Chapter XXXIII: Part 33

“Nor are we to imagine, certainly, that God _makes_ his creatures do,
whatever is done by them, in any such manner as is inconsistent with
their own proper agency. Rational creatures certainly act; and act as
freely, as if there were no being above them to direct their steps, or
to govern their actions. When God works in men, to will and to do that
which is good; they, nevertheless will and do it themselves; and are
really praise-worthy. And he does not, surely, so influence any to
evil, as to render them unactive, involuntary, or undeserving of
blame.

“Nor do I believe it true, literally and strictly speaking, that God
_creates_, whatsoever comes to pass; particularly darkness, and moral
evil.

“But this must not be taken for granted, nor hastily passed over:
because, however indisputable, it is disputed. There are some among
us, and some who are deservedly in reputation for wisdom, and general
soundness in the faith; who appear to be of opinion, that God is the
direct Author—the immediate Cause—the proper Creator, of all evil, as
well as of all good—of all sin, as well as holiness, in heart and
life—in thought, word, and deed.

“This opinion, however, notwithstanding my high esteem and particular
friendship for some of the holders of it, I am not yet ready to adopt,
for several reasons.

“1. To suppose that the actions of men, whether virtuous or vicious,
are _created_, seems to confound all distinction between creation and
Providence; or rather, wholly to exclude the latter.

“The work of creation, we used to think, was God’s making creatures
and things, at first; or giving the beginning of existence to matter
and minds, with their various properties, instincts and organizations.
And that God’s works of Providence, were his preserving things already
made, and governing all their operations. But according to this new
philosophy, creation is all; Providence is nothing. For what
preserving and governing of creatures or actions can there be, when
every creature and every action, is every moment created anew? An
action, a thought, or volition, whether good or evil, is a new and
strange kind of creature, or created thing. But, in a theological
view, the question before us is of chief importance, as it respects
moral evil. I add, therefore;

“2. It appears to me, that to suppose God the Creator of sin, whether
in principle or action, is hardly reconcilable with his perfect
holiness. ‘Doth a fountain send forth, at the same place, sweet waters
and bitter?’ Can darkness proceed from Him, as its proper source, in
whom there is no darkness at all?

“It is true, God has created many things which are of a _different_
nature from himself; as the bodies of men and beasts, and all parts of
the world of matter: but nothing, I conceive, directly _opposite_ to
his own nature; as is sin. The sun is the immediate cause of the
growth of vegetables; though these are essentially different from the
sun itself: but it is not thus the cause of ice and darkness; which
are no more of a contrary nature to it, than sin is to the nature of
God.[184]

“I am sensible it has been said, there is no more inconsistency with
the holiness of God, in supposing him the efficient, immediate cause
of sin, for necessary good purposes; than in supposing he only permits
it, for wise ends, and so orders things that he knows it will be
committed.

“But these two ways of accounting for the existence of moral evil,
appear to me materially different. There are supposable cases in which
it would be right for a _man_, not to hinder another from sinning,
when he could hinder him; and also to place him in circumstances of
temptation, expecting that he would sin. For instance, a parent may
leave money in the way of a child suspected of being given to theft;
and may conceal himself and let the child steal it; with a view to
correct him, in order to reclaim him, or as a warning to his other
children. All this might be perfectly right in the parent; however
certainly he might know, that the child would be guilty of the
expected crime. But I question whether any case can be supposed in
which it would not be wrong, directly to influence another to do evil,
that good might come. Exciting one to sin by power or persuasion; and
placing one in circumstances of trial, wherein he would be tempted to
sin, without restraining him from it, are surely different things,
although the certainty of his sinning may be the same.

“3. I dare not think that God creates sin, and all kinds of evil,
because this seems plainly contrary to the general current of the holy
scriptures.

“In the first chapter of Genesis, it is said, ‘God saw every thing
that he had made, and, behold, it was very good.’ Of his making two
great lights, we are told; and that he made the stars also: but no
account is there given of his creating darkness. Respecting our own
species, the inspired historian particularly informs us, that ‘God
created man in his own image: in the image of God created he him: male
and female created he them.’ Nor do we find in that book, or in all
the Bible, that he hath since ever created them otherwise. Solomon
three thousand years after the fall, having made diligent search among
men and women, to find out their true character, and the cause of
their so universal depravity, says; ‘Lo, this only have I found, that
_God_ made man upright; but _they_ have sought out many inventions.’
Wicked practices, and deceitful inventions to conceal their
criminality, are ever ascribed in scripture to mankind themselves, or
to other fallen creatures, and never to God, as their efficient cause.

“In the New-Testament, christians are said to be ‘created unto good
works:’ and we read of ‘the new man, which after God, is created in
righteousness and true holiness’. But no where do we read of any one
that was created unto _evil_ works; or after _Satan_ in
unrighteousness and sin. It is written, 1 Cor. xiv. 33, ‘God is not
the author of confusion, but of peace.’ And James i. 13-17, ‘Let no
man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be
tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: but every man is
tempted when he is led away of his own lust and enticed.—Do not err,
my beloved brethren. Every good gift and every perfect gift is from
above, and cometh down from the Father of lights.’ Can any thing be
more express to teach us, that a distinction ought carefully to be
made between the origin of good and evil; and that we should not
conceive them both alike to come from God?

“For scripture proof that God is not the efficient author of sin, I
will only add, that the fruits of the Spirit, and works of the flesh,
are set in contrast and spoken of as diametrical opposites: whereas,
did God create sinful propensities in men, or directly influence them
to evil actions, the works of the flesh would be as real and immediate
fruits of the divine Spirit, as the holiest exercises of the best
saints.

“4. I see no occasion for the supposition of God’s being thus the
author of all evil: nor any good ends that it can answer.

“Could it be seen how evils might be accounted for, without supposing
them any part of the creation of God; and how God might have an
absolute dominion over all events, without being the immediate cause
of bad things; no good man, I conclude, would wish to conceive of Him
as being thus the proper source of darkness and evil. And indeed, were
it so, that our weak minds were unable to comprehend how God can work
all things after the counsel of his own will, or how natural and moral
evil could ever have been, without believing that God is as much, and
as immediately, the cause of evil as of good; yet it might be more
modest, and more wise, to leave these among other incomprehensibles,
than to have recourse to so bold an hypothesis for the solution of
them. But, I apprehend, there is no need of this hypothesis in order
to account for the existence of evil, or in order to an understanding
belief of the universal government of the Most High.

“Evils, of most if not all kinds, are such negative things—such mere
defects, in their origin at least, as do not need creation, or require
a positive omnipotent cause. This is the case, evidently, with respect
to natural darkness: it is only the want of light. This is the case,
also, with respect to natural death: it is only the cessation, the
loss, the want of life. And this may be the case, with respect to
spiritual darkness, and spiritual death. It has heretofore been the
orthodox opinion, that all moral evil consists radically in privation;
or, that unholiness, at bottom, is the mere want of holiness. And,
notwithstanding all the floods of light, from various quarters, which
have come into the world in this age of new discoveries, possibly this
one old opinion may yet be true. ‘God made man _upright_.’ That is, He
formed him with a disposition impartially just and good: He created in
him a principle of universal righteousness. When man fell, by eating
the forbidding fruit, this principle had not been preserved in perfect
strength and exercise. In consequence of that disobedience, the divine
internal influence was so withdrawn, that this principle was entirely
lost. But we are not told, nor need it be supposed, that any opposite
principle was then created in him. Our first parents had, I believe,
in their original formation, all the radical instincts of nature which
they had after the fall; or which any of their posterity now have.
Such as a principle of self-preservation, a desire of self-promotion,
and a propensity to increase and multiply; together with all the more
particular appetites and passions, subservient to these purposes. All
these are innocent in themselves, though not in themselves virtuous.
But these private instincts, when left to operate alone, without the
governing influence of a public spirit, or a just regard for other
beings, will naturally lead to all manner of iniquity, in heart and
life. To avarice and ambition; to envy and malice; to intemperance and
lewdness; to frauds and oppressions; to wars and fightings.

“There is no need of supposing any other divine agency, than only to
uphold in existence creatures that have lost their virtue, amidst
surrounding temptations, in order to account for all the evil
affections which we ever feel, and for all the external wickedness
that is ever committed. Nor, in order to the holiest creatures losing
their virtue, need any thing more be supposed on God’s part, than only
his leaving them to themselves; or not upholding in them, and
constantly invigorating, a virtuous disposition.

“And as, in this way, we can account for the existence of all manner
of evil; so we can thus understand how it is possible for God to bring
about whatsoever comes to pass, without his being the actor, or maker,
or instigator, of any thing that is not perfectly good. When He does
not cause light, there will be darkness. When He does not make peace,
there will be evil. The darkness takes place according to his
appointment, with the same exactness and certainty, as if He actually
created it; and so does evil of every kind. What He determines to
permit, knowing perfectly the circumstances and dispositions of every
agent concerned, will as infallibly come to pass, as what he
determines to do himself, or to effect by his own positive influence.
The king’s heart, and the rivers of water; the waves of the sea, and
the tumults of the people, are in the hand of the Lord, to all
important intents and purposes, if it be only true that He restrains
them, or lets them run; stilleth them, or suffereth them to rage, just
as he sees fit.

“In this sense, I conceive, it is to be understood, that God forms the
light, and creates darkness; makes peace, and creates evil. He has the
absolute government—the perfect control—the entire superintendency, of
all these things.

“When any folly has been committed or any mischief has been done, some
are ready to say, _It was so ordered_; as if therefore nobody was to
be blamed. But this is a false inference, from just premises. True, it
was so ordered of God; and ordered righteously and wisely: but it was
so ordered by the doer of the mischief also; and ordered carelessly,
perhaps, or wickedly. You will say, It must have been so, and the
actor could not have done otherwise: but, I say, he might have done
otherwise, if he would. It is true, there is a kind of necessity in
the actions of men. They necessarily act according to their own
choice; and they necessarily choose to act according to their own
disposition. Under this kind of necessity God himself acts. It is
impossible for him to do, because it is impossible for him to will
that which is contrary to his own nature. He necessarily wills and
does, what is agreeable to his moral perfections. But such a necessity
as this, is so far from being inconsistent with freedom, that it is
essential to all free agency. Actions which can and do take place,
contrary to the inclination of the agent, are not _his_ actions. He
has no command over them; and therefore can deserve no praise or blame
for them.

“The necessity of acting according to our own minds, is all the
necessity which need be supposed, when we suppose that all our actions
were decreed, and are ordered of God. A creature that acts according
to any laws of nature, and not at perfect random, without any
self-government, acts in such a manner that He who knows what is in
him, may fore-know all his actions; and in such a manner that He in
whose hand his times are, may govern all his volitions. Men follow
their several courses, as freely as the rivers of water, and with a
higher kind of freedom; yet, since they run agreeably to their own
inclination, and cannot do otherwise, a Being omniscient and
omnipotent, can calculate before hand all their motions; can keep them
in the channels decreed for them, and can turn them whithersoever he
will. If any do not comprehend this, yet let them not think they so
fully comprehend the contrary, as to feel certain, that either man
cannot be free, or God cannot govern the world. Certainly the
providential government of God, over the hearts and ways of men,
though most absolute, is not such but that, if they do well, they are
praise-worthy; and if they do not well, the sin lieth at their own
door.

“Neither let it be imagined that the criminality of a bad action is
taken away, or at all extenuated, because it will be over-ruled for
good. Actions are good or evil, according to the nature of them, and
the intention of the agent, and not according to undesigned
consequences. When we act wickedly, and with a wicked mind, its being
productive of happy effects, alters nothing in regard to our
blame-worthiness. In the divine decrees, and in the divine providence,
‘Whatever is, is right:’ but in the conduct of creatures, many things
that are, are not at all the less wrong. God’s governing all things,
so as to make them subserve his wise and holy designs, should not lead
us to think any more favourably of our own, or of our neighbour’s
foolish and sinful actions.”

SMALLEY’S SERMONS.

Footnote 184:

“There is a vast difference between the sun’s being the cause of the
lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and of the brightness of
gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence; and its
being the occasion of darkness and frost in the night, by its motion
whereby it descends below the horizon. The motion of the sun is the
occasion of the latter kind of events; but not the proper cause,
efficient, or producer of them.—No more is any action of the divine
Being, the cause of the evil of men’s wills. If the sun were the
proper _cause_ of cold and darkness, it would be the fountain of these
things, as it is the fountain of light and heat: and then something
might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of
nature in the sun; and it might be justly inferred that the sun itself
is dark and cold: but from its being the cause of these, no otherwise
than by its absence, no such thing can be inferred, but the contrary.
It may justly be argued that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold
and darkness are found to be the consequence of its withdrawment; and
the more constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with
and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun
to be the fountain of light and heat. So, in as much as sin is not the
fruit of any positive influence of the Most High, but on the contrary,
arises from the withdrawment of his action and energy, and under
certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his
influence, this is no argument that he is sinful, or his operation
evil; but on the contrary, that he and his agency are altogether holy,
and that he is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange
arguing indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves
them to themselves; and necessarily sin when he does so, that
therefore their sin is not from themselves, but from God: as strange
as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when the sun is
gone, and never dark when he is present, that therefore darkness is
from the sun, and that his disk and beams must be black.”

_Edwards on the Will._

Page 259. _Boston Ed._ 1754.

Footnote 185:

_Dr. Whitby, in his discourse of election, &c._

Footnote 186:

_See his discourse concerning election, page 36. 37. &c._

Footnote 187:

_See the contrary opinion defended by Whitby in loc._

Footnote 188:

_See Whitby’s discourse, &c. page 40, & seq._

Footnote 189:

_See_ Twiss. Vind. Grat. & de Prædest. _and his riches of God’s love,
against Hord; and also that part of the writings of some others, in
which they treat of predestination_, _viz._ _Beza, Gomarus, Piscator,
Maccovius, Rutherford, Whitaker, and Perkins_.

Footnote 190:

_Among these were bishop Davenant, and other divines, who met in the
synod of Dort; also Calvin, P. Du Moulin, Turrettin, and, indeed, the
greater number of those who have defended the doctrine of
predestination; and there are many others, who, when they treat of it,
seem to wave the particular matter in controversy, as thinking it of
no great importance or that this doctrine may be as well defended,
without confining themselves to certain modes of speaking, which have
been the ground of many prejudices against it, whose prudence and
conduct herein cannot be justly blamed._

Footnote 191:

Ου μονον εξ Ιουδαιων. non solum ex Judæis; _that is, those who are
called from among the Jews, as distinguished from the rest of them
that were rejected_.

Footnote 192:

זגקבצו

Footnote 193:

_See Questions_ lxvii, lxviii, lxxii, lxxv, lxxvi.

Footnote 194:

ειναι ἡμας ἁγιους.

Footnote 195:

_See Prov._ viii. 23.

Footnote 196:

ειναι.

Footnote 197:

_Vid. Grot. in loc._

Footnote 198:

Τεταγμενοι.

Footnote 199:

_Vid. Whitby in loc._

Footnote 200:

_Vid. Beza in loc._

Footnote 201:

_The principal text that Dr. Whitby refers to, as justifying his sense
of the word, is in Acts_ xx. 13. We went to Assos, there intending to
take in Paul, for so had he appointed, minding himself to go afoot;
_the words are_, ουτω γαρ ην διατεταγμενος μελλων αυτος πεζευειν;
_which he understands as though the meaning was, that the apostle was
disposed, in his own mind, to go afoot; but that sense is not
agreeable to the scope of the text, for the meaning of it seems to be
this: That it was determined, ordered, or preconcerted by them, before
they set sail; that Paul should be taken in at Assos, since he was to
go there afoot; so that this makes nothing to that author’s purpose,
but rather to the sense that we have given of the word._

Footnote 202:

_See Grot. in loc._

Footnote 203:

_See Dr. Whitby in loc._

Footnote 204:

_See Quest._ xliv, lxviii.

Footnote 205:

_See Dr. Goodwin, vol. 2. of election._

Footnote 206:

προεθετο.

Footnote 207:

_See page 137._

Footnote 208:

_This is what is meant by that axiom, used by the school-men_,
Decretum Dei, nihil ponit in esse.

Footnote 209:

_Thus the school-men distinguish between_ necessitas consequentis,
_and_ consequentiæ; _so that that, which is not in itself necessary,
is rendered eventually so, as the consequence of God’s purpose, that
it shall be_.

Footnote 210:

“There is no necessity for supposing a predestination to death, in the
same sense as unto life, that is to the means and the consequent end:
For the occurrence of sin may be satisfactorily accounted for on other
principles; though without pretending to the removal of every
difficulty in a subject the entire comprehension of which is probably
unsuited to our present state and faculties.”[211]

SMITH’S LETTERS TO BELSHAM.

Footnote 211:

It is acknowledged that this view of the subject is different from
that which most Calvinistic writers have given. Yet several eminent
divines have laid down the fundamental principles, at least, of this
sentiment, and have opened the way to it: particularly Augustine,
Theophilus Gale, and a class of German Theologians who may be termed
the school of Leibnitz. A short time ago an attempt was made to excite
the attention of thinking men to his doctrine, by a _Sermon on the
Divine glory, displayed by the Permission of Sin_. But, since the
publication of that pamphlet, the subject has been more ably and fully
treated by my reverend tutor, the Rev. Dr. Williams, in his _Discourse
on Predestination to Life_, published very lately.

Footnote 212:

αδοκιμοι.

Footnote 213:

_See Whitby’s Paraphrase, &c. on Jude, ver. 4._

Footnote 214:

_Thus Beza in loc. calls them_ vessels, _because, as creatures, they
are the workmanship of God, the great potter, but vessels prepared for
destruction by themselves, and therefore adds_, Exitii veras causas
minime negem in ipsis vasis hærere juxta illud _perditio, tua ex te
est_.

Footnote 215:

_It ought to be observed, that the word, here used, is_ κατηρτισμενα
εις απωλειαν, _and not_ προκατηρτισμενα; _nor is there any thing added
to the word, that signifies, that this preparation thereunto was
antecedent to their being; or as though it took its rise from God, as
the cause of that sin for which he designed to punish them; whereas,
on the other hand when the apostle in the following verse, speaks of
God’s_ making known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy,
_to wit, the elect, they are described as those whom he had_ afore
prepared unto glory, ἁ προητοιμασεν εις δοξαν. _What should be the
reason that the apostle alters the phrase, but that we may hereby be
led to consider, that when God chose the elect to glory they are
considered in his purpose as those whom he designed, by his grace, to
make meet for it! So that the vessels of wrath are considered as
fitting themselves for destruction; the vessels of mercy, as persons
whom God would first prepare for, and then bring to glory._

Footnote 216:

_See Whitby’s Discourse, &c. page 10._

Footnote 217:

_See his Riches of God’s love, against Hord. Part II. page 50._

Footnote 218:

_See Bishop Patrick in loc._

Footnote 219:

_This agrees with the sense given of it by Grot. in loc. and Whitby in
his discourse, &c. page 11. and it agrees very well with the sense of
the Hebrew words_, פעל למענרה _which does not so much signify to make,
as to dispose, and adapt one thing to another, which the lxx. render_,
φυλασσεται ὁ ασεβης, &c. the wicked is reserved to the day of evil.

Footnote 220:

_See Quest. xliv._

Footnote 221:

_The words are_, παντα τετραποδα, _that is_, all four-footed beasts.

Footnote 222:

_Matt. iv. 23. The words are_, θεραπευων πασαν νοσον και πασαν
μαλακιαν, every sickness, and every disease; _and so the same words
are translated, in Matt. ix. 35._

Footnote 223:

It is improper to say we have no power, when we can do the thing if we
will; and criminal to take the glory, which is God’s.

Footnote 224:

_See Whitby of Election, Chap. 5. Limborch. Amic. Collat. page 242._

Footnote 225:

_Vid. Sixt Senens. Bibliothec. Lib. V. Annotat 101. Annotavit quidam
Chrytostomum interdum naturæ nostræ vires plus æquo extulisse ex
contentione disceptandi cum Manichæis & Gentilibus, qui hominem
asserebant, vel natura malum vel fati violentia ad peccandum
compelli._

Footnote 226:

_Vid. Aug. Retrac. I. Cap. 25._

Footnote 227:

_Vid. Aug. de Prædest. Sanet. Cap. 14. Quid igitur opus est, ut eorum
scrutemur opuscula, qui prius quam ista hæresis oriretur, non
habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quæstione
versari: quod proculdubio facerent, si respondere talibus cogerentur._

Footnote 228:

_Vid. Forbes. Instruct. Historico-Theol. Lib. VIII. Cap. 28. § 16, &c.
& Joh. Jacobi Hottingeri, Fata Doctrinæ de Prædestinat. Lib. I. § 35,
&c._

Footnote 229:

_Vid. G. J. Vossii Hist. Pelag. Lib. VI. Thes. 8, 9, 10._

Footnote 230:

_Vid. Calv. Instit. Lib. III. Cap. 22. § 1. Certior est hic Dei
veritas, quam ut concutiatur, clarior quam ut obruatur hominum
authoritate._

Footnote 231:

_See the epistles that passed between Berevov, a physician at Dort,
and several divines at that time, in_ Lib. de Term vitæ.

Footnote 232:

_Seneca de Consol. ad Marciam, cap. 20. Nemo nimis cito moritur, qui
victurus diutius quam vixit non fuit, fixus est cuique terminus,
manebit semper ubi positus est, nec illum ulterius diligentia aut
gratia promovebit. Et Cicero de Senect. Quod cuique temporis ad
vivendum datum, eo debet contentus esse. Virg. Æn. X. Stat sua cuique
dies. Serv. Fixum est tempus vitæ._

Footnote 233:

Evil as well as good actions are links in the chain of providence, and
yet do not impeach Divine holiness.

Footnote 234:

_Vid. Senac. de Prov. cap. 5. August, de Civ. Dei, Lib. V. cap. 1, &
8. Lips Phys. Stoic. Lib. J. Diss. 12._

Footnote 235:

_See Quest. XVIII._

Footnote 236:

_See Quest. XXI, XXII._

Footnote 237:

When we contend for this doctrine as a _truth_, it should be viewed in
connexion with its real _importance_. These two objects are extremely
different in things natural, civil, and religious. There are many
things true in history, in philosophy, in politics, and even in
theology, which no sober person deems important. There are other
things hypothetically important, whether actually true or not. And of
this kind is the subject before us. Such is the nature, the connexion,
and consequences of it, that _if_ it be true, it cannot fail of being
of the first importance.

But how are we more particularly to estimate the importance of this
subject? By the influence which the admission or the denial of it has
on the very foundations of religion. For instance, if it be NOT true,
either _man_ himself or mere _chance_ has the principal share in
effecting our actual salvation, and investing us with eternal glory.
Some indeed are so lost to modesty and self-knowledge, and so
unacquainted with the leading truths of christianity, that they do not
scruple to ascribe the eventual difference in our future state,
whether good or bad, to man himself, but attended with some verbal,
unmeaning compliment to divine mercy. Such persons should first learn
the rudiments of christianity, before they have a right to expect any
deference shewn to their opinions. On the other hand, if this BE true,
its utility is plain; it will hide pride from man; it will exclude
chance from having any share in our deliverance; it will exalt the
grace of God; it will render salvation a certain, and not a precarious
thing; and, in a word, it will secure to them who have the Spirit of
Christ the greatest consolation.

This was the view which our episcopal reformers had of the doctrine,
both as to its truth, and the importance of it. ‘Predestination to
life’ say they, ‘is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby, before
the foundations of the world were laid, he hath constantly decreed by
his counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those
whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by
Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour.—The godly
consideration of Predestination and our election in Christ is full of
sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as
feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ mortifying the
works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their
minds to high and heavenly things; as well because it doth greatly
establish and confirm their faith of eternal salvation, to be enjoyed
through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards
God.’—Another observation I would make is,

2. That it is highly proper, in order to investigate the present
subject with success, to keep it perfectly distinct, and free from all
_impure mixtures_. This is what some of our early reformers, and many
of the modern defenders of this doctrine have not done. For want of
this, many bitter enemies have opposed it. Dr. WHITBY, for instance,
and most who have written on the same side of the question since his
time, place predestination to death, or reprobation to misery, as the
very foundation of Calvinism, and inseparable from predestination to
life. But so far is predestination to death from being true, that
nothing can be more untrue. It is but an arbitrary assumption; a
foreign, impure mixture, having no foundation either in the real
meaning of holy writ, or in the nature of things; except indeed we
mean by it, what no one questions, a determination to punish the
guilty.[238] But is not one man’s misery as _certain_ as another man’s
happiness? Yes; _equally certain_. What then; must they therefore be
equally _predestinated_? No. But how can a thing be _certain_, if it
be not _predestinated_? Have a little patience and I will tell you.
The previous question is, Does God predestinate to _sin_ as the means,
and to death or misery as the end, in the same way as he predestinates
to holiness as the means, and eternal glory as the end? This we deny,
as it would be infinitely unworthy of God, making him the author of
sin, or doing evil that good may come. Some indeed have distinguished
between being the author or the cause of sin, and being a sinner. But
the distinction itself is not solid, nor could it fully satisfy those
who have made it in clearing the divine character.[239]

In fact, sin and holiness are not only different, but _opposite
effects_, and their causes equally opposite; but as God is the sole
cause, the sole exclusive cause of holiness, the creature, in some
way, must be the sole and exclusive cause of sin. If you ask how? I
reply, by exercising his _liberty_, which is a mere natural
instrument, on _himself_, rather than on God. But how came he to do
that? By his _passive power_. What is passive power? In general, it is
that which distinguishes the creature from the Creator. But more
particularly, it is that tendency to nothing as to being, and to
defection as to well being, which is essential to every created
existence. If every creature have, and must of necessity have this
passive power, you will ask, how came the holy angels, and the spirits
of the just, not to sin? The answer is, because divine grace upholds
them. These things duly considered, though briefly stated, will shew,
that as God is not the author of sin, so neither has he predestinated
sin. He is the author and cause of good only. He is the author of our
liberty; but that in itself is not evil. And he is the author of our
nature as limited; that also of itself is no moral evil. But when our
liberty unites with this limited nature, or terminates on passive
power, when this latter is not controuled by grace, their offspring is
imperfect, or sinfulness attaches to our moral acts.

Hence you may learn, that sin and future misery are events perfectly
certain, though not predestinated. It has been often assumed, but
without propriety or truth, that an event is foreknown only because it
is decreed. In reality all _good_ is foreknown, because it is decreed;
for there is no other ground of its existence. But sin, as before
shewn, has another ground of existence, namely, passive power, which
can no more be an object of divine predestination or decree than its
perfect opposite, the all-sufficiency of Jehovah. Yet, observe
attentively, this has its _proper nature_, and God sees all things,
and all essences, in their proper nature. What! Does not God foreknow
the sinfulness of any event in its _deficient_ cause, as well as the
goodness of another in that which is efficient? Beside, passive power
in union with liberty is an _adequate_, a fully adequate ground of sin
and death; and therefore to introduce a predestination of sin and
death, is to ascribe to God what is equally impious and
needless.[240]—Let us, therefore, keep this doctrine free from all
impure mixtures, and now proceed to a

3rd Observation, that is, When the _end_ is maintained to be
infallibly certain, the _means_ to promote that end are included. Thus
you may suppose a chain suspended from a great height, and to the
lowest link a weight is fixed, which is borne by it. You do not
suppose that this link is unconnected with the next, and so on till
you come to the highest. Every one of the links is equally necessary
with that which is next the weight; and the whole is connected with
something else which is stronger than the weight, including that of
the chain also, however long and heavy.

Thus also in the cultivation of our land, though it is decreed that on
such a field there shall be this very season a crop of wheat, this was
not independent of providential virtue giving the increase, the genial
showers, the solar warmth, and the vivifying air. It is not
unconnected with the proper seed sown, needful tillage, plowing and
harrowing, and the quality of the soil. And the same holds true as to
the health of the body, and the prolongation of life to an appointed
period. He who dies must first have life; he who grows to manhood must
arrive at it through the previous stages of youth, childhood and
infancy. So likewise an the education of our children; if learning be
the end, that supposes the previous means of application; and if it is
determined who shall be the first scholar of the age in which he
lives, it is _equally_ determined that he shall begin with the
rudiments of letters, and diligently prosecute his literary studies.
And respecting religious attainments the matter is equally plain; if
life or eternal glory be the end predestinated, the previous steps of
purity of heart, justification and a new birth unto righteousness,
preservation in Christ, and every individual event and circumstance
preceding, is included in the decree, as far as there is any
_goodness_ in them. As to the _evil_ with which any events or
circumstances are blended, that has been already accounted for on
another principle. Nothing can be more true or plain, God had
predestinated an everlasting righteousness to be brought in by the
Lord Jesus Christ. But is it not equally true and plain that the birth
of Jesus, and of his virgin mother, the existence of David, the call
of Abraham, the preservation of Noah, and the creation of Adam and Eve
were predestinated?—Let us therefore guard against separating the end
and the means; and what God joins together in his predestinating care
and love, let no man put asunder.—We now come

II. To consider some proofs of this doctrine.—That the scriptures,
especially those of the New Testament, _appear_, at least, to maintain
the doctrine in question, no person of common modesty will deny. Thus,
for instance, Rom. viii. 29, 30. “Whom he did foreknow, he also did
_predestinate_ to be conformed to the image of his Son.” Again, Eph.
i. 4-6. “According as he hath chosen us in him, before the foundation
of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in
love; having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus
Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the
praise of the glory of his grace.” And again, ver. 11. “In whom also
we have obtained an inheritance, being _predestinated_ according to
the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own
will.” Believers are said to be “called according to God’s _purpose_;”
and certain discriminations are made between man and man, between
nation and nation, “that the _purpose_ of God according to election,
might stand, not of works but of him who calleth.” “The _election_
hath obtained it.” “So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him
that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.” “Shall the thing formed
say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?”—“I will have
mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I
will have compassion.”

These are some of the many passages of holy writ which at least _seem_
to hold this doctrine. But it is of importance to observe, that to
establish this very doctrine is the main drift of the apostle Paul’s
elaborate argument in a considerable part of his epistle to the
Romans. See Rom. ix.-xi.—But more particularly,

1. It is evidently inconsistent with God’s infinite perfection to
suppose that he has _no_ purposes, designs, or aims in his operations;
or, which is virtually the same thing, to suppose that he decrees or
predestinates _nothing_. Wherein would he then differ from blind,
unmeaning chance, which hath neither wisdom, power, nor properties? An
intelligent spirit without _any_ plan or purpose, is inconceivable;
much less is the infinitely perfect Jehovah such a being.

But if he purposes _any thing_, what can be conceived of in this world
of higher importance, or more worthy of his predestinating care, than
the _salvation_ of his people, that is, of those who are eventually
saved? Shall he purpose from eternity to give his Son to appear in the
form of a servant, to suffer an ignominious death, and to be head over
all things to the church, at an _uncertainty_? Does he bestow his Holy
Spirit without knowing, or without intending, who shall be ultimately
changed into the divine image from glory to glory, and made meet for
the inheritance of the saints in light? Truly, if in time he draws
with loving-kindness, it is because he has loved with an everlasting
love.

2. What scripture and experience teach of man’s condition as a sinner,
utterly excludes every other cause of salvation but God’s
predestinating love. From our very birth we are sinful, guilty, and
without strength. The carnal mind is enmity against God. The graceless
heart is a heart of stone; in spiritual concerns unfeeling and
impenetrable. Well may our Lord say to his disciples, Ye have not
chosen me, but I have chosen you. If then those who were dead in
trespasses and sins have been quickened, if persecutors have been
arrested and alarmed, if those who were fully bent on rebellion have
been instantly rendered humble, meek, loving and obedient, to what can
we rationally ascribe it but to the discriminating and sovereign
pleasure of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own
will? If such are not predestinated, how came they to be called,
converted, and regenerated?

Consult the good man’s experience. Will he coolly and deliberately
arrogate any thing to himself? Follow him to the throne of grace; what
is his language before God? Listen to his most holy, happy, and
animated praises in the church. Attend to him in his happiest
frames—or, when emerging from the deep waters of affliction—when
restored from backslidings—or with faltering speech on the brink of
eternity; and you will find him steady to one point; “Behold, God is
my salvation.” My recovery from sin and woe is all of grace. Yea,
follow him to heaven, when he joins the noble army of martyrs, and the
countless myriads of the redeemed from among men, and there he shouts
aloud in chorus, “Unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins
in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his
Father; to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen.”—“Thou
art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou
hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were
created.” If we search eternally into the origin and cause of our
deliverance from sin, and our exaltation to happiness and glory, none
can be found but God’s predestinating love.

3. Nothing short of eternal predestination could secure that which is
demonstrably the most worthy, the most glorious, the most real _end_
of God in the salvation of man, that is, the praise of the glory of
his grace. No _end_ can be compared to this in excellence; it is
expressly the end which God has proposed to himself in the salvation
of his people; “having predestinated us unto the adoption of children
by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his
will, to the praise of the glory of his grace.” If there be no
predestination, how can such an end ever be proposed, and how
infallibly secured? Can there be any effect without an adequate cause?
Or can the invention of men or angels discover any other cause than
predestination?

On any other supposition, how can divine love, grace, and mercy be
glorified, _infallibly_ glorified? Is the honour of these glorious and
blessed perfections of Jehovah to be suspended on a feeble
peradventure? Or is the spiritual temple constructed of some materials
which come by chance, or approach of themselves, while others are
brought forth by a divine hand out of the quarry of nature, and placed
on the living foundation? Is the glory of the Creator to depend upon
the precarious will of man? The supposition is too absurd to admit a
thought.—Again,

4. Predestination to life is essentially necessary to secure the _full
end_ of the _death of Christ_ and the efficacy of divine influence.
What though he laid down his life for his sheep, if after all he do
not bring them into his fold? For him to lay down his life a _ransom_
for many, and then leave it to _them_ whether they should come for
life, and all the benefits of his death, righteousness and grace, is
to suppose them possessed of more power than Adam had before the fall.
For the power he needed was only that which might keep him from
falling; but the power which fallen man requires is that by which he
may rise from his fallen state, and enter into the favour of God, into
union with Christ, into spiritual sensibility and life, into wisdom,
righteousness and holiness, and into eternal glory. Now what can be
adequate to this but omnipotent power helping our infirmities?

If it be said, Though we cannot of ourselves do this, may we not
through Christ and his holy Spirit assisting us? I reply, _assistance_
is of two kinds; it is either affording us proper _means_, such as the
holy scriptures, the ministry of the word, ordinances of religion, and
precious promises by way of encouragement;—or, it is actually to
_influence_ the mind by supernatural agency. If this latter assistance
be afforded, the event is secured; for nothing is requisite to secure
the volitions, and all the exercises of the will, in faith,
repentance, love, hope, and even perseverance therein unto the end,
but _this kind_ of influence to a certain degree. But does God impart
any gracious influence without _purposing_ to do so? And does he not
know what influence is necessary to secure the end? Without
predestination to life, what security can there be, that the death of
Christ will not prove abortive and unavailing?

The notion that a _sufficient_ degree of grace is given to all, but
that a degree _more_ than sufficient is given to the elect; that all
the elect are certainly and infallibly saved, but the others left at
uncertainty, with a _perhaps_ that some of them may be saved in
_addition_ to the elect—this notion is neither founded in revealed
truth, nor capable of rational consistency.[241]

Without predestination to life, the influences of the Holy Spirit,
which, it is confessed, are given to some, might be given in vain, or
without effecting any saving purpose in any one of the human race.
Where then could be the wisdom of a dispensation of the Spirit, or of
communicating the influence of grace? Does God foresee that some will
be so good and pliable as to improve a _common_ favour in such a way
and to such a degree as to constitute the difference between them and
others that perish? But where is this divinity taught, and by whom is
it sanctioned? It is not sanctioned by the patriarchs and prophets, by
Christ and his apostles, nor is it contained in the words of
inspiration, or even in the tablet of unsophisticated reason.

5. Setting aside this doctrine, or supposing it not true, what room is
left for a covenant of grace between the Father, Son, and Spirit? Has
not the Father given to the Son a people for whom he should be
obedient unto death, for whom he should give his life a ransom, for
whom he should rise, live, and reign till all his enemies be subdued,
and to whom Christ has engaged to give eternal life? If we reject
predestination to life, what meaning is there in his office of
_surety_? Is not Jesus a surety for his people? But what is a surety?
It is one who undertakes for another. What does Jesus undertake to do?
He undertakes not only to become incarnate for them, to obey the law,
to endure the contradiction of sinners and cope with the rigid demands
of equity, but also to justify many, to give them life, to keep them
from every rapacious hand, to purify them by his blood, to save them
from sin and hell, and to bring them to the beatific vision of his
glory.

In a word, take away this doctrine, and you take away the foundation
of God—the foundation of his covenant—the foundation of his temple,
the church—the foundation of the saints’ hope and joy. But, blessed be
God, his foundation standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth
them that are his. Known unto God are all his ways, and all his people
from the beginning. Blind chance and impotent free will shall never be
the partners of his throne.

We next come to notice

III. Some objections which may be, and often are, made to this
doctrine. And

1. If this doctrine be true, it is urged by some, God would then be an
arbitrary and partial being. This objection supposes that God has _no
right_ to be so; but on the contrary, nothing appears more worthy of
him than to exercise arbitrary power, and to manifest partiality. No
such right is vested in man, as to do what he pleases, while he
disdains to consult any other will than his own. But whose will beside
his own can the infinitely perfect God consult? Who hath known the
mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor? Or, who hath first
given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him,
and through him, and to him are all things; to whom be glory for ever.

Let us appeal to facts. Are there not marks of high sovereignty and
holy partiality through universal nature? Are they not visible in the
heavens above, and in this lower world? Is there not a greater light
that rules the day, and the lesser lights that rule the night? And
does not one star differ from another star in glory? Are not these
marks visible in the operations of providence, in the persons of men,
their corporeal forms and mental endowments? Are they not constantly
seen in the history of nations, the changes of empires, and the
dispensations of grace to different tribes of men? How conspicuous is
this in God’s conduct towards Abraham and his posterity for a series
of ages, and afterwards in the calling of the Gentiles? And how
becoming in us to adopt the same language with the apostle Paul on
that occasion: “O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and
knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways
past finding out!” And is not the same partiality visible at this very
day? Yet is he holy in all his works, and righteous in all his ways.

2. It is objected, If this doctrine be true, then is man reduced to a
mere machine. No, a mere machine has no sensibility, no consciousness,
no reason, and no will. But he is acted upon, they say, and therefore
not an agent. Is it then essential to an agent not to be acted upon?
Then there is but one agent in the universe; for every thing but the
first cause is acted upon more or less. The fact is, there is no
contrariety in these two things. Angels and men are acted upon, yet
they are moral agents. The holy agency upon them respects chiefly
their _disposition_ itself, but the agency they exert is the
_exercise_ of their faculties, will, and disposition. Whether their
disposition be good or bad, still they are agents. If this be made
good, it must be by sovereign influence; and then the agency and
choice will be good: but if this be bad, the agency is bad too.

But granting to the objector that the objects of predestination are,
in the sense now mentioned, machines, or instruments in the hand of
divine sovereignty; what then? I fain would know what better lot can
be assigned us than to be instruments in the hand of a predestinating
God? I solemnly protest that I desire no better, no other lot. And who
can describe the nature of this high privilege! This people have I
formed for myself, they shall shew forth my praise. O the blessedness
of being entirely passive in the hand of that God who predestinates
nothing but good? Was Paul obliged to the Lord, or was he not, for
arresting him in the midst of his wicked career? Has that man any
reason to complain, who is restrained from wickedness, but compelled
to embrace happiness? Then, say some, his will would be forced. O no!
this by no means follows. My people, saith the Lord, shall be willing
in the day of my power. Surely God can put his Holy Spirit in either
man or child without forcing the will. And let there be but the
active, regenerating renewing presence of this divine agent, the
choice of good will be no more compelled, or the will no more forced,
than in the most free acts of which the human mind is capable.

3. This doctrine, it is said, tends to licentiousness.—This is an
assertion which has been often made, but, I apprehend, never fairly
proved; for it is contrary to universal experience. Turn your eyes to
a vast army, headed by experienced officers—what is the language of
nature and experience? You uniformly find great generals anxious to
impress the sentiment on the minds of their troops that they are
_destined_ to victory. What gives rise to this kind of oratory? What
is the philosophy of such rhetoric? It is founded in the nature of
man, and confirmed by the experience of ages, that confidence in a
favourable issue animates exertion.