Chapter XII: Part 12

_Answ._ 1. As to what respects the first threatening, that death should immediately ensue upon sin’s being committed, we shall have occasion to speak to this in its proper place,[64] and therefore all that need be replied to it at present is, that the threatening was in some respect, executed the day, yea, the moment in which our first parents sinned: If we take it in a legal sense, they were immediately brought into a state of condemnation, which, in a forensic sense, is often called death; they were immediately separated from God, the fountain of blessedness, and plunged into all those depths of misery, which were the consequence of their fall; or if we take death, the punishment threatened, for that which is, indeed, one ingredient in it, to wit, the separation of soul and body; or for the greatest degree of punishment, consisting in everlasting destruction, from the presence of the Lord, and the glory of his power; then it is sufficient to say, that man’s being liable hereunto was the principal thing intended in the threatening. Certainly God did not hereby design to tie up his own hands, so as to render it impossible for him to remit the offence, or to recover the fallen creature out of this deplorable state; and therefore if you take death for that which is natural, which was not inflicted till nine hundred and thirty years after, then we may say, that his being exposed to, or brought under an unavoidable necessity of dying the very day that he sinned, might be called his dying from that time; and the scripture will warrant our using the word in that sense, since the apostle, speaking to those who were, by sin, liable to death, says, _The body is dead, because of sin_, Rom. viii. 10. that is, it is exposed to death, as the consequence thereof, though it was not actually dead; and if we take death for a liability to eternal death, then the threatening must be supposed to contain a tacit condition, which implies, that man was to expect nothing but eternal death, unless some expedient were found out, which the miserable creature then knew nothing of, to recover him out of that state into which he was fallen.

2. As to what concerns the sparing of Nineveh; we have sufficient ground to conclude that there was a condition annexed to this threatening, and so the meaning is; that they should be destroyed in forty days, if they did not repent: this condition was designed to be made known to them, otherwise Jonah’s preaching would have been to no purpose, and the warning given would have answered no valuable end; and it is plain, that the Ninevites understood it in this sense, otherwise there would have been no room for repentance; so that God connected the condition with the threatening: and as, on the one hand, he designed to give them repentance, so that the event was not dubious and undetermined by him, as depending on their conduct, abstracted from his providence; so, on the other hand, there was no reflection cast on his truth, because this provisionary expedient, for their deliverance, was as much known by them as the threatening itself.

_Object._ 2. It is objected that several promises have not had their accomplishment. Thus there are several promises of spiritual blessings, which many believers do not experience the accomplishment of in this life; which has given occasion to some to say, with the Psalmist, _Doth his promise fail for evermore?_ Psal. lxxvii. 8.

_Answ._ It is true, that all the promises of God are not literally fulfilled in this world to every particular believer; the promise of increase of grace is not actually fulfilled, while God suffers his people to backslide from him, and the work of grace is rather declining than sensibly advancing; neither are the promises, respecting the assurance and joy of faith, fulfilled unto one that is sinking into the depths of despair; nor those that respect the presence of God in ordinances, to such as are destitute of the influences of his grace therein; nor are the promises of victory over temptation fulfilled, to those who are not only assaulted, but frequently overcome by Satan, when it is as much as they can do to stand their ground against him; and there are many other instances of the like nature: notwithstanding, the truth of God may be vindicated, if we consider,

1. That there is no promise made, whereof there are not some instances of their accomplishment in kind; this therefore is a sufficient conviction to the world, that there are such blessings bestowed as God has promised.

2. Those who are denied these blessings, may possibly be mistaken when they conclude themselves to be believers; and then it is no wonder that they are destitute of them, for God has promised to give joy and peace only in a way of believing; or first to give the truth of grace, and then the comfortable fruits and effects thereof. But we will suppose that they are not mistaken, but have experienced the grace of God in truth; yet their graces are so defective, that they know but little of their own imperfections, if they do not take occasion from thence, to justify God, who with-holdeth those blessings from them, and to adore, rather than call in question, the equity of his proceeding therein. And if remunerative justice be not laid under obligations to bestow these blessings by any thing performed by us, then certainly the faithfulness of God is not to be impeached, because he is pleased to deny them.

3. In denying these blessings, he oftentimes takes occasion to advance his own glory some other way, by trying the faith and patience of his people, correcting them for their miscarriages, humbling them by his dealings with them, and over-ruling all for their good in the end; which is an equivalent for those joys and comforts which they are deprived of. And, indeed, God has never promised these blessings to any, but with this reserve, that if he thinks it necessary, for his own glory, and their good, to bring about their salvation some other way, he will do it, without the least occasion given hereby to detract from the glory of his faithfulness.

4. All these promises, which have not had their accomplishment in kind, in this world, shall be accomplished in the next, with the greatest advantage; so that then they will have no reason to complain of the least unfaithfulness in the divine administration. If rivers of pleasures at God’s right hand for ever, will not compensate for the want of some comforts, while we are in this world, or silence all objections against his present dealings with men, nothing can do it; or if the full accomplishment of all the promises hereafter, will not secure the glory of this perfection, it is a sign that men are disposed to contend with the Almighty, who deny it; therefore to such we may justly apply God’s own words to Job, _He that reproveth God, let him answer it_; or, as he farther says, _Wilt thou disannul my judgment? Wilt thou condemn me, that thou mayest be righteous?_ Job xl. 2. compared with ver. 8.

We shall now consider how the faithfulness of God ought to be improved by us. And,

(1.) The consideration thereof may be a preservative against presumption on the one hand, or despair on the other. Let no one harden himself in his iniquity; or think that because the threatnings are not yet fully accomplished, therefore they never shall; it is one thing for God to delay to execute them, and another thing to resolve not to do it. We may vainly conclude, that the bitterness of death is past, because _our houses are safe from fear, neither is the rod of God upon them_; but let it be considered, that _the wicked are reserved for the day of destruction; they shall be brought forth to the day of wrath_, Job xxi. 9. compared with ver. 30. the zeal of the Lord of hosts will do this. His threatenings lay him under an obligation to punish finally impenitent sinners, because he is a God of truth; therefore let none harden themselves against him, or expect impunity in a course of open rebellion against him. And, on the other hand, let not believers give way to despair of obtaining mercy, or conclude, that, because God is withdrawn, and hides his face from them, therefore he will never return; or, because his promises are not immediately fulfilled, therefore they never shall, since his faithfulness is their great security; _he will ever be mindful of his covenant_, Psal. cxi. 5.

(2.) Let us compare the providences of God with his word, and see how every thing tends to set forth his faithfulness. We are very stupid, if we take notice of the great things that are doing in the world; and we behold them to little purpose, if we do not observe how this divine perfection is glorified therein. The world continues to this day, because God has several things yet to do in it, in pursuance of his promises; the whole number of the elect are to be gathered, and brought in to Christ; their graces must be tried, and their faith built up in the same way, as it has been in former ages; therefore the church is preserved, and _the gates of hell have not prevailed against it_, according to his word, Matth. xvi. 18. and as it was of old, so we now observe that the various changes which are made in civil affairs, are all rendered subservient to its welfare; _the earth helps the woman_, Rev. xii. 16. not so much from its own design, as by the appointment of providence; and why does God order it so, but that his promises might be fulfilled? And that the same ordinances should be continued, and that believers should have the same experience of the efficacy and success thereof, as the consequence of his presence with them, which he has given them ground to expect _unto the end of the world_, Matth. xxviii. 20. are blessings in which his faithfulness is eminently glorified.

(3.) This divine perfection is a sure foundation for our faith. As his truth, with respect to what he has revealed, is an infallible ground for our faith of assent, so his faithfulness, in fulfilling his promises, affords the highest encouragement for our trust and dependence on him: thus we are said to _commit the keeping of our souls to him in well-doing, as unto a faithful Creator_, 1 Pet. iv. 19. and, when we lay the whole stress of our salvation upon him, we have no reason to entertain any doubt about the issue thereof. Moreover, are we exposed to evils in this world? we may conclude, that as _he has delivered, and does deliver_, so we have reason to _trust in him, that he will deliver us_, 2 Cor. i. 10. and is there much to be done for us, to make us meet for heaven? we may be _confident of this very thing, that he that has begun a good work in us, will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ_, Phil. i. 6.

(4.) The faithfulness of God should be improved by us, as a remedy against that uneasiness and anxiety of mind, which we often have about the event of things, especially when they seem to run counter to our expectation. Thus when there is but a very melancholy prospect before us, as to what concerns the glory of God in the world, and the flourishing state of his church in it, upon which we are ready to say with Joshua, _Lord, what wilt thou do unto thy great name?_ Josh. vii. 9. or when we have many sad thoughts of heart about the rising generation, and are in doubt whether they will adhere to, or abandon, the interest of Christ; when we are ready to fear whether there will be a reserve of faithful men, who will stand up for his gospel, and fill the places of those who are called off the stage, after having served their generation by the will of God; or when we are too much oppressed with carking cares about our outward condition in the world, when, like Christ’s disciples, we are immoderately thoughtful _what we shall eat, what we shall drink, or wherewithal we shall be clothed_, Matth. vi. 31. or how we shall be able to conflict with the difficulties that lie before us: our great relief against all this solicitude is to be derived from the faithfulness of God; for since godliness has the promise annexed to it, of _the life that now is_, as well as of _that which is to come_, 1 Tim. iv. 18. this promise shall have its accomplishment, so far as shall most redound to God’s glory, and our real advantage.

(5.) The consideration of the faithfulness of God should be improved, to humble, and fill us with shame and confusion of face, when we consider how treacherously we have dealt with him, how unsteadfast we have been in his covenant, how often we have broke our own promises and resolutions that we would walk more closely with him, how frequently we have backslidden from him, contrary to all the engagements which we have been laid under. Have we found any unfaithfulness in him? Has he, in the least instance, been worse than his word? as God says, when he reproves his people, _What iniquity have your fathers found in me, that they are gone far from me, and have walked after vanity, and are become vain?_ Jer. ii. 5.

Footnote 48:

His ideas are not the effects, but causes of things. Vide post p. 124,
125.

Footnote 49:

There is not succession in His ideas, but he exists in every point of
time.

Footnote 50:

Effects spring from _power_, not _laws_, and prove a _virtual_, or
influential, revelation, an _essential_ ubiquity.

Footnote 51:

Quest. xv. and xviii.

Footnote 52:

Quest. lxvii.

Footnote 53:

Vide Edwards on Free-will, part I. sect. IV.

Footnote 54:

The Divine knowledge is as undeniable as the Divine existence, and as
certain as human knowledge. “He that formed the eye doth he not see?
He that planted the ear doth he not hear? He that teacheth man
knowledge doth he not know?” But though human knowledge proves the
Divine, as the effect does its cause, it by no means follows, that
they are similar. Our knowledge principally consists of the images of
things in the mind, or springs from them; but if the Divine knowledge
were such, it would result that things were prior to his knowledge,
and so that he is not the Creator of them; all things must therefore
be the representations of his ideas, as an edifice represents the plan
of the skilful architect. On this account our knowledge is
superficial, extending only to the external appearances of things; but
their intimate natures are known to him, who made them conformed to
his original ideas. Our knowledge is circumscribed, extending only to
the things which are the objects of our senses, or which have been
described to us; but the universe, with all its parts, the greatest
and the smallest things, are all known to him, who called them into
existence, and moulded them according to his own plan. Our knowledge
embraces only the things which are, or have been; with respect to the
future, we can know nothing, except as he, upon whom it depends, shall
reveal it to us; or as we may draw inferences from his course of
action in former instances. But the Creator knows not only the past
and the present, but the future. He knows the future, because it
wholly depends on him; and nothing can take place without him,
otherwise it is independent of God, but this is incompatible with his
supremacy. If he know not the future, his knowledge is imperfect; if
he is to know hereafter what he does not now know, he is increasing in
knowledge, this would argue imperfection; if his knowledge be
imperfect, he is imperfect; and if he be imperfect, he is not God.—But
all things to come are to be what he designs they shall be; there
accompanies his knowledge of the future, also a purpose, that the
thing designed shall be effectuated; and his wisdom and power being
infinite guarantee the accomplishment of his purposes.

To be the subjects of foreknowledge, such as has been mentioned,
implies the absolute certainty of the things, or occurrences, thus
foreknown. A failure in their production, would not less prove
imperfection, than a defect of the foreknowledge of them. Contingency
belongs not to the things in futurity, but to the defective knowledge
of imperfect beings, and is always proportional to our ignorance.

That the future is categorically certain with God, appears by the
invariable succession of effects to their causes in the natural world;
miracles themselves may not be exceptions; but would always, it is
probable, flow from the same causes, which are occult from us. The
voluntary actions of moral agents, how uncertain soever to themselves,
are also not exceptions from the Divine knowledge and purposes; “He
doth his will in the army of Heaven, and among the inhabitants of the
earth”; “The wrath of man praises him, and the remainder he doth
restrain.” Every prophecy, which has been fulfilled, so far as it was
accomplished by the voluntary actions of men, proves the certainty of
the divine foreknowledge, the absolute certainty of the then future
event, and that the will of man is among the various means, which God
is pleased to make use of to accomplish his purposes.

If there be such certainty in God’s foreknowledge, and in the events
themselves in the Kingdom of Providence, we may reasonably expect his
conduct will be similar in the Kingdom of Grace; and the more
especially if man’s salvation from first to last springs from, and is
carried on, and accomplished by him.

Footnote 55:

As knowledge is a faculty of which wisdom is the due exercise, the
proofs of divine wisdom are so many evidences of the knowledge of God.
Wisdom consists in the choice of the best ends, and the selection of
means most suitable to attain them. The testimonies of the wisdom of
God must therefore be as numerous and various, as the works of his
creation. The mutual relations and subserviency of one thing to
another; as the heat of the sun, to produce rain; both, to produce
vegetation; and all, to sustain life; ensation, digestion, muscular
motion, the circulation of the fluids, and, still more, intelligence,
and above all, the moral faculty, or power of distinguishing good and
evil, are unequivocal proofs of the wisdom, and consequently of the
knowledge, of God.—_He that formed the eye, doth he not see: he that
planted the ear, &c._

Mortal artificers are deemed to understand their own work, though
ignorant of the formation of the materials and instruments they use:
but the Creator uses no mean or material which he has not formed. He
therefore knows, from the globe to the particle of dust or fluid, and
from the largest living creature to the smallest insect. He has
knowledge equally of the other worlds of this system, and every
system; of all things in heaven, earth, and hell.

Our knowledge is conversant about his works; he knows all things which
are known to us, and those things which have not come to our
knowledge.

He formed and sustains the human mind, and knows the thoughts: this is
necessary to him as our Judge. He knows equally all spiritual
creatures, and sustains his holy spirits in holiness.

Our knowledge springs from things; but things spring from his
purposes: they are, because he knows them; otherwise they existed
before his knowledge, and so independently of him.

We know but the external appearances, he the intimate nature of
things. We inquire into the properties of things by our senses, by
comparing them, by analizing, &c: but nothing possesses a property
which he did not purpose and give; otherwise his hands have wrought
more than he intended. We look up through effects unto their causes:
he looks down through intermediate causes, and sees them all to be
effects from him.

We are furnished with memories to bring up ideas, being only able to
contemplate a part at a time; but his comprehension embraces all
things.

He never changes; his purposes of the future embrace eternity: all
things that are really future are certain, because his purposes cannot
fail of accomplishment. But all future things to us are contingent,
except as he has revealed their certainty. That the future is known to
him, also appears by the accomplishment of every prophecy.

But man’s sin receives hereby no apology. He gives the brutal creation
the capacity of deriving pleasure from gratification of sense, and
provides for such appetites. He offers to man, pleasures which are
intellectual: he has tendered him the means, and requires man to seek
his spiritual happiness in God. When he refuses and withholds his
return of service from God, man is alone to blame. And the more
numerous and powerful the motives which he resists, the guilt is the
greater. The divine foreknowledge of this is no excuse for man. When
the Lord overpowers man’s evil with good, the glory of man’s salvation
belongs to God.

Footnote 56:

_See Ray’s Wisdom of God in the Works of Creation, and Derham’s
Physico-Theology._ See also Fenelon, Newenlyle, Paley, and Adams’s
Philosophy.

Footnote 57:

See Page 46.

Footnote 58:

See Quest. clvi. and clvii.

Footnote 59:

_Quest. xvi. xvii. xxi. and xxx._

Footnote 60:

_The Quest. xliv. and lxxi._

Footnote 61:

_Quest. xxix. and lxxix._

Footnote 62:

All the good which we behold in Creation, Providence, and redemption,
flows from goodness in God, and are the proofs of this attribute. If
all the evil, which we discover, springs from the liberty given to
creatures to conform, or not, to the revealed will; or if all moral
evil be productive of good, _the remainder being restrained_; then the
evil, which exists, is no exception to the proofs of Divine goodness.
What Deity now is, he always was; he has not derived his goodness; he
is not a compounded being; his goodness therefore belongs to his
essence. His goodness has been distinguished into _immanent_ and
_communicative_. The latter discovers to us the former, but his
communicative goodness, though flowing in ten thousand streams, and
incalculable, is less than his immanent, which is an eternal fountain
of excellency.

Infinite knowledge discerns things as they are, and a perfect being
will esteem that to be best, which is so; God therefore discerns, and
esteems his own immanent goodness as infinitely exceeding all the
good, which appears in his works, for the excellency in these is but
an imperfect representation of himself. The happiness of Deity must
consist consequently in his own self-complacency; _he made all things
for his pleasure, or glory_, but they are only so far pleasing, as
they reflect his own picture to himself. Yet when we suppose Deity to
be the subject of motives, we are ever in danger of erring.

Divine communicative goodness has been termed _benevolence_ when in
intention, _beneficence_ when carried into effect. This is nearly the
same as _moral rectitude_, because the government of the Universe
must, that it may produce the good of the whole, be administered in
righteousness. The correct administration of justice in rewarding
every good, if there be merit in a creature, and punishing every evil
is no less an effect of benevolence, than the conferring of benefits,
which are purely gratuitous. In like manner the punishment of
offenders in civil society has for its object general utility, whether
we imagine the power which judges and inflicts, to spring from the
social compact, or to have been ordained of God.

The cutting off of flagrant offenders, as by the deluge, the
destruction of Sodom, &c. has been obviously designed to prevent the
spreading contagion of sin. But there is a time appointed, unto which
all things are tending, and unto which men generally refer the wrongs
they sustain, in which perfect justice shall be administered. Some
attributes of Deity seem to be ground of terror, and others of love;
but God is one; he is subject to no perturbation of mind; his wrath
and indignation are but other terms for his steady and unchangeable
goodness, bearing down the evil, which sinful creatures oppose to his
purposes of general advantage. Those acts of justice which are
accounted by the guilty to be unnecessary severity, are deemed, by
glorified saints and angels, the effects of that goodness, which they
make the subject of their Hallelujahs. Thus the highest proof of God’s
goodness consisted in his not sparing his own Son, nor abating any
thing from the demands of his law. After this all hopes that Divine
goodness shall favour the finally impenitent must be utterly vain.

Footnote 63:

“Mark iii. 11, v. 7; Luke viii. 28; and Mat. viii. 29. These
extraordinary personages in the New Testament, are not called
_devils_, Διαβολοι, in the original; that word never occurring in the
Christian scriptures, but in the singular number, and as applied to
one Being alone. They are called _dæmons_, Δαιμονες or Δαιμονια. Yet
they are plainly devils in fact; being called Unclean Spirits, though
sometimes only Spirits (Mark ix. 20; and Luke x. 20;) and showing
themselves to be devils, by their whole history. In Mat. xii. 24 and
26 particularly, the Pharisees say ‘our Saviour casts out devils,
(dæmons) by Beelzebub the prince of the devils (dæmons);’ and our
Saviour replies, that then ‘Satan casts out Satan.’ See also Luke x.
17-18; where the apostles rejoicing declare, ‘even the devils (dæmons)
are subject unto us;’ and our Saviour says unto them, ‘I beheld Satan
as lightning fall from heaven.’ So very false in itself, and directly
contradicted by the very words of our Saviour, is that hypothesis of
Dr. Campbell’s in his new translation of the Gospels; which asserts
these possessions of the New Testament to be nowhere attributed to the
devil, and which avers the dominion or authority of the devil to be
nowhere ascribed to the dæmons! Beelzebub is expressly called the
_prince_ of the dæmons, the dæmons are expressly denominated _Satan_
with him, and these are only inferior devils subordinate to the great
one. And though the word _dæmons_ (as Dr. Campbell urges) might
critically be more exact in a translation; yet the word _devils_
better accords, with the usages of our language and the course of our
ideas. Exactness therefore has been properly sacrificed to utility.”

WHITAKER.

Footnote 64:

_See Quest. xx._

Quest. VIII.

QUEST. VIII. _Are there more Gods than one?_

ANSW. There is but one only, the living and true God.

I. In this answer, God is described as the living and true God. As life is the greatest excellency belonging to the nature of any finite being, upon which account some have concluded that the lowest degree thereof renders a creature more excellent in itself, than the most glorious creatures that are without it; and inasmuch as intelligent creatures have a superior excellency to all others, because that which gives life to them, or the principle by which they act as such, is most excellent; so the life of God is that whereby he infinitely excels all finite beings; therefore, when he is called the living God, this is not one single perfection of the divine nature, but it is expressive of all his divine perfections. Thus when God represents himself, in scripture, as giving his people the highest assurance of any thing which he designs to do, he useth the form of an oath, and sweareth by his life, _As I live_; or, _as truly as I live_, Isa. xlix. 18. and Numb. xiv. 21. which imports the same thing, as when he says, _I have sworn by myself_, Gen. xxii. 16. so that when he is called the living God, his glory is set forth, as a God of infinite perfection: but this has been considered under the last answer.

Therefore we may farther observe, that when God is styled the living God, it connotes the display of all his perfections, as life is a principle of action; and hereby he is distinguished from lifeless idols, who were reputed gods by their stupid and profane worshippers. Thus the apostle lays down both the terms of opposition, when he speaks to some, as having _turned from idols_, or false gods, _to serve the living and true God_, 1 Thess. i. 9. Here we might consider the origin and progress of idolatry, as men were inclined to _worship the creature more than the Creator_, Rom. i. 25. or _to do service to them, who, by nature, are no gods_, Gal. iv. 8. and shew how some seemed to have been destitute of common sense, as they were of true religion, when they not only worshipped God by idols, of their own making, but prayed to them, and said, _Deliver us, for ye are our gods_; this the prophet takes notice of, Isa. xliv. 17. and exposes their unaccountable stupidity, by observing to them that these gods were first growing among the trees of the forest, then cut down with their own hands, and fashioned into their designed form, and part thereof cast into the fire, as destined for common uses. These were lifeless gods, without a metaphor, and their senseless worshippers but one remove from them, as the Psalmist says, _They that make them are like unto them, and so is every one that trusteth in them_, Psal. cxv. 8. But this we shall have occasion to insist on in a following part of this work[65], and therefore shall pass it over at present, and consider,

II. The unity of the Godhead. Scripture is very express in asserting this: thus it is said, _The Lord our God is one Lord_, Deut. vi. 4. and, _I, even I, am he; and there is no God with me_, chap. xxxii. 39. and, _The Lord he is God; there is none else besides him_, chap. iv. 35. and elsewhere, _Thou art God alone_, Psal. lxxxvi. 10. And this is a truth, not barely founded on a few places of scripture that expressly assert it, but it may be deduced from every part thereof; yea, it is instamped on the very nature of man, and may be as plainly proved, from the light of nature, as that there is a God; and every one of the divine perfections, which were particularly considered under the last answer, will supply us with arguments to confirm our faith therein: but that this may farther appear, let it be considered,

1. That the idea of a God implies that he is the first cause of all things, in which respect he is opposed to the creature; it follows, therefore, that he was from all eternity. Now there can be no more than one being, who is without beginning, and who gave being to all other things, which appears from the very nature of the thing; for if there are more Gods, then they must derive their being from him, and then they are a part of his creation, and consequently not gods, for God and the creature are infinitely opposed to each other: and since there is but one independent being, who is in and of himself, and derives his perfections from no other, therefore there can be but one God.

2. There is but one being, who is the ultimate end of all things, which necessarily follows from his being their Creator; for he that produced them out of nothing must be supposed to have designed some valuable end hereby, which, ultimately considered, cannot be any thing short of himself, for that is inconsistent with the wisdom and sovereignty that is contained in the idea of a Creator; therefore he is said to have _made all things for himself_, Prov. xvi. 4. and consequently the glory that results from thence is unalienable, and so cannot be ascribed to any other God; therefore to suppose that there are other gods, is to ascribe a divine nature to them, divested of that glory which is essential to it. And to this we may add, that if God be the ultimate end of all things, he is to be glorified as such, and all worship is to terminate in him; and we must proclaim him to be our chief good, and only portion and happiness, which is plainly inconsistent with a plurality of gods. Besides, he that is the object of adoration must be worshipped, and _loved with all our heart, soul, strength, and mind_, Luke x. 27. our affections must not be divided between him and any other. Therefore since man is under a natural obligation to give supreme worship to him, it follows that there is no other God that has a right to it, and therefore that he is the only true God.

3. Infinite perfection being implied in the idea of a God, as has been proved under the last answer, it is certain that it cannot belong to more than one; for as it implies that this perfection is boundless, so it denotes that he sets bounds to the perfections of all others; therefore, if there are more Gods than one, their perfections must be limited, and consequently that which is not infinite is not God. And as infinite perfection implies in it all perfection, so it cannot be divided among many, for then no being, that has only a part thereof, could be said to be thus perfect; therefore, since there is but one that is so, it follows that there is no other God besides him.

4. Since omnipotency is a divine attribute, there can be but one almighty being, and therefore but one God; which will farther appear, if we consider, that if there were more Gods than one, all of them must be said to be able to do all things, and then the same individual power, that is exerted by one, must be exerted by another, than which nothing is more absurd. And it will also follow, that he, who cannot do that which is said to be done by another, is not almighty, or able to do all things, and consequently that he is not God.

5. There is but one being, who has an absolute sovereign will, who, though he can controul all others, is himself subject to no controul; who has a natural right to give laws to all who are his subjects, but is subject to none himself; for absolute dominion and subjection are as opposite as light and darkness. Two persons may as well be said to give being to each other, as to have a right to give laws to each other. Moreover, if there were more Gods than one, then there would be a confusion in the government of the world; for whatever one decrees, another may reverse; or whatever is done by one, the contrary might be done by the other, for that is the consequence from a sovereignty of will. And as there might be opposite things commanded, or forbidden, pursuant to the different wills of a plurality of gods, so the same thing, with respect to those who are under an obligation to yield obedience, would be both a sin and a duty, and the same persons would be both condemned and justified for the same action.

6. There is but one being, who is, as God is often said to be, the best and the greatest; therefore, if there were more Gods than one, either one must be supposed to be more excellent than another, or both equally excellent. If we suppose the former of these, then he, who is not the most excellent, is not God; and if the latter, that their excellencies are equal, then infinite perfection would be divided, which is contrary to the idea thereof, as was before hinted; as well as to what is expressly said by God, _To whom will ye liken me, or shall I be equal? saith the Holy One_, Isa. xl. 25. From these, and several other arguments to the same purpose, which might have been taken from every one of the divine attributes, and from all essential and relative glory which belongs to him, the unity of the divine essence appears, even to a demonstration. And indeed to assert that there are more Gods than one is, in effect, to say that there is no God; so the apostle deems it, when he tells the church at Ephesus, that, before their conversion, when they worshipped other gods, _they were without God in the world_, which implies as much as that they were atheists therein, as the words αθεοι ἐν τω κόσμω may, with equal propriety, be rendered.[66]

Having considered the unity of the Godhead, not only as evinced from scripture, but as it may be demonstrated by the light of nature, it will be necessary that we obviate an objection that may be brought against this latter method of proving it, _viz._

_Object._ If the unity of the Godhead might be known by the dictates of nature, or demonstrated by other arguments, besides those which are matter of pure revelation, how comes it to pass that the heathen owned, and worshipped, a plurality of gods? and as it was not one particular sect among them that did so, but this abominable practice universally obtained, where revealed religion was not known, therefore, though this be an undoubted truth, yet it is not founded in the light of nature.

_Answ._ That they did so is beyond dispute, especially after idolatry had continued a few ages in the world, and so had extinguished those principles of revealed religion, which mankind, before this, were favoured with; yet it must be considered, that though the ignorant and unthinking multitude, among them, believed every thing to be a God, which the custom of the countries where they lived had induced them to pay divine adoration to, yet the wiser sort of them, however guilty of idolatry, by paying a lower kind of worship to them, have, notwithstanding, maintained the unity of the Godhead, or that there is one God superior to them all, whom they often call the father of gods and men; to whom probably the Athenians erected that altar, as the apostle Paul observes, with this inscription, To THE UNKNOWN GOD; because he says, in the words immediately following, _Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you_, Acts xvii. 23.

This appears from what they assert to the same purpose, whereby they plainly discover their belief of but one supreme God, who has all the incommunicable perfections of the divine nature, however, in other instances, their conduct seemed to run counter to their method of reasoning: thus it appears, by their writings, that many of them assert that there is a God, who is the first cause, or beginning, of all things; and that he was from eternity, or in the beginning, and that time took its rise from him; that he is the living God, the fountain of life, and the best of all beings[67]: Also, that this God is self-sufficient, and therefore it is absurd to suppose that he stands in need of, or can receive advantage from, any one[68]; and that he is the chief good, or contains in himself whatever is good, and that by him all things consist; and that no one hath enough in himself to secure his own safety and happiness, which is to be derived from him[69].

And there are others also, who plainly assert the unity of God in as strong terms, as though they had learned it from divine revelation, calling him, the beginning, the end, and author of all things; who was before, and is above all things, the Lord of all, the fountain of life, light, and all good, yea, goodness itself; the most excellent being; and many other expressions to the like purpose. I could multiply quotations for the proof of this, from Proclus, Porphyry, Iamblicus, Plotinus, Plutarch, Epictetus, and several others; but this has been already done by other hands[70]; by which it appears, that though they mention other gods, they suppose them to be little more than titular or honorary gods; or at least persons, who were the peculiar favourites of God, and admitted to the participation of divine honours, as well as employed in some part of the government of the world. They frequently speak of them as having derived their being from God, whom they call the cause of causes, the God of gods. Some of them speak of God in the singular number, throughout the greatest part of their writings, and only make mention of the gods occasionally, especially when they treat of those works that become a God, or the greatest honours that are due to him; thus Seneca and Plato, and, in particular, the latter of them says, concerning himself[71], that when he wrote any thing in a grave and serious manner, his custom was, to preface his epistles with the mention of one God; though, it is true, when he wrote otherwise, he used the common mode of speaking, and talked of other gods; and it is observed, in his writings, that he sometimes uses this phrase; If it please God, or by the help of God, not the gods.

But, notwithstanding this, they were all idolaters, for they joined in the rites of worship performed to the false gods of their respective countries; yea, Socrates himself, who fell under the displeasure of the Athenians, for asserting the unity of the Godhead, which cost him his life, did not refuse to pay some religious honour to the heathen gods. So that it is plain they paid some religious worship to them, but it was of an inferior and subordinate nature, not much unlike to that which the Papists give to saints and angels: but they are far from setting them upon a level with God; for they confess they were but men, who formerly lived in this world; they give an account of their birth and parentage; where they lived and died; write the history of their lives, and what procured them the honour they suppose them after death advanced to[72]; how some of them obtained it, as the reward of virtue, or in commemoration of the good they had done to the world in their life: as some were advanced to this honour, who were the inventors of arts, beneficial to mankind, or were successful in wars, or a public blessing to the country where they lived, others had this honour conferred upon them, especially among the Romans, at the request of their surviving friends; and this was done after Julius Cæsar’s time, by the decree of the senate, who, at the same time, when they ranked them among the number of their gods, appointed also the rites of worship that should be paid to them; and some of the Roman emperors obliged the senate to deify them while they were alive. These things are very largely insisted on, by many ancient and modern writers[73]; so that, upon the whole, it plainly appears, that, whatever they say of a plurality of gods, the wiser sort among the heathen did not deny the unity of the divine essence, in the highest and most proper sense; and, inasmuch as they received the knowledge hereof from the light of nature, we may from hence conclude that this truth might be known that way, as well as by divine revelation.

We shall conclude with some practical inferences from the doctrine contained in this answer.

1. Since he, who is the object of our worship, is the living God; this reproves that lifeless formal way, in which many address themselves to him, in the performance of religious duties, without that reverence and due regard to the divine perfections, which are contained in this character of the Godhead. It is also a very great aggravation, not only of apostacy, but of any degree of backsliding, in those who have made a profession of religion; that it is a _departure from the living God_, Heb. iii. 12. Is he the God and giver of life, and shall we forsake him, who _has the words of eternal life_, John vi. 68. whose sovereign will has the sole disposal thereof?

Again, this consideration, of his being the living God, renders his judgments most terrible, and his wrath insupportable; as the apostle says, _It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God_, Heb. x. 31.

2. From his being the true God, we infer, that all hypocrisy, both in heart and life, is to be avoided; and we should draw nigh to him with a true heart and faith unfeigned; and not like those whom the prophet reproves, when he says, God was _near in their mouth, and far from their reins_, Jer. xii. 2.

Moreover, let us take heed that we do not set up an idol in our hearts, in opposition to him as the true God: whatever has a greater share in our affections than God, or is set up in competition with him, that is, to us, a god, and is therefore inconsistent with our paying that regard which is due to him; as our Saviour says, _Ye cannot serve God and mammon_, Mat. vi. 24. and, upon this account, covetousness is styled idolatry, Col. iii. 5. as the world is loved more than him; and we read of some _whose God is their belly_, Phil. iii. 19. who make provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof, as though this was their chief good. And when we confide in any thing below him, in a religious way, or expect that from the creature which is only to be found in him; or when we esteem men as lords of our faith; or when his sovereignty, or right to govern us, is called in question, while we presumptuously, or wilfully, rebel against him; this is, in effect, a dethroning, or denying him to be the true God: but more of this when we consider the sins forbidden in the first commandment[74].

3. From the unity of the Godhead, we may infer, that we ought to take heed that we do not entertain any conceptions of the divine Being, which are inconsistent herewith; therefore, as we are not to assert a plurality of gods, so we are not to think or speak of God in such a way as tends to overthrow the simplicity of the divine nature; therefore we must not conceive that it is compounded of various parts, all which, being taken together, tend to constitute the divine essence; which gives occasion to that known aphorism, generally laid down by those who treat of this subject, that _whatever is in God, is God_; which we must reckon as one of the incomprehensibles of the divine Being, which when we attempt to speak of, we only give an evident proof of the imperfection of our finite understandings, and that we cannot order our words, by reason of darkness: however, it is necessary, when we lay down this proposition, that we signify what we intend hereby, that so we may not be supposed to use words without ideas; and especially that we may, in some measure, account for those modes of speaking, which are agreeable to scripture, which so often describes God as having a plurality of perfections, and those, in some respects, distinct; and yet, at the same time, that we may not hereby be led to infer a plurality of gods. Here let it be considered,

(1.) That we have not the least similitude, or resemblance, of this in any finite being. Every thing below God is composed of parts, some of which we call integral, as all the parts of matter taken together constitute the whole; others are called essential, as when we say an intelligent being has various powers or properties which are essential to it; so that it would not be complete without every one of them; and that these are all of them distinct, so that we cannot say whatever is in the soul of man is the soul, but every one of those powers, or properties, taken together, constitute the man; but this is by no means to be applied to the divine Being; therefore,

(2.) When we conceive of God, as holy, powerful, just, good, &c. we must not suppose that these perfections are so many ingredients in the divine Being, or that, when taken together, they constitute it, as the whole is constituted of its parts; for then every one of them would have no other than a partial perfection, and consequently the essential glory of one of those attributes would not be equal to the glory of the divine Being, which is supposed to consist of them all; and therefore there would be something in God less than God, or a divine perfection less than all the divine perfections taken together, which we are not to suppose. These are the properties of composition; and therefore, when we speak of God as a simple or uncompounded Being, we cannot forbear to mention them as what are inconsistent with his perfection as such.

Neither are the divine perfections distinct or different from one another, as the various parts of which the whole is constituted are said to be distinct; which follows from the former, since the divine essence has no parts; therefore we are not to suppose, that the divine attributes, considered as they are in God, are so distinguished, as one thing, or being, is from another; or as wisdom, power, justice, mercy, &c. are in men; for that would be to suppose the divine Being as having several distinct, infinitely perfect beings contained in it, which is contrary to its simplicity or unity; or, at least, if we call it one, it would be only so by participation and dependence, as a general or complex idea is said to be one, which partakes of, and depends on, all those particular or simple ideas that are contained in it; or, to illustrate it by numbers, as one hundred is one, as it contains such a number of units in it, as are, all taken together, equal to a hundred; this is not what we mean, when we say God is one.

Moreover, when we speak of the divine perfections, as being in God, we suppose them all essential to him, as opposed to what is accidental. Now an accident is generally described, as what belongs, or is superadded, to a being or subject, which it might have existed without, or have been destitute of, and yet sustained no loss of that perfection, which is essential to it: thus, wisdom, holiness, justice, faithfulness, are accidents in men; so that they who have them not, do not cease to be men, or to have the essential perfection of the human nature: but this is by no means to be applied to the divine Being and attributes; for to suppose God to be destitute of any of them, is as much as to say that he is not infinitely perfect, or that he is not God. This, I think, is generally intended, when it is said, _whatever is in God, is God_; which, because it may be reckoned by some to be a metaphysical speculation, I should have avoided to mention, had it not been, in some respects, necessary, since the unity of God cannot well be conceived of, unless his simplicity be defended; and I do not see how that can be maintained, if this proposition be not duly considered. If I have used more words than are needful, or repeated the same ideas too often, in attempting to explain it, I have done it to avoid some scholastic modes of speaking, or with a design to render what has been said more intelligible; but to this we may add,

(3.) That when we speak of the divine perfections as many, or distinct from one another, as we often do, and have scripture warrant to justify us therein, namely, when we speak of the justice of God, as different from his mercy, or these, from his power, wisdom, faithfulness, &c. this must not be deemed inconsistent with what has been said concerning the divine simplicity: and therefore let it be considered, that the nature and perfections of God are incomprehensible; and therefore all the ideas which we have of them are taken from our comparing them with some small resemblance that there is thereof in intelligent creatures, and, at the same time, separating from them whatever argues imperfection.