Chapter II: The Military State of North America (9)

"Permit me to entreat your Excellency, therefore, to enable
me to transmit by him such intelligence to Congress, as may
relieve them from their present distressing doubts and
uncertainties.

"I sincerely hope it may be such as may make them happy in a
prospect of soon seeing an intimate and lasting union
established between France, Spain, and the United States, a
union which, by being raised on the solid foundation of
mutual interest and reciprocal advantages, may secure to each
the blessings of uninterrupted tranquillity. This generous
policy pervades the treaties already formed between his Most
Christian Majesty and the United States, and I am happy in
being persuaded, that the magnanimity of his Catholic
Majesty's conduct towards my country, on this and other
occasions, will furnish materials for some bright pages in
the American annals.

"I have the honor to be, Sir, &c.

JOHN JAY."

Here follow the propositions alluded to, and sent enclosed in the preceding letter.

"St Ildefonso, September 22d, 1781.

"As the time allowed Mr Jay for offering such propositions,
as may become the basis of the proposed treaty between his
Catholic Majesty and the United States of North America, is
very short, he should fear the consequences of haste and
inaccuracy, if he were not persuaded that the candor, with
which they will be received, will secure him from the
inconveniences to which these circumstances might otherwise
expose him.

"Mr Jay presumes that it is not expected he should offer a
plan of a treaty drawn at length, but only general
propositions, which may be so modified and enlarged, as on
due consideration and discussion may appear expedient. With
this view, he begs leave to present the following as the
basis of a treaty of amity and alliance, viz.

PROPOSITIONS.

I.

"There shall forever subsist an inviolable and universal
peace and friendship between his Catholic Majesty and the
United States, and the subjects and citizens of both.

II.

"That every privilege, exemption, and favor, with respect to
commerce, navigation, and personal rights, which now are, or
hereafter may be granted, by either, to any the most favored
nation, be also granted by them to each other.

III.

"That they mutually extend to the vessels, merchants, and
inhabitants of each other, all that protection, which is
usual and proper between friendly and allied nations.

IV.

"That the vessels, merchants, or other subjects of his
Catholic Majesty, and the United States, shall not resort to,
or be permitted (except in cases which humanity allows to
distress,) to enter into any of those ports or dominions of
the other, from which the most favored nation shall be
excluded.

V.

"That the following commerce be prohibited, and declared
contraband between the subjects of his Catholic Majesty and
the United States, viz.

"All such as his Catholic Majesty may think proper to
specify.

REMARKS. "On this proposition Mr Jay can offer nothing, but
an assurance of his being ready to concur in every reasonable
regulation that may be proposed.

VI.

"The United States shall relinquish to his Catholic Majesty,
and in future forbear to use, or attempt to use, the
navigation of the river Mississippi from the thirtyfirst
degree of north latitude, that is, from the point where it
leaves the United States, down to the ocean.

REMARKS. "The impression made upon the United States by the
magnanimity of his Majesty's conduct towards them; the
assistance they hope to receive from the further exertions of
the same magnanimity; the deep wound which an alliance with
so great a monarch would give to the hopes and efforts of the
enemy; the strong support it would afford to their
independence; the favorable influence which the example of
such a King would have on other nations, and the many other
great and extensive good consequences which would result at
this interesting period from his Majesty's taking so noble
and decided a part in their favor, have all conspired in
prevailing upon Congress to offer to relinquish in his favor,
the enjoyment of this territorial and national privilege, the
importance of which, to their constituents, can only be
estimated by the value they set upon his Majesty's
friendship.

"By this proposition, the United States offer to forego all
the advantages and conveniences, which nature has given to
the country bordering on the upper parts of that river, by
ceasing to export their own, and receiving in return the
commodities of other countries by that only channel, thereby
greatly reducing the value of that country, retarding its
settlement, and diminishing the benefits which the United
States would reap from its cultivation.

"Mr Jay thinks it his duty frankly to confess, that the
difficulty of reconciling this measure to the feelings of
their constituents, has appeared to Congress in a serious
light, and they now expect to do it, only by placing in the
opposite scale the gratitude due to his Catholic Majesty, and
the great and various advantages, which the United States
will derive from the acknowledgment and generous support of
their independence by the Spanish monarchy, at a time when
the vicissitudes, dangers, and difficulties of a distressing
war, with a powerful, obstinate, and vindictive nation,
renders the friendship and avowed protection of his Catholic
Majesty in a very particular manner interesting to them. The
offer of this proposition, therefore, being dictated by these
expectations and this combination of circumstances, must
necessarily be limited by the duration of them, and
consequently, that if the acceptance of it should, together
with the proposed alliance, be postponed to a general peace,
the United States will cease to consider themselves bound by
any propositions, or offers, which he may now make in their
behalf.

"Nor can Mr Jay omit mentioning the hopes and expectations of
Congress, that his Majesty's generosity and greatness of
mind will prompt him to alleviate, as much as possible, the
disadvantages to which this proposition subjects the United
States, by either granting them a free port, under certain
restrictions, in the vicinity, or by such other marks of his
liberality and justice, as may give him additional claims to
the affection and attachment of the United States.

VII.

"That his Catholic Majesty shall guaranty to the United
States all their respective territories.

VIII.

"That the United States shall guaranty to his Catholic
Majesty all his dominions in North America.

Lastly.

"As the aforegoing propositions appear to Mr Jay the most
essential, he omits proposing those less and subordinate
ones, which seem to follow of course. He therefore concludes
this subject with a general offer and propositions to make
and admit all such articles as, in the course of this
negotiation, shall appear conducive to the great objects of
the proposed treaty.

REMARKS. "Nothing on Mr Jay's part shall be wanting to
expedite the happy conclusion of this business, by adhering
constantly to the dictates of candor, frankness, and
unsuspecting confidence.

"He is ready to receive the treaty between the United States
and his Christian Majesty, as a model for this, or with such
alterations as, founded on the principles of reciprocity, may
be more agreeable to his Catholic Majesty, it being his
earnest desire to arrive at the important objects of his
mission in any way his Majesty may be pleased to prefer.

"The subject of aids, either by subsidy or loan as may be
most convenient to his Majesty, will require a particular
convention, but as the manner, extent, and terms depend on
his Majesty's pleasure, it is impossible for Mr Jay, without
some knowledge of it, to offer propositions adapted thereto.
All that he can at present say on that subject is, that
Congress are ready to do everything in their power. He will
not, however, endeavor to conceal their incapacity to do much
in the way of compensation, while the enemy shall continue to
make the United States the theatre of a desolating war, and
the object of their predatory operations. But when those
obstacles shall cease, it will be in their power, as well as
their inclination, to make retribution, and render important
services to his Majesty. Mr Jay will therefore continue to
decline attempting to induce his Majesty to take any
measures, however favorable to his country, by delusive
promises, or rash engagements; but on the other hand, he is
ready to enter into such reasonable ones, as he may have good
reason to say shall be faithfully and punctually performed.

"A particular treaty regulating the conduct to be observed by
his Catholic Majesty, and the United States, towards each
other during the war, also appears to Mr Jay important to
both; but as the proper plans and articles of such a treaty
can only result from a free conference on the subject, he can
upon this occasion only express his readiness to concur in
every provision, which may be calculated to give energy and
success to the operations and objects of both.

JOHN JAY."

Your Excellency will be pleased to observe, that among my remarks on the sixth proposition, I have limited the duration of the offer contained in it. I did this from a persuasion, that such limitation was not only just and reasonable in itself, but absolutely necessary to prevent this Court's continuing to delay a treaty to a general peace. Besides what the Minister dropped upon this head in his conference with me at Aranjues, I think it probable that they still wish to adhere to that idea. To me they appear desirous of avoiding the expense that the aids, which a treaty we should expect would render unavoidable, and which at present would not be very convenient for them. They wish to see our independence established, and yet not be among the first to subscribe a precedent, that may one day be turned against them. They wish not to exclude themselves, by any present engagements, from taking advantage of the chances and events of the war, not choosing on the one hand, that in case we sink, that we should be fastened to them by any particular ties, nor on the other hand, in case we survive the storm, to be so circumstanced as not to make the most of us. I think it is their design, therefore, to draw from us all such concessions as our present distress, and the hopes of aid may extort, and by protracting negotiations about the treaty, endeavor to avail themselves of these concessions at a future day, when our inducements to offer them shall have ceased. As this would evidently be unjust, I think the limitation in question can give them no offence, and I hope Congress will be pleased to communicate to me their sentiments on the subject.

I must also remark, that after what has passed, and considering how well they are acquainted with my instructions, it would not only have been useless, but absurd, to have made these propositions otherwise than agreeably to those instructions.

Congress may at first view be a little surprised at the extent of the fifth proposition, but when they compare it with the second, I am persuaded they will find it sufficiently restrained.

In forming these propositions, it was my determination to leave them so free from disputed, or disputable points, as that no plausible pretexts for delay should arise from the face of them. I am well apprised, nevertheless, that in the course of the negotiation, it will be impossible for me to prevent their practising as much procrastination as they may find convenient. Almost the only hope I have of their seriously doing business arises from their fearing, that the instruction respecting the Mississippi will be recalled the moment that either any very decided successes on our part in America may render a treaty with Spain of less importance to us, or a general treaty of peace give us different views and prospects.

These are my conjectures and opinions. Perhaps they may prove erroneous; as facts accompany them, Congress will be enabled to judge for themselves. I will add, that from everything I can hear, the King is honestly disposed to do us good, and were he alone to be consulted in this business, I believe it would soon be concluded.

On the 23d of September, the foregoing propositions were to be laid before the King. I heard nothing further from the Minister until the 27th, when he sent me the following note.

Translation.

"Although the last letter of Mr Jay, accompanied with a
certain plan, was transmitted on Saturday in the evening to
the Count de Florida Blanca, and although he could not inform
himself of their contents until translated from the English,
he nevertheless did not fail to render an account thereof to
the King in his despatch of Sunday. His Majesty having then
shown himself disposed to appoint some person to confer with
Mr Jay, it is become necessary to prepare a suitable
instruction, and present it to the King for his approbation.
The Count de Florida Blanca flatters himself, that he shall
be able to arrange this affair before the departure of the
Count for the Escurial, and in the meanwhile, he has the
honor to transmit to Mr Jay a passport for Major Franks.

"_Thursday, September 27th, 1781._"

I have been given to understand, though not officially, that M. Del Campo, the Minister's Secretary, is the person who will be appointed to confer with me, and though that gentleman is constantly about the Minister, yet it seems, that a set of formal instructions are to be prepared for him. When the Minister will be able to find either time or health to complete them is uncertain.

There is reason to believe, that still less progress would have been made in this affair, had Major Franks not have arrived. I regret his detention, but hope the reasons assigned for it will be deemed sufficient; I am perfectly satisfied with him.

Notwithstanding Congress had given me reason to expect, that the plan of drawing bills upon me had been laid aside, I have now bills to the amount of between seventy and eighty thousand dollars to pay, and no funds provided. What am I to do? Dr Franklin writes me, that so far from being able to give me further aids, he does not expect to have it in his power even to pay our salaries in future.

From the facts stated in this letter, Congress will perceive that this Court neither refuse nor promise to afford us further aid. Delay is their system; when it will cease I cannot conjecture, for that is a question which I doubt whether they themselves have as yet determined.

I am indebted largely to Mr Harrison for money advanced by him to distressed seamen. He ought to be paid, and it is so far from being in my power to do it, that I have been reduced to the mortifying necessity of desiring him for the present to hold his hand. A great many of this valuable class of people are confined in English gaols, without other means of obtaining their enlargement than by entering into the enemy's service. They complain bitterly of being neglected by their country, and I really think not without reason. Retaliation ought to be practised, and if we have not a sufficient number of marine officers and seamen in our power to make the objects of it, why would it be improper to substitute landsmen?

As to Portugal, I have more than once spoken to the Minister on the subject. He admits the justice of our being treated by that as by other neutral nations. He has promised to interfere in our behalf, but nothing efficacious has yet been done. To send an agent there, could do no harm, and might do good; I am therefore for it. The Ambassador of France thinks with me, that before that step is taken, it ought to be confidentially communicated to this Court, and I am persuaded difficulties will arise from it. I shall do my best.

M. Gardoqui's departure is uncertain. He is still attending the orders of the Court. I doubt his receiving them till the campaign closes, and perhaps not then.

I do not despair of seeing some good result, finally, from all this complication of political solecisms. It would not surprise me if we should in the end be the gainers by them. My greatest fears are about the fate of the bills. If protested, for want of payment, they will become the source of much evil.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

_P. S._ I have this instant received a letter from Commodore Gillon, dated at Corunna, the 28th of September, and one from Colonel Searle of the 26th of September. I herewith enclose copies of them. Their contents are interesting. J. J.

FOOTNOTES:

[30] See these letters at large in the _Secret Journal of Congress_, Vol. II. pp. 323, 326. The latter was drawn up by Mr Madison.

[31] Secret Journal of Congress, Vol. II. p. 393.

[32] Secret Journal of Congress, Vol. II. p. 404.

[33] See this letter above, p. 449.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Madrid, October 18th, 1781.

Sir,

Major Franks delivered me the despatches committed to his care on the 30th of August. He set out for France the 5th instant. My letters by him to your Excellency will account for his remaining here so long. I also beg leave to refer to them for other more interesting particulars.

Congress will doubtless be informed that I have refused to accept some of their bills. As the enemies of America in Europe had, with some success, endeavored to render the credit of our paper suspected, it appeared to me expedient to state the reasons for these refusals very particularly, and I caused them to be recited at large in the protests. I have sent copies of them to Dr Franklin and Mr Adams, that in case these transactions should be represented to our disadvantage, either in France or Holland, they might be enabled to set the matter right. I now send copies to Congress, to prevent their being alarmed at any general report that may arrive in America, of my having refused to accept their bills drawn upon me.

Our merchants would, in my opinion, do well to write their endorsements on bills at length, and in their own hand writing. There is reason to believe that the enemy often turn blank endorsements to good account.

M. Gardoqui is here. Those ships of the Spanish flotilla, which carried the treasure, are arrived at Cadiz. Trenches are not yet opened against Fort St Philip at Minorca. Another expedition is preparing at Cadiz; its destination is uncertain.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.

Philadelphia, November 1st, 1781.

Dear Sir,

Your letter to Congress of April last having been read and answered by them, though not so minutely as I would wish, I forbear making any remarks upon it, because I am not yet perfectly acquainted with their sentiments, (and would not wish any which might interfere with them) having just entered upon the office, in consequence of which I open this correspondence, though long since appointed. I beg of you, agreeably to the directions of Congress, to address in future your public letters to me, and to notify the Count de Florida Blanca of this alteration in our system, our unacknowledged situation rendering it improper to do it formally.

Congress have at length completed the organization of their executive departments, by the choice of General Lincoln for their Secretary at War. It is expected that order and system will arise out of this mode of doing business, and the strictest economy.

If the great powers of Europe, with every advantage that settled governments enjoy, feel themselves under the necessity of making foreign loans, can it be expected that a war of six years, in the heart of our country, should not have abridged the resources of a State, which had every necessary for their army to import; which never manufactured for itself; which had no marine; and which, with a number of internal enemies in their bosom, had civil governments to establish? Perhaps it would be impossible to offer a better picture of the resources of this country, and the stability of her funds when they shall be well managed, than by comparing our present debt with the duration of the war and the exertions we have made. For though our enemies may allege, that our debt was relieved by the depreciation of our bills, yet it must be remembered, that that very depreciation was a tax, though an unequal one, borne by the people of these States, and as it has not produced national ruin, it must follow, that the States had sufficient resources to bear this burthen. These resources, though lessened, still remain.

The only object for which Britain continues the war, is the recovery of this country. What better plan of finance then can be adopted by France or Spain, than by timely aids of ships and money to blast this hope, and by a speedy peace to terminate their expenses? If, on the contrary, they wish to linger out the war till Britain is more exhausted, this country affords them the easiest means of doing it.

Armies may be maintained here for one third of the expense that Britain lays out upon hers. This France has experienced. Though her affairs were not perhaps managed with the strictest economy, though her bills were extremely low, her supplies cost at least one third less than the British paid at New York, without taking into account the hire of transports, the seamen employed, paid, and fed in that service, and the number of them that fell into our hands. Be persuaded yourself, and endeavor to persuade others, that if this is a war of finance, which all modern wars are, Britain is most vulnerable in America.

I congratulate you upon the important success of our aims in South Carolina and Virginia, of which I enclose you official accounts. On the returns you will remark a number of British American nominal regiments. These were recruiting in Virginia and North Carolina, and their success will show the truth of what Britain advances with respect to the number of her partisans in America. I will venture to say, that with similar advantages, their recruiting parties would have been more successful in any country in Europe. Besides the troops mentioned in the returns, the enemy lost during the siege near two thousand negroes. Previous to the surrender, they had a naval engagement with the Count de Grasse. The Terrible, a British seventyfour, was burnt, so that our affairs here stand upon the most respectable footing imaginable.--[Upwards of thirty lines follow interspersed with a cypher, the key to which is not to be found.]

But this is a delicate subject, and I quit it till I am more fully acquainted with the views of Congress thereon, for I confess to you, that the sentiments I have hazarded are rather my own, than any that I know to be theirs, and should weigh accordingly with you. The provision trade with the Havana being very considerable and important to Spain, while she has fleets and armies to maintain there, it might be proper to suggest to the Spanish Ministry the advantage of allowing small convoys of frigates, which would enable us to carry it on in vessels of greater burden, and by that means diminish the expense of freight and insurance, both of which, eventually, fall upon Spain. A few frigates would answer the purpose, as the stations of the enemy's ships are almost always known on this coast, and, indeed, they seldom have any out but frigates cruising singly.

Another thought strikes me, which, perhaps, if digested, might be ripened into a plan advantageous to France, Spain, and America. While France keeps an army here, she must draw bills, or export money. She has, for the most part, preferred the former, at the loss of forty per cent discount. The money of Spain is lodged at the Havana, and cannot be brought to Europe without great hazard; whereas the risk of sending it here under convoy is extremely small. It may be vested in European bills to such advantage, as to pay the whole expense of transportation, and even an interest, till the bills are negotiated in Europe. This plan affords France a market for her bills, Spain a cheap and easy way of bringing her money home, and America a circulating medium, which enables her to tax with advantage.

The enclosed act of Congress informs you of the appointment of Mr Hanson, of Maryland, to the Presidentship.

I shall write very frequently to you, and shall in return expect that you will omit no opportunity of letting me hear from you. A Court kalendar, if one is printed with you, with notes of your own thereon, might be of some service to us. I shall use our private cypher, as corrected by that sent by Mr Toscan, till you receive the one transmitted by Mr Thomson, in which case, as it is less troublesome, be pleased to use that, if you are sure it came safe.

I am, dear Sir, with the sincerest regard and esteem, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.

Philadelphia, November 28th, 1781.

Dear Sir,

I wrote so fully to you not long since, that I should not trouble you at this time, if I had not determined to omit no opportunity of letting you hear from this side of the water, and enabling you at all times to meet any falsehood the enemy may find it politic to publish.

Since the capture of Cornwallis, nothing very material has happened. The ravaging parties on the northern frontiers have been defeated with great loss by the militia. The armies have taken their stations for the winter quarters; the French, in Virginia and Maryland; our troops, on the Hudson, excepting some detachments under General St Clair, destined to reinforce General Greene. They have orders to take Wilmington in their way, where the enemy have about six hundred men; it is probable they will not wait the attack. General Greene will have men enough to shut up the enemy, but not to force their strong holds. Want of money cramps all our exertions, and prevents our making a glorious winter campaign. The enemy are all shut up on two or three points of land, which is all they possess of the immense country they hope to conquer; and even these they hold by a very precarious tenure. Disaffection, which has languished for some time past, died when Cornwallis surrendered.

Congress are occupied in taking measures for an active campaign; and they feel themselves satisfied with everything both at home and abroad.

Congress have dissolved Mr Adams's powers to make a treaty of commerce with Great Britain; and, as you know, joined Dr Franklin and Mr Laurens in his other commission, if England should at length be wise enough to wish for peace.

The Marquis de Lafayette is the bearer of this. He has promised to convey it with safety to you, and to correspond with you in such a manner as to enable you to avail yourself of the knowledge which he has acquired, that may be of use to you. The resolves of Congress, of which I enclose a copy, show their sense on this subject, and the confidence which they very justly repose in him. His Aid waits for this. Adieu my dear Sir.

Believe me to be, with the highest respect and esteem, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

END OF THE SEVENTH VOLUME.

+--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE. | | | | Omitted words, shown as blank spaces in the original, have been | | transcribed as four hyphens ('----'). | | | | Every effort was made to match the original text. Spelling | | variations between letters have been preserved. Apparent typos | | and misspellings were retained, including the following: | | | | Page Original text | | 47 "supprised" possible misspelling | | 169 "he did not embark till June 1st, 1794 1784? | | 198 "Marquis de La Flolte possible misspelling | | 216 "Jean Guy Guatier" possible misspelling | | 267 "the following is an extrac" possible misspelling | | 285 "May 28th, 1780" date is given as May | | 30th in Table of | | Contents | | 399 sum of Revenues does | | not appear correct | | 400 sum of Expenses does | | not appear correct | | | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+