Chapter M: Gerard to Arthur Lee (2)

In this distress their hope is fixed upon his Majesty, and I most earnestly beseech your Excellency so to represent our situation to the King, as may move his royal benevolence to furnish the relief, which will raise an everlasting tribute of gratitude in the minds of the people of the United States.

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, your Excellency’s most obedient, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

[38] “_In Congress, December 3d, 1777._ The great quantity of paper money, issued to defray the necessary expenses of the war, having at length become so considerable as to endanger its credit, and Congress apprehending, that the slow operation of taxes may not be adequate to the prevention of an evil so pernicious in its consequences, and as experience proves, that the method of paying the interest by bills on France does not fill the loan office so fast as the urgent calls of war demand,

“_Resolved_, That the Commissioners at the Courts of France and Spain be directed to exert their utmost endeavors to obtain a loan of two millions sterling on the faith of the United States, for a term not less than ten years, with permission if practicable to pay the same sooner if it shall be agreeable to these States, giving twelve months’ previous notice to the lender, of such intention to return the money. That the Commissioners be instructed to consider the money hereby directed to be borrowed, as a fund to be applied, unless Congress direct otherwise, solely to the purpose of answering such drafts as Congress shall make for the purpose of lessening the sum of paper money in circulation.

“That in order more effectually to answer the good purposes intended by this plan, the Commissioners be also instructed to keep as secret as the nature of the thing will admit, whatever loan they shall be able to obtain for this purpose on account of the United States.”

TO THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Paris, July 29th, 1778.

Gentlemen,

I enclose you a duplicate of the news of an engagement between the fleets of France and England. The particulars received since make the loss on board the French fleet very inconsiderable, and paint the behavior of the English to have been inexpert and dastardly. The repulsing them in the first engagement will probably lead to the defeating them in the next, for which purpose the fleet of our allies will go out in a few days.

The Empress and Emperor seem at length sensible of the impropriety of their conduct, and in consequence a truce for six weeks is agreed on, to give time for negotiation to prevent the effusion of blood.

The quadruplicate of the ratification reached us on the 3d in safety, as all the rest have done. The answer of Congress to the Commissioners was immediately sent to the ministers, and will, I am persuaded, give great satisfaction.

It has been forgotten, I believe, to mention both in our joint and particular letters, that we have attended to the plan proposed by the Committee of sending the frigates to cruise in the East Indies, and upon considering all things it seemed to us impracticable at present. Better order must be established in our marine, and the ships’ companies better sorted, before it will be safe to attempt enterprises at such a distance, and which require a certain extent of ideas in the Captain, and entire obedience in the crew.

The authority of Congress for omitting the 11th and 12th articles of the Commercial Treaty, which was omitted in the other despatches, came safe in the last, and will be presented immediately to the minister, who has already agreed to have them expunged.

I enclose you our letter, and Mr Hodge’s answer, concerning the money expended at Dunkirk, together with a particular account of what he has received from the public banker.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

JAMES GARDOQUI TO ARTHUR LEE.

Madrid, August 13th, 1778.

Dear Sir,

My last respects went to you under the 23d ult. and referring you to my sequels with regard to your desires of me in money matters, I must beg leave to inform you, that the proposal you have made for borrowing money through the hands of a nobleman at your place is received, and that your being served therewith would give your friends on this side a real pleasure, but I am sorry to tell you, that it is impossible for the present. You will please to observe and consider upon the immense charges occasioned within these two or three years, and that all is done merely on account of your present quarrel, as likewise that such formidable preparations have been and will still be of infinite service to the Americans; besides which, it is well known to yourself, and more so to your worthy constituents, that great succors have been sent forthwith through various channels, and that the same is continued to this day, and will be so in future as much as possible.

In short, it is not doubted but you will represent the whole to your constituents, looking upon all in its true light, and observing that if affairs should be accommodated to their satisfaction and that of this side, the means of succoring you would be facilitated.

I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant.

JAMES GARDOQUI.

JAMES GARDOQUI TO ARTHUR LEE.

Madrid, August 20th, 1778.

Dear Sir,

I confirm my last compliments to you under the 13th inst, wherein I observed how difficult it would be to borrow the two millions sterling here, under the present circumstances, more especially while the enormous charges and fitting out of vessels are carried on merely to protect your colonies, which are besides assisted with effective succors, and will be so in future as much as possible. Since my letter, I have maturely considered upon the matter, and it has occurred to me, that if your government means by it to take up all the paper that has been laid out, perhaps the cession of Florida to Spain, (in case you could reduce it,) might at the conclusion of peace produce, if not the whole, at least a great part of the funds required.

You will no doubt consider, that I cannot penetrate the way of thinking of our Court in this and other entangled matters, but judging like a merchant, I think a negotiation of this kind might well take place, for I imagine it would be proper for both, that the frontier in question should not remain in future in the hands of enemies or suspicious powers. There is, besides, a further negotiation which might be added to the great benefit of your States and this Court, and that is, your providing this kingdom with good timber for the Spanish navy at commodious prices.

I hope, Sir, you will excuse my liberty in pointing out these hints, to which I am led by the honest principle of friendship, and by the wished for view that the interest of both countries may be united upon a sincere and lasting footing; therefore I hope you will weigh the same as you may think more convenient, observing that I suppose you will not propose it to our Court, before you know how the honorable Congress thinks upon both objects.

I am with unfeigned esteem, &c.

JAMES GARDOQUI.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Paris, August 21st, 1778.

Gentlemen,

I wrote you on the 28th ult. of my having pressed for the loan directed by Congress. I have received an assurance through the Ambassador, that an answer will be given to my memorial as soon as possible.

I enclose you a memorial for the consideration of Congress, as we do not think ourselves authorised to act upon it without express orders. Could one be sure, that justice would be done to the public, it might be of advantage to adopt this scheme, for Congress must not trust to the success of a loan, which, for the following reasons, I apprehend will be found impracticable.

The war in Germany supervening on that between us and Great Britain, and the preparations for it by France and Spain, have raised and multiplied the demand for money, so as to give the holders of it their choice and their price. The Empress Queen has engrossed every shilling in the Netherlands. England has drawn large sums from the Hollanders, who cannot easily quit their former market. France is negotiating a loan of one hundred million livres, which will exhaust Geneva and Switzerland. The money holders regard the lending their money at such a distance, as Jacob did the sending Benjamin into Egypt, and it is time only will make them endure the thought of such a separation.

These are the difficulties which the circumstances of things oppose to our scheme of a loan, and render the aid of some other operation necessary for sinking the superabundant paper.

The Minister’s answer relative to M. Holker was, that he had no authority from this Court, but on this our joint letter I expect will be more full. I have determined to write to you once a month or oftener, as opportunity offers, and as we do not write so frequently, I am tempted to mention things which should properly come from all the Commissioners, as they relate to the joint commission.

From the necessity of the case we have ventured to administer the oath of allegiance to those who desire passports of us, but I hope Congress will authorise their Commissioners to do so where it is necessary.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

TO JAMES GARDOQUI.

Paris, August 27th, 1778.

Dear Sir,

I received yesterday your favor of the 13th. If I remember rightly what made me delay writing to you relative to the bills was my desire of informing you, at the same time, of their being accepted; and it was long before I could learn that myself, from the manner in which they were drawn. I am very sorry it did you any disservice.

I am neither unmindful of, nor ungrateful for, the support we have received from your quarter. The inevitable necessity, which compelled an application for more, gave me great uneasiness. I was sensible the sum desired was very considerable. But so are our wants. It is our misfortune, not our fault, that we are obliged thus to trouble and distress our friends. I trust they will consider it in that light. There is nothing more precarious and immeasureable than what influences public credit. The sum sought would have enabled Congress to call in such a quantity of the paper emitted, as must establish the credit and value of the rest in defiance of all the efforts of our enemies. And I think that if our friends could lend us even as much as would constitute a fund here, on which Congress might draw, so as to call in at once one or two million dollars, it would greatly raise the value of the rest. This would require about eight or ten million livres. When it is seen that the redemption is begun, hopes and expectations will be raised, and credit grow upon them. But emitting more, without redeeming any, makes people think that no redemption is intended, and consequently produces doubts and discredit.

It is long ago that I foresaw, and I had the honor of stating it at Burgos, the necessity of providing for the support of our funds, or rather funds themselves, by the assistance of our friends in Europe. I will venture to say, that one million sterling, furnished in this manner, would have been a more effectual aid than all the preparations that have or can be made, unless they go to actual hostilities. Have these preparations prevented twelve ships of the line from being sent on our coasts to augment enormously that naval force, which was already sufficient to stop our commerce and prevent us from sending our produce to procure funds in Europe? When we argue against facts we deceive ourselves. The fact then is, that these preparations, however formidable, have had so little effect, that though our enemies were hardly a match for France alone at sea, they ventured, in the face of those preparations, to despatch a powerful fleet against us. Some how or other they did not believe those preparations were meant against them. Have they been deceived in the event? Has their temerity been chastised as it deserved? Has the fleet of Spain joined that of France to crush at one blow their divided naval power? I do not mean to question the goodness of the reasons for this; I mean only to state the fact. I mean to show too that it is not extraordinary, that we should desire other aid than that which, however well intended, does not effectually operate to the relief intended. It is our necessity, not our choice, that speaks. To make a diversion in our favor was benevolent, to send us clothing for troops and naval stores was generous and friendly, but if that diversion has not hindered our commerce from being obstructed by powerful fleets, if the utter discredit of our money for want of funds prevents soldiers, sailors, and others from engaging in our service, and exposes our country to the cruel depredations and devastations of an enraged enemy, can our friends think hardly of us, if we press them for that assistance which only can relieve our distress?

There is a passage in your letter, which, as I suppose it was not inadvertently inserted, I will give my opinion upon fully. It is “that if affairs should be accommodated to your and our satisfaction, the means of succoring us would be facilitated.” There is nothing we wish more than such an accommodation, consistent with our engagements and our future security. I can assure you, that no people are more averse to war than those of the United States. Were peace once established upon wise principles, leaving us such neighbors as the Spaniards, whose fair and unencroaching dispositions would prevent any attempts to disturb us, I do not see any reason to suppose we should ever be engaged in a foreign war. A war of ambition I am sure we shall never have. No people were ever more sensible of the value of peace, or more disposed to enjoy themselves and let others enjoy in tranquillity the fruits of their labor.

We are a young people, and have had fourteen civil governments to settle during the heat and pressure of a violent war, accompanied with every possible circumstance, that could augment the expense and difficulty usually attending a state of warfare. It is in this moment of distress, that our real friends will show themselves in enabling us to prevent those calamities, which, though they cannot subdue, will yet injure us infinitely. Our industry, were peace and commerce once established, would soon enable us to repay them, and they would be sure of a gratitude more lively and lasting.

Be so good as to assure our friends, that I have not omitted, nor shall I omit the smallest circumstance of their friendship and generosity, which has passed through me. I hope for a speedy and favorable answer to transmit to my constituents.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Paris, August 31st, 1778.

Gentlemen,

It has been hinted to me, that there will be two important subjects of negotiation with the Spanish Court, upon which I beg to have the orders of Congress.

1st. Providing the Spanish navy with masts at a stipulated and as reasonable a price as possible.

2d. The cession of Florida, should it be conquered, to them.

For this they would stipulate, whenever peace is concluded, to furnish the funds for redeeming all, or a great part of the paper.

I cannot presume to proceed at all on these propositions without express instructions. In the meantime, whatever further lights I can obtain shall be communicated immediately.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

TO JAMES GARDOQUI.

Paris, September 1st, 1778.

Dear Sir,

I received your favor of the 20th ult. last night, and will trouble you in addition to what I wrote on the 27th. It depends on your side to begin a treaty, of which, what you mention must be a part. I have already signified my powers and my readiness to do my part, without receiving any answer. My powers by commission are full, and the ratification confirms them specially. Neither my constituents nor myself will be found unwilling to make every reasonable return for any aid given us. There are no neighbors we could prefer to you.

By the last accounts from America, the British army and fleet, after a bloody battle in the Jerseys, were blocked up in New York by General Washington and Count d’Estaing.

It is not improbable they may be forced to surrender before they are released.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Paris, September 9th, 1778.

Gentlemen,

I enclose you copies of the accounts, bills of lading, &c. of the articles, which I before informed you I should direct to be shipped, and which I pay for out of the funds intrusted to me alone. The only error I find in them is the charge of five per cent commission, which I shall endeavor to have rectified. It will be easy to compare the uniforms at 32 livres, with those furnished by Mr Monthieu at 37 livres, according to Mr Deane’s contract, and which Mr Williams reported to us ought to have been rejected; a report, which was concealed from me, as well as the contract.

I have before informed you of my having received remittances in bills, to the amount of 187,500 livres. As I knew it would not be necessary to expend this sum sooner than three months, I thought it better to get interest for it for that time, than let it lie idle. The enclosed receipt will show you, that I have succeeded with the first bill that was due, but I doubt if it will be practicable with the rest.

It may be proper to inform you, that I have dismissed my former secretary, Major Thornton, because it was verified to me, that he had received from Mr Wharton a note of hand for five hundred pounds, payable on war taking place in such a time. This afforded so strong a suspicion, that they who are now his accusers had seduced him into this gambling society, and probably for the purpose of betraying my secrets in the Spanish negotiation, that I thought it prudent to supply his place with another, and have chosen the Rev. Hezekiah Ford, of the State of Virginia, and chaplain to the 3d and 5th regiments of North Carolina troops, in the service of the United States. We have administered to him an oath of secrecy and fidelity, which from his character I have every reason to believe he will religiously observe. The present moment is as totally barren of news, as times of the most perfect tranquillity.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

JAMES GARDOQUI TO ARTHUR LEE.

Madrid, September 28th, 1778.

Sir,

A severe illness, which almost reduced me to the last, has prevented my giving you punctual answers to your favors down to the 1st instant; but embracing the first moments of my recovery, I have to say, that I am afraid I did not explain my sentiments clearly in my last. The hints given you were purely mine, and as a friend who wishes the best to both, in order that you might make use of them as you thought proper, and of course I cannot say anything about your powers and treaties, being things out of my way, with which it would be improper for me to meddle. I wish most heartily, that things may be accommodated happily for both parties, so I pray consider this as such, as I should be sorry, that hints given you without either design or authority should be thought otherwise, or meet with results of consequence.

In this same light, and as a sincere friend, who wishes the best intelligence between your constituents and this side, I have now to add, that the capture of the Swedish ship, the Henrica Sofia, Captain P. Held, loaded with Spanish property, and bound from London to Teneriffe, by Captain Cunningham of the Revenge privateer, has occasioned the utmost disgust on this side. I would, therefore, recommend to you not only the immediate release of said vessel, but likewise to give the strictest orders to said Cunningham to pay more regard to the territories of this Kingdom, and to the Spanish flag, for there has been such complaints about his conduct, that I hear orders have been sent to the several ports to prevent his entry; besides which, there are rumors, that he is not properly an American privateer, being manned by French adventurers, who, with their commander, have acted contrary to the law of nations.

Some of my friends, with whom I tried to raise a sum for you, desire to know the length of time you want it, the interest you will allow, and whether you will pay said interest in tobacco, and at what price it will be reckoned in Bilboa, with all other particulars that may offer to you; so I wish you to let me know, if agreeable, that I may let them see it, observing, that I judge we may raise a part, though not the two million of livres, which you desired of me; I would also know whether you will want the money in France or Spain.

I am with sincere esteem, your most obedient humble servant,

JAMES GARDOQUI.

TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Chaillot, September 28th, 1778.

Sir,

I had the honor of your Excellency’s letter of the 23d. I should not trouble you with an answer, did it not appear to me necessary to show, that the blame it imputes to me is by no means merited. For that purpose your Excellency will permit me to remind you of what is the fact, that I was not present when the conversation relative to M. Holker, to which your Excellency refers passed between you and my colleagues. I imagine too it arose accidentally, as the intention of conversing on that subject was not communicated to me.

With regard to the duties, my knowledge of them arose from a transaction of my own as Commissioner for Spain, in which my colleagues had no concern. I have always been so sensible of the impropriety of one Commissioner acting, or being acted with, for the whole, in what regards their deputation here, as scrupulously to avoid setting the example. Therefore I entirely agree with your Excellency, that such a precedent should never be permitted.

It was not my intention to make any complaint about the duties, which were probably imposed for wise purposes, but to offer my opinion to your Excellency of what I conceived might be beneficial to that union, which my connexion and myself have always been most zealous in advising, and for the permanency of which, it is therefore natural that I should be particularly anxious.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Paris, September 30th, 1778.

Gentlemen,

Since I wrote you the 9th of this month, no step has been taken either by our enemies or allies of moment enough to advise you of; nor has any material event happened in Europe, insomuch that times of the profoundest peace could not possibly be more barren. This arises from the general reluctance to war, which, though all are preparing for, no one seems to desire. The fate of this campaign with you will determine whether we shall have immediate offers of peace or continuance of war. If their fleets and armies maintain their ground, or gain any advantage, they will continue the war, and wait for something in the chapter of accidents, which is the sole resource of the Ministers.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

TO JAMES GARDOQUI.

Paris, October 6th, 1778.

Sir,

I have not had the pleasure of any answer from you to mine of the 22d of August. I am afraid that the total silence of your friends about taking an open part with us, when all the impediments, which you know were stated, are removed, will make bad impressions on the minds of my countrymen, and transfer all their gratitude to those who have declared in their favor. And this more especially, as one of the English Commissioners, Governor Johnstone, had pledged his honor publicly to prove, that Spain disapproved of, and endeavored to prevent, the declaration of France in our favor.

If to stop the effusion of human blood, and all the shocking calamities attending a war like this, be worthy of a pious prince; if to prevent the chances of war from having any influence in preventing the dismemberment of the British Empire, and the humiliation of their pride be an object worthy of a political prince; if to drive the English immediately from America, and receive a portion of her independent commerce, be an advantage to the crown and people of Spain, this is the moment for its monarch to decide and enforce those events by an immediate declaration of our independency, and an union of force, which must be irresistible.

The last certain accounts from America announce preparations for an assault upon Rhode Island, on the 16th of August. It was already invested both by sea and land, and the enemy had been obliged to burn several of their vessels, and among the rest one of twentysix guns.

The report is, that the Island is taken, for a confirmation of which we wait with much anxiety. The loss of it would deprive the enemy of their port for wintering their navy, and oblige them to abandon New York.

I hope to receive good tidings from you soon, and have the honor to be, with great esteem, Sir, your most obedient servant,

ARTHUR LEE.

TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, October 12th, 1778.

Sir,

Your Excellency has seen in the separate and secret act, signed the 6th of February, 1778, that I am charged with full powers to conclude a treaty with Spain. You are also acquainted with my having been in Spain, and having had conferences with the Marquis de Grimaldi on this subject.

All the objections, which were then alleged against an immediate declaration, are now removed. The consistency of our cause is unquestionable. France is ready, and has actually declared. Their treasure is safe, and the fleet from Buenos Ayres is in their harbors, yet we do not see the least movement on their part towards realising the hopes they gave us; but on the contrary such ostensible measures as they have taken must certainly give encouragement to our enemies. That Court has not thought proper to take the least notice of the ratification of the separate and secret article, which I announced to them. While we are therefore bound, they remain at liberty.

All this, Sir, gives me much uneasiness. I am apprehensive, that Congress will not think this mode of acting very satisfactory; and that the encouragement, that it must hold out to the Court of London, will prolong this pernicious war, and make it cost us much more blood and treasure than is necessary to tie the hands of our common enemy, and establish effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, of the United States.

In these very critical circumstances I must have recourse to the King and to your Excellency. Our cause is common, and it is my wish to conduct it by your experience, your lights, and your counsel, as to the measure I am to take, whether it be to act or to wait. This would always be my desire; but I consider it now as my duty; for it appears to be the mutual sentiment of your Court and of Congress, that the eventual treaty signed at Paris, the 6th of February, is now become actual, permanent, and indissoluble. The first article of that treaty says, “That if war should break out between France and Great Britain, during the continuance of the present war between the United States and Great Britain, his Majesty and the United States will make it a common cause, and will aid each other with their mutual good offices, counsels, and forces, according to the exigency of things, and as becomes good and faithful allies.”

It is upon these principles, that I think it my duty to endeavor to place upon an equal footing the interests of France, and those of the United States; and therefore not to commence anything without the concurrence of your Court. Upon the same principles, I flatter myself with obtaining the aid and assistance of your wisdom and information, as to the moment of commencing the measures to be taken, and the means to be employed, with the Court of Spain.

I am persuaded, and always was so, that Great Britain cannot make head for a year against the united counsels and force of the House of Bourbon and the United States of America.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO ARTHUR LEE.

Translation.

Versailles, October 17th, 1778.

Sir,

I have received the letter you did me the honor to write to me the 12th instant. I have examined its contents with that attention, which is due to the interest I take in every thing that respects the prosperity of the United States, and it is my opinion, that you will act prudently in suspending the measures you wish to take at the Court of Madrid, with the view of ascertaining its principles and resolutions with regard to America.

I have the honor to be, &c.

DE VERGENNES.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Paris, October 19th, 1778.

Gentlemen,

Our affairs in Holland, both as to the treaty and loan, are in a promising state. The King of Naples and of Sicily has declared to us in form, by his Ambassador here, that his ports are open to all vessels belonging to the United States. As the success of our cause gains ground daily in the opinion of mankind, I imagine this winter will produce us some more declared friends among the European powers.

The enemy appears to have no system about continuing the war, or ending it on the terms which Congress has marked out to them. A little success in privateering, since the commencement of hostilities, has given a momentary exhilaration to their depressed spirits; and the expectation of a speedy peace, which is artfully circulated by Ministerial agents, keeps them from entirely sinking.

I find by a specimen, which did not reach me until the goods were shipped, that I have been most egregiously imposed upon in the fusils sent from Berlin. I mean to complain of it to the king of Prussia’s Minister, as it was the king’s contractor that furnished them by his order. The impositions, that we daily meet with, are in consequence of an opinion prevailing among individuals, that as we are not acknowledged they may do it with impunity.

No movements yet on the part of Spain. I have consulted Count de Vergennes on the propriety of my taking any measures to bring that Court to a decision; his advice is in these words. “My opinion is, that you will act prudently to suspend the advances, which you desire to make to that Court, with the view of ascertaining its principles and resolutions with regard to America.”

Agreeably to this advice, I shall wait the positive orders of Congress, unless some change of circumstances should make it evidently prudent and necessary for me to act before they arrive.

I beg my humble duty may be recommended to Congress, and have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

TO BARON DE SCHULENBURG.

Chaillot, October 21st, 1778.

Sir,

Your Excellency had the goodness to write me on the 16th of January last, in the following words. “As to the fusils and other arms of our manufacture, you will have liberty to purchase them, and the bankers Splittgerber, who have charge of the fabrication of arms, will be instructed to deliver to you whatsoever may be demanded on your part. I subjoin a note of the prices, which are the same as the king pays, and add, that the fusils for the infantry may be had at a little lower price, if regard is only had to the solidity of the work, without insisting on that exact uniformity which the king requires.”

In consequence of this, I ordered eight hundred fusils for infantry, of the best kind, from the Messrs Splittgerber, and paid them their own price immediately. My intention was to arm a regiment, that the whole army might judge of the superiority of the Prussian model. The fusils were sent by Hamburgh to Bordeaux, and were shipped from thence to America, a case having previously been opened, and a fusil taken out and sent to me. By this specimen, I find that the fusils, so far from being of the sort at present used in his Prussian Majesty’s army, are directly the reverse, and of the worst and most ordinary workmanship that can be imagined. I do assure your Excellency, that they are such as our militia would reject, and appear to me and others, who are competent judges, to be old rejected muskets. The ramrod is not a quarter of an inch in diameter, and the lock holes that receive it narrow and of the same diameter above and below; so that the Prussian manner of charging is impracticable with these fusils. The observation I made a thousand times over of the fusils, which the troops at Berlin used, enables me to assure you, that this is a most egregious imposition in being sent as the same, and I am sure they would not sell in Europe for six livres a piece.

My merchant at Bordeaux, the Commercial Agent of Congress, assures me that he took the fusil, from which I form my judgment, with his own hand out of one of the cases sent from Messrs Splittgerber, through the house of Chapeaurouge at Hamburgh.

I therefore entreat your Excellency to oblige these men to do me justice. I am not so much offended at the imposition, for the money it has defrauded me of, as for the disgrace it will bring on the manufactures of Prussia, and the disappointment of the plan I had formed to introduce them into the United States. The mildest reparation, which I conceive can be demanded of the Messrs Splittgerber, is that they send immediately to Bordeaux, at their own expense, eight hundred fusils, such as are ordered, that is, of the present Prussian form, and the best workmanship. Those, that they have sent, I will order to be sold in America, and the net amount of what they bring shall be paid to them.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO ARTHUR LEE.

Translation.

Versailles, October 24th, 1778.

Sir,

I have received, with great sensibility, the news which you have obtained by the way of Spain. It is a very great fatality, that the unlucky gale of wind separated the squadrons just as Count d’Estaing had joined the English. He then had a superiority, which he must have lost, if the Admirals Byron and Parker have joined Lord Howe. We are very impatient to receive some direct accounts from our Vice Admiral. We flatter ourselves, that the favorable winds will bring some despatches from him. I request you, in the meantime, Sir, to communicate whatever news you may receive through other channels.

I have the honor to be, &c.

DE VERGENNES.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Paris, November 4th, 1778.

Gentlemen,

I wrote you on April the 14th, May the 9th, 20th and 23d, June the 1st, 9th, 15th, 17th, July 6th, 16th, 20th, 28th, 29th, August 21st and 31st, September 9th, and 30th, October 5th and 19th, none of which have been acknowledged or answered. I usually send triplicates of my letters and of all the papers enclosed.[39]

Whether the British cabinet have yet determined upon relinquishing the war in America, I have not been able to learn. This is certain, that they have ordered considerable quantities of clothing and provisions to be made ready for that quarter, which looks as if they intended their fleet and army should winter with you. From their situation at present, and that of Europe, it appears improbable that they can reinforce, or even recruit their army to any effect. Their naval force is so exactly balanced in Europe by that of France alone, that they can hardly venture to detach any more of their fleet against you. It seems, therefore, that you have before you the utmost force that you are likely to contend with.

It serves the purposes of the enemy to propagate reports of aid from Russia, sometimes in ships, sometimes in troops. As far as there is any certainty in political events, you may be assured they will have neither. The plan they adopt for Parliament, which will meet the 26th, will, I imagine, depend much on the representations of Lord Howe and Governor Johnstone, who are both arrived in England.

Should their fleet and army winter in America, it will be a capital object to intercept their provision fleets. For this purpose I shall obtain and transmit to you, from time to time, intelligence of their being collected at Cork, from which you may judge what time they may be expected on the coast.

The whale fishery, which the enemy have established on the coast of Brazil, and which they carry on by men from Nantucket, is likely to become very valuable; and being totally unprotected, it might be destroyed at one blow.

The instruments for abolishing the 11th and 12th articles are exchanged, and that matter entirely settled.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

[39] Several of these letters are missing.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Paris, November 15th, 1778.

Gentlemen,

I am informed, that it is determined in the Cabinet of London not to recall their Commissioners this winter. Governor Johnstone has been very graciously received; Lord Howe not. He conducts himself as one that is discontented, and has not been at Court. It is given out, that Johnstone declares he is possessed of impeachable matter against both the Howes.

I before mentioned, that the enemy was preparing to send out provisions and clothing for their troops, as if it was intended they should remain in America. It is also certain, that they have contracted for twelve thousand tons of shipping for the beginning of next March. They talk of sending over either ten thousand British, or twelve thousand Russians, for the next campaign, which I am assured and believe they have determined to risk.

To sustain this, they affirm very confidently, that a triple alliance offensive and defensive is concluded between Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain. This I believe is at best anticipation. That such an alliance will be the subject of this winter’s negotiation is very probable; perhaps too it may succeed, and that Denmark and Sweden may join. But the good effects of it in favor of our enemy are very problematical. It will inevitably draw forth Spain, which in our part of the question is of much more weight than all the rest. And as to the general war, the league that would be necessarily formed against the other, between the United States, the Empress, France, and Spain, would be the most powerful. I do not count upon Portugal, Naples, Tuscany, and Sardinia, which yet, in all human probability, will join our confederacy. The temper of Holland is such, that the junction of the United Provinces may well be expected, if England has not the wisdom to recede from her claims; and if she does, the Hollanders, having gained the points in trade which they contend for, will render their neutrality perhaps more favorable to us in matters of supply, than an actual confederation.

These are the plans, that must employ the negotiation of all Europe during this winter, which will produce either a general pacification or a general war. The latter is what our enemy is endeavoring to effect. In doing this, by the same fated perversion of understanding, which has happily prevailed in all their measures, they are laboring to secure what they wish to subvert, the absolute independency of America. For there never was a political event more manifest and sure, than that a general war must involve in it the independence of the United States, as an inevitable consequence.

The obtaining money in Europe is doubtful, though not desperate. But this seems very probable, that if the irritation and ill humor in Holland is continued by England’s persisting in the interruption of their trade, they will lend us money out of revenge; and if England retracts, the Dutch will send us such plentiful supplies, and take in return our produce as in a great measure to compensate for the want of funds. The dispute seems to be in such a state, that there is no medium. I am therefore in hopes, that if the war should continue, the distress of it will press with much more severity upon our enemies than on us.

I am informed, that a Swedish ship, the Henrica Sofia, Captain P. Held, loaded with Spanish property, bound from London to Teneriffe, has been taken by Captain Cunningham in the Revenge, which being considered in Spain as a violence done to them, has given great offence. I have assured them, that upon its being made to appear in the Admiralty Court in America, that the property is neutral, it will be restored, with such damages as are just. The Court of Spain is so much offended at Captain Cunningham’s conduct before this, that they write me orders have been sent to all their ports to prohibit his entrance. From the beginning to the end of this business of Cunningham, it has been so bad, that Congress only can correct it, by punishing those who are concerned. It has cost the public more than one hundred thousand livres, and embroiled us both with the French and Spanish Courts.

The State of Virginia having sent for arms and artillery necessary for their defence, and some advances being absolutely necessary to obtain the supply, I ventured to advance fifty thousand livres out of the public funds in my hands. Had not this demand pressed so much, I certainly should not have done this without the permission of Congress. But as it is, and though I expect the reimbursement before the articles I have ordered for the public will call for payment, yet I think it my duty to communicate this transaction, and submit it to the censure of Congress. I expect a complete cargo is by this time shipped in my department, consisting of blankets, shoes, tentcloth, sailcloth, and rigging for a vessel of five hundred tons. This cargo, with what went before, should contain ten thousand blankets. I have ordered twenty thousand more, which, with half of the freight, I am obliged to advance for the above cargo, will more than employ all the funds in my hands.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

_P. S._ _November 18th, 1778._ Every hour’s intelligence confirms the opinion, that the enemy will not obtain any Russian auxiliaries.

TO JAMES GARDOQUI.

Paris, December 4th, 1778.

Dear Sir,

I wrote you on the 10th ult. and have not been favored with anything from you since. Upon a supposition, that I should have funds sufficient in my hands, I desired your house to collect 20,000 or 30,000 blankets, which I intended to pay for without troubling our friends with you. But I find the clothing, shoes and stockings, which I was obliged to send from hence, have consumed most part of the money remitted to me, so that I shall be unable to pay for those blankets. Yet they are an article most essential to our army both in winter and summer. I must therefore beg you to beseech our friends to extend their order to them, and have them shipped as fast as they are collected by your house, _on the old plan_.

In consequence of what passed when we were at Burgos and Vitoria, I wrote that our vessels would be received at the Havanna, as those of the most favored nation. It is desired to know whether, under this, the produce of the States may be carried thither for sale, and prizes sold there or in any other of his Catholic Majesty’s ports in America. I shall be much obliged to you to get me an explanation on this head, as we would wish to avoid giving embarrassment or offence, by extending the liberty further than is meant. The ports being open in this manner would be certainly beneficial to both, but I am no judge how far it would be consistent with the policy of your commercial regulations.

Count d’Estaing’s fleet was refitted, and ready to sail from Boston the 3d of November. His officers and sailors have behaved there with the greatest decorum, and rendered themselves exceedingly agreeable to the inhabitants. The fray, of which our enemies make so much, was entirely accidental, and owing to some privateersmen wanting to get biscuit for a cruise. The readiness of our enemies to hope, from every little incident, a dissolution of our foreign connexions, serves only to show how much they apprehend from a continuance of them.

There is no certain intelligence of the enemy’s fleet or army.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

TO THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Paris, December 5th, 1778.

Gentlemen,

I had the honor of writing you on the 14th of April, May the 9th, 20th, and 23d, June the 1st, 9th, 15th, and 17th, July the 6th, 16th, 20th, 28th, and 29th, August the 21st, and 31st, September the 9th and 30th, October the 5th and 19th, November the 4th, 18th and 20th, with various enclosures, among which were triplicates of Mr Williams’s accounts, and quadruplicates of the state of the Swiss militia.

From Lord Suffolk’s speech on the address, it appears, that they have adopted a dernier plan for conducting the war against you, which, I am informed, is to burn and destroy every thing they approach. The example of Colonel Butler is to be pursued on all the frontiers accessible to the Indians, to whom small bodies of regulars are to be joined. The fleet and armies are to lay waste the sea coast and its vicinities. Lord Suffolk is the mouth of the king of Great Britain, and his advisers, Lords Bute and Mansfield, and Mr Wedderburne. What he says may therefore be depended on as their resolution.

From the enclosed piece (copies of which have been sent from Holland) you will be able to judge of the nature and situation of the dispute in Holland. The friends to themselves and us are for augmenting their marine, the purchased advocates of England, and the dependants of the Stadtholder, are for increasing their army.

To make them and other neutral nations feel the necessity of supporting the privileges of their flags against the English, this Court has declared its determination to make prize of all goods belonging to the enemy, found in neutral ships, as long as the same is permitted to be done by the British cruisers, with regard to the effects of France in the same situation. This is such a blow to their interests as, it is imagined, must rouse the Dutch to vigorous exertions against Great Britain, in support of their privileges as common cruisers.

The Court of Spain has published its intention of admitting the sale of prizes, made by the French, and the entrance of all American vessels upon the footing of all other neutral nations.

The Empress of Russia has determined to take part with the King of Prussia in the German war, which the House of Austria seems resolved to support against their united forces. As Hanover, and the other German princes, are pledged to assist Prussia, our enemy can hardly expect any aid from thence. Though it is therefore impossible to conceive how they can maintain the war in their very exhausted state, and without one effectual ally, yet it is certain, that they mean to try another campaign.

I send you some charts of the Continent of America, and of the Islands, lately published, and reckoned extremely accurate, from which perhaps Congress may think proper to have others engraved for the use of the navy. They consist of three volumes folio, with a quarto volume of directions.

We are in daily expectation of the final pleasure of Congress, on the several important matters relating to our missions.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ARTHUR LEE.

TO COUNT DE FLORIDA BLANCA.[40]

Paris, December 17th, 1778.

Sir,

I have the honor of enclosing to your Excellency a true copy of a proclamation and manifesto lately issued in America by the British Commissioners. The plan of desolation and cruelty announced in it has been approved in Parliament, by one of his Britannic Majesty’s principal Secretaries of State, the Earl of Suffolk; and a majority in both Houses of Parliament have given their sanction to the manifesto itself by refusing to disclaim it. Upon these grounds it may justly be considered the act of the nation.

The intentions of Great Britain, derogatory at once of all the sacred rights of humanity, and of the honor of God, and of the established laws of civilized nations, are thus declared in the manifesto. “The policy as well as the benevolence of Great Britain have thus far checked the _extremes of war_, when they tended to distress a people still considered as our fellow subjects, and _to desolate_ a country shortly to become again a source of mutual advantage. But when that country professes the unnatural design, not only of estranging herself from us, but of mortgaging herself and her resources to our enemy, the whole contest is changed, and the question is how far Great Britain may, by every means in her power, destroy or render useless a connexion contrived for her ruin, and for the aggrandizement of France. Under such circumstances, the laws of self-preservation must direct the conduct of Great Britain; and if the British Colonies are to become an accession to France, will direct her to render that acquisition of as little avail as possible to her enemy.”

The pretext here alleged for carrying war to all extremities, which the laws of humanity and of nations forbid, and of _desolating_ merely for the purpose of desolation, is, that the country is to be monopolised by France. That this is merely a pretext is manifest from the treaty itself on which they ground it, in which it is declared, that the United States are at liberty to make the same treaty with all nations.

Your Excellency knows too, how unjust this imputation is in our most secret transactions. By one of those strange absurdities, into which men blinded by bad passions are often betrayed, they denounce this desolation against the people at large, who they in the same breath assert have not ratified the treaty. Thus, if we are to credit their own assertions, the ground of their rage is pretended, and the objects of it innocent.

It is therefore most clear, that the threatened cruelties are not out of policy, but out of revenge. And as nothing is more odious than this spirit, nothing more dangerous to all that is deemed dear and sacred among men, than an open avowal of such a principle, and an exercise of the barbarities which it suggests, such a conduct ought to arm all nations against a people, whose proceedings thus proclaim them to be _hostis humani generis_.

It is not that they can add to the cruelties they have already exercised; desolation and massacre have marked their steps wherever they could approach. The sending of those captives, whom they pretend now to be their fellow subjects, into perpetual slavery in Africa and India; the crowding of their captives into dungeons, where thousands perish by disease and famine; the compelling of others, by chains and stripes, to fight against their country and their relations; the burning of defenceless towns; and the exciting of the savages, by presents and bribes, to massacre defenceless frontier families, without distinction of age or sex, are extremities of cruelty already practised, and which they cannot exceed. But the recovery of what they called their rights, and the reduction of those who had renounced as they alleged a just supremacy, was then avowedly the object of the war. These cruelties were, it was pretended, incidental severities, and necessary to the attainment of a just object. But now destruction alone is the object. It is not profit to themselves, but injuries to others, which they are pursuing. Desolation for the pleasure of destroying is their only purpose. They will sacrifice to disappointed vengeance what their injustice lost, and their power cannot regain.