Chapter XVIII: Book 1: , Page 7 (7)

DÖNITZ: Yes, that is the operational area of August 1940.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, of August 1940.

DÖNITZ: And it is in accord in extent with the so-called combat zone which America forbade her merchant ships to enter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say it is in accord. Let us just look at it and see what the two things were. The United States at that time said that its merchant ships were not to come into that zone. You said that if any merchant ship came into that zone, 750,000 square miles in extent, none of the laws and usages of war applied, and that ship could be destroyed by any means you chose.

That was your view, was it not?

DÖNITZ: Yes, that is the German point of view in international law, which was also applied by other nations, that operational areas around the enemy are admissible. I may repeat that I am not a specialist in international law but a soldier, and I judge according to common sense. It seems to me a matter of course that an ocean area, or an ocean zone, around England could not be left in the undisturbed possession of the enemy.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think you are disputing it at all; but I want to get it quite clear. It was your view that it was right that if you fixed an operational zone of that extent, any neutral ship—and you agree that it is a neutral ship—coming unarmed into that zone could be destroyed by any means that you cared to use? That was your view of the way to conduct a war at sea; that is right, is it not?

DÖNITZ: Yes; and there are plenty of British statements which declare that in wartime—and we were at war with England—one cannot permit neutrals to enter and give aid to the belligerents, especially if they had previously been warned against doing so. That is quite in accordance with international law.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will discuss the matter of law with the Tribunal. I want to get at the facts.

That is the position which you adopt? And equally, if you found a neutral vessel outside the zone using its wireless, you would treat it as if it were a ship of war of a belligerent power, would you not? If a neutral vessel used its wireless after seeing the submarine, you would treat it as a ship of war of a belligerent power, would you not?

DÖNITZ: Yes, according to the regulations of international law.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. As I say, the matters of law rest with the Tribunal. I am not going to argue these with you. But, apart altogether from international law, did it ever strike you that that method of treating neutral ships was completely disregarding the life and safety of the people on the ships? Did that ever strike you?

DÖNITZ: I have already said that the neutrals had been warned not to cross the combat zones. If they entered the combat zones, they had to run the risk of suffering damage, or else stay away. That is what war is. For instance, no consideration would be shown on land either to a neutral truck convoy bringing ammunition or supplies to the enemy. It would be fired on in exactly the same way as an enemy transport. It is, therefore, quite admissible to turn the seas around the enemy’s country into a combat area. That is the position as I know it in international law, although I am only a soldier.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see.

DÖNITZ: Strict neutrality would require the avoidance of combat areas. Whoever enters a combat area must take the consequences.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is your view? I do not think it could possibly be put more fairly.

DÖNITZ: And for that reason the United States explicitly prohibited entry into these zones in November, because it refused to enter the combat zone.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In your view, any neutral ship which entered a zone of 750,000 square miles around Britain was committing an un-neutral act and was liable to be sunk without warning at sight. That is your view of how war at sea should be conducted; that is right, is it not?

DÖNITZ: Yes. Special lanes were left open for the neutrals. They did not have to enter the combat area unless they were going to England. Then they had to run the risk of war.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to tell me, if you will look back to Document C-21; that is, on Page 30 of the English book and Pages 59 to 60 of the German, you see that in all these cases—you take the one in Paragraph 2, Page 5:

“Conference with the Chief of Naval Operations Staff”—on 2
January; that was the “intensified measures” in connection with
the “Case Yellow,” that is, the invasion of Holland and
Belgium—“the sinking by U-boats... without any warning, of all
ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can
be employed.”

Why, if, as you have just told the Tribunal several times, you were acting in accordance with what you believe to be international law, why did you so act only in areas where mines could be employed?

DÖNITZ: I have already explained that that was a question not of legality but of military expediency. For military reasons I cannot give the enemy explicit information as to the means of combat I am using in an area which may be mined. You operated in the same way. I remind you of the French danger zone which was declared, corresponding to the mined areas around Italy. You did not state which weapons you were using, either. That has nothing to do with legality. That is purely a question of military expediency.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, I think you will appreciate that the point that I am putting to you is this: That you were pretending to neutrals that you were acting in accordance with the London Treaty, whereas you were actually acting not in accordance with the Treaty, but in accordance with instructions you laid down for yourself, based on military necessity.

What I am suggesting to you is that what the Naval High Command was doing was pretending to, and getting the advantage fraudulently of appearing to, comply with the Treaty. And that, I suggest, is the purpose of these orders that you would only do this where mines could be laid. Isn’t that what was in your mind?

DÖNITZ: It is not true that we tried to fool the neutrals. We warned the neutrals explicitly that combat actions were going on in these operational areas and that if they entered they would suffer damage. We pretended nothing; we told them explicitly: “Do not enter these zones.” England did the same.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, doesn’t the next sentence bear upon that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, Your Lordship; I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Would you look at the next sentence in II-1, where it says the following?

“By the present order, the Navy will be authorized, in keeping
with the general intensification of the war, to sink by U-boats,
without any warning, all ships in those waters near the enemy
coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for
external consumption, pretense should be made that mines are
being used. The behavior of, and use of weapons by, U-boats
should take this into consideration.”

Do you say, in the face of that sentence, that you were not trying to fool the neutrals—to use your own phrase? Do you still say you were not trying to fool the neutrals?

DÖNITZ: No, we did not fool them because we warned them beforehand. In wartime I do not have to say what weapon I intend to use; I may very well camouflage my weapon. But the neutrals were not fooled. On the contrary, they were told, “Do not enter these zones.” After that, the question of which particular military method I use in these areas no longer concerns the neutrals.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to tell the Tribunal, what was your view of your responsibility to the seamen from boats that were sunk? Would you have in mind the provisions of the London Treaty, and will you agree that your responsibility was to save seamen from boats that were sunk wherever you could do so without imperiling your ship? Is that, broadly, correct?

DÖNITZ: Of course, if the ship herself behaved according to the London Agreement, or unless it occurred within the operational areas mentioned.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh? Do you really mean that? That is, if you sank a neutral ship which had come into that zone, you considered that you were absolved from any of your duties under the London Agreement to look after the safety of the crews?

DÖNITZ: In operational areas I am obliged to take care of the survivors after the engagement, if the military situation permits. The same held good in the Baltic and in many operational areas.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I put to you, Defendant. Please believe me, I don’t want to make any false point. I put to you: If they could do so without imperiling their ships, that is, without risking losing their ships. Let us get it quite clear: Do you say that in the zone which you fixed there was no duty to provide for the safety of the crew, that you accepted no duty to provide for the safety of the crew?

DÖNITZ: I have stated that I was obliged to take care of the survivors after the engagement, if the military situation permitted. That forms part of the Geneva Convention or the agreement on its application.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then it didn’t matter whether the sinking was in the zone or out of the zone. According to what you say, you undertook exactly the same duty towards survivors whether it was in the zone or outside the zone. Is that right?

DÖNITZ: No, that is not correct, because outside the zone neutrals were treated according to the Prize Ordinance, only inside the zone they were not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I can’t understand is this—and really, I hope I am not being very stupid—what was the difference? What difference did you consider existed in your responsibility towards survivors if the sinking was inside the zone or outside the zone? That is what I want to get clear.

DÖNITZ: The difference was that neutrals outside the zone were treated according to the Prize Ordinance. According to the London Agreement, we were obliged, before sinking the ship, to see that the crew were safe and within reach of land. There was no obligation to do so inside the zone. In that case we acted according to the Hague Agreement for the application of the Geneva Convention, which provides that the survivors should be taken care of after the fight if the military situation permits.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree that an order in express terms to annihilate, to kill, the survivors of a ship that is sunk would be an appalling order to give?

DÖNITZ: I have already stated that the attacks on survivors were contrary to a soldier’s idea of fair fighting and that I have never put my name to any order which could in the slightest degree lead to anything of the kind—not even when it was proposed to me as a reprisal measure.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree that even with the discipline in your own branch of the service, there was a possibility that some U-boat commanders would have refused to comply with an order to annihilate survivors?

DÖNITZ: No such order was ever given.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it is quite a fair question. What if it were given in express terms, “Annihilate survivors after you sink a ship”? You know your officers. Would there, at any rate, have been some danger that some of them would have refused to carry out that order?

DÖNITZ: Yes. As I know my U-boat forces, there would have been a storm of indignation against such an order. The clean and honest idealism of these would never have allowed them to do it; and I would never have given such an order or permitted it to be given.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what I put to you.

Now, just look at Page 33 of the English document book. That contains your own Standing Order Number 154 (Exhibit Number GB-196). Let me read it to you, rather slowly, if the Tribunal does not mind. It says:

“Do not pick up survivors and take them with you; do not worry
about the merchant ship’s boats; weather conditions and distance
from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and
strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible. We
must be harsh in this war.”

First of all, tell me, what do you mean by “your next success”? Doesn’t that mean the next attack on a vessel?

DÖNITZ: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just look at that order of yours and compare it with the words of the London Treaty. The Treaty, you remember, says that a warship, including a submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without first having placed passengers, crew, and ship’s papers in a place of safety. For this purpose, the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land or the presence of another vessel.

Defendant, you had that article of the London Treaty in front of you, had you not, when you were drafting this order? And you were deliberately excluding from your order the matters mentioned in the London Treaty? Listen to your order: “Do not worry about the boats; weather conditions”—one thing mentioned in the Treaty—“and distance from land”—another thing mentioned in the Treaty—“play no part.”

Your order could have been put in other language almost as clearly: “Disregard all the matters that are stated in Paragraph 2 of the London Treaty.”

Now tell me, didn’t you have the London Treaty in front of you when you drew that order?

DÖNITZ: Of course I had the London Treaty in my mind and in front of me. I stated in detail yesterday, however, that we were thinking in terms of an engagement, a ship under escort, as is shown by the order as a whole. You have taken just one paragraph. There was, therefore, no question of applying the London Agreement, which does not refer to ships under escort.

Secondly, we were thinking of an area in the immediate vicinity of the permanent positions, enemy defenses off the harbors on the British coast. The London Agreement has nothing to do with fighting ships under escort. Those are two entirely different things; and that order applied to this area and the combating of ships under escort. I explained that in detail yesterday.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if you say that that only applied when it was a question of attacking ships in convoy, would you look at Page 26 of the English document book and at Page 57 of the German document book? There you will find the account of the sinking of the _Sheaf Mead_ on 27 May 1940. And if you will look at the U-boat’s log, opposite the time group 1648 hours—which is on Page 27 of the English and Page 57 of the German (Exhibit Number GB-192)—this is what the log says:

“A large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify
the name. The crew have saved themselves on wreckage and
capsized boats. We fish out a buoy; no name on it. I ask a man
on the raft. He says, hardly turning his head ‘Nixname.’ A young
boy in the water calls, ‘Help, help, please.’ The others are
very composed; they look damp and somewhat tired and have a look
of cold hatred on their faces. Then on to the old course.”

If you turn to Page 57 of the German document book, or Page 28 of the English, you will find the last sentence from the survivors’ report describes the submarine as doing this:

“They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us
in the water. Otherwise they just watched us but said nothing.
Then she submerged and went off without offering us any
assistance whatever.”

There you see the point, Defendant, that your own commander says that there was a young boy in the water calling, “Help, help, please,” and your submarine takes a few photographs, submerges, and then goes off.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought you not to refer to the passage just after the name of the vessel, under 1648, “It is not clear....”?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “It is not clear whether she was sailing as a normal merchant ship. The following seemed to point to the contrary.”

And then, My Lord, it gives a number of matters.

Of course, My Lord, I am on the point of survivors at the moment. I am not taking this instance as a matter of wrongful sinking; I am taking it as an instance of carrying out this order.

I am very much obliged to Your Lordship, but that is why I didn’t do it.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant has now had the opportunity of looking at the log of _U-37_. Was it not your practice in May 1940 to see personally the logs of all U-boats when they arrived?

DÖNITZ: I had the commanders of submarines report verbally to me every time. The logs, which arrived or were finished several weeks later or some time after the entries were made since they had to be written in the port, were only submitted to me by my Chief of Staff if they contained something special in addition to the verbal report.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you remember seeing the log of _U-37_ that was involved in this incident?

DÖNITZ: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now observe that the _Sheaf Mead_ was not sailing in convoy?

DÖNITZ: Yes, I know that. And I know that she was an armed ship and that, according to the orders which the commander had, he was justified in sinking her as an armed ship. It also appears from his log that he could not decide on firing the torpedo until he had ascertained that the ship was armed. That is very clearly expressed here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I please explain to His Lordship that I am not on the question of sinking. I am on the question of survivors. Did you take any action with the U-boat commander, Kapitänleutnant Ernst, for not having assisted in the rescue of survivors?

DÖNITZ: No. But I did tell him that if he was on the spot where this rescue went on he should also have helped.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was he not simply carrying out your Order 154 of November or December 1939?

DÖNITZ: No, he was not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now...

DÖNITZ: I have already stated to which waters it applied and that it only applied to ships which were protected.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you look at Page 34 in the English document book, Page 69 in the German document book. That is the report of the conversation between Hitler and Oshima, and you say that you were told nothing about it. Now I want you just to follow about halfway down, halfway through the extract, where it says:

“After having given further explanations on the map, the Führer
pointed out that however many ships the United States built, one
of its main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that
reason merchant ships would be sunk without warning, with the
intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it
gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings,
the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new
people. The training of seagoing personnel takes a long time.”

Now, did you agree with that argument of Hitler’s that once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people? Did you think that that was a sound argument on the question of sea warfare against the United States?

DÖNITZ: I have already given my answer to that question in writing to the Foreign Office, and I clearly stated my opinion, which was that I did not believe that it would take a long time to train seamen, and that America had no lack of them. Consequently I would also not be of the opinion that this would serve as a deterrent if they had enough men.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you do not agree with the Führer’s reasoning on that point?

DÖNITZ: No, I do not agree with the last part, namely, that there would be a shortage of seamen.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, it is the first point that I want your opinion on expressly: “Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people.” That is, I suggest to you, that the new people would be scared off by the news of the sinking and killing of the first people. Did you agree that that was a sound argument? That is what I want your view on.

DÖNITZ: That is his personal point of view. Whether they would be scared off or not is an American matter which I cannot judge.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at your own document book, Volume I, Page 29 in the English version, which is your report to the Führer on 14 May 1942. Do you see the last sentence where you are advocating a range pistol? You say:

“A range pistol will also have the great advantage that the crew
will not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick
sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of crews will
no doubt cause difficulties for the assignment of crews for the
great American construction program.”

DÖNITZ: It is perfectly clear, it is correct. If I have not got the old crews any more, I have to have new ones. It makes it more difficult. It says nothing about scaring off there, but the positive fact is stated that new crews have to be trained.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So are we to take it that you did not think that would have any frightening or terrorizing effect on the getting of new crews, if the old crews were sunk under conditions where they would probably lose their lives.

DÖNITZ: That is a matter of opinion, it depends on the courage, the bravery of the people. The American Secretary Knox said that if in peacetime—in 1941—the sinkings of German U-boats were not published he expected it would have a deterrent effect on my U-boats. That was his opinion. I can only say that the silent disappearance through American sinkings in peacetime did not scare off my U-boats. It is a matter of taste.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, on 14 May the Führer was pressing you to take action against the crews after the vessel was sunk. Is that not so?

DÖNITZ: Yes. He asked whether we could not take action against the crew and I have already said, after I heard of the Oshima discussion here, that I believe this question to Grossadmiral Raeder and myself was the result of that Oshima discussion.

My answer to that, of course, is known; it was “no.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your answer was “no,” it would be far better to have a range pistol and kill them while they were still on the boat. That was your answer, was it not?

DÖNITZ: No. My answer was: Taking action against shipwrecked personnel is out of the question, but it is taken for granted that in a fight one must use the best possible weapon. Every nation does that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but the object of your weapon, as quite clearly set out, was that the crew would not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick sinking of the ship. That is why you wanted to use the range pistol.

DÖNITZ: Yes. And also of course, because we considered the crews of the steamers as combatants since they were fighting with weapons.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going back to deal with that point again, but that was in your mind. Now, the Führer raised this point again on 5 September 1942, as is shown in your document book, Volume II, Page 81.

DÖNITZ: I do not have it. Where is it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It begins with the discussion in the OKW on 5 September 1942. It is Exhibit Dönitz-39, Page 81, and it is in the English document book, Volume II.

DÖNITZ: Yes, I have it now.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It arises out of an incident of the sinking of the mine boat, _Ulm_, and there is a question of whether British destroyers had fired with machine arms on soldiers in lifeboats; and the Führer gave orders to the Naval Command to issue an order, according to which “our warships would use reprisals”; and if you look a little lower down, you will see that the matter had been investigated by your operations staff, and it is stated:

“It could not be proved beyond a doubt that the fire had been
aimed at the crew boarding the lifeboats. The enemy fire was
evidently aimed at the ship itself.”

Then you discuss the question of applying reprisals, at the foot of that page, and you say:

“It is the opinion of the Naval Operations Staff that before
issuing reprisal orders, one should take into consideration
whether such measures, if applied by the enemy against us, would
not in the end be more harmful to us than to the enemy. Even now
our boats are able only in a few cases to rescue shipwrecked
enemy crews by towing the lifeboats, _et cetera_, whereas the
crews of sunken German U-boats and merchant vessels have so far,
as a rule, been picked up by the enemy. The situation could
therefore only change in our favor if we were to receive orders,
as a measure of reprisal, that shipwrecked enemy crews should
not only not be saved, but that they should be subdued by fire.
It is significant in this respect that so far it could not be
proved that in the cases on record where the enemy used arms
against shipwrecked Germans such action was the result of, or
was covered by, an order of an official British agency. We
should therefore bear in mind the fact that knowledge of such a
German order would be used by enemy propaganda in such a manner
that its consequences could not easily be foreseen.”

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I object against this manner of procedure. The document about which this cross-examination is being made is a document from me, and I have not submitted it yet. I do not know whether it is customary in this Trial that exhibits of the Defense are submitted by the Prosecution. For this reason I had suggested at the time to begin with the documentary evidence so that the Prosecution should also have an opportunity to use my exhibits in cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any objection to the document which is in your document book being offered in evidence?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I only want to avoid having my documents presented by the Prosecution in cross-examination because this upsets my entire documentary evidence. This particular case does not play a decisive role for me, but if the Prosecution proposes to present other documents of mine which have not yet been submitted, I should like to ask that the cross-examination be interrupted and I first be afforded an opportunity to submit my documents.

THE PRESIDENT: That will only waste time, will it not? It would not do any good; it would only waste time.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I do not think it would be a waste of time if I, as Defense Counsel, ask that I be allowed to submit my own documents to the Tribunal myself and that they shall not be quoted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution from my document book, because the manner of presentation and the questions asked by the Prosecution do, of course, give these documents a quite definite meaning.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal thinks there is no objection to the course that is being taken. You have had the opportunity already of putting this document to the witness. You will have a further opportunity of putting it to him again in re-examination.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that there was fresh pressure put on you to take this course, that is, to fire on the crews of sunken vessels and that in September, was there not?

DÖNITZ: No, that is not correct. I only learned of this document of the naval war here; I was not under pressure, therefore; but it is true that, in accordance with this document, the Naval Operations Staff had apparently had orders from the OKW to compile a list of all such cases and that the Naval Operations Staff very correctly took the point of view that one would have to be very careful in judging these cases and that it advised against reprisal measures. It appears to me that the compilation of this document served to convince us that in principle one should keep away from these reprisal measures.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that on the instructions of Hitler the OKW had put through an inquiry to the naval war command on this point in September?

DÖNITZ: No, I did not know that. I just said I do not know about this entry in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff and the appendix which is attached to it. I first heard of it here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You first heard of it here?

DÖNITZ: I did not know about the entry in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. That was done in Berlin, and I was Commander of the Submarine Fleet in France at the time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you tell the Tribunal that you did not know about it in September, then we will pass on to another document. That is what you say, that you did not know about it in September 1942?

DÖNITZ: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you—I do not want to take you through the _Laconia_ in any detail, but I want you just to tell me about one, I think, one or two entries. I think it is Page 40 of your own document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that not on Page 41?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.

[_Turning to the defendant._] It is Page 41, at the bottom. It is on 20 September, 1320 hours. That is your wireless message to the U-boat _Schacht_. Do you see that?

DÖNITZ: Yes, and I explained that in great detail yesterday.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to know: Is it true what is stated in your wireless message that the boat was dispatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that true?

DÖNITZ: That is correct, because the vessel had reported to me that it had four boats in tow—and it says on Page 40, “...with British in tow.” It was clear, considering the whole situation, that a submarine with vessels in tow could not remain on the surface without the greatest danger to itself. Hence on Page 40 under heading 2 the order and the instructions given, “Boats with British and Poles to be cast adrift.” I wanted to get rid of the boats. That was the only reason. And it was only afterwards—Page 41—when a long radio message came from him, which in itself was a repetition but which was interpreted to mean that after the two air attacks had taken place he had again endangered his boat by stopping and picking up men, only then did he receive this wireless message, after it had gradually dawned on me—during the first four days, or perhaps three days, I had nothing against rescuing the British—that the Italians, who after all were our allies, were getting the worst of it, which indeed proved to be the case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have given a long explanation. Now, is that wireless message true, that the boat was dispatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that true or not true?

DÖNITZ: Of course; this wireless message contained both instructions and it becomes unequivocally clear from these two instructions as well as from the impression I had that the British who were rescued far outnumbered the Italians, who were left to drown.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there is one point I want you to make a little clearer. When you were interrogated about this matter, you said that you were under great pressure at the time; and, I think, that the pressure came to you from Hitler only through Captain Fricke. Is that right?

DÖNITZ: No, “only” is not correct. It was “also.” The pressure, as I have very clearly explained here, was due to worry and anxiety regarding the fate of my submarines, because I knew that they were now being greatly jeopardized. We had evidence of that already from the bombing attacks; secondly, of course, from the Führer’s orders which Fricke gave. But I have also stated here that in spite of that order, even if it was not militarily correct to act in this way, I continued rescuing. However, the pressure, my worry and anxiety, were mostly caused by the fate of the submarines themselves.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that at this time you had had the report to the Führer on 14 May; you had then had the _Laconia_ incident, and during that incident you had had the pressure from the Führer. Now, was it not because of this...

DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, but...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Allow me to ask my question.

DÖNITZ: I think there is an error that has crept in here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well, I will correct it. You had had the report to the Führer on 14 May. You have told me that. There was then the _Laconia_...

DÖNITZ: That has nothing to do with the Führer’s order in the case of the _Laconia_. In the case of the _Laconia_ the Führer had given orders, and quite rightly, that no boats should be endangered by the rescue. That is something quite different from the subject of 14 May.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am trying to assemble for the moment what matters you had to deal with. You had had the 14th of May, the _Laconia_ incident, and then an order to stop, coming through from the Führer.

DÖNITZ: No, in the case of the _Laconia_ incident I never thought at all of the order or of the discussion of 14 May with the Führer, and I could not, because that was an entirely different subject. This is quite another matter, here it was purely a matter of rescue. There is no connection whatsoever between the two.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will see about that. Turn to Page 36 in the British document book, or Pages 71 to 75 in the German document book.

Now, you have told us that what mainly concerned you was the safety of your own boats and of your own personnel.

DÖNITZ: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you put into the order, “The elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of ships and crews are contrary to rescuing”? What was the point of putting these words in, unless you meant to encourage people to destroy enemy ships and crews?

DÖNITZ: I explained that in great detail yesterday. I preached during all these years: You must not rescue when your own safety is in danger. In the case of the _Laconia_ I myself in my anxiety and worry wirelessed that to the troops many times. Apart from that, I found again and again that submarine commanders were taking the danger from the air too lightly. I also showed how that is to be explained psychologically. I described yesterday the overwhelming increase of the air force, and consequently in no circumstances would I have again given my people as a reason that, if there is danger from the air, or since you are being endangered from the air, _et cetera_, you must not rescue, or rescuing would be contrary to the elementary demands of warfare; because I did not want to leave it to my commanders to discuss whether there was danger from the air or not. After all my experience of the losses suffered and in view of the ever-present air force, which as history has shown was becoming stronger and stronger, I had to give a clear-cut order to the commanders based on that experience: “You cannot go on like that, or while we rescue the enemy we shall be attacked and killed by the enemy.” Therefore this reasoning must not enter into it. I did not wish to give the commanders another opportunity of deliberating or discussing. I told you already yesterday that I could have added, “If now, in view of the danger from the air, we are killed by that self-same enemy while rescuing him, then rescue is contrary to the elementary demands of warfare.” I did not want to do that, because I did not want any more discussion. We all had the impression that this refrain, “Do not rescue if there is danger from the air,” was outworn, because this would have meant that the commanders would nevertheless lose their liberty of action, and might slip into this thing.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if you had simply said, “You are forbidden to rescue,” and if you had wanted to give a reason, “You are forbidden to rescue because in view of the Allied air cover it is a matter of too great danger for the safety of yourself and your boat ever to rescue at all,” that would have been quite clear. Why did you not put it that way?

DÖNITZ: No, that is just what I could not do. I have just said so, because some commander in some naval theater might get the idea that there was no danger from the air, and the next moment the plane would appear and he would be struck down. I have already said all that in reply to your suggestion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had two experienced staff officers with you at the time that you got this order out—Captains Godt and Hessler, had you not?

DÖNITZ: Yes, that is right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler advised you strongly against the issue of this order, did they not?

DÖNITZ: As far as I can remember, they said something like this, “The bulk of the submarines”—I have said that here—“the bulk of the U-boats, that is, more than 90 percent of the U-boats, are already fighting the convoys, so that such an order is out of the question for them.”

That was the question: Should we issue such a general order at all, and would not the further developments which forced us all the time to issue new orders, namely, “Remain on the surface as little as possible,” make such an order superfluous? However, since I was responsible for warding off every possible danger to a submarine, I had to give this order and my staff agreed with me perfectly as far as this measure was concerned.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you not say when you were interrogated on 22 October and on other occasions: “Godt and Hessler told me, ‘Do not send this wireless message—you see, one day there may be a wrong impression about it; there may be a misinterpretation of that.’” Did you not say that?

DÖNITZ: Yes, I said that, and it is true too that such a remark may have been made. But it was not misinterpreted by the U-boats; nobody thought of that or we would not have issued the order. But we were thinking of the effects on the outside world.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And was not the effect that you wanted to produce: That you would have an order which could be argued was merely a prohibition of rescue, and would encourage the submarine commanders who felt that way to annihilate the survivors of the crews?

DÖNITZ: No, that is absolutely wrong, and it is also proved by the documents which we have submitted.

Apart from the Möhle case, nobody misunderstood this order and when we compiled the order we were aware of that fact. That becomes clear from the communications which we had with U-boat commanders, and it becomes clear from my searching inquiries when I asked whether they had in any way thought of that. The order does not show that at all, neither does the reason which led to it. The fact is that we were rescuing for all we were worth. The question was, “to rescue or not to rescue,” and nothing else. That is the key to the _Laconia_ case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said that “we issued the order.” Do you remember saying this in an interrogation on 6 October: “I am completely and personally responsible for it, because Captains Godt and Hessler both expressly stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or likely to be misinterpreted.”

Do you remember saying that, “I am completely and personally responsible” because both your staff officers had pointed out that it was ambiguous? Did you say that?

DÖNITZ: I do not think so. I cannot think I said it that way. I am not sure, but I will say the following:

During the interrogation I was told that Captains Godt and Hessler made this order, and in reply to that I said, “It is quite immaterial, I am responsible for the order.” Moreover, the main point of discussion on that order was whether one ought to issue such an order. That it should ever have entered Captain Godt’s or Captain Hessler’s mind that such an order could be misunderstood by us—by the U-boats—is completely erroneous. I emphatically stated that, too, during the interrogation. I clearly stated that this consideration and the discussion of the question whether the order was to be issued or not had nothing whatever to do with it as far as these two gentlemen were concerned. That is quite clear; and that also was contained in the interrogation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were making clear that it was the first occasion. I made it clear that you were not blaming your junior officer who had advised you against this, and you were taking the responsibility on this occasion yourself. That is true, these junior officers advised you against it? In your own words, they both expressly stated that they considered the telegram ambiguous and liable to be misinterpreted; that is right, is it not, they did say that?

DÖNITZ: I did not see the discussion after it was put down, and I did not sign it. I can tell you quite clearly—and this is clear from another discussion—that I said that I myself will assume full responsibility. For me that was the essential thing. The only reason why the whole question came up was because the interrogating officer told me these officers had drafted the order, and then, as I recall it, the idea was that on no account should these officers be held responsible for my order. That was the point of the matter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, at any rate, you are not changing what you said a few minutes ago that both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler advised you against issuing this order, are you?

DÖNITZ: According to my recollection, at first both advised against it. I have now heard that both are saying they did not advise against it, but that perhaps I or somebody else might have advised against it. I do not know for certain. I recollect that at first both advised me against issuing such an order at a time when 90 percent of our submarines were already engaged in fighting convoys and when we were being forced under the water anyway and it was absolutely impossible to make any more rescues since we were below the surface; and I said, “No; there will surely still be cases where such a thing can happen and where the commander will be faced with an awkward situation and in that case I want to relieve him of such a decision.” That was the reason and the meaning of the discussion, nothing else.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will continue. That is the first part of the order. Now take Paragraph 2, “Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply.” Now, Defendant, you know perfectly well that in order to find the captain or chief engineer, the U-boat has got to go around the lifeboats or wreckage and make inquiries, “Where is the captain?” And you know very well that the usual practice of the British merchant navy was to try and hide the captain and prevent them finding out who he was. Is that not the practical position that had to be met, that you had to go around the lifeboats asking for the captain if you wanted to bring him in? Is that not so?

DÖNITZ: Not exactly, no. I stated quite clearly yesterday that, first, the risk of taking aboard one man was much less as far as time was concerned, and would not limit the crashdiving ability of the boat, whereas rescuing activities would limit severely the crashdiving ability. Secondly, that that had a military aim ordered by the Naval Operations Staff for which, as is always the case in war, a certain risk would have to be taken; and, thirdly, that the significance of that paragraph appeared to all of us to be unimportant, the results being always poor. This order, if you want to construe it like this and take it out of its context, militates against your contention that I wanted to destroy these people; because I wanted to take prisoners, and if I intended to kill somebody first, then I certainly could not have taken him prisoner.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting it to you that the second part of the order is that you are to bring in captains and chief engineers to find out what you can from them.

Look at the third paragraph: “Rescue ship crews only if their statements will be of importance for U-boats,” that is, of importance for you to learn from them the position of Allied ships or the measures the Allies are taking against submarines. That is the point against two and three, is it not? You are only to take prisoners if you can find out some useful thing from them?

DÖNITZ: I think it is taken for granted that we should try to get as much information as possible, and since I cannot take the whole crew as prisoners on a U-boat, I have to confine myself to the most important persons. Therefore I remove these people from further engagement, whereas the others may engage again. Of course, in view of the limited room on a U-boat, I do not take unimportant people but the important ones.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not want to take up a lot of time, but I want you to tell me this: Did I understand your explanation of the word “again” in the War Diary to be that you had drawn the attention of certain submarine commanders to your telegrams during the _Laconia_ incident, is that your explanation?

DÖNITZ: No, it did not refer to U-boat commanders; and I believe the word “again,” as my staff says, referred to those four wireless messages which we have read as meaning this during the last few days and which were submitted to the Tribunal yesterday.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put to you a moment ago a question and you said the “again” refers to the messages you sent out during the _Laconia_ incident. I think you agree with that, do you not? Do not be afraid to agree with what I say. When was that?

DÖNITZ: Yesterday it was explained to me that there were four wireless messages, and I assumed that the person was summarizing the whole event, and that was probably his way of putting it. He was a chief petty officer and I do not know what he meant when he used the word “again.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you say you had never heard of the Hitler and Oshima conversations which I put to you a few moments ago?

DÖNITZ: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Therefore, one may assume, may one not, that Lieutenant Heisig, who gave evidence, had not heard of the Hitler and Oshima conversations either; do you not think he could not have heard about it?

DÖNITZ: I assume it was out of the question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you notice that Heisig said in his evidence that during a lecture he heard you put forward the same argument as Hitler put forward in his conversations with Oshima?

DÖNITZ: First of all I want to state that Heisig here in this witness box said something different from what he said during his interrogation. During cross-examination he has admitted here that I have not said anything about fighting against shipwrecked personnel; secondly, everything else he said is so vague that I do not attach much value to its credibility; thirdly, he stated quite clearly that I did not say this in a lecture but during a discussion, which is in itself of no importance; and fourthly, it may well be that the subject of America’s new construction program and the manning of the new ships by trained crews was discussed. It was possible during that discussion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now say you agree you never opened any discussion having reference to the American shipbuilding program and the difficulty of finding crews? Do you agree with Heisig on that?

DÖNITZ: The German press was full of that. Everybody read and knew about the shipbuilding program. Pictures were made...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the argument I am suggesting to you, you know, was that the building program would be useless if you could destroy or frighten off sufficient merchant navy crews. That is the point in Hitler’s conversation, and that Heisig said you said. Did you say that?

DÖNITZ: I have always taken the view that losses of crews would make replacement difficult, and this is stated in my war diary together with similar ideas, and perhaps I said something of the kind to my midshipmen.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Page 37 of the Prosecution document book, Page 76 in the German translation? It is an order dated 7 October 1943 (Document Number D-663, Exhibit Number GB-200). I just want you to look at the last sentence: “In view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, their sinking is of great value.”

DÖNITZ: I have read it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “In view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, their sinking is of great value,” and it is continually pressing, the need for ships’ crews.

DÖNITZ: Yes, of course, but in the course of fighting. It is perfectly clear that these rescue ships were heavily armed. They had aircraft and could be sunk just like other convoy ships. If there were steamer crews on hand it was naturally our desire to sink them since we were justified in sinking such crews. Moreover they were used as U-boat traps near the steamers.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the question of the rightness or wrongness of sinking rescue ships, the destruction of ships’ crews, now, I want to ask you one or two questions about Möhle. He commanded the U-boat Flotilla from 1942 until the end of the war. That is nearly three years; and as he told us, he has a number of decorations for gallant service. Are you telling the Tribunal that Commander Möhle went on briefing submarine commanders on a completely mistaken basis for three years without any of your staff or yourself discovering this? You saw every U-boat commander when he came back.

DÖNITZ: I am sorry that Korvettenkapitän Möhle, being the only one who said he had doubts in connection with this order, as he declared here, did not report this right away. I could not know that he had these doubts. He had every opportunity of clearing up these doubts and I did not know, and nobody on my staff had any idea, that he had these thoughts.