Chapter III: Front Matter (3)

I see no prospect of agreeing upon any regulation of commerce here. The present Ministry are afraid of every knot of merchants. A clamor of an interested party, more than an evil to their country, is their dread. A few West India merchants, in opposition to the sense and interest of the West India planters, are endeavoring to excite an opposition to our carrying the produce of the West India Islands from those islands to Europe, even to Great Britain. There are also secret schemes to exclude us, if they can, from the trade of Ireland, to possess themselves of the carrying trade of the United States, by prohibiting any American vessel to bring to Great Britain any commodity but those of the State to which it belongs. Thus, a Philadelphia vessel can carry no tobacco, rice, or indigo, nor a Carolina vessel wheat or flour, nor a Boston vessel either, unless grown in its own State. In this way, a superficial party think they can possess themselves of the carriage of almost all the productions of the United States, annihilate our navigation and nurseries of seamen, and keep all to themselves more effectually than ever. They talk too of discouraging the people of the United States, and encouraging those of Canada and Nova Scotia, in such a manner as to increase the population of those two Provinces, even by migrations from the United States. These are dreams, to be sure; but the dreamers are so many, as to intimidate the present Ministry, who dare venture upon nothing that will make a clamor. I have lately heard, that the merchants in America are waiting to hear the regulations of trade made here. They will wait, I know not how long. There is no present prospect of our agreeing at all upon any regulations of trade.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, June 23d, 1783.

Sir,

The British nation and Ministry are in a very unsettled state; they find themselves in a new situation, and have not digested any plan. Ireland is in a new situation; she is independent of Parliament, and the English know not how to manage her. To what an extent she will claim a right of trading with the United States, is unknown. Canada too, and Nova Scotia, are in a new situation; the former, they say, must have a new government. But what form to give them, and, indeed, what kind of government they are capable of, or would be agreeable to them, is uncertain. Nothing is digested.

There is a party, composed probably of refugees, friends of the old hostile system, and fomented by emissaries of several foreign nations, who do not wish a cordial reconciliation and sincere friendship between Great Britain and the United States, who clamor for the conservation of the navigation act, and the carrying trade. If these should succeed so far as to excite Parliament or the Ministry to adopt a contracted principle, to exclude us from the West India trade, and from trading with Canada and Nova Scotia, and from carrying freely, in vessels belonging to any one of the Thirteen States, the production of any other to Great Britain, the consequences may be to perplex us for a time, may bind us closer to France, Spain, Holland, Germany, Italy, and the northern nations, and thus be fatal to Great Britain, without being finally very hurtful to us.

The nations of Europe, who have islands in the West Indies, have, at this moment, a delicate part to take. Upon their present decisions, great things will depend. The commerce of the West India Islands, is a part of the American system of commerce. They can neither do without us, nor we without them. The Creator has placed us upon the globe in such a situation, that we have occasion for each other. We have the means of assisting each other, and politicians and artful contrivances cannot separate us. Wise statesmen, like able artists of every kind, study nature, and their works are perfect in proportion as they conform to her laws. Obstinate attempts to prevent the islands and the continent, by force or policy, from deriving from each other those blessings, which nature has enabled them to afford, will only put both to thinking of means of coming together. And an injudicious regulation at this time may lay a foundation for intimate combinations, between the islands and the continent, which otherwise would not be wished for, or thought of by either.

If the French, Dutch, and Danes, have common sense, they will profit of any blunder Great Britain may commit upon this occasion. The ideas of the British cabinet and merchants, at present, are so confused upon all these subjects, that we can get them to agree to nothing. I still think, that the best policy of the United States is, to send a Minister to London to negotiate a treaty of commerce, instructed to conclude nothing, not the smallest article, until he has sent it to Congress, and received their approbation. In the meantime, Congress may admit any British or Irish ships, that have arrived, or may arrive, to trade as they please.

For my own part, I confess I would not advise Congress to bind themselves to anything, that is not reasonable and just. If we should agree to revive the trade upon the old footing, it is the utmost that can, with a color of justice or modesty, be requested of us. This is not equal, but might be borne. Rather than go further, and deny ourselves the freight from the West Indies to Europe, at least, to Great Britain, especially rather than give away our own carrying trade, by agreeing that the ships of one State should not carry to Great Britain the produce of another, I would be for entering into still closer connexions with France, Spain, and Holland, and purchase of them, at the expense of Great Britain, what she has not wisdom enough to allow us for her own good.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, June 24th, 1783.

Sir,

The gazettes of Europe still continue to be employed, as the great engines of fraud and imposture to the good people of America. Stockjobbers are not the only people, who employ a set of scribblers to invent and publish falsehoods for their own peculiar purposes. British and French, as well as other politicians, entertain these fabricators of paragraphs, who are stationed about in the various cities of Europe, and take up each other's productions in such a manner, that no sooner does a paragraph appear in a French, Dutch, or English paper, but it is immediately seized on, and reprinted in all the others; this is not all; in looking over the American newspapers, I observe, that nothing is seized on with so much avidity by the American _nouvellists_, for republication in their gazettes, as these political lies. I cannot attribute this merely to the credulity of the printers, who have generally more discernment than to be deceived. But I verily believe, there are persons in every State employed to select out these things, and get them reprinted.

Sometimes the invention is so simple, as really to deceive. Such, I doubt not, will be that of a long paragraph in the English papers, all importing that Mr Hartley had made a treaty of commerce with us, or was upon the point of concluding one. Nothing is further from the truth. We have not to this hour agreed upon one proposition, nor do I see any probability that we shall at all, respecting commerce.

We have not, indeed, as yet, agreed upon a point respecting the definitive treaty. We are waiting for those instructions of yours, which you mentioned in yours of the 14th of April, which I have not yet received.

Americans should be cautious of European newspapers, as well as of their own; more so, indeed, because they have not so much knowledge, and so good opportunities to detect the former as the latter. There is a great number of persons in Europe, who insert things in the papers in order to make impressions in America. Characters are in this way built up and pulled down, without the least consideration of justice, and merely to answer sinister purposes, sometimes extremely pernicious to the United States.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, June 27th, 1783.

Sir,

Yesterday Dr Franklin, Mr Jay, and myself, met to prepare the definitive treaty, and made so much progress in it, that tomorrow we shall be ready to communicate to Mr Hartley the result. But I have small hopes of obtaining anything more by the definitive treaty.

The Duke of Manchester, and Count d'Aranda have arranged everything between England and Spain, and are ready to finish for their two Courts. France, I presume, waits only for Holland, or perhaps for some other negotiation with the Imperial Courts. If all the other parties were now to declare themselves ready, we should be puzzled. In such a case, however, I am determined (and I believe, but do not know, that my colleagues would join me) to declare myself ready to sign the provisional treaty, _totidem verbis_, for a definitive treaty.

From all I can learn, I am persuaded we shall gain nothing by any further negotiation. If we obtain anything by way of addition or explanation, we shall be obliged to give more for it than it is worth. If the British Minister refuses to agree to such changes as we may think reasonable, and refuses to sign the provisional articles as definitive ones, I take it for granted, France will not sign till we do. If they should they are still safe, for the provisional articles are to constitute the treaty as soon as France has made peace, and I should rather have it on that footing, than make any material alteration.

I have put these several cases, because I should be supprised at nothing from the present British Ministry. If they have any plan at all, it is a much less gracious one towards America, than that of their immediate predecessors. If Shelburne, Townshend, Pitt, &c. had continued, we should have had everything settled long ago, to our entire satisfaction, and to the infinite advantage of Great Britain and America, in such a manner as would have restored good humor and affection, as far as in the nature of things they can now be restored.

After the great point of acknowledging our independence was got over, by issuing Mr Oswald's last commission, this Shelburne administration conducted towards us like men of sense and honor. The present administration have neither discovered understanding nor sincerity. The present British administration is unpopular, and it is in itself so heterogeneous a composition, that it seems impossible it should last long. Their present design seems to be not to commit themselves by agreeing to anything. As soon as anything is done, somebody will clamor. While nothing is done, it is not known what to clamor about. If there should be a change in favor of the Ministry that made the peace, and a dissolution of this profligate league, which they call the coalition, it would be much for the good of all who speak the English language. If fame says true, the coalition was formed at gambling tables, and is conducted as it was formed, upon no other than gambling principles.

Such is the fate of a nation, which stands tottering on the brink of a precipice, with a debt of two hundred and fiftysix millions sterling on its shoulders; the interest of which, added to the peace establishment only, exceeds by above a million annually all their revenues, enormously and intolerably as they are already taxed. The only chance they have for salvation is in a reform, and in recovering the affection of America. The last Ministry were sensible of this, and acted accordingly. The present Ministry are so far from being sensible of it, or caring about it, that they seem to me to be throwing the last dice for the destruction of their country.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, June 27th, 1783.

Sir,

A few vessels have arrived in England from various parts of America, and have probably made the Ministry, merchants, and manufacturers less anxious about a present arrangement of commerce. Whether these vessels have rashly hazarded these voyages against the laws of their country, or whether they have permission from Congress, or their States, we are not informed.

It would have been better, no doubt, to have had an agreement made before the trade was opened, but the eagerness of both sides may not easily be restrained. Whether it is practicable for Congress to stop the trade, I know not, or whether it would be expedient if practicable, I doubt.

The balance of parties in England is so nicely poised, that the smallest weight shifts the scales. In truth nothing can be done without changing the Ministry, for whatever is done raises a cry sufficient to shake those who do it. In this situation, it is a question whether it is best to keep things in suspense, or bring them to a decision. If Congress were to prohibit all trade with England, until a Treaty of Commerce were made, or some temporary convention at least, it might bring on a decision, by exciting a cry against the Ministry for not making a convention. But the moment a convention is made, a cry will be raised against them for making it. The present Ministry, to judge by their motions hitherto, will hazard the clamor for not making one, rather than that for making one. They think it least dangerous to them, especially since they have seen so many American vessels arrive in England, and have heard, that British ships are admitted to an entry in the ports of America, particularly Philadelphia.

The most difficult thing to adjust in a Treaty of Commerce, will be the communications we shall have with the West India Islands. This is of great importance to us, and to the islands, and I think to Great Britain too. Yet there is a formidable party for excluding us at least from carrying the produce of those islands to Great Britain.

Much will depend upon the Minister you first send to London. An American Minister would be a formidable person to any British Minister whatever. He would converse with all parties, and if he is a prudent, cautious man, he would at this moment have more influence there than you can imagine.

We are chained here on the only spot in the world, where we can be of no use. If my colleagues were of my mind, we would all go together to London, where we could negotiate the Definitive Treaty, and talk of arrangements of commerce to some purpose. However, one Minister in London, with proper instructions, would do better than four. He would have the artifices of French emissaries to counteract, as well as English partizans; for you may depend upon it, the French see with pleasure the improbability of our coming soon and cordially together, as they saw with manifest regret, the appearances of cordial reconciliation under the former administration. These sentiments are not unnatural, but we are under no obligation, from mere complaisance, to sacrifice interests of such deep and lasting consequence. For it is not merely mercantile profit and convenience, that is at stake; future wars, long and bloody wars, may be either avoided or entailed upon our posterity, as we conduct wisely or otherwise the present negotiation with Great Britain.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, July 3d, 1783.

Sir,

On the last Ambassador's day, which was last Tuesday, Dr Franklin, Mr Jay, and myself waited on the Count de Vergennes, who told us, he thought he had agreed with the Duke of Manchester, but that his Grace had not yet received the positive approbation of his Court. The Count advised us to make a visit altogether to the Ambassadors of the two Imperial Courts. Accordingly, yesterday morning we went, first to the Count de Mercy Argenteau, the Ambassador of the Emperor of Germany, and King of Hungary and Bohemia. His Excellency was not at home, so we left our card.

We went next to the Prince Bariatinski, Minister Plenipotentiary from the Court of Russia; our servant asked if the Prince was at home, and received for answer, that he was. We were shown into the Prince's apartment, who received us very politely. While we were here, Mr Markoff came in. He also is a Minister Plenipotentiary, adjoined to the Prince in the affair of the mediation. I told him we proposed to do ourselves the honor of calling on him. He answered, "As you are an old acquaintance I shall be very happy to see you." Whether this was a turn of politeness, or whether it was a political distinction, I know not. We shall soon know, by his returning, or not returning, our visit. The Prince asked where I lodged, and I told him. This indicates an intention to return the visit.

We went next to the Dutch Ambassador's, M. de Berkenrode. He was not at home, or not visible. Next to the Baron de Blome, Envoy Extraordinary of the King of Denmark; not at home. Next to M. Markoff's. The porter answered, that he was at home. We alighted, and were going to his apartment, when we were told he was not come in. We left a card, and went to the other Dutch Ambassador's, M. Brantzen, who was not at home; _en passant_, we left a card at the Swedish Minister's, and returned home, the heat being too excessive to pursue our visits any further.

Thus, we have made visits to all the Ministers, who are to be present at the signature of the definitive treaty. Whether the Ministers of the Imperial Courts will be present, I know not. There are many appearances of a coldness between France and Russia, and the Emperor seems to waver between two opinions, whether to join in the war that threatens, or not. Perhaps the Ministers of the Imperial Courts will write for instructions whether to return or not our visit.

After I had begun this letter, Captain Barney came in, and delivered me your duplicate of No. 12, November the 6th, 1782; duplicate of No. 14, December the 19th, 1782, and triplicate of No. 16, April the 14th, 1783, and the original of your letter of the 18th of April, 1783, not numbered. The last contained my account. But as I have never received any of this money from Dr Franklin, or M. Gerard, but have my salary from Messrs Willinks & Co. at Amsterdam, I am extremely sorry you have had so much trouble with this affair.

Although in your later letters you say nothing of my resignation, or the acceptance of it, I expect to receive it soon, and then I shall have an opportunity to settle the affair of my salary at Philadelphia.

After reading your letters to me, I went out to Passy to see those addressed to us all. Dr Franklin, Mr Jay, and myself, (Mr Laurens being still in England) read them all over together. We shall do all in our power to procure the advantages in the definitive treaty, you mention. The state of parties is such in England, that it is impossible to foresee when there will be a Ministry, who will dare to take any step at all. The coalition between Lord North and his connexions, and Mr Fox and his, is a rope of sand. Mr Fox, by pushing the vote in the House of Commons disapproving the peace, and by joining so many of the old Ministers in the new administration, has justly excited so many jealousies of his sincerity, that no confidence can be placed in him by us. I am extremely sorry, that the most amiable men in the nation, Portland, and the Cavendishes, should have involved themselves in the same reproach.

In short, at present, Shelburne, Pitt, Townshend, and the administration of which they were members, seem to have been the only ones, who, for a moment, had just notions of their country and ours. Whether these men, if now called to power, would pursue their former ideas, I know not. The Bible teaches us not to put our trust in Princes, and _a fortiori_ in Ministers of State.

The West India commerce now gives us most anxiety. If the former British Ministry had stood, we might have secured it from England, and, in that case, France would have been obliged to admit us to their islands, _se defendendo_. The first maxim of a statesman, as well as that of a statuary, or a painter, should be to study nature; to cast his eyes round about his country, and see what advantages nature has given it. This was well attended to, in the boundary between the United States and Canada, and in the fisheries. The commerce of the West India Islands, falls necessarily into the natural system of the commerce of the United States. We are necessary to them and they to us; and there will be a commerce between us. If the government forbid it, it will be carried on clandestinely; France can more easily connive at a contraband trade than England. But we ought to wish to avoid the temptation to this. I believe, that neither France nor England will allow us to transport the productions of their Islands to other parts of Europe.

The utmost we may hope to obtain would be permission to import the productions of the French Islands into France, giving bond to land them in some port of that kingdom, and the productions of the English Islands into some port of Great Britain, giving bonds to land them there. It must, however, be the care of the Minister, who may have to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, to obtain as ample freedom in this trade as possible.

While I was writing the above, my servant announced the Imperial Ambassador, whom I rose to receive. He said, that he was happy that the circumstances of the times afforded him an opportunity of forming an acquaintance with me, which he hoped would be improved into a more intimate one. I said, his Excellency did me great honor, and begged him to sit, which he did, and fell into a conversation of an hour. We ran over a variety of subjects, particularly the commerce which might take place between the United States and Germany, by the way of Trieste and Fiume, and the Austrian Netherlands, and the great disposition in Germany to migration to America. He says he knows the country round about Trieste very well, having an estate there; that it is a very extensive and a very rich country, which communicates with that maritime city, and that the navigation of the Adriatic sea, though long, is not dangerous. I asked him what we should do with the Barbary powers. He said, he thought all the powers of the world ought to unite in the suppression of such a detestable race of pirates, and that the Emperor had lately made an insinuation to the Porte upon the subject. I asked him if he thought France and England would agree to such a project, observing that I had heard that some Englishmen had said, "if there were no Algiers, England ought to build one." He said, he could not answer for England.

It is unnecessary to repeat any more of the conversation, which turned upon the frugal and industrious character of the Germans, the best cultivators in Europe, and the dishonorable traffic of some of the German Princes in men, a subject he introduced and enlarged on himself. I said nothing about it. Rising up to take leave, he repeated several compliments he had made when he first came in, and added, "The Count de Vergennes will do me the honor to dine with me one of these days, and I hope to have that of your company. We will then speak of an affair upon which the Count de Vergennes and you have already conversed."

This shows there is something in agitation, but what it is I cannot conjecture; whether it is to induce us to make the compliment to the two Imperial Courts to sign the definitive treaty as mediators, whether there is any project of an association for the liberty of navigation, or whether it is any other thing, I cannot guess at present, but I will write you as soon as I know. Whatever it is, we must treat it with respect, but we shall be very careful how we engage our country in measures of consequence without being clear of our powers, and without the instructions of Congress.

I went out to Passy, and found from Mr Jay, that he had made his visit there, in the course of the day, but had said nothing to Dr Franklin or him about the dinner with the Count de Vergennes. In the course of the day, I had visits from the Prince Bariatinski and M. de Markoff, the two Ministers of the Empress of Russia. The porter told these gentlemen's servants, that I was at home, but they did not come up, but only sent up their cards.

While I was gone to Passy, Monsieur de Blome, Envoy Extraordinary from the King of Denmark, called and left his card. Thus the point of etiquette seems to be settled, and we are to be treated in character by all the Powers of Europe.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

Paris, July 5th, 1783.

Sir,

Your favors of the 12th and 29th of May were delivered to me on the 3d of this month by Captain Barney. Every assistance, in my power, shall be given to Mr Barclay. Mr Grand will write you the amount of all the bills which have been paid in Holland, which were accepted by me. You may banish your fears of a double payment of any one bill. I never accepted a bill without taking down in writing a very particular description of it, nor without examining the book, to see whether it had been accepted before. I sent regularly, in the time of it, copies of these acceptances to Dr Franklin, and I have now asked him to lend them to me, that I may copy them and send them to you. The Doctor has promised to look up my letters, and let me have them. The originals are at the Hague, with multitudes of other papers, which I want every day.

Among the many disagreeable circumstances attending my duty in Europe, it is not the least, that instead of being fixed to any one station, I have been perpetually danced about from "post to pillar," unable to have my books and papers with me, unable to have about me the conveniences of a house-keeper for health, pleasure, or business, but yet subjected in many articles to double expenses.

Mr Livingston has not informed me of any determination of Congress upon my letter to you of the 17th of November, which distresses me much on Mr Thaxter's account, who certainly merits more than he has received, or can receive, without the favor of Congress.

I thank you, Sir, most affectionately for your kind congratulation on the peace. Our late enemies always clamor against a peace, but this one is better for them than they had reason to expect after so mad a war. Our countrymen too, I suppose, are not quite satisfied. This thing and that thing should have been otherwise, no doubt. If any man blames us I wish him no other punishment than to have, if that were possible, just such another peace to negotiate, exactly in our situation. I cannot look back upon this event without the most affecting sentiments, when I consider the number of nations concerned, the complications of interests, extending all over the globe, the characters of actors, the difficulties which attended every step of the progress, how everything labored in England, France, Spain, and Holland, that the armament at Cadiz was upon the point of sailing, which would have rendered another campaign inevitable, that another campaign would have probably involved France in a continental war, as the Emperor would in that case have joined Russia against the Porte; that the British Ministry was then in so critical a situation, that its duration for a week or a day depended upon its making peace; that if that Ministry had been changed, it could have been succeeded only either by North and Company, or by the coalition; that it is certain, that neither North and Company, nor the coalition, would have made peace upon any terms, that either we or the other Powers would have agreed to; and that all these difficulties were dissipated by one decided step of the British and American Ministers. I feel too strongly a gratitude to Heaven for having been conducted safely through the storm, to be very solicitous whether we have the approbation of mortals or not.

A delay of one day might, and probably would, have changed the Ministry in England, in which case all would have been lost. If, after we had agreed with Mr Oswald, we had gone to Versailles to show the result to the Count de Vergennes, you would have been this moment at war, and God knows how or when you would have got out. What would have been the course? The Count de Vergennes would have sprinkled us with compliments, the holy water of a Court. He would have told us; "you have done, gentlemen, very well for your country. You have gained a great deal. I congratulate you upon it, but you must not sign till we are ready; we must sign altogether here in this room." What would have been our situation? We must have signed against this advice, as Mr Laurens says he would have done, and as I believe Mr Jay and I should have done, which would have been the most marked affront, that could have been offered, or we must have waited for France and Spain, which would have changed the Ministry in England, and lost the whole peace, as certainly as there is a world in being. When a few frail vessels are navigating among innumerable mountains of ice, driven by various winds, and drawn by various currents, and a narrow crevice appears to one, by which all may escape, if that one improves the moment and sets the example, it will not do to stand upon ceremonies, and ask, which shall go first, or that all may go together.

I hope you will excuse this little excursion, and believe me to be, with great respect and esteem, your most obedient and most humble servant,

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, July 7th, 1783.

Sir,

We cannot as yet obtain from Mr Hartley, or his principals, an explicit consent to any one proposition whatever. Yet England and France, and England and Spain are probably agreed, and Holland, I suppose, must comply. Our last resource must be to say, we are ready to sign the Provisional Treaty, _totidem verbis_, as the Definitive Treaty.

I think it is plain, that the British Ministry do not intend to sign any treaty till Parliament rises. There are such dissensions in the Cabinet, that they apprehend a treaty laid before Parliament, if it did not obtain advantages, of which they have no hope, would furnish materials to overthrow them. A new administration is talked of, under Lord Temple. The West India commerce is now the object, that interests us the most nearly. At dinner with the Duc de la Vauguyon, on Saturday last, he told me, that he believed the commerce between the French West India Islands and the United States, would be confined to ships built in France, and navigated by French seamen.

"So then, M. le Duc," said I, laughing, "you have adopted the ideas of the British navigation act. But suppose the United States should adopt them too, and make a law, that no commerce should be carried on with any West India Islands, French, English, Spanish, Dutch, or Danish, but in ships built in America, and navigated with American seamen? We can import sugar from Europe. But give me leave to tell you, that this trade can never be carried on without a great number of seamen, which the French vessels being all large require, and your navigators are too slow. The trade itself was only profitable to us as a system, and little vessels, with a few hands, run away at any season of the year, from any creek or river, with a multitude of little articles, collected in haste. Your merchants and mariners have neither the patience to content themselves with much and long labor, and dangerous voyages for small profits, nor have they the economy, nor can they navigate vessels with so few hands." "Aye, but we think," said the Duke, "if we do not try, we shall never learn to do these things as well and as cheap as you." The Duke told me, some days before, that he had had a great deal of conversation with the Count de Vergennes, and he found he had a great many good ideas of commerce. The Count himself told me a few weeks ago, "in our regulations of the commerce between our Islands and you, we must have regard to our shipping, and our nurseries of seamen for our marine; for," said he, smiling politely enough, "without a marine, we cannot go to your succor."

In short, France begins to grow, for a moment, avaricious of navigation and seamen. But it is certain, that neither the form of government, nor the national character, can possibly admit of great success in it. Navigation is so dangerous a business, and requires so much patience, and produces so little profit among nations who understand it best, and have the best advantages for it, where property is most secure, lawsuits soonest and cheapest ended, (and by fixed certain laws,) that the French can never interfere much with the Dutch, or Americans, in ship building or carrying trade. If any French merchants ever begin to carry on this commerce, between America and the Islands, they will break to pieces very soon, and then some new plan must be adopted. The English, for aught I know, will make a similar law, that the communications between us and their Islands shall be carried on in British built ships, or ships built in Canada or Nova Scotia, and navigated by British seamen. In this case, we must try what we can do with the Dutch and Danes. But the French and English will endeavor to persuade them to the same policy, for the Duc de la Vauguyon told me, that he thought it a common tie (_lien commun_.) In this they will not succeed, and we must make the most we can of the Dutch friendship, for luckily, the merchants and Regency of Amsterdam had too much wit to exclude us from their Islands by the treaty. Happily, Congress will have a Dutch Minister, with whom they may consult upon this matter, as well as any others, but I should think it would not be convenient to invite an English or French Minister to be present at the consultation.

I am at a loss, Sir, to guess what propositions made to us Congress have been informed of, which they had not learned from us. None have been made to us. The Dutch Ambassadors did once propose a meeting to us, and had it at my house. Dr Franklin came, but Mr Jay did not, and Mr Laurens was absent. The Ambassadors desired to know, whether we had power to enter into any engagements, provided France, Spain, and Holland, should agree to any, in support of the armed neutrality. We showed them the resolution of Congress, of the 5th of October, 1780, and told them, that Mr Dana had been since vested with a particular commission to the same effect. We never heard anything further about it.

Not seeing, at the time, any probability that anything would come of this, nor intending to do anything of any consequence in it, if we should hear further of it, without the further orders of Congress, we did not think it necessary to write anything about it, at least, till it should put on a more serious appearance. If the Count de Mercy's dinner, to which we are to be invited, with the Count de Vergennes, should produce any insinuations on this subject, (which I do not, however, expect) we shall inform you, and request the orders of Congress.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, July 9th, 1783.

Sir,

Since the dangerous fever I had in Amsterdam, two years ago, I have never enjoyed my health. Through the whole of the last winter and spring, I have suffered under weaknesses and pains, which have scarcely permitted me to do business. The excessive heats of the last week or two have brought on me a fever again, which exhausts me in such a manner, as to be very discouraging, and incapacitates one for everything. In short, nothing but a return to America will ever restore my health, if even that should do it.

In these circumstances, however, we have negotiations to go through, and your despatches to answer. The liberal sentiments in England respecting the trade are all lost for the present, and we can get no answer to anything. It is the same thing with the Dutch. One of the Dutch Ambassadors told me yesterday at Versailles, that now, for five weeks, the English had never said one word to them, nor given them any answer. These things indicate, that the Ministry do not think themselves permanent.

The Count de Vergennes asked Dr Franklin and me, yesterday, if we had made our visits. We answered, that we had, and that they had been promptly returned. "The thing in agitation," says the Count, "is for you to determine whether your definitive treaty shall be signed under the mediation of the two Imperial Courts, or not. Ours and the Spanish treaty with England are to be so finished, and if you determine in favor of it, you have only to write a letter to the Ministers of the Imperial Courts, who are here." I told him, in the present case, I did not know what a mediation meant. He smiled, but did not seem to know any better than I; at least, he did not explain it. We told him we would determine upon it soon.

How we shall determine, I cannot say. For my own part, I see no harm in accepting the mediation, nor any other good, than a compliment to the two empires. In Europe it may be thought an honor to us, and, therefore, I shall give my voice, as at present informed, in favor of it, as it seems rather to be the inclination of the Count de Vergennes that we should.

Your late despatches, Sir, are not well adapted to give spirits to a melancholy man, or to cure one sick with a fever. It is not possible for me, at present, to enter into a long detail in answer to them. You will be answered, I suppose, by all the gentlemen jointly. In the meantime, I beg leave to say to you a few words upon two points.

1st. The separate article never appeared to me of any consequence to conceal from this Court. It was an agreement we had a right to make; it contained no injury to France or Spain. Indeed, I know not what France has, or ever had, to do with it. If it had been communicated to this Court, it would probably have been communicated to Spain, and she might have thought more about it than it was worth. But how you could conceive it possible for us to treat at all with the English, upon supposition, that we had communicated every, the minutest thing, to this Court, when this Court were neither obliged, nor thought proper, to communicate anything whatever to us, I know not. We were bound by treaty no more than they to communicate. The instructions were found to be absolutely impracticable. That they were too suddenly published, is very true.

2dly. A communication of the treaty to this Court, after it was agreed upon, and before it was signed, would have infallibly prevented the whole peace. In the first place, it was very doubtful, or rather, on the contrary, it is certain, the English Minister never would have consented that we should have communicated it. We might, it is true, have done it without his consent or knowledge; but what would have been the consequence? The French Minister would have said, the terms were very good for us, but we must not sign till they signed; and this would have been the continuance of the war for another year, at least. It was not so much from an apprehension, that the French would have exerted themselves to get away from us terms that were agreed on, that they were withheld. It was then too late, and we have reasons to apprehend, that all of this kind had been done, which could be done. We knew they were often insinuating to the British Ministers things against us, respecting the fisheries, tories, &c. during the negotiation, and Mr Fitzherbert told me, that the Count de Vergennes had "fifty times reproached him for ceding the fisheries, and said it was ruining the English and French commerce both." It was not suspicion, it was certain knowledge, that they were against us on the points of the tories, fisheries, Mississippi, and the western country.

All this knowledge, however, did not influence us to conceal the treaty. We did not, in fact, conceal it. Dr Franklin communicated the substance of it to the Count and M. de Rayneval. So did I. In a long conversation with the Count and M. de Rayneval together, I told them the substance of what was agreed upon, and what we further insisted on, and the English then disputed. But the signing before them is the point. This we could not have done, if we had shown the treaty, and told them we were ready. The Count would certainly have said to us, you must not sign till we sign. To have signed after this would have been more disagreeable to him, and to us too. Yet we must have signed or lost the peace. The peace depended on a day.

Parliament had been waiting long, and once prorogued. The Minister was so pressed, he could not have met Parliament and kept his place, without an agreement upon terms, at least, with America. If we had not signed, the Ministry would have been changed, and the coalition come in, and the whole world knows the coalition would not have made peace upon the present terms, and, consequently, not at all this year. The iron was struck in the few critical moments when it was of a proper heat, and has been moulded into a handsome vessel. If it had been suffered to cool, it would have flown in pieces like glass. Our countrymen have great reason to rejoice, that they have obtained so good a peace, when, and as they did. With the present threatening appearances of a northern war, which will draw in France, if our peace was still to be made we might find cause to tremble for many great advantages, that are now secured. I believe the Count himself, if he were now to speak his real sentiments, would say, he is very glad we signed when we did, and that without asking his consent.

The Duc de la Vauguyon told me and M. Brantzen together, last Saturday, "if you had not signed when you did, we should not have signed when we did." If they had not signed when they did, d'Estaing would have sailed from Cadiz, and in that case nobody would have signed to this day. It is not possible for men to be in more disagreeable circumstances than we were. We are none of us men of principles or dispositions to take pleasure in going against your sentiments, Sir, much less those of Congress. But in this case, if we had not done it, our country would have lost advantages beyond computation.

On Monday, Sir, we pursued our visits, and today we finish. Yesterday at Court all the foreign Ministers behaved to us without reserve, as members of the _Corps Diplomatique_, so that we shall no longer see those lowering countenances, solemn looks, distant bows, and other peculiarities, which have been sometimes diverting, and sometimes provoking, for so many years.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

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TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, July 10th, 1783.

Sir,

In the present violent heat of the weather, and feverish state of my health, I cannot pretend to sit long at my pen, and must pray you to accept of a few short hints only.

To talk in a general style of confidence in the French Court, &c. is to use a general language, which may mean almost anything, or almost nothing. To a certain degree, and as far as the treaties and engagements extend, I have as much confidence in the French Court as Congress has, or even as you, Sir, appear to have. But if, by confidence in the French Court is meant an opinion, that the French Office of Foreign Affairs would be advocates with the English for our rights to the fisheries, or to the Mississippi river, or our Western Territory, or advocates to persuade the British Ministers to give up the cause of the refugees, and make Parliamentary provision for them, I own I have no such confidence, and never had. Seeing and hearing what I have seen and heard, I must have been an idiot to have entertained such confidence, I should be more of a Machiavelian, or a Jesuit, than I ever was, or will be, to counterfeit it to you, or to Congress.

M. Marbois' letter is to me full proof of the principles of the Count de Vergennes. Why? Because I know, (for it was personally communicated to me upon my passage home, by M. Marbois himself,) the intimacy and confidence there is between these two. And I know further, that letter contains sentiments concerning the fisheries, diametrically opposite to those, which Marbois repeatedly expressed to me upon the passage, viz. "That the Newfoundland fishery was our right, and we ought to maintain it." From whence I conclude, M. Marbois' sentiments have been changed by the instructions of the Minister. To what purpose is it where this letter came from? Is it less genuine, whether it came from Philadelphia, Versailles, or London? What if it came through English hands? Is there less weight, less evidence in it for that? Are the sentiments more just, or more friendly to us for that?

M. de Rayneval's correspondence too with Mr Jay. M. de Rayneval is a _Chef de Bureau_. But we must be very ignorant of all Courts not to know that an Under Secretary of State dares not carry on such a correspondence without the knowledge, consent, and orders of the principal.

There is another point now in agitation, in which the French will never give us one good word. On the contrary, they will say everything they can think of to persuade the English to deprive us of the trade of their West India Islands. They have already, with their emissaries, been the chief cause of the change of sentiment in London on this head against us. In general they see with pain every appearance of returning real and cordial friendship, such as may be permanent between us and Great Britain. On the contrary, they see with pleasure every seed of contention between us. The tories are an excellent engine of mischief between us, and are, therefore, very precious.

Exclusion from the West India Islands will be another. I hold it to be the indispensable duty of my station, not to conceal from Congress these truths. Do not let us be dupes, under the idea of being grateful. Innumerable anecdotes happen daily to show, that these sentiments are general. In conversation, a few weeks ago, with the Duc de la Vauguyon, upon the subject of the West India trade, I endeavored to convince him, that France and England both ought to admit us freely to their islands. He entered into a long argument to prove, that both ought to exclude us. At last, I said, the English were a parcel of sots to exclude us, for the consequence would be, that in fifteen or twenty years we should have another war with them. _Tant mieux! tant mieux! je vous en felicite_," cried the Duke, with great pleasure. "_Tant mieux pour nous_," said I, because we shall conquer from the English in that case all their islands, the inhabitants of which would now declare for us, if they dared. But it will not be the better for the English. They will be the dupes, if they lay a foundation for it. "Yes," said the Duke, "I believe you will have another war with the English." And in this wish he expressed the vows of every Frenchman upon the face of the earth. If, therefore, we have it in contemplation to avoid a future war with the English, do not let us have too much confidence in the French, that they will favor us in this view.[6]

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[6] See a letter from Dr Franklin, containing remarks on Mr Adams's opinions of the policy and designs of the French Court, dated July the 22d, 1783. _Franklin's Correspondence_, Vol. IV. p. 138. Also a letter from Mr Laurens, Vol. II. p. 486.

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TO ROBERT MORRIS.

Paris, July 10th, 1783.

Sir,

Upon the receipt of the despatches by Barney, I sent off your letters for Messrs Willinks & Co. and I received last night an answer to the letter I wrote them upon the occasion. They have engaged to remit Mr Grand a million and a half of livres in a month, which has relieved Mr Grand from his anxiety.

This Court has refused to Dr Franklin any more money. They are apprehensive of being obliged to take a part in the northern war, and their own financiers have not enough of the confidence of the public to obtain money for their own purposes.

Your design of sending cargoes of tobacco and other things to Amsterdam, to Messrs Willinks & Co. is the best possible to support our credit there. The more you send, the more money will be obtained. Send a Minister too; residing there, he may promote it much. It is a misfortune, that I have not been able to be there, but this post cannot be deserted. Instruct your Minister to inquire whether the House of Hope could be persuaded to engage with Willinks in a new loan. This should be done with secrecy and discretion. If that House would undertake it, you would find money enough for your purpose, for I rely upon it, the States will adopt a plan immediately for the effectual payment of interest. This is indispensable. The foundation of a happy government can only be laid in justice; and as soon as the public shall see, that provision is made for this, you will no longer want money.

It is a maxim among merchants and monied men, that "every man has credit who does not want it." It is equally true of States. We shall want it but little longer, if the States make provision for the payment of interest, and therefore we shall have enough of it. There is not a country in the world whose credit ought to be so good, because there is none equally able to pay.

Enclosed is a pamphlet of Dr Price's, for your comfort. You will see by it, that the only nation we have reason to fear wants credit so much, that she is not likely to have it always, and this is our security. By some hints from Mr Hartley, he will probably return to London, and not be here again. The present Ministry is so undecided and feeble, that it is at least doubtful whether they will make the definitive treaty of peace.

With great respect, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

Paris, July 11th, 1783.

Sir,