Chapter II: Part 2

As for the apostle Paul’s wish, it is either, as some suppose, a rash and inconsiderate flight of zeal for God, and so not warrantable, though in some respects proceeding from a good principle; or rather, as I humbly conceive the meaning is, he could wish himself accursed from Christ, so far as is consistent with his love; or he is content to be under the external marks of God’s displeasure; or deprived of the comfortable sensation of his love, or many of those fruits and effects thereof, which the believer enjoys in this life: for I cannot, in the least, think he desires to be deprived of a real interest in it, or to be eternally separated from Christ, on any condition whatsoever.[6]

2. Since the eternal enjoyment of God is one great end which we ought to have in view, it is no sign of a mercenary spirit to have an eye to the heavenly glory, to quicken us to duty; seeing this is promised by God to those who are faithful, thus, Psal. lxxxiii. 24. _Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory_. The like promises we have in many other scriptures, which are designed to excite our desire and hope of this blessedness; therefore the exercise of these graces, from such motives, is far from being unlawful: yea, it is commended in the saints, who are said, Heb. xi. 16. to _desire a better country, that is, an heavenly_. And Moses is commended for having the _recompence of reward_ in view, when he preferred the _reproach of Christ_ before the _treasures of Egypt_, ver. 26.

Nevertheless, when this respect to future blessedness is warrantable, it must be considered as an expedient for our glorifying God, while we behold his glory; and when we consider it as a reward, we must not look upon it as what is merited by our service, or conferred in a way of debt, but as a reward of grace, given freely to us, though founded on the merits of Christ.

Footnote 4:

He who glorifies God intentionally, thereby promotes his own
happiness. Our enjoying God is glorifying him. The two objects
coalesce. Vide note on page 19.

Footnote 5:

The answer connected with this question makes the glorifying and
enjoyment but _one_ end; and thus the enjoyment is supposed to consist
in the glorifying God.

Footnote 6:

It is not probable that the idea of a _book of life_, which is not to
be understood literally, was at all in use in the days of Moses. The
term ηυχομην used by Paul is not hypothetical, but affirmative, and in
the past tense, _I did wish_, or rather _I was wishing_ to be
separated from Christ. The truth of this assertion no one, who is
acquainted with his history, can doubt; for he had been a persecutor.
Such a wish, made after he was a subject of saving grace, would have
been unnatural, irrelevant, impious and impossible. It has been
nevertheless, zealously contended by some learned and pious modern
divines that, “the benevolent person is disposed, and willing to give
up, and relinquish his own interest and happiness, when inconsistent
with the public good, or the greatest good of the whole.”[7] By
_benevolence_ they mean love to being in general, without regard to
any excellency in that being, “unless mere existence”[8] be such. In
this they place all virtue, and all religion. And that they may the
more clearly distinguish this species of love from that of
_complacency_ and _gratitude_, in which the party ever has his eye
upon his own advantage, they usually adopt the phrase _disinterested
benevolence_, yet not wholly discarding the idea of the party’s own
interest, but viewing it only on the general scale with that of all
other beings.

True holiness consists in a disposition, and suitable expressions of
it, in conformity to the _revealed will_ of God; so far as this
accords with the good of the whole, such benevolence will run parallel
with holiness; but every attempt to substitute any other rule of
action or ground of obligation than the authoritatively expressed will
of God, approaches the crime of idolatry. It is certainly a very high
stand we assume, when we profess to pass by all the amiableness, and
excellency of the divine character; and all his goodness, and mercy to
us; and to love his _being_ only together with created existences,
with the same independent, and dignified love of benevolence, which he
exercises towards his helpless creatures. All the displays of his
perfections and compassions seem designed rather to elicit the
affections of _complacency_ and _gratitude_. That the advantages of
religion in this world, and the next may be sought from selfish, and
mercenary views is a lamentable truth; but because carnal minds may
find their own destruction in aiming at the blessings which the
spiritual only can enjoy, this is no reason wherefore the saints
should not find their ultimate interest to accompany their duty in
every instance. Accordingly, for their encouragement, the blessings of
peace, and spiritual consolations here, and of eternal happiness, are
exhibited to their view in glowing colours. But this would not have
been done if it were essential to the character of their love, that
they should be willing to be _separated from Christ_. That we have by
nature a fearful propensity to earthly good, which is vain, illusory,
disgusting and debasing, must be acknowledged; and that we are
therefore required to _deny our_ natural _selves_ is known unto every
Christian. But it by no means results, that because we must turn away
from the temptations of _temporal things_, we may not aspire to those
blessings which are _spiritual and eternal_. God himself is eternally
happy in his _own self complacency_, and has encouraged us to expect
everlasting happiness from the same source. Jesus Christ, whose
benevolence towards us is an eternal appeal to our _gratitude_, which
supposes a regard to our own interest; in suffering death had respect
also to the joy which was set before him, and shall see of the travail
of his soul and shall be satisfied. Love is essential to duty, without
which it is forced, and cannot be deemed obedience in the view of him
who searches the heart. This has been noticed by the Saviour, but he
has omitted those distinctions, which are accounted so important in
modern times; yet his doctrines are _not less_ spiritual, than ours
after we have sublimated the gospel to the highest pitch of
refinement.

Footnote 7:

Dr. HOPKINS.

Footnote 8:

President EDWARDS.

Quest. II.

QUEST. II. _How doth it appear that there is a God?_

ANSW. The very light of nature in man, and the works of God, declare
that there is a God; but his word and Spirit only, do sufficiently
and effectually reveal him unto men for their salvation.

Before we enter on the proof of this important doctrine, let it be premised, that we ought to be able to prove by arguments, or give a reason of our belief that there is a God.

1. Because it is the foundation of all natural and revealed religion; and therefore it must not be received merely by tradition, as though there were no other reason why we believe it, but because others do so, or because we have been instructed herein from our childhood; for that is unbecoming the dignity and importance of the subject, and would be an instance of great stupidity, especially seeing we have so full and demonstrative an evidence thereof, taken from the whole frame of nature; in which there is nothing but what affords an argument to confirm our belief that there is a God.

2. There is a great deal of atheism in our hearts, by reason whereof we are prone sometimes to call in question the being, perfections, and providence of God. To which we may also add, that the Devil frequently injects atheistical thoughts into our minds; which is a great affliction to us, and renders it necessary that we should use all possible means for our establishment in this great truth.

3. The abounding of atheism in the world, and the boldness of many in arguing against this truth, renders it necessary that we should be able to defend it, that we may stop the mouths of blasphemers, and so plead the cause of God, and assert his being and perfections against those that deny them; as Psal. xiv. 1. _The fool, who saith in his heart there is no God._

4. This will greatly tend to establish our faith in those comfortable truths that arise from our interest in him, and give us a more solid foundation for our hope, as excited by his promises, which receive all their force and virtue from those perfections which are implied in the idea of a God.

5. This will make us set a due value on his works, by which we are led to conclude his eternal power and Godhead, and so to admire him in them, Job xxxvi. 24. _Remember that thou magnify his work, which men behold._

We shall now consider those arguments mentioned in this answer, by which the being of a God may be evinced; as,

I. From the light of nature in man, by which we understand that reason which he is endowed with, whereby he is distinguished from, and rendered superior to, all other creatures in this lower world, whereby he is able to observe the connexion of things, and their dependence on one another, and infer those consequences which may be deduced from thence. These reasoning powers, indeed, are very much sullied, depraved, and weakened, by our apostacy from God, but not wholly obliterated; so that there are some remains thereof, which are common to all nations, whereby, without the help of special revelation it may be known that there is a God.

But this either respects the principle of reasoning, which we were born with, upon the account whereof infants are called intelligent creatures; or the exercise thereof in a discursive way, in the adult, who only are capable to discern this truth, which they do more or less, in proportion to their natural capacity, as they make advances in the knowledge of other things. Now for the proof of the being of a God from the light of nature, let the following propositions be considered in their respective order.

1. There hath been, for many ages past, a succession of creatures in the world.[9]

2. These creatures could not make themselves, for that which is nothing cannot act; if it makes itself, it acts before it exists; it acts as a creator before it exists as a creature; and it must be, in the same respect, both a cause and an effect, or it must be, and not be, at the same time, than which nothing can be more absurd; therefore creatures were made by another, upon which account we call them creatures.

3. These creatures could not make one another; for to create something out of nothing, or out of matter altogether unfit to be made what is produced out of it, is to act above the natural powers of the creature, and contrary to the fixed laws of nature; and therefore is too great a work for a creature, who can do nothing but in a natural way, even as an artificer, though he can build an house with fit materials, yet he cannot produce the matter out of which he builds it; nor can he build it of matter unfit for his purpose, as water, fire, air, &c. All creatures act within their own sphere, that is, in a natural way: but creation is a supernatural work, and too great for a creature to perform; therefore creatures cannot be supposed to have made one another.

4. If it was supposed possible for one creature to make another, then superiors must have made inferiors; and so man, or some other intelligent creature, must have made the world: but where is the creature that ever pretended to this power or wisdom, so as to be called _the Creator of the ends of the earth_.

5. If any creature could make itself, or other creatures of the same species, why did he not preserve himself; for he that can give being to himself, can certainly continue himself in being? or why did he not make himself more perfect? Why did he make himself, and other creatures of the same species, in such a condition, that they are always indigent, or stand in need of support from other creatures.

Or farther, supposing the creature made himself, and all other things, how comes it to pass that no one knows much of himself comparatively, or other things? Does not he that makes things understand them? therefore man could not make himself, or other creatures.

6. It follows therefore from hence, that there must be a God, who is the first cause of all things, necessarily existing, and not depending on the will of another, and by whose power all things exist; _Of him, and through him, and to him are all things_, Rom. xi. 36. _In him we live, and move, and have our being_, Acts xvii. 28.

Thus much concerning the more general method of reasoning, whereby the light of nature evinces the being of a God; we proceed,

II. To consider more particularly how the being of God may be evinced from his works. The cause is known by its effects; since therefore, as was but now observed, creatures could not produce themselves, they must be created by one who is not a creature.

Now, if there be no medium between God and the creature, or between infinite and finite, between a self-existent or underived, and a derived being; and if all creatures exist, as has been shewn, by the will and power of their Creator, and so are finite and dependent; then it follows, that there is one from whom they derived their being, and on whom they depend for all things; that is, God. This is usually illustrated by this similitude. Suppose we were cast on an unknown island, and there saw houses built, but no men to inhabit them, should we not conclude there had been some there that built them? Could the stones and timber put themselves into that form in which they are? Or could the beasts of the field build them, that are without understanding? Or when we see a curious piece of workmanship, as a watch, or a clock, perform all its motions in a regular way, can we think the wheels came together by chance?[10] should we not conclude that it was made by one of sufficient skill to frame and put them together in that order, and give motion to them? _Shall the clay say to him that fashioned it, What makest thou, or thy work, He hath no hands?_ Isa. xlv. 9.

This leads us to consider the wisdom of God in his works, which demonstrates his being. This the Psalmist mentions with admiration, Psal. civ. 24. _O Lord, how manifold are thy works; in wisdom hast thou made them all!_ When we see letters put together, which make words or sentences, and these a book, containing the greatest sense, and the ideas joined together in the most beautiful order, should we not conclude that some man, equal to this work, had put them together? Even so the wisdom that shines forth in all the parts of the creation, proves that there is a God. This appears,

In the exact harmony and subserviency of one part of the creation to another, Hos. ii. 21, 22. _I will hear, saith the Lord; I will hear the heavens, and they shall hear the earth. And the earth shall hear the corn, and the wine, and the oil, and they shall hear Jezreel._ One part of this frame of nature ministers to another. Thus the sun, and other heavenly bodies, give light to the world, which would be no better than a cave or dungeon without them; and afford life and influence to plants and trees; and maintain the life of all living creatures. The clouds send down rain that moistens the earth, and makes it fruitful; and this is not poured forth by whole oceans together, but by small drops, Job xxxvi. 27. _He maketh small the drops of water; they pour down rain according to the vapour thereof_; and these are not perpetual, for that would tend to its destruction. The moist places of the earth, and the sea supply the clouds with water, that they may have a sufficient store to return again to it. The air fans and refreshes the earth, and is necessary for the growth of all things, and the maintaining the life and health of those that dwell therein. This subserviency of one thing to another is without their own design or contrivance; for they are not endowed with understanding or will; neither doth this depend on the will of the creature. The sun doth not enlighten or give warmth to the world, or the clouds or air refresh the earth at our pleasure; and therefore all this is subject to the order and direction of one who is the God of nature, who commands the sun, and it shineth, and the clouds to give rain at his pleasure. It is he that gave the regular motion to the heavenly bodies, and, by his wisdom, fixed and continues the various seasons of the year, summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, day and night, and every thing that tends to the beauty and harmony of nature; therefore these curious, and never-enough to be admired, works, plainly declare that there is a God. This is described with unparalleled elegancy of style, Job xxxvii. 9, &c. _Out of the south cometh the whirlwind; and cold out of the north. By the breath of God, frost is given; and the breadth of the waters is straitened. Also by watering he wearieth the thick cloud; he scattereth his bright cloud. Dost thou know the balancings of the clouds, the wondrous works of him which is perfect in knowledge? How thy garments are warm when he quieteth the earth by the south-wind?_[11]

But that we may farther evince this truth, we shall lay down the following arguments to prove the being of a God, which appears,

I. From those creatures that are endowed with a lower kind of life than man.

1. No creature can produce a fly or the least insect, but according to the fixed laws of nature; and that which we call life, or the principle of their respective motion and actions, none but a God can give; so that his being is plainly proved, from all living creatures below man, which are subservient, many of them, to one another, and all to man, and that not by our ordering; therefore this is done by the hand of him who is the God of nature.

2. The natural instinct of living creatures, every one acting according to its kind; and some of the smallest creatures producing things that no human art can imitate, plainly proves a God. Thus the bird in building its nest; the spider in framing its web; the bee in providing store-houses for its honey; and the ant in those provisions which it lays up in summer against winter; the silk-worm in providing cloathing for man, and in being transformed into various shapes, and many others of smaller sort of creatures, that act in a wonderful way, without the exercise of reason or design, these all prove the being of God.

3. The greater, fiercer, or more formidable sort of living creatures, as the lion, tiger, and other beasts of prey, are so ordered, that they fly from man, whom they could easily devour, and avoid those cities and places where men inhabit, that so we may dwell safely. They are not chased into the woods by us; but these are allotted, as the places of their residence by the God of nature.

4. Those living creatures that are most useful to men, and so subject to them, _viz._ the horse, camel, and many others, these know not their own strength, or power, to resist or rebel against them; which is ordered by infinite wisdom: and there are many other instances of the like nature, all which are very strong arguments to prove that there is a God, whose glory shines forth in all his works.

II. From the structure of human bodies, in which respect we are said to be fearfully and wonderfully made; this, if it be abstractedly considered without regard to the fixed course and laws of nature, exceeds the power and skill of all creatures, and can be no other than the workmanship of a God, and therefore is a demonstration of his being and perfections. No man ever pretended to give a specimen of his skill therein. The finest statuaries or limners, who have imitated or given a picture, or representation of human bodies, have not pretended to give life or motion to them; herein their skill is baffled. The wisest men in the world have confessed their ignorance of the way and manner of the formation of human bodies; how they are framed in their first rudiments, preserved and grow to perfection in the womb, and how they are increased, nourished, and continued in their health, strength, and vigour for many years. This has made the inquiries of the most thoughtful men issue in admiration: herein we plainly see the power and wisdom of God, to which alone it is owing.

Here it may be observed, that there are several things very wonderful in the structure of human bodies, which farther evince this truth. As,

1. The organs of sense and speech.

2. The circulation of the blood, and the natural heat which is preserved for many years together, of which there is no instance but in living creatures. Even fire will consume and waste itself by degrees, and all things, which have only acquired heat, will soon grow cold; but the natural heat of the body of man is preserved in it as long as life is continued.

3. The continual supply of animal spirits, and their subserviency to sense and motion.[13]

4. The nerves, which, though small as threads, remain unbroken, though every one of these small fibres performs its office, and tends to convey strength and motion to the body.

5. The situation of the parts in their most proper place: the internal parts, which would be ruined and destroyed if exposed to the injuries that the external ones are: these are secured in proper inclosures, and so preserved, Job x. 11. _Thou hast cloathed me with skin and flesh, and hast fenced me with bones and sinews._

6. All the parts of the body are so disposed, that they are fitted for their respective uses, as being situate in those places which render them most fit to perform their proper actions.

7. The differing features of different bodies, so that we scarce see persons in all respects alike, is wonderful, and the result of divine wisdom: for even this is necessary for society, and our performing the duties we owe to one another.

8. The union of this body with the soul, which is a spirit of a very different nature, can never be sufficiently admired or accounted for; but gives us occasion herein to own a superior, infinitely wise being. Which leads us,

III. To consider how the being of God may be evinced from the nature of the soul of man. He is said, Zech. xii. 1. _To have formed the spirit of man within him._ And hereby his power and wisdom, and consequently his being, is declared. For,

1. The nature of a spiritual substance is much less known than that of bodies; and therefore that which we cannot fully understand, we must admire.

If the wisdom and power of God is visible in the structure of our bodies, it is much more so in the formation of our souls; and since we cannot fully describe what they are, and know little of them but by their effects, certainly we could not form them; and therefore there is a God, who is the _Father of spirits_.

2. The powers and capacities of the soul are various, and very extensive.

(1.) It can frame ideas of things superior to its own nature, and can employ itself in contemplating and beholding the order, beauty, and connexion of all those things in the world, which are, as it were, a book, in which we may read the divine perfections, and improve them to the best purposes.

(2.) It takes in the vast compass of things past, which it can reflect on and remember, with satisfaction, or regret: and it can look forward to things to come, which it can expect, and accordingly conceive pleasure or uneasiness in the forethoughts thereof.

(3.) It can chuse or embrace what is good, or fly from and reject what is evil and hurtful to it.

(4.) It is capable of moral government, of conducting itself according to the principles of reason, and certain rules enjoined it for the attaining the highest end.

(5.) It is capable of religion, and so can argue that there is a God, and give him the glory that is due to his name, and be happy in the enjoyment of him.

(6.) It is immortal, and therefore cannot be destroyed by any creature; for none but God has an absolute sovereignty over the spirits of men; _No man hath power over the spirit to retain the spirit; neither hath he power in the day of death_, Eccles. viii. 8.

IV. From the nature and office of conscience, which is that whereby the soul takes a view of itself, and its own actions, as good or evil; and considers itself as under a law to a superior being, from whom it expects rewards or punishments; and this evidently proves a God. For,

1. Conscience is oftentimes distressed or comforted by its reflection on those actions, which no man on earth can know: and therefore when it fears punishment for those crimes, which come not under the cognizance of human laws, the uneasiness that it finds in itself, and its dread of punishment, plainly discovers that it is apprehensive of a divine being, who has been offended, whose wrath and resentment it fears. All the endeavours that men can use to bribe, blind, or stupify their consciences, will not prevent these fears; but the sad apprehension of deserved punishment, from one whom they conceive to know all things, even the most secret crimes committed, this makes persons uneasy, whether they will or no. Whithersoever they fly, or what amusement soever they betake themselves to, conscience will still follow them with its accusations and dread of divine wrath: _The wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest_, Isa. lvii. 20. _A dreadful sound is in his ears; in prosperity the destroyer shall come upon him_, Job xv. 21. _Terrors take hold of him as waters, a tempest stealeth him away in the night. The east-wind carrieth him away, and he departeth; and as a storm hurleth him out of his place. For God shall cast upon him, and not spare; he would fain flee out of his hand_, Job xxvii. 20, 21, 22. _The wicked flee when no man pursueth_, Prov. xxviii. 1.

And this is universal, there are none but are, some time or other, liable to these fears, arising from self-reflection, and the dictates of conscience; the most advanced circumstances in the world will not fortify against, or deliver from them, Acts xxiv. 25. _As Paul reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled._ Even Pharaoh himself, the most hard-hearted sinner in the world, who would fain have forced a belief upon himself that there is no God, and boldly said, _Who is the Lord, that I should obey him?_ yet he could not ward off the conviction that there is a God, which his own conscience suggested. Therefore he was forced to say, Exod. ix. 27. _I have sinned this time; the Lord is righteous, and I and my people are wicked._ And indeed all the pleasures that any can take in the world, who give themselves up to the most luxurious way of living, cannot prevent their trembling, when conscience suggests some things terrible to them for their sins. Thus Belshazzar, when in the midst of his jollity and drinking wine, having made a great feast to a thousand of his lords, when he saw the finger of a man’s hand upon the wall, it is said, Dan. v. 6. _The king’s countenance was changed, and his thoughts troubled him; so that the joints of his loins were loosed, and his knees smote one against another._

Thus concerning those dictates of conscience, which make men very uneasy, whereby wicked men are forced to own that there is a God, whether they will or no; we now proceed to consider good men, as having frequently such serenity of mind and peace of conscience, as affords them farther matter of conviction concerning this truth. It is, indeed, a privilege that they enjoy, who have the light of scripture revelation, and so it might have been considered under a following head; but since it is opposed to what was but now brought, as a proof of the being of a God, we may here observe, that some have that composure of mind, in believing and walking closely with God, as tends to confirm them yet more in this truth. For,

(1.) This composure of mind abides under all the troubles and disappointments they meet with in the world: those things which tend to disturb the peace of other men, do not so much affect them; _He shall not be afraid of evil tidings; his heart is fixed, trusting in the Lord_, Psal. cxii. 7. And as this peace abides under all the troubles of life, so it does not leave them, but is sometimes more abundant, when they draw nigh to death.

(2.) It is a regular and orderly peace that they have, accompanied with grace, so that conscience is most quiet when the soul is most holy; which shews that there is a hand of God in working or speaking this peace, as designing thereby to encourage and own that grace which he has wrought in them: Rom. x. 13. _thus the God of hope_ is said _to fill us with all joy and peace in believing_.

(3.) Let them labour never so much after it, they can never attain this peace, without a divine intimation, or God’s speaking peace to their souls; therefore when he is pleased, for wise ends, to withdraw from them, they are destitute of it; so that God is hereby known by his works, or by those influences of his grace, whereby he gives peace to conscience.

V. The being of a God appears from those vast and boundless desires, which are implanted in the soul; so that it can take up its rest, and meet with full satisfaction, in nothing short of a being of infinite perfection: therefore there is such an one, which is God. This will farther appear if we consider,

1. We find, by experience, that though the soul, at present, be entertained, and meets with some satisfaction in creature-enjoyments, yet it still craves and desires more, of what kind soever they be; and the reason is, because they are not commensurate to its desires; _The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing_, Eccles. i. 8. _That which is wanting cannot be numbered_, ver. 15.

2. We cannot rationally suppose that such boundless desires should be implanted in the soul, and yet that there should be nothing sufficient to satisfy them; for then the most excellent creature in this lower world would be, in some respects, more miserable than other creatures of a lower order, which obtain their ultimate desire. Thus the Psalmist, speaking of the brute creatures, says, Psal. civ. 28. _They are filled with good_; that is, they have all that they crave. Therefore,

3. There must be one that is infinitely good, who can satisfy these desires, considered in their utmost extent; and that is God, the fountain of all blessedness.

VI. The being of a God may be farther evinced, from the consent of all nations to this truth. Now that which all mankind agrees in, must be founded in the nature of man, and that which is so, is evident from the light of nature. It is true, there are many who have thus _known God, who have not worshipped and glorified him as God; but have been vain in their imaginations, and have changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator_, as the apostle says, Rom. i. 21, 25. But it doth not follow from hence, that the heathen, who were guilty of idolatry, had no notion of a God in general, but rather the contrary; that there is something in the nature of man, which suggests, that they ought to worship some divine being, whom they could not, by the light of nature, sufficiently know, and therefore they did service to those who were by nature no gods; however, this proves that they were not wholly destitute of some ideas of a God, which therefore are common to all mankind. Now that all nations have had some discerning that there is a God, appears,

1. From the credit that is to be given to all ancient history; which sufficiently discovers that men, in all ages, have owned and worshipped something that they called a God, though they knew not the true God.

2. The heathen themselves, as may easily be understood from their own writings, reckoned atheism a detestable crime, for this reason, because contrary to the light of nature; and therefore some of them have asserted, that there is no nation in the world so barbarous, and void of reason, as to have no notion of a God.

3. We may consider also, that no changes in the world, or in the circumstances of men, have wholly erased this principle: whatever changes there have been in the external modes of worship, or in those things which have been received by tradition, still this principle has remained unalterable, that there is a God. Therefore the being of a God may be proved by the consent of all nations.

_Object._ 1. But it is objected to this, that there have been some speculative atheists in the world. History gives us an account of this; and we are informed, that there are some whole countries in Africa and America, where there is no worship, and, as to what appears to us, no notion of a God. Therefore the being of a God cannot be proved by the consent of all nations.

_Answ._ 1. As to the first branch of this objection, that there have been some speculative atheists in the world; it is true, history furnishes us with instances of persons who have been deemed so, yet their number has been very inconsiderable; so that it will not follow from hence, that the idea of a God is not some way or other, impressed upon the heart of man. Might it not as well be said, that, because some few are born idiots, therefore reason is not natural to man, or universal? And it may be farther observed, that they who are branded with the character of atheists in ancient history, or such as appear to be atheists in our day by their conversation, are rather practical atheists than speculative. We do not deny, that many in all ages have, and now do, assert, and pretend to prove, that there is no God; but it is plain that they discover, at some times, such fear and distress of conscience, as is sufficient to disprove what they pretend to defend by arguments.

2. As to the second branch of the objection, that there are some parts of the world, where the people seem to be so stupid, as not to own or worship a God; this is hard to be proved; neither have any, that have asserted it, had that familiarity with them, as to be able to determine what their sentiments are about this matter.

But suppose it were true in fact, that some nations have no notion of a God or religion, nothing could be argued from it, but that such nations are barbarous and brutish, and though they have the principle of reason, do not act like reasonable creatures; and it is sufficient to our purpose to assert, that all men, acting like reasonable creatures, or who argue from those principles of reason, that they are born with, may from thence conclude that there is a God.

_Object._ 2. It is farther objected by atheists against the being of God, and indeed against all religion, which is founded thereon, that both one and the other took its rise from human policy, that hereby the world, being amused with such-like speculations, might be restrained from those irregularities, which were inconsistent with the well-being of civil government; and that this was readily received, and propagated by tradition, and so by an implicit faith transmitted from one generation to another, among those who enquired not into the reason of what they believed; and that all this was supported by fear, which fixed their belief in this matter: so that human policy invented, tradition propagated, and fear rooted in the minds of men, what we call the natural ideas of God and religion.

_Answ._ This is a vile insinuation, but much in the mouths of atheists, without any shadow of reason, or attempt to prove it; and indeed it may be easily disproved. Therefore,

1. It appears that the notices we have of the being of a God, are not in the least founded in state policy, as a trick of men, to keep up some religion in the world, as necessary for the support of civil government. For,

If the notion of a God, and religion consequential hereon, were a contrivance of human policy, it would follow,

(1.) That it must be either the invention of one single man, or else it was the result of the contrivance of many convened together in a joint assembly of men, in confederacy, to impose on the world.

If it was the invention of one man, who was he? when and where did he live? What history gives the least account of him? or when was the world without all knowledge of a deity, and some religion, that we may know, at least, in what age this notion first sprang up, or was contrived? Or could the contrivance of one man be so universally complied with, and yet none pretend to know who he was, or when he lived? And if it was the contrivance of a number of men convened together, how was this possible, and yet the thing not be discovered? or how could the princes of the earth, who were at the head of this contrivance, have mutual intelligence, or be convened together? By whose authority did they meet? or what was the occasion thereof?

(2.) It is morally impossible, that such a piece of state policy should be made use of to deceive the world, and universally take place, and yet none in any age ever discover the imposture. The world could never be so imposed on, and yet not know by whom; the plot would certainly have been confessed by some who were in the secret.

(3.) If human policy had first invented this notion, certainly the princes and great men of the world, who had a hand in it, would have exempted themselves from any obligation to own a God, or any form of worship, whereby they acknowledge him their superior; for impostors generally design to beguile others, but to exempt themselves from what they bind them to. If any of the princes, or great men of the world, had invented this opinion, that there is a God, and that he is to be worshipped, their pride would have led them to persuade the world that they were gods themselves, and ought to be worshipped; they would never have included themselves in the obligation to own a subjection to God, if the notion of a God had, for political ends, been invented by them.

(4.) If the belief of a God was invented by human policy, how came it to be universally received by the world? It is certain, that it was not propagated by persecution; for though there has been persecution to inforce particular modes of worship, yet there never was any such method used to inforce the belief of a God, for that took place without any need thereof, it being instamped on the nature of man.

If therefore it was not propagated by force, neither was the belief of a God spread through the world by fraud, what are those arts which are pretended to have been used to propagate it? It took its rise, say they, from human policy; but the politicians not known, nor the arts they used to persuade the world that there is a God found out. How unreasonable therefore is this objection, or rather cavil, against a deity, when the atheists pretend that it was the result of human policy!

2. It appears that the belief of a God was not propagated in the world merely by tradition, and so received by implicit faith. For,

(1.) Those notions that have been received with implicit faith by tradition, from generation to generation, are not pretended to be proved by reason; but the belief of a God is founded on the highest reason; so that if no one in the world believed it besides myself, I am bound to believe it, or else must no longer lay claim to that reason which is natural to mankind, and should rather shew myself a brute than a man.

(2.) No schemes of religion, that were propagated merely by tradition, have been universally received; for tradition respects particular nations, or a particular set of men, who have propagated them. But as has been before considered the belief of a God has universally prevailed. Moreover, if the belief of a God was thus spread by tradition through the world, why was not the mode of worship settled, that so there might be but one religion in the world? The reason is, because their respective modes of worship were received, by the heathen, by tradition: whereas the belief of a God was not so, but is rooted in the nature of man.

(3.) Whatever has been received only by tradition, has not continued in the world in all the turns, changes, and overthrow of particular nations, that received it; but the belief of a God has continued in the world throughout all the ages and changes thereof: therefore it is not founded in tradition, but by the light of nature.

3. It appears, moreover, that the belief of a God could not take its first rise merely from fear of punishment, which men expected would be inflicted by him, though that be a strong argument to establish us in the belief thereof. For,

(1.) A liableness to punishment for crimes committed, supposes that there is a God, who is offended by sin, and from whom punishment is expected. Therefore as the effect cannot give being to the cause, so fear could not be the first ground and reason of the belief of a God. But,

(2.) The principal idea which mankind has of God, and that which is most natural to us, is, that of an infinitely amiable object, and so we conceive of him, as a being of infinite goodness, 1 John iv. 8. _God is love._ Thus we conceive of him, as the spring of all we enjoy and hope for; and as for fear, that is only what arises in the breasts of wicked men, and is founded in the secondary ideas we have of him; to wit, as taking vengeance, supposing he is offended. But they who do not offend him are not afraid of his vengeance; and the sentiments of the worst of men are not to be our rule in judging concerning the being of a God. If these believe that there is a God, only because they fear him, others believe him to be the fountain of all blessedness, and as such they love him: therefore the ideas that men have of the being of a God, did not arise from fear.

VII. The being of a God, may be proved from the works of providence, whereby the world is governed, as well as preserved from returning to its first nothing. It is that which supplies all creatures with those things that their respective natures or necessities require: creatures could no more provide for themselves than they could make themselves; therefore he that provides all things for them is God. All finite beings have their respective wants, whether they are sensible thereof or no; and he must be all-sufficient that can fill or supply the necessities of all things, and such an one is God.

Thus the Psalmist speaks of this God, as supplying the necessities of _beasts and creeping things_; who are said, _to wait upon him, that he may give them their meat in due season_, Psal. civ. 25, 27. Psal. cxlv. 15,16.

In considering the providence of God, whereby his being is evinced, we may observe,

1. The extraordinary dispensations thereof, when things happen contrary to the common course, and fixed laws of nature, as when miracles have been wrought. These are undeniable proofs of the being of a God; for herein a check or stop is put to the course of nature, the fixed order or laws thereof controuled or inverted; and this none can do but he who is the God and author thereof. To deny that miracles have been wrought, is little better than scepticism; since it hath been proved, by the most unquestionable testimony, contained not only in scripture, but in other writings, and is confessed, even by those who deny the principal things designed to be confirmed thereby. It is true, they were never wrought with an immediate design to prove that there is a God, since that is sufficiently demonstrated without them; but in as much as they have been wrought with other views, the being of a God, whose immediate power has been exerted therein, appears beyond all contradiction.

2. This may be proved from the common dispensations of providence, which we daily behold and experience in the world.

These we call common, because they contain nothing miraculous, or contrary to the laws of nature: they are indeed wonderful, and have in them the traces and footsteps of infinite wisdom and sovereignty, and therefore prove that there is a God. For,

(1.) It cannot otherwise be accounted for, that so many things should befal us, or others in the world, that are altogether unlooked for. Thus one is cast down, and a blast thrown on all his endeavours, and another raised beyond his expectation, Psal. lxxv. 6, 7. _Promotion cometh neither from the east, nor from the west, nor from the south. But God is the judge; he putteth down one, and setteth up another._

(2.) The wisest and best concerted schemes of men are often baffled, and brought to nought, by some unexpected occurrence of providence, which argues a divine controul, as God says, 1 Cor. i. 19. _I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent._ And who is it that can turn the counsels of men into foolishness; but an infinitely wise God?

VIII. The being of a God may be proved by the foretelling future events, which have come to pass accordingly. For,

1. No creature can, by his own wisdom or sagacity, foretel future contingent events with a certain peremptory and infallible knowledge, and not by mere conjecture, Isa. xli. 24. _Shew the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods._ And the reason is plain, because our knowledge reaches no farther than to see effects, and judge of them in and by their causes. Thus we may easily foretel that necessary causes will produce those effects that are agreeable to their nature: but when the effect is not necessary, but contingent, or purely arbitrary, then we have nothing to judge by, and therefore cannot come to the knowledge of things future, without an intimation given us thereof, by him who orders and disposes of all things, and that is God: and therefore to foretel things to come in this sense, is an evident proof of the being of God.

2. That there have been such predictions, and that the things foretold have come to pass accordingly, is very obvious from scripture: and if it be highly reasonable to believe that which is so well attested, as scripture is, we are bound from hence to conclude that there is a God.

But since we are arguing, at present, with those who deny a God, and consequently all scripture-revelation, we will only suppose that they whom we contend with will allow that some contingent events have been foretold; and then it will follow, that this could be done no other way, but by some intimation from one that is omniscient, and that is God.

IX. The being of a God appears from his providing for the necessities of all living. Here let us consider,

1. That there is a natural instinct in all creatures, to take care of and provide for their young, before they are capable of providing for themselves. This is not only observable in mankind, as the prophet says, Isa. xlix. 15. _Can a woman forget her sucking child?_ but also in the lower sort of creatures; and among them in those who are naturally most fierce and savage, even they provide for their young with extraordinary diligence, and sometimes neglect, and almost starve, themselves to provide for them, and sometimes endanger their own lives to defend them.

2. They bring forth their young at the most convenient season of the year, when the grass begins to spring to supply them with food, and when the fowls of the air may get a livelihood by picking up the seed that is sown, and not covered by the earth, and when the trees begin to put forth their fruits to supply and feed them.

3. When they bring forth their young, there is a providence that provides the breast, the paps, the udder replenished with, milk to feed them; and there is a natural instinct in their young, without instruction, to desire to receive their nourishment that way.

4. Providence has furnished many of the beasts of the fields with weapons for their defence, and has given others a natural swiftness to fly from danger, and has provided holes and caverns in the earth to secure them from those that pursue them. And this cannot be the effect of mere chance, but it is an evident proof of the being of a God.

5. Providence is, in a peculiar manner, concerned for the supply of man, the noblest of all creatures in the world; _He giveth food to all flesh_, Psal. cxxxvi. 25. _Thou preservest man and beast_, Psal. xxxvi. 6. The earth is stored with variety of food; and whereas the poor, which is the greater part of mankind, cannot purchase those far-fetched, or costly dainties, which are the support of luxury, these may, by their industry, provide that food which is most common, and with which the earth is plentifully stored, whereby their lives and health are as well maintained, as the rich, who fare deliciously every day; and if their families increase, and a greater number is to be provided for, they generally have a supply in proportion to their increasing number.

6. Providence has stored the earth with various medicines, and given skill to men to use them as a relief against the many sicknesses that we are exposed to. All these things, and innumerable other instances that might be given, argue the care and bounty, and consequently prove the being of God, whose tender mercies are over all his works.

Here let us consider how the providence of God provides for the safety of man against those things that threaten his ruin.

The contrariety and opposition of things one to another would bring with them inevitable destruction, did not providence prevent it. As,

(1.) Those things, which are the greatest blessings of nature, would be destructive, were there not a providence: as the sun that enlightens and cherishes the world by its heat and influence, would be of no advantage, were it situate at too great a distance, and would burn it up if it were too near. So the sea would swallow up, and bring a deluge on the earth, if God had not, by his decree, fixed it within certain bounds, and made the shore an inclosure to it, and said hitherto shalt thou go and no farther.