courage, to the success of the day. But courage, though indispensable, does not take the place of judgment and presence of mind.[777] Ney failed most unmistakably to make the most of his resources; he lost sight, practically, of one of the two corps under his orders; he used up all his cavalry; and he neglected to make even the preparations and arrangements which were yet feasible to second the attack of the Guard. It is impossible not to contrast his conduct with that of Wellington, whose admirable forethought and coolness gave him the control of the situation, and enabled him to utilize fully all the resources which at the close of this trying day still remained to him.

5. We have not thought it necessary to do more than to call attention to the fact that the Duke of Wellington retained some 18,000 men of Colville’s division at Hal and Tubize throughout this perilous and bloody day. The best English authorities[778] unhesitatingly condemn the Duke’s action in this regard. Says Sir James Shaw-Kennedy:—[779]

“Wellington certainly ought to have had Colville, with the force
under his command, on the field of battle at Waterloo. There was no
cause whatever for his being kept in the direction of Hal. It would
have been a gross error on the part of Napoleon to have detached
any important force on that road, and Colville should, early on the
morning of the 18th, have been ordered to march to Waterloo, if he
had no information of the advance of the enemy on Hal.”

6. It may be thought by some that the effect upon the corps of Bülow and Pirch I. of the appearance of Marshal Grouchy’s command, marching from Moustier and Ottignies upon Lasne and St. Lambert, has been stated too strongly in the text. But we cannot think so. Imagine 30,000 or 40,000 men marching in a long column along miry roads to attack an enemy, and still some miles from the field of battle, perceiving a body of troops of apparently equal or nearly equal strength moving right upon their line of march, which is also their line of communications. How many officers in Bülow’s position would not have halted to resist such an attack?

It is to be observed, that the dilemma in which Bülow and Pirch I. were placed by knowing that Grouchy was attacking Wavre was quite a different one. In the first place, they, as we now know, estimated Grouchy’s force at only half its strength,—they never, it must be remembered, actually saw it; and in the second place, Grouchy might well be detained by Thielemann at and about Wavre until the battle of Waterloo had been won.

If, however, Grouchy had been observed marching from the Dyle directly on their columns _en route_ for Planchenoit, the Prussian commanders almost certainly would have been compelled to halt and to give him battle. And this they must have done even although they might have been satisfied that their forces were superior in numbers. A smaller force, if it is directed on the line of march of a larger one, almost inevitably must detain it.

7. The complete ruin which overtook the French army at Waterloo is to be attributed mainly to the unexpected appearance and vigorous attack of Zieten’s Corps at the close of the day, when the French had become thoroughly exhausted, and when, owing to the darkness, it was impossible for the Emperor to accomplish anything in the way of rallying them or making new dispositions. The English had certainly won a great success in routing the Imperial Guard; but they were not strong enough to drive the French army from the field, even with the assistance which Bülow and Pirch I. afforded on the side of Planchenoit. They had cleared their front of the enemy from Hougomont to the turnpike; but they were in no condition to attack the strong position of the French, defended by the troops of the 2d Corps, and crowned with many and powerful batteries. The French centre, Müffling tells us,[780] remained immovable after their right wing was in full retreat, and it was not until some of Zieten’s batteries, which had been brought over to the west of La Haye Sainte, opened fire, that it began to retire. Then Wellington ordered his whole line to advance. But it was a very thin line indeed, consisting, as Müffling says, only of small bodies, of a few hundred men each, and at great intervals from each other. Müffling goes on to say:—[781]

“The advance of such weak battalions, with the great gaps between,
appeared hazardous, and General Lord Uxbridge, who commanded the
cavalry, drew the Duke’s attention to the danger; the Duke, however,
would not order them to stop. * * * The Duke with his practised
eye perceived that the French army was no longer dangerous; he was
equally aware, indeed, that, with his infantry so diminished, he
could achieve nothing more of importance: but if he _stood still_,
and resigned the pursuit to the Prussian army _alone_, it might
appear in the eyes of Europe as if the English army had defended
themselves bravely indeed, but that the Prussians alone decided and
won the battle.”

The rout of the divisions of Durutte and Marcognet was entirely due to Zieten’s attack; this is universally admitted. Had it not been for Zieten, then, the only contest that would have gone on that evening would have been at and near Planchenoit; and it is hard to suppose that Napoleon could not have maintained his position there, if he had had his whole army to draw from when the Young Guard and Lobau needed reinforcements. To the unexpected irruption of Zieten’s Corps,—or rather of his leading division of infantry, all his cavalry, and most of his artillery,—arriving at the close of the day, on the flank of the army, and in perfectly open ground, is the rout of the French army, therefore, principally to be attributed.

8. It only remains to discuss the question of the responsibility for the intervention of the Prussians, as between the Emperor and Marshal Grouchy. It may fairly be said that if either of them had taken all the steps which the situation, as it presented itself to his mind, demanded, this intervention might have been prevented.

If the Emperor, when he thought it possible that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English, had taken Grouchy with him, and had stationed his two corps, or one of them, on the day of the battle, at or near Lasne and St. Lambert, or if he had employed one or both of Grouchy’s corps in attacking the English, Blücher, it is safe to say, would not have interfered in the duel between Napoleon and Wellington.

If, after sending Grouchy off, Napoleon had informed him of the impending battle, and had charged him to return to the main army by way of Moustier if he found that the Prussians had gone to Wavre, it is altogether probable that the march of the Prussians would have been arrested.

On the other hand, if Grouchy had acted of his own motion on sound military principles at daybreak of the 18th, or even had been willing to follow the counsel of Gérard at noon, the same result would probably have been attained.

Napoleon took a wholly unnecessary risk when he detached Grouchy with such a large force, after he had reason to apprehend that the Prussians were intending to unite with the English, and he negligently omitted to take the usual means to reduce this risk by supplying his lieutenant with the necessary information, and with precise orders in case he should find that Blücher intended to coöperate with Wellington. He trusted to Grouchy to take the right course, and Grouchy failed to do so. Both Napoleon and Grouchy are therefore responsible for the intervention of the Prussians and the loss of the battle.

FOOTNOTES:

[756] _Ante_, pp. 303, 304.

[757] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 343; Jones, p. 384.

[758] Jones, p. 387.

[759] Ib., p. 227.

[760] Sidney’s Life of Lord Hill, p. 309.

[761] Jones (Artillery Operations), p. 177; Sharpin in the “Waterloo Letters,” pp. 228 _et seq._; Gore, pp. 58 _et seq._ See, also, Captain Batty’s account (pp. 106 _et seq._,) in his “Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815”: London, 1820. He was an ensign in the 1st regiment of foot-guards in Maitland’s brigade. He speaks, it is true, of the chasseurs of the Guard “forming another attack”; but he says that it was when Maitland was advancing, that he perceived the chasseurs “so far advanced as to menace the right flank of the brigade,”—which is substantially the view maintained in the text. _Cf._ Siborne, vol. 2, p. 170, where the same statement is made. Yet Siborne (vol. 2, p. 174) says that “between the heads of the two attacking columns there was a distance during their advance of _from ten to twelve minutes’ march_.” How such an interval was possible, when the contest of the Guard with Maitland’s brigade was of such extremely short duration, is not apparent. See Maitland’s statement in “Waterloo Letters”, pp. 244, 245; also statements of Powell and Dirom; pp. 255, 257, 258.

[762] Gawler, p. 15.

[763] Ib. pp. 31, 32.

[764] Leeke, vol. 1, p. 84.

[765] Lord Seaton, then Sir John Colborne, who commanded the 52d, admits that he did not himself see, and could not have seen, any movement of the guards. He simply claims that the Imperial Guard halted when his skirmishers opened fire on their flank. Leeke, vol. 1, p. 101.

[766] Ib., pp. 43, 44, 84.

[767] Leeke, vol. 1, p. 84. See also his letter to the Editor of the Army and Navy Gazette, August 17, 1867.

[768] Waterloo Letters, p. 229. _Cf._ a statement of an officer in the same battery,—Jones, p. 177,—probably Sharpin.

[769] Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 255.

[770] Waterloo Letters, p. 257.

[771] Ib., p. 293; _Cf._ Colborne’s Letter, p. 285.

[772] Leeke, vol. 1, p. 104; Letter of Colonel Brotherton.

[773] Ib., p. 101.

[774] Charras, vol. 1, p. 321.

[775] Wellington brought up about this time to the right centre of his line Chassé’s Dutch-Belgian Division, besides other troops.

[776] Wellington about this time brought over the brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur to the threatened centre of his line, as well as the remnants of Somerset’s and Ponsonby’s brigades.