Chapter XXXI: Part 31

There is another scripture to the same purpose, in Psal. lxxxi. 12. _So I gave them up unto their own heart’s lust, and they walked in their own counsels_; the meaning of which is, that God left them to themselves, and then lust, or the corrupt habits of sin, which they had acquired, conceived, and, as the apostle James speaks, _brought forth sin_, chap i. 15. or greater acts of sin, which exposed them to a greater degree of condemnation; and all this is to be resolved into God’s permissive will, or purpose, to leave man, in his fallen state, to himself, which he might do, without giving occasion to any to say, on the one hand, that he is the author of sin; or, on the other, that he deals injuriously with the sinful creature.

And to this we may add our Saviour’s words concerning the Jews, in John xii. 39, 40. _Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them_. The sense which they, who misrepresent this doctrine, suppose we put upon them, and conclude, that no other is consistent with the argument we are maintaining, is, that the unbelief, which the Jews are charged with, was principally, if not altogether, resolved into God’s eternal purpose, to blind their eyes, and harden their hearts, namely, by some positive act, as a cause producing this effect, with this view, that they should not be converted, and saved, that thereby his decree to condemn them, might take effect. It is no wonder to find persons prejudiced against this doctrine, when set in such a light; but as this is very remote from the explication we have given thereof, so our Saviour’s design, in this text, is to give an account why those miracles, which he wrought before the Jews, were ineffectual for their conviction; the more immediate cause whereof was the blindness of their mind, and the hardness of their hearts, inasmuch as they had shut their eyes against the light, and, through the corruption of their nature, had hardened their own hearts. As to what God is said to have done, in a judicial way, agreeable to the mode of speaking here used, when it is said, _He hath hardened their hearts_, it imports nothing else but his leaving them to the hardness of their own hearts, or denying them heart-softening grace, which would have been an effectual remedy against it. And may not God deny his grace to sinners, without being charged as the author of sin, or the blame thereof devolved on him, and not themselves? And, since this judicial act of providence cannot but be the result of an eternal purpose, is there any thing, in this decree, that reflects on his perfections, any more than there is in the execution thereof?

There is another scripture, in Prov. xvi. 4. _The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil_; from whence they infer, that the doctrine of reprobation, which they suppose to be founded on a perverse sense given of it, includes in it the divine purpose to make man to damn him; for they conclude that we understand it in that sense; and they proceed a little farther than this, and pretend that we infer from it, that God made men wicked, or that he made them wicked for his glory, as if he had need of sinful man for that end. I should never have thought that so vile a consequence could be drawn from this doctrine, if the learned writer, before mentioned, had not told the world that we infer this from it;[216] and, to give countenance to this suggestion, he quotes a passage out of Dr. Twiss;[217] his words are these: “That all, besides the elect, God hath ordained to bring them forth into the world in their corrupt mass, and to permit them to themselves, to go on in their own ways, and so finally to persevere in sin; and, lastly, to damn them for their sin, for the manifestation of the glory of his justice on them.”

I am not ashamed to own my very great esteem of this excellently learned and pious writer, who was as considerable for that part of learning, which his works discover him to have been conversant in, as most in his day; though I cannot think myself obliged, in every respect, to explain this doctrine as he does; and Dr. Whitby knew very well, that if such an inference, as what we have been speaking of, were to be deduced from the writings of any, who maintain the doctrine of reprobation, it must be from one who gives into the Supralapsarian way of explaining it; and this expression, which, it may be, was a little unguarded, seems to bid as fair for it as any other he could have found out: But any one that reads it, without prejudice, and especially that compares it with what is connected therewith, would not suppose that any thing is intended hereby, that gives the least ground to conclude that God made men wicked for the manifestation of his justice. The most obnoxious part of this quotation, is, _God ordained to bring forth into the world the non-elect, in their corrupt mass_, that is, that persons, who are every day born into the world, are the seed of corrupt and fallen man, and so have the habits of sin propagated with their nature, which many other divines have endeavoured to maintain. What my sentiments are concerning this matter, I shall rather choose to insist on, under a following answer, in which we shall be lead to speak of the doctrine of original sin, and of that corruption of nature, which is the consequence of it; therefore, passing this by, there is nothing, in what remains of this quotation, but what is very defensible, and far from making God the author of sin; for we may observe, that all he says, concerning the providence of God relating to this matter, is only, that he permits, or leaves them to themselves, and he supposes them finally to persevere in sin, without which they cannot be liable to damnation, or the display of the justice of God therein; and if the author, who brings this quotation, had duly considered the words immediately before, he might have seen the reason to have saved himself the trouble of making this reflection upon it; for Dr. Twiss, who, though a Supralapsarian, says, “That he reckons that controversy, relating to the order of God’s decrees, to be merely _Apex Logicus_, as he calls it, _a logical nicety_;” and adds, “That his opinion about it is well known, namely, that God doth not ordain any man to damnation, before the consideration of sin;” and, a few lines after, he says, “That God, of his mere pleasure, created all, but, of his mere pleasure, he damneth none; but every one that is damned, is damned for his sin, and that wilfully committed, and contumaciously continued in by them that come to ripe years.” And if nothing more than this is intended by the doctrine of reprobation, it ought not to be so misrepresented, with a design to cast an odium upon it.

But to return to the scripture but now mentioned: When God is said _to have made the wicked for the day of evil_, the meaning is not that man’s damnation was the end designed by God, in creating him, for there are some other ideas that intervene between God’s purpose to create and condemn him; he must be considered not barely as a creature, but as a sinner; now, as God did not create man that he might sin, he could not be said to create him, that he might condemn him. Accordingly, the sense which some give of this text, is, that God is said to have _made all things for himself_, to wit, for his own glory. And inasmuch as some will be ready to object, that God will have no glory from the wicked, who oppose his name and interest in the world; the answer to this is, that in them, from whom he shall have no glory, as a Saviour, he will, notwithstanding, be glorified as a Judge; which judicial act, though it be deferred for a time, while his long-suffering waits upon them, yet it shall fall heavily on them, in the day of evil: which is very remote from that supposition, that God made man to damn him. And there is a sense given of it by some, who are on the other side of the question, which seems equally probable, or agreeable to the mind of the Holy Ghost, and is not in the least subversive of the doctrine we are maintaining, namely, “That the Lord disposeth all things throughout the world, to serve such ends as he thinks fit to design, which they cannot refuse to comply withal; for if any man be so wicked as to oppose his will, he will not lose their service; but when he brings a public calamity upon a country, employ them to be the executioners of his wrath: Of this there was a remarkable instance in the destruction of Jerusalem, by the Roman soldiers, whom our Saviour used, to punish his crucifiers, not that they undertook that war out of any design or desire to do our blessed Saviour right, but out of an ambition to enslave the world; yet God made use of them for another design, as public executioners, by whom he punished the ungodly[218].” So the Assyrian is said, in Isa. x. 5, 6. to be _the rod of God’s anger_, and to be _sent against the people of Israel, and to lead them captive_, and therein _to tread them down, like the mire in the streets_[219]. And as to what concerns the purpose of God, on which these judicial proceedings depend, this is to be judged of by the execution thereof, as is evidently to be inferred from thence. And this is the sense in which we understand the doctrine of _reprobation_, as in the foregoing argument.

Thus we have endeavoured to prove the doctrine of _election_ and _reprobation_, and defend it from the reproaches and misrepresentations cast upon it by considering it, not only as agreeable to the divine perfections, but as founded on scripture. We shall therefore proceed,

VI. To enquire, whether the contrary doctrine as defended by some, be not derogatory to the divine perfections, and therefore does not contain greater absurdities; or, if expressions of detestation were a sufficient argument to set it aside, whether we have not as much reason to testify our dislike that way, as they have against the doctrine we are maintaining? As to that part of the charge brought against us, as though we represented God as severe and cruel to his creatures; or that it is inconsistent with his goodness to suppose that he leaves any to themselves in their fallen state, so as not to give them the means of grace, when he knew that being destitute thereof, they could not believe, and so would fall short of salvation, pursuant to his eternal purpose relating thereunto: can this be said to be inconsistent with his goodness, any more than all his other displays of vindictive justice? If they suppose that it is, we might easily retort the argument upon them since they will not assert, that the whole race of fallen man shall be saved; and, if so, must we not suppose that God certainly fore-knew this, otherwise where is his infinite understanding? And if he knew that this would be the consequence of their being born, and living in the world, where is his goodness in bringing them into it? If it be said that they have a free-will to choose what is good, and so had a power to attain salvation; therefore their not attaining it, is wholly owing to themselves. Suppose this were taken for granted, without entering on that subject at present; yet it must be farther enquired whether they will allow that God fore-know that they would abuse this freedom of will, or power to make themselves holy or happy; and, if so, could he not have prevented this? Did he make a will that he could not govern or restrain? Could he not have prevented the sin that he knew they would commit? And, if he could, why did he not do it, and thereby prevent their ruin, which he knew would be the consequence hereof? So that if men are disposed to find fault with the divine dispensation, it is no difficult matter to invent some methods of reasoning to give umbrage to it; and, indeed this objection is not so much against God’s fore-ordaining what comes to pass, as it is a spurning at his judicial hand, and finding fault with the equity of his proceedings, when he takes vengeance on sinners for their iniquities; or charging severity on God, because all mankind are not the objects of his goodness, and consequently not elected to eternal life.

But passing by this, we shall proceed to consider how, in several instances, the methods used to oppose the doctrine, which we are maintaining, are attended with many absurd consequences, derogatory to the divine perfections; which farther discovers the unreasonableness of their opposition to it; particularly,

1. It represents God as indeterminate, or unresolved what to do, which is the plain sense of their asserting that he has not fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. To suppose him destitute of any determination, is directly contrary to his wisdom and sovereignty, and it would argue that there are some excellencies and perfections belonging to intelligent creatures, which are to be denied to him, who is a God of infinite perfection: but if, on the other hand, they suppose that every thing, which comes to pass, is determined by him; nevertheless, that his determinations, as they respect the actions of intelligent creatures, are not certain and peremptory, but such as may be disannulled, or rendered ineffectual as taking his measures from the uncertain determinations of man’s will; this is, in effect to say, that they are not determined by God; for an uncertain determination, or a conditional purpose, cannot properly be called a determination. Thus for God to determine, that he that believes shall be saved, without resolving to give that faith which is necessary to salvation, is, in effect, not to determine that any shall be saved; for, since they suppose that it is left to man’s free-will to believe or not, and liberty is generally explained by them, as implying that a person might, had he pleased, have done the contrary to that which he is said to do freely; it follows that all mankind might not have believed, and repented, and consequently that they might have missed of salvation, and then the purpose of God, relating thereunto, is the same as though he had been indeterminate, as to that matter. But, if, on the other hand, they suppose that to prevent this disappointment, God over-rules the free actions of men, in order to the accomplishment of his own purpose, then they give up their own cause, and allow us all that we contend for; but this they are not disposed to do; therefore we cannot see how the independency of the divine will can be defended by them, consistently with their method of opposing this doctrine.

Again, if it be supposed, as an expedient to fence against this absurd consequence, that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and that his determinations were the result thereof, and, consequently, that the event is as certain as the divine fore-knowledge, this is what is not universally allowed of by them; for many are sensible that it is as hard to prove, that God fore-knew what must certainly come to pass, without inferring the inevitable necessity of things, as it is to assert that, he willed or determined them, whereby they are rendered eventually necessary. And if they suppose that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and, particularly, that they would convert themselves, and improve the liberty of their will, so as to render themselves objects fit for divine grace, without supposing that he determined to exert that power and grace, which was necessary thereunto; this is to exclude his providence from having a hand in the government of the world, or to assert that his determinations rather respect what others will do, than what he will enable them to do, which farther appears to be inconsistent with the divine perfections.

2. There are some things, in their method of reasoning, which seem to infer a mutability in God’s purpose which is all one as to suppose, that he had no purpose at all relating to the event of things: Thus, in opposing the doctrine of election, they refer to such-like scriptures as these, namely, that _God will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth_, 1 Tim. ii. 4. applying this act of the divine will to every individual, even to those who shall not be saved, or come to the knowledge of the truth; and they understand our Saviour’s words, _How often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not? Behold your house is left unto you desolate_, Mat. xxiii. 37, 38. as implying, that God purposed to save them, but was obliged afterwards, by the perverseness of their actions, to change his purpose. What is this, but to assert him to be dependent and mutable?

3. They, who suppose that salvation is not to be resolved into the power and will of God, must ascribe it to the will of man, by which we determine ourselves to perform those duties, which render us the objects of divine mercy; and then what the apostle says, _It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy_, Rom. ix. 16. would hardly be intelligible, or a defensible proposition; and when it is said, _We love him, because he first loved us_, 1 John iv. 19. the proposition ought to be inverted, and it should rather be said, He loved us, because we first loved him; and that humbling question, which the apostle proposes, _Who maketh thee to differ_, 1 Cor. iv. 7. should be answered, as one proudly did, I make myself to differ.

4. As to what concerns the doctrine of discriminating grace, which cannot well be maintained, without asserting a discrimination in God’s purpose relating thereunto, which is what we call election; if this be denied, there would not be so great a foundation for admiration, or thankfulness, as there is, or for any to say, as one of Christ’s disciples did, speaking the sense of all the rest, _Lord, how is it, that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world_, John xiv. 22. Nor is there so great an inducement to humility, as what will arise from the firm belief, that, when no eye pitied the poor helpless and miserable sinner, he was singled out of a ruined and undone world, among that remnant whom God first designed for, and then brought to glory.

VII. We shall now consider those methods of reasoning, by which the contrary doctrine is defended, and enquire into the sense of those scriptures, which are generally brought for that purpose; and shall endeavour to make it appear, that they may be explained, in a different way, more consistently with the divine perfections. It is plain that the main design of those, who oppose the doctrine of election, is to advance the goodness of God; and, since all mankind cannot be said to be equally partakers of the effects of this goodness, inasmuch as all shall not be saved, they suppose that God has put all mankind into a salvable state; and, accordingly, as the gospel-overture is universal, so God’s purpose to save, includes all to whom it is made; but the event, and consequently the efficacy of the divine purpose relating hereunto, depends on the will of man; and, that there may be no obstruction which may hinder this design from taking effect, God has given him a power to yield obedience to his law, which, though it be not altogether so perfect as it was at first, but is somewhat weakened by the fall; yet it is sufficient to answer the end and design of the gospel, that is to bring him to salvation if he will, and the event of things is wholly put on this issue; so that, though there be not an universal salvation, there is a determination in God to save all upon this condition. How far this is inconsistent with the divine perfections has been already considered; and we are farther to enquire, whether there be any foundation for it in scripture, and what is the sense of some texts, which are often brought in defence thereof.

One text referred to, is, those words of the apostle, in 1 Tim. ii. 4. _Who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth_; and another scripture, to the same purpose, in 2 Pet. iii. 9. _The Lord is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance_; and several others, from whence they argue the universality of the divine purpose relating to the salvation of mankind, or that none are rejected, or excluded from it, by any act of God’s will, and consequently that the doctrine of election and reprobation is to be exploded, as contrary hereunto.

That the sense of these scriptures cannot be, that God designed that all men should be eventually saved, or come to the knowledge of the truth, so that none of them should perish, is evident, from many other scriptures, that speak of the destruction of ungodly men, which, doubtless, will be allowed by all; therefore it follows, that the meaning of these two scriptures, is not that God purposed, or determined, what shall never come to pass, which is inconsistent with the glory of his wisdom and sovereignty, as has been before observed; but they are to be understood with those limitations, which the word _all_, which refers to the persons mentioned, as designed to be saved, is subject to in other scriptures; as will be more particularly considered, when we treat of universal and particular redemption, under a following answer[220]. And therefore, at present, we need only observe, that these scriptures may be set in a true light, that the word _all_ is oftentimes taken for all sorts of men, or things; as when it is said, that _of every thing that creepeth upon the earth, there went in two and two unto Noah into the ark_, Gen. vii. 8, 9. that is all the _species_ of living creatures, not every individual; so, Acts x. 12. in the vision that Peter saw of the sheet let down from heaven, in which _there were all manner of four-footed beasts_[221], &c. and it is said concerning our Saviour, that he _went about, healing all manner of sickness, and all manner of diseases among the people_[222]; and elsewhere God promises, that _he will pour out his Spirit on all flesh_, Acts ii. 17. that is, persons of all ages and conditions, young and old.

There are many instances of the like nature in scripture, which justify this sense of the word _all_; and it seems plain, from the context, that it is to be so taken in the former of the scriptures, but now referred to, when it is said, _God will have all men to be saved_; for he exhorts, in ver. 1. that _prayer and supplication should be made for all men_, that is, for men of all characters and conditions in the world, and, in particular, for _kings, and all that are in authority_, and thereby he takes occasion to resolve a matter in dispute among them, whether those kings that were tyrants and oppressors, ought to be prayed for, when he tells them, that all sorts of men are to be prayed for; and the reason of this is assigned, namely, _because God will have all men_, that is, all sorts of men, _to be saved_.

Moreover, they whom God will save, are said to be such as _shall come_, that is, as he will bring _to the knowledge of the truth_. Now it is certain, that God never designed to bring every individual to the knowledge of the truth; for, if he did, his purpose is not fulfilled, or his providence runs counter to it, for every individual of mankind have not the gospel; therefore it follows, that since God did not purpose that all men should come to the knowledge of the truth, the foregoing words, _Who will have all men to be saved_, are not to be understood in any other sense, but as signifying _all sorts of men_. Neither can it well be proved, whatever may be attempted in order thereto, that the following words, which speak of Christ’s being _a Mediator between God and men_, intend, that he performs this office for every individual man, even for those that shall not be saved; for then it would be executed in vain for a great part of them, as will be farther considered in its proper place; therefore we must conclude, that, in the former of these scriptures, nothing else is intended, but that God determined to give saving grace to all sorts of men.

And as for the latter, in which the apostle Peter says, that _God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance_; there the word _all_ is expressly limited, in the context, as referring only to those who are elect and faithful; and therefore he says, including himself among them, that _the Lord is long-suffering to us-ward_. Now if we observe the character which he gives of the church, to which he writes, in the beginning of both his epistles, (which, as he says, in ver. 1. of this chapter, were directed to the same persons) it is as great as is given of any in scripture; and they are distinguished from those profane _scoffers, who walked after their own lusts_, and other ungodly men, whose perdition he speaks of, as what would befal them in the dissolution of the world, by fire, in the day of Judgment; and they are described not only as _elect unto obedience_, and as having _obtained like precious faith_ with the apostles, but they were such as God would _keep, through faith, unto salvation_; therefore the apostle might well say, concerning them, that God determined that none of them should perish, without advancing any thing that militates against the doctrine we are maintaining.

_Object._ The apostle, in this verse, speaks of God, as willing that _all should come to repentance_; therefore they are distinguished from that part of the church, who had obtained like precious faith, and were included in the character that he gives of some of them, in both his epistles, which infers their being then in a state of salvation; therefore the word, _all_, in this text, is not subject to the limitation before mentioned, but must be applied to _all the world_, and consequently the meaning is, that God is not willing that any of mankind should perish, but that all should come to repentance.

_Answ._ The apostle, in this text, speaks of God’s deferring the day of judgment, and perdition of ungodly men, and so exercising his long-suffering towards the world in general; not that he designed to bring them all to repentance hereby, for that would be to intend a thing which he knew should never come to pass: But the end of his patience, to the world in general, is, that all whom he designed to bring to repentance, or who were chosen to it, as well as to obedience, and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus, should be brought to it.

There are other arguments, which they bring in defence of their sense of the doctrine of election, as supposing that it is not peremptory, determinate, or unchangeable, and such as infers the salvation of those who are the objects thereof, taken from those scriptures, which, as they apprehend, ascribe a kind of disappointment to God; as when he says, in Isa. v. 4. concerning his vineyard, to wit, the church of the Jews, _Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?_ and our Saviour’s words, in Luke xiii. 6. that _he sought fruit on the fig-tree_, meaning the church of the Jews in his day, _but found none_; and, speaking concerning Jerusalem, he says, in Matth. xxiii. 37, 38. _How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! Behold, your house is left unto you desolate_; therefore they conclude, that God’s purpose, or design of grace, may be defeated; so that these, and many other scriptures, not unlike to them, are inconsistent with the doctrine of election, as ascertaining the event, to wit, the salvation of those who are chosen to eternal life; which leads us, particularly to consider the sense thereof.

As to the first of them, in which God says, by the prophet, _What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?_ He condescends therein to speak of himself after the manner of men, as he often does in scripture, and is said to look for what might reasonably have been expected, as the consequence of all the means of grace, which he had vouchsafed to them; the reasonableness of the thing is called his looking for it, as though he should say, it might have been expected, from the nature of the thing, that they, who had been laid under such obligations, should express some gratitude for them, and so have brought forth some fruit, to the glory of God. And those words, which seem to attribute disappointment to him, when it is said, _I looked_, &c. signifying nothing else but the ingratitude of the people, that they did not walk agreeably to the obligations they were under; not that God was really disappointed, for that would militate against his omniscience. He knew, before he laid these obligations on them, what their behaviour would be; therefore, had he eyes of flesh, or seen as man seeth, their behaviour would have tended to disappoint him; but there is no disappointment in the divine mind, though the sin reproved in the people be the same as though it had had a tendency to defeat the divine purpose, or disappoint his expectation.

As for that other scripture, in which it is said, that _he sought fruit on the fig-tree, but found none_, that is to be explained in the same way, _he sought fruit_, that is, it might reasonably have been expected, but _he found none_, that is, they did not act agreeably to the means of grace which they enjoyed. Therefore neither this, nor the other scripture, does in the least argue, that the purpose of God was not concerned about the event, or that he did not know what it would be; for, as his providential dispensation gives us ground to conclude, that he determined to leave them to themselves, so he knew beforehand that this, through the corruption of their nature, would issue in their unfruitfulness, otherwise he is not omniscient. Therefore it follows, that neither of these scriptures have the least tendency to overthrow the doctrine of the certainty and peremptoriness of the divine purpose.

As to what our Saviour says, relating to his willingness, to _have gathered Jerusalem, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but they would not_, it may be taken, without the least absurdity attending the sense thereof, as referring to the end and design of his ministry among them; and it is as though he should say, your nation shall be broken, and you scattered, as a punishment inflicted on you for your iniquities, and this destruction would have been prevented, had you believed in me; so that all that can be inferred from hence, is, that Christ’s ministry and doctrine were attended with that convincing evidence, being confirmed by so many undoubted miracles, that their unbelief was not only charged on them as a crime, but was the occasion of their ruin; or (as it is said in the following words) of their _houses being left unto them desolate_. And this might have been prevented, by their making a right improvement of that common grace, which they had; for though it be not in man’s power,[223] without the special influence of divine grace, to believe to the saving of the soul; yet I know no one who denies that it is in his power to do more good, and avoid more evil, than he does, or so far to attend to the preaching of the gospel, as not to oppose it with that malice and envy as the Jews did; and, had they paid such a deference to Christ’s ministry, as this amounted to, they would not have been exposed to those judgments which afterwards befel them; for it is one thing to say, that men, by improving common grace, can attain salvation, and another thing to conclude, that they might have escaped temporal judgments thereby.

Therefore, if it be enquired, what was God’s intention in giving them the gospel? the answer is very plain: It was not that hereby he might bring them all into a state of salvation, for then it would have taken effect; but it was, as appears by the event, to bring those, that should be saved among them, to that salvation, and to let others know, whether they would hear, or whether they would forbear, that God had a right to their obedience, and therefore that the message which the Redeemer brought to them, ought to have met with better entertainment from them, than it did. And if it be farther enquired, whether, provided they had believed, their ruin would have been prevented? This is an undoubted consequence, from our Saviour’s words; but yet it does not follow, from hence, that it was a matter of uncertainty with God, whether they should believe or no; for it is one thing to say, that he would not have punished them, unless they rejected our Saviour; and another thing to suppose that he could not well determine whether they would reject him or no. So that the purpose of God must be considered, as agreeing with the event of things, and the design of Christ’s ministry, as being what it really was; yet he might, notwithstanding, take occasion to charge the Jews’ destruction upon their own obstinacy.

There are many other scriptures, which they bring to the like purpose, which I pass over, because the sense they give of them differs not much from that, in which they understand the scriptures before-mentioned, and their reasoning from them, in opposition to this doctrine is the same, and the same answer may be given to it.

However, I cannot but observe, that as, from some scriptures, they attribute disappointment to God, they represent him, from others, as wishing, but in vain, that it had happened otherwise, and as being grieved at the disappointment; so they understand those words, in Psal. lxxxi. 13, 14. _Oh! that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways! I should soon have subdued their enemies, and turned my hand against their adversaries_; and that, in Luke xix. 42. _If_, or, _Oh! that thou hadst known, even thou at least, in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes_.

As for the sense of these, and such-like scriptures, it is no more than this, that the thing which they refused to perform, was, in itself, most desirable, or a matter to be wished for, and not that God can be said to wish for a thing that cannot be attained. And when our Saviour laments over Jerusalem, as apprehending their destruction near at hand, whether the words are to be considered in the form of a wish, that it had been otherwise, or an intimation, that if they had known the things of their peace, their destruction would not have ensued, it is only to be understood as a representation of the deplorableness of their condition, which, with a tenderness of human compassion, he could not speak of, without tears: Yet we are not to suppose that this mode of expression is applicable to the divine will; so that, when the misery of that people is hereby set forth, we are not to strain the sense of words, taken from human modes of speaking, so far, as to suppose that the judicial acts of God, in punishing a sinful people, are not the execution of his purpose relating thereunto.

Again, when the Spirit is said to be _grieved_, Eph. iv. 30. or _resisted_, Acts vii. 15. nothing else is intended hereby, but that men act in such a way, as that, had the Spirit of God been subject to human passions, it would have been matter of grief to him. But far be it from us to suppose that the divine nature is liable hereunto, or that any disappointment can attend his purposes, which has a tendency to excite this passion in men. And when he is said to be resisted, it is not meant as though his will, or design, could be rendered ineffectual, but it only implies, that men oppose what the Spirit communicated by the prophets, or in his word. This a person may do, and yet it may be truly said, that _the counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, the thoughts of his heart to all generations_, Psal. xxxiii. 11.

VIII. We shall proceed to consider several objections that are made against the doctrine we have endeavoured to maintain, and what reply may be given to them. Some have been occasionally mentioned under several foregoing heads, and there are others which require a distinct reply.

_Object._ 1. That the doctrine of absolute Election and Reprobation was altogether unknown by the Fathers in the three first centuries, and that it was first brought into the Christian world by Augustin; before whose time, the only account we have of it, is, that God foreknowing who would live piously, or believe and persevere to the end, accordingly predestinated them to eternal life, or determined to pass them by, and so is said to have rejected them.[224]

_Answ._ This objection, were it literally true, cannot have any tendency to overthrow this doctrine, in the opinion of those, who depend not on the credit of Augustin, as defending it, on the one hand, nor are staggered by the opposition made to it by some of the Fathers, who lived before his time, on the other; and therefore we might have passed it by, without making any reply to it. However, since it contains a kind of insult, or boast, which will have its weight with some, it may be expected that a few things should be said, in answer to it.

We will not deny but that the Fathers, before the Pelagian heresy was broached in the world; expressed themselves, in many parts of their writings, in so lax and unguarded a manner concerning the doctrines of predestination, free-will, and grace, that, had they lived after those doctrines began to be publickly contested, one would have thought that they had verged too much towards Pelagius’s side; but, since they were not the subject-matter of controversy in those ages, it is no wonder to find them less cautious in their modes of expressing themselves, than they might otherwise have been; and therefore it is a just observation, which one[225] makes of this matter, that they had to do with the Manichees, and some of the heathen, who supposed that men sinned by a fatal necessity of nature, as though there were no wicked action committed in the world, but some would be ready to excuse it, from the impotency or propensity of human nature to sin, which rendered it, as they supposed, unavoidable; and others took occasion, from hence, to charge God with being the author of sin. It is very probable the Fathers, in those ages, were afraid of giving countenance to this vile opinion, and therefore they were less on their guard, in some respects, than they would have been, had they been to encounter with Pelagius, or his followers.

And indeed, Augustin himself, before he took occasion to enquire more diligently into the state of this controversy, gave into the same way of expressing his sentiments about the power of nature, or the grace of God, as some others of the Fathers had done, and concluded that faith was in our power, as well a duty incumbent on us, but afterwards retracted such modes of speaking as the result of more mature deliberation.[226] But notwithstanding though he expressed himself in a different way from them, yet he often takes occasion, from some passages which he purposely refers to in their writings, to vindicate them as holding the same faith, though not always using the same phrases. And, after he had thus defended Cyprian and Ambrose, in that respect, he puts a very charitable construction on their unguarded way of expressing themselves, and says, that this arose from their not having any occasion to engage in that controversy, which was on foot in his day.[227] The same might be said to Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, Chrysostom, and several others, whom some modern writers defend from the charge of favouring the Pelagian scheme, by referring to some places in their writings, in which they acknowledge, that the salvation of men is owing to the grace of God, whereby all occasions of glorying are taken away from the creature,[228] or expressions used by them to the like purpose. And the learned Vossius, though he acknowledges, that the Fathers, before Augustin, expressed themselves in such a way, as is represented in the objection, yet he vindicates them from the charge of verging towards the Pelagian, or Semi-Pelagian heresy; inasmuch as he concludes, that when they speak of God’s predestinating men to eternal life, on the foresight of good works, they only intend those good works, which God would enable them to perform; and this will clear many of those expressions which they use, from this imputation.[229] But if all these endeavours to establish our claim to those Fathers, who lived before Augustin, as not being opposers of this doctrine, appear to be to no purpose, yet this will not weaken the truth thereof; for we suppose it to be founded on scripture, and several consequences plainly deduced from it, and therefore it doth not want the suffrage of human testimony to support it.

But if it be said, that this is a very desirable thing as doubtless it is, we might consider this doctrine, as obtaining very much in, and after Augustin’s time, being examined and defended by very considerable numbers of men, who have transmitted it down to posterity, throughout the various ages of the church. Notwithstanding, by whomsoever it is defended, or opposed, we lay no great stress on human authority, as a judicious divine well observes[230]. We shall therefore proceed to consider some other objections, which it will be more necessary for us to give a particular answer to.

_Object._ 2. To the doctrine of God’s purpose’s ascertaining all events, it is objected that he has not determined the bounds of the life of man, but that it may be lengthened, or shortened, by the intervention of second causes. This is nothing else but the applying one branch of this controversy, relating to the decrees of God, to a particular instance. And it was very warmly debated in the Netherlands, towards the beginning of the last century.[231] This objection is managed in a popular way, and is principally adapted to give prejudice to those who are disposed to pass over, or set aside, these necessary distinctions, which, if duly considered, would not only shorten the debate, but set the matter in a clearer light, which we shall endeavour to do; but shall first consider their method of reasoning on this subject, and the sense they give of some scriptures, which as they suppose, give countenance to this objection.

They therefore thus argue, that if the term of life be immoveably fixed by God, then it is a vain thing for any one to use those means that are necessary to preserve it, and the skill of the physician, as well as the virtue of medicine, is altogether needless; and the good advice which is often given to persons, to take heed that they do not shorten their lives by intemperance, will be to no purpose; for they have a reply ready at hand, namely, that they shall live their appointed time, do what they will. And that, which is still more absurd, is, that if a person attempts to lay violent hands upon himself, it will be to no purpose, if God has determined that he shall live longer; or if he has determined that he shall die, then he is guilty of no crime, for he only fulfils the divine purpose.

They add, moreover, that this not only renders all our supplications to God to preserve our lives, or to restore us from sickness, when we are in danger of death, needless; but our conduct herein is a practical denial of the argument we maintain; for what is this, but to suppose that the bounds of life are unalterably fixed.

As to what concerns the countenance, which they suppose, scripture gives to this objection, they refer us to those places in which the life of man is said to be lengthened or shortened; accordingly, there are promises of _long life given to the righteous who love God, and keep his commandments_, Exod. xx. 12. Deut. iv. 40. 1 Kings iii. 14. and Solomon says expressly, _The fear of the Lord prolongeth days; but the years of the wicked shall be shortened_, Prov. x. 27. and elsewhere he speaks of the _wicked’s dying before their time_, Eccl. vii. 17. and the Psalmist says, that _bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days_, Psal. lv. 23.

They also refer to that scripture in which Martha tells our Saviour, that _if he had been with her brother Lazarus_, before his death, _he had not died_, John xi. 21. which either contradicts the argument we are maintaining, or else Martha was mistaken; which, had she been, our Saviour would have reproved her, for asserting that which was false.

Moreover, they add, that when the old world was destroyed in the deluge, and so died before their time, they might have prolonged their lives, had they repented in that space of time, wherein _Noah as a preacher of righteousness_, gave them warning of this desolating judgment, and Christ, _by his Spirit_, in him, _preached to them_, as the apostle says, 1 Pet. iii. 20. which, doubtless, was with a design to bring them to repentance, and save them from this destruction.

And when Abraham pleaded with God in the behalf of Sodom, God tells him, that _if he found but ten righteous persons in the city, he would spare it for their sake_, Gen. xviii. 32. which is inconsistent with his determination, that they should all die by an untimely death, if the bounds of their lives had been fixed.

And lastly, they refer to that scripture, in which God first told Hezekiah, that _he should die, and not live_, and afterwards, that he would _add to his days fifteen years_, Isa. xxxviii. 1. compared with 5.

_Answ_. To prepare our way for a reply to this objection, let us consider that the contrary side of the question, which we are maintaining, is equally supported by express texts of scripture: thus it is said _His days are determined, the number of his months are with thee; thou hast appointed him bounds that he cannot pass_, Job xiv. 5. than which, nothing can be more express, where he speaks concerning that decree of God, which respects all mankind, without exception, and sets forth his absolute sovereignty, and the irreversibleness of his purpose herein; and the apostle Paul, in reasoning with the Athenians concerning the decree and providence of God in whom we live, move, and have our being says, that _he hath determined the times before appointed, and fixed the bounds of their habitation_, Acts xvii. 26. As he has placed men upon the earth, by his decree and providence, so he has determined not only the place where they should live, but the time of their continuance in the world. This was no new doctrine; for the heathen had been instructed in it by their own philosophers and therefore the apostle speaks their sense, especially that of the _stoicks_, about this matter.[232] When he mentions the times are determined, it is not to be understood of the seasons of the year, which God has fixed to return in their certain courses, but the seasons appointed for every work, or for every occurrence of life; and, among the rest, the time of life, and of serving our generation therein, as Solomon expressly says, in Eccl. iii. 1, 2. _To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose; a time to be born, and a time to die._ Several other scriptures might be brought to the same purpose, as a farther proof hereof, namely, those in which God has foretold the death of particular persons, 2 Sam. xii. 14. 1 Kings xiv. 12. chap. xxii. 28.

Moreover, if the providence of God is conversant about all the actions of men, and _the hairs of their head are all numbered_, Matt. x. 30. so that the smallest changes in life do not come by chance, but are subject thereto; then certainly the time of life must be subjected to his providence, who is styled, _Our life, and the length of our days_, Deut. xxx. 20. He must therefore certainly be considered as the sovereign Arbiter thereof, which doctrine none that own a providence, can, with any shadow of reason, gainsay; so that this doctrine is agreeable not only to several scriptures, but to the very nature and perfections of God.