Chapter XXXIV: Part 34

Consult a serious christian, who, through a long pilgrimage, has
believed this doctrine. Will he deliberately tell you that it has this
tendency, or that he has found this effect in his own experience? No,
he will tell you nothing gives him more courage and vigour against
sin.—It is not when in a dry, backsliding frame of mind, or when
verging to licentiousness, that he can rest in this doctrine; but when
he is most resolved for God and heaven—when most diligent in the high
way of holiness. Then, indeed, he can say, I know that all things work
together for my good—my predestination includes conformity to Christ,
my calling, my justification, and warfare against sin. If God be for
me, who can be against me? Who shall lay any thing to my charge? It is
God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that
died, is risen, and maketh intercession. Who shall separate me from
the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or famine, or
persecution, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? Nay, in all these
things I am more than conqueror through him that loved me. For I am
persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor
principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come,
nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to
separate me from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus my Lord.

4. Some would insinuate, that though this doctrine be true, yet it
should not be preached, because it is a secret in the mind of God. But
I hope it has been proved, that as a _doctrine_ it is not a secret,
but is revealed in the holy scriptures, and supported by the soundest
arguments. The objects, indeed, or the persons who are predestinated,
are known to God only before they bear fruit, By their _fruits_ WE can
come to know them, in the _ordinary_ course of things; nor is it any
part of the doctrine asserted, that it belongs to man to ascertain the
individual objects any farther than by character.

But there are other ends to be answered by this doctrine.—To be in the
way to eternal glory is an unspeakable privilege; and it is the proper
part of a christian to enquire into the cause of it. His own humility
and gratitude are involved in it. The honour of God, the wisdom of his
counsel, and the lustre of his grace; the offices of Christ, the
surety of a better covenant, and the good Shepherd of the sheep; his
powerful intercession, and his government over all things to the
church—all are involved in the proper declaration of this truth.—Once
more,

5. This doctrine, it may be said, is dangerous, in proportion as it is
insisted upon, in that it prevents the more needful enquiry, “Am I
born again!” Yes, there would be danger, if _all_ the attention of
ministers and people, or even a disproportionate share of it were
confined to this. But, thou mistaken objector, because there are some
who will take the bread of children and cast it away, are the children
not to be fed? Because there were corrupt men disposed to turn the
grace of God into lasciviousness, would you rob any child of God of
this holy triumph. He will choose our inheritance for us! The Lord
will not cast off his people, neither will he forsake his inheritance.
For the Lord is our defence, the Holy One of Israel is our King. I
will trust and not be afraid, for the Lord Jehovah is my strength and
my song, he also is become my salvation.——For the same reason that we
ought not to be ashamed of the gospel of Christ, we need not, we ought
not to be ashamed of this doctrine.

I would now offer

IV. A few practical uses of the subject. And,

1. This doctrine is a source of great comfort, when contrasted with
the fickleness of men, and the perpetual vicissitudes of the world.
The lot may be cast, but the Lord is the disposer of it. He worketh
all things after the counsel of his own will. His counsel shall stand,
and he doeth, and will do, all his pleasure. The wrath of man shall
praise him, and the remainder of wrath he will restrain. All things
work together for good to them who love God, to them who are the
called according to his purpose. He doeth all things well.

After viewing the present perturbed state of the world, the
revolutions of empire, the devastations of war, the alarms of
invasion, the degradation of some, and the exaltation of other
characters—how pleasing and consolatory to view a steady hand
over-ruling, guiding, and influencing all! Providence is “as it were a
wheel in the middle of a wheel.”—As for their rings, they are so high
that they are dreadful, and are full of eyes round about them. But how
delightful to reflect, that within these perpetually revolving wheels
there is an immoveable centre! God’s aim is steady, he is of one mind,
who can turn him?

2. As the predestination for which we contend is only to _good_, it
affords the most pleasing view of the divine character. God is love.
In him is no such inconsistency as is but too frequently found among
men. He is not a fountain sending forth at the same place both sweet
water and bitter, yielding both salt water and fresh. With the utmost
safety and confidence may a humble soul commit itself into the arms of
such a being. No one has any thing to fear from God but the proud and
rebellious, the unbelieving and impenitent. And surely bad must be the
doctrine that speaks peace to the wicked.

3. As in the present case the end, and the way leading to it, are
inseparable; every reason and argument, every alarming topic, every
scriptural exhortation, and every obligation to duty, are in full
force. They who represent these things as inconsistent with
predestination, either have a wrong view of the subject, or care not
what they say nor whereof they affirm. Obligation to duty is founded
on widely and totally different considerations.[242]

God sustains, with respect to man, a twofold character, the one is
that of an equitable governor, the other that of a sovereign disposer.
Answerably to this, man sustains a twofold character also; that of an
accountable agent, and that of a disposable subject. As _passive_ in
the hand of a sovereign God, he is necessitated to good, in proportion
as goodness attaches to him; and in the heirs of salvation this is
predestination to life. As _active_, or a moral agent, man is treated
according to the rules of reason and equity, yet mingled with
undeserved favours. So that every man is, in these different respects,
at once the subject of liberty and necessity.

Equally vague and unprofitable, therefore, is all controversy on the
subject now alluded to while one side contends for _liberty_ and the
other for _necessity_ to the usual exclusion of the opposite. Neither
can be wholly right. For, as sure as God disposes of a man for final
good, the doctrine of necessity is true; and as sure as a man is a
transgressor of divine law, and thus is fitted for destruction, he is
_free_ from all _decretive_ necessity. Therefore,

4. Here is no room for the impious inference, that when we do evil we
are predestinated to it. Let no man say when he is tempted, I am
tempted of God; for as God cannot be tempted with evil, so neither
tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of
his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth
forth sin; and sin when it is finished, bringeth forth death. Do not
err, my beloved brethren; every good gift, and every perfect gift is
from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no
variableness, neither shadow of turning.—But evil, in whatever person,
in whatever place, at whatever time, in whatever form or degree, is
from a quarter diametrically opposite.—On the contrary,

5. When at any time we are engaged in the work of God, in any thing
whatever that is morally good, then are we employed in the execution
of the divine purposes; for there is no good done in time but was
decreed to be done, in all its circumstances, from eternity. Even all
the actions of the wicked, except the deformity or sinfulness which is
in them, are also worthy of God to predestinate. This consideration,
every one must allow, is a great incentive to virtue and holiness.
This remark is applicable both to ministers and people. Are ministers
engaged in preaching the law for conviction, the promises for
encouragement, and the unsearchable riches of Christ for consolation;
are they urging, according to scripture commands and example,
repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ; do they
enforce christian duties, teaching the disciples all things whatsoever
our Lord and lawgiver has commanded; do they warn sinners to flee from
the wrath to come, or invite the burdened and heavy laden to seek rest
in the meek and lowly, the merciful and loving Saviour? They are in
all this only the instruments of a sovereign God, or the _appointed
means_ whereby he executes his eternal purposes. Again, has God
enjoined the necessity of repentance, faith, holiness, obedience, and
perseverance; poverty of spirit, holy mourning, purity of heart, love
to enemies, &c? our personal compliance, which is evermore of grace,
is only the _decreed method_ of bringing us to that eternal glory
which is the end. Once more,

6. This doctrine properly guarded, and rightly understood, shews with
peculiar force the true ground of repentance, and the obligations of
gratitude and holiness.—If the sinfulness of no action is decreed, but
proceeds wholly from that in us which is opposite to God and his will,
whether secret or revealed, rectoral or decretive, what can be more
binding and reasonable than repentance toward God? And if all good,
whether natural, supernatural, moral or spiritual, in ourselves and
others, in time and to eternity proceed from God’s predestination,
what a foundation is there laid for gratitude! Put on, therefore, as
the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness,
humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering. Give all diligence to
make your calling and election sure. And let the peace of God rule in
your hearts, to the which also ye are called in one body, and be ye
thankful. And whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of
the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him. _Amen._

DR. WILLIAMS.

Footnote 238:

Predestination _to Death_ or _misery_, as the end, and to _sin_ as the
means, I call “an impure mixture;” a _mixture_, because its connexion
with Predestination to life is arbitrary and forced;—impure, because
the supposition itself is a foul aspersion of the divine character.
St. Augustine, Calvin, Perkins, Twisse, Rutherford, &c. &c. though
highly valuable and excellent men, upon the whole, were not free from
this impure mixture of doctrine. But of all modern authors, if we
except the philosophical Necessarians, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, Hartley,
Priestly, &c. Dr. Hopkins, of America seems the most open in his
avowal of the sentiment, that _sin and misery_ are _decreed_ in the
same manner as holiness and happiness, in order to produce the
greatest general good. The substance of his reasoning is thus
expressed by himself: “All future existences, events, and actions,
must have a cause of their futurition, or there must be a reason why
they are future, or certainly to take place, rather than not. This
cause must be the _divine decree_ determining their future existence,
or it must be in the future _existences themselves_. But the future
existences could not he the cause of their own futurition; for this
supposes them to exist as a cause, and to have influence, before they
have any existence, even from eternity.—The cause therefore can be
nothing but _divine decree_, determining their future existence,
without which nothing could be future, consequently nothing could be
known to be future.”—See his System of doctrines, 2 vol. 8vo.
especially Vol. i p. 110-217.

On the sentiment itself, by whomsoever held, I would offer the
following strictures:

1. It is a mere assumption, that _sin_, which the above proposition
avowedly includes, has no possible _cause_ of its futurition but
either the divine decree, or the future existences themselves. For
though God’s decrees are the cause of our being, faculties, and
volitions, none of these, nor any thing else that can he traced to
divine causation, will constitute _sin_. Nor yet is it true that sin
is the _cause of itself_; for then sin would be self-existent. It
follows therefore that it must have another origin than either the
divine decree or its own existence.

2. It is equally plain that the _cause_ of sin is not itself morally
evil; For this would involve a contradiction, making cause and effect
to be the same thing. Nor yet can the cause be morally good. For as
from truth nothing but truth can legitimately proceed, so from good
nothing but good can flow. Evil, indeed, is _related_ to good, but not
as cause and effect. Though evil could not follow were there no
infinite good, no creature, no will, no freedom, yet something else
must be sought as the matrix, where the monster sin is generated and
fostered, and which, morally considered, is neither good nor
evil.—Therefore,

3. We assert, that the _origin of moral evil_ is to be found in the
_union_ of two principles, neither of which considered alone partakes
of a _moral_ character. These two principles are _Liberty_ and
_Passive Power_. Liberty, it is manifest is morally neither good nor
bad, but is a mere natural instrument, if I may so speak, and may be
termed a _natural good_ of which God is the author and decreer. On the
contrary, Passive Power is a _natural evil_ of which God is not the
author or decreer, yet morally considered is not evil. But this term,
being little understood, requires further explanation; at least it is
incumbent on me to shew in what sense I use it. My design is not to
vindicate the use of it by others, but I adopt it to convey a specific
idea, for which I find no other word or phrase more appropriate. By
‘Passive Power,’ then, I mean, That which is of _unavoidable
necessity_ found in every creature, as such, in direct opposition to
the self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency of God. In other
words, It is that _tendency_ to nihility, physically considered, and
to defection, morally considered, which of _absolute necessity_
belongs to every dependent or created nature. That there is such a
principle is self-evident, nor is it probable that any reasonable
being will ever controvert its existence. Now, it is demonstrable that
this, from the definition, cannot be the object of divine decree, or
of will; for it is stated to be of _absolute_ or _unavoidable_
necessity; besides, it is absurd to suppose that God has decreed, or
produces, any thing the existence of which stands in _direct
contrariety_ to himself. That it is not a _moral_ evil is plain, for
the _holiest_ creatures are subjects of it—God alone is exempt.

4. Let it be further observed, that the First Cause, being goodness
itself, impels, whether decretively or efficiently, to _good only_;
and of this character is even our being necessitated to exercise our
volitions. Yet, when the exercise of liberty, in itself innocent,
_unites_ with passive power, the fruit or offspring of this union is
moral evil. This, I am fully persuaded, is the true solution of this
question, _Whence cometh moral evil?_ If any person shall think proper
candidly to assign his reasons to the contrary, due regard shall be
paid to them,

5. If it be asked, where lies the difference between _decreeing_ and
_permitting_ sin to take place? I answer, the difference is, that the
one would be an act of _injustice_, the other is _doing nothing_. So
that until it can be shewn that there is no difference between
injustice and doing nothing, there is no force in the objection. That
to necessitate sin decretively would be an act of injustice, and
therefore incompatible with the divine character, is, I think,
demonstrable; for, it would be to decree to destruction _antecedently_
to desert—to _annihilate_ the sinfulness of any act, making its evil
nature to consist in its effects—and to destroy the immutable essences
of good and evil. Whereas to _permit_, or to _suffer_ to take place
without prevention, is _not to act not to decree_. To ‘decree to
permit,’ therefore, is a contradiction in terms.

6. But, it has been said, the _event_ is the same to the sinner,
whether he hurried on to sin and misery by a decretive impulse, or
these effects are not prevented when in the power of omnipotence to
interpose. This objection would have some weight, if the _happiness_
of the creature were the only, or even the _principal_ end of God in
creation. But this not being the case, its weight vanishes. To
illustrate this we may suppose, that the _event_ of a man’s execution
is well known to a judge; but, instead of proceeding on the principles
of law and equity, and to effect conviction and condemnation according
to legal evidence, he orders the man to be executed clandestinely
without any equitable process, under pretence that it could make no
difference to the sufferer, for the _event_ of his execution was
_certain_! Besides, the spirit of the objection reflects on God’s
_actual_ dealings with his creatures, in every instance of their
sufferings; because it is in the power of omnipotence to interpose.
And in fact, it must be allowed, either that the _happiness_ of the
Creature is not the _chief_ end of creation, or that the permission of
sin is an act of injustice. But the case is plain, that his own glory
is the chief end of creation and government, and that there is no
injustice in the permission of sin.

7. It may be said, If the union of liberty with passive power be the
origin of moral evil, and if the holiest creatures in heaven are both
free and the subjects of passive power, how is it that they do not
sin! If both are united in the same persons, does the one never
terminate upon; or unite itself to the other? In answer to this
enquiry, we must distinguish between _having_ the principle, and being
under its influence without control. Though the spirits of the just,
and holy angels, have in them the principle, as the condition of their
created existence, yet it is counteracted by sovereign favour. They
may say, as well as Paul, by the grace of God we are what we are. The
object of divine support is the _disposition_, or the _seat_ of moral
action; this being made good, or pure, or holy, prior to all acts of
the will, effectually counteracts the influence of passive power. The
Liberty and choice of a heavenly being therefore, terminating on such
a disposition, no acts but such as are holy can ensue. Hence,

8. If we would know how this is consistent with the actual fall of
beings who were once in this condition, we must attend to another
important consideration; which is, that when God at any time deals in
_mere equity_ with a moral agent, without the counteracting influence
of sovereign favour, the inevitable consequence is, that his liberty,
or free choice, will terminate upon his passive power. Hence the
_certainty_ of the futurition of moral evil, in all possible degrees
and circumstances, without any decretive efficiency in its
production.—If it be asked, why the exercise of _equity_ is assigned
as the occasion of this union, rather than _sovereignty_; or, why
leaving a free agent to the influence of his passive power should not
be considered a sovereign rather than an equitable act? The best
answer to this enquiry, is a definition of the two terms. By _equity_
then I mean the principle that gives to each his due; by
_sovereignty_, a right to do whatsoever is not inconsistent with
equity. And from this definition it must appear that there may he a
two-fold deviation from equity, _viz._ giving _more_ than is due, or
_less_ than is due; more good and less evil, or more evil and less
good than is equitable. The former of these, more good and less evil,
must needs be for the advantage of the creature; and therefore it may
be called a _gracious_ deviation. Without it, there would be no room
for either mercy or grace. The latter, more evil and less good than is
due, is properly called _injustice_, and is such a deviation from
equity as is not compatible with the divine character. Therefore, to
do us good _beyond_ our claim is an act of _sovereignty_; but to give
us neither more nor less than is our due is to deal with us in _pure
equity_.

9. Hence it follows, that when God deals with angels or men in
_sovereignty_, according to the definitions, he does them _good
beyond_ their claim. But to make _this_ to be the immediate _cause_ of
the sin of men and angels is absurd. On the other hand, it is
incompatible with the divine character, as before observed, to give
them less good and more evil than is their due; and therefore _this_
cannot be the cause of sin, as sure as God is incapable of exercising
injustice.—Wherefore, it remains that then alone can moral agents fall
into sin when dealt with in _pure equity_. In the act of defection, or
becoming sinful, they are equally free from being impelled by
injustice, and upheld by sovereign favour.

COROLLARIES.

1. All the _good_ and happiness in the universe of created beings are
the fruit of Sovereignty and Decree.

2. All the _moral evil_ and misery in the universe are the offspring
of _liberty_, a natural good, terminating or acting upon, or united to
_passive power_, a natural evil not counteracted by sovereignly
gracious acts on the disposition, or the seat of the moral principle,
which may be called analogically _the heart_.

3. As every act and degree of liberty is perfectly fore-known to God,
as the effect of his own decree, and every hypothetical tendency of
passive power, though itself not an object of decree, is equally
fore-known, it follows, that every sin is as accurately fore-known as
if decreed, and has an equally infallible ground of certain
futurition.

Footnote 239:

It is allowed that there is a difference between the _cause of sin_,
as a _principle_, and being a _sinner_; but when applied to an
_agent_, to be the author or the cause of sin, and to be a sinner, is
the same thing. Therefore, when applied to God, in no proper sense
whatever can it be said that he is the _author of sin_.—“If by _the
author of sin_ is meant (says President Edwards) the permitter, or a
_not hinderer_ of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of
events in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and
purposes, that sin infallibly follows: I say, if this be all that is
meant by the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of
sin, though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and
custom is apt to carry another sense.” Edwards on the Will, Part iv.
Sect. xi.

But though this acute and excellent writer disavows the use of the
phrase, he no where assigns the _true ground_ why it should not be
used. The truth is, he does not seem to have been aware of any
alternative between the _certain futurition_ of sin and its being
_decreed_. And his only method of warding off the most ruinous
consequences appears to have been adopted for want of a better, and
not from the satisfactory nature of that method. His view, in brief,
is this: God is a being of infinite goodness and wisdom; he can will
nothing but good; the system he hath adopted is the best; now, says
he, “if the will be good, and the object of his will be, all things
considered, good and best, then the choosing and willing it, is not
_willing evil_. And if so, then his ordering according to that will is
not _doing evil_.”

It is very seldom that this eminent author fails in his reasoning; but
here certainly he does fail. The phrases _willing evil_, and _doing
evil_, are not used in the same sense in both parts of the premises,
from whence the conclusion is inferred. A system, all things
considered, being best, is no good reason why each individual part of
it is good. And it may be forcibly retorted; a system which includes
an infinite evil as a part of its institution cannot be from God. Nor
can it be said that this is arguing against _fact_, without begging
the question, that God has _appointed the evil_ which is blended with
the good.—On the subject itself let the following things be
considered:

1. If choosing and willing a system in which _sin is a decreed part_
is not _willing evil_, because the system is good and best, all things
considered then it would inevitably follow, that sin, because such a
part of that system is _not an evil_. But, it may be said, It is
willing it for a _good end_. Does then a good _end_ or intention
destroy the _nature_ of sin? Was the sin of Paul or any other saint
_anihilated_ because he _sincerely aimed_ at the Glory of God? Or has
any _design_, however comprehensive, exalted or sincere, the _least
tendency_ to alter the _nature_ of sin?

2. Allowing as incontrovertible that the present system of things is
the best, all things considered, and that sin is actually blended with
it, it does not thence follow that the sin itself is _decreed_, or is
any part of divine appointment. For _not to hinder_ sin, is extremely
different from being the _cause_ or author of it. The one is perfectly
consistent with equity, the other would be an act of _injustice_.

3. It is a sentiment so repugnant to all analogical propriety, to _do
evil that good may come_, that it cannot be supposed a man of Mr.
Edwards’ piety would have adopted any thing like it, but from what
appeared to him an inevitable necessity. And indeed whoever assumes
the principle, that every event comes to pass from _decretive_
necessity, sin not excepted, must of course be driven to his
conclusion. But this valuable author had no need to recur to that
opinion, in order to establish his theory of _hypothetical_ necessity;
for this will stand on a rock, immoveably, without such aid.

4. In reality, the certain futurition of _good_, and that of _evil_,
arises from _different_, yea from diametrically _opposite_ causes. The
one flows from the operative will of God, and is fore-known to be
future because decreed, the other flows from a deficient or privative
cause, passive power, when united to liberty, as before explained,
which exists only in created beings, and in all these, as a contrast
to self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency. Yet _this_ is
the subject of hypothetical tendencies and results no less than the
good to which it stands opposed, in all the boundless varieties of its
blendings; therefore no case can be so complicated, but to infinite
prescience the event must appear with _equal certainty_ as if decreed.

Footnote 240:

“_Equally impious and needless._” _Needless_, because the existence of
sin is fairly and fully accounted for on another principle; _impious_,
because it ascribes to God the worst of all principles, the causation
of sin. That God superintends, directs, and over-rules the actions of
men is worthy of him; and equally so that he does _not hinder_ the
existence of moral evil; but that he is a positive and efficacious
cause of moral evil, or that this is consistent with either his
justice or holiness can never be proved. Dr. Hopkins, indeed, says,
that “the attempt to _distinguish_ between the sinful volitions or
actions of men as natural and moral actions; and making God the origin
and cause of them considered as natural actions, and men the cause and
authors of the _depravity_ and sin which is in them, is, it is
believed, _unintelligible_—unless by making this distinction it be
meant, that in every sinful action, God is not the sinful cause of
it.” The author, however, candidly adds, “But if the contrary can be
made to appear, this doctrine, with all that is implied in it, shall
be given up and renounced.” As the removal of this principle, and the
establishment of the other, appear to me of the highest importance in
theology, a few remarks, in addition to those already made, may not be
superfluous, as tending to exhibit the principle here maintained in
different lights and connexions; and when all are properly examined,
it is probable they will not be wholly “_unintelligible_.”

1. God, JEHOVAH, is the infinite and eternal Essence, which is of
_absolute necessity_—the self-existent, independent, and
all-sufficient Being—from eternity to eternity generating his own
light and joy, called his only begotten Son; not from mere will, but
of the same necessity.

2. God in his boundless all-sufficiency views all _possibles_ with all
their positive and privative _tendencies_. That all possibles have
their _positive_ tendencies is as plain as that two added to three
make five. Were there no positive tendencies, there could be no
hypothetical certainty, no law of nature, no connexion between cause
and effect. And it is equally true, though not equally plain, that
there are _privative_ tendencies in all beings but that one who exists
of _absolute necessity_. To suppose the contrary, is the same as to
suppose that a creature _may be made_ independent, and all-sufficient.
But that is, every reasonable being must allow, _absolutely
impossible_, as implying the grossest contradiction. On this
demonstrated fact rests unavoidably the existence of that principle in
every created nature which I call _Passive Power_. Yet.

3. It does not follow that the mere collateral existence of these two
principles in the same subject must needs produce moral evil. Then
alone does this take place when the one terminates upon, or is united
to the other, without the interposition of sovereign favour. It is not
in the power of equity to assist. For the exercise of equity is to
give each his due; but to _prevent_ sin is not _due_ to the subject of
it, otherwise no one _could ever sin_ but on condition of _injustice_
in God.

4. After all, it may be objected, that the _scriptures_ ascribe to God
the causation of moral evil; as, hardening the heart of
Pharaoh—hardening whom he will—making the wicked for the day of
evil—appointing to destruction—determining the death of
Christ—delivering him by determinate counsel—doing all evil in a
city—making vessels to dishonour—fitting them for destruction, &c.—In
reply to this objection it must be considered, that whatever the
import of such representations may be, no interpretation which is
_unworthy of God_ can be the true meaning—that the idioms of the
sacred languages ascribing cause or operation to God must be
understood according to the nature of the subject—and, what is
particularly to our purpose, that active verbs which denote _making_,
_doing_, _causing_, and the like, often denote a _declaration_ of the
thing done, or that shall take place; or a _permission_ of it.

Take a few specimens. Thus Acts x. 15. “What God hath _cleansed_,”
means, what God hath _declared_ to be clean.—Isai. vi. 9, 10. The
prophet is commanded to tell the people, “understand not, perceive
not;” and he is ordered to “_make_ the heart of this people fat, to
_make_ their ears heavy, and to _shut_ their eyes.” And what can this
mean more than to _declare a fact_, either what they then were, or
what they would be?—So Jer. i. 10. The Prophet’s _declaration_ of what
should be, is called his _rooting_ out _pulling_ down, &c.—Ezek.
xliii. 3. The prophet says, “when I came to _destroy_ the city;” his
meaning undoubtedly is, When I came to prophecy or _declare_ that the
city should be destroyed.—Exod. v. 22. “Lord, wherefore hast thou
_evil entreated_ this people?” Moses means, Wherefore hast thou
_permitted_ them to be evil entreated?—Jer. iv. 10. “Lord God, thou
hast greatly _deceived_ this people;” that is, _permitted_ or not
hindered them to be deceived by the false Prophets.—Ezek. xiv. 9. “I
the Lord have _deceived_ that prophet.” Can any thing else be meant
than suffering him to deceive himself?—Matt. xi. 25. “Thou hast _hid_
these things” _i. e._ _not revealed_.——Thus also, Rom. ix. 18. “Whom
he will he _hardeneth_,” he suffereth to be hardened.—Rom. xi. 8. “God
_gave them_ a spirit of slumber,” _i. e._ permitted them to slumber. 2
Thes. ii. 11. “God shall _send_ them strong delusion, that they should
believe a lie;” _i. e._ shall _permit_ them to be deluded so that they
shall believe a lie.—Exod. vii. 3. &c. “And I will _harden_ Pharaoh’s
heart,” i. e. I will _suffer_ it to be hardened. Matt. x. 34, 35. “I
am not come to _send_ peace, but _a sword_; For I am come to _set_ a
man _at variance_ against his father,” That is, my coming shall be the
_innocent occasion_ of wars and variance.—Jude 4. “Who were before of
old _ordained_ to this condemnation;” _i. e._ _foretold_, or
_forewritten_, as the word signifies; _announced_ in the sacred pages,
and _proscribed_ by divine law.

But the passage above all others, which appears to countenance the
notion, that God is the _cause_ of sin, is 1 Pet. ii. 8. “A stone of
stumbling, and a rock of offence, even in them which stumble at the
word, being disobedient, _whereunto also they were appointed_.” _i.
e._ _unto which thing_, their stumbling, _they were appointed because
disobedient_. The Greek participle includes the cause of their
falling; as Heb. ii. 3. _Neglecting_ so great salvation, how shall we
escape? _To which_ not escaping, they _were appointed, for neglecting_
so great salvation. A striking _contrast_ to this we have, John vii.
17. “If any man will _do his will_, he shall _know_ of the doctrine;”
but the _disobedient_ shall, according to an awful but equitable
_appointment_, “stumble, and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and
be taken.”—(Isa. viii. 15.) We have a further illustration of this
meaning in Heb. iii. 18. “To whom sware he that they should not enter
into his rest, but to them that _believe_ not?” _i. e._ Who were
_appointed_ to destruction? The answer is, the _disobedient_; for the
original word is the same here as in Peter, under a different
inflection. And it is added, ver. 19. “So they could not enter in
_because_ of _unbelief_.”—Thus also Rom. xi. 7. “The rest _were
blinded_, or _hardened_;” _i. e._ were _suffered_ to be blind or hard.
And that this is the meaning is decided by ver. 20. “_Because of
unbelief_ they were broken off.”

Upon the whole, Peter intimates, that none should be offended at such
characters, men of learning and eminence rejecting the Messiah and his
gospel. Their end is what might be expected, as _foretold_ by the
prophets, according to God’s _righteous_ government, and his eternal
_appointment_, or _determination_, respecting all such offenders.
Their habitual unbelieving _disobedience_ was the _cause_, but their
actual stumbling at the word to their destruction was the natural, the
righteous, the appointed _effect_. To this they were appointed,
_placed_, or _set forth_ (as Pharaoh was _raised up_) by the righteous
judgment of God, who resisteth the proud and disobedient; in order to
shew forth the glory of his justice in them. They were personally
_appointed_ to exalted situations, being civil and ecclesiastical
_builders_; they were _suffered_ to reject Christ, in pure equity; and
thus were deservedly _constituted_ awful warnings to others.

Footnote 241:

This notion, perhaps more than any other, has been termed
_Baxterianism_, and yet it is not easy to say that Mr. Baxter ever
maintained it. He says indeed “all have so much (grace) as bringeth
and leaveth the success to man’s will;” and this in a discourse
wherein he allows that God hath “positively elected certain persons by
an absolute decree to overcome all their resistances of his Spirit,
and to draw them to Christ, and by Christ to himself, by such a power
and way as shall _infallibly_ convert and save them.” He moreover
says, “What if men cannot here tell how to resolve the question,
whether _any_ or _how many_ are ever converted or saved by that _mere
grace_ which we call _sufficient_, or rather _necessary_, and common
to those that are not converted; and whether man’s will ever make a
saving determining improvement of it?”—“And yet,” he adds, “this
question itself is formed on false suppositions and is capable of a
satisfactory solution.” Baxter’s Works, Vol. ii. p. 929.—On the
subject of this Note the author begs leave to refer his readers to
Doddridge’s Works, Vol. v. p. 238, 239, Notes.

Footnote 242:

The nature of God, his holy will, and our peculiar relation to him,
form an adamantine chain of obligation to duty which cannot with
impunity be broken; from which predestination is so far from releasing
us, that it forms another chain of gold that shall finally prevail;
and divine grace personally experienced is a silken cord to draw the
soul along in the path of duty. But do these powerful ties render
useless God’s _reasoning_ with sinners, his _exhortations_ to
repentance, to believing, to obedience, and to every particular branch
of duty? No: for these methods are the very means to attain the end,
and form a part of the decree itself.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

Transcriber’s Notes:

Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected. The author's archaic punctuation and spellings have been retained.

End of Project Gutenberg's A Body of Divinity, Vol. 1 of 4, by Thomas Ridgley