Chapter XIV: Part 14

2. That they intend hereby to depreciate divine revelation, and then the sense thereof is this; that though the light of nature leads mankind into such a degree of the knowledge of divine truths, as is sufficient, in its kind to salvation; so that they, who are destitute of divine revelation, may thereby understand the terms of acceptance with God, and the way which, if duly improved, would lead to heaven; yet God was pleased to give some farther discovery of the same things by his word, and, in this sense, the one is only an improvement upon the other, as it makes the same truths, which were known, in some degree, without it more clear, and frees them from those corruptions, or false glosses, which the perverse reasonings of men have set upon them; whereas we, by insisting on inexplicable mysteries, which we pretend to be founded on divine revelation, though, in reality, they are not contained in it, cloud and darken that light, and so make the way of salvation more difficult, than it would otherwise be; and this certainly tends to depreciate divine revelation, how plausible soever the words, at first view, may appear to be; for it supposes those doctrines but now mentioned, and many others of the like nature, not necessary to salvation; so that this objection takes its first rise from the Deists, however it may be applied, by the Anti-trinitarians, in militating against the doctrine of the Trinity. Therefore, since it is principally designed to overthrow this doctrine, by supposing it to be unintelligible, and consequently, according to their method of reasoning, in no sense the object of faith, the only reply which need be made to it is, that the discoveries of the glory of God, by the light of nature, are, in some respects, as incomprehensible as the doctrine of the Trinity; which we are not, for that reason, obliged to disbelieve, or reject; and therefore there is no advantage gained against our argument, by supposing that the light of nature contains a discovery of truths, plain, easy, and intelligible by all, in the full extent thereof, and that the doctrine of the Trinity is otherwise, and consequently must not be contained in divine revelation, and, as such, cannot be defended by us.

4. Another thing that may be premised, before we enter on the proof of the doctrine of the Trinity, is, that it is not contrary to reason, though it be above it; neither are our reasoning powers, when directed by scripture-revelation, altogether useless, in order to our attaining such a degree of the knowledge thereof, as is necessary, and ought to be endeavoured after. When a doctrine may be said to be above reason, has been already considered, as well as that the doctrine of the Trinity is so; and now we are obliged to obviate an objection, which is the most popular one of any that is brought against it, namely, that it is an absurd and irrational doctrine; and that they who maintain it must first lay aside their reason, before they can be induced to believe it, for it is as much as to say that three are equal to one; which is contrary to the common sense of all mankind, or else, that we maintain a plurality of gods, which is contrary to the very first principles of the light of nature. And here we are reflected on, as though we demanded that our antagonists should lay aside their reason, before we argue with them, and then it is easy to determine on which side the argument will turn; therefore, to make way for what might be said in defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, we shall, under this head, consider,

(1.) When a doctrine may be said to be contrary to reason.

(2.) Shew that the doctrine of the Trinity is not so.

(3.) What is the use of reason, in establishing it, or any other doctrines, which are the subject of pure revelation.

(1.) When we may conclude, that a doctrine is contrary to reason. This it may be said to be, when it is contrary to the methods of reasoning made use of by particular persons, which are not always just, and therefore it does not follow, from hence, that it is false or absurd, because our reasoning about it is so, but rather the contrary; so that when they, on the other side of the question, tell us, with an air of boasting, that if the doctrine we are maintaining could have been accounted for, how comes it to pass that so many men of sense and learning, as are to be found among the Anti-trinitarians, have not been able to do it? But this is nothing to our present argument; therefore we suppose that a doctrine is contrary to reason, when it contradicts some of the first principles, which the mind of man cannot but yield its assent to, as soon as ever it takes in the sense of the words which contain them, without demanding any proof thereof; as that the whole is greater than the part; and that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time; or that two is more than one, &c. or when we can prove a thing to be true to a demonstration, and yet suppose that a contradictory proposition, in which the words are taken in the same sense, may be equally true.[80]

(2.) That the doctrine of the Trinity is not contrary to reason. This appears, inasmuch as we do not say that the three Persons in the Godhead are one Person, or that the one divine Being is three divine Beings.

_Object._ But it is objected, that it is contrary to reason, which establishes and proves the unity of the Godhead, to say that the divine nature may be predicated of more than one, inasmuch as that infers a plurality of Gods, and every distinct Person must be concluded to be a distinct God; therefore the Trinitarian doctrine is down-right Tritheism, and consequently contrary to reason; and here those words of the Athanasian Creed are produced, as an instance hereof, namely, that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, yet there are not three Gods, but one God; so, that the Father is Eternal, the Son is Eternal, and the Holy Ghost Eternal, yet there are not three Eternals, but one Eternal; and the Father Almighty, the Son Almighty, and the Holy Ghost Almighty, yet are there not three Almighties, but one Almighty. This they suppose, though without ground, to be a plain contradiction.

_Answ._ But to this it may be replied, that when we say the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are God, we do not say they are distinct Gods, for the distinction between them respects their personality, not their deity: and when we assert that they are all Eternal, or Almighty, we do not suppose that their duration, or power, are distinct; and the same may be said of all other divine perfections that are attributed to them, the perfections are the same in all of them, though the persons are distinct. So that the charge of Tritheism lies in a narrow compass: they say that there is one divine Being, so do we; and to this they add, that this divine Being is a divine person, since existence and personality are the same; therefore, if there are more divine Persons, there must be more Gods; this consequence they maintain, but we deny. But how do they prove it? The proof amounts to no more than this; that there is no instance in finite things, when we speak of angels or men, to whom alone personality can be applied, of any distinct persons, but at the same time their beings are distinct; therefore it must be so with respect to the divine persons. This we are bound to deny, since our ideas of personality and existence are not the same; therefore, how inseparable soever they may be in what respects creatures, we may have distinct ideas of them, when we speak of the divine being and personality of the Father, Son, and Spirit. Here it will, doubtless, be demanded, that we determine wherein the difference consists; or, in particular, since every distinct finite person is a distinct being, what there is in the divine personality, that should exclude the Father, Son, and Spirit, from being distinct beings, because distinct persons; so that when we conclude that there is a small or faint resemblance between divine and human personality, we must be able to comprehend, and fully to describe, that infinite disproportion that is between them, or else must be charged with using words without any manner of ideas annexed to them, and so our cause must fall to the ground. If, indeed, the divine personality were finite, like that of the creature, then it might be required that a finite mind should account for it: but since it is not so, but incomprehensible, we are bound to believe what we cannot comprehend.

But have we no ideas at all of the distinct personality of the Father, Son, and Spirit? To this we may answer; that we have finite ideas thereof, and more than these we have not of any of the divine perfections. We are taught, by scripture, to say that they are distinct persons; and we know what those personal characters, or properties, from whence our ideas take their rise, signify, when applied to men; but, at the same time, abstract, in our thoughts, every thing from them that argues imperfection; or, in short, our conceptions hereof proceed in the same way, as when we think of any of the perfections of the divine nature: these, as well as the divine personality, are equally incomprehensible; yet, while we say they are infinitely more than can be in any creature, we, notwithstanding, retain such ideas of them, as tend to answer those ends of religion, which suppose that we apprehend something of them that is conducive hereunto. We are now to consider,

(3.) The use of reason in proving or defending the doctrine of the Trinity, or any other doctrines of pure revelation. They could not, indeed, have been at first discovered by reason, nor can every thing that is revealed be comprehended by it, yet our reason is not to be laid aside as useless; therefore some call it a servant to faith. Thus revelation discovers what doctrines we are to believe, demands our assent to them, and reason offers a convincing proof that we are under an indispensable obligation to give it: it proves the doctrine to be true, and such as is worthy of God, as it is derived from him, the fountain of truth and wisdom; and this office of reason, or the subserviency thereof to our faith, is certainly necessary, since what is false cannot be the object of faith in general; and nothing unworthy of God can be the matter of divine revelation, nor consequently the object of a divine faith.

Now, in order to reason’s judging of the truth of things, it first considers the sense of words; what ideas are designed to be conveyed thereby, and whether they are contrary to the common sense of mankind; and if it appears that they are not, it proceeds to enquire into those evidences that may give conviction, and enforce our belief thereof; and leads us into the nature of the truths revealed, receives them as instamped with the authority of God, and considers them as agreeable to his perfections, and farther leads us into his design of revealing them, and what we are to infer from them; and in doing this it connects things together, observes the dependence of one thing on another, what is the importance thereof, and how they are to be improved to answer the best purposes.

Now this may be applied particularly to the doctrine of the Trinity; for it contains in it no absurdity contradictory to reason, as has been already proved; and the evidences on which our faith herein is founded will be farther considered, when we prove it to be a scripture doctrine, by the express words thereof, agreeable to the mind of the Holy Ghost, or by just consequences deduced from it; by which it will farther appear, that it is necessary for us to use our reason in stating those doctrines, which are neither founded on, nor can be comprehended by it.

5. We are now to consider from whence the doctrine of the Trinity is to be deduced, or where we are to search for that knowledge thereof, which we are to acquiesce in. And here it must be observed, that it cannot be learnt from the light of nature, for then we should certainly be able to behold some traces or footsteps thereof in the works of creation and providence, that so this might be understood thereby, as well as the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, as the cause is known by its effect; but we should never have known that God made all things by his essential word, _without whom nothing was made, that was made_, as the evangelist speaks, John i. 3. had we not received this doctrine from divine revelation: likewise, we should never have known that the Spirit, as a distinct Person from the Father, created all things, and performed several other works, by which his personal glory is demonstrated, had we not received the account which we have thereof from scripture. The light of nature could discover to us, indeed, that God, who is a Spirit, or incorporeal Being, has produced many effects worthy of himself; but we could not have known hereby, that the word Spirit signifies a distinct person, which we are beholden to divine revelation for.

And as for the work of our redemption, in which, more than in all the other divine works, the personal glory of the Father, Son, and Spirit, is demonstrated, we could have known as little of that by the light of nature, as we do the persons to whom it is attributed. But I am sensible that it will be objected to this,

_Object._ 1. That our first parents knew the doctrine of the Trinity as soon as they were created, otherwise they could not have given that distinct glory to the Persons in the Godhead that is due to them; and if we are required, not only to worship the divine Being, but to worship the Father, Son, and Spirit; and, if this worship is due from us, as creatures, and not merely as fallen and redeemed; then it will follow from hence, that our first parents must know the doctrine of the Trinity: but this they did not know by divine revelation; therefore they knew it by the light of nature.

_Answ._ We will allow every thing contained in this objection, excepting that they did not know this by divine revelation; for certainly they had some ideas conveyed this way at first, otherwise they could not have known any thing that related to instituted worship, which, it is plain, they did. And shall it be reckoned any absurdity to suppose that they received this doctrine of the Trinity by divine revelation, though we have no particular account thereof, in that short history which Moses gives us of things relating to the state of innocency? It is therefore sufficient to our purpose, to suppose that it was agreeable to the wisdom and goodness of God to make known to them this important truth, and consequently that he did so, though not by the light of nature.

_Object._ 2. It is farther objected, that the heathen knew something of the doctrine of the Trinity, as appears by their writings, though they were unacquainted with scripture. To support this objection, they refer to several mystical expressions in the works of Plato, which seem to look that way, when he speaks of three principles; one whereof he calls goodness, or a being that is good; the second he calls his word, or reason; and the third a spirit, which diffuses its influence throughout the whole system of beings, and calls him sometimes the soul of the world; and in other places, he speaks of them as having a distinct sovereignty.[81] And he supposes the first of these to be the cause of things most great and excellent; the second, the cause of things of an inferior nature; the third, of things yet more inferior; and some of his followers plainly call them three hypostases; and sometimes, Father, Word, and Spirit.

_Answ._ The account which Plato and his followers seem to have given of the doctrine of the Trinity does not appear to have been taken from the light of nature, and therefore this makes nothing to the objection. We have sufficient ground to conclude that Plato travelled into Egypt, with a design to make improvements in knowledge; and some suppose, that there he saw some translation of a part of the Bible into Greek,[82] more ancient than that which is commonly attributed to the LXX, which was not compiled till an hundred years after his time. But whether he did this, or no, is uncertain: it is true, he used several expressions, which are contained in the books of Moses, and took the plan of his laws from thence; upon which account some have called him a second Moses, speaking Greek: but whether he received his notions more immediately from scripture, or by conversation with the Jews, of whom a great number settled in Egypt, after Gedaliah’s death, is not material; however, it is sufficiently evident, that he had not all of them, in a way of reasoning, from the light of nature: and as for his followers, such as Plotinus, Proclus, Porphyry, and others, they lived in those ages, when Christianity prevailed in the world, though none of them pretended to be Christians; and one of them was the most inveterate enemy to Christianity that lived; yet these might well be supposed to make their master Plato speak several things, as to this mystery, which he never intended, were it only to persuade the Christians to believe that he was not inferior to Moses, or any other recorded in scripture.

Thus having answered the objections, we shall take leave to consider how unwarily some divines, who have defended the doctrine of the Trinity, have not only asserted that Plato understood a great a deal of it, but have made use of this, as an answer to the Anti-trinitarian objection before mentioned, that the doctrine of the Trinity is unintelligible; and they have taken a great deal of pleasure in accounting for this doctrine in such a way as these philosophers have done:[83] and some of them have taken notice of a few dark hints, which they have met with in some of the poetical fictions, and from thence concluded that there was something of the Trinity known, even by the Heathen in general: thus when the word three is mentioned by them, and applied to some things, which they relate concerning their gods; or when they speak of gods delighting in an unequal number, or in the number three. But this is too gross to be particularly mentioned, lest it should give us an unbecoming idea of this divine mystery, or of those who have better arguments than these to defend it.

The reflection which I would make on this is, that what they call an advantage to the doctrine has been certainly very detrimental to it; and, as a late learned divine observes, has tended only to pervert the simplicity of the Christian faith with mixtures of philosophy and vain deceit.[84] And I doubt not but the apostle had an eye to this, among other corruptions, which they who were attached to the Heathen philosophy began to bring into their scheme of divinity, and would notoriously do in after ages, which he purposely fences against, when he says, _Beware, lest any man spoil you, through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ_, Col. ii. 8. And this corruption so much prevailed, that it has given occasion to some of the Anti-trinitarians, to reproach the doctrine of the Trinity, as though it were a system of Platonism. And it is their being too fond of using Plato’s words, in explaining the doctrine of the Trinity, that has given occasion to some of the fathers to be suspected, as though they were less favourable to the scripture account thereof; by which means the adversaries have laid claim to them as their own; and produced some unwary expressions out of Justin Martyr, and others, supposing them to be in the Arian scheme, who, in other parts of their writings, appear to be remote from it.[85]

And this leads us to consider the method which some divines have taken, in using similitudes to explain the doctrine of the Trinity, which, at best, tend only to illustrate, and not to prove a doctrine: and we can hardly make use of this method of illustrating this doctrine, without conveying some ideas, which are unbecoming, if not subversive thereof; and while we pretend to explain that which is in itself inexplicable, we do no service to the truth.

I shall here give a short specimen of this matter, that hereby we may see how some have unwarily weakened the cause which they have been maintaining. Some have taken a similitude from three of the divine perfections, _viz._ that there are three invisibles of God; power, wisdom, and goodness. Power creates, wisdom governs, and goodness conserves; and so they have gone on to explain this doctrine, till they had almost given it into the hands of the Sabellians: and, indeed, they might have instanced in more divine perfections than three, had it been to their purpose.

Again, others have explained this doctrine by some resemblance which they apprehend to be of it in man; and so they speak of the soul as a principle of a threefold life, rational, sensitive, and vegetative. Others speak of three causes concurring to produce the same effect; such as the efficient, constitutive and final cause. Others have taken their similitude from inanimate things; as the sun, in which there is light, heat, and motion, which are inseparably connected together, and tend to produce the same effects.

Moreover, others illustrate it by a similitude, taken from a fountain, in which there is the spring in the bowels of the earth, the water bubbling out of the earth, and the stream diffusing itself in a perpetual course, receiving all it communicates from the fountain. I am sorry there is occasion to caution any against this method of explaining the doctrine of the Trinity. But these, and many other similitudes of the like nature, we find in the writings of some, who consider not what a handle they give to the common enemy. There are, indeed, in most of them, three things, which are said, in different respects, to be one; but we may observe, that all these similitudes, and others of the like nature, brought to illustrate this doctrine, lead us to think of the whole divided into those parts, of which they consist, whereof they take notice of the number three; or they speak of three properties of the same thing; and if their wit and fancy saw it needful to speak of more than three, the same method of illustrating would serve their purpose, as much as it does the end for which they bring it. Therefore I would conclude this head, by using the words of God to Job, _Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?_ Job xxxviii. 2. Who are these, that, by pretending to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity by similitudes, do that, which, though very foreign to their design, tends to pervert it?

6. We shall now consider what general rules may be observed for our understanding those scriptures, on which our faith, with respect to the doctrine of the Trinity, is founded; and since it is a doctrine of pure revelation, as has been before observed, we must keep close to scripture, even to the words thereof, where they are express and distinct, as to this matter; and to consequences deduced from it, so far as they are just, and self-evident; and, at the same time, while we are sensible that we cannot comprehend this mystery, we must take care that we pretend not to be wise above what is revealed. Now there are some rules, which may be of use to us, in our enquiries into the sense of scripture concerning this doctrine; as,

(1.) We must not suppose that the words of scripture, relating thereunto, are to be taken in a sense, which can be known by none but criticks, as though it were designed only for them to understand; or that the unlearned part of the world should be left in the dark, or led astray, as to several things contained in this important doctrine. Thus we are not to suppose that we are at a loss as to the proper sense of the word God; or could hardly know how to direct our faith and worship, founded thereon, without the help of criticism; or, for want of being acquainted with some distinctions, concerning one that may be called God by nature, or the supreme God, and others who may be called gods by office, or subordinate gods, we should be led to ascribe divine honour where it is not due; or else we must be able to distinguish also concerning worship, and, instead of honouring the Son as we honour the Father, must give him an inferior kind of divine worship, short of what is due to the Father. This we have no scripture warrant for; neither are we led by the scriptures to have any notion of a middle being between God and the creature, or one that is not properly God, so as the Father is, and yet more than a creature, as though there were a medium between finite and infinite; neither are we led, by scripture, to conceive of any being, that has an eternal duration, whose eternity is supposed to be before time, and yet not the same with the eternal duration of the Father. These things we shall have occasion to mention in their proper place, and therefore need make no farther use of them at present, but only to observe, from hence, how intelligible the scripture would be in what relates to this doctrine, if the words thereof had not a plain and determinate sense; but we must make use of these methods of reasoning, if we would arrive to the meaning thereof.

(2.) If some divine perfections are attributed in scripture to the Son and Spirit, all the perfections of the divine nature, may, by a just consequence from thence, be proved to belong to them, by reason of the simplicity and unity thereof: therefore, if we can prove, from scripture, that they have some perfections ascribed to them, which, I hope, it will not be a difficult matter to do, we are not to suppose that our argument is defective, or that the doctrine of the Trinity is not sufficiently maintained, if we cannot produce a scripture to prove every perfection of the divine nature to be ascribed to them.

(3.) When any thing is mentioned in scripture, concerning our Saviour, or the Holy Spirit, which argues an inferiority to the Father, this is to be understood consistently with other scriptures, which speak of their having the same divine nature; since scripture does not, in the least, contradict itself; and how this may be done, will be farther considered under a following head.

(4.) If we have sufficient arguments to convince us of the truth of this doctrine, our faith ought not to be shaken, though we cannot fully understand the sense of some scriptures, which are brought to support the contrary; not that we are to suppose that the scripture gives countenance to two opposite doctrines: but a person may be fully satisfied concerning the sense of those scriptures that contain the doctrine of the Trinity, and yet not be supposed perfectly to understand the meaning of every word or phrase used in scripture, or of some particular texts, which are sometimes brought to support the contrary doctrine; so that objections may be brought, which he is not able readily to reply to. Shall he therefore deny the truth, because he cannot remove all the difficulties that seem to lie in the way of it? That would be to part with it at too easy a rate, which, when he has done, he will find greater difficulties attending the contrary scheme of doctrine. Do they object, that we believe things contrary to reason, because we assert the incomprehensibleness of divine mysteries? or that we are Tritheists, because we believe that there are three Persons in the Godhead, and cannot exactly determine the difference between divine and human personality? We could, on the other hand, point at some difficulties, that they cannot easily surmount. What shall we think of the head of giving divine worship to our Saviour, when, at the same time, they deny him to have those perfections, that denominate him God in the same sense as the Father is so called? The Socinians found it very difficult, when the matter was disputed among themselves, to reconcile their practice with their sentiments, when they worshipped him, whose Deity they denied. And the Arians will find that this objection equally affects their scheme; and it will be no less difficult for them to reconcile Christ’s character, as Redeemer, Governor of the world, Judge of quick and dead, with their low ideas of him, when denying his proper Deity. These things we only mention occasionally at present, that it may not be thought that the doctrine of the Trinity is exposed to greater difficulties than the contrary doctrine, to the end that they who are not furnished with all those qualifications, which are necessary for its defence, may not reckon those arguments, by which they have been convinced of the truth thereof, less valid, because they are not able, at present, to answer all the objections that may be brought against them.

(5.) The weight of several arguments, taken from scripture, to prove this doctrine, is to be considered, as well as the arguments themselves; we do not pretend that every one of them is equally conclusive; there are some, which are oftentimes brought to support it, which we can lay no great stress upon, and therefore shall omit to mention them, among other arguments brought to that purpose, lest we should give occasion to the adversary to insult, or conclude that we take any thing for an argument that has been brought as such to prove this doctrine. Therefore we will not pretend to prove, or peremptorily to determine, that the doctrine of the Trinity is contained in those words of the Psalmist, Psal. xxxiii. 6. _By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the Hosts of them by the breath of his mouth._ Nor will we pretend to prove this doctrine from the threefold repetition of the word Jehovah, in the form of benediction to be used by the high priest, Numb. vi. 24, 25, 26. _The Lord bless thee, and keep thee; the Lord make his face to shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee; the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace._ Nor do we lay any stress on the three-fold repetition of the word _Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of Hosts_, Isa. vi. 3. though we shall shew, in its proper place, that there are several things in this chapter, which prove this doctrine. However, if at any time, together with arguments that are more conclusive, we bring some that are less so; this use may be made of it, to shew how the scripture way of speaking is consistent therewith in those places that do not so directly prove it. This we thought proper to mention, because it is a very common thing for those, who cannot answer the most weighty arguments that are brought to support a doctrine, to bend their greatest force against those which have the least strength; and then to triumph, as though they had gained the victory, when they have only done it in what respects that which is less material.

II. We shall now consider in what sense we are to understand the words _Trinity_ and _Persons_ in the Godhead; and in what respect the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are said to be one. It is true, the word _Trinity_ is not to be found in scripture, but what we understand by it is plainly contained therein; therefore we use the word, as agreeable thereunto: thus we read of the _three that bear record in heaven_, _viz._ _the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost_, and that _these three are one_, 1 John v. 7. These three here mentioned are Persons, because they are described by personal characters; and we shall take occasion elsewhere, when we prove the Deity of the Son and Spirit, to consider their being one, that is, having the same divine nature, which we shall therefore wave at present, being only considering the sense of words commonly used by us in treating of this doctrine. All contending parties, however they have explained the word _Trinity_, according to their different ways of thinking, have notwithstanding, in compliance with custom, used the word, and so far explained it, as that we might understand that they intend hereby three, who are, in some respect one, though some have not cared to use the word _Person_; or if they have, it is without the most known and proper idea contained in it. Thus the Sabellians, whenever they use the word, intend nothing by it, but three relations, which may be attributed to the same Person; as when the same Person may be called a father, a son, and a brother, in different respects; or as when he that, at one time, sustains the person of a judge, may, at another time, sustain that of an advocate: this is what some call a Trinity of names; and they might as well have declined to use the words altogether, as to explain them in this sense.

Again, the Arians use the word _Person_; but these have run into another extreme, inasmuch as that, whilst they avoid Sabellianism, they would lay themselves open to the charge of Tritheism, did they not deny the proper Deity of the Son and Spirit; for they suppose that every distinct Person is a distinct being, agreeable to the sense of personality, when applied to men; but this, as has been before considered, is to be abstracted from the idea of personality, when applied to the Persons in the Godhead. These also understand the oneness of these divine Persons, in a sense agreeable to their own scheme, and different from ours, and therefore they speak of them as one in will, consent, or design, in which respect God and the creature may be said to be one: accordingly Arius, and his adherents, in the council at Nice, refused to allow that the divine persons were Ὁμοουσιοι consubstantial, and, with a great many evasions and subterfuges, attempted to conceal their sentiments: all that they could be brought to own was, that the Son was Ὁμοιος, or Ὁμοιουσιος, which amounts to no more than this, that whatever likeness there may be, in some respects, yet he has not the same proper divine nature with the Father and Holy Ghost.

Which leads us to consider the sense in which it is generally used by those who defend what we think to be the scripture-doctrine of the Trinity. There are some, it is true, both among ancient and modern writers, that attempt to explain what they mean by the word _Person_, who are so unhappy as to leave the sense thereof more dark than they found it, when they have given a definition thereof, agreeable to what is used by metaphysicians and schoolmen, to this effect, that it is a _suppositum_, endowed with reason; or that it is one entire, individual, incommunicable, rational subsistence: and when they define Personality, some tell us, that it is a positive mode of a being terminating and compleating its substantial nature, and giving incommunicability to it, which words need to be explained more than the thing defined thereby. And here I cannot but take notice of that warm debate which there was between the Greek and Latin church about the words _Hypostasis_ and _Persona_; the Latin, concluding that the word _Hypostasis_ signified substance or essence, thought, that to assert that there were three divine _Hypostases_, was to say that there were three Gods: On the other hand, the Greek church thought that the word _Person_ did not sufficiently guard against the Sabellian notion of the same individual being sustaining three relations; whereupon each part of the church was ready to brand the other with heresy, till by a free and mutual conference, in a synod at Alexandria, A. D. 362. they made it appear, that it was but a mere contention about the grammatical sense of a word; and then it was allowed, by men of temper on both sides, that either of the two words might be indifferently used.[86] But what signifies the use of them, when perplexed with the scholastic explications thereof? This has given occasion to some, whose sentiments have been very remote as to the doctrine of the Trinity, to express themselves with some dislike; on the one hand, the Socinians, and some among the Remonstrants, who made very great advances toward their scheme, _viz._ Curcellæus, Episcopius, and others,[87] have complained of clouding this doctrine with hard words; and the complaint is not altogether groundless, though it may be their design herein was to substitute such words in the room of them, as would make the remedy worse than the disease. On the other hand, some, who have embraced the doctrine of the Trinity, would not have liked its advocates the worse, had they chose to have defended it in a more plain intelligible manner. Thus Calvin himself wishes, that some words, which are so warmly opposed and defended on each side, were altogether laid aside, and buried, provided that such might be retained as express our faith in the doctrine of the Father, Son, and Spirit, being the one God, but distinguished by their personal properties.[88] And this is that plain sense of the word, which I shall make use of, in what I shall farther attempt to lay down in the defence thereof. And accordingly,

1. We never call any thing a person that is not endowed with understanding and will; and therefore the most glorious inanimate creatures, either in heaven or earth, whatever excellencies they have, or how useful soever they are to the world, they are not persons. Thus, when the sun is described as though it were a person, and is compared to _a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoicing as a strong man to run a race_, Psal. xix. 5. the words are never understood in any other but a metaphorical sense; so Behemoth and the Leviathan, mentioned in Job, being no other than brute creatures, are described with personal characters, in the same figurative way of speaking; therefore we suppose a person to have an understanding and will.

2. Whenever _I_, _thou_, or _he_, are applied to such a subject, they always connote a person; _I_, a person speaking; _thou_, a person spoken to; and _he_, or _him_, a person spoken of; and when such modes of speaking are sometimes applied to things that are destitute of reason, or to any moral virtues or principles of acting, which, from the nature of the thing, cannot be denominated persons, such expressions are very easily understood in a figurative sense, which may without any difficulty be distinguished from the proper one, whereby those who are so described are denominated persons.

There are some characters which always denote persons, and some works performed which are properly personal, which can be performed by none but persons. Thus the character of a father, or a son; so a Creator, a Redeemer, a benefactor, a Mediator, an advocate, a surety, a judge, a lord, a law-giver, and many others of the like nature, are all of them personal characters. So that whoever acts with design, and has such-like characters attributed to him, according to the proper acceptation of the word, him we call a person; and these characters we shall endeavour to apply to the Persons in the Godhead, to prove their distinct personality.

But since we are at present only considering the acceptation of words, we shall briefly observe the difference between a divine and a human person, when some personal properties, characters, or works, are attributed to each of them. And,

(1.) Human persons are separated one from the other: thus, for instance, Peter, James, and John, were three persons, but they were separated one from the other; whereas the Persons in the Godhead, however distinguished by their characters and properties, are never separated, as having the same divine essence or nature. As for human persons, one of them might have had a being and personality, had the other never existed, because it exists by the will of God; but the divine persons have a necessary existence and personality, as being, in all respects, independent, so that as they could not but be God, they could not but be divine Persons; the personality of the Son and Spirit are equally independent with that of the Father, and as much independent as their being and divine perfections.

(2.) Human persons have only the same kind of nature, which is generally called a common specific nature, but not the same individual nature with another person; so that though every man has a nature like that of the rest of mankind, yet the human nature, as attributed to one person, is not the same individual human nature that is attributed to another, for then the power and understanding, or the ideas that there are in one man, would be the same individual power and ideas, that are in another, which they are not. Whereas, when we speak of the Persons in the Godhead, as having the divine nature and perfections, we say that this nature is the same individual nature in all of them, though the persons are distinct, otherwise the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, could not be said to be truly and properly God, and to have the same understanding, will, and other perfections of the divine nature.

(3.) When we speak of human persons, we say, that as many persons as there are, so many beings there are; every human person has its own proper being, distinct from all other persons or beings; but we do not say so with respect to the divine Persons, for the divine Being is but one, and therefore the Godhead of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the very same; which is what we understand when we say, that though there are three Persons in the Godhead, yet they are the same in substance, or the one only living and true God.

This leads us to consider in what respect the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are said to be one; by which we mean, that the Son and Holy Ghost have all the perfections of the divine nature, in the same sense as the Father has; to say less than this, is to assert no more than what our adversaries will allow; for they will not deny them perfections, nor would they be thought to deny them to have divine perfections; yea, many of them will not stick to say, that they are truly and properly God; by which they mean, that whatever deity is attributed to them in scripture, by the appointment of the Father, that is, whatever divine authority they have, this properly belongs to them: but, I think, they will none of them allow that they have the divine nature in the same sense in which the Father is said to have it. This is what we shall endeavour to prove; and more need not be said concerning them, in order to establish that supreme worship which is due to them, as well as the Father; and, in order hereto, we shall consider the force of those arguments contained in one of these answers, and, together with them, the sense of that scripture, John x. 30. in which our Saviour says, _I and my Father are one_; as also that other scripture, 1 John v. 7. that _the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, who bear record in heaven, are one_; the consideration whereof we shall reserve to a following head.

And inasmuch as they are said to be equal in power and glory, we may observe, that there are two expressions, which we often use, to set forth the deity of the Son and Spirit; sometimes we say they are God, equal with the Father; at other times, that they have the same essential perfections. To which, it may be, some will reply, that if they are equal, they cannot be the same; or, on the other hand, if they are the same, they cannot be equal. For the understanding what we mean by such-like expressions, let it be observed, that when we consider them as having the divine essence, or any of the perfections thereof, we do not chuse to describe them as equal, but the same; we do not say that the wisdom, power, holiness, &c. of the Son and Spirit are equal to the same perfections, as ascribed to the Father: but when we speak of them as distinct Persons, then we consider them as equal: the essential glory of the Father, Son, and Spirit, is the same; but their personal glory is equal; and in this sense we would be understood, when we say the Son and Holy Ghost are each of them God, or divine Persons, equal with the Father.[89]

III. We shall prove that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are distinct persons in the Godhead, by applying what has been but now observed, by which any one may, by our common mode of speaking, be denominated a person; and to this we shall add something concerning those personal properties, mentioned in one of the answers we are explaining, with respect to the eternal generation of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Ghost. And,

1. To prove the personality of the Son. If this be reckoned needless, inasmuch as the Arians and Socinians never yet called it in question, we own that it is not necessary, when we dispute with them, to prove it: but inasmuch as the Sabellians deny it, as a late writer[90] has done, who plainly gives in to that scheme, and concludes the Son of God to be no other than the eternal reason of God; and so he renders that text, John i. 1. _In the beginning was the word_, that is, _reason, and by him_, that is, _by it, were all things made_; and when it is objected, that this mode of speaking signifies nothing more than a quality in God, the only answer he gives to it, is, that it signifies no more a quality, than if we should translate it, _The word_, as it is generally done: I say, if persons, whether they pretend to be Sabellians or no, express themselves in such a manner, it is certainly necessary for us to prove the personality of the Son.

It appears, therefore, that the Son is a distinct Person from the Father,

(1.) Inasmuch as we often read, in scripture, of two divine Persons speaking to, or of, one another, the distinguishing personal characters, _I_, _thou_, and _he_, being applied to them: thus it is said, Psal. cx. 1. _The Lord_, that is the Father, _said unto my Lord_, namely the Son, _sit thou at my right-hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool_: this may be observed throughout the whole Psalm; thus, ver. 3. _Thy people shall be willing_; and ver. 6. _He_, meaning the Son, _shall judge among the heathen_; and ver. 7. _He shall drink of the brook in the way_; so Psal. xlv. 2. speaking of the Son, _Thou art fairer than the children of men_; and ver. 6. _Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever_. The places of scripture, which have such modes of speaking concerning the Son, are almost innumerable; and therefore we proceed to consider,

(2.) Other personal characters given him; thus, when he is called the Son of God, whatever we are to understand by that relation or character, of which more under a following head, it certainly denotes him a Person distinct from the Father; so does his being sent into the world by the Father, which expression is frequently used in the New Testament; now a quality, relation or property, cannot be said to be sent as the Son is. So when he is described as a Redeemer, a Mediator, a Surety, a Creator; and when he is styled, by the prophet, _the everlasting Father_; and often described as a prophet, priest, or king; or _Lord of all_, or the _Prince of peace_, or the _Prince of the kings of the earth_; all these characters sufficiently prove his personality; and all those works which he performs, as sustaining these relations or characters, are properly personal; and some of them are never ascribed to any other person. Thus the Father, or Holy Ghost, are never said to assume the human nature, or to become sureties for the salvation of men, or to execute mediatorial offices, subservient thereunto; from all which it evidently appears, that the Son is a distinct Person: that he is a divine Person, will be proved under a following head: we shall therefore proceed,

2. To prove the distinct personality of the Holy Ghost. This is denied, not only by the Sabellians, but by some of the Socinians; yea, even by Socinus himself; who describes the Holy Ghost as the power of God, intending hereby, as his mode of speaking seems to denote, the energy of the divine nature, or that whereby the Father, who is the only one, to whom, according to him, the divine nature is attributed, produces those effects which require infinite power; so that they call the Spirit the power of God essentially considered; these set aside all those proofs, that may be produced from scripture, to evince his personality, which are so plain and evident, that many of them have dissented from Socinus herein, and owned the Spirit to be a person. Accordingly some of them have described him as the chief of created spirits, or the head of the angels, because they deny his divine nature. Thus a bold writer expresses himself; “I believe that there is one principal minister of God and Christ, peculiarly sent from heaven, to sanctify the church, who, by reason of his eminency and intimacy with God, is singled out of the number of other heavenly ministers, or angels, and comprised in the holy Trinity, being the third person thereof; and that this minister of God and Christ is the Holy Spirit.[91]”

Now we shall prove the personality of the Holy Ghost, by considering some personal characters ascribed to, and works performed by him. Thus there are several such characters, by which he is denominated a person; particularly when he is called a Sanctifier, a Reprover, a Witness, a Comforter, it evidently appears from hence that he is a person: thus when it is said, in John xvi. 8. that _when he_, to wit, _the Comforter is come, he will reprove the world of sin, of righteousness and judgment_; and also, that _he will guide you into all truth; he shall shew you things to come_, &c. And in John xiv. 16, 17. there is the distinct personality of the three persons, and particularly of the Holy Ghost, asserted; _I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, even the Spirit of truth_; and also in ver. 26. _The Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things._[92]

It is certain, that to be said to teach, or to instruct, is a personal character; so it is to speak, or to dictate, to another what he should say; but this he is said to do, as our Saviour says to his disciples, _Whatever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye; for it is not you that speak, but the Holy Ghost_, Mark xiii. 11.