Chapter XXII: Book 1: , Page 7 (11)

WAGNER: That question was duly studied by the Naval Operations Staff and discussed at great length. I should like to point out that on Page 2 of the memorandum, in the first paragraph, it states that obedience to the laws of chivalry comes before all else in naval warfare. That, from the outset, would prevent a barbarous waging of war at sea. We did think, however, that the modern technical developments would create conditions for naval warfare which would certainly justify and necessitate further development of the laws of naval warfare.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Which technical developments do you mean?

WAGNER: I am thinking mainly of two points: First, the large-scale use of the airplane in naval warfare. As a result of the speed and wide range of the airplane, militarily guarded zones could be created before the coasts of all warfaring nations, and in respect to these zones one could no longer speak of freedom of the seas. Secondly, the introduction of electrical orientation equipment which made it possible, even at the beginning of the war, to spot an unseen opponent and to send fighting forces against him.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It says in this memorandum that decisive war measures are to be taken even though they create new laws at sea. Did occasion arise for such measures?

WAGNER: No; at any rate, not at once. In the meantime, I think on 4 November, the United States of America declared the so-called American combat zone, and the specific reason given for it was that in that zone actual belligerent actions rendered the sea dangerous for American shipping. By this announcement some of the points of that memorandum were in immediate need of being revised. As a rule we remained within the limits of the measures as they had been employed by both parties during the first World War.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: By these measures do you mean the warning against navigating in certain zones?

WAGNER: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: According to some of the exhibits used by the Prosecution, Numbers GB-194 and 226, submarines were permitted to attack all ships without warning in certain areas, beginning with January 1940. The attacks were to be carried out, if possible, unseen, while maintaining the fiction that the ships struck mines.

Will you please tell the Tribunal which sea lanes or areas were concerned in this? I shall have a sea-chart handed to you for that purpose. I am submitting it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Dönitz-93.

Will you please explain what can be seen on that map.

WAGNER: In the middle of the map you will find the British Isles. The large part of the ocean which is shaded on the edge shows the afore-mentioned American combat zone. The shaded parts of the sea near the British coast are those parts which were ordered to be German submarine operational zones. They were given letters from A to F in accordance with the time when they were set up.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you tell us up to which depth these German operational zones went?

WAGNER: I think perhaps as far as the 200 meter line.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does this depth guarantee favorable use of mines?

WAGNER: Yes, down to 200 meters the use of anchored mines is possible without any difficulty.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these operational zones certain dates have been entered. Will you please explain how it happened that on those particular dates, and in that sequence, these territories were made operational zones?

WAGNER: All those areas were declared to be operational zones where our fighting forces came into contact with enemy traffic and a concentration of the enemy defense, resulting in main combat areas.

To begin with, they were the zones at the northern and southern end of the German-mined zones which had been declared along the British East Coast and in the Bristol Channel. You can see, therefore, that Zone A lies to the east of Scotland and is dated 6 January. The Bristol Channel Zone is dated 12 January, and finally at the southern end of this danger zone, that is, to the east of London, there is the date of 24 January.

Later on, according to the fluctuations of the actual fighting, further areas around the British Isles and then off the French Coast were designated.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Up to what date did this development continue?

WAGNER: The last zone was declared on 28 May 1940.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had neutrals been warned against navigating in these zones?

WAGNER: Yes, an official note had informed neutral countries that the entire U.S.A. fighting zone had to be considered as being dangerous, and that they should negotiate the North Sea to the east and to the south of the German mine area which was north of Holland.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What difference is there between the situation as shown by this map, and the German declaration of a blockade of 17 August 1940?

That is, Mr. President, the declaration I have submitted as Dönitz-104, which can be found on Page 214 in Volume IV of the document book.

WAGNER: As far as the limits of the danger zone are concerned, there was really no difference. This fact was also stated by Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons at the time. However, the difference which did exist was that up to that time we confined ourselves to the area I have just described, near the British Coast, whereas now we considered the entire U.S.A. combat zone as an operational zone.

The declaration regarding a blockade was based on the fact that in the meantime France had been eliminated from the war, and that Britain now was the focal point of all belligerent action.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the German blockade zone in its entirety correspond exactly or more or less with the U.S.A. combat zone?

WAGNER: It was nearly exactly the same as the U.S.A. combat zone. There were merely a few insignificant corrections.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I am submitting another sea-chart as Dönitz-92, in which...

THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that would be a good time to break off then.

[_A recess was taken._]

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, Mr. President, as Dönitz-94, I submit a chart of the German blockade zone dated 17 August.

Admiral Wagner, just for the sake of repeating, what were the limits of the German blockade region in relation to the U.S. fighting zone?

THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had already told us that. You told us that the blockade zone was the same as the American zone, didn’t you?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I thought that we had not been understood quite correctly before the recess.

[_Turning to the witness._] What was the naval practice of the enemy as far as this operational zone was concerned? Was there any practice that they followed?

WAGNER: Yes, the practice on the part of the enemy was identical with ours. In the areas controlled by us in the Baltic, in the eastern part of the North Sea, around Skagerrak and later on in the Norwegian and French waters, the enemy used every suitable weapon without giving previous warning, without notifying us in advance by which means of combat other ships were to be sunk—submarines, mines, aircraft, or surface vessels. In these regions the same thing applied to neutrals, and especially to Sweden.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, I would like to confront you with a statement by the First Lord of the British Admiralty. You will find this on Page 208 of the document book, Volume IV. This statement is dated 8 May 1940, and I have ascertained, Mr. President, that unfortunately it is wrongly reproduced in the British document book; so I shall quote from the original.

“Therefore we limited our operations in the Skagerrak to the
submarines. In order to make this work as effective as possible,
the usual restrictions which we have imposed on the actions of
our submarines were relaxed. As I told the House, all German
ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk as
opportunity served.”

I should like to submit this as Exhibit Dönitz-102.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the difference that you were making in the copy we have before us—“...all ships were to be sunk by day and German ships by night...” Is that it?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. It should be corrected to read, “all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk.”

THE PRESIDENT: I see; I said it wrong—“and all ships by night.” Yes, very well.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Wagner, what was the significance of this statement and this practice so far as the German ships were concerned?

WAGNER: It means that all German ships by day and by night in this area were to be sunk without warning.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what does it mean for the neutral ships?

WAGNER: It means that without warning all neutral ships in this area by night...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, surely the document speaks for itself. We don’t need to have it interpreted by a witness who isn’t a lawyer.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well.

[_Turning to the witness._] Then, tell me, please, from what period of time onward, according to German experiences, did this practice exist in the Skagerrak?

WAGNER: With certainty from 8 April 1940, but I believe I recall that even on 7 April this practice was already in existence.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had this area at this period of time, that is, the 7th or 8th of April, already been declared a danger zone?

WAGNER: No, the first declaration of danger zone for this area took place on 12 April 1940.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I shall have a sea-chart handed to you dealing with the British danger zones, and this shall be Dönitz-92. Please explain the significance of this chart briefly to the Tribunal.

WAGNER: This chart shows the danger zones in European waters as declared by England on the basis of German data. The following areas are of special significance:

First of all, the area in the Bay of Helgoland which on 4 September 1939, that is, on the second day of the war, was declared dangerous. Then the afore-mentioned danger zone, Skagerrak and the area south of Norway, which was declared on 12 April 1940. Then the danger zone in the Baltic, on 14 April 1940; and following upon that, the other danger zones as declared in the course of the year 1940.

I should like to remark also that, according to my recollection, these danger zones were all declared mine danger zones, with the exception of the Channel zone and of the Bay of Biscay, on 17 August 1940. These were generally dangerous zones.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these areas actually dominated by the British sea and air forces, or did German traffic still continue?

WAGNER: In these areas there was even very lively German traffic. Thus the Baltic Sea, which in its entire expanse from East to West, about 400 nautical miles in length, had been declared a danger zone, was in reality controlled by us during the entire war. In this area there was an extensive freight traffic, the entire ore traffic from Sweden and the corresponding exports to Sweden.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was there only traffic of German ships or also of neutral ships?

WAGNER: This traffic was in German and Swedish ships, but other neutrals also participated in this traffic, for instance, Finland. A similar situation applied in the Skagerrak where, besides the German supply traffic, a large part of the foodstuffs for the Norwegian population was transported. Of course, during this time both German and neutral ships were lost.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I assume, therefore, that both German and neutral seamen lost their lives. Is that correct?

WAGNER: Of course, personnel losses took place as well.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were the German merchantmen, at the time when these operational zones were declared, armed—that is, at the end of 1939 or the beginning of 1940?

WAGNER: Until the middle of 1940 German merchantmen were not at all armed. From then on they were comparatively slightly armed, especially with antiaircraft weapons.

Transport ships of the Navy had always been armed, that is, government ships, which supplied German cruisers and auxiliary cruisers in the Atlantic.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I shall submit to you a document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-193, which is found in the Prosecution’s document book on Page 29. This document deals with a proposal by the Commander of the U-boats that “...in the Channel, ships with blacked-out lights may be sunk without warning.” Can you tell me just whose ideas we are dealing with in the statements set forth in this document?

WAGNER: From the signature found in this document it appears that we are concerned with a document by a U-boat expert in the Naval Operations Staff.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who was that?

WAGNER: Lieutenant Fresdorf, who was my subordinate.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are these statements in accord with the actual circumstances and were they approved by the Naval Operations Staff, or just what was the situation?

WAGNER: Here we are concerned with the rather romantic ideas of a young expert, ideas which were in no way commensurate with the situation. The situation was rather as follows: At this time, that is, in September 1939, the second wave of the British Expeditionary Corps left England for France. The transports ran mostly during the night and were blacked out. At this same time an order existed according to which French ships were neither to be stopped nor attacked; this was still in force for political reasons.

It is quite obvious that at night a blacked-out French ship cannot be told from a blacked-out English ship, just as at night a merchant ship cannot, or only with difficulty, be told from a warship.

These orders, therefore, meant that at night, in order to avoid a mistake, practically no shooting could be done, and therefore the English troop transport was entirely unhampered. This brought about really grotesque situations. It was ascertained that a German U-boat in a favorable position of attack let a fully-loaded English troop transport ship of 20,000 tons pass by, since there was the possibility of making a mistake. The Naval Operations Staff agreed completely with the commanders of the U-boats that no naval war could be carried on in this manner. If a blacked-out ship sails in a belligerent area, better still, in an area where there is a large supply and troop transport traffic, it is liable to suspicion and cannot expect the war to be halted at night for its sake.

Therefore it was not a question of our explaining or excusing ourselves for sinking a ship without warning because we had mistaken it, but the obvious fact at hand was that the blacked-out ship alone was to blame if it was not properly recognized and was sunk without warning.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these notes we find that the commanders of U-boats, when sinking a merchant ship without warning, were required to make the notation in their log that they had taken it for a warship and that an order, a verbal order, to this effect was to be given to the commanders of the U-boats. Is that correct, and was it done in actual practice?

WAGNER: No, we never did anything like that.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the Flag Officer of the U-boats given strict and clear orders that blacked-out ships at night in the Channel might be attacked without warning?

WAGNER: Yes. This clear order was issued, but nothing more.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If the statements of this young officer are not correct, and if no orders were issued accordingly, how is it that these things can be found in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff?

WAGNER: This paper is not a direct part of the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. The War Diary itself, in which the daily happenings were recorded, was signed by me, by the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff, and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Here we are concerned with the entry of an expert which was destined for a file collection and motivated by the War Diary.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That means, then, that the considerations and opinions of experts were collected and filed no matter whether they were approved of or put into actual practice?

WAGNER: Yes. All of these files were collected for later purposes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff receive news of the incidents which happened after the sinking of the _Laconia_, and did it approve of the measures taken by the Commander of the U-boats?

WAGNER: The Naval Operations Staff, then as always, listened in on all the wireless messages of the Commander-in-Chief in the _Laconia_ case. It approved of the measures taken by him, but it would not have been at all surprised if the Commander of the U-boats had stopped the entire rescue work at the very first air attack upon the U-boats.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff know of the order of the Commander of the U-boats, dated 17 September, in which rescue work by U-boats was expressly prohibited?

WAGNER: This order given by the Commander of the U-boats was also heard by wireless.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this order interpreted by the Naval Operations Staff to the effect that it was to be an order for the shooting of shipwrecked people?

WAGNER: No; no one ever had this idea.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, at this point I should like to put several questions to the witness which have a bearing on the credibility of the statements made by the witness Heisig. But I should like to ask in advance whether there are any objections to my putting these questions, since my documents referring to the witness Heisig were not ruled admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: Was the object of the questions which you were offering to put to this witness to show that the witness Heisig was not a witness who could be believed upon his oath? Was that your object?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The general object is to show how the testimony of this witness originated; that is, the testimony which was submitted to the Court.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “originated”?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is to say, what influence on the witness Heisig forms the basis of this testimony.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the exact question you wanted to ask? You may state it, and we will let the witness wait until we have seen what the question is.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to ask the witness, “Did the witness Heisig report to you about the manner in which his affidavit, which was submitted to the High Tribunal as evidence by the Prosecution, originated?”

THE PRESIDENT: The question that you put, as I took it down, was: What did the witness Heisig report to you about the way his affidavit came about? Is that the question?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: What are you purporting to prove by getting the reports that Heisig may have made to this witness?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I should like to prove therewith, Mr. President, that Heisig was under a certain influence, that is, that he wrongly assumed that he could help a comrade through his testimony.

THE PRESIDENT: Who applied for Heisig’s affidavit?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I did not understand, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Heisig has given an affidavit, has he not?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: That was for the Prosecution, was it?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is right.

THE PRESIDENT: And have you asked to cross-examine him?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I interrogated him about this affidavit, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: You did?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, I did question him; and I called his attention to the contradictions between his affidavit and his testimony here in Court.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not read the transcript on this point for about 10 days. But I did read it then, and my recollection is that it was never suggested to the witness Heisig that he gave his affidavit under pressure, which I gather is the suggestion now. Your Lordship will remember that although we had the affidavit, we called the witness Heisig. He said that what was in his affidavit was true; and then he gave his evidence, giving a detailed account of all the relevant matters. So we made it perfectly possible for Dr. Kranzbühler to cross-examine him at the time and to show any differences, as Dr. Kranzbühler just said he purported to do, between the affidavit and his oral evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler has just said, I think, that he did actually cross-examine him.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did cross-examine him on that point—on any differences that appeared between his affidavit and his oral testimony. But he was here to be cross-examined, and if it is going to be suggested that the affidavit was obtained by improper means, that suggestion ought to have been made at the time, and then it could have been dealt with.

My Lord, I object to its coming in at this stage, after the witness Heisig has been away, and therefore no opportunity has been given to us either to investigate the matter or to have the evidence there, which could have been done when Heisig gave his evidence; and we could have been prepared for any contradictory evidence now.

My Lord, as a matter of strictness, surely, if I may put it that way, there are two distinct lines. If it was a question of whether Heisig’s evidence was admissible or whether it had been obtained under pressure, then it would be quite possible to have this trial within a trial as to whether it was admissible or not. But if this evidence is, broadly, merely directed to the credibility of Heisig’s evidence, then I respectfully submit it falls within the same objections I made on Saturday to general evidence directed against the credibility of a witness.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is suggested that there was any pressure put by the Prosecution upon Heisig. I do not understand that that is what you are suggesting, Dr. Kranzbühler, is it?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, no pressure; but the picture as drawn was not true.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I understood Dr. Kranzbühler—if I misunderstood him, so much the easier—I understood him to say that he wanted to give this evidence as to certain influence. I thought that was the word used.

THE PRESIDENT: I think he meant, not influence exerted by the Prosecution, but exerted by a mistaken notion in the witness’ own mind that he was helping a friend.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. My Lord, then that merely goes to credibility and it does then fall within my general objection; that is, if we are going to have evidence as directed on credibility, we go on _ad infinitum_.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal will allow this question to be put in this particular instance, but they make no general rule as to the admissibility of such questions.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Admiral Wagner, in December you were in the prison here together with the witness Heisig. Is that correct?

WAGNER: Yes, from the first until the fifth of December.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what did Heisig tell you about the underlying considerations of his affidavit?

WAGNER: He told me the following personally: At the interrogation he had been told that Lieutenant Hoffmann, officer of the watch of Kapitänleutnant Eck, had testified that at that time he had listened to the speech by Admiral Dönitz at Gotenhafen in the autumn of 1942, and that he had considered this as a demand for the killing of survivors of shipwrecks. Heisig had been told:

“If you confirm this testimony of Hoffmann, then you will save
not only Eck and Hoffmann, but also two others who would have
been sentenced to death. You will prevent any kind of judicial
proceeding against Captain Möhle from being instituted. Of
course, you will thus incriminate Grossadmiral Dönitz but the
material against Admiral Dönitz is of such tremendous weight
that his life has been forfeited anyway.”

Further he told me, and without prompting, that at that time, on the occasion of the speech by the Admiral Dönitz, he had been deeply distressed. He had just returned from Lübeck, where he had experienced and seen the frightful consequences of an air attack; that is he had perhaps not experienced it, but at least he had seen the consequences. His mind was set on revenge for these brutal measures, and he considered it possible that this emotional state might have influenced his interpretation of Grossadmiral Dönitz’ speech.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now we shall turn to a different point.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: If the Prosecution desire to do so, they can, of course, recall Heisig for the purpose of investigating this further.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, Heisig is no longer here; that is the difficulty when this is done in this order. However, we can consider the matter, My Lord, and we are grateful to the Tribunal for the permission.

THE PRESIDENT: Is Heisig not in custody? Is that what you mean?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, he is no longer in custody.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: He is studying medicine at Munich; he can be very easily reached.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: From when on were you admiral for special tasks attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and what were your tasks in that capacity?

WAGNER: From the end of June 1944 onward, and the purpose of my assignment was the following: After the success of the Anglo-Saxon invasion in northern France, Admiral Dönitz counted on an increased tension in the military situation. He believed that one day he might be forced to leave the Naval Operations Staff, either to remain permanently at the Führer’s headquarters, or at least for a longer period of time, in order to keep up with the development of the entire war situation, or because a transfer of the Naval Operations Staff might be necessary because of the increasingly heavy air attacks on Berlin. For this purpose the Grossadmiral wanted an older and experienced naval officer in his immediate vicinity, an officer who was well-versed in the problems of sea warfare and who was acquainted with the duties and tasks of the Naval Operations Staff.

My mission was, therefore, a sort of liaison between the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Naval Operations Staff and the other offices of the High Command for the duration of the Grossadmiral’s absence from the High Command.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you accompany the Grossadmiral regularly on his visits to the Führer’s headquarters?

WAGNER: Yes; from the period mentioned I was present regularly.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now I hand you a list of these visits which has been submitted by the Prosecution as GB-207. This may be found in the document book of the Prosecution on Page 56. Please look at this list and tell me whether the dates recorded there are essentially correct.

WAGNER: The dates are essentially correct. At the end the list is not complete, for the period from 3—no; from 10 April until 21 April 1945 is missing. On that day the Grossadmiral participated for the last time at the conferences in the Führer’s headquarters. Beyond that, it seems to me that the list of the people present is incomplete. I also do not know according to what point of view or with what idea in mind this was compiled.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If you carefully examine this list of people, can you tell me whether Admiral Dönitz was always with these people on the dates mentioned, or does this mean only that these persons were at the Führer’s headquarters at the same time he was? Can you still recall these points?

WAGNER: Yes. If these people participated in the military conferences, then Admiral Dönitz at least saw them. Of course, people in high positions were frequently at the Führer’s headquarters who did not participate in the military conferences and whom the Grossadmiral did not see unless he had special conversations with them.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: For what reason did Admiral Dönitz...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, upon this point, if the witness is saying that any one of these minutes is incomplete, I should be very grateful if he would specify it, because we can get the original German minutes here and confirm the affidavit.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I believe the witness said only that additional people participated in these discussions and that, at the end, some of the conferences are lacking. However, I do not know just what details I should question him about. Perhaps the Prosecution will deal with that matter later in cross-examination?

THE PRESIDENT: But Sir David wants him to specify which are the ones, if he can.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well.

[_Turning to the witness._] Can you tell me more specifically as to any one of these dates, whether those present are correctly named or whether there were other people present, or whether Grossadmiral Dönitz was not present?

WAGNER: I can tell you exactly that this list is incorrect because it never occurred that neither Field Marshal Keitel nor Generaloberst Jodl was present at the headquarters. For example, on 4 March 1945 neither one of these men is mentioned, nor on 6 March or 8 March. Therefore I conclude that this list cannot be complete. In other places, however, the name of Jodl appears; for example, on 18 March 1945.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The decisive point seems to be whether Admiral Dönitz was present in the Führer’s headquarters on all of these days. Can you confirm that point?

WAGNER: Of course, from memory I cannot confirm that with reference to every single day. However, I am under the impression that the list is correct in that connection, for the frequency of the visits of the Grossadmiral corresponds with the notes in this list, and spot checks show me that the dates are correct.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why did Grossadmiral Dönitz come to the Führer’s headquarters? What were the reasons?

WAGNER: The chief reason for the frequent visits, which became even more frequent toward the end of the war, was the desire to keep up with the development of the general war situation so that he, Dönitz, could lead the Navy and carry on the naval war accordingly. Beyond that, questions usually came up which the Admiral could not decide for himself out of his own authority and which, because of their importance, he wanted to bring up personally or to discuss with the representatives of the OKW and of the General Staff.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In each of these cases was there a personal report of the Grossadmiral to the Führer?

WAGNER: This is what happened: Most of the problems and reports for the Führer were taken care of during the conference in connection with the Admiral’s report on the naval warfare situation.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One moment. Was the Admiral always present at the military conferences when he was at the headquarters?

WAGNER: The Admiral took part at least in the discussion of the main session every day.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And what is the main session?

WAGNER: At noon every day there was a military conference which lasted several hours. This was the main conference. In addition, for months, sessions, including special sessions, were held in the evening or at night, at which the Admiral participated only when very important matters were to be discussed—matters of special importance for the conduct of the war. Then, as I said, he participated.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now you say that most of the questions which the Grossadmiral had to put to the Führer were taken care of at the military conference. Were there any personal reports besides this?

WAGNER: Personal reports on the part of the Grossadmiral to Hitler took place very seldom; on the other hand, personal discussions with the OKW and the other military offices at the headquarters took place daily.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, I would like to know something more in detail about this so-called “Lagebesprechung,” the conferences.

The Prosecution seem to consider this as a sort of War Cabinet at which, for instance, Ribbentrop would report about foreign policies, Speer about questions of production, Himmler about security questions. Is this a correct picture? Who took part in these sessions, what people participated regularly and who attended only once in a while?

WAGNER: The participants at the conferences were generally the following:

Regular participants: from the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, General Jodl, General Buhle, Post Captain Assmann, Major Büchs, and a few more Chiefs of Staff. Then the Chief of the General Staff of the Army with one or two aides, and as a rule also the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force with one aide. Further regular participants were: the Chief of the Army Personnel Office, who was Chief Adjutant to the Führer; General Bodenschatz, until 20 July 1944; Vice Admiral Voss who was the permanent deputy of the Grossadmiral; Gruppenführer Fegelein, as Himmler’s permanent deputy; Ambassador Hewel; Minister Sonnleitner, permanent deputy of the Foreign Minister; Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich. Frequently the following participated: the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; less frequently, Himmler. In addition to these there was a varying participation on the part of special officers, mainly from the General Staff of the Army, and on the part of higher front commanders of the Army and of the Air Force who happened to be in headquarters. Beyond that, toward the end of the war Reich Minister Speer in his capacity as Armament Minister also participated in an increasing measure, and in rare cases the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, both as listeners at the conferences. I believe that is the complete list.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who reported at these conferences and what was reported on?

WAGNER: These sessions were for the sole purpose of informing Hitler about the war situation—about the Eastern situation through the General Staff of the Army, and through the OKW about the situation in all other theaters of war and concerning all three branches of the Wehrmacht. The report took place as follows:

First of all, the Chief of General Staff of the Army reported about the Eastern situation; then Generaloberst Jodl reported on the situation in all other theaters of war on land. Next, Post Captain Assmann of the OKW reported on the naval situation. In between, frequent, often hour-long, conversations took place which dealt with special military problems, panzer problems, aerial problems and such. And after the aerial problems were dealt with the discussion was at an end, and we left the room. I frequently saw that Ambassador Hewel went in to Hitler with a batch of reports, apparently from the Foreign Office, and reported on them without the rest of us knowing what they contained.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In these conferences was there voting or was there consultation, or who gave the orders?

WAGNER: In these conferences all military questions were discussed and frequently decisions were reached by the Führer, that is, if no further preparations were necessary for a decision.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What for example did the Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop do there when he was present?

WAGNER: I only saw Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop perhaps five or six times at these conferences, and I cannot remember that he ever said anything during the entire session. He was only present at the conference for his own information.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How about Minister Speer, what did he do?

WAGNER: Minister Speer also very seldom brought in armament problems during the discussion. I know that questions of armament were always discussed between Hitler and Speer in special discussions. However, some exceptions may have occurred.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was Himmler doing there, or his permanent deputy Fegelein? Did they discuss questions of security, or what was their mission?

WAGNER: No. During the military conference security problems were never discussed. Himmler and his deputy appeared very frequently in connection with the Waffen-SS, and Fegelein had always to give reports about the setup, organization, arming, transportation and engagement of the SS divisions. At this time the SS divisions, according to my impression, still played a very important part, for ostensibly they represented a strategic reserve and were much discussed.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have a record of the meeting which was written by you. It has the Number GB-209. It is not found in the document book. It says in the third paragraph—and I am just reading one sentence:

“The Deputy of the Reichsführer-SS at the Führer’s headquarters,
SS Gruppenführer Fegelein, transmits the request of the
Reichsführer as to when he can count on the arrival of the
‘Panther’”—those are tanks—“coming from Libau.”

Is this typical of SS Gruppenführer Fegelein’s work?

WAGNER: Yes. That was the kind of questions which were dealt with at every one of these sessions.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: At the end of the war Kaltenbrunner appeared several times also. Did he speak or report?

WAGNER: I cannot remember one single utterance on Kaltenbrunner’s part during one of these military conferences.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What role did Admiral Dönitz play at the session discussions?

WAGNER: Even when Grossadmiral Dönitz was present the naval situation was reported by the deputy from the OKW, Commodore Assmann. However, the Admiral used this occasion to present, in connection with the individual theaters of war, or in summary at the end, those questions which he had in mind. The Admiral was neither asked nor did he give any opinion on questions dealing with air or land warfare which had no connection with the conduct of the naval war. In his statements he strictly confined himself to the sphere of the Navy, and very energetically objected if someone else during the session tried to interfere in questions of naval warfare.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have come to a break. If the Tribunal agrees to declare a recess...

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30 in order to sit in closed session.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Admiral Wagner, as time went on a close relationship developed between Admiral Dönitz and Adolf Hitler. Was this due to the fact that the Admiral was particularly ready to comply with the Führer’s wishes?

WAGNER: No, not at all. Admiral Dönitz’ activity as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy began with a very strong opposition to Hitler. It was Hitler’s intention to scrap the large ships of the Navy, that is to say, the remaining battleships and cruisers. Admiral Raeder had already rejected that plan.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That story is already known, Admiral. You need not go into it in detail.

WAGNER: Very well. Apart from that, Hitler’s respect for Dönitz was due to the fact that every statement which the Admiral made was absolutely reliable and absolutely honest. The Admiral attached particular importance to the fact that particularly unfavorable developments, failures, and mistakes were to be reported at headquarters without digression, objectively, and simply. As an example, I should like to mention that the Admiral had given me the order...

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we need examples of that sort of thing. Surely the general statement is quite sufficient.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Admiral in any way show himself particularly willing to comply with the Führer’s political wishes or those of the Party?

WAGNER: No. Such wishes of the Party were, in my opinion, only put to the Navy in three cases. One was the question of the churches, which for the most part came up during the time of Admiral Raeder. I think it is generally known that the Navy retained its original religious organization and, in fact, extended it as the Navy grew.

The second request made by the Party was that, modeled on the Russian example, political commissars should be set up within the Armed Forces. On that occasion Admiral Dönitz went to see Hitler and prevented the carrying out of that plan. When after 20 July 1944 Bormann nevertheless succeeded in getting the so-called “NSFO”—the National Socialist Leadership Officers—introduced into the Armed Forces, it did not happen in the way the Party wished, by appointing political commissars. It was merely done by using officers who were under the jurisdiction of the commander and who could not in any way interfere with the leadership of the troops. The third case was the intention on the part of the Party to take away from, the Armed Forces the political penal cases.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: This case is also already known, Admiral. You kept the records of the visits at the Führer’s headquarters, is that correct?

WAGNER: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A number of these records have been introduced as evidence in this Court. Will you please explain to the Tribunal what was the purpose of keeping these records of visits of commanders-in-chief to the Führer’s headquarters?

WAGNER: The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, the Chief of the Naval Armaments, and the Chief of the General Navy Department—that is to say, the three leading men in the High Command of the Navy—were to be informed by means of these records of all happenings which took place in the presence of the Admiral, as far as they were of any interest to the Navy. That was one of my tasks.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You have just said “informed about happenings which took place in the presence of the Admiral.” Does that mean that he himself must have heard everything that has been put down in these records?

WAGNER: Not necessarily. It happened quite frequently that during situation reports, when they took place in a large room and when subjects were discussed which did not interest him so much, the Admiral would retire to another part of the room and deal with some business of his own or discuss Navy questions with other participants in the meeting. It was possible that on such occasions I heard things and put them down in the record which the Admiral himself did not hear. But, of course, he would know about them later when he saw my record.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am going to have shown to you one of your own records of discussions on 20 February 1945. It is Exhibit Number GB-209, and it is on Page 68 of the document book of the Prosecution. This deals with considerations regarding the renouncing of the Geneva Convention. Will you please describe exactly what happened as you remember it?

WAGNER: Approximately two or three days before the date in this record—in other words, on or about 17 or 18 February 1945—Admiral Voss telephoned me from headquarters, which at that time was situated in Berlin, and informed me that in connection with Anglo-Saxon propaganda to induce our troops to desert in the West, Hitler had stated his intention to leave the Geneva Convention.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What did he hope to achieve?

WAGNER: According to my first impression at the time, the intention was evidently to express to the troops and the German people that captivity would no longer bring any advantage. Thereupon, I immediately telephoned to the Naval Operations Staff, since I considered the intention to be completely wrong, and I asked them for a military opinion and an opinion from the point of view of international law.

On the 19th, when taking part in the situation discussion, Hitler once more referred to this question, but this time not in connection with happenings on the western front; but in connection with the air attacks by the western enemies on open German towns—attacks had just been made on Dresden and Weimar.

He ordered the Admiral to examine the effects of leaving the Geneva Convention from the point of view of naval warfare. An immediate answer was not expected and it was not given. Generaloberst Jodl was also quite strongly opposed to these intentions and he sought the Admiral’s support. Thereupon it was agreed to have a conference and that is the conference which is mentioned in the record under Figure 2.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That is the conference of 20 February, Admiral?

WAGNER: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Who participated in that conference?

WAGNER: Admiral Dönitz, Generaloberst Jodl, Ambassador Hewel, and myself.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What was the subject?

WAGNER: The subject was the Führer’s intention of renouncing the Geneva Convention. The result was the unanimous opinion that such a step would be a mistake. Apart from military consideration we especially held the conviction that by renouncing the Geneva Convention both the Armed Forces and the German people would lose confidence in the leadership, since the Geneva Convention was generally considered to be the conception of international law.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In your notes there is a sentence, “One would have to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs ‘to save face’ with the outer world.” What is the significance of that sentence?

WAGNER: That sentence means that on no account should there be any irresponsible actions. If the leaders considered it necessary to introduce countermeasures against air attacks on open German towns, or against the propaganda for desertion in the West, then one should confine oneself to such countermeasures which appear necessary and justifiable. One should not put oneself in the wrong before the world and one’s own people by totally repudiating all the Geneva Conventions and announce measures which went far beyond what appeared to be necessary and justifiable.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were any concrete measures discussed in this connection or were any such measures even thought of?

WAGNER: No. I can remember very well that no specific measures were discussed at all during the various conferences. We were mainly concerned with the total question of whether to repudiate the Geneva Convention or not.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you ever learn anything about a so-called intention on Adolf Hitler’s part to shoot 10,000 prisoners of war as a reprisal for the air attack on Dresden?

WAGNER: No, I have never heard anything about that.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The expression “to save face”—doesn’t that mean secrecy, hiding the true facts?

WAGNER: In my opinion it was certain that there was no question of secrecy, for neither the countermeasures against air attacks nor the measures of intimidation against desertion could be effective if they were concealed.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How long did this whole conversation which you recorded last?

WAGNER: Will you please tell me which conversation you mean?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The discussion of 20 February which contains the sentences which I have just read to you.

WAGNER: It took perhaps ten minutes or a quarter of an hour.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: So that your record is a very brief condensed summary of the conversation?

WAGNER: Yes, it only contains the important points.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz also submit his objections to the Führer?

WAGNER: As far as I recollect, it never reached that point. One became convinced that Hitler, as soon as he put his questions to the Admiral, could gather from the Admiral’s expression and the attitude of the others that they rejected his plans. We passed our views on to the High Command of the Armed Forces in writing and heard no more about the whole matter.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to show you another record which is submitted under GB-210. It is on the next page of the document book of the Prosecution and it refers to conferences at the Führer’s headquarters from 29 June to 1 July 1944.

You will find an entry under the date of 1 July which reads, “In connection with the general strike in Copenhagen, the Führer says that terror can be subdued only with terror.” Was this statement made during a conversation between Hitler and Admiral Dönitz or in which connection?

WAGNER: This is a statement made by Hitler during a situation discussion and addressed neither to Admiral Dönitz nor to the Navy.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Well, if it was not addressed to the Navy, then why did you include it in your record?

WAGNER: I included in my record all statements which could be of any interest to the Navy. The High Command of the Navy was, of course, interested in the general strike in Copenhagen because our ships were repaired in Copenhagen; and apart from that Copenhagen was a naval base.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And to whom did you pass this record? Who received it?

WAGNER: According to the distribution list on Page 4, the paper went only to the Commander-in-Chief and department 1 of the Naval Operations Staff.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did the Naval Operations Staff have anything to do with the treatment of shipyard workers in Denmark?

WAGNER: No, nothing at all. From 1943 on the shipyards were entirely under the Ministry of Armaments.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The Prosecution sees in this statement and its transmission to a department of the OKW an invitation to deal ruthlessly with the inhabitants. Does that in any way tally with the meaning of this record?

WAGNER: There can be no question of that. The only purpose of this record was to inform the Departments of the High Command.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I am now going to have another document shown to you. It is Exhibit Number USA-544. It is in the document book of the Prosecution on Pages 64 and 65. It is a note by the international law expert in the Naval Operations Staff regarding the treatment of saboteurs. Do you know this note?

WAGNER: Yes. I have initialed it on the first page.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: At the end of that note you will find the sentence:

“As far as the Navy is concerned, it should be investigated
whether the occurrence cannot be used, after reporting to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, to make sure that the treatment
of members of Commando troops is absolutely clear to all the
departments concerned.”

Was this report made to Admiral Dönitz who at that time had been Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for ten days?

WAGNER: No, that report was not made, as the various remarks at the head of it will show.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Will you explain that, please?

WAGNER: The international law expert in the Naval Operations Staff IA made this suggestion through the Operations Office IA to me as Chief of the Operational Department. The chief of the IA Section in a handwritten notice beside his initials, wrote, “The subordinate commanders have been informed.” That means that he had objected to the proposal of the international law expert and considered that an explanation of the orders within the Navy was superfluous. I investigated these matters and I decided that the operations officer was right. I sent for the international law expert, Dr. Eckardt, informed him orally of my decision, and returned this document to him. Thus the suggestion to report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy made in connection with the explanation of this order was not actually carried out.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you remember whether Admiral Dönitz on some later occasion received reports on this Commando order?

WAGNER: No, I have no recollection of that.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have submitted to you GB-208, which is a record regarding the case of a motor torpedo boat at Bergen. It is the case which is contained in the British document book on Pages 66 and 67. Have you ever heard about this incident before this Trial?

WAGNER: No. I heard about it for the first time on the occasion of interrogations in connection with these proceedings.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I gather from the files of the British court-martial proceedings, which have been submitted by the Prosecution during cross-examination, that before the shooting of the crew of that motor torpedo boat there had been two telephone conversations, between the Chief of the Security Service in Bergen and the SD at Oslo, and between the SD at Oslo and Berlin. Can you recollect whether such a conversation took place between the SD at Oslo and yourself or one of the representatives in the High Command?

WAGNER: I certainly had no such conversation, and as far as I know neither did any other officer in my department or in the High Command.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider it at all possible that the SD at Oslo might get in touch with the High Command of the Navy?

WAGNER: No, I consider that quite out of the question. If the SD in Oslo wanted to get in touch with a central department in Berlin then they could only do so through their own superior authority, and that is the RSHA.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I now put to you another document; it is Exhibit GB-212 which appears on Page 75 of the document book of the Prosecution. It mentions an example of a commandant of a German prisoner-of-war camp and it says he had communists who had attracted attention among the inmates suddenly and quietly removed by the guards. Do you know of this incident?

WAGNER: Yes, such an episode is known to me. I think we received the report from a prisoner-of-war—a man who had been severely injured and who had been exchanged—that the German commandant of a prisoner-of-war camp in Australia, in which the crew of the auxiliary cruiser _Cormoran_ were detained, had secretly had a man of his crew killed because he had been active as a spy and traitor.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But this order does not mention the word “spy.” It says “communist.” What is the explanation?

THE PRESIDENT: It does not say “communist.” It says “communists” in the plural.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “Communists,” plural.