Chapter XXXVI: Book 5

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, that is attached to the Czech report, USSR-60, and is not in my document book. I was only referring to that.

Apart from these two actions which were decreed by Hitler personally, did other arrests take place on a rather large scale during the time of your office?

VON NEURATH: No, but single instances of arrest did take place recurrently, and I continually intervened anew to have them investigated and perhaps rescinded, at the suggestion of the Czech Government and private people.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to read a few more sentences from the document of the Czech Prosecution, USSR-60, to be found on Page 59 of the English text. I quote:

“Immediately after the occupation representatives of the ‘Sokol’
(Falcon) athletic association, which had 1 million members,
joined a movement for the liberation of the country; this
included the underground movement at home and the movement
abroad. The idea of the ‘Sokol’ united the army members abroad
and gave strength and enthusiasm even in the hardest time. This
was true at home to an even larger extent. The Gestapo was aware
of this danger, and therefore proceeded with the utmost
severity. In the beginning, their measures were moderate, but
when they realized the firm resolve of the ‘Sokols,’ they began
to use force. The first arrests took place on the day of the
occupation of Czechoslovakia, and a further large number of
arrests on 1 September 1939. Then extensive arrests of single
individuals and of organizations followed.”

Will you please comment on this.

VON NEURATH: The “Sokol” was the most dangerous organization hostile to the State in the Protectorate. The extent of its activity can be seen especially from the sentences of the Czech Indictment which have just been read. It was taken for granted that machinations of this kind could not be tolerated, especially in war, and the report itself characterizes the first police measures as “still moderate.” I am convinced that in no other country would such intrigues (underground movements) have been treated any differently. In such cases of undoubted high treason or cases of sabotage, I could not possibly intervene for the people responsible, and moreover, the Czech Government quite understood this.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further mentions shootings under martial law. Did such shootings occur during your period of office?

VON NEURATH: No, apart from the case of the nine students which has already been mentioned I know of no shootings under martial law during my time in office.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Frank, aside from his disastrous activity as Higher SS and Police Leader, as your State Secretary try to use his influence in the policy and administration of the Protectorate, and did you work closely with him in that respect?

VON NEURATH: Frank represented one-sided, radical German interests. That was the old Sudeten-German hatred of the Czechs. I repeatedly curbed these tendencies, but as my representative he, in practice, took part in the general policy and in the administration.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your personal relationship to Frank?

VON NEURATH: From the very beginning it was bad because of the fact that he was so radical, and beyond that, I quite soon realized that very frequently he did not tell me the truth.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your personal and official relationship to President Hacha and to the Czech Government?

VON NEURATH: In general, good. The Czech Government at that time was convinced of the fact that my intentions for fair and just treatment of the Czech population were quite sincere, and that I did everything within my power to realize my intentions. On the other hand, I fully understood and recognized in every respect the efforts of the Czech Government to represent primarily the interests of the people. As to my personal relationship to President Hacha, I might go so far as to say it was very good. I always tried to facilitate Mr. Hacha’s difficult task as far as I could, for I knew that he, too, through his assumption of the post of President and through his remaining in office was making a great personal sacrifice. He and the members of the Government were always invited to all occasions which did not have a purely German character, and were treated with distinction in accordance with their rank.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the manner of work of your office in Prague? Were you quite independent in your work or were you in your office bound by directives from Berlin?

VON NEURATH: My answer in this respect is a rather tedious matter. The fundamentals of policy and the administration of the departments were determined in Berlin as far as they applied to the Protectorate, that is, by Hitler himself or by department ministers. My field was the supervision of the execution and application of these principles as they applied to the Protectorate, always considering the special circumstances which arose from the ethical, cultural, and economic structure of the country. Obviously, above all in war, the Protectorate, which was situated in the center of the Reich, could not be treated as an independent unit but had to be incorporated into the general pattern. As I have already stated, the various branches of my authority had been established by the central offices in Berlin. The officials of these branches, therefore, from the beginning, had certain practical connections with their parent ministries, even though they were later subordinate to me. The individual heads of the branches received their directives in regard to specific problems direct from their department ministries in Berlin. Then those directives were submitted to Under State Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who was the head of the administration, or, if they were very fundamental matters, also to me. The carrying-out of these measures in the Protectorate was in that way discussed, and subsequently settled with the Czech Minister. Thus were established the decrees and basic directives which were signed by me or by my deputy. Frequently these dealt with the introduction of legal or administrative measures which already existed in the Reich, or which were newly issued in the Reich. Apart from that, a series of directives applying to the Protectorate were issued directly by the competent Berlin ministries. The Reich Minister of the Interior had been designated as the so-called central agency for the release of these Reich directives.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to refer to the following documents to be found in my Document Book 5: Documents Number 145, a decree from the Führer and Reich Chancellor dealing with the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, supplementing the decree of 22 March 1939; Number 146, extracts from basic regulations applying to the Protectorate, dealing with commercial transactions with the Protectorate, dated 28 March 1939; Number 147, a directive as to the administration of criminal justice in the Protectorate, dated 14 April 1939; Number 148, a directive dealing with statutory law in the Protectorate, dated 7 June 1939; and I should like to refer to a document which has already been submitted, Number 149, the regulation dealing with the structure of the administration and the German Security Police. In this connection I should like to remark that all these directives were signed, not by the Reich Protector, but rather by the competent Reich department minister, and sometimes also by Reich Marshal Göring as Chairman of the Reich Defense Council. The legal basis for the authority of the Protector is the decree by the Führer and Reich Chancellor in regard to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia dated 16 March 1939, signed by Hitler, Frick...

THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask the defendant to clear up what his concern was with these decrees of the Reichsführer and of the Defendant Göring.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, Mr. President, I wanted to show that he had nothing to do with these matters but that he was obliged to carry them out. According to the decree which put him in office it was his duty to supervise these measures, which were issued by agencies in the Reich. That was what I wanted to prove, that all these directives did not originate with him, but rather with the Reichsführer.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, Defendant?

VON NEURATH: Yes. I should like to remark that I was chiefly concerned with seeing that these matters were duly published in the Protectorate, and then having my agencies supervise their execution.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How far did the autonomy of the Protectorate reach in all these decisions?

VON NEURATH: The extent of autonomy was not clearly defined. Basically the Protectorate was autonomous, and it was administered by its own Czech authorities and Czech officials. But in the course of time considerable restrictions were placed on this state of autonomy, as was provided for in the decree which you have just read. The introduction of these restrictions was regarded as practical by the Reich Government and resulted, in part, from general tendencies toward centralization in Berlin, but it was also necessitated to a large extent by the general political development in view of the war and of the so-called totalization of the war effort. I constantly objected to these restrictions insofar as in my opinion they did not correspond with the vital needs of the Protectorate and of its people.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to refer to Article 3 of the order which has already been quoted, a decree issued by the Führer and Reich Chancellor dealing with the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia; Number 144 of my Document Book 5. This reads:

“1.) The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is autonomous and
administers itself.

“2.) Its sovereign rights as a Protectorate are exercised on the
basis of the political, military, and economic interests of the
Reich.

“3.) These sovereign rights are upheld by its own organizations,
its own authorities, and with its own officials.”

How about the Armed Forces offices in the Protectorate? Were you connected with them?

VON NEURATH: No, they were subordinate to a special Plenipotentiary of the Armed Forces who was to keep me advised about the basic military questions.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to turn to specific points which are mentioned in the Czech report, USSR-60, and of which you are accused.

To which extent were you competent for administering criminal justice in the Protectorate? Specifically, did you have to confirm death sentences against the Czechs?

VON NEURATH: The criminal justice of the German courts was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice in Berlin. The Czech courts were not under my jurisdiction at all. I was concerned only with decisions in cases of appeals for clemency against verdicts of German courts in the Protectorate, which were submitted to me by the President of the Provincial Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht).

These, in special cases, might also apply to Czechs. However, they did not concern political crimes. Political proceedings against Czechs were, as far as I recall, handled by the Peoples’ Court (Volksgerichtshof) in Berlin, insofar as they dealt with high treason. As far as I know, in these proceedings against Czechs the same basic principles were applied as against Germans.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the right to grant pardon when the Peoples’ Court gave decisions against Czechs?

VON NEURATH: No, I had no possibility of influence, and I did not have the right to pardon.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In your time did you know anything about the activity of special courts in the Protectorate?

VON NEURATH: No, I cannot recall that special courts were active during the time I was there. In my opinion, this could apply only to German courts for the prosecution of specific offenses, for example, violations of radio regulations; such courts were established at the beginning of the war in the Reich. However, these courts were not under my jurisdiction, but directly subordinate to the Reich Minister of Justice. He appointed the judges, gave them their directives, and the judges reported directly to him. I had no opportunity of using influence in any way.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Regarding the activity of these special courts, I should like to quote one sentence from the Czech report, USSR-60. This may be found on Page 106 of the German text and Page 92 of the English text. It deals with orders and decrees that were to be applied by these special courts. I quote:

“A large number of these orders and decrees violate principles
that all civilized countries consider irrevocable.”

Is that report correct?

VON NEURATH: Yes, in this case I agree entirely with the Czech Prosecution report. But I should imagine that in the latest developments this principle has been considerably attenuated even among civilized peoples.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to know something about the alleged plans dealing with the Germanization of the areas in the Protectorate inhabited by Czechs. You said previously that, when you assumed office, you knew nothing about such plans. Who later revealed the pattern of these plans to you?

VON NEURATH: These plans in part originated with Sudeten-German circles, but in the main they could be traced back to the organizations of Himmler and also to suggestions on the part of the Gauleiter of Lower Danube.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In regard to this problem of alleged efforts at Germanization, I should like to read to you a report to the OKW dated 15 October 1940 by the Armed Forces Plenipotentiary General in the Protectorate, General Friderici. This is the document which has been submitted by the Prosecution under Document Number 862-PS, Exhibit Number USA-313; and it is concerned with statements about basic policy pursued in the Protectorate, which State Secretary Frank made in an official discussion with your office. In this document Frank mentions a memorandum in which, after careful investigation, the Reich Protector had defined his attitude toward the various plans of numerous offices. He mentions three possibilities of solution to the question of the possible Germanization of the Czech territory. You probably know this document and I do not believe that it is necessary for me to read it. What do you know about this memorandum? Did you compose it yourself? Tell us what you have to say about it.

VON NEURATH: The memorandum refers to the proposals which I just mentioned on the part of various Party offices for the possible resettlement of the Czechs. I objected to this plan from the very beginning as being quite absurd and incapable of execution. Frank, who agreed with me on this point, therefore at my direction drew up this memorandum which you have just mentioned, in which the radical measures of the SS and of the Party were rejected and in which the so-called gradual assimilation was considered as the only possible solution of this problem. In this way I wanted to postpone the matter and thwart the plans of the SS. Since these plans for resettlement had already been put by Himmler before the Führer, I required a rather stringent directive from the latter in order to quash them. However, for tactical reasons I had to make some sort of proposal: Hence, that of the policy of assimilation, because with this suggestion the matter was in practice postponed. In order to forestall countermeasures by the SS and Himmler, I reported to the Führer personally about the matter and asked him to issue a stringent directive, which he did. Thus the matter was buried and was not taken up again. The sentence found in this memorandum to the effect that “....Germanization would have to be carried out for a number of years by the office of the Reich Protector....” means specifically that the SS could no longer interfere in this matter. The Reich Protector alone was to be the competent authority, and the Reich Protector did nothing. Moreover, the statement of General Friderici, who was equally opposed to radical fantasy, to the effect that “....as far as the Armed Forces were concerned there would be no important consequences, since he had always adhered to this concept....” goes to show the same. If after this report Frank said that “....the elements which were working contrary to the intended Germanization would have to be handled roughly and would have to be eliminated....”; these were merely his words and the type of language that was used in speeches of that kind. Actually, as I have said, nothing further was done to assimilate the people.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I now ask your permission to quote a few sentences from the affidavit that we have mentioned, which was made by Baroness Ritter, Number 3 in my Document Book 1. They are found on Page 18. It says there:

“With regard to the plans for the Germanization, that is, the
gradual assimilation, of the Czechs, Neurath stated as follows
in a letter:

“‘Quite aside from the sensible point of view, the people who
are simply to be resettled arouse pity in one’s soul. However, I
believe I have discovered a way now to prevent the disaster.
Time won is everything won, and frequently to postpone a thing
is to do away with it!’”

Mr. President, if it is permissible for me to make a suggestion, I would ask that we stop now, since the problem of Germanization is now completed.

THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you are going to be? You have already been a day and a half.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, the Indictment contained in the Czech report is not well substantiated and not very concrete, so that I must mention each individual point contained therein. I have approximately 20 more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: One hour.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will expect you to conclude in an hour.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I hope so, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 25 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus “Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout.

Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in the trial.

An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as possible to the original document presentation and layout.

[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 16_, by Various.]