Chapter IX: Front Matter (9)

WIMMER: I believe I may say that at the end of the period of German occupation the majority of the civil servants who had been in office when the German occupation force came into the Netherlands were still in office.

DR. STEINBAUER: Seyss-Inquart has been accused of dissolving the political parties. When and why did that take place?

WIMMER: The dissolution of the political parties was necessitated by the fact that some political parties displayed an attitude which, especially in critical times, the occupying power could not tolerate, apart from the fact that in an occupied territory it is generally difficult, if not impossible, to deal with political parties. Report after report came from our intelligence services about conspiracies of the most various kinds, and so the Reich Commissioner felt himself called upon to dissolve the parties. Nevertheless, he did not constitutionally remove the parties as such; the institution of parties, as such, still remained.

DR. STEINBAUER: It was suggested on the part of the Reich that the administration be reorganized and that the Netherlands be divided into five administrative districts instead of the traditional provinces. Did Seyss-Inquart do that?

WIMMER: The Reich Commissioner refused such suggestions or demands every time, and indeed he could do that all the more easily because the Dutch administration was on a high level and primarily because the Reich Commissioner expected, and on the basis of all kinds of assurances was able to expect, that the Dutch administration would co-operate with the occupying power.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now we also have a party which was very close to the National Socialists, the NSB, led by Mussert. Did this NSB party gain a leading influence in the administration or not?

WIMMER: The NSB, as a party, gained no influence at all in the administration. It was only that the occupying power, as was very natural, applied to the NSB and consulted it in certain cases, for no occupying power, in history, I believe, as well as in our day, is going to approach those parties or groups which assume a hostile attitude towards it.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did the leader of the NSB, Mussert, try to create a similar situation as existed in Norway under Quisling; that is, for him to become Prime Minister of the Netherlands?

WIMMER: Mussert did have that aim. He expressed it persistently, again and again, and I can say that by doing so he put the Reich Commissioner into disagreeable situations.

DR. STEINBAUER: Well, briefly, the Reich Commissioner...

WIMMER: The Reich Commissioner rejected this every time.

DR. STEINBAUER: Another question. Did Seyss-Inquart in any way exert pressure in religious matters on the population of the occupied territory?

WIMMER: No.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did he, in the field of education, issue decrees which reduced the rights of the Netherlands?

WIMMER: No.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did he not encourage the Dutch Red Cross, although there were cells of the illegal resistance movement in it?

WIMMER: He not only permitted the Red Cross to carry out its functions without hindrance, but, as you say, he even encouraged it. As far as the political attitude was concerned, he would have had plenty of reasons to interfere because broadcasting stations, illegal broadcasting stations, had been found under Red Cross control.

DR. STEINBAUER: They were resistance centers?

WIMMER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: Furthermore, he has been accused of interfering with the existing legislation by issuing laws concerned with citizenship and also with marriage. You were in charge of the Justice Department. What can you say about that, quite briefly?

WIMMER: Acts of interference of that kind did occur. However, they occurred because they were necessary from the point of view of the conduct of the war and for the Armed Forces in particular for, to mention the question of citizenship, those Dutchmen who had entered the German Army wanted to have the assurance of also obtaining German citizenship. The Reich Commissioner, however, who was of the opinion that by acquiring German citizenship they should not incur any disadvantage in Holland, decreed—and this can be found in the corresponding decree—that these Dutchmen who acquired German citizenship should retain their Dutch citizenship, so that by so doing they would not be alienated from their people and their nation.

So far as marriage laws are concerned, the necessity arose that if soldiers, in particular, wanted to marry Dutch girls, the parents’ approval of the marriage was not asked, and not for political reasons. This approval was of some importance in that connection because the parents, contrary to the rule in many other nations, retained this right of approval until, I believe, the thirtieth year of the daughter concerned.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to another chapter. That is the question of the so-called summary courts-martial (Standgericht). Will you tell us how these courts-martial were organized and how long and when they were in session?

WIMMER: The creation of courts-martial was seen as a necessity after a general strike had broken out in Amsterdam and we wanted to have a legal basis for future cases so as to prevent future strikes as far as possible, that is, to be able to combat them effectively after they had broken out on the basis of the proper law.

How these courts-martial were organized and when they had to function is exactly set down in the corresponding decree of the Reich Commissioner. However, if I am to answer your specific question here about the composition of these summary courts-martial, I can in any case only say from memory that the president of these courts was a judge, and moreover a judge who fulfilled all the requirements which a judge in the German Reich had to fulfill.

DR. STEINBAUER: Well, that is the essential point, and if I understand you correctly, before these courts became police courts a judicial functionary was president of these courts-martial. Is that correct?

WIMMER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you whether Seyss-Inquart had so-called collective fines imposed on certain cities and communities?

WIMMER: The Reich Commissioner actually imposed such collective fines. The largest which was imposed, I believe, was the one which was imposed once on Amsterdam on the occasion of the general strike which I have already mentioned. The fines were decreed in accordance with established procedure on the basis of existing decrees, and they were proclaimed in an official decree by the police.

DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, therefore, these collective fines—you mentioned the words “general strike”—were imposed when actions of a large community were involved, and not actions by individuals.

WIMMER: The collective fines were imposed in cases of violations which were charged to a fairly large portion of the community in question.

DR. STEINBAUER: I believe we can conclude that chapter. However, you did not tell me how long these so-called police courts-martial were in session.

WIMMER: The police courts-martial were in session as long as police martial law was in force. That was 2 weeks. Moreover, that was the only time that martial law had been imposed in Holland by the Reich Commissioner, that is, if you do not count the state of emergency that was declared after the invasion as such.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to one of the most severe accusations brought against my client. That is the accusation that he had hostages shot illegally and contrary to international law, or participated in their execution.

With the permission of the Tribunal I submit two statements to you which were put to my client yesterday by the Prosecution. One is a statement by General of the Air Force Christiansen, as a defendant, dated 20 February 1946, and the other one is also an interrogation of a defendant, a higher police official, Dr. Schöngarth. It is F-886.

Will you please look at it and tell me what you know about these questions. Take your time—I remind you of your oath—and answer these questions as far as you can do it in good faith.

Have you read it?

WIMMER: No, not yet.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I will help you. Are you through?

WIMMER: No, I am not through yet, but please go ahead.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that hostages were shot in August 1942, on the occasion of an act of sabotage in Rotterdam?

WIMMER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: Why were these hostages shot? On whose orders?

WIMMER: It is well known what the Rotterdam incident was all about. It was an attempt to blow up an Armed Forces leave train. In this affair, the Armed Forces applied to the Reich Commissioner and therefore...

THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question was: Who gave the order?

WIMMER: The order for what?

DR. STEINBAUER: For shooting the hostages.

WIMMER: The order for the execution was, I believe, given by the Police.

DR. STEINBAUER: What did the Reich Commissioner have to do with it? You have read here how Christiansen accuses him in that connection.

WIMMER: The Armed Forces applied to the Reich Commissioner, because it was customary in fairly important matters for the two offices, that is, the commander of the Armed Forces and the Reich Commissioner, to get together and discuss these things. I recall that the commander of the Armed Forces appeared in a very determined manner and demanded that an example should be made so that such cases might be prevented in the future as far as possible. It was stated on the part of the Armed Forces that they considered hardly any other means possible than the shooting of a considerable number of hostages.

I no longer recall the figure very exactly today, but as far as I do remember it was about 50. I also recall that it was stated on the part of the Armed Forces that they could dispense with such a selection of hostages if the assurance could be given by the Police that on the basis of some sort of material which the Police had in their possession there was a chance that the perpetrators might be found and brought to punishment by a German court, that is to say, by the court of the Armed Forces.

On the part of the Armed Forces it was also pointed out that at the time resistance in the Netherlands was beginning to develop in increasing measure, and that this was finding expression in an increase in sabotage and other acts hostile to the occupation forces. I also recall that it was pointed out that if the Armed Forces and the Police had been present in larger numbers than was actually the case, it would perhaps not have been necessary to take a severe step of that kind. The forces at that time at the Army’s disposal in the Netherlands were extremely small and in case of an increase in the resistance movement the position of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands might have been seriously endangered.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I shall ask you several questions so that we can go ahead.

You have stated that the commander of the Armed Forces came and reported that in view of this outrage he would have to shoot some hostages.

WIMMER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you that there was a Reich decree stating that saboteurs in the occupied western territory should not be tried by the courts but turned over to the Police? Can you remember that?

WIMMER: I do not think that was the case at this particular time, especially if you refer to the so-called “Night and Fog Decree” which, to my recollection, is of a later date. I remember very clearly that an order was mentioned at that time, but I believe this order was one which applied exclusively to the military sector, so I do not know the wording of that order.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you that the Reich Commissioner used his influence to see that instead of the 50 you mentioned—in reality, it was only 25 hostages—the number was reduced to 5?

WIMMER: That is known to me.

DR. STEINBAUER: And that he also succeeded in having this done?

WIMMER: And that he succeeded.

DR. STEINBAUER: And that he particularly succeeded in having fathers of families excluded?

WIMMER: Yes, indeed.

DR. STEINBAUER: That concluded one case. There is another case which has been presented to you. That is the case of the attempt made on the life of the Higher SS and Police Leader Rauter when, in fact, more than 150 persons were shot as hostages. Have you finished reading that?

WIMMER: Partly.

DR. STEINBAUER: Please read it all then.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, why is it necessary for the witness to read the whole document? You can put the facts to him.

DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.

Witness, at that time it was demanded that as a reprisal for the attempt on the Police and SS Leader hostages should be shot?

WIMMER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: Who ordered that and who carried it out?

WIMMER: I know of the case because—that is, I know of it from the report of Brigadeführer Schöngarth, who was at that time the Chief of the Security Police. He had applied to me to find out what his proper title was, after Rauter had become incapacitated for duty and he had to sign a proclamation and in so doing add his official title. On that occasion he told me this story and he also told me that he had gotten in touch with Berlin, to find out what they would consider necessary as reprisals for the attempt on Rauter. Berlin wanted a considerable number of hostages shot. He mentioned a figure to me which was something like 500, at any rate, not less than 500, but rather more than 500. Then he also told me that he had talked to the Reich Commissioner and told him about this wish on the part of Berlin.

DR. STEINBAUER: Would you be more specific please; Berlin is large and had various Reich offices.

WIMMER: That was the Reichsführer SS, of course; it was quite clear that where one of the highest functionaries in the sphere of the Police and SS was concerned one had to approach the Reichsführer SS personally, and not only his office. He also told me he reported it to the Reich Commissioner, and that the Reich Commissioner, who as such was not authorized to deal with that matter, had asked him to tell the Reichsführer SS that he asked and advised him to refrain from carrying out such a large number of executions. Thereupon—naturally everything was done only by telephone—the Reichsführer agreed to reduce the number and I believe that in the end, on the basis of several telephone conversations back and forth, a number of about 200 or 150—I no longer know it exactly today—was decided upon.

I am convinced that if this advice and this request and these representations had not been offered by the Reich Commissioner through Schöngarth, the number originally demanded by Berlin would have lost their lives, so that one can say with full right that in this case the Reich Commissioner saved the lives of several hundred Netherlanders.

DR. STEINBAUER: Were the people who were actually shot collected at random in the streets or were they people who had already been officially condemned?

WIMMER: Of course, on this point, I can only report what Brigadeführer Schöngarth told me at that time during the conference. Indeed I have no reason to assume that he did not tell me the truth. He informed me that only such persons were considered who had already been condemned, so that it was only a question of advancing the time of the execution, and if the number should not suffice, then possibly others might be selected who in any case were already in prison and would certainly be sentenced to death.

DR. STEINBAUER: I believe I can conclude this chapter by asking you what happened to the hostages who were sent as such to Buchenwald by way of a so-called Dutch East Indian reprisal.

WIMMER: After some time, I no longer remember just how long, when complaints were received about their treatment, a large number of these hostages, or perhaps all of them, were brought back into the Netherlands and a very large number of them were released; not all together and at once, as I remember, but a few at a time.

DR. STEINBAUER: A small town, Putten, was destroyed because of serious acts of sabotage; was this ordered by the Reich Commissioner or someone else?

WIMMER: Since it was a purely military affair, just like the Rotterdam incident, where a plot was directed against the Armed Forces the incident was handled by the Armed Forces. The order was given by the commander of the Armed Forces and if I remember correctly, the Reich Commissioner—in any case, I—only learned about the incident after the execution had taken place.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now I pass over to the next chapter, and that is the combating of so-called enemies of the State.

Yesterday it was mentioned that the property of the Freemasons and Jehovah’s Witnesses was confiscated. I should like to ask you, so that there may be no mistake, whether it was only the property of the organizations which was claimed, or was it also the property of the individual members? And so, taking the Freemasons as an example, was the property of the individual Freemason claimed as well as the property of the lodges?

WIMMER: In all these cases property that belonged to organizations was demanded, never that belonging to individuals. If there were individual cases where this happened, then these were abuses by individuals, but I cannot recall any such abuses.

DR. STEINBAUER: The Dutch Jews were also counted among the so-called enemies of the State. Who was responsible for handling the Jewish question in the Netherlands—you have really already told me that.

WIMMER: From the very beginning, the Police laid claim to the handling of the Jews, to jurisdiction over the treatment of the Jews, as a matter of fundamental principle.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now, we have an entire list of decrees here which bear the name of Seyss-Inquart and which indicate encroachments on the right of the Jews. Can you remember when the legislation against the Jews was introduced and in what form?

WIMMER: The development was briefly more or less as follows: Seyss-Inquart was opposed to the entire idea of taking up the Jewish question at all in the Netherlands, and in one of the Reich Commissioner’s first conferences it was ordered that this question was not to be dealt with.

After a certain time—it may have been a few months—the Reich Commissioner informed us that he had received an order from Berlin to take up the Jewish problem because Jews had participated in a relatively large number in various movements and actions in the Netherlands which at that time, indeed, could only be characterized essentially as conspiracies.

Apart from that, one had to expect that if the war should last a fairly long time, the Jews who naturally because of the treatment they had undergone were not, and could not be, friends of the Germans, might become dangerous, and, therefore, that they should be considered as enemies—if not in the formal sense of the word, at least, practically so.

The Reich Commissioner began to carry out this order with much hesitation, although in the official conference he pointed out that he could not help doing so because he could not assume such a responsibility.

So far as I remember, this can be ascertained immediately from the Reich Commissioner’s ordinance bulletin. At first, steps were taken to register the property of the Jews, then to prevent German maidservants from being in Jewish households; the Police requested that especially, because naturally all kind of information could be carried back and forth in this way. Then, when Berlin became more insistent in that question, the Reich Commissioner finally decided to decree and regulate a registration of all Jews by ordinance. It was pointed out particularly that we would at least have to know where the Jews were, because only in this way could the proper Security Police control and supervision be made possible.

In themselves those were measures which were far behind those which were already being carried out in the Reich at that time.

Then more pressure was exerted; I do not know whether it was perhaps Heydrich who did this at that time, whether he was already in the Netherlands at that time—I never saw him. I know only that he visited the Reich Commissioner in the Netherlands at least twice.

At any rate, in the course of the year 1941 and particularly in 1942, a comprehensive treatment of the question was urged. At first the Reich Commissioner still believed that he could meet these demands by bringing the Jews in the Netherlands together in one place where they could be more easily supervised, and therefore the idea arose that in Amsterdam one, two, or three districts of the city might be used to house the Jews there, which was also connected with the necessity of resettling a part or a considerable number of non-Jewish Netherlanders because there was not yet a completely separate Jewish quarter at that time. The non-Jewish Dutch did not live completely apart from them.

THE PRESIDENT: All this evidence that the witness is giving is all in the decree and has already been given by the defendant, has it not? What is the difference?

DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the point of it?

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I wanted to say only one thing, and that is that on such an important question I wanted to have confirmation briefly by the witness.

WIMMER: I have not much more to say.

DR. STEINBAUER: All right, I shall now summarize. Is it true that one wanted to put the Jews together in a ghetto in Amsterdam?

WIMMER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that Heydrich demanded the evacuation of the Jews?

WIMMER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it true that the Reich Commissioner tried, insofar as was possible under existing conditions, to use more humane methods in this deportation of the Jews?

WIMMER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: I believe that I have now finished that chapter, too.

There were also concentration camps in the Netherlands. Is it known to you that Seyss-Inquart had these camps inspected by judicial commissions and corrected abuses found there?

WIMMER: Yes. Not only in concentration camps, but in camps of this kind in general.

DR. STEINBAUER: At the end of 1944 and early in 1945 there was a large-scale operation to deport all the men in Holland able to bear arms. Was that operation directed by the Reich Commissioner or by a different office?

WIMMER: That was an operation by the Reich, primarily an operation by the Armed Forces.

DR. STEINBAUER: Why did that operation take place?

WIMMER: It took place because during those critical times there were objections to the fact that men who were able to bear arms remained in Holland. First, because a large number of former prisoners of war who were released by order of the Führer in 1940 were later on mostly brought back to the Netherlands and a part of them remained there. Secondly, the resistance movements increased greatly during that time, and so it was stated that, from the military point of view, the responsibility of leaving those people able to bear arms in the Netherlands could not be assumed.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner, in order to moderate that operation, issue so-called “release certificates” (Freistellungsscheine)?

WIMMER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did not a part escape this operation by way of the Allocation of Labor?

WIMMER: As far as I know, yes; but I have no detailed knowledge of it.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know what happened to the diamonds confiscated after the battle of Arnhem?

WIMMER: These diamonds were placed in safety in Arnhem, during artillery fire, by a German office, the Economic Testing Office I believe, and then after some time they were taken to Berlin, from where, as indeed I learned in Holland, after the surrender they were brought back to Amsterdam again.

DR. STEINBAUER: How was the financial economy in the administration? Was the tax money used sparingly, or was a very lax management displayed?

WIMMER: I am not really competent in this field. The Commissioner General for Finance and Economy could say much more about that and with much greater authority than I can, but so far as my impressions went, I may say...

THE PRESIDENT: If he is not competent to speak about it, I do not see why he should speak about it.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the witness Fischböck cannot be found. However, as a deputy of the Reich Commissioner, this witness must know something about the general features of it. I will ask him for details.

Did the Reich Commissioner save fairly large sums of money in his budget and deposit them in a special fund?

WIMMER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: You know nothing about foreign currency restrictions, apparently?

WIMMER: No.

DR. STEINBAUER: How were raw materials, manufactured items, and foodstuffs requisitioned in the civilian branch of the administration?

WIMMER: It was regulated by an ordinance in the Reich Commissioner’s ordinance bulletin and can be seen there. As a matter of principle, the requisitions were sent from the Reich to the Reich Commissioner and the Reich Commissioner passed them on to the Dutch offices concerned, which then carried out those requisitions themselves.

DR. STEINBAUER: So it was not the German offices, but the Dutch offices headed by the Dutch secretaries general?

WIMMER: Yes. They also were authorized to do this by a special decree.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Reich Commissioner or his offices take anything from the large museums?

WIMMER: I did not quite understand that. From where?

DR. STEINBAUER: From the public museums.

WIMMER: No. I do not recall a single case, and I would have had to know about it because the museums were under me.

DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, that is why I asked you. Were there possibly any archives that were carried away?

WIMMER: In general, no; but an exchange of archives was probably worked out during the occupation, which had been under consideration even before the war. There was an exchange of archives between, in particular, the “Hausarchiv,” but also other Dutch archives, and German archives, and—to be exact, this was done according to where they came from—on the so-called principle of origin.

DR. STEINBAUER: Was it possible for everybody to confiscate what he wanted, or was that controlled in any way?

WIMMER: No, that was controlled, and the respective regulations were again repeated in an especially stern decree of the Reich Commissioner during the last year. Those who transgressed or intended to transgress these regulations were given serious warning. There were only two agencies which, according to the decree, were allowed to carry out confiscations at all, and these were the Police and the Armed Forces.

DR. STEINBAUER: In conclusion, I should like to refer back once again to the Armed Forces operations. Was that discontinued in the fall? By “Armed Forces operation” I mean the deportation of those members of the population able to carry arms.

WIMMER: That was stopped on the basis of an objection made by myself on behalf of the Reich Commissioner to General Student, who at that time was chief of the army group, and under whose jurisdiction the Netherlands also came at that time.

DR. STEINBAUER: Then one last question. Can you remember the Jewish Library Rosenthaliana?

WIMMER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: What happened to that?

WIMMER: As far as I know, it remained in the Netherlands.

DR. STEINBAUER: Was that not to have been removed?

WIMMER: Yes. There were such intentions, but since this library was public property, the property of the City of Amsterdam, the Reich Commissioner, upon my suggestion, ordered that this library was to remain in Holland.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have concluded the questioning of this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendants’ counsel want to ask questions?

Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

M. DEBENEST: Witness, you were selected to fill the office of commissioner general in the Netherlands by Seyss-Inquart himself?

WIMMER: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: You had known Seyss-Inquart for several years?

WIMMER: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: Had you not been one of his assistants ever since 1938?

WIMMER: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: Is it true that during the occupation of the Netherlands a large number of members of the NSB and pro-German elements were appointed not only to leading positions, but also to subordinate positions in the Dutch police, and that they were charged with executing orders issued by the occupation authorities, such as the arresting of Jews, members of the resistance, and hostages?

WIMMER: I can confirm the fact that members of the NSB and of groups friendly to the Germans were employed in high and low positions by the Reich Commissioner. However, as to their proportional part within the total of Dutch civil servant employment in the civilian branch, I believe that even at the end of the occupation period the participation of these groups in proportion to the Dutch population was not greater...

M. DEBENEST: I spoke to you expressly about the police; reply to that point.

WIMMER: You mean only the police?

M. DEBENEST: I told you, the police.

WIMMER: Yes, that is known to me. However, I do not believe that those members of pro-German groups received special assignments, but rather I believe that they received their assignments in exactly the same way as the other civil servants in the same positions. I cannot, however, say anything in detail about that, because I had very little to do with the police.

M. DEBENEST: When officials of the Dutch police refused to carry out orders which had been given to them by the occupation authorities and abandoned their posts, did not the German authorities take members of their families as hostages—women and children, for instance?

WIMMER: I cannot recall that.

M. DEBENEST: In no case?

WIMMER: That relatives of police officials were arrested? Members of their families?

M. DEBENEST: Yes, of those who were not carrying out the orders of the German authorities.

WIMMER: I do not remember that.

M. DEBENEST: That is fine. Well, perhaps you may remember that members of families of Dutch citizens who offered resistance in one way or another were arrested as hostages?

WIMMER: I have heard about that.

M. DEBENEST: There were some hostages arrested in such cases, for example, were there not? There were hostages arrested in those cases?

WIMMER: You call it “hostages.” Do you also use that expression in cases where the individuals concerned did not have to expect that they would lose their lives, that it would cost them their heads?

M. DEBENEST: So far I have been asking you the questions, and you have been answering them.

For instance, did you not receive protests from the Board of the University of Amsterdam against the fact that the wife and children of a professor of that university had been arrested as hostages?

WIMMER: I do not remember that. It is possible, however, that such a complaint came to the Main Department for Education, which belonged to my Commissariat.

M. DEBENEST: In any case, you do not deny the fact?

WIMMER: I could not deny it 100 percent, but I do not know anything about it.

M. DEBENEST: Another question. Following the declaration of loyalty which was imposed on the students, those who refused, were they not forced to present themselves immediately for work, and were they not deported to Germany without waiting for their group to be called up?

WIMMER: Yes, but not by the Labor Service. Do you mean the Office for the Allocation of Labor?

M. DEBENEST: That is of little importance; but they were deported to Germany for that reason, were they not?

WIMMER: Yes, by virtue of a decree by the Higher SS and Police Leader.

M. DEBENEST: Is it not true that numerous and extensive reforms were introduced by the Reich Commissioner in all the activities of the life of the Dutch people, and that these reforms were all contrary to the Constitution?

WIMMER: One cannot say that.

M. DEBENEST: But there were reforms, were there not?

WIMMER: Certainly, yes, which were caused by the necessities of war and the fact of the occupation. And there is a third factor involved, too, which was that there were measures necessitated by the absence of the head of the State and the Government.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Debenest, would it not be better to put the particular points you want to him, rather than general questions, which will enable him to deal with the matter at length?

M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the witness._] Did the civil administration service in the Netherlands enjoy a certain freedom?

WIMMER: Yes, a great deal of freedom.

M. DEBENEST: I am going to read to you a passage from a report by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, a report drafted on 19 July 1940. You shall tell me whether you still maintain the reply that you have just given me. This is what Seyss-Inquart wrote:

“The civil administration”—he means the civil administration in
the Netherlands—“at present finds itself in a sufficient and
otherwise progressive way under the direction and control of the
German authorities.”

Is the answer which you have just made in agreement with what Seyss-Inquart wrote?

WIMMER: If mention is made in Dr. Seyss-Inquart’s reply that the control was in German hands, that can only mean that the supervision was in the hands of German authorities, for it is naturally to be taken for granted that the German occupation authorities reserved for themselves a certain control and supervision over Dutch legislation, as well as over all important acts of administration and government; and if everything went as it should, important decrees could not be issued without the approval of the occupying power.

M. DEBENEST: That is enough. The Tribunal will judge your answer with regard to this document.

Will you explain why a civilian government was established in the Netherlands, whereas no such government was set up in other countries, such as Belgium, for instance?

WIMMER: I do not know the real reason for that, but from what I have heard and could find out myself the main reason was that Germany attached the greatest value to establishing a good relationship with the Netherlands, and the leaders in the Reich probably thought that this could be more easily done through men of the civilian administration than through the Armed Forces.

M. DEBENEST: More exactly, were they not pursuing a political goal in this, the goal of placing the country in the hands of the National Socialists, in order to bring about some sort of Germanic federation of Germanic states?

WIMMER: Whenever I spoke with the Reich Commissioner about such things, the Reich Commissioner expressed the point of view that the Dutch people had all the characteristics of a distinct and independent people and therefore should remain independent and sovereign as a state. It goes without saying that during the occupation period the Reich Commissioner and the German administration maintained fairly close contact with these parties and groups which were pro-German, and I do not have to give any reasons for that. But that the Netherlands, especially during a period of occupation, were not going to accept completely the political ideology of the occupying power was quite clear to the Reich Commissioner, as indeed to anyone who was able to judge the conditions at all reasonably.

M. DEBENEST: You said a few moments ago, if I understood correctly, that the Reich Commissioner did not want to force the secretaries general of the Netherlands to make decisions which might be contrary to their conscience, and if they felt uneasy about it, they could ask for their dismissal. Is that what you stated?

WIMMER: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: Did he dismiss any secretaries general who had not asked to resign?

WIMMER: There was only one exception, that of Secretary General Spitzen. That was the Secretary General to the Ministry of Waterways who did not carry out an order of the Reich Commissioner and in spite of this did not hand in his resignation.

M. DEBENEST: What secretary general was this? In which department?

WIMMER: That was the Ministry of Waterways; that was the Ministry that was responsible for canals, reclaimed land, highways, inland waterways, and so forth.

M. DEBENEST: Is that the only case that you knew of?

WIMMER: That is the only case of which I knew.

M. DEBENEST: In what year was that?

WIMMER: That, I believe—one moment—at any rate, that was in 1944; in the summer, I believe.

M. DEBENEST: Do you not remember the dismissal of the Secretary General for National Defense, Mr. Ringeling?

WIMMER: The dismissal of the Secretary General for National Defense was not a matter for the Reich Commissioner, but fell within the jurisdiction of the military commander, since by virtue of the Führer’s decree all military matters fell within the jurisdiction of the military commander.

M. DEBENEST: Why was he dismissed?

WIMMER: That is not known to me.

M. DEBENEST: Try to refresh your memory with the aid of Seyss-Inquart’s report and then we will see whether this was in agreement with the head of the Armed Forces. This is what the defendant writes:

“One of the secretaries general tried....”

THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the witness does not know anything about it, apparently.

M. DEBENEST: He says that he does not know the reasons, Mr. President, but he adds—he had previously added—that it was in agreement with the military authorities.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a matter which would come under the competence of the military authorities; and he does not know about it. That is what he said.

WIMMER: All the matters of the Ministry for National Defense fell within the jurisdiction of the military commander, for it is perfectly clear that everything of a military nature which took place or was directed in the Netherlands there was directed by this Ministry, and it is clear that the commander, the German military representative of the Reich, was competent in this sphere.

THE PRESIDENT: If you have a document which proves that the man’s dismissal was done by Seyss-Inquart, I suppose you can put it to him.

M. DEBENEST: I wanted simply to demonstrate that the answer he gave was inexact, merely by reading four lines of the document.

THE PRESIDENT: As I said, if you have a document which proves that the man’s dismissal was by Seyss-Inquart, you can put it to him.

M. DEBENEST: That is what I intended to do, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Do it; put it to him, then.

M. DEBENEST: I do not have the original in German. I handed it in yesterday evening to the Secretary of the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Read it to him, M. Debenest. Read it to him.

M. DEBENEST: That is what I am going to do, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the witness._] Here is what Seyss-Inquart wrote:

“One of the secretaries general tried to appeal to the authority
of Winkelmann”—Winkelmann was the military chief—“concerning
the question of the continuation of work in armament factories
for the Armed Forces, but this official....”

WIMMER: I did not understand that. Will you please read the last two sentences once more?

M. DEBENEST: “....concerning the matter of the continuation of
armament factories for the Armed Forces. But this official was
immediately dismissed.”

WIMMER: But that does not say that the Reich Commissioner dismissed this official.

M. DEBENEST: Certainly it is not said that the Reich Commissioner did it; but it is none the less clear in this report that the Reich Commissioner indicates here that when an official, no matter who he may be, does not obey the orders which are given to him, he is dismissed from his office and he quotes this case as an example.

WIMMER: But here it is a question of the military branch. What I have said before deals exclusively with the civilian sector branch, the Reich Commissioner’s branch. It is perfectly clear and possible that in a report to Hitler the Reich Commissioner should speak about other things also, because he was the guardian of the interests of the Reich. And he reported about other things to his superior, besides those which were exclusively within his sphere of activity. Nor do I know whether by these officials or these workers, for example, the secretary general is meant, the Secretary General for National Defense.

M. DEBENEST: Very well. We will leave this question.

Did you not require that the Secretary General for Education should place the Kammerlingh Onnes laboratories in Leyden at the disposal of the German authorities for research on atomic energy?

WIMMER: But only in the Netherlands; not in Germany.

M. DEBENEST: But if it was not for Germany, the Secretary General for Education had perfect freedom to decide for himself; you did not have to intervene, did you?

WIMMER: No. That was a German measure which had been demanded by the Reich and which was now carried out in such a manner that all the materials, machinery, and so on, remained in the Netherlands, and German scientists were to have the opportunity to carry out their researches there. Moreover I do not believe that that had anything to do with atomic matters. Who said that?

M. DEBENEST: You claim that important public libraries and private libraries were not confiscated or transported to the Reich? You said so just now, is that not a fact?

WIMMER: Just now? I did not talk about libraries at all just now.

M. DEBENEST: But just now when Seyss-Inquart’s defense counsel was questioning you, you certainly said, unless I misunderstood you, that no libraries had been transported to the Reich which came from the Netherlands.

WIMMER: I did not say that. Will you please show me that in the transcript?

M. DEBENEST: Then it is doubtless a mistake. Were not the professors of the University of Amsterdam threatened with the death penalty if they handed in their resignations, and did you not threaten them yourself?

WIMMER: I neither expressed such a threat, nor do I know of any such threat. I consider it quite impossible that anybody could have uttered such a threat.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 14 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH DAY
Friday, 14 June 1946

_Morning Session_

[_The witness Wimmer resumed the stand._]

M. DEBENEST: I still have a few questions to put to this witness.

Witness, in view of the answers which you made yesterday about the libraries which have been looted and taken to Germany, I would like to read to you a few lines taken from a document which I submitted the day before yesterday to the Tribunal. This document is F-803, Exhibit RF-1525, on Page 34 of the French text. This is a report from the Minister of Education and Art of the Netherlands. We find the following:

“The collections as well as the libraries of the International
Institute for Social History at Amsterdam have been closed down.
The library, which has about 150,000 volumes, as well as a very
important collection of newspapers, has been taken to Germany.
The Library Rosenthaliana of the University of Amsterdam, which
belongs to the city, has been packed in 153 crates and has also
been taken to Germany. Famous collections concerning natural
history of the College of St. Ignace at Valkenburg and the
Museum of Natural History at Maastricht have also been taken to
Germany, as well as the library which belonged to it.

“In 1940 all the property of the Freemasonry Lodges was
confiscated and taken away to Germany. It included the
well-known Klossiana Library.”

THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, haven’t you put enough for the purpose of your question now? We have got the document already, and you have put about half a dozen libraries which you are suggesting to him were taken to Germany, and you want to know what he has to say to it, I suppose. It is not necessary to go into the whole detail.

M. DEBENEST: What do you think about this story, Witness? Are these facts correct?

WIMMER: The question which you have put to me was answered in part yesterday, as far as it concerns the property of Freemasons. It was said yesterday, and I confirmed it, that it is known to me that the property of the organizations, but not of the individual members, was confiscated.

THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question is, was it true that these libraries were moved to Germany?

WIMMER: I know nothing of the removal of these libraries.

M. DEBENEST: But you did, nevertheless, claim that the Rosenthaliana Library had remained in the Netherlands, did you not?

WIMMER: The Rosenthaliana, I said that.

M. DEBENEST: The Rosenthaliana, yes; the report specifies that it was packed in 153 crates and taken to Germany.

WIMMER: I do know that instructions were given by the Reich Commissioner that this library was to remain in Amsterdam. If it was removed in spite of this, the action was contrary to instructions and I have no knowledge of it.

M. DEBENEST: But still it was you who were responsible for education, or at least for supervising education in arts?

WIMMER: Yes, but not of the arts.

M. DEBENEST: No, but as far as the libraries and universities were concerned?

WIMMER: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: It is rather curious that you should not have been kept informed of this.

WIMMER: I do not know whether the library was removed or not.

M. DEBENEST: Very well, then. According to the statements which you made yesterday evening you seem to claim that the Reich Commissioner did all he could for the Dutch nation; is that not so?

WIMMER: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: At any rate, he always did everything he could to avoid the worst; is that so?

WIMMER: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: On the other hand, you know that numerous people in that country were interned, deported, and shot; that that nation was hampered and coerced in every sphere, under threat of heavy penalties and reprisals. Finally you know that that country was looted. Who were then the people who ordered these crimes and committed them?

WIMMER: I said that the Reich Commissioner did for the country what he could, and prevented as much as he could. In a 5-year period of occupation measures had to be taken which were difficult for the country to bear. I do not deny the fact; it is undeniable. I would ask you to formulate your question more concretely, and to mention the actions which you call crimes. The question is too general for me to answer it “yes” or “no,” or even briefly.

M. DEBENEST: Who ordered the arrests?

WIMMER: Which arrests?

M. DEBENEST: The arrests of the Dutch people, of course.

WIMMER: The arrests were ordered by the Higher SS and Police Leader; he was chief of police.

M. DEBENEST: Who ordered the internments?

WIMMER: Which internments? Do you mean internments in the concentration camps?

M. DEBENEST: In concentration camps and in internment camps.

WIMMER: They were ordered by the Higher SS and Police Leader. That was his department.

M. DEBENEST: Who chose the hostages?

WIMMER: The Police.

M. DEBENEST: Who appointed Rauter as Commissioner for Public Security?

WIMMER: As Commissioner General for Public Security? He was appointed by the Reich Commissioner, but his main function was that of the Higher SS and Police Leader. For this function he was appointed by the Reichsführer SS.

M. DEBENEST: But he had been appointed—I suppose you know the order—to assist the Reich Commissioner in his job of helping with the Police and for security.

WIMMER: He was to be at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner, but the Reich Commissioner did not have the unconditional right to issue instructions to the Higher SS and Police Leader. The Reichsführer SS had this right. The appointment as Secretary General for Security was a formality. It was made because the Reichsführer SS wished the Higher SS and Police Leader to have this title too. Originally he was not to be appointed Commissioner General.

M. DEBENEST: You therefore consider that Seyss-Inquart had no authority over Rauter?

WIMMER: Yes.

M. DEBENEST: Very well. In that case I am going to read a document to you, and you will tell me what you think of it, whether Seyss-Inquart had no authority; and you can also make any explanations you choose.

That is Document 3430-PS, which has already been submitted as Exhibit USA-708. This is an excerpt from Seyss-Inquart’s speeches made in Holland, and is to be found on Pages 124 and 125 of the German text. I submit it to the Tribunal. It will most probably also be found in the trial brief of Seyss-Inquart. I am afraid I do not have the exact page but I think it is Page 57 or 58.

[_Turning to the witness._]

Seyss-Inquart in that speech of 29 January 1943 said:

“I will give the orders, and they must be strictly carried out
by everybody. In the present situation, the refusal to carry out
such an order cannot be called anything except sabotage. It is
equally certain that we must, more than ever, eliminate and do
away with all resistance directed against the struggle for
life.”

And further on, he says:

“At a time when our husbands, our sons, our fathers are fighting
and meeting death in the East with bravery and fortitude and
without weakening and are making the greatest sacrifices, it is
unthinkable that we should tolerate conspiracies which seek to
render insecure the rear of the front in the East. The person
who dares to do that must perish.”

If Seyss-Inquart had had no authority over the Police, would he have been able to make such a speech and say that he would issue the orders?

WIMMER: I did not say that Seyss-Inquart had no authority with regard to the Police, I only said that the orders were given by the Higher SS and Police Leader. The relationship with the Police was as follows:

The Reich Commissioner could, of, course, turn to the Police in any case in which he needed them; but this only amounted to a wish and not a binding order. In such cases, if they were important, the Police first consulted the Reichsführer SS or his office; and only if this office approved could a wish of the Reich Commissioner be carried out by the Police.

M. DEBENEST: The question is simpler than that. Could he—“yes” or “no”—issue orders in cases such as are mentioned in his speech? He himself mentioned this, you know.

WIMMER: He could make a request but not give orders.

M. DEBENEST: I merely note that you do not agree with Seyss-Inquart’s speech.

I will now speak to you of another document; and you will tell us how you explain that. Seyss-Inquart could only make requests, as you term it, and not give orders. This is Document F-860, which I submitted yesterday. This document is a letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr. Lammers. In this letter he writes that he had wanted to reorganize the Dutch police in order to adapt it to the German police organization; and in the same document he states the opinion that the police must be the strongest expression of the internal administration of a country, which should not be transferred to another agency. That is what Seyss-Inquart says in that document. How can you then co-ordinate your answer with what Seyss-Inquart writes?

WIMMER: This reorganization was not suggested by the Reich Commissioner but originated from the Police itself. The Reich Commissioner by this reorganization—and I myself, too—tried to have the Dutch police at least not completely separated from the administration, which in the main was already the case in Germany, and was what the German Police in the Netherlands also wanted.

M. DEBENEST: You contradict what Seyss-Inquart himself wrote in this document. How do you explain what Seyss-Inquart wrote further on in the same document:

“I would not like to appoint expressly as administrator of court
procedure the Higher SS and Police Leader here, for this
appointment suggests to the Dutch a limitation of the authority
of the Reich Commissioner. This is of particular importance
because the Reich Commissioner was appointed as the guardian of
the interests of the Reich by order of the Führer. But I have
myself given to the Higher SS and Police Leader all the powers
which an administrator of courts needs.”

WIMMER: Would you please read the first two sentences again?

THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the document is before us, don’t you think?

M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: It is scarcely worth while to argue with the witness about it.

M. DEBENEST: I will not insist upon it, Mr. President.

Witness, how do you explain the fact that Schöngarth—you saw the document yesterday, did you not, which counsel for the defense submitted to you, the interrogatory of Schöngarth—how do you explain the fact that Schöngarth, on the very morning after the attempt on Rauter’s life, went to Seyss-Inquart and that Seyss-Inquart gave him the order, as he himself states in the document, to take increased measures of reprisal and to execute 200 prisoners, and this with the aim of intimidating the population?

WIMMER: Yesterday, I believe, I exhausted this subject. I said everything I knew about it.

M. DEBENEST: Will you give me the explanation I am asking you to make?