Chapter XXXII: Part 32

This being premised we return to the arguments laid down against it, and the scriptures cited to give countenance to them. It is certain, that two contradictory propositions cannot be both true in the same sense; and the scriptures, which are exactly harmonious, as well as infallibly true, no where contradict themselves. Therefore we must consider what answer may be given to the objections before-mentioned; and, that our work herein may be shortened, we may observe, that the bounds of life are twofold; either such as men might have lived to, according to the common course of nature if nothing had intervened to ruin the constitution, or no disease, or violent death, had broken the thread of life before; or that time which God has ordained that men shall live, whether it be longer or shorter: the former of these respects the lengthening or shortening of life, by the influence of second causes; and, in this respect, we do not suppose that the terms of life are immoveably fixed, but that in some, it is longer, and, in others shorter; for it is certain, that by intemperance, or other methods, men may shorten their days; or, by laying violent hands on themselves, not live the time that otherwise they would have done. But if we consider the over-ruling, or disposing providence of God, as conversant about this matter, there is nothing happens without the concurrence thereof. Therefore persons, who shorten their days by intemperance, do this by the permissive providence of God; though he be not the author of their intemperance, which is sinful, yet he permits, or determines not to hinder it, and consequently though he has fixed the bounds of life, which can neither be lengthened or shortened, yet knowing what men will do, in a natural way, to shorten them, he determines that this shall put an end to their lives.[233] And when we read, in scripture, of God’s _delivering_ him, who dies a violent death, _into his hands_, who is the immediate cause of it, Exod. xxi. 13. God is not the author of the sin of the murderer; yet providence is not wholly to be exempted from that action, so far as it is not sinful, but purely natural, or the effect of power; and, when this is said to have a tendency to shorten the life of man, it does not detract from the time that he had in his own purpose affixed to it. We must also consider, that his decree and providence respects the means, as well as the end, which are always inseparably connected, and equally subject thereunto.

These things being premised, we proceed more particularly to answer the arguments brought against this doctrine. And,

1. When it is said, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, renders all means for the preservation thereof unnecessary, that depends upon a false supposition, namely, that God does not ordain the means as well as the end. If God had determined that persons shall live, he has determined to give them the supports of life, and to prevent every thing that might tend to destroy it; so, on the other hand, when he takes them away, by a disease, this is ordained by him, as a means conducive thereunto. If health is to be supported, or recovered, by means, and thereby life preserved, God has ordained that these means shall be used, as well as the end attained.

2. As to persons shortening their lives by intemperance, this has a natural tendency to do it; so that, though God be not the author of the sin, he certainly knows, before-hand, what methods the sinner will take to hasten his end, and leaves him to himself; so that, though the sin be not from God, the punishment, which is the consequence thereof, may truly be said to be from him, and therefore this was determined by him.

And when it is farther objected, that they, who destroy their health, or lay violent hands on themselves, cannot be said to sin in so doing, because they do that which tends to fulfil the divine will, provided God has determined the fatal event; herein they oppose this doctrine, without taking the words in the same sense in which it is maintained; for it is well known, that the will of God is sometimes taken for that prescribed rule that he has given us, which is the matter of our duty, in which sense we readily allow, that he that fulfils it, cannot be said to sin. But, besides this, it is sometimes taken for his purpose to permit sin; or, to give the sinner up to his own heart’s lusts, to act that which he hates, and is resolved to punish. In this sense, the sinner is said to do that which God would not have suffered him to do, had he willed the contrary; but it is a very groundless insinuation, to suppose that this exempts him from the guilt of sin.

3. To say, that God’s fixing the bounds of life, is inconsistent with our praying, that our lives may be prolonged, or that we may be delivered from sickness, or death, when we are apprehensive that we are drawing nigh to it, is no just consequence; for as we do not pray that God would alter his purpose, when we desire any blessing of him, but suppose this to be hid from us, and expect not to know it any otherwise than by the event; so a person, who prays to be delivered from sickness, or death, is not to address the divine Majesty, as one who presumptuously, and without ground, supposes that God has decreed that he shall immediately die, but as one who hopes, or who has no ground to conclude otherwise, but that he will make it appear, by answering his prayer, that he has determined to spare his life. For the secret purpose of God, relating to the event of things, is no more to be a rule of duty, inasmuch as it is secret, than if there had been no purpose relating thereunto; but yet it does not follow from hence, that this matter is not determined by him.

4. As to those scriptures, that seem to give countenance to this objection, they may, without the least absurdity, be understood consistently with other scriptures, which have been before produced, whereby it is proved, that God has fixed, or determined the bounds of life. As for those _promises_, which God has made of a long life, _to those that love him, and keep his commandments_, the meaning thereof is this, that he will certainly bestow this blessing, either in kind or value, on those whose conversation is such as is therein described; this none can deny, who rightly understand the meaning of that scripture, in which it is said, that _godliness hath the promise of the life that now is_, as well as of _that which is to come_, 1 Tim. iv. 8. But, so far as it affects the argument we are maintaining, we must consider, that that efficacious grace, whereby we are enabled to love God, and keep his commandments, is as much his gift, and consequently the result of his purpose, as the blessing connected with it; therefore if he has determined that we shall enjoy a long and happy life in this world, and to enable us to live a holy life therein; if both the end and the means are connected together, and are equally the objects of God’s purpose, then it cannot justly be inferred from hence, that the event, relating to the lengthening or shortening our lives, is not determined by him.

As for those scriptures that speak of the wicked’s _dying before their time_, or _not living half their days_, these are to be understood agreeably to that distinction before-mentioned, between men’s dying sooner, than they would have done according to the course of nature, or the concurrence of second causes thereunto, in which sense it is literally true, that many do not live out half their days; and their dying sooner than God had before determined. May not the sovereign Disposer of all things inflict a sudden and immediate death, as the punishment of sin, without giving us reason to conclude that this was not pre-concerted, if we may so express it, or determined beforehand?

As for that other scripture, referred to in the objection, in which Martha tells our Saviour, that if he had been with Lazarus, when sick, _he had not died_, she does not suppose Christ’s being there, would have frustrated the divine purpose, for then, he would, doubtless, have reproved her for it; whereas, in reality, he did not come to visit him, because he knew that God had purposed that he should die, and be afterwards raised from the dead; so that this does not argue that he has not fixed the bounds, or term of life.

Again, as for that argument, to support this objection, taken from the destruction of the world in the flood, or that of Sodom, by fire from heaven, that they might have prolonged their lives, had they repented, we do not deny but that this would have been the consequence thereof, but then their repentance would have been as much determined by God, as their deliverance from that untimely death, which befel them.

The last scripture mentioned, in which God, by the prophet Isaiah, tells Hezekiah, that _he should die, and not live_; notwithstanding which, fifteen years were added to his life, which is very frequently insisted on, by those who deny the unalterable decree of God, relating to life and death, as that which they apprehend to be an unanswerable argument to support it: to this it may be replied, that when God says, _Set thine house in order, for thou shalt die, and not live_, he gave Hezekiah to understand, that his disease was what we call mortal, namely, such as no skill of the physician, or natural virtue of medicine, could cure, and therefore that he must expect to die, unless God recovered him by a miracle; and Hezekiah, doubtless, took the warning in this sense, otherwise it would have been a preposterous thing for him to have prayed for life, as it would have been an affront to God, to have desired to have changed his purpose. But God, on the other hand, designed, by this warning, to put him upon importunate prayer for life; therefore when he says, _I will add to thy days fifteen years_, the meaning is only this, though thou mightest before have expected death, my design in giving thee that intimation, was, that thou shouldest pray for life, which might be given thee by a miracle, and now I will work a miracle, and fulfil, in this respect, what I before purposed in adding to thy life fifteen years.

_Object._ 3. It is farther objected, against the doctrine of election and reprobation, and particularly the immutability of God’s purpose therein, that it tends to establish a fatal necessity of things, and overthrow that known distinction that there is between things, as necessary, or contingent, as though nothing in the whole series of causes and effects could happen otherwise than it does, and God himself were confined to such a method of acting, that it was impossible for him to have done the contrary; which is nothing else but the Stoical doctrine of fate applied to, and defended by some scriptures, though it be contrary to others, which speak of the uncertainty of future events.

Thus God speaks of the Jews, turning from their iniquities, and his bestowing pardoning mercy, as the result thereof, as an uncertain event, when he says, in Jer. xxxvi. 3. _It may be that the house of Judah will hear all the evil, which I purpose to do unto them, that they may return every man from his evil way, that I may forgive their iniquity and their sin._ So when God gave the Jews a sign, immediately before the captivity, taken from the prophet Ezekiel’s personating one that was removing his stuff, or household-goods, as signifying, that the nation in general should soon remove to other habitations, when carried captive into Babylon, he adds, upon this occasion, _It may be they will consider, though they be a rebellious house_, Ezek. xii. 3. And the prophet Zephaniah exhorts the people _to seek righteousness and meekness_, and, as the consequence thereof, says, _It may be ye shall be hid in the day of the Lord’s anger_, Zeph. ii. 3. And the apostle speaks of the uncertainty of the divine dispensations of grace, when he advises Timothy, _in meekness, to instruct those that oppose themselves, if God, peradventure, will give them repentance, to the acknowledging of the truth_, 2 Tim. ii. 25. which is directly contrary to the unalterable necessity of events, depending upon the divine purpose, according to the doctrine of election.

_Answ._ 1. As to the former part of this objection, in which this doctrine is pretended to have taken its rise from, and to be agreeable to, that of the Stoics, concerning fate and destiny, it will not be much to our purpose to enquire what was the opinion of that sect of philosophers concerning it; and, indeed, it will be difficult to fix on a just sense thereof, in which they all agree. Some are of opinion, that many of them intended nothing else thereby, but the immutability of God’s purposes, but the dispensation of his providence, being a necessary execution thereof; and when he is said to be bound by the laws of fate, they mean, that he cannot act contrary to what himself has determined.[234] And, had it been universally explained by them in this sense, it would not have done them much service, who oppose the doctrine of election, to have compared it therewith; for it would only have proved the agreeableness of the doctrine of the immutability of God’s purpose, relating to all events, to the light of nature, as some of the heathen were thereby instructed in it. But since this does not appear to be the sense of all the Stoicks about the doctrine of fate, but some of them understood it in the same sense as it is represented in the objection, this we cannot but militate against, and assert the doctrine of election to be very remote from it.

Therefore we need only, in answer to this part of the objection, explain what we mean, when we maintain the necessity of events, as founded on the will of God. We are far from asserting that there is a necessary connexion between second causes, and their respective effects, in which some are produced arbitrarily, by the will of intelligent creatures; and when we call any thing a necessary cause, producing effects, according to its own nature, we suppose that this is agreeable to the order, or course of nature, which was fixed by God. All that we pretend to prove, is the dependence of things on the divine will, and the necessity of God’s purposes taking effect; so that that which is arbitrary or contingent, which might be, or not be, as depending on, or relating to second causes, is eventually necessary, as it is an accomplishment of the divine purpose. Therefore we always distinguish between things being contingent, with respect to us, and their being so, with respect to God; and, consequently, though _it may be_, or _peradventure_, may be applied to the apparent event of things, these words can never be applied to the fulfilling of the divine will; and this leads us to consider the latter part of the objection; therefore,

2. As to the scripture’s speaking concerning the uncertainty of future events, in those places mentioned in the objection, these, and all others of the like nature, in which such a mode of speaking is used, may be explained, by distinguishing between what might reasonably have been expected to be the event of things, supposing men had not been given up to the blindness of their mind, and hearts, to act below the dictates of reason, without consulting their own safety and happiness, or expressing their gratitude to God; and what would be the real event of things, which God was not pleased to reveal, and therefore was unknown to them. Thus, when the prophets Jeremiah and Ezekiel represented the repentance and reformation of Israel as an uncertain event, as well as their forgiveness, and deliverance from the captivity, connected with it, in such dubious terms, _It may be they will consider and return, every man from his evil way_; it implies, that this was what might have been reasonably expected by men, though it was no matter of uncertainty to the heart-searching God, who knoweth the end from the beginning, and perfectly foresees what will be the event of things, which, in various respects, are under the direction of his providence. Though it could hardly be thought, by men, that such an admonition should be treated with such contempt, yet God knew how they would behave themselves; there was no _peradventure_ with respect to his judgment thereof; he knew that they would not repent, otherwise he would have inclined their wills, and effectually have persuaded them to exercise this grace, and thereby have prevented his expectation, or determination, from being disappointed, or frustrated.

If it be objected, that, according to this sense of the text, the prophet’s message to the people would have been to no purpose, and his ministry, among them, exercised in vain; or that it was contrary to the wisdom and goodness of God to make this overture to them, when he knew it would not be complied with.

To this it may be replied, that the great God is not bound to decline the asserting his right to man’s obedience, or requiring that which is a just debt to him, though he knew that they would not comply with his demand thereof; and, indeed, this objection cannot be maintained, without supposing, that, when the gospel is preached to man, the glory of the divine wisdom and goodness therein cannot be secured, unless we conclude either that God doth not know whether man will embrace it, or no, which is contrary to his omniscience; or that he determines, that all, to whom the gospel is preached, shall embrace it, which is contrary to matter of fact. But there may be a medium between both these, which vindicates the divine perfections, in ordering that the gospel should be preached, and thereby asserting his sovereignty, and unalienable right to their obedience; accordingly, there might be a small remnant among them, in whom God designed that this message should take effect. And will any one say, that because the goodness of God was not herein demonstrated to all, that therefore no glory was brought to that perfection?

And if it be farther said, that supposing there were some who turned from their evil ways, the captivity, which was threatened, was not hereby prevented, and therefore the promise, relating thereunto, did not take place; to this it may be replied; that as God did not give them ground to expect this blessing, unless this repentance should be more universal, than it really was, so he had various ways to testify his regard to those who should receive advantage by this message, for whose sake it was principally intended.

As for that other scripture, in which God advises his people to _seek righteousness and meekness_, and, as the consequence hereof, says, _it may be ye may be hid in the day of the Lord’s fierce anger_; the meaning is, that they, who were enabled to exercise these graces, should either have some instances of temporal deliverance vouchsafed to them; or if not, that they should have no reason to complain that the exercise thereof was altogether in vain.

As for that scripture, in which the apostle bids Timothy to exhort those that oppose the gospel, _if, peradventure, God would give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth_; the meaning is, that it was uncertain to Timothy whether God would give this grace or no; and therefore he must preach the gospel, whatever were the event thereof: Nevertheless, it was no matter of uncertainty, with respect to God, who must be supposed to know what grace he designs to bestow, and therefore the event of things may be dubious to us, and yet be certain with respect to him.

_Object._ 4. Another objection, against the doctrine of election and reprobation, is, that it is altogether inconsistent with the preaching of the gospel; for if God has determined the final state of man, so that his purpose cannot be altered, then it is a preposterous thing, not to say illusory, for grace to be offered to the chief of sinners, which must certainly argue, that it is impossible to be attained by them; and, since the overture is universal, we must conclude that God has put all mankind into a salvable state, and consequently not excluded any from salvation by his peremptory and unchangeable decree. To what purpose are the promises of the gospel held forth, to all that sit under the sound thereof, if it be impossible for them to attain the blessings promised therein? Or what regard could men be supposed to have to the promises, if they were not a declaration of God’s purpose? And, on the other hand, the threatnings denounced would be as little regarded, as an expedient to deter men from sinning, if their state were unalterably fixed by God, according to this doctrine of election, as it has been before considered.

_Answ._ That we may proceed with greater clearness in answering this objection, we shall first shew what we mean by preaching the gospel, which is nothing else but a declaration of God’s revealed will, and our duty pursuant thereunto, which is to be made known, particularly what is contained in the word of God, relating to the salvation of men, and the way which he has ordained in order to their attaining it. Therefore,

1. When this salvation is said to be offered in the gospel, we intend nothing else thereby, but that a declaration is made to sinners, that there are many invaluable privileges which Christ has purchased for, and will, in his own time and way, apply to all those whom God has purposed to save; and, since we cannot describe them by name, and no unregenerate person has ground to conclude that he is of that number, therefore there is a farther declaration to be made, namely, that God has inseparably connected this salvation, which he has chosen them to, with faith and repentance, and the exercise of all other graces, which, as they are God’s gift, and to be prayed for, and expected, in a diligent attendance on all his ordinances; so they are to be considered as the mark and evidences of their being chosen to salvation, without which, it is certainly a vain and presumptuous thing for any one to pretend that he has a right to it, as the object of God’s eternal election.

2. No one, who preaches the gospel, has any warrant from God to tell any individual person that whether he repents and believes, or no, he shall be saved; or, to direct his discourse to him, as one that is chosen thereunto, much less to give the impenitent sinner occasion to conclude, that, though he obstinately, and finally, remain in a state of rebellion against God, notwithstanding he may hope to be saved, because there is a number of mankind chosen to salvation; for this is not to declare God’s revealed will, but that which is directly contrary to it, and therefore not to preach the gospel. Therefore,

3. All, who sit under the sound of the gospel, ought to look upon it as a declaration of God’s design to save a part of mankind, under the preaching thereof, and among them the chief of sinners, which they have a sufficient ground to conclude themselves to be; but yet a door of hope is so far opened hereby, that they have no reason to conclude that they are rejected, any more than that they are elected; and, while they wait on God’s instituted means of grace, they have, at least, this encouragement, that, peradventure, they may be of the number of God’s elect; and, when they find in themselves that faith, which is the evidence thereof, then they may determine their interest in, and lay claim to this privilege, when they are enabled to make their calling, and thereby their election sure.

And as for the promises and threatnings, these are to be considered by unregenerate persons, without determining their right to the one, or falling under the other, as elected or rejected; for that is still supposed to be a secret; therefore they are to regard the promise, as a declaration of God’s purpose, relating to the connexion that there is between faith and salvation, as an inducement to perform the one, in expectation of the other. And as for the threatnings, though they determine the present state of impenitent sinners to be such, in which they are undone and miserable, yet they are not to be extended to those events, which are hid in the purpose of God, so as to give any one ground to conclude that he is thereby finally excluded from salvation, since such an exclusion as this is inseparably connected with final impenitency and unbelief.

_Object._ 5. It is farther objected, that this doctrine is, in many instances subversive of practical religion. And,

1. That it is inconsistent with the duty of prayer; for if God has determined to save a person, what need has he to ask a blessing, which is already granted? and, if he has determined to reject him, his prayer will be in vain.

2. It is farther supposed, that it leads to presumption, on the one hand, or despair, on the other; election, to presumption; reprobation, to despair. And,

3. They add, that it leads to licentiousness, as it is inconsistent with our using endeavours that we may be saved: for to what purpose is it for persons to strive to enter in at the strait gate, when all their endeavours will be ineffectual, if they are not elected? or to what purpose is it for persons to use any endeavours to escape the wrath of God, due to sin, if they are appointed to wrath, and so must necessarily perish?

_Answ._ This objection is, beyond measure, shocking; and it is no wonder, that a doctrine, that is supposed to have such consequences attending it, is treated with the utmost degree of detestation: but as the greatest part of the objections against it, are no other than misrepresentations thereof, so it is no difficult matter to reply to them, to the conviction of those who are disposed to judge impartially of the matter in controversy between us. We shall therefore proceed to reply to the several branches of this objection. And,

1. As to what concerns the duty of prayer; when we are engaged in it, we are not to suppose that we are to deal with God, in such a way, as when we have to do with men, whom we suppose to be undetermined, and that they are to be moved, by intreaties, to alter their present resolutions, and to give us what we ask for; for that is to conceive of him as altogether such an one as ourselves; accordingly, we are not to conclude, that he has not determined to grant the thing that we are to pray to him for; for that would be presumptuously to enter into his secret purpose, since he has no where told us we shall be denied the blessings we want; but rather that there is forgiveness with him, and mercy for the chief of sinners, as an encouragement to this duty; and, besides this, has given us farther ground to hope for a gracious answer of prayer, where he gives a heart to seek him. Therefore we are to behave ourselves, in this duty, as those who pretend not to know God’s secret purpose, but rather desire to wait for some gracious intimation or token for good, that he will hear and answer our prayer; therefore his secret purpose is no more inconsistent with this duty, than if, with those that deny the doctrine we are maintaining, we should conclude that this matter is not determined by him.

2. As to this doctrine’s leading to presumption, or despair, there is no ground to conclude that it has a tendency to either of them. It cannot lead to presumption, inasmuch as election is not discovered to any one till he believes; therefore an unconverted person has no ground to presume and conclude, that all is well with him, because he is elected; for that is boldly to determine a thing that he knows nothing of; the objection therefore, with respect to such, supposes that to be known, which remains a secret. And, on the other hand, they have no ground to despair, on a supposition that they are finally rejected; for it is one thing to be the object of the decree of reprobation, which no one can, or ought to determine, concerning himself, so long as he is in this world, much more if we consider him as enjoying the means of grace, and a door of hope is open to him therein; and God has pleased to declare, in the gospel, that he will receive sinners that repent and believe in him, how unworthy soever they are; therefore such are not to conclude that their state is desperate, though it be exceeding dangerous, but to wait for the efficacy of the means of grace, and those blessings that accompany salvation.

And as for those that are in a converted state, this doctrine is far from having a tendency, either to lead them to presumption, or despair; but, on the other hand, to thankfulness to God, for his discriminating grace, which, when persons experience, they are not only encouraged to hope for farther blessings, but to perform those duties whereby they may express their gratitude to him. As for presumption, which is the only thing that election is pretended to lead them to, that cannot be the natural consequence or tendency thereof; for if they presume that they shall be saved, this is not to be reckoned a crime in them; for that presumption which is supposed to be so in the objection consists in a person’s expecting a blessing without reason; but this is contrary to the supposition that he is a believer; and it would be a strange method of reasoning to infer, that he, who has ground to conclude that he has a right to eternal life, from those marks and evidences of grace, which he finds in himself, is guilty of a sinful presumption, when he is induced hereby to lay claim to it; and therefore the sense of the objection, must be this, that a believer having been once enabled to conclude himself elected, may, from hence, take occasion, supposing that his work is done, and his end answered, to return to his former wicked life, and yet still presume that he shall be saved; whereas that would be a certain indication that he had no ground to conclude this, but was mistaken, when he thought that he had; so that this doctrine cannot lead a believer, as such, to presumption, and consequently the objection, in which it is supposed that it does, is founded on one of these two mistakes, _viz._ that every one, who is elected to salvation, knows his interest in this privilege, as though it were immediately revealed to him, without inferring it from any marks and evidences of grace that he finds in himself; or else, that it is impossible for any one, who thinks that he believes, and, from thence, concludes that he is elected, to appear afterwards to have been mistaken in the judgment, which he then passed upon himself; but either of these contain a misrepresentation of the consequences of the doctrine of election; neither is there any regard had to that necessary distinction that there is, between a person’s being chosen to eternal life, and his being able to determine himself to be interested in this privilege; and it is contrary to what we have before considered, that whenever God chooses to the end, he chooses to the means, which are inseparably connected with it, which is the only rule whereby we are warranted, when applying it to ourselves, to conclude that we shall be saved.

3. It cannot, in the least, be proved that this doctrine has any tendency to lead persons to licentiousness; nor is it inconsistent with our using the utmost endeavours to attain salvation. If it be said, that many vile persons take occasion, from hence, to give the reins to their corruption; that is not the natural, or necessary consequence thereof; since there is no truth but what may be abused. The apostle Paul did not think the doctrine of the grace of God, which he so strenuously maintained, was less true, Or glorious, because some drew this vile consequence from it, _Let us continue in sin, that grace may abound_, Rom. vi. 1.

And as for those means, which God has ordained to bring about the salvation of his people, we are obliged to attend upon them, though we know not, before-hand, what will certainly be the event thereof; and if through the blessing of God accompanying them, we are effectually called and sanctified, and thereby enabled to know our election, this will (agreeably to the experience of all true believers,) have a tendency to promote holiness.

_Object._ 6. It is farther objected, that more especially against the doctrine of reprobation, that it argues God to be the author of sin; and particularly in such instances as these, _viz._ with respect to the first entrance of sin into the world, and in God’s imputing the sin of our first parents to all their posterity, and afterwards suffering it to make such a progress as it has done ever since; and, most of all, when it is supposed that this is not only the result of the divine purpose, but that it also respects the blinding men’s minds, and hardening their hearts, and so rendering their final impenitency and perdition unavoidable.

_Answ._ To this it may be answered,

1. As to what concerns the first entrance of sin into the world, it cannot reasonably be denied, that the purpose of God was concerned about it, before it was committed, in the same sense as his actual providence was afterwards, namely, in permitting, though not effecting it; notwithstanding this was not the cause of the committing it, since a bare permission has no positive efficiency in order thereunto; the not hindering, or restraining a wicked action, does not render him the author of it. It is true, God knew how man would behave, and particularly, that he would mis-improve and forfeit that original righteousness, in which he was created, and that, by this means, he would contract that guilt, which was the consequence thereof, and thereby render himself liable to his just displeasure; to deny this, would be to deny that he foreknew that, from eternity, which he knew in time. And, so far as the actual providence of God was conversant about what was natural therein, so far his purpose determined that it should be; but neither does this argue him to be the author of sin. But this will be farther considered, when we speak concerning the actual providence of God under a following answer.[235]

2. As to that part of the objection, which respects the imputing the sin of our first parents to all their posterity, that is more frequently brought against this doctrine than any other; and it is generally represented in the most indefensible terms, without making any abatements as to the degree of punishment that was due to it; and, accordingly, they think that we can hardly have the front to affirm, that our arguments, in defence hereof, are agreeable to the divine perfections, as we pretend those others are, which have been brought in defence of this doctrine. But, I hope, we shall be able to maintain the doctrine of _original sin_, in consistency with the divine perfections, as well as scripture, in its proper place, to which we shall refer it.[236] Therefore all that I shall add, at present, is, that if the doctrine of original sin be so explained, as that it does not render God the author of sin, his purpose relating thereunto, which must be supposed, in all respects, to correspond with it, does not argue him to be the author of it.

3. As to the progress of sin in the world, and the proneness of all mankind to rebel against God; this, as before was observed, concerning sin in general, is the object of his permissive, but not his effective will; though there is this difference between God’s suffering sin to enter into the world at first, and his suffering the continuance, or increase of it therein, that, at first, he dealt with man as an innocent creature, and only left him to the mutability of his own will, having before given him a power to retain his integrity. But the fallen creature is become weak, and unable to do any thing that is good in all its circumstances, and afterwards is more and more inclined to sin, by contracting vicious habits, and persisting therein. Now, though God’s leaving man to himself at first, when there was no forfeiture made of his preventing grace, must be reckoned an act of mere sovereignty, his leaving sinners to themselves may be reckoned an act of justice, as a punishment of sin before committed, and neither of these argue him to be the author of it; neither does the purpose of God, relating thereunto, give the least occasion for such an inference.

Again, we must distinguish between the occasion and the cause of sin. God’s providential dispensations, though unexceptionably holy and righteous, are often-times the occasion thereof: thus his afflictive hand sometimes occasions the corruptions of men to break forth, in repining at, and quarrelling with his providence; and his giving outward blessings to one, which he withholds from another, gives occasion, to some, to complain of the injustice of his dealings with them; and the strictness, and holiness of his law, and gives occasion, to corrupt nature to discover itself in the blackest colours; the apostle plainly evinces this truth, when he says, _Sin taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence_, Rom. vii. 8. and, indeed, there is nothing in the whole compass of providence, or in the methods of the divine government therein, but what may be, and often is, an occasion of sin, in wicked men. But certainly it is not the cause of it; even as the clemency of a prince may occasion a rebellion among his subjects; but it is the vile ingratitude, and wickedness of their nature, that is the spring and cause thereof; so the providence, and consequently the purpose of God, which is executed thereby, may be the occasion of sin, and yet the charge brought in this objection, as though God hereby was argued to be the author of sin, is altogether groundless.

4. As to what is farther objected, relating to the purpose of God, to blind the minds, and harden the hearts of men, and that final impenitency, which is the consequence thereof, God forbid that we should assert that this is a positive act in him; and, so far as it contains nothing else but his determining to deny that grace, which would have had the contrary effect, or his providence relating thereunto, this does not give any countenance to the objection, or weaken the force of the arguments that we have before laid down, which is very consistent therewith.

_Object._ 7. There is another objection, which is generally laid down in so moving a way, that, whether the argument be just or no, the style is adapted to affect the minds of men with prejudice against this doctrine, and that is taken from the inconsistency thereof with God’s judicial proceedings against the wicked in the day of judgment, and that it will afford the sinner a plea, in which he may say to this effect: Lord, I sinned by a fatal necessity; it was impossible for me to avoid that which thou art now offended with me for; it was what thou didst decree should come to pass. I have been told, that thy decrees are unalterable, and that it is as impossible to change the course of nature, or to remove the mountains, which thou hast fixed with thy hand, as to alter thy purpose; wilt thou then condemn one, who sinned and fell pursuant to thy will? Dost thou will that men should sin and perish, and then lay the blame at their door, as though they were culpable for doing what thou hast determined should be done?

_Answ._ This objection supposes that the decree of God lays a necessary constraint on, and enforces the will of man to sin; which, if they could make it appear that it does, no reply could be made to it. But this is to represent the argument we are maintaining in such a way, in which no one, who has just ideas of this doctrine, would ever understand it, and it is directly contrary to the foregoing method of explaining it. We have already proved, in our answer to the third objection, that sin is not necessary in that sense, in which they suppose it to be, or that, though the decree of God renders events necessary, yet it does not take away the efficiency of second causes, and therefore the purpose of God, relating thereunto, is not to be pleaded, as an excuse for it, or as a ground of exemption from punishment. We read of the Jews, that, _with wicked hands, they crucified_ our Saviour; the crime was their own; but this is expressly said to have been done by, or, in pursuance of, _the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God_, Acts ii. 23. He fore-knew what they would do, and purposed not to prevent it; but yet he did not force their will to commit it. And elsewhere God says, concerning Israel, _Thou heardest not; yea, thou knewest not; from that time thine ear was not opened_; and then he adds, _I knew that thou wouldest deal very treacherously_, Isa. xlviii. 8. Israel might as well have pleaded, that God knew, before-hand, how they would behave themselves, and so have thrown the blame on him, for not preventing this foreseen event, but suffering them to go on in this destructive way, with as much reason, as the sinner is supposed, in the objection, to have, when taking occasion so to plead, as he is represented, as having ground to do, in the day of judgment, as a consequence from the doctrine we are maintaining.

Again, whatever has been said concerning the immutability of the divine purpose, yet this does not give the least countenance to any one’s charging his sin on God; as we have, in answer to the last objection, proved that it does not render him the author of sin; and therefore man’s destruction must lie at his own door. It is one thing to say, that it is in the sinner’s power to save himself, and another thing to say, that the sin he commits is not wilful, and therefore that guilt is not contracted thereby; and, if so, then this affords no matter of excuse to the sinner, according to the import of the objection.

IX. We are now to consider some things that may be inferred from the doctrine we have been insisting on, and how it is to be practically improved by us, to the glory of God, and our spiritual advantage. And,

1. From the methods taken to oppose and decry it, by misrepresentations, which contain little less than blasphemy, we infer, that however unjust consequences deduced from a doctrine may be an hindrance to its obtaining in the world; yet this method of opposition will not render it less true, or defensible; nor ought it to prejudice the minds of men against the sacred writings, or religion in general. We cannot but observe, that while several scriptures are produced in defence of this doctrine and others in opposition to it, and the utmost cautions have not been used to reconcile the sense given thereof with the natural ideas which we have of the divine perfections; and many, in defending one side of the question have made use of unguarded expressions, or called that a scripture-doctrine which is remote from it; and others, in opposition hereunto, have, with too much assurance, charged the defenders thereof with those consequences, which are neither avowed by them, nor justly deduced from their method of reasoning; the unthinking and irreligious part of mankind have taken occasion, from hence, with the Deists, to set themselves against revealed religion, or to give way to scepticism, as though there were nothing certain, or defensible, in religion; and take occasion to make it the subject of satire and ridicule. But, passing this by, though it is a matter very much to be lamented we will consider this doctrine as rendered less exceptionable, or more justly represented; and, accordingly,

2. We may infer from it, that as it is agreeable to the divine perfections, so it has the greatest tendency to promote practical godliness. For,

(1.) Since God has fore-ordained whatever comes to pass; this should lead us to an humble submission to his will, in all the dispensations of his providence. When we consider that nothing, in this respect comes by chance; this should have a tendency to quiet our minds, and silence all our murmuring and uneasy thoughts, whatever afflictions we are exposed to. We are too apt to complain sometimes of second causes, as though all our miseries took their rise from thence; and, at other times, to afflict ourselves beyond measure, as apprehending that those proper means have not been used, which might have prevented them; as Martha tells our Saviour, _If thou hadst been here, my brother had not died_, John xi. 21. whereas we ought rather to consider, that all this befalls us in pursuance of God’s purpose: had he designed to have prevented the affliction, he would have directed to other means conducive to that end, or would have attended those that have been used, with their desired success. We use the means as not knowing what are the secret purposes of God, with respect to the event of things; but, when this is made known to us, it should teach us to acquiesce in, and be entirely resigned to the divine will.

(2.) When we cannot see the reason, or understand the meaning of the dispensations of divine providence, and are not able to pass a judgment concerning future events, whether relating unto ourselves, or others; and, when all things look with a very dismal aspect, as to what concerns the interest and church of God in the world, we must be content to wait till he is pleased to discover them to us; what he oftentimes does, _we know not now, but shall know hereafter_, as our Saviour said to one of his disciples, John xiii. 7. It is no wonder that we are at a loss, as to God’s purposes, since secret things belong to him; and therefore all that we are to do, in such a case, is, to rest satisfied, that all these things shall, in the end, appear to have a tendency to advance his own perfections, and bring about the salvation of his people.

(3.) Since the purpose of God respects the means, as well as the end, this should put us upon the use of those proper means, in which we may hope to obtain grace and glory; and therefore this doctrine does not lead us to sloth, and indifference in religion; for that is to suppose, that the ends and means are separated in God’s purpose: and when, through his blessing attending them, the ordinances, or means of grace, are made effectual for the working of faith, and all other graces, these being connected, in God’s purpose, with glory, it ought to encourage our hope relating to the end of faith, even the salvation of our souls.

(4.) Let us take heed that we do not peremptorily, without ground conclude ourselves elected unto eternal life, on the one hand, or rejected on the other. To determine that we are chosen to salvation, before we are effectually called, is presumptuously to enter into God’s secret counsels, which we cannot, at present, have a certain and determinate knowledge of; but to lay this as a foundation, as to what concerns the conduct of our lives, is oftentimes of a very pernicious tendency. If, as the result of this conclusion made, we take encouragement to go on in sin, this will cut the sinews of all religion, and expose us to blindness of mind, and hardness of heart, and a greater degree of impenitency and unbelief, as the consequence of this bold presumption and affront to the divine Majesty.

Neither, on the other hand, are we to conclude that we are not elected; for though we may be in suspense about the event of things, and not know whether we are elected or rejected, this is not inconsistent with our using endeavours to attain a good hope, through grace; yet to determine that we are not elected, is to conclude, against ourselves that all endeavours will be to no purpose; which we have no ground to do, since it is one thing to conclude that we are in a state of unregeneracy, and another thing to determine that we are not elected. The consequence of our concluding that we are in an unconverted state, ought to be our praying, waiting, and hoping for the efficacy of divine grace, which extends itself to the chief of sinners, as a relief against despair, though such can have no ground to say, they are elected; therefore the safest way, and that which is most conducive to the ends of religion, is to be firmly persuaded, that though the final state of man be certainly determined by God, yet this is to be no rule for an unregenerate person to take his measures from, any more than if it were a matter of uncertainty, and, in all respects, undetermined by him.

(5.) Let us, according to the apostle’s advice, _Give diligence to make our calling and election sure_, 2 Pet. i. 10. It is certainly a very great privilege for us, not barely to know, that some were chosen to eternal life, but to be able to conclude that we are of that happy number; and, in order hereunto, we must not expect to have an extraordinary revelation thereof, or to find ourselves described by name in scripture, as though this were the way to attain it; for the rule by which we are to judge of this matter, is, our enquiring whether we have those marks, or evidences thereof, which are contained therein; and therefore we are, by a diligent and impartial self-examination, to endeavour to know whether we are called, or enabled, to perform the obedience of faith, which God is said to elect his people to; or whether we are holy, and without blame, before him in love? whether we have the temper and disposition of the children of God, as an evidence of our being chosen to the adoption of children, and as such, are conformed to the image of Christ?

(6.) If we have ground to conclude that we are chosen to eternal life, this ought to be improved to the glory of God, and our own spiritual advantage; it ought to put us upon admiring and adoring the riches of discriminating grace, which is herein eminently illustrated; and such are under the highest obligation to walk humbly with God, as well as thankfully; for it is owing to his grace, not only that they are chosen to eternal life, but that they are enabled to discern their interest in this privilege.[237]

Footnote 183:

“Certainly, it is not to be understood, in a literal or strict sense,
that He _does_, all that is done. ‘Far be it from God,’ says Elihu,
‘that he should do wickedness: and from the Almighty, that he should
commit iniquity.’ Doing wickedness, and committing iniquity, are
synonymous phrases: but to impute to the Most High, any thing like
what is commonly meant by either of these phrases, is evident
blasphemy.