Chapter XVII: Book 1: , Page 7 (6)

At the end of the war I was given the task of organizing large-scale transports in the Baltic Sea. Gradually the necessity arose to move the hundreds of thousands of poverty-stricken refugees out of the coastal areas of East and West Prussia where they were exposed to starvation, epidemics, and bombardment and to bring them to Germany. For this reason I made enquiries about merchant shipping, which was not actually under my jurisdiction; and in so doing I learned that out of eight ships ordered in Denmark, seven had been destroyed by saboteurs in the final stage of construction. I called a meeting of all the departments connected with those ships and asked them, “How can I help you so that we get shipping space and have damaged ships repaired more quickly?” I received suggestions from various quarters outside the Navy, including a suggestion that repair work, _et cetera_, might be speeded up by employing prisoners from the concentration camps. By way of justification, it was pointed out, in view of the excellent food conditions, such employment would be very popular. Since I knew nothing about the methods and conditions in the concentration camps, I included these proposals in my collection as a matter of course, especially as there was no question of making conditions worse for them, since they would be given better food when working. And I know that if I had done the opposite I could have been accused here of refusing these people an opportunity of having better food. I had not the slightest reason to do this, as I knew nothing about any concentration camp methods at the time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure we are grateful for your explanation. But I just want you to tell me, after you had proposed that you should get 12,000 people from concentration camps, did you get them?

DÖNITZ: I do not know. I did not do anything more about that. After the meeting I had a memorandum prepared and submitted to the Führer...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Keep to the answer. The answer is that you do not know whether you got them or not, assuming that you did get them.

DÖNITZ: I did not get them at all. I had nothing to do with shipyards and consequently I do not know how those responsible for the work in the shipyards received their additional workers. I just do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you held a position of some responsibility; if you get 12,000 people from concentration camps into the shipbuilding industry, they would have to work alongside people who weren’t in concentration camps, would they not?

DÖNITZ: Certainly, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling this Tribunal that when you ask for and you may have got 12,000 people out of concentration camps, who work alongside people not in concentration camps, that the conditions inside the concentration camps remain a secret to the other people and to all the rulers of Germany?

DÖNITZ: First of all, I do not know whether they came. Secondly, if they did come, I can very well imagine that they had orders not to talk; and thirdly, I do not even know what camps they came from and whether they were not people who had already been put into other camps on account of the work they accomplished. At any rate, I did not worry about the execution or methods, _et cetera_, because it was none of my business; I acted on behalf of the competent non-naval departments which required workmen in order to carry out repairs more quickly, so that something could be done about repairs for the merchant navy. That was my duty, considering the arrangements which I had to make for the re-transport of these refugees. I would do exactly the same thing again today. That is the position.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look a little down the document to the fourth paragraph, after it says, “Translator’s note.” If you will look at the English, the paragraph beginning: “Since elsewhere...” Have you found that? This is as you have told us, after you express your worry about the sabotage in the Danish and Norwegian shipyards. I just want you to look at your proposal to deal with saboteurs.

“Since elsewhere measures for exacting atonement taken against
whole working parties among whom sabotage occurred have proved
successful and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was
completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the
Scandinavian countries will come under consideration.”

That is what you were suggesting, Defendant, a collective penalty against the whole working party where any sabotage occurred; isn’t that so?

DÖNITZ: Yes. May I give an explanation in that connection?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all right. But otherwise, it is so?

DÖNITZ: Agencies outside the Navy connected with shipbuilding stated at that meeting that sabotage had been prevented in France by the introduction of certain measures for exacting atonement. Through an affidavit by an officer who attended the meeting and drafted the minutes or the short memorandum, I have now ascertained that these measures at that time meant the withholding of the additional rations issued by the management of the shipyard. That is what that meant. And, secondly, to come to Norway and Denmark, I told these people:

“It is impossible for us to build ships there with our foreign
currency and our materials, only to have them smashed up by
sabotage—and assuredly with the co-operation of the shipyard
workmen—when they are nearly ready. What can we do against
that?”

The answer I received was that the only way was to keep them away from saboteurs and to round them up in camps.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The whole of this explanation that you have given us is in this document which is in front of the Tribunal. Have you anything to add to what is in the document?

DÖNITZ: Right. I have to add that the workmen were to be treated in exactly the same way as our own workmen who were also housed in barracks. The Danish and Norwegian workers would not have suffered the slightest discomfort.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look at one more sentence:

“By the employment of the working parties concerned as
concentration camp workers, their output would not only be
increased by 100 percent but the cessation of their previously
good wages might possibly result in their being considerably
deterred from sabotage...”

That fairly represents your view of the way to treat Norwegian and Danish workers, does it not?

DÖNITZ: This was a safety measure to allow us to get control of the sabotage.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just turn back to Page 70 of the English document book, Page 103 in the German document book. This is an extract from the minutes of a meeting between you and Hitler on 1 July 1944, signed by yourself. Have you got it?

DÖNITZ: Not yet.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 70 in the English, Page 112 in the German text (Exhibit Number GB-210).

DÖNITZ: I have got it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In connection with the general strike in Copenhagen, the Führer says:

“The only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court-martial
proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such
men are on everybody’s lips whereas there is silence with regard
to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar
circumstances without court-martial proceedings.”

Silence with regard to those who are condemned without trial! Do you agree with that statement of Hitler’s?

DÖNITZ: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why did you distribute it to Operations for circulation if you didn’t approve of it?

DÖNITZ: I do not agree with this procedure, but it expresses an idea of the Führer’s. This was not a discussion between the Führer and myself; it represents notes on the military situation generally, made by the officer who accompanied me, and contains widely differing points.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you try and answer my question? It is a perfectly simple one. It is: Why did you distribute that to Operations for circulation? What was there in these few lines that was of interest to your officers? What did you think was valuable for your officers to know in that dreadful piece of savagery that I have just quoted to you?

DÖNITZ: It is very easy to explain that. The officer who made the minutes included it in order to inform our shipyard establishments that there was a general strike in Copenhagen. That one paragraph from the long situation discussions was included so that the shipyard establishments would know that there was a strike in Copenhagen. That was the whole point.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am suggesting to you, Defendant, that you circulated that to your officers to inculcate ruthlessness among them. That is my suggestion. What do you say to that?

DÖNITZ: I say that is entirely wrong. I may tell you also that I did not even hear the Führer make that statement, but it is possible that it was taken down by the accompanying officer, Wagner, for the reason which I have just given you, to warn our people of the general strike in Copenhagen.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I am not going to argue with you about your knowledge of documents you have signed. I have questions which deal with documents you haven’t signed, so let’s pass on to the next one.

DÖNITZ: I know the document. I know it because I have signed it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 69, that is Page 4 in the English document book or Page 102 in the German document book (Exhibit Number GB-209), the minutes of the conference on 19 February 1945, between you and Hitler.

DÖNITZ: No, that is not correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I beg your pardon. It is an extract from the minutes of the Hitler conference on 19 February 1945; and then there is a note...

DÖNITZ: No. It says here: Participation by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in situation discussion with the Führer. It was not a special conference on the general military situation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not mean to say “special.” I said the Hitler conference on the 19th.

DÖNITZ: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now the first sentence of Paragraph 1 says:

“The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should
renounce the Geneva Convention.”

The last sentence:

“The Führer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to
consider the pros and cons of this step and to state his opinion
as soon as possible.”

And if you look down at the next minutes of the conference on 20 February, which is headed, “Participation of C-in-C Navy at a Führer conference on 20 February at 1600 hours,” it reads as follows:

“The C-in-C Navy informed the Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff, Generaloberst Jodl, and the representative of
the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Führer’s headquarters,
Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany’s possible
renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a military
standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the
conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the
disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Even from a general
standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that
this measure would bring no advantage.”

Now look to the last sentence:

“It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary
without warning and at all costs to save face with the world.”

That means, put in blunt and brutal language, “Don’t denounce the convention, but break it whenever it suits you,” doesn’t it?

DÖNITZ: No, that is not true.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What does it mean? Let’s take it word for word. “It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary....” Aren’t these measures contrary to the rules of the Geneva Convention?

DÖNITZ: I must give an explanation of that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Answer my question first and then make a statement. You have done it before but try to answer my question: “These measures considered necessary”—If they don’t mean measures contrary to the terms of the Geneva Convention, what do they mean? Answer that question first.

DÖNITZ: They are measures against our own troops. I had heard, or I was told that the Führer intended, or had said, that because the front was yielding in the West and he feared that American and British propaganda might induce men to desert, he intended to leave the Geneva Convention, so I said to my staff, “How is it possible in this connection to contemplate abandoning lock, stock, and barrel a system of international law almost a century old?” I may have said something like this, “The necessary measures must be taken.” There was no thought of concrete measures in that connection and no such measures were introduced. My own views on the treatment of prisoners of war can best be heard from the 8,000 British prisoners of war who were in my camps. That is the situation regarding this matter. All the chiefs of the Wehrmacht branches protested against the idea of renouncing the Geneva Convention. They were not in favor of this idea.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that your total explanation of “to carry out measures considered necessary”? You have nothing else to add on that point? Well, I shall pass to another one. Do you remember saying to Dr. Kranzbühler yesterday that when you became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy the war was purely a defensive war? Do you remember saying that to your counsel yesterday?

DÖNITZ: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was not your fault, was it? It was not your fault that it remained limited to the countries engaged when you took over? Do you remember your advice to Hitler on the meeting of 14 May 1943?

DÖNITZ: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let me just suggest to you, do you remember the discussion about the sea transport for Sicily and Sardinia? Do you remember having a discussion on that, and do you remember your warning Hitler that your U-boat losses were 15 to 17 U-boats a month and that the position as to the future of the U-boat war looked rather gloomy? Do you remember that?

DÖNITZ: Yes, I do.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember Hitler saying, “These losses are too heavy. This cannot go on.” And did you say to Hitler:

“Now our only small outlet for sorties is the Bay of Biscay, and
control of this involves great difficulties and already takes up
ten days. C-in-C Navy sees best strategic solution in occupation
of Spain, including Gibraltar.”

And did Hitler remark:

“In 1940 this would still have been possible with the
co-operation of Spain; but now, and against the will of Spain,
our resources are no longer adequate.”

Do you remember suggesting that to Hitler on 14 May 1943, and Hitler saying his resources were no longer adequate?

DÖNITZ: I do not think that I had proposed to the Führer that we should occupy Spain. I described the situation very clearly; I said that we were blocked in that small corner of the Bay of Biscay and that the situation would be different if there was much more room. That, however, does not suggest that, in consideration of the defensive situation, we should occupy Spain.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us get it clearly, I am quoting you now from Admiral Assmann’s headline diary, a verbatim translation.

The original is in London, My Lord. I will get the copy and put it in and certify it. This point again only arose yesterday and I haven’t got it. I will have the original given and I will show Dr. Kranzbühler this entry.

[_Turning to the defendant._] These are the words that Admiral Assmann records:

“C-in-C Navy continues: ‘Now our only small outlet for sorties
is the Bay of Biscay, and control of this involves great
difficulties and already takes up 10 days.’

“C-in-C Navy sees best strategic solution in occupation of
Spain, including Gibraltar.”

Did you say that “the best strategic solution lies in the occupation of Spain, including Gibraltar”?

DÖNITZ: That is possible. If that is the wording you have got there, it is possible that that is the way I said it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I was going to pass on from these general...

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you passed altogether from C-158 on Page 69?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I had, but I can easily return to it, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the second sentence in Paragraph 1 appears to have some bearing upon the answers which the defendant has given.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am sorry, but I tried to cut it as short—to the bare bone—and I am sorry if I omit matters.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, would you return to the last document, C-158. That’s the one about the Geneva Convention; it’s Page 69 of the English book; 102 of the German, whichever you’re following. The sergeant major will help you to find it.

Now, if you’ll look at the first paragraph, after the sentence I read, “The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention,” it goes on:

“Not only the Russians but also the Western Powers are violating
international law by their actions against the defenseless
population and the residential districts of the towns. It
therefore appears expedient to adopt the same course in order to
show the enemy that we are determined to fight with every means
for our existence and, also, through this measure to urge our
people to resist to the utmost.”

Were not these, that are referred to there as the “same course”—were not these the “measures considered necessary” to which you were referring in the second minute?

DÖNITZ: The witness who drew up these two records will be able to explain exactly where and when this information was given. I myself was only told, just as the Reich Marshal testified, that the Führer was upset because our Western Front was not holding, and men were quite pleased to become American and English prisoners of war. That was how the whole thing began; and that was the information which I originally received.

I cannot give an opinion on these minutes which were drawn up by an officer. The best thing would be for Admiral Wagner to give more exact details of these matters. I cannot say more than that under oath. I was of the opinion that the renunciation of the Geneva Convention was in principle a great mistake and was wrong. I have given practical proof of my views on the treatment of prisoners of war. Everything else is wrong.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to make quite clear the point that the Prosecution put against you as this: That you were prepared not to denounce the Convention, but you were prepared to take action contrary to the Convention and say nothing about it; and that’s what I suggested is the effect of the last sentence, especially when read with these words in the first paragraph.

My Lord, I am going to pass to the war at sea.

DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon, but may I say one thing more? If measures are taken against desertion, they must be made public. They must have a deterrent effect; and so it never entered my head to keep them secret. On the contrary my only thought was, “How is it possible to leave the Geneva Convention at all?” And that is what I was expressing.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The document is clear.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, did you know that on the first day of the war the Navy put up to the Foreign Office that the maximum damage to England could only be achieved, with the naval forces you had, if U-boats were permitted the unrestricted use of arms without warning against Allied and neutral shipping in a wide area? From the first day of the war, did you know that the Navy put that up to the German Foreign Office?

DÖNITZ: I do not believe that the Naval Operations Staff at the time sent me a memorandum of that kind, if it was ever set up, which I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to try and remember because it’s quite important. You say that the naval command never informed the Flag Officer of U-boats that that was their view of the war?

DÖNITZ: I do not know. I cannot remember that the Naval War Staff ever informed me of such a letter to the Foreign Office. I do not believe they did; I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, perhaps it would assist your memory if you looked at the letter.

My Lord, this is Document Number D-851 and it will become Exhibit Number GB-451.

DÖNITZ: No, I do not know this paper.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just will take it by stages because, of course, you wouldn’t know the first part; but I’ll read it to you and then we’ll look at the memorandum together.

“Submitted respectfully to the Secretary of State”—that would
be Baron von Weizsäcker—“with the enclosed memorandum.

“The Chief of the Operational Department of the Naval High
Command, Captain Fricke, informed me by telephone that the
Führer was already dealing with this matter. The impression had,
however, arisen here that the political connections had again to
be gone into and brought to the Führer’s notice anew. Captain
Fricke had therefore sent Korvettenkapitän Neubauer to the
Foreign Office in order to discuss the matter further.”

That’s signed by Albrecht on 3 September 1939. Then there is the memorandum:

“The question of an unlimited U-boat war against England is
discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the Naval High
Command.

“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage
to England, which can be achieved with the forces available, can
only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted
use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping
in the prohibited area indicated in the enclosed map.

“The Navy does not fail to realize that (a) Germany would
thereby publicly disregard the agreement of 1936 regarding the
prosecution of economic warfare, and (b) a military operation of
this kind could not be justified on the basis of the hitherto
generally accepted principles of international law.”

And then it goes on to deal with it.

Are you telling the Tribunal that the Defendant Raeder never consulted or informed you before these data were submitted to the Foreign Office?

DÖNITZ: No, he did not do so, and that is shown by the fact that it is a memorandum from the Chief of the Operations Department to the Secretary of State, that is to say, a negotiation between Berlin and the Foreign Office; and the front-line commander, whose station was on the coast and who, for all practical purposes, was in charge of the U-boats, had nothing to do with it.

I do not know this letter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, are you saying that you went on with your activities at the beginning of the war without knowing that this was the view of the Naval High Command?

DÖNITZ: I was not informed about this letter. I have said already that my knowledge of it...

THE PRESIDENT: That wasn’t an answer to the question. The question was whether you knew at the time that this was the view of the Naval High Command. Answer the question.

DÖNITZ: No, I did not know that. I knew that the view of the Naval High Command was to follow the measures of the enemy step by step. I knew that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you see, that is the entire difference, Defendant. That is what you said at great length in giving your evidence the day before yesterday and yesterday, that you were answering, step by step, the measures of the enemy. You gave that evidence. Do you say that you didn’t know that this was the view of the Defendant Raeder, formed on the first day of the war? Do you say you didn’t know it at all, you had no inkling that that was Raeder’s view?

DÖNITZ: No; I did not know that because I did not know of this letter; and I do not know if that is Herr Raeder’s view. I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, again I don’t want to argue with you; but if the Commander, the Chief of the Navy—and I think at that time he called himself chief of the naval war staff as well—allows the chief of his Operational Department to put this view forward to the Foreign Office—is it the practice of the German Navy to allow post captains to put forward a view like that when it is not held by the Commander-in-Chief?

It is ridiculous, isn’t it? No Commander-in-Chief would allow a junior officer to put forward that view to the Foreign Office unless he held it, would he?

DÖNITZ: Will you please ask the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder. I cannot give any information as to how this letter came to be written.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will do that with very great pleasure, Defendant; but at the moment, you see, I have got to question you on the matters that you put forward, and my next question is: Was it not in pursuance of the view and desire expressed in that memorandum that the U-boat command disregarded from the start the London Treaty about warning ships?

DÖNITZ: No, on the contrary, entirely on the contrary. In the West we wanted to avoid any further complications, and we endeavored as long as possible to fight according to the London Agreement. That can be seen from all the directives that the U-boats received.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought you perhaps to draw his attention to the penultimate paragraph in that memorandum?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I probably should. My Lord, I will read the three, because if you will notice it goes on:

“The High Command does not assert that England can be beaten by
unrestricted U-boat warfare. The cessation of traffic with the
world trade center of England spells serious disruptions of
their national economy for the neutrals, for which we can offer
them no compensation.

“Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using
military method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England
gives us a justification, by her method of waging war, to order
this form of warfare as a reprisal.

“It appears necessary, in view of the great importance in the
field of foreign politics of the decision to be taken, that it
should be arrived at not only as a result of military
considerations, but taking into full account the needs of
foreign politics.”

I am greatly obliged, Your Lordship.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you hear of any qualification of this view which was arrived at on considerations of foreign politics? Did you hear anything about that?

DÖNITZ: No, I can only repeat that I saw this document here for the first time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well now, I would like you, just before we go on to the question, to look at Page 19 of the English document book, Page 49 of the German.

My Lord, the whole of the treaty, which is very short, is set out there. My Lord, I have the formal copy if Your Lordship would like to see it, but it is set out in these two paragraphs.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You see:

“1. In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must
conform to the rules of international law to which surface
vessels are subjected.

“2. In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to
stop on being duly summoned or of active resistance to visit or
search, a warship, whether a surface vessel or submarine, may
not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel
without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship’s papers
in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship’s boats are not
regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the
passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather
conditions by the proximity of land, or the presence of another
vessel which is in position to take them on board.”

I had better remind you of that because I have some questions to put to you upon it.

Would you turn over the page and look at the foot of Page 20 in the English document book—it is either Page 50 or 51 in the German document book—where there are some figures set out.

Have you got the page?

DÖNITZ: Yes, I have read it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You read it. You see that it says in the two sentences before:

“In a certain number of early cases the German commander allowed
the crew of the merchant vessel to get clear; and he even made
some provision for them before he destroyed the vessel. Such
destruction was in accordance with Article 72 of the Prize
Ordinance; and therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the
Germans have been given the benefit of the doubt in such cases.”

The following are the figures on record. This is for the first year of the war:

“Ships sunk: 241.

“Recorded attacks: 221.

“Illegal attacks: 112. At least 79 of these 112 ships were
torpedoed without warning. This does not, of course, include
convoy ships.”

I wanted you to be quite clear, Defendant, that it excludes, first of all, ships where any measures had been taken for the safety of the crew and secondly, it excludes convoy ships.

Now, do you dispute these figures in any way, that there were 79 attacks without warning in the first year of the war?

DÖNITZ: Yes, I do. These figures cannot be checked. Yesterday I stated that in consequence of the use of arms by ships we had to take other measures. So I cannot check whether this report, which for other reasons looks very like propaganda to me, takes into consideration the behavior of the crews and their resistance, _et cetera_. That is to say, it is impossible for me to check these figures or to say on what they are based. At any rate, the German point of view was that it was legal considering that the ships were armed and that they transmitted intelligence—were part of an intelligence organization—and that from now on action would be taken against these ships without warning. I have already mentioned the fact that England acted in exactly the same way, and so did other nations.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to ask you some questions about that, but let’s just take one example. Was any warning given before the _Athenia_ was sunk?

DÖNITZ: No, I have already stated that that was a mistake; the _Athenia_ was taken for an auxiliary cruiser. The sinking of an auxiliary cruiser without warning is quite legal. I have also stated already that on a thorough examination of the case, I have found that the commander should have been more cautious and that is why he was punished.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to get your view, Defendant. Did it ever occur to you that in the case of a merchant ship, if it were sunk without warning, it meant either death or terrible suffering to the crew and to these merchant seamen? Did that ever occur to you?

DÖNITZ: If merchant ships...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just answer the question.

DÖNITZ: If a merchant ship acts like a merchant ship, it is treated as such. If it does not, then the submarine must proceed to attack. That is legal and in accordance with international law. The same thing happened to the crews of German merchant ships.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That isn’t what I asked you. I wanted to know, because it is important on some of these points: Did it ever occur to you, did you ever consider, that you were going to cause either death or terrible suffering to the crews of merchant ships who were sunk without warning?

Just tell us, did it occur to you or didn’t it?

DÖNITZ: Of course; but if a merchant ship is sunk legally, that is just war, and there is suffering in other places, too, during the war.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you view with pride of achievement the fact that 35,000 British merchant seamen lost their lives during the war? Do you view it as a proud achievement or do you view it with regret?

DÖNITZ: Men are killed during wars and no one is proud of it. That is badly expressed. It is a necessity, the harsh necessity of war.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just look at Page 29 in the English document book, or Page 58 in the German, whichever you care to look at. It is Document Number C-191, Exhibit GB-193. This is 22 September, 19 days after the beginning of the war.

“Flag Officer, U-boats, intends to give permission to U-boats to
sink without warning any vessel sailing without lights.

“Previous instructions, permitting attacks on French war and
merchant ships only as a defensive measure, purely French or
Anglo-French convoys only north of the latitude of Brest and
forbidding attacks on all passenger ships, give rise to great
difficulties to U-boats, especially at night. In practice, there
is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot
identify the target, which is a shadow, in a way that entirely
obviates mistakes being made. If the political situation is such
that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be
forbidden to make any night attacks in waters where French and
English naval forces or merchant ships may be moving. On the
other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be
expected, the measure desired by the Flag Officer, U-boats, can
be carried out. Permission to take this step is not to be given
in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of
the Naval Operations Staff. U-boat commanders would be informed
by word of mouth”—and note the last line—“and the sinking of a
merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to
possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser.”

Now, just tell me—take your choice—do you consider that sailing without lights is either persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned or active resistance to visit and search, within the Treaty? Which of either of these things do you consider it to be?

DÖNITZ: If a merchant ship acts like a warship...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: First of all, you must answer my question, if the Tribunal does not rule otherwise; and then you can give your explanation. My question is this: Do you consider that sailing without lights is either persistent refusal to stop or active resistance to visit and search? Do you consider it to be either one or the other, or both of these things? Do you?

DÖNITZ: The question is not correctly expressed, because we are dealing with a certain operational area in which British and French...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you will answer the question, please.

DÖNITZ: I beg your pardon?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you consider that sailing without lights is either persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, which is one of the matters in the Treaty, or active resistance to visit and search, which is the other matter set out in the Treaty? Now, do you consider that sailing without lights is either or both of these matters mentioned in the Treaty?

DÖNITZ: If a merchant ship sails without lights, it must run the risk of being taken for a warship, because at night it is not possible to distinguish between a merchant ship and a warship. At the time the order was issued, it concerned an operational area in which blacked-out troop transports were traveling from England to France.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your answer is that it is not covered by the Treaty, but by one of the matters in the Treaty; but your explanation was that you thought you were entitled to torpedo without warning any ship that might be mistaken for a warship. That is your answer, is it?

DÖNITZ: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why didn’t the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and all these naval advisers stipulate for that when Germany adhered to this Treaty, if you were going to interpret it in that way? Were you ever asked about it before Germany adhered to this Treaty in 1936?

DÖNITZ: I was not asked before Germany signed this Treaty; Germany adhered to the Treaty in practice, as I know very well, until countermeasures were introduced; and then I received orders to act accordingly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us go through this document and see if you can help me perhaps a little more on some other points. Why was this action to be based on the unspoken approval of the naval war staff? Why hadn’t the naval war staff the courage to speak its approval in an ordinary order if it was all right?

DÖNITZ: Yes; the paper you are showing me is a note or memorandum made by a young official on the Naval Operations Staff. In fact—it was the idea of that particular officer on the Naval Operations Staff; and as I have pointed out here, I did not know of the matter—in actual fact, the Naval Operations Staff never gave me such an order. The contents of that paper are fiction.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, of course, they weren’t to issue an order at all. You see, this states with great frankness that you were to act on the unspoken approval of the naval war staff, so that the naval war staff could say, as you have said now, “We didn’t issue an order;” and the junior officers would be acting on an unspoken word, and I want to know—you have been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy—why is it done in this way, why is it done by unspoken words, on oral orders?

DÖNITZ: No, precisely that is not correct. That was this young officer’s idea. The order which I received from the Naval Operations Staff stated explicitly that blacked-out vessels could be sunk in this area where English transports were traveling from England to France. So, you see, it contained none of the things stated in this memorandum. There is no doubt that the section chief and likewise the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff refused and rejected that entirely impossible idea and gave me that short and explicit order.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you suggesting to the Tribunal that on these vitally important points—“unspoken approval of the war staff, U-boat commanders informed by word of mouth”—that a young staff officer is allowed to put in an incorrect memorandum and get away with it uncorrected? Is that the way, is that the state of efficiency of the staff of the German Navy?

DÖNITZ: No, that is a misunderstanding. It actually has been corrected. That is a note submitted by the official on the Naval Operations Staff, of which his superiors on the Naval Operations Staff did not approve. It was corrected. There was no unspoken agreement but an explicit and clear order to myself; so that young officer’s idea had already been turned down by the Naval Operations Staff itself.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that the original is initialed by Admiral Von Friedeburg?

DÖNITZ: No, that is quite wrong, that is impossible. “Fd” is written there—that means Fresdorf. That was Kapitänleutnant Fresdorf. He was an official on the Naval Operations Staff—not Friedeburg. He was a young officer in the first department of the Naval Operations Staff. These are all things which I learned of here. His chief, Admiral Wagner, had condemned it already. It was not Friedeburg, but Fresdorf. That is the way this young officer thought about it, but actually a definite order was issued without these things.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Take the next bit. “The sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or auxiliary cruiser.” Do you agree with faking the records after you have sunk a ship?

DÖNITZ: No, and it was not done. That also belongs to the same category—the ideas of that officer. No order for that has ever been given. The order of the Naval Operations Staff issued to me in that connection has been submitted and that is a clear and concise order, without the things mentioned here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, you appreciate that these things, according to this memorandum, are to be stated without orders. There has to be no order because an order might come out—because if it is done without an order it won’t come out. Are you suggesting—you are putting it on the shoulders of this lieutenant commander, that he invented these three damning facts: Unspoken approval, oral instructions to commanders, and faking the orders? You say that these existed only in the mind of a Kapitänleutnant? Is that what you are telling the Tribunal?

DÖNITZ: Yes, yes, of course, because the clear, concise order was given by the Naval Operations Staff to me in which these things were not mentioned. And quite as clearly I passed my orders on. That is how it is. This memorandum, or these ideas of that officer, was already disapproved by his chief of department in Berlin. A clear order was given to me, however, and there was nothing in it about a War Diary and all these things mentioned here. That order is available.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we shall be able to ask, I understand, Admiral Wagner as to where this Kapitänleutnant got hold of these ideas, is that so, or whether he made them out? Is that what you are telling us, that Wagner will be able to deal with this, will he?

DÖNITZ: Admiral Wagner ought to know all about it, because this official was in his department in Berlin.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, if you put that onto the Kapitänleutnant, let’s pass on to another point. In mid-November...

DÖNITZ: I am not laying any blame on anybody, but they are ideas of a young officer which were already disapproved of by his chief of department. I am blaming no one. I do not accuse anybody.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. I thought you were.

Well, now, let’s pass to another point. In mid-November of 1939, Germany gave warning that she would sink, without warning, merchant ships, if armed. Don’t you know that before that warning—if you want to see the point you will find it on Page 21 of the English document book or 51 to 52 of the German document book. It is just before the break, about five lines.

“By the middle of November, a score of”—that is 20—“British
merchantmen had already been illegally attacked by gunfire or
torpedoed from submarines.”

THE PRESIDENT: Which page did you say?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Page 21, about ten lines before the break.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You see, what I am suggesting, Defendant, is that the statement, the warning, that you would sink merchant ships, if armed, made no difference to the practice you had already adopted of sinking unarmed ships without warning.

DÖNITZ: In the beginning of October, if I remember correctly, I received the order or the permission, the legal permission, to sink armed merchantmen. From that moment on I acted accordingly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just tell me: Was it your view that the mere possession of arms, a gun, on the merchant ship, constituted active resistance to visit or search within the Treaty; or was this a new addition for the guidance of German U-boat warfare which you were introducing completely independent of the Treaty?

DÖNITZ: It is a matter of course that if a ship has a gun on board she will use it. It would have been a one-sided obligation if the submarine, in a suicidal way, were then to wait until the other ship fired the first shot. That is a reciprocal agreement, and one cannot in any circumstances expect the submarine to wait until it gets hit first. And, as I said before, in practice the steamers used their guns as soon as they came within range.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you know, the arming of merchant ships, Defendant, was well known in the last war. It was well known for 20 years before this Treaty was signed. And you will agree with me, won’t you, that there is not a word in the Treaty forbidding the arming of merchant ships? Why didn’t you give these ships the opportunity of abstaining from resistance or of stopping? Why did you go in the face of the Treaty which you had signed only 3 years before? That is all I want to know. If you can’t tell me, if you say it is a matter for argument, I will ask Admiral Raeder. At the moment, will you tell us, or can you tell us, why didn’t you keep to the Treaty?

DÖNITZ: That was not an infringement of the Treaty. I am not an expert on international law. I am soldier; and I acted according to my military orders. Of course, it is suicide for a submarine to wait till it receives the first hit. It goes without saying that the steamer is not carrying guns for fun, but to make use of them. And I have already explained what use was made of them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just one other matter, because I must cover these points in view of your evidence.

Did you order your commanders to treat the use of wireless as active resistance? Did you consider that the use of wireless for merchant ships was active resistance within the Treaty?

DÖNITZ: On 24 September, the Naval Operations Staff’s order...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no, just answer the question first, Defendant, and then give your explanation. I said that to you quite 20 times yesterday and today. Did you consider the use of wireless by merchant ships as active resistance?

DÖNITZ: It is generally laid down by international law that a merchant ship can be fired on if it makes use of its wireless when stopped. That is also in the French Ordinance, for instance. In order to avoid more severe measures we had not, as a rule, done so yet. Not until the end of September, when I received a definite order or permission to do so, was that rule, which is in accordance with international law, put into effect.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me, didn’t the German Admiralty know in 1936 that most merchantmen had wireless?

DÖNITZ: Of course, but according to the International Conference on International Law—I happen to know this because it appeared as a footnote in the Prize Ordinance—according to this conference of 1923, they were not allowed to use wireless when being stopped. That is international law and is found in all instructions. I know for certain that the French instructions say this too.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate again, the German Admiralty and the German Foreign Office did not make any mention of use of wireless in this Treaty.

What I am suggesting—I want to put it quite clearly to you—is that you were not bothering about this Treaty at all in any case where it didn’t suit you in the operations in this war.

DÖNITZ: That is not true.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s pass on to neutrals. I haven’t heard you suggest that you were dealing with neutrals because they were armed, but let’s take a concrete example.

“On 12 November 1939...”

DÖNITZ: I have never said that neutrals were armed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I thought. Well, we will rule that out. We will take the example.

My Lord, it is given on Page 20 of the document book, and in the middle of the middle paragraph (Exhibit Number GB-191).

[_Turning to the defendant._]

“On 12 November, the Norwegian _Arne Kjode_ was torpedoed in the
North Sea without warning at all. This was a tanker bound from
one neutral port to another.”

Now, Defendant, were you classing tankers bound from one neutral port to another as warships; or for what reason was that ship torpedoed without warning? The master and four of the crew lost their lives. The others were picked up after many hours in an open boat. Why were you torpedoing neutral ships without warning? This is only the 12th of November in the North Sea, a tanker going from one neutral port to another.

DÖNITZ: Well, the submarine commander in this case could not see, first of all, that the ship was traveling from one neutral port to the other, but this ship...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Therefore...

DÖNITZ: No, not for that reason; no. But that ship was heading for England, and he confused it with an English ship. That is why he torpedoed it. I know of that case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You approve of that action by the submarine commander?

DÖNITZ: No; that is an assertion made by yourself and it is in practice refuted by our clean submarine warfare and by the fact that it was done by mistake.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When in doubt, torpedo...

DÖNITZ: That is one of the cases...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you approve of that: when in doubt, torpedo without warning? Is that your view?

DÖNITZ: No, no; that is merely what you assert. If one or two instances of mistakes are found in the course of 5½ years of clean submarine warfare, it proves nothing; but it does contradict your assertion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, now, let’s look at your clean U-boat warfare, if you want. Will you turn to Page 30 of the English book or Page 59 to 60 of the German book.

Now, the first of these—this is the note on the intensification of U-boat warfare. You say that on the directive of the Armed Forces High Command of 30 December—this is on the 1st of January 1940:

“...the Führer, on report by the C-in-C Navy”—that is the
Defendant Raeder—“has decided: (a) Greek merchant vessels are
to be treated as enemy vessels in the zone around Britain
declared barred by the U.S.A.”

There is a mistake, My Lord, in the translation. You see it says “blockaded by the U.S.A. and Britain.” The proper translation should be “in the zone around Britain declared barred by the U.S.A.”

Now, Defendant, I don’t want to make any bad point, at any rate intentionally. Were you including Greek ships because you believed that most of the Greek merchant navy was on British charter, was being chartered by Britain? Was that the reason?

DÖNITZ: Yes. That was probably why the Naval Operations Staff gave the order, because of the Greek fleet sailing in England’s service. I assumed that those were the reasons of the Naval Operations Staff.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Assumed that was the reason. I do not want to occupy time on the point. What I want to know is this: Did that mean that any Greek ship in these waters would be sunk without warning?

DÖNITZ: Yes. It says here that they were to be treated like enemy ships.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In sum, then, that means that a Greek merchantman from then on would be sunk without warning if it came into the zone around the British coast.

Now, you mentioned the Bristol Channel, and you have given your explanation of the next sentence. You say all ships may be attacked without warning. For external consumption, these attacks should be given out as hits by mines.

I just want to get it clear from you. You are not suggesting that the reason of the Naval High Command was to conceal the maze of operations of the U-boats; the reason was to avoid trouble with neutrals whose good will you wanted to keep, was it not?

DÖNITZ: I already stated my position on that yesterday. These are matters connected with the political leadership and I know nothing about them. I myself, as Commander of U-boats, looked at them only from the angle of military advantage or expediency, just as England did in similar cases. What the political reasons may have been, I cannot say.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is my whole suggestion to you, you know, Defendant, that you were acting on the military necessity stated in that memorandum of the Naval Command that the maximum damage to England could only be achieved with unrestricted use of arms without warning. But let us just look at the next one now.

DÖNITZ: There were certain areas which neutrals had been warned not to cross. I stated yesterday that the same procedure was followed in English operational areas. If a neutral in spite of these warnings entered those areas, where military actions were constantly being carried on by one side or the other, it had to run the risk of suffering damage. Those are the reasons which induced the Naval Operations Staff to issue these orders.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As you mentioned that, I shall deal first with your areas. Your zone, which is published, was from the Faroes to Bordeaux and 500 miles west of Ireland. That is, your zone was 750,000 square miles; isn’t that right? Your zone around Britain was from the Faroes to Bordeaux, and 500 miles west of Ireland?