Chapter XIV: Book 1: , Page 7 (3)

DÖNITZ: Here we are concerned with an order of the Naval Operations Staff that captains are to be taken prisoners, that is, to be brought home and that again is something different from rescue. The Naval Operations Staff was of the opinion—and rightly—that since we could not have a very high percentage, say 80 to 90 percent, of the crews of the sunk merchantmen brought back—we even helped in their rescue, which was natural—then at least we must see to it that the enemy was deprived of the most important and significant parts of the crews, that is, the captains; hence the order to take the captains from their lifeboats on to the U-boats as prisoners.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did this order exist in this or another form until the end of the war?

DÖNITZ: Yes, it was later even incorporated into the standing orders, because it was an order of the Naval Operations Staff.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it carried out until the end of the war, and with what results?

DÖNITZ: Yes, according to my recollection it was carried out now and then even in the last few years of the war. But in general the result of this order was very slight. I personally can remember only a very few cases. But through letters which I have now received from my commanders and which I read, I discovered that there were a few more cases than I believed, altogether perhaps 10 or 12 at the most.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: To what do you attribute the fact that despite this express order so few captains were taken prisoner?

DÖNITZ: The chief reason, without doubt, was that on an increasing scale, the more the mass of U-boats attacked enemy convoys, the convoy system of the enemy was perfected. The great bulk of the U-boats was engaged in the battle against convoys. In a few other cases it was not always possible by reason of the boat’s safety to approach the lifeboats in order to pick out a captain. And thirdly, I believe that the commanders of the U-boats were reluctant, quite rightly from their viewpoint, to have a captain on board for so long during a mission. In any event, I know that the commanders were not at all happy about this order.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, now I turn to a document which is really the nucleus of the accusation against you. It is Document GB-199, Page 36 of the British document book. This is your radio message of 17 September, and the Prosecution asserts that it is an order for the destruction of the shipwrecked. It is of such importance that I will read it to you again.

“To all Commanding Officers:

“1. No attempt of any kind must be made to rescue members of
ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water
and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and
handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the most
elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships
and crews.

“2. Orders for bringing back captains and chief engineers still
apply.

“3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of
importance for your boat.

“4. Be harsh. Bear in mind that the enemy takes no regard of
women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.”

Please describe to the Tribunal the antecedents of this order, which are decisive for its intentions. Describe first of all the general military situation out of which the order arose.

DÖNITZ: In September of 1942 the great bulk of the German U-boats fought convoys. The center of gravity in the deployment of U-boats was in the North Atlantic, where the protected convoys operated between England and America. The U-boats in the north fought in the same way, attacking only the convoys to Murmansk. There was no other traffic in that area. The same situation existed in the Mediterranean; there also the objects of our attack were the convoys. Beyond that, a part of the boats was committed directly to American ports, Trinidad, New York, Boston, and other centers of congested maritime traffic. A small number of U-boats fought also in open areas in the middle or the south of the Atlantic. The criterion at this time was that the powerful Anglo-American air force was patrolling everywhere and in increasingly large numbers. That was a point which caused me great concern, for obviously the airplane, because of its speed, constitutes the most dangerous threat to the U-boat. And that was not a matter of fancy on my part, for from the summer of 1942—that is, a few months before September, when this order was issued—the losses of our U-boats through air attacks rose suddenly by more than 300 percent, I believe.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, for clarification of this point, I am giving you a diagram which I would like to submit in evidence to the Tribunal as Dönitz-99. Will you, with the use of the diagram, explain the curve of losses?

DÖNITZ: It is very clear that this diagram showing the losses of U-boats corroborates the statements which I have just made. One can see that up to June 1942 U-boat losses were kept within reasonable limits and then—in July 1942—what I have just described happened suddenly. Whereas the monthly losses up till then varied as the diagram shows between 4, 2, 5, 3, 4, or 2 U-boats, from July the losses per month jumped to 10, 11, 8, 13, 14. Then follow the two winter months December and January, which were used for a thorough overhauling of the ships; and that explains the decrease which, however, has no bearing on the trend of losses.

These developments caused me the greatest concern and resulted in a great number of orders to the submarine commanders on how they were to act while on the surface; for the losses were caused while the boats were above water, since the airplanes could sight or locate them; and so the boats had to limit their surface activities as much as possible. These losses also prompted me to issue memoranda to the Naval Operations Staff.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When?

DÖNITZ: The memoranda were written in the summer, in June.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In June of 1942?

DÖNITZ: In June 1942 or July. At the pinnacle of my success, it occurred to me that air power might some day stifle us and force us under water. Thus, despite the huge successes which I still had at that time, my fears for the future were great, and that they were not imaginary is shown by the actual trend of losses after the submarines left the dockyard in February 1943; in that month 18 boats were lost; in March, 15; in April, 14. And then the losses jumped to 38.

The airplane, the surprise by airplane, and the equipment of the planes with radar—which in my opinion is, next to the atomic bomb, the decisive war-winning invention of the Anglo-Americans—brought about the collapse of U-boat warfare. The U-boats were forced under water, for they could not maintain their position on the surface at all. Not only were they located when the airplane spotted them, but this radar instrument actually located them up to 60 nautical miles away, beyond the range of sight, during the day and at night. Of course, this necessity of staying under water was impossible for the old U-boats, for they had to surface at least in order to recharge their batteries. This development forced me, therefore, to have the old U-boats equipped with the so-called “Schnorchel,” and to build up an entirely new U-boat force which could stay under water and which could travel from Germany to Japan, for example, without surfacing at all. It is evident, therefore, that I was in an increasingly dangerous situation.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, in order to characterize this situation I want to call your attention to your war diary of this time. This will have the Number Dönitz-18, reproduced on Page 32, Volume I. I want to read only the contents of the entries from the 2nd until the 14th of September, Page 32:

“On 2 September U-256 surprised and bombed by aircraft; unfit
for sailing and diving;

“On 3 September aircraft sights U-boat;

“On 4 September U-756 has not reported despite request since 1
September when near convoy; presumed lost.

“On 5 September aircraft sights U-boat;

“On 6 September U-705 probably lost because of enemy aircraft
attack;

“On 7 September U-130 bombed by Boeing bomber;

“On 8 September U-202 attacked by aircraft in Bay of Biscay.

“On 9 September...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the defendant has already told us of the losses and of the reason for the losses. What is the good of giving us details of the fact that U-boats were fighting aircraft?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I wanted to show, Mr. President, that the testimony of Admiral Dönitz is confirmed by the entries in his diary of that time. But if the Tribunal...

THE PRESIDENT: That’s a matter of common knowledge. We can read it. Anyhow, if you just draw our attention to the document we will read it. We don’t need you to read the details of it.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. I will do it that way.

DÖNITZ: That is a typical and characteristic entry in my war diary of those weeks and days just before the issuance of my order; but I wanted to add the following: The aircraft were very dangerous especially for psychological reasons: when no aircraft is on the scene, the commander of the U-boat views his situation as perfectly clear but the next moment when the aircraft comes into sight, his situation is completely hopeless. And that happened not only to young commanders, but to old experienced commanders who remembered the good old times. Perhaps I may, quite briefly, give a clear-cut example. A U-boat needs one minute for the crew to come in through the hatch before it can submerge at all. An airplane flies on the average 6,000 meters in one minute. The U-boat, therefore, in order to be able to submerge at all—and not to be bombed while it is still on the surface—must sight the aircraft from a distance of at least 6,000 meters. But that also is not sufficient, for even if the U-boat has submerged it still has not reached a safe depth. The U-boat, therefore, must sight the airplane even earlier, namely, at the extreme boundary of the field of vision. Therefore, it is an absolute condition of success that the U-boat is in a state of constant alert, that above all it proceeds at maximum speed, because the greater the speed the faster the U-boat submerges; and, secondly, that as few men as possible are on the tower so that they can come into the U-boat as quickly as possible which means that there should be no men on the upper deck at all, and so on. Now, rescue work, which necessitates being on the upper deck in order to bring help and take care of more people and which may even mean taking in tow a number of lifeboats, naturally completely interrupts the submarine’s state of alert, and the U-boat is, as a consequence, hopelessly exposed to any attack from the air.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I wish now to take up the _Laconia_ matter itself which I would be reluctant to have interrupted. If it is agreeable to the Tribunal, I would suggest that we have a recess now.

[_A recess was taken._]

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, you have just described the enemy’s supremacy in the air in September 1942. During these September days you received the report about the sinking of the British transport _Laconia_. I submit to the Tribunal the war diaries concerning that incident under Numbers Dönitz-18, 20, 21, and 22. These are the war diaries of the commanders of U-boats and of the commanders of the submarines which took part in this action, Kapitänleutnants Hartenstein, Schacht and Würdemann. They are reproduced in the document book on Page 34 and the following pages. I shall read to you the report which you received. That is on Page 35 of the document book, 13 September, 0125 hours. I read:

“Wireless message sent on America circuit:

“Sunk by Hartenstein British ship _Laconia_.”

Then the position is given and the message continues:

“Unfortunately with 1,500 Italian prisoners of war. Up to now
picked up 90...”

then the details, and the end is: “Request orders.”

I had the document handed to you...

THE PRESIDENT: Where are you now?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On Page 35, Mr. President, the entry of 13 September, time 0125 hours, the number at the beginning of the line; at the bottom of the page.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I had the documents handed to you to refresh your memory. Please tell me, first, what impression or what knowledge you had about this ship _Laconia_ which had been reported sunk, and about its crew.

DÖNITZ: I knew from the handbook on armed British ships which we had at our disposal that the _Laconia_ was armed with 14 guns. I concluded, therefore, that it would have a British crew of at least about 500 men. When I heard that there were also Italian prisoners on board, it was clear to me that this number would be further increased by the guards of the prisoners.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please describe now, on the basis of the documents, the main events surrounding your order of 17 September, and elaborate, first, on the rescue or nonrescue of British or Italians and secondly, your concern for the safety of the U-boats in question.

DÖNITZ: When I received this report, I radioed to all U-boats in the whole area. I issued the order:

“Schacht, Group Eisbär, Würdemann and Wilamowitz, proceed to Hartenstein immediately.”

Hartenstein was the commander who had sunk the ship. Later, I had to have several boats turn back because their distance from the scene was too great. The boat that was furthest from the area and received orders to participate in the rescue was 710 miles away, and therefore could not arrive before two days.

Above all I asked Hartenstein, the commander who had sunk the ship, whether the _Laconia_ had sent out radio messages, because I hoped that as a result British and American ships would come to the rescue. Hartenstein affirmed that and, besides, he himself sent out the following radio message in English...

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is on Page 36, Mr. President, under time figure 0600.

DÖNITZ: “If any ship will assist the shipwrecked _Laconia_ crew, I will not attack her, provided I am not being attacked by ship or air force.”

Summing up briefly, I gained the impression from the reports of the U-boats that they began the rescue work with great zeal.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many U-boats were there?

DÖNITZ: There were three or four submarines. I received reports that the numbers of those taken on board by each U-boat were between 100 and 200. I believe Hartenstein had 156 and another 131. I received reports which spoke of the crew being cared for and taken over from lifeboats; one report mentioned 35 Italians, 25 Englishmen, and 4 Poles; another, 30 Italians and 24 Englishmen; a third, 26 Italians, 39 Englishmen, and 3 Poles. I received reports about the towing of lifeboats towards the submarines. All these reports caused me the greatest concern because I knew exactly that this would not end well.

My concern at that time was expressed in a message to the submarines radioed four times, “Detailed boats to take over only so many as to remain fully able to dive.” It is obvious that, if the narrow space of the submarine—our U-boats were half as big as the enemy’s—is crowded with 100 to 200 additional people, the submarine is already in absolute danger, not to speak of its fitness to fight.

Furthermore, I sent the message, “All boats are to take on only so many people...”

THE PRESIDENT: Are these messages in the document?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, where are they? Why did he not refer to the time of them?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: They are all messages contained in the three diaries of the U-boats. The first message is on Page 36, Mr. President, under group 0720. I will read it.

“Radio message received”—a message from Admiral
Dönitz—“‘Hartenstein remain near place of sinking. Maintain
ability to dive. Detailed boats to take over only so many as to
remain fully able to dive.’”

DÖNITZ: Then I sent another message:

“Safety of U-boat is not to be endangered under any
circumstances.”

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This message is on Page 40, Mr. President, under the date of 17 September, 0140 hours.

DÖNITZ: “Take all measures with appropriate ruthlessness,
including discontinuance of all rescue activities.”

Furthermore, I sent the message:

“Boats must at all times be clear for crashdiving and underwater
use.”

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is on Page 37, under 0740, Heading 3.

DÖNITZ: “Beware of enemy interference by airplanes and submarines.”

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “All boats, also Hartenstein, take in only so many people that boats are completely ready for use under water.”

DÖNITZ: That my concern was justified was clearly evident from the message which Hartenstein sent and which said that he had been attacked by bombs from an American bomber.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This message, Mr. President, is on Page 39, under 1311 hours. It is an emergency message, and under 2304 hours there is the whole text of the message which I should like to read.

DÖNITZ: At this occasion...

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. The message reads:

“Radiogram sent: From Hartenstein”—to Admiral Dönitz—“Bombed
five times by American Liberator in low flight when towing four
full boats in spite of a Red Cross flag, 4 square meters, on the
bridge and good visibility. Both periscopes at present out of
order. Breaking off rescue; all off board; putting out to West.
Will repair.”

DÖNITZ: Hartenstein, as can be seen from a later report, also had 55 Englishmen and 55 Italians on board his submarine at that time. During the first bombing attack one of the lifeboats was hit by a bomb and capsized, and according to a report on his return there were considerable losses among those who had been rescued.

During the second attack, one bomb exploded right in the middle of the submarine, and damaged it seriously; he reported that it was only by a miracle of German shipbuilding technique that the submarine did not fall to pieces.

THE PRESIDENT: Where has he gone to now? What page is he on?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: He is speaking about the events which are described on Pages 38 and 39, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: It would help the Tribunal, you know, if you kept some sort of order instead of going on to one page and then to 40, and then back to 38.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The reason is that we are using two different war diaries, Mr. President.

Admiral, would you tell us now what measures you took after Hartenstein’s report that he had been attacked repeatedly in the course of the rescue measures?

DÖNITZ: I deliberated at length whether, after this experience, I should not break off all attempts at rescue; and beyond doubt, from the military point of view, that would have been the right thing to do, because the attack showed clearly in what way the U-boats were endangered.

That decision became more grave for me because I received a call from the Naval Operations Staff that the Führer did not wish me to risk any submarines in rescue work or to summon them from distant areas. A very heated conference with my staff ensued, and I can remember closing it with the statement, “I cannot throw these people into the water now. I will carry on.”

Of course, it was clear to me that I would have to assume full responsibility for further losses, and from the military point of view this continuation of the rescue work was wrong. Of that I received proof from the submarine U-506 of Würdemann, who also reported—I believe on the following morning—that he was bombed by an airplane.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That report, Mr. President, is on Page 42 in the war diary of Würdemann, an entry of 17 September, at 2343 hours. He reported:

“Transfer of survivors to _Annamite_ completed.”—Then come
details—“Attacked by heavy seaplane at noon. Fully ready for
action.”

DÖNITZ: The third submarine, Schacht’s, the U-507, had sent a wireless message that he had so and so many men on board and was towing four lifeboats with Englishmen and Poles.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is the report on Page 40, the first report.

DÖNITZ: Thereupon, of course, I ordered him to cast off these boats, because this burden made it impossible for him to dive.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is the second message on Page 40.

DÖNITZ: Later, he again sent a long message, describing the supplying of the Italians and Englishmen in the boat.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is on Page 41, at 2310 hours. I shall read that message:

“Transferred 163 Italians to _Annamite_.”—The _Annamite_ was a
French cruiser which had been called to assist in the
rescue.—“Navigation officer of _Laconia_ and another English
officer on board. Seven lifeboats with about 330 Englishmen and
Poles, among them 15 women and 16 children, deposited at Qu. FE
9612, women and children kept aboard ship for one night.
Supplied all shipwrecked with hot meal and drinks, clothed and
bandaged when necessary. Sighted four more boats at sea-anchor
Qu. FE 9619.”

Then there are further details which are not important.

DÖNITZ: Because I had ordered him to cast off the lifeboats and we considered this general message as a supplementary later report, he was admonished by another message; and from that, the Prosecution wrongly concluded that I had prohibited the rescue of Englishmen. That I did not prohibit it can be seen from the fact that I did not raise objection to the many reports speaking of the rescue of Englishmen.

Indeed, in the end I had the impression that the Italians did not fare very well in the rescue. That this impression was correct can be seen from the figures of those rescued. Of 811 Englishmen about 800 were rescued, and of 1,800 Italians 450.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, I want once more to clarify the dates of the entire action. The _Laconia_ was torpedoed on 12 September. When was the air attack on the lifeboats?

DÖNITZ: On the 16th.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the night of the 16th? On the 17th?

DÖNITZ: On the 16th.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On the 16th of September. So the rescue took how many days altogether?

DÖNITZ: Four days.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And afterwards was continued until when?

DÖNITZ: Until we turned them over to the French warships which had been notified by us.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, what is the connection between this incident of the _Laconia_, which you have just described, and the order which the Prosecution charges as an order for destruction?

DÖNITZ: Apart from my great and constant anxiety for the submarines and the strong feeling that the British and Americans had not helped in spite of the proximity of Freetown, I learned from this action very definitely that the time had passed when U-boats could carry out such operations on the surface without danger. The two bombing attacks showed clearly that in spite of good weather, in spite of the large numbers of people to be rescued who were more clearly visible to the aviators than in normal heavy sea conditions when few people have to be rescued, the danger to the submarines was so great that, as the one responsible for the boats and the lives of the crews, I had to prohibit rescue activities in the face of the ever-present—I cannot express it differently—the ever-present tremendous Anglo-American air force. I want to mention, just as an example, that all the submarines which took part in that rescue operation were lost by bombing attack at their next action or soon afterwards. The situation in which the enemy kills the rescuers while they are exposing themselves to great personal danger is really and emphatically contrary to ordinary common sense and the elementary laws of warfare.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the opinion of the Prosecution, Admiral, you used that incident to carry out in practice an idea which you had already cherished for a long time, namely, in the future to kill the shipwrecked. Please, state your view on this.

DÖNITZ: Actually, I cannot say anything in the face of such an accusation. The whole question concerned rescue or nonrescue; the entire development leading up to that order speaks clearly against such an accusation. It was a fact that we rescued with devotion and were bombed while doing so; it was also a fact that the U-boat Command and I were faced with a serious decision and we acted in a humane way, which from a military point of view was wrong. I think, therefore, that no more words need be lost in rebuttal of this charge.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, I must put to you now the wording of that order from which the Prosecution draws its conclusions. I have read it before; in the second paragraph it says, “Rescue is contrary to the most primitive laws of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.”

What does that sentence mean?

DÖNITZ: That sentence is, of course, in a sense intended to be a justification. Now the Prosecution says I could quite simply have ordered that safety did not permit it, that the predominance of the enemy’s air force did not permit it—and as we have seen in the case of the _Laconia_, I did order that four times. But that reasoning had been worn out. It was a much-played record, if I may use the expression, and I was now anxious to state to the commanders of the submarines a reason which would exclude all discretion and all independent decisions of the commanders. For again and again I had the experience that, for the reasons mentioned before, a clear sky was judged too favorably by the U-boats and then the submarine was lost; or that a commander, in the role of rescuer, was in time no longer master of his own decisions, as the _Laconia_ case showed; therefore under no circumstances—under no circumstances whatsoever—did I want to repeat the old reason which again would give the U-boat commander the opportunity to say, “Well, at the moment there is no danger of an air attack”; that is, I did not want to give him a chance to act independently, to make his own decision, for instance, to say to himself, “Since the danger of air attack no longer permits.” That is just what I did not want. I did not want an argument to arise in the mind of one of the 200 U-boat commanders. Nor did I want to say, “If somebody with great self-sacrifice rescues the enemy and in that process is killed by him, then that is a contradiction of the most elementary laws of warfare.” I could have said that too. But I did not want to put it in that way, and therefore I worded the sentence as it now stands.

THE PRESIDENT: You haven’t referred us back to the order, but are you referring to Page 36 of the Prosecution’s trial brief, or rather British Document Book?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, Page 36 of the British Document Book.

THE PRESIDENT: There are two orders there, are there not?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No. It is one order with four numbered parts.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, there are two paragraphs, aren’t there? There is Paragraph 1 and there is Paragraph 2 of 17 September 1942.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I think you mean the excerpt from the war diary of the Commander of the U-boats, which is also on Page 36 in the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Hadn’t you better read the phrase that you are referring to?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. I am speaking now of the second sentence, dated 17 September, under heading 1, on Page 36 of the document book of the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The second sentence reads, “Rescue is contrary to the most elementary laws of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.” That is the sentence on which Admiral Dönitz commented just now.

THE PRESIDENT: On Page 36, the first order is an order to “All Commanding Officers” and Paragraph 1 of it begins, “No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships...” Is that the paragraph you are referring to?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, and of that I mean the second sentence, Mr. President. “Rescue is contrary to the most primitive laws of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.”

THE PRESIDENT: What about the next paragraph, 17 September 1942, Paragraph 2?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I just wanted to put that to him. That is an entry in the war diary on which I would like to question him now.

Admiral, I now put to you an entry in your war diary of 17 September; there we find:

“All commanders are again advised that attempts to rescue crews
of ships sunk are contrary to the most elementary laws of
warfare after enemy ships and their crews have been destroyed.
Orders about picking up captains and chief engineers remain in
force.”

THE PRESIDENT: It is differently translated in our document book. You said: “After enemy ships have been destroyed...” In our translation it is “.... by annihilating enemy ships and their crews.”

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I think it should be “by,” Mr. President, not “after.”

DÖNITZ: This entry in the war diary refers to the radio order, the four regular radio messages which I sent during the _Laconia_ incident and which were also acknowledged.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. Please explain to the Tribunal first how such entries in the war diary were made. Who kept the war diary? Did you yourself keep it or who did that?

DÖNITZ: Since I am not to conceal anything here, I have to say that the keeping of the war diary was a difficult matter for me because there were no reliable officers available for this task. That entry, as I suspected and as has been confirmed to me here, was made by a former chief petty officer who tried to condense my orders during the entire case into an entry of this sort. Of course, I was responsible for each entry; but this entry had in reality no actual consequences; my radio order was the essential thing.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, the decisive point here, in my opinion, is whether that entry is a record of your actual reflections or whether it is only an excerpt from the wireless order, an extract which had been noted down by a subordinate according to his best knowledge and ability.

DÖNITZ: The latter is correct. My own lengthy deliberations were concerned with the order of the Naval Operations Staff, the order of the Führer, and my own serious decision, whether or not I should discontinue that method of warfare; but they are not included in the war diary.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral, will you explain what is meant in the war diary by the entry, “All commanders are advised again,” and so on.

DÖNITZ: I do not know exactly what that means. My staff, which is here, has told me that it referred to the four radio messages which I had sent; because before the _Laconia_ case no statement on this subject had been made. “Again,” therefore, means that this was the fifth radio message.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thus the order of 17 September 1942 was, for you, the end of the _Laconia_ incident?

DÖNITZ: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: To whom was it directed?

DÖNITZ: According to my best recollection, it was directed only to submarines on the High Seas. For the various operation areas—North Atlantic, Central Atlantic, South Atlantic—we had different radio channels. Since the other submarines were in contact with convoys and thus unable to carry out rescue measures, they could simply shelve the order. But I have now discovered that the order was sent out to all submarines, that is, on all channels; it was a technical matter of communication which of course could do no harm.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said that the fundamental consideration underlying the entire order was the overwhelming danger of air attack. If that is correct, how could you in the same order maintain the directive for the rescue of captains and chief engineers? That can be found under Heading 2.

DÖNITZ: There is, of course, a great difference in risk between rescue measures for which the submarine has to stop, and men have to go on deck, and a brief surfacing to pick up a captain, because while merely surfacing the submarine remains in a state of alert, whereas otherwise that alertness is completely disrupted.

However, one thing is clear. There was a military purpose in the seizure of these captains for which I had received orders from the Naval Operations Staff. As a matter of principle, and generally, I would say that in the pursuit of a military aim, that is to say, not rescue work but the capture of important enemies, one must and can run a certain risk. Besides, that addition was not significant in my view because I knew that in practice it brought very meager results, I might say no results at all.

I remember quite clearly having asked myself, “Why do we still pick them up?” It was not our intention, however, to drop a general order of that importance. But the essential points are, first the lesser risk that the state of alert might not be maintained during rescue and, secondly, the pursuit of an important military aim.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean by the last sentence in the order, “Be harsh”?

DÖNITZ: I had preached to my U-boat commanders for 5½ years, that they should be hard towards themselves. And when giving this order I again felt that I had to emphasize to my commanders in a very drastic way my whole concern and my grave responsibility for the submarines, and thus the necessity of prohibiting rescue activities in view of the overwhelming power of the enemy air force. After all it is very definite that on one side there is the harshness of war, the necessity of saving one’s own submarine, and on the other the traditional sentiment of the sailor.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You heard the witness Korvettenkapitän Möhle state in this Court that he misunderstood the order in the sense that survivors should be killed, and in several cases he instructed submarine commanders in that sense.

DÖNITZ: Möhle is...

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. I want to put a question first. As commanding officer, do you not have to assume responsibility for a misunderstanding of your order?

DÖNITZ: Of course, I am responsible for all orders, for their form and their contents. Möhle, however, is the only person who had doubts about the meaning of that order. I regret that Möhle did not find occasion to clarify these doubts immediately, either through me, to whom everybody had access at all times, or through the numerous staff officers who, as members of my staff, were either also partly responsible or participated in the drafting of these orders; or, as another alternative, through his immediate superior in Kiel. I am convinced that the few U-boat commanders to whom he communicated his doubts remained quite unaffected by them. If there were any consequences I would of course assume responsibility for them.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You are acquainted with the case of Kapitänleutnant Eck, who after sinking the Greek steamer _Peleus_ in the spring of 1944 actually fired on lifeboats. What is your view of this incident?

DÖNITZ: As Kapitänleutnant Eck stated at the end of his interrogation under oath, he knew nothing of Möhle’s interpretation or Möhle’s doubts nor of the completely twisted message and my decision in the case of _U-386_. That was the incident which Möhle mentioned when the submarine met pneumatic rafts with fliers, and I voiced my disapproval because he had not taken them on board. A written criticism of his actions was also forwarded to him. On the other hand, some authority pointed out that he had not destroyed these survivors. Eck knew nothing about the interpretation or the doubts of the Möhle order, nor of this affair. He acted on his own decision, and his aim was not to kill survivors but to remove the wreckage; because he was certain that otherwise this wreckage would on the following day give a clue to Anglo-American planes and that they would spot and destroy him. His purpose, therefore, was entirely different from the one stated in the Möhle interpretation.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Eck said during his examination that he had counted on your approval of his actions. Did you ever hear anything at all about the Eck case during the war?

DÖNITZ: No. It was during my interrogation here that I heard about it, for Eck was taken prisoner during that same operation.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you approve of his actions, now that you know of them?

DÖNITZ: I do not approve his actions because, as I said before, in this respect one must not deviate from military ethics under any circumstances. However, I want to say that Kapitänleutnant Eck was faced with a very grave decision. He had to bear responsibility for his boat and his crew, and that responsibility is a serious one in time of war. Therefore, if for the reason that he believed he would otherwise be spotted and destroyed—and that reason was not unfounded, because in the same operational area and during the same time four submarines, I think, had been bombed—if he came to his decision for that reason, then a German court-martial would undoubtedly have taken it into consideration.

I believe that after the war one views events differently, and one does not fully realize the great responsibility which an unfortunate commander carries.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Apart from the Eck case did you, during the war, or after, hear of any other instance in which a U-boat commander fired on shipwrecked people or life rafts?

DÖNITZ: Not a single one.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You know, do you not, the documents of the Prosecution which describe the sinking of the ships _Noreen Mary_ and _Antonico_? Do you or do you not recognize the soundness of these documents as evidence according to your experience in these matters?

DÖNITZ: No. I believe that they cannot stand the test of an impartial examination. We have a large number of similar reports about the other side, and we were always of the opinion, and also stated that opinion in writing to the Führer and the OKW, that one must view these cases with a good deal of skepticism, because a shipwrecked person can easily believe that he is being fired on, whereas the shots may not be aimed at him at all, but at the ship, that is, misses of some sort.

The fact that the Prosecution gives just these two examples proves to me that my conviction is correct, that apart from the Eck case no further instances of this kind occurred during those long years in the ranks of the large German U-boat force.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You mentioned before the discussion with the Führer in May 1942, during which the problem whether it was permissible to kill survivors was examined, or at least touched upon by the Führer. Was that question re-examined at any time by the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats or the Naval Operations Staff?

DÖNITZ: When I had become Commander-in-Chief of the Navy...

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That was in 1943?

DÖNITZ: I think in the summer of 1943 I received a letter from the Foreign Office in which I was informed that about 87 percent of the crews of merchant ships which had been sunk were returning home. I was told that was a disadvantage and was asked whether it was not possible to do something about it.

Thereupon I had a letter sent to the Foreign Office in which I wrote that I had already been forced to prohibit rescue because it endangered the submarines, but that other measures were out of the question for me.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There is an entry in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff which deals with this case. I submit this entry as Dönitz-42, on Pages 92 to 94 in Volume II of the document book.

I shall read as introduction the first and second sentences of Page 92. The entry is dated 4 April 1943.

“The German Foreign Office pointed out a statement of the
British Transport Minister according to which, following
sinkings of merchant vessels, an average of 87 percent of the
crews were saved. On the subject of this statement the Naval
Operations Staff made a comprehensive reply to the Foreign
Office.”

Then there is the reply on the next pages, and I should like to call to your attention a part of it first, under Heading 1, about the number of convoy ships sunk. What is the importance of that in this connection?

DÖNITZ: That so many people certainly returned home.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Furthermore, under Heading 2, it is mentioned that the sailors do not need a long period of training, with the exception of officers, and that an order for the picking up of captains and chief engineers already existed. What is the meaning of that?

DÖNITZ: It is intended to emphasize that a matter like that is being judged in the wrong light.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment, Admiral. By “a matter like that,” you mean the usefulness, from a military point of view, of killing the shipwrecked?

DÖNITZ: I mean that crews were always available to the enemy, or unskilled men could very quickly be trained.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Under Heading 4, you point to the great danger of reprisals against your own submarine crews. Did such reprisals against German U-boat crews occur at any time in the course of the war?

DÖNITZ: I do not know. I did not hear anything about reprisals in that respect. I only received reliable reports that when U-boats were bombed and destroyed from the air, the men swimming in the water were shot at. But whether these were individual acts or reprisals carried out on orders, I do not know. I assume they were individual acts.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The decisive point of the entire letter seems to be in Heading 3; I shall read that to you:

“A directive to take action against lifeboats of sunken vessels
and crew members drifting in the sea would, for psychological
reasons, hardly be acceptable to U-boat crews, since it would be
contrary to the innermost feelings of all sailors. Such a
directive could only be considered if by it a decisive military
success could be achieved.”

Admiral, you yourself have repeatedly spoken about the harshness of war. Are you, nevertheless, of the opinion that psychologically the U-boat crews could not be expected to carry out such an order? And why?

DÖNITZ: We U-boat men knew that we had to fight a very hard war against the great sea powers. Germany had at her disposal for this naval warfare nothing but the U-boats. Therefore, from the beginning—already in peacetime—I trained the submarine crews in the spirit of pure idealism and patriotism.

That was necessary, and I continued that training throughout the war and supported it by very close personal contacts with the men at the bases. It was necessary to achieve very high morale, very high fighting spirit, because otherwise the severe struggle and the enormous losses, as shown on the diagram, would have been morally impossible to bear. But in spite of these high losses we continued the fight, because it had to be; and we made up for our losses and again and again replenished our forces with volunteers full of enthusiasm and full of moral strength, just because morale was so high. And I would never, even at the time of our most serious losses, have permitted that these men be given an order which was unethical or which would damage their fighting morale; much less would I myself ever have given such an order, for I placed my whole confidence in that high fighting morale and endeavored to maintain it.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said the U-boat forces were replenished with volunteers, did you?

DÖNITZ: We had practically only volunteers.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Also at the time of the highest losses?

DÖNITZ: Yes, even during the time of highest losses, during the period when everyone knew that he took part in an average of two missions and then was lost.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How high were your losses?

DÖNITZ: According to my recollection, our total losses were 640 or 670.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And crew members?

DÖNITZ: Altogether, we had 40,000 men in the submarine force. Of these 40,000 men 30,000 did not return, and of these 30,000, 25,000 were killed and only 5,000 were taken prisoner. The majority of the submarines were destroyed from the air in the vast areas of the sea, the Atlantic, where rescue was out of the question.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I come now to a new subject. Would this be a suitable time to recess?

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am turning now to the theme of the so-called conspiracy. The Prosecution is accusing you of participating from 1932, on the basis of your close connections with the Party, in a conspiracy to promote aggressive wars and commit war crimes. Where were you during the weeks of the seizure of power by the National Socialists in the early part of 1933?

DÖNITZ: Immediately after 30 January 1933, I believe it was on 1 February, I went on leave to the Dutch East Indies and Ceylon, a trip which lasted well into the summer of 1933. This leave journey had been granted me, at Grossadmiral Raeder’s recommendation, by President Hindenburg.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: After that, you became commander of a cruiser at a foreign station?

DÖNITZ: In the autumn of 1934 I went as captain of the cruiser _Emden_ through the Atlantic, around Africa into the Indian Ocean, and back.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before this sojourn abroad or after your return in 1935 and until you were appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in the year 1943 were you politically active in any way?

DÖNITZ: I was not active politically until 1 May 1945, when I became head of the State, not before then.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution has submitted a document, namely, an affidavit by Ambassador Messersmith. It bears the number USA-57 (Document Number 1760-PS) and I have the pertinent extracts in my document book, Volume II, Page 100. In this affidavit, Ambassador Messersmith says that from 1930 until the spring of 1934 he acted as Consul General for the United States in Berlin. Then, until July 1937, he was in Vienna and from there he went to Washington. He gives an opinion about you with the remark, “Among the people whom I saw frequently and to whom my statements refer were the following....” Then your name is mentioned. From this one must get the impression that during this period of time you were active in political circles in Berlin or Vienna. Is that correct?

DÖNITZ: No. At that time I was Lieutenant Commander and from the end of 1934 on I was Commander.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With the permission of the Tribunal I sent an interrogatory to Ambassador Messersmith in order to determine upon what facts he was basing his opinion. This interrogatory was answered and I am submitting it as Exhibit Dönitz-45. The answers will be found on Page 102 of the document book, and I quote:

“During my residence in Berlin and during my later frequent
visits there as stated in my previous affidavits, I saw Admiral
Karl Dönitz and spoke to him on several occasions. However, I
kept no diary and I am unable to state with accuracy when and
where the meetings occurred, the capacity in which Admiral
Dönitz appeared there, or the topic or topics of our
conversation. My judgment on Dönitz expressed in my previous
affidavit is based on personal knowledge and on the general
knowledge which I obtained from the various sources described in
my previous affidavits.”

Did you, Admiral, see and speak with Ambassador Messersmith anywhere and at any time?

DÖNITZ: I never saw him, and I hear his name here for the first time. Also, at the time in question, I was not in Berlin. I was in Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea coast or in the Indian Ocean. If he alleges to have spoken to me it would have had to be in Wilhelmshaven or in the Indian Ocean. Since neither is the case, I believe that he is mistaken and that he must have confused me with somebody else.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you a member of the NSDAP?

DÖNITZ: On 30 January 1944 I received from the Führer, as a decoration, the Golden Party Badge; and I assume that I thereby became an honorary member of the Party.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When did you become acquainted with Adolf Hitler and how often did you see him before you were appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?

DÖNITZ: I saw Adolf Hitler for the first time when, in the presence of Grossadmiral Raeder in the autumn of 1934, I informed him of my departure for foreign parts as captain of the cruiser _Emden_. I saw him again on the day following my return with the _Emden_. From the autumn of 1934 until the outbreak of war in 1939, in 5 years, I saw him four times in all, including the two occasions when I reported to him as already mentioned.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what were the other two occasions? Were they military or political occasions?

DÖNITZ: One was a military matter when he was watching a review of the fleet in the Baltic Sea and I stood next to him on the bridge of the flagship in order to give the necessary explanations while two U-boats showed attack maneuvers.

The other occasion was an invitation to all high-ranking army and navy officers when the new Reich Chancellery in the Voss Strasse was completed. That was in 1938 or 1939. I saw him there but I did not speak with him.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many times during the war, until your appointment as Commander-in-Chief, did you see the Führer?

DÖNITZ: In the years between 1939 and 1943 I saw the Führer four times, each time when short military reports about U-boat warfare were being made and always in the presence of large groups.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Until that time had you had any discussion which went beyond the purely military?

DÖNITZ: No, none at all.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When were you appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy as successor to Grossadmiral Raeder?

DÖNITZ: On 30 January 1943.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the war which Germany was waging at that time at an offensive or defensive stage?

DÖNITZ: At a decidedly defensive stage.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In your eyes was the position of Commander-in-Chief, which was offered to you, a political or a military position?

DÖNITZ: It was self-evidently a purely military position, namely, that of the first soldier at the head of the Navy. My appointment to this position also came about because of purely military reasons which motivated Grossadmiral Raeder to propose my name for this position. Purely military considerations were the decisive ones in respect to this appointment.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You know, Admiral, that the Prosecution draws very far-reaching conclusions from your acceptance of this appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, especially with reference to the conspiracy. The Prosecution contends that through your acceptance of this position you ratified the previous happenings, all the endeavors of the Party since 1920 or 1922, and the entire German policy, domestic and foreign, at least since 1933. Were you aware of the significance of this foreign policy? Did you take this into consideration at all?

DÖNITZ: The idea never entered my head. Nor do I believe that there is a soldier who, when he receives a military command, would entertain such thoughts or be conscious of such considerations. My appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy represented for me an order which I of course had to obey, just as I had to obey every other military order, unless for reasons of health I was not able to do so. Since I was in good health and believed that I could be of use to the Navy, I naturally also accepted this command with inner conviction. Anything else would have been desertion or disobedience.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Then as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy you came into very close contact with Adolf Hitler. You also know just what conclusions the Prosecution draws from this relationship. Please tell me just what this relationship was and on what it was based?

DÖNITZ: In order to be brief, I might perhaps explain the matter as follows: