Chapter XX: Book 1: , Page 7 (9)

Then, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the German Prize Ordinance, an excerpt of which can be found on Page 137. I should like to point out that Article 74 agrees word for word with the regulations of the London Protocol.

May I point out at the same time that, as shown on Page 138, this Prize Ordinance was not signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. That is a contribution to the question as to whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was a member of the Reich Government. He had no authority to sign this ordinance.

The next document which I submit is Dönitz-55. That is the order of 3 September 1939, with which the U-boats entered the war. I do not know whether these documents are so well known to the Tribunal that I need merely sum them up or whether it is better to read parts of them.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you might mention them together, really, specifying shortly what they relate to.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes. The order of 3 September directs the boats to pay strict attention to all the rules of naval warfare. It orders the war to be conducted according to the Prize Ordinance. Furthermore, it provides for a preparatory order for the intensification of economic warfare, because of the arming of enemy merchant ships. This order is on Page 140. Since I shall refer to that later when examining a witness, I need not read it now.

I should like to read to the Tribunal from an English document, to show that the boats were really acting according to these orders. It is Exhibit Number GB-191. It is in the original on Page 5, Mr. President. That sentence is not in the English excerpt, and that is why I will read it in English from the original:

“Thus the Germans started with the Ordinance which was, at any
rate, a clear, reasonable, and not inhuman document.

“German submarine commanders, with some exceptions, behaved in
accordance with its provisions during the first months of the
war. Indeed, in one case, a submarine had ordered the crew of a
trawler to take to their boat as the ship was to be sunk. But
when the commander saw the state of the boat, he said: ‘Thirteen
men in that boat! You English are no good, sending a ship to sea
with a boat like that.’ And the skipper was told to re-embark
his crew on the trawler and make for home at full speed, with a
bottle of German gin and the submarine commander’s compliments.”

That is an English opinion taken out of a document of the Prosecution.

My next document is Dönitz-56, an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff of 9 September 1939, on Page 141.

“English information office disseminates the news through
Reuters that Germany has opened total U-boat warfare.”

Then, as Dönitz-57, on Page 143, I should like to submit to the Tribunal an account of the experiences which the Naval Operations Staff had in U-boat warfare up to that date. It is an entry of 21 September 1939 in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. I read under Figure 2:

“The commanders of U-boats which have returned report the
following valuable experiences:

“...(b) English, partly also neutral steamers, sharp zigzags,
partly blacked-out. English steamers, when stopped, immediately
radio SOS with exact position. Thereupon English planes come in
to fight U-boats.

“(c) English steamers have repeatedly tried to escape. Some
steamers are armed, one steamer returned fire.

“(d) Up to now no cases of abuse by neutral steamers.”

The document on Page 144 of the document book is already in evidence. It is an excerpt from Exhibit GB-222, war diary of the U-boat U-30, of 14 September. I will only read a few sentences from the beginning:

“Smoke clouds. Steamer on sharp zigzag course. Easterly course.
Ran towards her. When recognized, turns to counter-course and
signals SOS.

“English steamer _Fanad Head_, 5200 tons, bound for Belfast.

“Pursued at full speed. Since steamer does not react to order to
stop, one shot fired across her bows from a distance of 2,000
meters. Steamer stops. Crew takes to the boats. Boats pulled out
of the danger zone.”

I summarize the following: It shows how the U-boat, as a result of the wireless message from the steamer, was attacked by airplanes, what difficulties it had in getting the prize crew on board again, and how, in spite of the bombing attacks of the planes, it did not sink the steamer until two English officers who were still on deck had jumped overboard and had been rescued by the U-boat. The depth charge pursuit lasted for ten hours.

The next document, Dönitz-58, shows that merchant ships acted aggressively against U-boats; and that also is an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. I read the entry of 24 September:

“Commander, Submarine Fleet, reports that on 6 September the
English steamer _Manaar_, on being told to stop by _U-38_ after
a warning shot, tried to escape. Steamer sent wireless message
and opened fire from rear gun. Abandoned ship only after four or
five hits, then sank it.”

Then, another message of 22 September:

“English reports that, when the English steamer _Akenside_ was
sunk, a German U-boat was rammed by a steam trawler.”

From the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-193, which is copied on Page 147, I should only like to point out the opinion from the point of view of the Naval Operations Staff as to radio messages. I read from Figure 2, two sentences, beginning with the second:

“In almost every instance English steamers, on sighting U-boats,
have sent out wireless SOS messages and given their positions.
Following these SOS messages from the ship, after a certain time
English airplanes always appeared which makes it clear that with
the English it is a matter of a military measure and organized
procedure. The SOS call together with the giving of the position
may therefore be considered as the giving of military
information, even as resistance.”

The next document, Dönitz-59, shows the approval of the entry submitted by the Commander of the Submarine Fleet that ships which used their wireless when stopped should be sunk. I read the entry of 24 November 1939. It is quite at the bottom, Figure 4:

“On the basis of the Führer’s approval, the following order is
given to Groups and Commander, Submarine Fleet:

“4) Armed force should be employed against all merchant vessels
using wireless when ordered to stop. They are subject to seizure
or sinking without exception. Efforts should be made to rescue
the crew.”

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 May 1946, at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED
AND TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY
Saturday, 11 May 1946

_Morning Session_

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I continue to submit documents concerning naval warfare. My next document is printed on Page 149 of Document Book Number 3. It is a declaration of 26 September 1939 by the British First Lord of the Admiralty concerning the arming of the British merchant fleet. In this declaration he announces that within a short time the entire British merchant fleet will be armed. Then he speaks about the training of the crews, and in conclusion he thanks his predecessors for the care with which they prepared that work before the beginning of the war.

I submit Document Dönitz-60. Dönitz-60 is a large collection of documents concerning laws of naval warfare. It contains altogether 550 documents. In accordance with the request of the President, I have given special numbers to the later documents.

I come now to some documents which deal with the treatment of ships which acted suspiciously and were for that reason attacked by U-boats. The first document of this series is Dönitz-61, Page 150. It is a warning to neutral shipping against suspicious tactics. That warning was sent in a note to all neutral missions. At the end it points out that ships should avoid being mistaken for enemy warships or auxiliary cruisers, especially during the night. There is a warning against all suspicious tactics, for instance, changing course, use of wireless on sighting German naval forces, zig-zagging, blacking-out, not stopping upon demand, and the acceptance of enemy escort.

That warning is repeated in Document Dönitz-62, which is on Page 153, a renewed note of 19 October 1939 to the neutral governments. Document 63 is an example of how a neutral government, namely the Danish Government, in accordance with the German notes, warned its merchant shipping against suspicious conduct. It is found on Page 154. I should like to remind you again that the first warning was given on 28 September.

My next Document, Dönitz-64, shows that on 2 October the order was issued to the submarines to attack blacked-out vessels in certain operational areas close to the British coast. That order is particularly significant in view of the cross-examination of yesterday where the question was put as to whether an order of that kind had been issued at all, or whether that subject was transmitted to the commanders orally with instructions to falsify their logs. I read the order of 2 October 1939 on Page 155.

“Order by the SKL (Naval Operations Staff) to the Front:

“Inasmuch as it must be assumed that blacked-out vessels
encountered on the English and French coasts are warships or
auxiliary warships, full armed action is authorized against
blacked-out vessels in the following waters.”

An area around the British coast follows. The excerpt under it is taken from the War Diary of Commander of Submarines of the same date and shows the transmission of this order to the submarines.

The readiness of British merchant shipping to commit aggression against German submarines is motivated or furthered by the next document which I am going to show. It is numbered Dönitz-101 and is on Page 156. The old number was Dönitz-60, Mr. President. It is an announcement by the British Admiralty, which I will read:

“The British Admiralty circulated the following warning to the
British merchant marine on 1 October:

“Within the last few days some German U-boats have been attacked
by British merchant marine vessels. In this connection the
German radio announces that the German U-boats have so far
observed the rules of international law in warning the merchant
marine vessels before attacking them.

“Now, however, Germany intends to retaliate by considering every
British merchant marine vessel as a warship. While the
first-mentioned fact is absolutely untrue, it may indicate an
immediate change in the policy of German submarine warfare.

“Be prepared to meet it. Admiralty.”

On Page 157 there is a second report of the same date. “The British Admiralty announces that German submarines are pursuing a new strategy. English boats are called upon to ram every German submarine.”

The next document, Dönitz-65, contains orders issued as a result of the armament of, and armed resistance by, merchant vessels. I read the order of 4 October 1939, which was issued by the SKL to the Front.

“Immediate attack in any manner available is permitted
submarines against enemy merchant vessels which are obviously
armed or have been proclaimed as such on the basis of conclusive
evidence received by the Naval Operations Staff. As far as
circumstances permit, measures are to be taken to save the crew
after every possibility of danger for the submarine has been
eliminated. Passenger ships not used to transport troops are
still not to be attacked, even if armed.”

The excerpt below shows the transmission of the order to the submarines. The experiences gained in the war up to that period are summarized in a document on Page 159, which is an excerpt from the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-196, “Standing War Order 171,” by Commander of Submarines. I should only like to read from Paragraph 4, the first sentence:

“Tactics of Enemy Merchant Vessels. The following instructions
have been issued for British shipping...”

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this document?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The document was issued before May 1940. I shall have to call on a witness to give the correct date, Mr. President; I assume it was in October 1939:

“The British Merchant Navy has received the following
instructions:

“(a) To fight every German submarine with all the means at hand,
to ram it or attack it with depth charges, if equipped to do
so.”

Further details follow.

Experiences drawn, from the entire operations of the British Merchant Service are summarized in the next document in an order. It has been numbered Dönitz-66, and is on Page 161. I shall read the order, which is dated 17 October 1939:

“At 1500 hours the following order was issued to Commander of
Submarines:

“Submarines are permitted immediate and full use of armed force
against all merchant vessels recognizable with certainty as
being of enemy nationality, as in every case attempts to ram or
other forms of active resistance may be expected. Exceptions to
be made as hitherto in the case of enemy passenger boats.”

On Page 162 I have reproduced another part of Document Dönitz-62, which has been submitted already. It is a note to the neutral countries dated 22 October 1939, defining conduct on the part of ships which is, according to German opinion, incompatible with the peaceful character of a merchant ship. I read from the long paragraph, the second sentence:

“According to previous experiences such tactics may be expected
with certainty from English and French boats, particularly when
sailing in convoys: inadmissible use of wireless, sailing
without lights, and in addition armed resistance and aggressive
action.”

In the next, the German Government warns neutral nations against the use of enemy ships for this reason. The German orders were issued in consequence of the experiences gained by our U-boats.

I have already submitted the next document, Dönitz-67, on Page 163 _et sequentes_ and I only wish to explain on the basis of a report made by the British Admiralty, which is on Page 163, that the orders for merchant shipping were published in the _Handbook for the Defense of Merchant Ships_ of January 1938—they were issued before the war.

Now I come to several documents dealing with the treatment of passenger ships. They have an important bearing on the _Athenia_ case, since the _Athenia_ was a passenger ship.

Document Dönitz-68 presents some evidence on the treatment of passenger ships. First comes an order issued on 4 September 1939, which I should like to read:

“On the Führer’s orders, no hostile action is to be taken
against passenger ships for the time being, even when in
convoy.”

The next excerpt from the same page contains reports on the use of passenger ships as troop transports.

I will now read an excerpt from the Directives for the Conduct of the War against Merchant Shipping, from October to the middle of November 1939, Page 3. As the fullest possible use was made of enemy passenger boats for the transport of troops, it was no longer possible to justify their being spared, at least when they were sailing in convoy. The following order was issued on 29 October: I will read the order, which is dated 29 October. It is at the bottom of the page:

“Passenger liners in enemy convoys may be subjected to immediate
unrestricted armed attack by U-boats.”

The next document, Dönitz-69, on Page 170, is to show that in November and December the German press issued a warning against the use of armed passenger ships by publishing lists of these ships.

The next document is Dönitz-70, on Page 171. It is an order issued on 7 November 1939 by the SKL to Commander of U-boats. I read the order:

“U-boats are permitted to attack immediately with all weapons at
their command all passenger ships which can be identified with
certainty as enemy ships and whose armament is detected or is
already known.”

That was about 6 weeks after permission to attack other armed ships had been given.

Dönitz-71 shows that the U-boats were also not permitted to attack blacked-out passenger ships until as late as 23 February 1940, 5 months—no, 4 months—after they were given permission to attack other ships.

Now I come to the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-224, which is reproduced on Pages 199 to 203 in Volume IV of my document book. I should like to emphasize again that the object of this document was to incriminate Admiral Raeder in particular; and that it was described by the Prosecution as a cynical denial of international law. I should like to point out, to begin with, that according to the title it concerns deliberations by the Naval Operations Staff on the possibilities of intensifying economic warfare against England. I shall read a few paragraphs, or give a short account of them, to show that a very thorough investigation of international law was made. The first paragraph is headed “War Aims.”

“The Führer’s proposal to restore a just and honorable peace and
establish a new political order in Central Europe has been
rejected. The enemy powers want war, with Germany’s destruction
as the goal. In the struggle in which Germany is now forced to
defend her existence and rights, Germany must employ her weapons
ruthlessly while fully respecting the rules of soldierly conduct
in warfare.”

Then there follows a paragraph in which it is stated that the enemy is also ruthless in carrying out his plans. On the next page, Page 200, there are a few sentences of basic importance which I should like to read. I read from the paragraph “Military Requirements” the fourth sentence:

“It is still desirable to base military measures on the existing
principle of international law; but military measures recognized
as necessary must be taken if they seem likely to lead to
decisive military successes, even if they are not admitted by
international law. For that reason, the military weapon which
effectively breaks the enemy’s powers of resistance must on
principle be given a legal base, even if new rules of naval
warfare have to be created for the purpose.

“After weighing political, military, and economic considerations
with regard to the war as a whole, Supreme War Command must
decide on the military procedure and legal rules of warfare to
be applied.”

Then there are a number of excerpts to show the way in which the Naval Operations Staff investigated the legal aspect of the situation; that is to say, the present legal aspect of the situation, the situation which would arise in the case of a siege of England or a blockade against England. The end, which is on Page 203, emphasizes the political character of the final decision. I shall read it:

“The decision as to the form to be taken by the intensification
of economic warfare and the time fixed for changing over to the
most intensified and therefore final form of naval warfare in
this war is of far-reaching political importance. It can be made
only by the Supreme War Command, which will weigh the military,
political, and economic requirements against each other.”

I should like to add that this document is dated 15 October 1939.

At the end of November 1939 the Naval Operations Staff took the consequent...

THE PRESIDENT: In our document it is 3 November. You said just now it was some date in October.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: 15 October, Mr. President. It is a memorandum dated 15 October, which was submitted.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I thought you were dealing with Exhibit GB-224. That is the one you have been reading just now.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: That is headed on our Page 199, 3 November 1939.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President. The 3rd of November is the date on which the memorandum was distributed to the High Command of the Armed Forces and to the Foreign Office. I have just been told that in the English text, above the word “Memorandum,” the date is apparently not printed. In the original it says, right above the word “Memorandum,” “Berlin, 15 October 1939.”

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have already submitted Document Dönitz-73, on Page 206, in which neutrals are warned against entry into the zone which corresponds to the American combat zone declared by President Roosevelt on 4 November.

The German point of view, that entry into this zone constitutes a danger to all neutrals by their own action, was also published in the press. Therefore, I submit Document Dönitz-103 on Page 210. It is an interview given by Admiral Raeder to a representative of the National Broadcasting Company, New York, on 4 March 1940. I should like to read a few sentences from that document. In the second paragraph Admiral Raeder points out the danger existing for neutral merchant ships if they act in a warlike manner and are consequently taken for enemy ships. The last sentence of that paragraph reads:

“The German standpoint may be concisely expressed by the
formula: Whoever depends on the use of arms must be prepared for
attack by arms.”

I shall read the two last paragraphs:

“In discussing the possibility that there might be frequent
differences of opinion, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
mentioned President Roosevelt’s order prohibiting American
shipping in the dangerous zones around England. He said, ‘This
prohibition is the best proof against England’s practice of
forcing neutrals to sail through these zones without being able
to guarantee their security. Germany can only advise all
neutrals to imitate the policy of your President.’

“Question: ‘Thus, according to this state of affairs, there is
no protection for neutral shipping in the war-endangered zones?’

“Answer: ‘Probably not, so long as England adheres to her
methods....’”

With the collapse of France, the entire U.S.A. combat zone was declared a German blockade area. That is shown by the next document, Dönitz-104, Page 212. I read from the middle of the long paragraph on that page:

“The entire sea area around England has thus become a theater of
operations. Every ship sailing this zone runs the risk of being
destroyed not only by mines but also by other combat means....”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, did you call that Exhibit Dönitz-60 or...

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That was originally also one of the documents from Dönitz-60, Mr. President, to which I have now given a new number. It is now Dönitz-104.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “Every ship sailing this zone runs
the risk of being destroyed not only by mines but also by other
combat means. For that reason the German Government issues a
fresh and most urgent warning against sailing in the danger
zone.”

At the end of the note, the German Government refuses to assume any responsibility for damage or loss incurred in this area.

I produce as the next document, on Page 214, with the new Exhibit Number Dönitz-105, an official German statement made on the occasion of the announcement of the total blockade of 17 August 1940. I only want to mention it.

I now come to several documents dealing with the treatment of neutrals outside the declared danger zones. As the first document, I submit, on Page 226, an excerpt of the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-196. It is a standing war order from the Commander of U-boats which was also issued before May 1940. I read the first sentences:

“Not to be sunk are:

“(a) All ships readily recognized as neutral so long as they do
not (1) move in any enemy convoy, (2) move into a declared
danger zone.”

The next document, Dönitz-76, Page 227, shows the concern of the Naval Operations Staff that the neutrals should really be recognizable as such. I read the first sentences of the entry of 10 January 1942:

“In view of the further extension of the war, the Naval
Operations Staff has asked the Foreign Office to point out again
to the neutral seafaring nations, with the exception of Sweden,
the necessity of carefully marking their ships in order that
they shall not be mistaken for enemy ships.”

The next Document, Dönitz-77, on Page 228, is an entry dated 24 June 1942, from the War Diary of the Flag Officer of U-boats:

“All commanders will again be given detailed instructions as to
their conduct toward neutrals.”

I have already submitted Dönitz-78—excuse me, it has not been submitted. Dönitz-78, Page 229, contains examples of the consideration which the Commander of U-boats showed to neutrals. The entry of 23 November 1942 shows that a submarine was ordered to leave one area solely because there was a great deal of neutral traffic in that area. The second entry of December 1942 specifies that Portuguese naval tankers had to be treated in accordance with directives, in other words, allowed to proceed.

On Page 230 there is a document which I have already mentioned. It contains an account of court-martial proceedings taken against a commanding officer who had torpedoed a neutral by mistake.

The next document, Dönitz-79, on Page 231, is an order decreeing the manner of treating neutrals which remained in force up to the end of the war. I do not think I have to read it. It again stresses the necessity of neutral ships being easily recognizable as such and refers to shipping agreements which have been made with a number of countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the correct date of it? You said...

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: August 1944, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: That is on the original...

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The original date was 1 April 1943. The order was revised on 1 August 1944 on the basis of the revisions necessitated by the shipping agreements.

So far I have dealt with the general principles which have been attacked by the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-191 and GB-224. Now I should like to submit several documents on individual points contained in the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-191. Mention is made there of a speech by Adolf Hitler ending with the words:

“Every ship, with or without escort, which comes within range of
our torpedo tubes will be torpedoed.”

I now wish to present as Dönitz-80, on Page 232, an excerpt from that speech. It shows that in that context the Führer’s statement only applied to ships carrying war materials to England.

I now come to two examples mentioned in GB-191 as characteristic examples of illegal German naval warfare. The first is the case of the Danish steamer _Vendia_. The Prosecution’s document says:

“On 30 September 1939 the first sinking of a neutral ship by a
submarine took place without a warning signal having been given.
On that occasion some people lost their lives. The ship was the
Danish steamer _Vendia_.”

With reference to this I am submitting Dönitz-83, on Page 235. That is the War Log of Submarine U-3, which sank the _Vendia_. I should like to read parts of it on account of its importance. I begin with the second sentence:

“The steamer turns away gradually and increases speed. The boat
comes up only very slowly. Obvious attempt to escape. The
steamer is clearly recognizable as the Danish steamer _Vendia_.
Boat reduces speed and uncovers her machine gun. Several warning
shots are fired across the steamer’s bow. Thereupon the steamer
stops very slowly; nothing more happens for a while. Then some
more shots are fired. The _Vendia_ lies into the wind.

“For 10 minutes nothing is visible on deck to remove suspicion
of possible intended resistance; at 1124 hours I suddenly see
bow waves and screw movements. The steamer swings sharply round
toward the boat. The officer on watch and the first mate agree
with my view that this is an attempt at ramming. For this reason
I turn in the same angle as the steamer. A torpedo is fired 30
seconds later; point of aim, bow; point of impact, extreme rear
of stern. The stern is torn off and goes down. The front part
remains afloat.

“By risking the loss of our own crew and boat (heavy sea and
numerous floating pieces of wreckage) six men of the Danish crew
are rescued, among them the captain and helmsman. No further
survivors can be seen. In the meantime the Danish steamer
_Swawa_ approaches and is stopped. She is requested to send her
papers across in a boat. She is carrying a mixed cargo from
Amsterdam to Copenhagen. The six persons rescued are transferred
to the steamer for repatriation.”

I read the second to the last sentence on the next page:

“After the crew of the steamer had been handed over, it was
learned that the engineer artificer of the steamer had told the
stoker Blank that the captain had intended to ram the
submarine.”

The document on Page 237, an excerpt from the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-82, shows that the _Vendia_ case formed the subject of a protest by the German Government to the Danish Government.

I shall deal now with the sinking of the _City of Benares_ on 18 September 1940. In this connection I should like first to read several sentences from the Prosecution’s document, because in my opinion it is characteristic of the probative value of the entire Exhibit GB-191. I read from the British Document Book, Page 23, starting at the passage where the Prosecution stopped reading. The Tribunal will remember that the _City of Benares_ had children on board. The Foreign Office report says here:

“The captain of the U-boat presumably did not know that there
were children on board the _City of Benares_ when he fired the
torpedoes. Perhaps he did not even know the name of the ship,
although there the evidence suggests strongly that he had been
dogging her for several hours before torpedoing her. He must
have known, however, that this was a large merchant ship,
probably with civilian passengers on board, and certainly with a
crew of merchant seamen. He knew the state of the weather, and
he knew that they were six hundred miles from land and yet he
followed them outside the blockade area and deliberately
abstained from firing his torpedo until after nightfall when the
chances of rescue would be enormously reduced.”

The next document I submit is Dönitz-84, Page 238, the War Log of U-boat 48, which sank the _City of Benares_. I read the entry of 17 September 1940:

“Time 1002. Convoy sighted. Course about 240 degrees, speed 7
nautical miles. Contact maintained, since underwater attack is
no longer possible because of the heavy swell. No escort can be
seen with the convoy.”

I will summarize the entry of 18 September 1940.

It describes the firing of a torpedo on a ship belonging to that convoy—the _City of Benares_.

A few minutes later, at 0007 hours, the submarine attacked a second ship in the convoy, the British steamer _Marina_. Both ships sent wireless messages. Twenty minutes later the submarine again had an artillery combat with a tanker from the convoy. That is the true story of the _City of Benares_.

I reproduce the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-192 again on Page 240. It concerns the sinking of the _Sheaf Mead_. In this connection I should like to point out that that ship was heavily armed and that it probably was no merchant vessel but a submarine trap. The Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-195, which was dealt with in yesterday’s hearing, contains an order issued by the Führer in July 1941 concerning attacks on United States merchant vessels in the blockade zone which had been declared around England. On the basis of this document, the Prosecution charges Dönitz with conducting a cynical and opportunistic warfare against neutrals.

My next document is Donitz-86, Page 243. It shows the efforts which were made to avoid a conflict with the United States. I read the entry, dated 5 March 1940, from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff:

“With reference to the conduct of economic warfare, orders are
given to the Naval Forces that U.S. ships are not to be stopped,
seized, or sunk. The reason is the assurance given by the
Commander-in-Chief to the American Naval Attaché, whom he
received on 20 February, that German submarines had orders not
to stop any American ships whatsoever. All possibility of
difficulties arising between the U.S.A. and Germany as a result
of economic warfare are thereby to be eliminated from the
start.”

This order means, therefore, that prize law measures were renounced.

The next document, Dönitz-87, Page 244, shows the practical recognition of the American zone of neutrality. It reads:

“4 April 1941. The following WIT message is directed to all
ships at sea:

“American neutrality zone from now on to be observed south of
20° North only at a distance of 300 nautical miles from the
coast. For reasons of foreign policy, the hitherto existing
limitation will for the time being continue to be observed north
of the above-mentioned line.”

That means full recognition of the neutral zone.

The next document, Dönitz-88, shows President Roosevelt’s attitude to the question of neutrality toward Germany in that war. It is an excerpt from the speech of 11 September 1941 and is well known:

“Hitler knows that he must win the mastery of the seas if he
wants to win the mastery of the world. He knows that he must
first tear down the bridge of ships which we are building over
the Atlantic and over which we constantly transport the war
material that will help, in the end, to destroy him and all his
works. He has to destroy our patrols on the sea and in the air.”

I should like to say a few words about the view also expressed in Exhibit GB-191, namely, that the crews of enemy merchant ships were civilians and noncombatants. On Page 254 of the document book I have reproduced part of Document Dönitz-67, which I have already submitted. It is an excerpt from the confidential Admiralty Fleet Orders and deals with gunnery training for the civilian crews of merchant ships. I only wish to refer to the first page of these orders which say that, as a general rule, there should be only one navy man at a gun, all the rest being taken from the crew of the ship. I read from the paragraph headed “Training,” Section (d):

“In addition to the gunlayer and the men specially trained for
serving guns, five to seven men more—depending on the size of
the gun—are needed to complete the gun crew and to bring
ammunition from the magazine.”

This is followed by regulations for training in port and gunnery drill for the crews.

The next document, re-numbered Dönitz-106, is a circular decree issued by the French Minister for the Merchant Marine on 11 November 1939. It deals with the creation of a special badge for men serving on merchant ships who are liable for military service. That is on Page 256. I should like to point out that this decree was signed by the head of the Military Cabinet, a rear admiral. The character of the order is demonstrated by the second to the last paragraph:

“This armband may only be worn in France or in the French
colonies. In no case may men issued the armband wear it in
foreign waters.”

I come now to several documents dealing with the question of the rescue of survivors. These documents can be found in Document Books 1 and 2.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, do you not think it would be sufficient if you were to refer to these documents and give us the numbers without reading from them? They are all dealing, as you say, with rescue.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I believe I can do this with most of them. On Page 9 there is reproduced the Hague Convention regarding the application of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare. Page 10 is Document Dönitz-8, the order of 4 October 1939 concerning the sinking of armed merchantmen. It contains the order already read, namely, that rescues should be effected wherever possible without endangering their own ship.

Dönitz-9, Page 12, gives examples of exaggerated rescue measures by German submarines which even let enemy ships pass without attack while so engaged. Dönitz-10 deals with the same subject and gives a further example.

The collection of statements made by commanding officers in Dönitz-13 can be found on Pages 19 to 26. I should like to deal with it along with War Order 154, which is the Prosecution’s Exhibit GB-196. These statements contain numerous examples, taken from all the war years, of rescue measures on the part of German submarines. One of these statements is supplemented by photographs—Page 21—which are included in the original. The facts stated in these statements are confirmed by Document Dönitz-14, Page 27, where there is a report on rescue measures in the war diary of a submarine; and at the end we find the sentence: “Taking British airmen on board is sanctioned.” It is signed by the Commander of U-boats.

The next document, Donitz-15, is again an excerpt from the war diary, giving an example of rescue measures after a battle with a convoy on 21 October 1941. It is on Page 28. The next two documents concern the _Laconia_ order. The Tribunal has permitted me to use Standing War Orders 511 and 513 in cross-examining Möhle. They deal with the capture of captains, chief engineers, and air crews. I submit them as Dönitz-24 and 25, and they can be found on Pages 46 and 47. I should like to point out that both orders explicitly state that capture should only be effected as far as is possible without endangering the boats.

Document Dönitz-24 explains that the British Admiralty, on their part, had issued orders to prevent the capture of British captains by German submarines. The next excerpt, on Page 48, cites an example showing that this British order was carried out and that a U-boat searched in vain among the lifeboats for the captain.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, could you inform the Tribunal what Paragraph 2 on Page 46 refers to and means?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: The paragraph refers to Standing War Order Number 101, that is, the order specifying which neutral ships can be sunk. That is, of course, in the blockade area.

THE PRESIDENT: Would it mean that those officers have to be sunk with the ship, or what?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: No, Mr. President. That means that captains and ships’ officers of neutral ships might be left in the lifeboats and need not be taken aboard the submarine from the lifeboats. The fact that it was actually much safer in the lifeboats than on the submarine is seen from the English order instructing captains to remain in the lifeboats and hide from the U-boats.

THE PRESIDENT: What if they do not have lifeboats?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I believe, Mr. President, that that case has not been ruled on here. I know of no case where a ship did not have lifeboats, especially in 1943, in which year the order originated. Every ship was provided not only with lifeboats but also with automatically inflating rafts.

Figure 2 refers only to the question of capture of neutral captains. May I continue, please?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A number of instances showing that captains were rescued after these orders were issued are quoted in the statements by commanders reproduced on Pages 22, 25, and 26, under Exhibit Number Dönitz-13.

I now come to the case of Submarine _U-386_, which figures very largely in Korvettenkapitän Möhle’s statement. The Tribunal will remember that this case was the decisive reason for the way in which Möhle interpreted the _Laconia_ order. With reference to this case, I submit Exhibit Number Dönitz-26, the affidavit made by Captain Witt. I should like to read a few paragraphs from that.

THE PRESIDENT: What page?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On Page 50, Mr. President.

“In November 1943, in the course of my official duties as a
member of the staff of Commander of U-boats, I had to interview
Lieutenant Albrecht, commander of U-boat _U-386_, on his
experiences during the action which had just terminated.
Albrecht reported to me that in the latitude of Cape Finisterre
he had sighted in daylight a rubber boat with shipwrecked
British airmen in the Bay of Biscay. He did not take any steps
to rescue them because he was on his way to a convoy in process
of formation. He could only reach his position by continuing
without a stop. Besides he was afraid...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, is it necessary to go into the details of each particular case? I mean, they all depend upon their own particular circumstances. You need not read the documents very carefully. It is not necessary at this stage of the case.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well, Mr. President, I shall only report.

The affidavit states briefly that the commander has been informed that he should have brought the airmen back. That is, in other words, the opposite of what Möhle has said in this courtroom. The correctness of Captain Witt’s statements is confirmed by the next document, Dönitz-27, which is the U-boat’s war log and contains the comments of the Commander of U-boats expressing disapproval of the fact that the Englishmen floating on the raft were not taken aboard.

The fact that Admiral Dönitz’ attitude toward rescues was not based on cruelty but on military expediency is shown by Page 53 of the following document, Dönitz-28. He is considering the rescue of our own personnel and comes to the conclusion that military considerations may forbid such a rescue. The following Document Dönitz-29 deals with the statement made by witness Heisig. It is on Page 54 and the following. It begins with an affidavit made by the Adjutant, Kapitänleutnant Fuhrmann, who describes the general ideas on which Admiral Dönitz’ talks were based. At the end he stresses the fact that he was never, in connection with Admiral Dönitz’ pronouncements, approached by young officers, who expressed any doubts as to the treatment of shipwrecked persons.

On Page 56 there is a statement made by Lieutenant Kress, who was present at the same lecture as Heisig. He says that neither directly nor indirectly did Admiral Dönitz order the survivors to be killed.

That is confirmed by Lieutenant Steinhoff’s statement on Page 59. The considerations which weighed with the Naval Operations Staff at that time in the question of fighting the crews are illustrated by the following document, Donitz-30, which is reproduced on Pages 60 and 61. Here again, no mention is made of the killing of survivors. It is the record of a conference with the Führer on 28 September 1942, which was attended by Admiral Raeder and Admiral Dönitz.

The Tribunal will remember Exhibit GB-200 which describes rescue ships as desirable targets. The same document states that they have the significance of submarine traps. For that reason I have reproduced on Page 63 Standing War Order Number 173, dated 2 May 1940. That order States that, in accordance with instructions from the British Admiralty, U-boat traps are employed in convoys. Document Dönitz-34, on Page 67 of Document Book 2, shows that the treatment of rescue ships has nothing to do with the sanctity of hospital ships. It is the last of the Standing Orders referring to hospital ships and is dated 1 August 1944. It begins with the words, “Hospital ships must not be sunk.”

My next document, Dönitz-35, is meant to show that the Naval Operations Staff actually went beyond the provisions of international law in regard to the sanctity of hospital ships, for, as the entry of 17 July 1941 proves, the Soviet Government on its part rejected the hospital ship agreement, basing its action on violations of international law committed by Germany on land. According to Article 18 of the hospital ship agreement, this meant that the agreement was no longer binding on any of the signatories.

In Document Dönitz-36, Pages 69 and following, I submit the only known instance of a U-boat commander’s actually firing on means of rescue. This is the interrogation of Kapitänleutnant Eck, carried out on 21 November 1945 by order of this Tribunal. That was 10 days before he was shot.

According to the wish of the Tribunal, I shall confine myself to a summary.

After sinking the Greek steamer _Peleus_, Eck tried to sink the lifeboats and wreckage by means of gunfire. The reason he gave was that he wanted in this way to get rid of the debris and avoid being detected by enemy aircraft. He states that he had the _Laconia_ order aboard, but that this order had no influence whatsoever upon his decision. In fact, he had not even thought of it. He had received his instructions from Möhle but had heard nothing about the killing of survivors which is alleged to have been desired; and he knew nothing about the instance of _U-386_. At the end of his examination, Eck states that he expected his action to be approved by Admiral Dönitz. A further reference was made in cross-examination yesterday to the question of whether Admiral Dönitz...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, we will adjourn now for a few minutes—only for a short time.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, the Tribunal, as you know, was going to deal with the applications for documents and witnesses, but if you could finish your documents in a short time, they would like to go on with that and get them finished, if you can.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I believe that even at my present speed, I shall need about an hour. I should like to ask you, therefore, for permission to continue on Monday morning.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Kranzbühler, if you think it will be as long as that, of course we must put it off to Monday morning, but the Tribunal does hope that you would not take anything like so long as that, because going in detail into these documents does not really help the Tribunal. They have all got to be gone into again in great detail, both in your speeches and in further consideration by the Tribunal.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall confine myself to making clear the connections, Mr. President, but in spite of that, I think it would be better if I did so on Monday morning.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, yes. Then the Tribunal will now deal with the applications. Yes, Sir David.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, the first application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach, who asked for one Hans Marsalek as a witness for cross-examination. The Prosecution have already introduced an affidavit from this man, and they have no objection to him being called for cross-examination.

My Lord, the second application on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach is in respect of one Kaufmann. The Defense desires to administer interrogatories to Kaufmann in lieu of calling Kaufmann, who has already been allowed as a witness. There is no objection to that.

My Lord, the next matter is an application by Dr. Seidl on behalf of the Defendant Hess, and it is a request for five documents relating to the German-Soviet agreements in August and September 1939. And it is also a request for the calling of Ambassador Gaus as a witness in connection with the above. But the position with regard to previous applications is somewhat lengthy, and without going into details, I tell the Tribunal that this matter has already been before them on six occasions. I have the details if the Tribunal would like them.

THE PRESIDENT: No, because the Tribunal made an order, did they not, that these documents were to be translated?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: And that they would then be considered by the Tribunal?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, My Lord. The Tribunal made an order for them to be translated on 25 March and, My Lord, if I may just remind Your Lordship of the bare facts, on 28 March Fräulein Blank, the private secretary of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, was asked about the agreement. Your Lordship may remember that my friend General Rudenko objected, but the Tribunal ruled that the questions were admissible, and the witness said she knew of the existence of the secret pact, but gave no details.

Then, on 1 April, in the course of Dr. Seidl’s cross-examination of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, the Gaus affidavit was read, and on 3 April, Dr. Seidl applied for Hilger and Weizsäcker to be called as witnesses on this point, and on 15 April Dr. Seidl applied for Ambassador Gaus to be called.

Now, My Lord, it was discussed before the Tribunal on 17 April, when I said that in view of the Tribunal’s previous ruling I could not contest the question of the agreement, but I objected to the witnesses. General Rudenko, I think, stated that he had submitted written objections, and the Tribunal said they would consider the matter. The position today appears to be, taking the five documents, that the affidavit of Dr. Gaus is already in evidence. My Lord, that is the first affidavit. But the second affidavit of Dr. Gaus is not in evidence. With regard to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, that is already in evidence. As to the Secret Supplementary Protocol appended to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, the substance is already in evidence. It was given in the Gaus affidavit.

Then, My Lord, we have the German-Soviet Frontier and Friendship Pact of 28 September 1939, and the Secret Supplementary Protocol to that pact. The Prosecution submit that these documents have no relevance to the defense of the Defendant Hess, and they cannot see any reason for them being wanted. If necessary, my Soviet colleague can deal further with the matter, but that is the general position. And we also submit that the second affidavit of Ambassador Gaus is unnecessary in view of his previous affidavit, and without stating them again, I refer to and repeat my objections to witnesses to the discussions preceding the conclusion of the agreement. It is submitted that this is really an irrelevant matter, and unnecessary to occupy the time of the Tribunal regarding it. My Lord, I do not know whether it is convenient...

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal, as I have said, is going to consider this matter. They have not yet had an opportunity to consider these documents, but I should like to ask you whether there is any reason why Ambassador Gaus should be called as a witness.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: None at all, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: He has already stated the substance of these documents, as has the Defendant Ribbentrop, and if the documents are now produced and supposing that the Tribunal took the view that they ought to be admitted, it would be entirely irrelevant to call Gaus as a witness.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In my submission that is so, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the Tribunal had better consider these documents, as they had stated in their order they were going to do when the documents had been produced.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.

Now, My Lord, the next application is on behalf of the Defendant Funk, and he requests permission to read the affidavit of the witness Kallus. The permission was previously granted to the Defendant Funk to submit an interrogatory to Kallus, which has been done, and the interrogatory has already been introduced in evidence. The affidavit now in question has been received and supplements the interrogatory, and the Prosecution have no objection.

The next application is on behalf of the Defendant Streicher, and he desires to call the witness Gassner as a witness, and he is desired to speak as to the _Stürmer_ and the size of the circulation and the profits. The Prosecution submit that it is unnecessary to call a witness as to the form of the _Stürmer_ after 1933. A representative number of copies of the newspaper are before the Tribunal and the form of the newspaper can be seen from them.

On the second point, both the Defendant Streicher and the witness Hiemer have given evidence as to the _Stürmer’s_ circulation, and it is respectfully submitted that the takings of the _Stürmer_ and the use to which they were put are irrelevant.

Then, My Lord, the next application, on behalf of the Defendant Sauckel, is for one Biedermann as a witness, instead of a witness allowed previously who cannot be found. The Prosecution have no objection to that, and they have no objection to the documents that are asked for, so with the approval of the Tribunal I shall not go through them in detail.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we should like to know when you think the most appropriate time would be to hear the evidence on behalf of those defendants whose cases have already been presented, whether to hear it at the end of all the evidence or to hear it earlier?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I should have thought that it was better to hear it earlier if the Tribunal could put aside a Saturday morning for it, or something of that kind, before the cases of the various defendants have gone too far into the background.

THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that and let you know.