Chapter XL: Appendix: B

ON MARSHAL GROUCHY AND THE BERTRAND ORDER.

We have stated (_ante_, p. 208) that Marshal Grouchy “denied, over and over again, in his pamphlets written about the battle, ever having received any written order, whether from Napoleon or Soult, until the next day (the 18th)”; and we have pointed out the grave misconceptions of the conduct of Napoleon which have been the result of these denials on the part of Marshal Grouchy, which, for many years, were very generally credited. We now propose to prove the truth of our statement.

In 1818 Marshal Grouchy published in Philadelphia his “_Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815 publiée par le Général Gourgaud_.” After giving an account of the verbal orders which Napoleon gave him, of his observations in regard to them, and of the Emperor’s reply (_ante_, p. 207), he says:—[818]

“Such are the only dispositions which were communicated to me; the
only orders which I received.”

In the same pamphlet he says:—[819]

“But why, unceasingly repeats this ‘Combatant of Waterloo,’—why does
not Marshal Grouchy publish the text of the orders which he received?

“The reason is simple. It is that they were only transmitted to me
verbally. Those who have served under Napoleon know how rarely he
gives them in writing. * * * If it is of any consequence to show that
they were only verbal, I can find if not a proof, certainly a strong
indication of it in the letter of the Major-General, Marshal Soult,
in speaking of my march on Sartavalin. He expresses himself in these
terms:—

“‘This movement is conformed to the dispositions which have been
communicated to you.’

“He would not have failed to say to the instructions or the orders
which I have transmitted to you, and which you are acting under, if I
had received any except verbal orders.”

The point of this argument is fully seen only when we remember that the Bertrand order was dictated by the Emperor in the absence of Soult, the chief-of-staff, and therefore no copy of it was likely to be found on the regular official files. But fortune enabled Grouchy to make sure of this, for he had, soon after Waterloo, an opportunity of examining the records of the chief-of-staff.

Accordingly, we find him, soon afterwards,[820] in support of his denial of having received the orders alleged in the Memoirs to have been sent to him, saying, not, as he ought to have done, that he did receive an order through Bertrand, which, however, was entirely different in its tenor from those given in the Memoirs, but that he received on the 17th no written order at all.

“The proof of this is in the order-book and correspondence of the
major-general, the organ of communication of the General-in-chief
with his lieutenants. This irrefutable document, which, when I
received the command of the army after the loss of the battle
of Waterloo, came into my possession, shows that no orders or
instructions except those contained in the two letters given
herewith, and dated at 10 A.M. and 1 P.M. of the 18th, were ever sent
to me.”

In a work published in Paris in 1829, speaking of the 10 A.M. order to him of the 18th of June, he says:—[821]

“This letter, and that dated from the field of battle of Waterloo,
at one o’clock, are the only ones which I received and which were
written to me on the 17th and 18th. The book of the orders and
correspondence of the major-general, which I possess, proves this.
It gives the hours at which orders are given, and the names of the
officers who carry them; and its details do not permit a suspicion of
an omission any more than of a misstatement.”

It is rather remarkable, to say the least, that General Bertrand should not have stated what he recollected about the matter. But he does not appear to have done so; unless the mention in Jomini’s “Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo,”[822] that General Bertrand sent Grouchy a positive order to march on Gembloux, may be attributed to information received from Bertrand.

The Bertrand order first saw the light in 1842,—twenty-seven years after the battle of Waterloo. It was printed in a work entitled “_Notice Biographique sur le Maréchal de Grouchy, &c._,”[823] by E. Pascallet, editor of a Review treating of Biography, Politics and Letters. The biography is eulogistic. The order is accompanied by no explanation of the repeated denials, to which we have called attention above, of any such order ever having been received by the Marshal.[824]

After this publication, however, the Bertrand order was acknowledged in the memoirs of Marshal Grouchy. It is found in the work of the Marquis de Grouchy, published in 1864, entitled “_Le Maréchal de Grouchy du 16 au 19 juin, 1815_,”[825] written to refute the accusations of Thiers, and in the 4th volume[826] of the “_Mémoires du Maréchal de Grouchy_,” by his son, the Marquis. In neither of these books is there any attempt at explaining away the point blank denials of the Marshal’s having received any written order on the 17th of June. It would certainly not be easy to conjecture what explanation could be given. The order reads as follows (Pascallet, p. 79):—

“_Rendez-vous à Gembloux avec le corps de cavalerie de général Pajol,
la cavalerie légère du quatrième corps, le corps de cavalerie du
général Excelmans, la division du général Teste, dont vous aurez
un soin particulier, étant détachée de son corps d’armée, et les
troisième et quatrième corps d’infanterie. Vous vous ferez éclairer
sur la direction de Namur et de Maestricht, et vous poursuivrez
l’ennemi. Eclairez sa marche, et instruisez-moi de ses manoeuvres,
de manière que je puisse pénétrer ce qu’il veut faire. Je porte mon
quartier-général aux Quatre-Chemins, où ce matin étaient encore les
Anglais. Notre communication sera donc directe par la route pavée
de Namur. Si l’ennemi a évacué Namur, écrivez au général commandant
la deuxième division militaire à Charlemont, de faire occuper Namur
par quelques bataillons de garde nationale et quelques batteries de
canon qu’il formera à Charlemont. Il donnera ce commandement à un
maréchal-de-camp.”_

_Il est important de pénétrer ce que l’ennemi veut faire: ou il se
sépare des Anglais, ou ils veulent se réunir encore, pour couvrir
Bruxelles et Liège, en tentant le sort d’une nouvelle bataille. Dans
tous les cas, tenez constamment vos deux corps d’infanterie réunis
dans une lieue de terrain, et occupez tous les soirs une bonne
position militaire, ayant plusieurs débouchés de retraite. Placez
détachemens de cavalerie intermédiaires pour communiquer avec le
quartier-général._

_Ligny, le 17 juin, 1815._

(_Dicté par l’empereur, en l’absence du major-général, au
grand-maréchal Bertrand._)

Passing now to Marshal Grouchy’s report to the Emperor, dated Gembloux, June 17,1815, 10 P.M. This was printed for the first time in the Count Gérard’s “_Dernières Observations sur les Operations de l’Aile Droite de l’Armée Française à la Bataille de Waterloo_,” published in Paris in 1830. It reads as follows:—[827]

“_Sire_:

“_J’ai l’honneur de vous rendre compte que j’occupe Gembloux, et que
ma cavalerie est à Sauvenières. L’ennemi, fort d’environ trente mille
hommes, continue son mouvement de retraite; on lui a saisi ici un
parc de 400 bêtes à cornes, des magasins et des bagages._

“_Il paraît d’après tous les rapports, qu’arrivés a Sauvenières,
les Prussiens se sont divisés en deux colonnes: l’une a dû prendre
la route de Wavres, en passant par Sart-à-Wallain; l’autre colonne
paraît s’être dirigée sur Perwès._

“_On peut peut-être en inférer qu’une portion va joindre Wellington,
et que le centre, qui est l’armée de Blücher, se rétire sur Liége:
une autre colonne avec de l’artillerie ayant fait son mouvement de
retraite par Namur, le général Excelmans a ordre de pousser ce soir
six escadrons sur Sart-à-Wallain, et trois escadrons sur Perwès.
D’après leur rapport, si la masse des Prussiens se retire sur Wavres,
je la suivrai dans cette direction, afin qu’ils ne puissent pas
gagner Bruxelles, et de les séparer de Wellington._

“_Si, au contraire, mes renseignements prouvent que la principale
force prussienne a marché sur Perwès, je me dirigerai par cette ville
à la poursuite de l’ennemi._

“_Les généraux Thielman et Borstell faisaient partie de l’armée que
Votre Majesté a battue hier; ils étaient encore ce matin à 10 heures
ici, et out annoncé que vingt mille hommes des leurs avaient été mis
hors de combat. Ils ont demandé en partant les distances de Wavres,
Perwès et Hannut. Blücher a été blessé légèrement au bras, ce qui ne
l’a pas empêché de continuer à commander après s’être fait panser. Il
n’a point passé par Gembloux._

_Je suis avec respect
de Votre Majesté_,
_Sire_, _Le fidèle sujet_,
(_Signé_) _Le Maréchal Comte de Grouchy_.”

This version of Grouchy’s report from Gembloux has been adopted textually by all writers on the campaign,—Charras,[828] Siborne,[829] La Tour d’Auvergne,[830] Chesney,[831] Quinet,[832] the author of “Napoléon à Waterloo,”[833] and others.

The salient thing in this report is its response to the Bertrand order. That directed Grouchy to find out what the Prussians were intending to do, whether to separate from the English, or to unite with them to cover Brussels or Liége in trying the fate of another battle. Grouchy says in this despatch, that, if the mass of the Prussians retires on Wavre he will follow them in that direction _in order that they may not be able to gain Brussels and to separate them from Wellington_; but it on the contrary his information proves that their principal force is marching on Perwès he will march on that city in pursuit of the enemy. But in the Grouchy Memoirs this expression of intention is supplanted by another.[834]

The whole clause reads as follows:—

“_Si j’apprends par des rapports qui, j’espère, me parviendront
pendant la nuit, que de fortes masses prussiennes se portent sur
Wavre, je les suivrai dans cette direction, ET LES ATTAQUERAI DES QUE
JE LES AURAI JOINTES._”[835]

This substitution of an expressed intention to attack the Prussians as soon as he should have caught up with them, if he finds them going to Wavre, is a radical departure from the received text. It is not difficult to see the motive for making this mutilation. Grouchy and his defenders were unwilling to allow that he had, in this despatch, expressed his intention of manœuvring with the object of separating the Prussians from Wellington, for that was exactly what he distinctly refused to do on the next day. And the reason which he alleged for refusing to follow Gérard’s advice was, that he had been told by the Emperor to follow the Prussians up closely, and attack them as soon as he should catch up with them. Hence, to admit that the received text of his 10 P.M. report on the 17th is correct, is to admit that Grouchy, at the time he wrote it, took a different view of his task from that which he put forward the next day, and ever afterwards maintained; it is, in fact, to admit that he had received, understood, and was intending to act under the Bertrand order, which warned him that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English; that on that evening of the 17th, at any rate, he fully recognized the real danger to be feared, and regarded, as his great task, not the following on the heels of the Prussians, and attacking their rear guard, but manœuvring so as to prevent them from carrying out their purpose of joining the English.[836]

That the changes in the two Grouchy books are wilful mutilations of the correct text, made for the purpose stated above, appears sufficiently from the fact that the statement of what Grouchy was going to do, if he found the Prussians retiring on Perwès is entirely omitted, apart from the fact that not a single writer adopts the Grouchy version.

Charras puts it mildly in our opinion when he says of Grouchy,[837]—“He has not always been very exact, or very sincere.”

FOOTNOTES:

[818] Observations, Phila. ed. 1818, p. 13. In the Philadelphia edition of 1819, p. 12, and in the Paris edition, 1819, p. 13, the statement is made somewhat stronger by the insertion of the words “word for word.”

[819] Obs., Phila. ed., 1818, pp. 26, 27; ed. 1819, pp. 24, 25; Paris ed., pp. 30, 31.

[820] Doutes sur l’authenticité des Mémoires Historiques attribués à Napoléon. Par le Cte de Grouchy. Philadelphie; Avril, 1820.

[821] Fragments Historiques: Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy, p. 5, note.

[822] Jomini, p. 149. Jomini’s Preface is dated in 1838.

[823] Pascallet, p. 79.

[824] _Cf._ Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 199, n.

[825] Le Mal de Grouchy en 1815, pp. 26-28.

[826] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 50, 51.

[827] Gérard: Dem. Obs., p. 15.

[828] Charras, vol. 1, p. 244.

[829] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 297.

[830] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 230.

[831] Chesney, p. 153.

[832] Quinet, p. 430.

[833] Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 219.

[834] Grouchy Mém., p. 58; see, also, p. 263, where the writer says that he has the original under his eyes. See, also, the same thing in the “Mal de Grouchy en 1815,” p. 37; and also p. 194, where Thiers is sharply taken to task for following the generally received version.

[835] The capitals are ours.

[836] _Cf._ Clausewitz, ch. 48, p. 131; ch. 50, p. 146.

[837] Charras, vol. 2, p. 53.