Chapter V: Trusts and Monopolies

We have already seen how production upon a large scale has superseded production upon a small scale in most important branches of manufactures. We have now to inquire whether production upon a large scale is in turn to be supplanted by single consolidated enterprises, by those combinations of capital known as trusts. Under one of these three conditions industry must be carried on; few people wish to revert to the stage when production was carried on in small establishments, but warm controversy and difference of opinion still exist as to whether centralized management by a single company or combination offers superior advantages to production by independent competing establishments. The concentration of production in a few large establishments has been followed by the consolidation of these larger units into a single whole. Since the days of Adam Smith capital has tended to combine for the purpose of fixing prices, and these 40 combinations have passed through several phases. The earliest form is the agreement of independent concerns to fix prices, as was done by the American railroads in their early traffic agreements. The next step was to divide the field, as has been done by the French railways and the American express companies. A third phase of combination was the pool, which attempted to regulate the output rather than to fix the price or divide the field. Railway, whisky, beam, and other pools were organized for this purpose, but all broke down because of the difficulty of enforcing the agreement and the temptations to each member to break it secretly for the sake of the large profits obtainable. By this time it had become clear that if a real permanent consolidation of interests was to be secured by the competing enterprises some closer form of combination must be devised which could not be broken at will by any member. An industrial union and not a loose confederation must be attained. Accordingly the next step was taken in 1882 by the formation of the Standard Oil Trust, so called because the constituent concerns handed over their business to the complete control of a central board of trustees, receiving in return trust certificates which entitled them to dividends. Similar “trusts” were formed in the whisky, sugar, and other industries, but were speedily declared illegal by the federal Supreme Court. By this decision the form of combination was changed, but the movement was not at all checked. The next phase and the last was the establishment of holding corporations, which are organized to buy up and hold the stock of a number of individual corporations, which still retain their corporate existence. In this way unity of control is secured, to which is added a certain flexibility; but it is really the trust under another legal form. Where pooling and combination by means of holding companies have been forbidden by law, as in the case of railroad companies, actual consolidation has often taken place, though when 41 trusts are spoken of the other form of combination is more often meant. From the point of view of business organization the holding company is simply an extension of the principle of the corporation, and to a consideration of this we must therefore turn.

There are three classes of establishments by which industry is carried on--those that are the property of an individual, those which belong to partnerships or firms of unlimited liability, and those belonging to corporations of limited liability. The usefulness of the individual system is of course limited to small undertakings, where but little capital and credit are necessary; this form of organization still dominates the field in agriculture, in the small retail trade, and in the repairing industries. The partnership is a joint undertaking by two or more individuals, and makes larger enterprises possible, but as each individual is liable for all obligations of the firm or his partners his personal liability is greatly increased. While it is well adapted to certain undertakings, as moderate mercantile establishments and professional firms, owing to a certain elasticity in the contractual relations of its members, it is not suited to large industrial ventures, both because of the excessive personal liability, and because of the necessity of dissolving the partnership upon the death, withdrawal, or insolvency of any member. The advantage of the corporation lies in the fact that it has a continuous existence, and that the liability of the shareholders is limited to the amount of capital actually contributed by each; it is well adapted to modern enterprise because it permits the summation of large amounts of capital from a number of small savers and centralizes the use of this capital in the most economical manner. There may thus be concentration of management without concentration of ownership. The federal census of manufactures in 1905 showed that, although less than one-quarter of the manufacturing establishments were organized as corporations, yet they produced three-quarters of the total manufactures in money 42 value. In the field of transportation, corporations are in almost exclusive control, most banks and insurance companies are organized under this form, while mercantile and industrial undertakings are being more and more generally organized as corporations. Not merely are most of our business enterprises being conducted under corporate form and organization, but most recently, as has been already pointed out, there has been a movement to combine individual corporations into larger concerns, or trusts. The trust is usually thought of as a monopoly and, while not necessarily so, it usually does exercise monopoly control; but for the present we shall consider the trust problem from the standpoint of business organization, deferring to the end of the section the discussion of monopoly.

The trust movement may be said to have begun with the formation of the Standard Oil Trust in 1882, but down to 1898 its progress was slow. Beginning with the revival of prosperity in 1898, however, there ensued a veritable stampede of business managers to enter into combinations. During the next three years 149 large combinations, with a capital of over $3,000,000,000, were formed. The movement spent most of its force by 1902, though it is by no means at an end yet, as the recent floating of the Dry Goods Trust indicates. A few figures from reliable authorities will make clear the extent of the movement. According to the New York Journal of Commerce, industrial (i.e., manufacturing and commercial) and gas trusts were organized in the United States between 1860 and 1900, not including combinations in banking, shipping, railroads, etc., as shown in the accompanying table.

Another more recent list by John Moody[4] gives the number of “industrial” trusts organized down to Jan. 1, 1904, as 318; these have

-----------------+------------+--------------- 43
Decade. | Number | Total Nominal
| Organized. | Capital.
-----------------+------------+---------------
1860-69 | 2 | $ 13,000,000
1870-79 | 4 | 135,000,000
1880-89 | 18 | 288,000,000
1890-99 | 157 | 3,150,000,000
-----------------+------------+---------------
Total, 40 years | 181 | $3,586,000,000
-----------------+------------+---------------

acquired or control 5,288 plants, and have a total nominal capital of $7,246,342,533. A movement so general and widespread, and of such gigantic proportions, must have had some powerful and intelligible causes behind. For it was not confined to the United States, but was equally observable in such industrial diverse countries as England, France, Germany, Russia, and other European nations.

The most important and general cause was the desire to secure the legitimate economies of large-scale production. A combined or federated industry may secure even greater economies than a single large factory. These have been concisely stated as follows[5]: “The cost of management, amount of stock carried, advertising, cost of selling the product, may all be smaller per unit of product. A large aggregation can control credit better and escape loss from bad debts. By regulating and equalizing the output in the different localities, it can run more nearly full time. Being acquainted with the entire situation it can reduce the friction. A strong combination has advantages in shipment. It can have a clearing-house for orders and ship from the nearest source of supply. The least efficient factories can be first closed when demand falls off. Factories can be specialized to produce that for which each is best fitted. The magnitude of the industry and its presence in different localities strengthens its influence with the railroads. Its political as well as its economic power is increased.”

Many of these economies of production are not new to these trusts, but 44 have been secured equally by large-scale manufacturing establishments. Some of the savings, especially in buying raw material and marketing their products, are peculiar to the trusts and mark a more efficient mode of organization than mere concentration of industry in single large establishments. Thus, it has been found possible to dispense with a great number of traveling salesmen, of whom it was said that 30,000 lost their positions in the year 1898 alone. When the whisky trust was formed only twelve of the eight distilleries entering into the combination were kept running, but as these were the largest, best located and best equipped, and were run at their full capacity, they were able to turn out as much as all had done before and at an immense economy. The saving of cross freights by having an order filled from the plant most conveniently located is considerable; Mr. Gates estimated the saving of the American Steel and Wire Company in this single point at $500,000 a year. Such an economy could not be secured by a single establishment, no matter how well organized or on how large a scale. The specialization of particular factories to do special processes is well illustrated by the organization of the United States Steel Corporation.

The growth of this latter combination is an example not only of consolidation, but of the integration of industry, that is, the grouping together under one control of a whole series of industries. From the mining of the ore and coal, through the processes of carrying it to the furnaces, coking the coal and making the pig iron, manufacturing the latter into the finished forms of iron and steel products, and down to the marketing of the latter, every step is carried on under the control of the United States Steel Corporation. The assets of the company were stated as follows soon after its organization, and illustrate the magnitude and scope of its operations:

Iron and Bessemer ore properties $ 700,000,000 45
Plants, mills, machinery, etc. 300,000,000
Coal and coke fields 100,000,000
Railroads, ships, etc. 80,000,000
Blast furnaces 48,000,000
Natural gas fields 20,000,000
Limestone properties 4,000,000
Cash and cash assets 148,251,000
--------------
Total $1,400,281,000

In addition to economies due to improvements in methods of organization, production and marketing, another cause for the sudden and vigorous outburst of trust promotion in the years 1898-1902 may be found in the profits to be secured by promoters and organizers. After the successful launching of the first few trusts, with their undoubted economies and advantages, the movement was taken in hand by professional promoters, who organized combinations, often with the help of underwriters, in every branch of industry where there was any promise of profit. That many of these were artificial or premature is evident from the financial results: of the 183 industrial combinations enumerated by the census in 1900, one-third paid no dividends whatever after their formation and another one-third paid no dividends to the holders of common stock. As an indication of the profits obtained by the successful trust promoter may be cited the testimony given before the Industrial Commission in the case of the Tin Plate Trust stating that this promoter realized from $2,000,000 to $3,000,000 profit from the undertaking. When to this is added the profit obtained by the owners of the constituent plants, which were usually taken over by the trust at an exorbitant valuation, it is clear that the stimulus of financial gain was probably stronger in many cases than that of economy in production. The bill was of course paid in most cases by the investing public, which absorbed large amounts of industrials in the years of their active promotion.

Other causes have sometimes been adduced to explain the growth of 46 combinations, such as the tariff and railroad freight discriminations, but these are too local in their influence to explain adequately the world-wide movement toward combination. Trusts exist in free-trade England, and in Germany where freight discriminations on the state-owned railroads are practically unknown. It is, however, true that in the United States both these factors have been of decisive importance in building up certain powerful trusts. “There can be no doubt,” said the conservative report of the Industrial Commission, “that in early times special favors from railroads were a prominent factor, probably the most important factor, in building up some of the largest combinations. The receipt of discriminating favors from railroads has been conceded repeatedly by representatives of the combinations themselves.” The Standard Oil, beef, coffee, steel, and other trusts may be cited as illustrations. In the matter of the tariff Mr. Havemeyer’s statement that “the mother of all trusts is the customs tariff law” may be set down as the rather peevish utterance of a disappointed beneficiary; but there is no doubt that combination has been made easier behind the tariff wall. Instance the sugar trust itself, the leather, steel, tin plate, and others.

Let us now turn to some of the effects of industrial combinations, which we may classify according as they bear upon competitors and producers of raw materials, labor, and consumers. As the number of competitors is reduced the fierceness of competition among those remaining in the field is greatly increased, for the value of the prize to the successful enterprise is correspondingly greater. It is not surprising therefore that at times this rivalry should have assumed unethical if not actually illegal forms. The practice by some trusts of fixing prices below cost at some strategic point in order to crush out a troublesome competitor, and then correspondingly raising them elsewhere so as not to sustain any loss, is serious because so 47 subtle. Prof. John B. Clark regards this as so serious an evil that he would have the Constitution amended in order that power might be given the Federal Government to prevent it. The producers of raw materials, as cattlemen, crude oil and coal producers, sugar and tobacco growers, and others, complain that the prices at which they sell their products are dictated to them by the trusts, which are practically the sole purchasers of what they have produced. They claim that prices are depressed to the lowest point possible and that every gain from increase of demand goes into the pockets of the trust managers. It may of course be answered that the trust cannot depress prices below the point at which a living profit can be secured by the producer of the raw material or he will stop producing, but there is no doubt but that the monopoly power possessed by the trust in such cases will sometimes be used to the disadvantage of those whose product it alone buys.

The effects upon labor of the organization of capital in combined industries and under centralized control are more complex. As trusts have superseded single corporations because this mode of industrial organization was more economical, we must expect to find that one of the economies was the displacement of labor. The discharge of traveling salesmen has already been spoken of; with the consolidation of various plants under one control other high-priced men were let go--managers, superintendents, etc. The same thing was true at the other end of the industrial scale and thousands of workmen, usually the least efficient and capable, were deprived of work. The natural consequences of these combinations and economies were not clearly apparent at the time, because they were happily coincident with a period of business expansion and prosperity which reabsorbed into the industrial organism most of the displaced workers. Another phase of the relation between trusts and labor is that of their effect upon wages.

In general it may be said that there are only two sources out of which 48 an increase of wages can be paid, and these are the profits of the business organizer and manager or the increased product of the business itself, and of these two only the latter can serve as a permanent source of higher wages. Now it is pretty evident that labor has not been in a position to force the trust magnates to forego their profits. On the other hand, wages in industries carried on by industrial combinations have risen, and it must therefore have been because there was more produced and consequently more to be divided. If the inefficient workers were discharged and only the best ones retained by the trusts, here is one explanation why they could afford to pay high wages--they paid more because they got more done. As yet labor has not admitted that it is unable to cope with these industrial combinations; it has however demanded that it be allowed to combine on a national scale and to bargain collectively for united labor with combined capital.

The discussion of the effects of trusts upon the consumer leads at once to the discussion of their effects upon prices, for it is through the agency of price that the trust touches the ordinary man. The advantages claimed by trust organizers are economies of production and lowered cost; but the vital question to the consumer is whether lowered cost increases profits or reduces prices. On this point the Industrial Commission reaches the following conclusion: “that in most cases the combination has exerted an appreciable power over prices, and in practically all cases it has increased the margin between raw materials and finished products. Since there is reason to believe that the cost of production over a period of years has lessened, the conclusion is inevitable that the combinations have been able to increase their profits.” Moreover the power over prices was greatest during certain periods when the control of the combinations was greatest. The problem therefore resolves itself into the question, 49 are trusts monopolies? While a categorical answer cannot be given to this, it may safely be affirmed that all trusts try to be monopolies. Nor is it necessary to control the production, sale, or purchase of a commodity absolutely in order to exercise monopoly power; the control of 50 or 60 per cent may suffice to secure virtual monopoly. The purpose of a monopoly is so to fix the price that it will obtain the maximum net profit. It is conceivable that this result may be attained by lowering the monopoly price below the point of the competitive price, but this is unusual. In general a monopoly price has meant a high price, and a high price has meant a restriction of the output. Where that has been the result of trust control, society has been injured, for not only has it not shared in the economies of production but it actually gets less and has to pay more than it would have done under competition. It may be said, however, that even in the case of the greatest monopoly there is always the specter of potential competition threatening its profits, while the possibility of substituting some other commodity for the monopolized article protects the consumer from too great extortion and keeps the price within limits. Absolute control over price is never exercised by any monopoly. Nevertheless, we may fairly conclude, in the words of Henry D. Lloyd, that “monopoly is business at the end of its journey,” control over prices is the object of combination.

There remains to be considered another charge of monopoly which has been brought against the trust, the monopoly of opportunity or the suppression of individual initiative. It is no longer possible, it is claimed, for the man of small means, even with good talents, to engage in business for himself: he must accept some subordinate position in a corporation where his individuality is checked and his power of initiative does not find free play. So far as this is true it would seem to be the result not so much of the trust movement as of 50 large-scale production. We have seen that the tendency of machine production is to enlarge the business unit and to call for the investment of constantly larger amounts of capital in up-to-date establishments. Some writers even point out that the average business man who engages in business on his own account fails, and that he should therefore be grateful if more efficient producers offer him a remunerative and steady salaried position. Without insisting upon this point it may still fairly be noted that there are large fields of enterprise that lie outside the area of monopolistic control. “Large-scale production is best adapted to articles that can be turned out in large quantities according to uniform patterns and standards; individual initiative is still free in those lines of production that call for artistic ability or appeal to individual tastes, or which, like agriculture, are dependent upon variable conditions.”[6]

There are, however, other evils connected with trust organization and management that are more easily remediable and that call for legislative regulation. “The evils of combination, remedied by regulative legislation,” concludes the report of the Industrial Commission,[7] “come chiefly from two sources: (1) the more or less complete exercise of the power of monopoly; (2) deception of the public through secrecy or false information.” Various remedies have been suggested to meet the first class of evils, those of monopoly, generally in the direction of strengthening the powers of the Federal Government. We have however no lack of legislation on this subject already: thirty-four states and territories have passed anti-trust laws, and the federal Anti-Trust Law of 1890 explicitly provides that “every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal.” The severe 51 restrictive measures of the states have been largely nullified by the loose legislation of three or four “charter granting” states, in which 95 per cent of all the trusts have accordingly been chartered, while the federal enactments have been found very difficult to enforce. It is not easy to define or to prove monopoly or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The second class of evils has been met by statutes requiring publicity and more definitely fixing the responsibility of corporation officials. Such measures of control must be the first step toward intelligent regulation, and are to be commended as thoroughly reasonable. The establishment of the federal Bureau of Corporations with power to “investigate” industrial corporations engaged in interstate commerce has already led to the publication of some valuable reports. We must first proceed along the lines of publicity and intelligent information before we attempt more drastic remedies.