Chapter VII: Front Matter (7)

As I am to remain in Europe for some time longer, I beg leave to take a cursory view of what appears necessary or expedient to be further done in Europe; for I conceive it to be not only the right but the duty of a Foreign Minister, to advise his Sovereign, according to his lights and judgments, although the more extensive information and superior wisdom of the Sovereign, may frequently see cause to pursue a different conduct.

With Spain no doubt Congress will negotiate by a particular Minister, either the present one or another, and perhaps it would be proper that the same should treat with Naples. With the two Empires, Prussia, Denmark, Portugal, Sardinia and Tuscany, I humbly conceive, it might be proper to negotiate, and perhaps with Hamburg; but there are other powers with whom it is more necessary to have treaties than it ought to be, I mean Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.

I presume that Congress will not think it expedient to be at the expense of sending Ministers to all these powers, if to any. Perhaps in the present state of our finances it may not be worth while to send any. Yet the present time is the best to negotiate with all. I submit it to consideration then, whether it is not advisable to send a commission to such Minister as you judge proper, with full powers to treat with all, to the Ministers now in Paris, or to any others. But I humbly conceive, that if powers to treat with all or any of these States are sent to any of your Ministers now here, it would be for the public good, that they should be sent to all. If Congress can find funds to treat with the Barbary Powers, the Ministers here are the best situated, for they should apply to the Court of Versailles and their High Mightinesses in the first place, that orders should be sent to their Consuls according to treaties to assist us. Ministers here may carry on this negotiation by letters, or may be empowered to send an agent if necessary. I have no private interest in this business. My salary will be the same, my expenses more, and labor much increased by such a measure. But as it is of public importance, I think, that no unnecessary delicacies should restrain me from suggesting these hints to Congress. Whatever their determination may be, will be satisfactory to me.

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, your Excellency's, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

THE

CORRESPONDENCE

OF

JOHN JAY;

MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE COURT OF SPAIN, AND ONE OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR NEGOTIATING PEACE.

John Jay was a member of the first Congress, which assembled at Philadelphia in September, 1774, having been, with four other persons, chosen a delegate from the city and county of New York. He was also in the Congress of the following year, but after the organization of the government of New York he was made Chief Justice of the State, and retired from Congress. On the 21st of October, 1778, even while he held the office of Chief Justice, he was elected by the Assembly a delegate to Congress for a specific object, till the first of March following. The Assembly at the same time declared, that by the constitution of New York both these stations were consistent with each other.

Mr Jay joined the Congress on the 7th of December, and was elected President of that body three days afterwards, as the successor of Henry Laurens. He discharged this office with great dignity and credit to himself till September 27th, 1779, when he was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to negotiate a treaty of amity and alliance with Spain. He sailed for France about the first of November in the same ship with M. Gerard, who had been the late French Minister in the United States. Accidents at sea compelled the Captain of the vessel to put into Martinique, whence Mr Jay sailed in another vessel for Europe, and arrived at Cadiz on the 22d of January, 1780. Here he remained between two and three months, and then proceeded to Madrid, and entered on the duties of his mission.

The two principal objects, which Mr Jay was instructed to obtain, were a grant of aids in money and military supplies from Spain, to assist in prosecuting the war against the common enemy, and a treaty between Spain and the United States. After encountering for more than two years innumerable embarrassments, vexatious delays, cold treatment, and a provoking indifference, that would have exhausted the patience, if not ruffled the temper of most men, he met with very little success in the former object, and none at all in the latter. The Spanish Court seemed nowise inclined to recognize the independence of the United States, or to show them any substantial marks of friendship, and yet there was evidently a willingness to keep on terms, and be prepared to act according to the issue of events. Tardy promises of money were made by the Minister, which he was reluctant to fulfil, and it was with extreme difficulty at last, that Mr Jay succeeded in procuring from his Catholic Majesty the pitiful loan of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars. In the treaty he made no progress, but was put off from time to time, with pretences as frivolous as they were insincere. He was never received in his public capacity, nor in any other character than that of a private gentleman empowered to act as Agent for the United States. In short, it must be confessed, that the conduct of Spain, in regard to this country during the revolutionary war, was not such as to inspire the gratitude or respect of succeeding generations.

Meantime, on the 13th of June, 1781, Mr Jay was chosen one of the Commissioners for negotiating a peace, when the parties at war should be prepared for such an event. Having already made considerable progress with Mr Oswald in the treaty; and being persuaded that the British government were in earnest as to their professed desire for peace, Dr Franklin wrote to Mr Jay requesting him to repair to Paris, and join in the negotiation. He arrived in that city on the 23d of June, 1782, and shortly afterwards engaged in the duties of his commission with his colleague. Mr Adams did not arrive till the 26th of October. The preliminary articles were signed on the 30th of November.

Mr Jay continued in Europe the year following, and signed, with the other Commissioners, the Definitive Treaty, September 3d, 1783. Several months previously he had asked permission to return home, but he did not embark till June 1st, 1794. He arrived in New York on the 24th of July following.

It having been understood that he would soon return, Congress had elected him Secretary of Foreign Affairs on the 7th of May, as successor to Mr Livingston, who had resigned some time before. He accepted this appointment, and took charge of the office, which he filled with the same dignity and ability, that had marked his conduct in every public station.

THE CORRESPONDENCE

OF

JOHN JAY.

INSTRUCTIONS TO JOHN JAY, MINISTER FOR NEGOTIATING
A TREATY WITH SPAIN.

In Congress, September 29th, 1779.

Sir,

By the treaties subsisting between his Most Christian Majesty and the United States of America, a power is reserved to his Catholic Majesty to accede to the said treaties, and to participate in their stipulations, at such time as he shall judge proper, it being well understood, nevertheless, that if any of the stipulations of the said treaties are not agreeable to the Court of Spain, his Catholic Majesty may propose other conditions analogous to the principal aim of the alliance, and conformable to the rules of equality, reciprocity, and friendship. Congress is sensible of the friendly regard to these States manifested by his Most Christian Majesty, in reserving a power to his Catholic Majesty of acceding to the alliance entered into between his Most Christian Majesty and these United States; and, therefore, that nothing may be wanting on their part to facilitate the views of his Most Christian Majesty, and to obtain a treaty of alliance, and of amity and commerce with his Catholic Majesty, have thought proper to anticipate any propositions, which his Catholic Majesty might make on that subject, by yielding up to him those objects, which they conclude he may have principally in view; and for that purpose have come to the following resolution;

That if his Catholic Majesty shall accede to the said treaties, and, in concurrence with France and the United States of America, continue the present war with Great Britain for the purpose expressed in the treaties aforesaid, he shall not thereby be precluded from securing to himself the Floridas; on the contrary, if he shall obtain the Floridas from Great Britain, these United States will guaranty the same to his Catholic Majesty; provided always, that the United States shall enjoy the free navigation of the river Mississippi into and from the sea.

You are, therefore, to communicate to his Most Christian Majesty the desire of Congress to enter into a treaty of alliance, and of amity and commerce with his Catholic Majesty, and to request his favorable interposition for that purpose. At the same time, you are to make such proposal to his Catholic Majesty, as in your judgment, from circumstances, will be proper for obtaining for the United States of America equal advantages with those, which are secured to them by the treaties with his Most Christian Majesty; observing always the resolution aforesaid as the ultimatum of the United States.

You are particularly to endeavor to obtain some convenient port or ports below the thirtyfirst degree of north latitude, on the river Mississippi, for all merchant vessels, goods, wares, and merchandises, belonging to the inhabitants of these States.

The distressed state of our finances, and the great depreciation of our paper money, inclined Congress to hope that his Catholic Majesty, if he shall conclude a treaty with these States, will be induced to lend them money; you are, therefore, to represent to him the great distress of these States on that account, and to solicit a loan of five millions of dollars upon the best terms in your power, not exceeding six per cent per annum, effectually to enable them to co-operate with the allies against the common enemy. But before you make any propositions to his Catholic Majesty for a loan, you are to endeavor to obtain a subsidy in consideration of the guarantee aforesaid.[14]

FOOTNOTE:

[14] The above is the form in which the instructions were reported by a committee.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Pierre's, Martinique, December 20th, 1779.

Sir,

This is the only opportunity of transmitting a letter to Philadelphia since our arrival; and as the route, which this is to take, will be very circuitous and doubtful, it will be short and general.

Having lost our bowsprit, all our masts, and many of our sails, as well as split our rudder, off the Banks of Newfoundland, we steered for this Island, and arrived yesterday afternoon. The Governor and Admiral are at Port Royal. They are informed of our being here, and I shall see them either at this or that place, according as we shall find it to be their intention to come to the one, or remain at the other. Till then, it must continue doubtful, whether we shall be able to obtain a passage in a French frigate, or speedily refit our own; neither of which can be done without the interposition of government.

Two days hence, a vessel will sail for St Eustatia. I shall write more particularly by her, and it is more than probable, that those letters will come to hand before this.

Yesterday, a fleet of twentyfive merchant-men under the convoy of a frigate, bound from France to this place, were attacked on the southern coast of Martinique, near Port Royal, by a number of the enemy's ships of war from St Lucia. Fourteen merchant-men were captured, and two driven on shore. The rest escaped during a very severe action between three line of battle ships under Monsieur le Motte Piquet, (who went from Port Royal to their relief) and double the number of the enemy. This intelligence was communicated to me this morning by the commanding officer here.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Pierre's, Martinique, December 22d, 1779.

Sir,

By a message received yesterday afternoon from the Marquis de Boullie, I find there is no reason to expect him or the Admiral here very soon. We shall, therefore, set out for Port Royal early tomorrow morning, and endeavor to get our ship refitted as soon as possible. She will follow us in a day or two, and, as the enemy's ships of war are frequently cruising near the Island, she will go under convoy; four of them are now in sight of this town.

It seems agreed on all hands, that the expense of refitting the Confederacy will be very considerable. To reduce this matter to greater certainty, I have desired the captain to make out an estimate of his wants; he promised to prepare it, and give me a copy this evening. If I receive it before nine o'clock, it will accompany this letter, otherwise it will be transmitted by the next conveyance.

The agent here tells me, he is without cash, and in debt on the public account. I fear he has been neglected. I shall, however, defer saying anything further on his subject till I shall be better informed. Should an opportunity offer of writing to your Excellency from Port Royal, I shall embrace it, if not, I shall take the first after my return. As the government here will, I hope, advance the money necessary for preparing the frigate for sea, I am anxious that you may have the earliest intelligence of it, that timely provision may be made for the payment.

Of the fleet mentioned in my letter of the 20th instant, only nine were taken or destroyed.

_7 o'clock._--I had written thus far, when Captain Harding called upon me. He has made out an estimate of the ship's wants, and given it to Mr Bingham, without having made a copy for me, which it is now too late to do to go by this vessel.

On our return from Port Royal, the captain will transmit particular accounts of everything respecting the ship, which he ought to communicate. He has been too much engaged to prepare his despatches to go by this vessel, and, therefore, postpones writing for the present, especially as he would have leisure only to repeat the general account of our misfortune contained in my letter.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Pierre's, Martinique, December 24th, 1779.

Sir,

My former letters to your Excellency of the 20th and 22d instant, (a triplicate of the former, and a duplicate of the latter are herewith enclosed) have already informed Congress of the disaster, which imposed upon us the necessity of coming hither. But as that necessity has been and still continues the subject of much inquiry and investigation, it is proper that the facts from which it arose be minutely stated.

On the 7th day of November last, between the hours of five and six in the morning, in latitude 41 03 N. and longitude 50 39 W. the Captain being in bed indisposed, and the master and second lieutenant on deck, the ship going nine knots an hour in a brisk breeze and rough sea, but by no means hard weather, her bowsprit and all her masts gave way in less than three minutes. The day was employed in clearing the ship of the wreck, and getting up a little sail; towards evening a heavy gale came on. During the night, the tiller was lashed fast, and she lay too very well, the wind blowing hard at south east. The next morning the shank of the rudder was found to be so much wrenched and split, that the Captain then told me he thought it a greater misfortune than the loss of the masts. There were two French gentlemen on board, who, it was said, and I believe with truth, were well skilled in maritime affairs, having been bred to that business from their infancy, viz. Monsieur Roche, a Knight of the Order of St Louis, and a Captain Remuy, of Marseilles. Either this day or the next, I am not certain which, M. Gerard remarked to me, that without any previous counsel, it seemed to be the unanimous opinion of all the naval officers on board to go to the West Indies, and that he believed it would be best, though he said he was at first inclined to oppose it. The first expedient to steer the ship was by the cable and a spar; below the split in the rudder there was a bolt with two rings, to which it had been intended to fix a chain for the purpose of steering the ship in case of such accidents, but the fixing the chains had been omitted; through this ring the Captain passed a chain, and to each end of it fastened a strong rope, which was conducted over the quarters, and this was the second mode of steering her; but from the uncommon breadth of the rudder by which its power became unusually great, and the acuteness of the angle between it and the chains rendering a greater force necessary than if it had approached nearer to a right angle; the bolt, though to appearance a good one, broke nearly in the middle, and came out.

It seems the rudder of this ship was hung after she had been launched, and that to do it the more easily an eyebolt had been fixed in each side of the rudder below the shank; to these eyebolts two chains were then fixed, which crossing the edge of the rudder in opposite directions, were fastened to pennants made of cordage, provided for the breechings of our twelve pounders. These pennants passed through blocks at the end of spars, run out of the ports of the cabin. From thence they were led through blocks in opposite ports of the main deck to the capstan, by means of which they were very conveniently managed, and the ship without much difficulty steered. Such however was the force and wear they underwent before our arrival in calmer latitudes and smoother seas, that they generally gave way every day or two; and the Captain tells me, no less than six hundred weight of that cordage has been consumed in that service.

So great was the swell off the Banks, and so high, though not severe the winds, that near a fortnight elapsed before the ship was put in her present condition for sailing. The same obstacles also retarded the repairing of the rudder, which after all was so weak that it was not thought advisable to steer by the tiller, and to prevent any further injury from its striking against the ship, which it constantly did in calm weather, bags stuffed with oakum were placed on each side of it, and a man employed night and day to tend them.

Some days before the 23d day of November, the Captain told me, he thought it advisable to call a council of his officers, and submit to their consideration the propriety of continuing our course towards Europe. M. Gerard shortly after mentioned to me the sitting of this council, and said, he could assure me that the Chevalier Roche and Monsieur Remuy would not give their opinions on the subject but in writing, and on being requested to do it in writing by the Captain. This intelligence appeared to me extraordinary, but as it was not necessary that my sentiments relative to it should be known, I made no reply to M. Gerard, but by degrees turned the conversation to another subject; nor did I give the least hint of it to the Captain, but observed a perfect silence relative to it. It appeared to me that those gentlemen either overrated their importance, or entertained improper ideas of the merit of our officers, and I confess it gave me pleasure to hear that they were not consulted at all.

The council of officers was held the 23d of November last. The Captain gave me their report, together with a return of the provisions and water on board, and assured me of his readiness to proceed to any port whatever, that M. Gerard and myself should direct. I gave these papers to M. Gerard, and although I did not think it expedient by consulting the French officers to give them reason to suppose, that I concurred in sentiments with them as to the importance of their opinions, yet I told M. Gerard, I was well satisfied he should communicate to them the report of our officers, and obtain their sentiments on the question stated in it, and the better to enable him to do it, I proposed that we should postpone the discussion of the subject till the next day, or longer if necessary. He took the papers, said it was very well, and that he would speak to those gentlemen. A day or two after, being on deck, M. Gerard took me aside and gave me the papers, telling me he had seen these gentlemen, and that they both declined giving any opinion about it; that they had always been, and still were, ready to do anything for the benefit of the ship; that had they been requested to give their opinions while the matter was in agitation, they would have done it; that it was now over, and determined; that under these circumstances their opinion would be of no avail, and that they did not choose, by declaring their sentiments, either to confirm the report, or give it ineffectual opposition. M. Gerard further intimated, that those gentlemen seemed to think their giving their advice in the course of our troubles had given offence to the officers of the ship; but I had never reason to think their apprehensions well founded. Upon this conduct of those gentlemen, I briefly observed to M. Gerard, that as they were passengers, we had no right to demand their opinions, and that they had a right to withhold them, or not, as they pleased, and for such reasons as they might think proper; but that as the Captain of the ship had been directed by the marine committee to obey such orders as he should receive from us, it was necessary that in the present conjuncture we should decide on the report; that the Captain, in my opinion, would not be justifiable in further pursuing his course against the solemn and unanimous opinion of all the officers, unless by our express orders; and he would be culpable in changing it, without a previous application to us for direction. M. Gerard observed, that he was sensible of the honor done him by the order alluded to, but that it was not convenient to him to give any opinion or direction on the subject. It did not appear to me prudent to reply to this, and therefore I took the first opportunity of turning the conversation to another topic. As this circumstance prevented the Captain's receiving any positive orders from us on the subject, he was of course left to pursue his own judgment, but being desirous of my opinion, I gave it to him, in the manner endorsed on the report of the council, of which a copy is herewith enclosed.

The reasons on which this opinion was grounded are, in part, contained in this report, but there were others not mentioned in it. That Congress may the better judge of their force, it is necessary that they be informed of some previous circumstances.

The first fair day after losing our masts, I went to the door of M. Gerard's room on the deck, which was open, to bid him good morning. Chevalier Roche was with him; they were conversing on the course most proper for us to steer, and the port most proper to make for. M. Gerard was for going to Cadiz; he had an excellent set of charts, and he had then one of the Atlantic Ocean, with its American, European, and African Coasts, and the intervening islands, before him. By the assistance of this map we perfectly understood his reasoning. The Chevalier at that time inclined to the West Indies, and I heard him, on leaving the room, tell M. Gerard, that to endeavor to get to Europe in the present condition of the ship, would be to "_run a very great risk of perishing in the ocean_." Some time after this, M. Gerard perceiving that I had adopted no decided opinion on the subject, (and that was really the case) in the course of an evening he spent with us in the cabin, (none of the officers of the ship being present) desired me to attend particularly to his several reasons for going to Cadiz, and consider them maturely before I made up my judgment. I promised him to do it, and was as good as my word. He proceeded to observe;

1st. That the distance to Cadiz and to Martinique differed but little, and that no weighty argument could be drawn from this difference.

2dly. That between us and Cadiz lay the Western and Canary Islands, into some one or other of which we might run, if necessary.

3dly. That if, on our arrival at either of these Islands, it should appear impracticable or imprudent to proceed further, our persons at least would be safe, and we might get to Europe in one of the many vessels, which frequent those Islands; whereas, on the other hand, there were no Islands between us and Martinique, and we should, in steering southward, be obliged to run all that distance without finding any place by the way, at which we might touch, or, in case of danger, find shelter.

4thly. That if calmer seas were our object, we should find them in going eastward as well as southward; that we must not expect to meet with the trade winds at that season but in a very remote southern latitude; that in crossing the latitude of Bermudas, we should meet with heavy squalls, and bad weather; that in the latitude between that and the trade winds, we must expect variable winds, and particularly long calms, which are often more dangerous, and more to be dreaded than hard winds.

5thly. That in a voyage to Cadiz, we should have nothing to apprehend from the enemy, but to Martinique, everything.

6thly. That if we should arrive safe at Martinique, we should probably be detained there until next Spring; that the vessels, which usually sail from thence for France every fall, would have departed before the time we should reach the Island; that he had reason to believe it would be very difficult, if not impracticable, to obtain a frigate, and, among other reasons, urged the absence of Count d'Estaing, and the improbability that any subordinate officer would undertake without his orders to grant us one, even admitting what was very unlikely, that one might be spared from the service.

7thly. That the ship might remain long at Martinique without being made ready for sea, for want of naval stores, provisions, &c.

These were M. Gerard's reasons for our steering for Cadiz, by the way of the Azores, and I do not remember to have afterwards heard an additional one. Whether the French officers really thought them conclusive, or whether they found it convenient to make a compliment of their sentiments to a gentleman very able to serve them, is uncertain; but I believe they in appearance inclined to M. Gerard's opinion, and gave him implied reasons to think their sentiments corresponded with his.

The matter appeared to me in a serious light, and to require caution on many accounts. Every consideration called me to Spain; private as well as public good forbade a difference with M. Gerard. I had reason to believe him well disposed towards me; I perceived, clearly, that he could not with any patience admit the idea of being absent from Europe at so important a season, and that he could scarcely treat with common decency the reasons urged for going to Martinique. Hence it appeared obvious, that should I be the means of his losing his objects, or should any public inconveniences result from our not being in Europe during the winter, I should be censured, not only by him, but by all those who judge of the propriety of a measure only by its consequences, of which number are the far greater part of mankind. Thus circumstanced, I found myself in a very unpleasant situation, without any way of extricating myself, but by agreeing to a sort of middle proposal; viz. to order the Captain to land us on one of the Western Islands, and then leave the ship to shift for herself. This would have satisfied M. Gerard, and we should have been as good friends as ever. I thought it my duty, however, to form my decision carefully, and honestly, and abide by it firmly. It was that we should proceed to Martinique. Some of the reasons for it are set forth in the report of the council of officers. The whole together were briefly these.

1st. That the officers of the ship, including the carpenter, who were to be presumed to be better judges than M. Gerard or myself, were of opinion, that we ought not to attempt to go to Europe, and had this reason stood single and unexplained, I should not readily have ventured to reject it, especially as it appeared to me against the interest of the officers to come to the West Indies, and I have heard them constantly and uniformly regret the necessity of it; but I also thought they decided on good grounds; for

2dly. The rudder daily gave us infinite trouble, almost everyday a pennant breaking, and on every such occasion the ship for some time left to the direction of the wind and waves, a circumstance which might be fatal in hard weather, and near land; the quantity of cordage consumed in this way of steering; the doubt of our having sufficient for the purpose without stripping the guns, which would thereby be rendered useless; the rudder irons daily becoming more and more loose, and, by the nails drawing out, opening a passage for the water into the stem of the ship. By this circumstance our bread had been damaged; the danger of our being obliged to get rid of the rudder entirely, and steering only by the cable, which in northern seas, and winter season, is very inadequate. This event would have arrived in case either of the eye bolts in the rudder had given way, as the first mentioned one had done, or the upper irons become entirely loose; and for this event it was thought necessary to prepare, by removing the obstacles to unhanging the rudder. Indeed the upper irons in the course of our passage here, with fair winds and no storms, became so loose as to render it necessary to lash the head of the rudder with ropes to a bolt fixed for the purpose in the cabin floor.

3dly. The sails we had left were bad, having been originally made, as Mr Vaughan the second Lieutenant told me, of damaged canvass; they frequently split; we had none to replace them, nor a sufficient stock of twine to mend them, eight pounds only being left of the twenty odd we brought from Philadelphia; nor were we much better supplied with cordage, for which there was a daily demand and some of which was very bad.

4thly. Our jury masts were not calculated for hard weather, the foremast being sprung a few feet below the top, and not able to endure a hard storm.

For these reasons the rough weather common in northern latitudes was by all means to be avoided, and smooth seas sought.

As to the conveniences to be derived from the Islands laying between us and Cadiz, I took some pains to examine into that matter. We had maps and descriptions of them all, and our master had been at many of them. I found there was not a single harbor in any one of them in which a ship could ride at anchor in every wind; on the contrary neither of them has anything more than open roads, out of which it is necessary for ships to make the best of their way, and put to sea whenever certain winds blow, a task which our ship was very far from being in condition to perform.

From this and other circumstances it was evident we could not refit in either of those Islands, not even so much as get a new rudder; for admitting materials for the latter could be had, yet such was the difficulty, if not impossibility, of hanging it in an open road, from whence the ship was every moment exposed to the necessity of going to sea by an unfavorable wind, that we could expect to derive no advantage from these Islands, except the prospect of obtaining some refreshments, which we could do without, and the value of which would not have compensated for the risk of approaching them in our condition.

As to the idea of our steering that course with a view of being landed on one of those Islands, and from thence going to Europe in another vessel, leaving our own to her fate, no earthly consideration could ever have reconciled me to it. The reasoning which was insisted on, that our being seasonably in Europe was of more importance to the United States than a frigate, and that in time of war, and for the public good, lives were to be risked by sea as well as by land, was a species of reasoning which applied to this case led to conclusions, which never have been, and I pray God never may be, among my principles of action. Had this plan of being landed on one of the Azores or Canaries been adopted, we should have either landed the crew with us or not; if the first, the frigate would have been given to destruction. This appeared to me inconsistent with the public good, because, if we reached Martinique, I had no doubt of a passage, and my arrival in France eight weeks sooner or later did not appear to me of equal importance to the United States with the frigate. Had the crew been left on board, it must have been with a view of saving the ship, either by her reaching Europe or the West Indies. The probability of her effecting either became then a most important question, as the lives of between two and three hundred Americans depended on the event. Against it were opposed the dangers of the seas, and the want of provisions; the former would have increased with the approach of winter, and therefore the longer the ship was detained to the northward, the more she had to suffer, and to fear. The frigate after having landed us on either of the Islands, must either have gone on towards Europe, or endeavored to get to the West Indies.

All the considerations abovementioned opposed the first, and whoever compares the time necessary for a voyage for a ship under jury masts, and almost without a rudder, from the banks of Newfoundland to the Azores or Canaries, and from thence to the West Indies, with our stock of provisions, will find them inadequate to the purpose, and be convinced of the cruelty of subjecting one's fellow citizens to such extremities. For these reasons I positively refused to join in this system.

As to the position in favor of going to Europe, that we should find the seas calmer as we advanced eastward, equally as we went southward, all the officers of the ship testified against it, nor would they admit that we had as much to dread from calms as from hard gales. The supposed difficulty of obtaining a passage from Martinique made but little impression on me. I could not suppose the Islands left unprotected by ships of war, or that the commanding officer would refuse to order a frigate on this service, if M. Gerard would represent it to be of importance, which I was sure he would do. How long our ship might be refitting here was not to be ascertained, but I could not prevail upon myself to believe, that the King of France would keep so considerable a fleet in those seas, without providing for the usual accidents they would be exposed to from the sea and the enemy. At the worst the ship would be in a safe port, and among a people bound by treaties and by interest to afford aid and protection, at least until Congress should be informed of her situation, and have an opportunity of providing for her wants. As to ourselves, in case we meet with the imagined difficulties respecting a passage, it would be easy by passing over to St Eustatia to get very safely in a Dutch ship to Holland.

On these reasons the advice I gave to the captain to come here was founded. I thought them right then, and was daily more and more confirmed in an opinion of their propriety. In the course of our run here, we had all the way fine, fair breezes; and, except in the latitude of Bermuda, smooth seas and scarce any calms. The night before we made the land, it was thought proper to lay the ship too, after the moon set, which was between twelve and one o'clock, and she continued in that position only four hours and a half. Such, however, was the effect of it upon the rudder, and so much damage did it receive from it, that had the ship continued as much longer in the same state, it was agreed on all sides, that the rudder would have been rendered useless.

M. Gerard, hurt by being disappointed in his expectation of being seasonably in France, and perhaps mortified at my preferring my own sentiments to his, ceased to observe that cordiality and frankness, which had before attended his conduct towards me. Nay, he once went so far as to tell me I had my reasons for coming here. I appeared not to understand him, and continued to endeavor to render the conversation as light and general as possible. This was a tax imposed on my feelings by regard to public good; as a private man, I should have acted differently.

Thus matters continued till about ten or twelve days before our arrival here, when M. Gerard observed to me in the presence of the captain, that it was time to think which side of the island of Martinique it would be most prudent for the ship to go, the north or south side, and proceeded to state the reasons which ought to induce us to prefer the north; particularly, that in the present condition of the ship, she would if she went to the south side be in great danger of running by the island to the leeward; for that as we might expect the wind at northeast, she would not be able to lay sufficiently close to the wind, to reach Port Royal or St Pierre's; besides, that she would be in danger of calms, and being in sight of St Lucia, would be exposed to the enemy's ships of war, without having reason to expect succor from any French ships of war; none of which, he said, cruised off the eastern part of the island, between Martinique and St Lucia. He then showed the advantages of going the other side, by an enumeration of many circumstances, of which I have notes, but which it would be too tedious to mention. The obvious meaning of all this appeared to me to be, that we should direct the captain to go to the northward of the island; but as I neither thought myself authorised, nor found myself inclined to interfere with the particular navigation of the ship, to which I was not competent, I only observed to M. Gerard, that his reasoning appeared to me to have weight; that it was a subject I did not understand, but that I thought his observations merited attention. On this the captain remarked, and I thought with propriety, that it was impossible to determine on which side of the island it would be best to go, until we were at or near the parting point, for that circumstances at present unforeseen might render that way rash, which we might now think prudent; for instance, an unexpected change in the wind, or the appearance of an enemy. He therefore thought a decision on the question improper, till we arrived off the eastern part of the island. This appeared to me so perfectly reasonable, that I thought no more about the matter, and I did not suspect that M. Gerard would have felt any further anxiety about it; but it nevertheless so happened, that in the afternoon of the 14th instant, there was a conversation in the cabin relative to a wager, which of the two we should see first, land or a sail. In the course of this conversation, M. Gerard observed, that it would depend on our going on the north or south side of the island, and insensibly leaving the subject of the wager, proceeded minutely to recapitulate his reasons for the one, and his objections to the other. In the progress of this disquisition, he grew warmer and warmer, and at length addressing himself more particularly on the captain, said, he was surprised that those facts and observations should meet with so little attention; that he owed it to his conscience and personal safety to mention and enforce them, and that he should represent the whole matter to his Court, &c. The captain repeated what he had before said relative to the impropriety of deciding on which side of the island we were to go, until we had made the land, observed whether any vessels were on the coast, and knew how the wind would be. He then questioned some matters relative to the navigation round the island, on which M. Gerard had insisted.

For my own part, as the subject was so serious, I wished to be informed of some others, which appeared to me to want explanation. The captain had informed me, that the master had been at the taking of Martinique last war, and was well acquainted with its bays, harbors, and coasts. I desired the captain to send for the master, which was immediately done. On this, M. Gerard more animated than usual, said, he pretended to no extraordinary knowledge on the subject, but that he had made inquiries, and was satisfied with the opinion he had given; then repeated what he had before said, about his conscience, personal safety, and Court, and was opening the door to go on deck, when I asked him if he would not stay, and hear what the master had to say. He said, no, he did not want to hear anything farther about it; he had done his duty in delivering what he had to us, and we might do as we pleased about the matter. I made no reply, but proceeded to examine the master, and one of the lieutenants. On the whole it did not appear to me necessary, but on the contrary invidious to give the captain any positive orders on the subject; nor did I enter into any farther conference respecting it with M. Gerard. I knew that no good would result from altercation, and that the best way of treating unreasonable propositions, cavalierly dictated, was silently to go my own way, uninfluenced by them.

This last business rendered M. Gerard still more dissatisfied with me. We observed, nevertheless, and still observe great politeness towards each other, but it proceeds more from the head than the heart. On coming ashore, I flattered myself we should have left all these controversies behind us; but this city was soon entertained with them. The opinions of French officers were taken by M. Gerard about the sufficiency of the rudder to have gone to Europe; the question about the northern and southern navigation was stated and agitated. M. Gerard claims the merit of having saved the ship, by having, as he insinuates, dragged us into the measure of taking the northern passage, &c. &c. As we are safe in the harbor, these matters are now of no consequence, and therefore I constantly avoid the subject. How they may be represented at Philadelphia is of some moment, and therefore it appears to me expedient to trouble myself and Congress with this narration.

I cannot conclude this letter without expressing my satisfaction with the attention and politeness observed by the captain and other officers towards the passengers, as far at least as my knowledge extends.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Pierre's, Martinique, December 25th, 1779.

Sir,

As singular instances of humanity and patriotism always merit, and sometimes meet with public notice, I take the liberty of transmitting to Congress a copy of the Rev. Mr Keith's narrative of the conduct of a Mrs Smith, at New York, to the Americans there, who had been taken at Fort Washington.

Conversing, while at sea, with Mr Keith (our chaplain, who had been one of those prisoners) respecting the cruelties exercised towards them by the enemy, and the manner in which they were treated by the inhabitants of the city, he mentioned the behavior of this Mrs Smith; whose conduct appeared to me so remarkably liberal, disinterested, and christianlike, that I desired him to commit it to paper, with a design to enclose it to your Excellency. I know nothing more of this woman than what Mr Keith told me; but, as from his profession and character I am induced to credit what he says, I transmit this account of her, that if, on further inquiry, it be found to be just, Congress may have an opportunity of saving from poverty and distress a widow, who generously divested herself of a decent maintenance, and applied it to the relief of many citizens and servants of the United States, who were then gloriously enduring the most extreme cruelties, for their faithful attachment to the rights of their country and mankind.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Pierre's, Martinique, December 25th, 1779.

Sir,

I have done, what perhaps I shall be blamed for, but my pride as an American, and my feelings as a man, were not on this occasion to be resisted. The officers of the Confederacy were here without money, or the means of getting any. The idea of our officers being obliged to sneak, as they phrase it, from the company of French officers, for fear of running in debt with them for a bottle of wine, or a bowl of punch, because not able to pay for their share of the reckoning, was too humiliating to be tolerable, and too destructive to that pride and opinion of independent equality, which I wish to see influence all our officers. Besides, some of them wanted necessaries too much to be comfortable, or, in this country, decent. In a word, I have drawn on the fund, pointed out for the payment of part of my salary, for one hundred guineas in their favor, to be divided among them according to their respective ranks. Indeed, it would have given me pleasure to have done something towards covering the nakedness of the crew; but the expense I have been put to by coming here; and the preparations for another voyage, would not admit of it.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Pierre's, Martinique, December 26th, 1779.

Sir,

On our arrival here, M. Gerard told me that he was about to write to the Governor and Admiral at Port Royal, and asked me whether I also chose to write, or would leave to him the necessary communication; offering to mention to them whatever I might desire. As I was well satisfied that he should take the lead in the business, I replied, that I was obliged to him, but did not think it necessary for him to communicate anything to those gentlemen from me, except our arrival, and the confidence I had in their readiness to afford us aid.

I thought it would have been improper to apply for a passage in one of their ships, till I know in what time our own could be refitted, and on this subject it appeared to me most advisable, that application should be made by our agent here; and that I should reserve all interference, till it should be rendered necessary by obstacles. Mr Bingham accordingly wrote without delay to the Governor, and had immediate and full assurances of his readiness to afford us every aid in his power. Nothing now remained to be ascertained, but the time in which the repairs could be made, and this depended on the state of their naval stores.

Mr Bingham went with us to Port Royal, on a visit to the officers of government, (a compliment paid them by all strangers.) The Governor again assured him, that everything should be done for the ship that was possible, and some orders were given for the purpose. This passed, I believe, without M. Gerard's knowledge. About two hours after our arrival at Port Royal, he took me aside, observed that great difficulties and delays would attend the Confederacy's refitting there; that there were no masts or spars in store, and the expectation of supplies uncertain; that an old mast of a merchant-man had been purchased for one of their ships of war, and that a main yard for another had been made of four pieces for want of a proper spar, and, after some general hints about expenses, provision, &c. proposed, that the frigate should be provided with a new rudder, and proceed to America to refit. I objected, that, contrary to our expectations, the English had an acknowledged superiority in these seas; that three French frigates were at that instant flying from four ships of the line, which were in full chase of them; that a frigate under jury masts would find no safety in flight; that it would be more prudent for Captain Harding to remain here without being refitted, till he could get materials and supplies from America, or receive orders from Congress, than expose his ship to such imminent danger, and, therefore, that I could not possibly come into the measure he proposed.

M. Gerard replied, that she might be convoyed to sea by the French squadron here; but this required no answer. It was not to be supposed, that the French squadron, which, in their present state of inferiority, choose to keep their eyes constantly on Port Royal, would expose themselves to very unequal combat, for no higher object than that of convoying the Confederacy seventy or eighty leagues off the coast, or, that if they did, she would then be out of that degree of danger, to which no ship in her condition ought to be exposed. Besides, I could not reconcile it to the wisdom of France long to leave their fleet here destitute of naval stores, or to disgust their allies by a conduct neither just nor politic. We agreed to leave the matter till the next day, when we expected to see the Admiral; but in an hour or two afterwards the Admiral came in; and a very little time elapsed when the Governor, and shortly after M. Gerard told me, the "_whole arrangement_ was completed; that the same attention should be paid to the Confederacy as if she had been a French frigate, and that the Aurora, of thirty odd guns, should carry us to France." The fact is, that the officers of government in general, and the Governor in particular, are strongly attached to everything that is American.

Our agent here is in high estimation. I really believe, from everything I hear, that he has done his duty faithfully, and that he well deserves the notice and approbation of Congress. This leads me to take the liberty of remarking, that it would, probably, be much for the public interest, if Congress were to pay off all private debts due from them to subjects of France, and have none but national engagements with that kingdom. The debts unavoidably contracted here, for the outfit of the Deane, &c. ought certainly to be paid. Our credit and reputation suffer from such delay. We sail tomorrow morning, at six o'clock.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO ARTHUR LEE.

Cadiz, January 26th, 1780.

Sir,