Chapter III: Part 3

(2.) The elements are advantageous to us, by their due temperature and mixture; but, were it otherwise, they would be destructive. So the various humours and jarring principles in our bodies would tend to destroy us, but that they are so mixed, as the God of nature, has tempered and disposed them, for the preservation of life and health.

(3.) The wild beasts would destroy us, had not God put the fear and dread of man into them, or, at least, caused them not to desire to be where men live; the forests and desert places, remote from cities, being allotted for them; and some creatures would be destructive to men, by the increase of their number, did they not devour one another. And insects would destroy the fruits of the earth, did not one season of the year help forward their destruction, as another tends to breed them.

(4.) Men by reason of their contrary tempers and interests, and that malice and envy, which is the consequence of our first apostacy, would destroy one another, if there were not a providence that restrains them, and gives a check to that wickedness that is natural to them, whereby the world is kept in a greater measure of peace than otherwise it would be; hence, the Psalmist says, Psal. lxxvi. 10. _Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee; the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain._

_Object._ It is objected, by atheists, against the being of a God, that the wicked are observed to prosper, in the world, and the righteous are oppressed. This temptation the Psalmist was almost overcome by; as he says, _my feet were almost gone; my steps had well nigh slipt. For I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked_, Psal. lxxiii. 2, 3.

_Answ._ To this it may be answered,

1. That the idea of infinite sovereignty is included in that of a God; and this distribution of good and evil, if made at any time, without regard to the deserts of men, argues the sovereignty of providence; and therefore proves that there is a God, who gives no account of his matters, but has an absolute right to do what he will with his own.

2. There is a display of infinite wisdom in these dispensations of providence, in that the good man is made better by affliction, as hereby the kindness and care of providence appears; and the wicked man is forced to own, by his daily experience, that all the outward blessings he enjoys in this world, cannot make him easy or happy, or be a sufficient portion for him.

3. Outward prosperity doth not prevent or remove inward remorse, or terror of conscience, which embitters the joys of the wicked; _A dreadful sound is in his ears; in prosperity the destroyer shall come upon him_, Job xv. 21. _Even in laughter the heart is sorrowful; and the end of that mirth is heaviness_, Prov. xiv. 13. And, on the other hand, outward trouble in the godly is not inconsistent with spiritual joy and inward peace, which is more than a balance for all the distresses they labour under; it is said, _The heart knoweth his own bitterness, and a stranger doth not intermeddle with his joy_, Prov. xiv. 10. _He shall be satisfied from himself_, ver. 14.

4. We are not to judge of things according to their present appearance, when we determine a person happy or miserable, but are to consider the end thereof, since every thing is well that ends well. Thus the Psalmist, who, as was before observed, was staggered at the prosperity of the wicked, had his faith established, by considering the different events of things. Concerning the wicked he says Psal. lxxiii. 18, 19, 20. _Thou didst set them in slippery places; thou castedst them down to destruction. How are they brought into desolation, as in a moment! they are utterly consumed with terrors. As a dream when one awaketh: so, O Lord, when thou awakest, thou shalt despise their image_; which is a very beautiful expression, representing all their happiness as imaginary, a vain dream, and such as is worthy to be contemned: but as for the righteous, he represents them as under the special protection and guidance of God here, and at last received to glory, and there enjoying him as their everlasting portion.

Having considered how the light of nature, and the works of God prove his being, we shall proceed to shew how this appears from scripture, as it is observed in this answer, that the word and Spirit only do sufficiently and effectually reveal him unto men for their salvation. The arguments hitherto laid down are directed more especially to those who are not convinced that there is a God, and consequently deny the divine original of scripture: but this argument supposes a conviction of both; but yet it must not be supposed unnecessary, in as much as we are oftentimes exposed to many temptations, which tend to stagger our faith; so that though we may not peremptorily deny that there is a God, yet we may desire some additional evidence of his being and perfections, beyond what the light of nature affords; and this we have in scripture. Herein the glory of God shines forth with the greatest lustre, and we have an account of works more glorious than those of nature, included in the way of salvation by a Mediator. The light of nature, indeed, proves that there is a God; but the word of God discovers him to us as a reconciled God and Father to all who believe, and is also attended with those internal convictions and evidences of this truth, which are the peculiar gifts and graces of the Holy Spirit; and therefore it is well observed, that this knowledge only is sufficient and effectual to salvation; which leads us to consider the insufficiency of the light of nature to answer this end. The knowledge of God, that may be attained thereby, is sufficient, indeed, in some measure, to restrain our corrupt passions, and it is conducive to the peace and welfare of civil societies: it affords some conviction of sin, and, in some respects, leaves men without excuse, and renders their condemnation less aggravated than that of those who sin against gospel light; but yet it is insufficient to salvation, since it is a truth of universal extent, that _there is salvation in no other, but in Christ_, Acts iv. 12. and that it is _life eternal to know_ not only _the true God, but Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent_, John xvii. 3. and this cannot be known by the light of nature, but by divine revelation; which leads us to consider in what respect the knowledge of God, as it is contained in and derived from scripture, is sufficient to salvation.

Here we do not assert the sufficiency thereof, exclusive of the aids of divine grace, so as to oppose the word to the Spirit: therefore it is said, in this answer, that the word and Spirit of God alone can reveal him to men sufficiently to their salvation. The word is a sufficient rule, so that we need no other to be a standard of our faith, and to direct us in the way to eternal life; but it is the Spirit that enables us to regard, understand, and apply this rule, and to walk according to it: these two are not to be separated; the Spirit doth not save any without the word,[14] and the word is not effectual to salvation, unless made so by the Spirit.

That nothing short of scripture-revelation is sufficient to salvation, will appear, if we compare it with the natural knowledge we have of God. For,

1. Though the light of nature shews us that there is a God, it doth not fully display his perfections, so as they are manifested in scripture, wherein God is beheld in the face of Christ.

2. Neither doth it discover any thing of the doctrine of a Trinity of persons in the divine essence, who are equally the object of faith: nor doth it give us any intimation of Christ, as the Lord our righteousness, in whom we obtain forgiveness of sins: this is known only by scripture-revelation; therefore, since this is necessary to salvation, we are bound to conclude that the scripture alone is sufficient to lead to it.

3. The light of nature suggests, it is true, that God is to be worshipped; but there is an instituted way of worshipping him, which depends wholly on divine revelation; and since this is necessary, it proves the necessity of scripture.

4. There is no salvation without communion with God; or he that does not enjoy him here, shall not enjoy him for ever hereafter. Now the enjoyment of God is what we attain by faith, which is founded on scripture. Thus the apostle says, 1 John i. 3. _That which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with us; and truly our fellowship is with the Father, and with his son Jesus Christ._

But since it is one thing to say, that the knowledge of God, which is derived from scripture, is sufficient to salvation in an objective way; that is, that it is a sufficient rule to lead us to salvation, and another thing to say, that it is made effectual thereunto: we are now to inquire when it is made so. In answer to which, let us consider, that the doctrines contained in scripture are made effectual to salvation; not by all the skill or wisdom of men representing them in their truest light, nor by all the power of reasoning, which we are capable of, without the aids of divine grace, but they are made effectual by the Spirit; and this he does,

(1.) By the internal illumination of the mind, giving a spiritual discerning of divine truth, which the natural man receiveth not, as the apostle says, 1 Cor. ii. 14. and it is called, 2 Cor. iv. 6. _a shining into our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, in the face of Jesus Christ_.

(2.) By subduing the obstinate will of man, and so enabling it to yield to a ready, chearful, and universal obedience to the divine commands contained in scripture; and, in particular, inclining it to own Christ’s authority, as king of saints; and to say, as converted Paul did, _Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?_ Acts ix. 6.

(3.) He works upon our affections, exciting in us holy desires after God and Christ, and a very high esteem and value for divine truth, and removes all those prejudices which are in our minds against it, opens and enlarges our hearts to receive the word, and comply with all the commands thereof, thus, Acts xvi. 14. _The Lord opened the heart of Lydia, that she attended to the things that were spoken of Paul._ So David prays, Psal. cxix. 18. compared with v. 5. _Open thou mine eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law. O that my ways were directed to keep thy statutes!_

Footnote 9:

“As for _our own existence_, we perceive it so plainly, and so
certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. For
nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence; _I think, I
reason, I feel pleasure and pain_: can any of these be more evident to
me, than my own existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very
doubt makes me perceive my own _existence_, and will not suffer me to
doubt of that. For if I know _I feel pain_, it is evident I have as
certain perception of my own existence, as of the existence of the
pain I feel: or, if I know _I doubt_, I have as certain perception of
the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call
_doubt_. Experience then convinces us, that _we have an intuitive
knowledge of our own existence_, and an internal infallible perception
that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning or thinking, we are
conscious to ourselves of our own being, and, in this matter, come not
short of the highest degree of _certainty_.”——

“In the next place, man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare
_nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to
two right angles_. If a man knows not that non-entity, or the absence
of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he
should know any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there
is some real being, and that non-entity cannot produce any real being,
it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been
something; since what was not from eternity, had a beginning, and what
had a beginning, must be produced by something else.

“Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from
another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its being
from another too. All the powers it has must be owing to, and received
from the same source. This eternal source, then, of all being, must
also be the source and original of all power; and so _this eternal
Being must be also the most powerful_.

“Again, a man finds in himself _perception_ and _knowledge_. We have
then got one step farther; and we are certain now, that there is not
only some being, but some knowing intelligent being in the world.

“There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being, and when
knowledge began to be; or else there has been also _a knowing being
from eternity_. If it be said, there was a time when no being had any
knowledge, when that eternal Being was void of all understanding: I
reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any
knowledge; it being as impossible that things wholly void of
knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should
produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should
make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as
repugnant to the _idea_ of senseless matter, that it should put into
itself sense, perception and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the
_idea_ of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles
than two right ones.

“Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly
find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of
this certain and evident truth, that _there is an eternal, most
powerful, and most knowing being_; which whether any one will please
to call _God_, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this
_idea_ duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other
attributes, which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. If,
nevertheless, any one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to
suppose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere
ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of the universe acted only
by that blind hap-hazard: I shall leave with him that very rational
and emphatical rebuke of _Tully, l. 2. de leg._ to be considered at
his leisure.

“What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming than for a man to
think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the
universe beside there is no such thing? Or that those things, which
with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend, should
be moved and managed without any reason at all?” _Quid est enim
verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se
mentem et rationem putet inesse, in cœlo mundoque non putet? Aut ea
quæ vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri
putet?_

“From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain
knowledge of the existence of a God, than of any thing our senses have
not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we
more certainly know that there is a God than that there is any thing
else without us. When I say we _know_, I mean there is such a
knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply
our minds to that, as we do to several other inquiries.”

LOCKE.

Footnote 10:

“In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a _stone_, and
were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer,
that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for
ever; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to shew the absurdity of
this answer. But suppose I had found a _watch_ upon the ground, and it
should be enquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I
should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for
any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet, why
should not this answer serve for the watch, as well as for the stone?
Why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For
this reason, and for no other, _viz._ that, when we come to inspect
the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that
its several parts are framed, and put together for a purpose, _e. g._
that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that
motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the
several parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a
different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner,
or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no
motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which
would have answered the use, that is now served by it. To reckon up a
few of the plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending
to one result: We see a cylindrical box, containing a coiled elastic
spring, which, by its endeavour to relax itself, turns round the box.
We next observe a flexible chain (artificially wrought for the sake of
flexure) communicating the action of the spring from the box to the
fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in,
and apply to, each other, conducting the motion from the fusee to the
balance, and from the balance to the pointer; and at the same time, by
the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion, as to
terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression,
to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the
wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust; the springs
of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the
watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of
the work, but, in the room of which, if there had been any other than
a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening
the case. This mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an
examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of
the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have
said, observed and understood,) the inference, we think, is
inevitable; that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have
existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer, or
artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to
answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use.

“I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion that we had never
seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making
one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of
workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was
performed: all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite
remains of some ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality
of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture.
Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance
of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist’s
skill, if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubts in our minds
of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time,
and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all,
the inference, whether the question arise concerning a human agent, or
concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent possessing, in
some respects, a different nature.

“II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the
watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The
purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer, might be
evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we
accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could
account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect,
in order to shew with what design it was made: still less necessary,
where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at
all.

“III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument,
if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not
discover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner they conduced to
the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not
ascertain, whether they conduced to that effect in any manner
whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case; if, by the loss, or
disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch
were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed or retarded, no doubt
would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these
parts, although we should be unable to investigate the manner
according to which, or the connection by which, the ultimate effect
depended upon their action or assistance: and the more complex is the
machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the
second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be
spared without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had
proved this by experiment; these superfluous parts, even if we were
completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning
which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of
contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.

“IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of
the watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told
that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms; that
whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have
contained some internal configuration or other; and that this
configuration might be the structure now exhibited, _viz._ of the
works of a watch, as well as of a different structure.

“V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his enquiry more satisfaction to be
answered, that there existed in things a principle of order, which had
disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation.
He never knew a watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even
form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order,
distinct from the intelligence of the watch-maker.

“VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear, that the mechanism of the
watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to
think so.

“VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his
hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of _metallic_
nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law, as the
efficient, operative, cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent;
for it is only the mode, according to which an agent proceeds: it
implies a power; for it is the order, according to which that power
acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct
from itself, the law does nothing; is nothing. The expression, ‘the
law of metallic nature,’ may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic
ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more
familiar to him, such as ‘the law of vegetable nature,’ ‘the law of
animal nature,’ or indeed as ‘the law of nature’, in general, when
assigned as the cause of phænomena, in exclusion of agency and power;
or when it is substituted into the place of these.

“VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his
conclusion, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he
knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his
argument. He knows the utility of the end: he knows the subserviency
and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his
ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect
not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing
little, need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.”——

“Suppose, in the next place, that the person who found the watch,
should, after some time, discover, that, in addition to all the
properties which he had hitherto observed in it, it possessed the
unexpected property of producing, in the course of its movement,
another watch like itself; (the thing is conceivable;) that it
contained within it a mechanism, a system of parts, a mould for
instance, or a complex adjustment of laths, files, and other tools,
evidently and separately calculated for this purpose; let us enquire,
what effect ought such a discovery to have upon his former conclusion!

“I. The first effect would be to increase his admiration of the
contrivance, and his conviction of the consummate skill of the
contriver. Whether he regarded the object of the contrivance, the
distinct apparatus, the intricate, yet in many parts intelligible,
mechanism by which it was carried on, he would perceive, in this new
observation, nothing but an additional reason for doing what he had
already done; for referring the construction of the watch to design,
and to supreme art. If that construction _without_ this property, or,
which is the same thing, before this property had been noticed, proved
intention and art to have been employed about it; still more strong
would the proof appear, when he came to the knowledge of this further
property, the crown and perfection of all the rest.

“II. He would reflect, that though the watch before him were, _in some
sense_, the maker of the watch, which was fabricated in the course of
its movements, yet it was in a very different sense from that, in
which a carpenter, for instance, is the maker of a chair; the author
of its contrivance, the cause of the relation of its parts to their
use. With respect to these, the first watch was no cause at all to the
second: in no such sense as this was it the author of the constitution
and order, either of the parts which the new watch contained, or of
the parts by the aid and instrumentality of which it was produced. We
might possibly say, but with great latitude of expression, that a
stream of water ground corn: but no latitude of expression would allow
us to say, no stretch of conjecture could lead us to think, that the
stream of water built the mill, though it were too ancient for us to
know who the builder was. What the stream of water does in the affair,
is neither more nor less than this: by the application of an
unintelligent impulse to a mechanism previously arranged, arranged
independently of it, and arranged by intelligence, an effect is
produced, _viz._ the corn is ground. But the effect results from the
arrangement. The force of the stream cannot be said to be the cause or
author of the effect, still less of the arrangement. Understanding and
plan in the formation of the mill were not the less necessary, for any
share which the water has in grinding the corn: yet is this share the
same, as that which the watch would have contributed to the production
of the new watch, upon the supposition assumed in the last section.
Therefore,

“III. Though it be now no longer probable, that the individual watch
which our observer had found, was made immediately by the hand of an
artificer, yet doth not this alteration in any wise affect the
inference that an artificer had been originally employed and concerned
in the production. The argument from design remains as it was. Marks
of design and contrivance are no more accounted for now, than they
were before. In the same thing, we may ask for the cause of different
properties. We may ask for the cause of the colour of a body, of its
hardness, of its heat; and these causes may be all different. We are
now asking for the cause of that subserviency to an use, that relation
to an end, which we have remarked in the watch before us. No answer is
given to this question by telling us that a preceding watch produced
it. There cannot be design without a designer; contrivance without a
contriver; order without choice; arrangement, without any thing
capable of arranging; subserviency and relation to a purpose, without
that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and
executing their office in accomplishing that end, without the end ever
having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it.
Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end,
relation of instruments to an use, imply the presence of intelligence
and mind. No one, therefore, can rationally believe, that the
insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued,
was the proper cause of the mechanism we so much admire in it; could
be truly said to have constructed the instrument, disposed its parts,
assigned their office, determined their order, action, and mutual
dependency, combined their several motions into one result, and that
also a result connected with the utilities of other beings. All these
properties therefore, are as much unaccounted for as they were before.

“IV. Nor is any thing gained by running the difficulty further back,
_i. e._ by supposing the watch before us to have been produced by
another watch, that from a former, and so on indefinitely. Our going
back ever so far brings us no nearer to the least degree of
satisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is still unaccounted for.
We still want a contriver. A designing mind is neither supplied by
this supposition, nor dispensed with. If the difficulty were
diminished the further we went back, by going back indefinitely we
might exhaust it. And this is the only case to which this sort of
reasoning applies. Where there is a tendency, or, as we increase the
number of terms, a continual approach towards a limit, _there_, by
supposing the number of terms to be what is called infinite, we may
conceive the limit to be attained: but where there is no such tendency
or approach, nothing is effected by lengthening the series. There is
no difference as to the point in question, (whatever there may be as
to many points) between one series and another; between a series which
is finite, and a series which is infinite. A chain composed of an
infinite number of links, can no more support itself, than a chain
composed of a finite number of links. And of this we are assured,
(though we never _can_ have tried the experiment) because, by
increasing the number of links, from ten for instance to a hundred,
from a hundred to a thousand, &c. we make not the smallest approach,
we observe not the smallest tendency, towards self-support. There is
no difference in this respect (yet there may be a great difference in
several respects) between a chain of a greater or less length, between
one chain and another, between one that is finite and one that is
indefinite. This very much resembles the case before us. The machine,
which we are inspecting, demonstrates, by its construction,
contrivance and design. Contrivance must have had a contriver; design,
a designer; whether the machine immediately proceeded from another
machine, or not. That circumstance alters not the case. That other
machine may, in like manner, have proceeded from a former machine: nor
does that alter the case: contrivance must have had a contriver. That
former one from one preceding it: no alteration still: a contriver is
still necessary. No tendency is perceived, no approach towards a
diminution of this necessity. It is the same with any and every
succession of these machines; a succession of ten, of a hundred, of a
thousand; with one series as with another; a series which is finite,
as with a series which is infinite. In whatever other respects they
may differ, in this they do not. In all equally, contrivance and
design are unaccounted for.

“The question is not simply, How came the first watch into existence?
which question, it may be pretended, is done away by supposing the
series of watches thus produced from one another to have been
infinite, and consequently to have had no such _first_, for which it
was necessary to provide a cause. This, perhaps, would have been
nearly the state of the question, if nothing had been before us but an
unorganized unmechanised substance, without mark or indication of
contrivance. It might be difficult to shew that such substance could
not have existed from eternity, either in succession (if it were
possible, which I think it is not, for unorganized bodies to spring
from one another,) or by individual perpetuity. But that is not the
question now. To suppose it to be so, is to suppose that it made no
difference whether we had found a watch or a stone. As it is, the
metaphysics of that question have no place; for, in the watch which we
are examining, are seen contrivance, design; an end, a purpose; means
for the end, adaptation to the purpose. And the question, which
irresistibly presses upon our thoughts, is, whence this contrivance
and design? The thing required is the intending mind, the adapting
hand, the intelligence by which that hand was directed. This question,
this demand, is not shaken off, by increasing a number or succession
of substances, destitute of these properties; nor the more, by
increasing that number to infinity. If it be said, that, upon the
supposition of one watch being produced from another in the course of
that other’s movements, and by means of the mechanism within it, we
have a cause for the watch in my hand, _viz._ the watch from which it
proceeded, I deny, that for the design, the contrivance, the
suitableness of means to an end, the adaptation of instruments to an
use (all which we discover in the watch,) we have any cause whatever.
It is in vain, therefore to assign a series of such causes, or to
allege that a series may be carried back to infinity; for I do not
admit that we have yet any cause at all of the phænomena, still less
any series of causes either finite or infinite. Here is contrivance,
but no contriver; proofs of design, but no designer.

“V. Our observer would further also reflect, that the maker of the
watch before him, was, in truth and reality, the maker of every watch
produced from it; there being no difference (except that the latter
manifests a more exquisite skill) between the making of another watch
with his own hands by the mediation of files, laths, chisels, &c. and
the disposing, fixing, and inserting, of these instruments, or of
others equivalent to them, in the body of the watch already made, in
such a manner, as to form a new watch in the course of the movements
which he had given to the old one. It is only working by one set of
tools, instead of another.

“The conclusion which the _first_ examination of the watch, of its
works, construction, and movement suggested, was, that it must have
had, for the cause and author of that construction, an artificer, who
understood its mechanism, and designed its use. This conclusion is
invincible. A _second_ examination presents us with a new discovery.
The watch is found in the course of its movement to produce another
watch similar to itself: and not only so, but we perceive in it a
system of organization, separately calculated for that purpose. What
effect would this discovery have, or ought it to have, upon our former
inference? What, as hath already been said, but to increase, beyond
measure, our admiration of the skill, which had been employed in the
formation of such a machine? Or shall it, instead of this, all at once
turn us round to an opposite conclusion, _viz._ that no art or skill
whatever has been concerned in the business, although all other
evidences of art and skill remain as they were, and this last and
supreme piece of art be now added to the rest? Can this be maintained
without absurdity? Yet this is atheism.”

PALEY.

Footnote 11:

“The works of nature want only to be contemplated. When contemplated,
they have every thing in them which can astonish by their greatness;
for, of the vast scale of operation, through which our discoveries
carry us, at one end we see an intelligent Power arranging planetary
systems, fixing, for instance, the trajectory of _Saturn_, or
constructing a ring of a hundred thousand miles diameter, to surround
his body, and be suspended like a magnificent arch over the heads of
his inhabitants; and, at the other, bending a hooked tooth, concerting
and providing an appropriate mechanism, for the clasping and
reclasping of the filaments of the feather of a humming-bird. We have
proof, not only of both these works proceeding from an intelligent
agent, but of their proceeding from the same agent: for, in the first
place, we can trace an identity of plan, a connexion of system, from
Saturn to our own globe; and when arrived upon our own globe, we can,
in the second place, pursue the connexion through all the organized,
especially the animated, bodies, which it supports. We can observe
marks of a common relation, as well to one another, as to the elements
of which their habitation is composed. Therefore one mind hath
planned, or at least hath prescribed a general plan for, all these
productions. One being has been concerned in all.

“Under this stupendous Being we live. Our happiness, our existence, is
in his hands. All we expect must come from him. Nor ought we to feel
our situation insecure. In every nature, and in every portion of
nature, which we can descry, we find attention bestowed upon even the
minutest parts. The hinges in the wings of an _earwig_, and the joints
of its antennæ, are as highly wrought, as if the Creator had had
nothing else to finish. We see no signs of diminution of care by
multiplicity of objects, or of distraction of thought by variety. We
have no reason to fear therefore, our being forgotten, or overlooked,
or neglected.

“The existence and character of the Deity, is, in every view, the most
interesting of all human speculations. In none, however, is it more
so, than as it facilitates the belief of the fundamental articles of
_Revelation_. It is a step to have it proved, that there must be
something in the world more than what we see. It is a further step to
know, that, amongst the invisible things of nature, there must be an
intelligent mind, concerned in its production, order, and support.
These points being assured to us by Natural Theology, we may well
leave to Revelation the disclosure of many particulars, which our
researches cannot reach, respecting either the nature of this Being as
the original cause of all things, or his character and designs as a
moral governor; and not only so, but the more full confirmation of
other particulars, of which, though they do not lie altogether beyond
our reasonings and our probabilities, the certainty is by no means
equal to the importance. The true Theist will be the first to listen
to _any_ credible communication of divine knowledge. Nothing which he
has learnt from Natural Theology, will diminish his desire of further
instruction, or his disposition to receive it with humility and
thankfulness. He wishes for light: he rejoices in light. His inward
veneration of this great Being, will incline him to attend with the
utmost seriousness, not only to all that can be discovered concerning
him by researches into nature, but to all that is taught by a
revelation, which gives reasonable proof of having proceeded from him.

“But, above every other article of revealed religion, does the
anterior belief of a Deity, bear with the strongest force, upon that
grand point, which gives indeed interest and importance to all the
rest—the resurrection of the human dead. The thing might appear
hopeless, did we not see a power under the guidance of an intelligent
will, and a power penetrating the inmost recesses of all substance. I
am far from justifying the opinion of those, who ‘thought it a thing
incredible that God should raise the dead;’ but I admit that it is
first necessary to be persuaded, that there _is_ a God to do so. This
being thoroughly settled in our minds, there seems to be nothing in
this process (concealed and mysterious as we confess it to be,) which
need to shock our belief. They who have taken up the opinion, that the
acts of the human mind depend upon _organization_, that the mind
itself indeed consists in organization, are supposed to find a greater
difficulty than others do, in admitting a transition by death to a new
state of sentient existence, because the old organization is
apparently dissolved. But I do not see that any impracticability need
be apprehended even by these; or that the change, even upon their
hypothesis, is far removed from the analogy of some other operations,
which we know with certainty that the deity is carrying on. In the
ordinary derivation of plants and animals from one another, a
particle, in many cases, minuter than all assignable, all conceivable
dimension; an aura, an effluvium, an infinitesimal; determines the
organization of a future body: does no less than fix, whether that
which is about to be produced, shall be a vegetable, a merely
sentient, or a rational being; an oak, a frog, or a philosopher; makes
all these differences; gives to the future body its qualities, and
nature, and species. And this particle, from which springs, and by
which is determined a whole future nature, itself proceeds from, and
owes its constitution to, a prior body: nevertheless, which is seen in
plants most decisively, the incepted organization, though formed
within, and through, and by a preceding organization, is not corrupted
by its corruption, or destroyed by its dissolution; but, on the
contrary, is sometimes extricated and developed by those very causes;
survives and comes into action, when the purpose, for which it was
prepared, requires its use.—Now an œconomy which nature has adopted,
when the purpose was to transfer an organization from one individual
to another, may have something analogous to it, when the purpose is to
transmit an organization from one state of being to another state: and
they who found thought in organization, may see something in this
analogy applicable to their difficulties; for, whatever can transmit a
similarity of organization will answer their purpose, because,
according even to their own theory, it may be the vehicle of
consciousness, and because consciousness, without doubt, carries
identity and individuality along with it through all changes of form
or of visible qualities. In the most general case, that, as we have
said, of the derivation of plants and animals from one another, the
latent organization is either itself similar to the old organization,
or has the power of communicating to new matter the old organic form.
But it is not restricted to this rule. There are other cases,
especially in the progress of insect life, in which the dormant
organization does not much resemble that which incloses it, and still
less suits with the situation in which the inclosing body is placed,
but suits with a different situation to which it is destined. In the
larva of the libellula, which lives constantly, and has still long to
live, under water, are descried the wings of a fly, which two years
afterwards is to mount into the air. Is there nothing in this analogy?
It serves at least to shew, that, even in the observable course of
nature, organizations are formed one beneath another; and, amongst a
thousand other instances, it shews completely, that the Deity can
mould and fashion the parts of material nature, so as to fulfil any
purpose whatever which he is pleased to appoint.

“They who refer the operations of mind to a substance totally and
essentially different from matter, as, most certainly, these
operations, though affected by material causes, hold very little
affinity to any properties of matter with which we are acquainted,
adopt, perhaps, a juster reasoning and a better philosophy; and by
these the considerations above suggested are not wanted, at least in
the same degree. But to such as find, which some persons do find, an
insuperable difficulty in shaking off an adherence to those analogies,
which the corporeal world is continually suggesting to their thoughts;
to such, I say, every consideration will be a relief, which manifests
the extent of that intelligent power which is acting in nature, the
fruitfulness of its resources, the variety, and aptness, and success
of its means; most especially every consideration, which tends to
shew, that, in the translation of a conscious existence, there is not,
even in their own way of regarding it, any thing greatly beyond, or
totally unlike, what takes place in such parts (probably small parts)
of the order of nature, as are accessible to our observation.

“Again; if there be those who think, that the contractedness and
debility of the human faculties in our present state, seem ill to
accord with the high destinies which the expectations of religion
point out to us, I would only ask them, whether any one, who saw a
child two hours after its birth, could suppose that it would ever come
to understand _fluxions_;[12] or who then shall say, what further
amplification of intellectual powers, what accession of knowledge,
what advance and improvement, the rational faculty, be its
constitution what it will, may not admit of, when placed amidst new
objects, and endowed with a sensorium, adapted, as it undoubtedly will
be, and as our present senses are, to the perception of those
substances, and of those properties of things, with which our concern
may lie.

“Upon the whole; in every thing which respects this awful, but, as we
trust, glorious change, we have a wise and powerful Being, (the
author, in nature, of infinitely various expedients for infinitely
various ends,) upon whom to rely for the choice and appointment of
means, adequate to the execution of any plan which his goodness or his
justice may have formed, for the moral and accountable part of his
terrestrial creation. That great office rests with him: be it ours to
hope and prepare; under a firm and settled persuasion, that, living
and dying, we are his; that life is passed in his constant presence,
that death resigns us to his merciful disposal.”

PALEY.

Footnote 12:

See Search’s Light of Nature, passim.

Footnote 13:

The theory of a nervous fluid, or animal spirits, is generally
abandoned.

Footnote 14:

See this doubtful doctrine discussed post Quest. 60.

Quest. III.

QUEST. III. _What is the Word of God?_

ANSW. The holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament are the word
of God, the only rule of faith and obedience.

In speaking to this answer, we shall consider the several names by which the scripture is set forth with the import thereof, and more particularly that by which it is most known; to wit, the Old and New Testament, and then speak of it as a rule of faith and obedience.

I. There are several names given to the word of God, in Psalm cxix. one of which is found in almost every verse thereof.

It is sometimes called his law, statutes, precepts, commandments, or ordinances,[15] to signify his authority and power to demand obedience of his creatures which he does therein, and shews us in what particular instances, and how we are to yield obedience to it.

It is also called his judgments, implying that he is the great Judge of the world, and that he will deal with men in a judicial way, according to their works, as agreeable or disagreeable to this law of his, contained in his word; and, for this reason, it is also called his righteousness, because all that he commands in his word is holy and just, and his service highly reasonable.

It is also called God’s testimonies, as containing the witness, evidence, or record, that he has given to his own perfections, whereby he has demonstrated them to the world. Thus we are said, 2 Cor. iii. 18. _To behold, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord._

It is also called his way, as containing a declaration of the glorious works that he has done, both of nature and grace; the various methods of his dealing with men, or the way that they should walk in, which leads to eternal life.

Moreover, it is called, Rom. iii. 2. _The oracles of God_, to denote that many things contained in it could not have been known by us till he was pleased to reveal them therein. Agreeably hereto, the apostle speaks of the great things contained in the gospel, as being hid in God; hid from ages and generations past, but now made manifest to the saints, Eph. iii. 9, Col. i. 26.

Again it is sometimes called the gospel, especially those parts of scripture which contain the glad tidings of salvation by Christ, or the method which God ordained for the taking away the guilt, and subduing the power of sin; and particularly the apostle calls it, _The glorious gospel of the blessed God_; 1 Tim. i. 11. and _the gospel of our salvation_. Eph. i. 13.

And, in this answer, it is called the Old and New Testament; that part of it which was written before our Saviour’s incarnation, which contains a relation of God’s dealings with his church, from the beginning of the world to that time, or a prediction of what should be fulfilled in following ages, is called the Old Testament. The other which contains an account of God’s dispensation of grace, from Christ’s first to his second coming is called the New.

A testament is the declared or written will of a person, in which some things are given to those who are concerned or described therein. Thus the scripture is God’s written will or testament, containing an account of what he has freely given in his covenant of grace to fallen man; and this is the principal subject matter of scripture, as a testament; therefore it contains an account,

1. Of many valuable legacies given to the heirs of salvation; the blessings of both worlds, all the privileges contained in those great and precious promises, with which the scripture so abounds. Thus it is said, _Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory_; Psal. lxiii. 24. and _the Lord will give grace and glory_, Psal. lxxxiv. 11.

2. It describes the testator Christ, who gives eternal life to his people, and confirms all the promises which are made in him; as they are said, 2 Cor. i. 20. _To be in him yea and amen, to the glory of God_; and more especially he ratified this testament by his death as the same apostle observes, which is a known maxim of the civil law, that _where a testament is, there must of necessity be the death of the testator_,[16] Heb. ix. 16, 17. upon which the force or validity thereof depends. And the word of God gives us a large account how all the blessings, which God bestowed upon his people, receive their validity from the death of Christ.

3. It also discovers to us who are the heirs, or legatees, to whom these blessings are given, who are described therein, as repenting, believing, returning sinners, who may lay claim to the blessings of the covenant of grace.

4. It has several seals annexed to it, _viz._ the sacraments under the Old and New Testament, of which we have a particular account in scripture.

This leads us to consider how the scripture is otherwise divided or distinguished.