Chapter XII: Profit-Sharing and Co-Operation

Among the reforms suggested for remedying some of the evils incident to the modern wage system those of profit-sharing and co-operation occupy a prominent place. The separation of the community into capitalists and laborers, classes different in conditions and ideals, constitutes a menace to the peace and progress of industrial society. The wage system moreover is thought by many to have broken down the former intimate relation of employer and worker, and some scheme is needed to correlate their interests again and to bind them together. To secure this result profit-sharing is advocated. As defined by the International Co-operative Congress in 1897 this is “the agreement, freely entered into, by which the employe receives a share, fixed in advance, of the profits.” It is not a change from the present wage system, but simply a modification of that system according to which the laborer receives a share in the profits in addition to his wages. The purpose is to identify the interests of the employes with those of their employer and thus to give him some of the same motives for energy, care, and thrift in the conduct of the business. Three principal methods of profit-sharing may be mentioned, though the variations are manifold. The favorite method in England and the United States is the payment of a cash bonus at the end of a fixed period, 111 as a year. A second plan, which is the rule in France, is a deferred participation by means of a savings bank deposit, provident fund, or annuity, for the purpose of providing for old age and disability. The third plan, which has recently grown in favor in this country, is the payment in shares of stock of the company.

The economic theory of profit-sharing is that by inducing greater care and diligence on the part of the employe he will himself create the fund from which he is paid. It is claimed by its advocates that it increases both the quantity and the quality of the product and that it promotes greater care of implements and materials, thus reducing the cost at the same time that it increases the output. The classic example of this is the case of the original profit-sharing scheme, the Maison Leclaire, in Paris; the result of the first six years’ experiment was a dividend on wages of $3,753 a year, derived entirely from the increased economy and care of the workers. In some cases, however, the object of the employers is to secure immunity from strikes and other labor disturbances and a greater permanence of the labor force; and participation in profits is conditioned on the men abstaining from joining a trade union, or on uninterrupted service. In these cases the deferred participation plan is used. The advantages claimed for the system are not merely the increase in product already spoken of and the greatest efficiency of the worker, but also the improvement in his material and moral standards, and the promotion of industrial peace by lessening discontent and friction. The main basis for the system, since it is economic and not philanthropic in its nature, must of course be the increase in production brought about by its adoption.

More weighty, however, appear the objections against profit-sharing, which seem to have had sufficient force to cause the failure of a number of ventures in this direction. In the first place, the 112 relation between the increased effort of a single workman and the success of a general business is so remote, especially in our complicated modern industry, that it is unlikely to act as a very powerful stimulus. But even if it should, the savings thus effected might be swept away by the poor business management of the employer. “It is quite possible that the workman who, in the hope of earning ‘bonus to labor,’ has done work 10 per cent in excess of the normal standard, may, even under a liberal scheme, find that, instead of receiving an addition to his normal wages of, say, 7 per cent, the bad management of his employer has reduced his bonus to so low a level that he has to be content with a supplement equivalent to only 2 per cent on his wages, or that, as has been the case in a large proportion of the schemes … no bonus whatever is forthcoming.”[34] It is undesirable to make the earnings of the laborer dependent in any way upon the fluctuations of business or the ability of the employer. The ordinary wage system has at least the merit that the reward of the laborer is made dependent only on his own efforts. The lot of the modern worker is too unstable and employment too unsteady to add a new element of uncertainty in wages. If the laborer has really earned the premium, say labor leaders, why not add it to his wages instead of adopting this roundabout method. The sliding scale, or a system of premiums or bonus payments for increased output, would be better than profit-sharing, and is rapidly spreading.

This leads to the second objection, which is that profit-sharing paralyzes the efforts of the laborers to better their own conditions through trade unions, strikes or other methods. The trade union attitude was vigorously stated by President Gompers of the American Federation of Labor in his testimony before the Industrial Commission[35]:

“There have been few, if any, of these concerns which have been even 113 comparatively fair to their employes…. They made the work harder, longer hours, and when the employes of other concerns in the same line of trade were enjoying increased wages, shorter hours of labor, and other improvements, tending to the material progress of the worker, the employes of the concern where so-called profit-sharing was the system at the end of the year found themselves receiving lower wages for harder work than were those who were not under that beneficent system.” As long as the system is viewed with suspicion by the laborer or used as a weapon in industrial bargaining by employers, the plan is foredoomed to failure. But even were it managed in the proper spirit, it is after all applicable to only a comparatively few industries, those, namely, in which labor makes up the largest part of the cost of production. In most modern industries capital plays such an important role as compared with labor that the field for this plan is comparatively limited.

In the actual practice of profit-sharing there have been many interesting experiments, and not a few failures. It may be said to date from 1842, when M. Leclaire, a Parisian painter and house decorator, introduced it into his business, and has since spread over France and England; it has met with little success in the rest of Europe. In the United States the movement has also been more recent and of smaller proportions. The reason for this is suggested by President Hadley as follows[36]: “Where the laborers under the old wage system are not working up to a high standard of efficiency, there is more chance for the success of profit-sharing. This seems to be the reason why it works better on the Continent than in England, and better in England than in America.” It was estimated in 1900 that there had been in the entire world some 500 experiments in profit-sharing, of which about 400 were still in existence: a more 114 conservative estimate would place the latter number at about 300.

More radical than profit-sharing, which involves only a change in the method of payment of wages, is co-operation, which involves a change of management as well. Its final goal, in the minds of its advocates, is the radical modification if not ultimate abolition of the present wage system. While profit-sharing is paternalistic and is directed to an increase of production, co-operation may be said to be democratic, and to aim at a more equitable distribution. Under this plan the laborers hope to divert to themselves the large amount of profits which they now see going into the possession of their employers. By eliminating the manager or enterpriser they hope to save his profits for themselves. Two different kinds of co-operation are usually distinguished--distributive or consumers’ co-operation, and producers’ co-operation--which we may profitably take up in turn.

Successful consumers’ co-operation may be said to have originated in Great Britain when twenty-eight Rochdale workingmen founded their famous society of Equitable Pioneers. The success and growth of this remarkable experiment, starting with a capital of £28, to a great system of 8,000 members with a capital of £200,000 in 1874, is a most romantic story. It was largely imitated and retail co-operative stores sprang up all over England. In 1864 the English Co-operative Wholesale Society was started, for the purpose of the joint purchase of supplies for the retail co-operative stores on better terms than these could secure singly from ordinary wholesalers. It effected large economies and was successful from the beginning; by 1901 it had a capital of £2,500,000 and acted as purchaser for over 1,000 retail societies. From buying, the society soon passed to making its own goods and now manufactures directly a long list of commodities. In 1868 the Scottish Wholesale Society was inaugurated upon practically the same plan. 115 Consumers’ co-operation has met with considerable success in Europe also. In the United States, however, experiments of this kind have in general had only a brief existence. It is impossible to say how many such societies exist today as no adequate statistics on the subject exist. Trade union stores in New England, the grange stores of the Patrons of Husbandry and later similar ones of the Sovereigns of Industry, and a few sporadic movements since in different parts of the country, show what has been attempted. The reasons for the lack of success in this country are not hard to find. Co-operation requires a willingness to take considerable trouble for small economies, which American workingmen, with their generally high wages, have not yet been willing to take. It also requires a considerable degree of homogeneity in thought and interests on the part of a people, which is naturally less present in the United States with its large admixture of foreign population than in England or the countries of Europe.

The methods of the Rochdale Society will serve as an illustration of the way in which the savings effected by co-operation are distributed among the members. Any one might become a member upon payment of one shilling and was then entitled to trade at the store. The prices charged were those current in the town, but purity of goods was assured; cash payments were an essential feature. At the end of the year the profits were divided among the members in proportion to the amount of their purchases. On the other hand, it may be noted that no attempt was made to, introduce profit-sharing with the employes, who are paid ordinary but good wages only. Other forms of consumers’ co-operation are those which undertake to supply insurance, or credit, like the co-operative insurance companies, banks, and building and loan associations. The latter especially have had considerable success in the United States and have helped many a laborer or man of small 116 means to the ownership of a home.

Producers’ co-operation differs from that just described in that it is a union on the part of laborers to do away with the employer and to secure for themselves the profits. The object of the first is to lower prices for the co-operators as consumers; the object of the second is rather to secure higher prices for themselves as producers by eliminating the profits of the industrial manager. They hope to perform his function by their collective effort, and to manage as well as labor; indeed, by diminishing friction and strikes they even hope to increase the profits. Examples of successful co-operation of this sort are not numerous, as it has great difficulties to contend with. Most of the experiments have failed, though recently it would seem that the movement is making substantial though slow progress, especially in France and England. Most of those in the latter country, however, seem to be of simple industries, as agriculture and dairy-farming. The most notable example of successful productive co-operation in the United States has been furnished by the coopers of Minneapolis, who organized a shop of their own in 1868 and have steadily increased their business since that time. Other instances often cited are the wood-workers in St. Louis and boot and shoe companies in Massachusetts. More recently there has been a considerable extension of co-operative creameries, cheese factories and similar businesses of a simple kind.

The advantages of co-operation are summed up as follows by President Walker.[37] From the laborer’s point of view: “First, to secure for the laboring class that large amount of wealth, which … goes annually in profits to the employer. Second, to secure for the laborer the opportunity to produce independently of the will of an employer…. In addition to these, the political economist beholds in cooperation three sources of advantage. First, co-operation would, 117 by the very terms of the case, do away with strikes…. Second, the workman would be incited to greater industry and to greater carefulness in dealing with materials and with machinery. Third, in no small degree frugality would be encouraged.” To these may be added other advantages, mostly realizable, however, in consumers’ co-operation. Saving in store-room, clerk hire, advertising, book-keeping, etc., is effected, while above all, the practice of cash payments saves all loss from bad debts. The initial success of the Rochdale pioneers was in large part due to the economy in this line, as a system of long credits burdened the retail trade of England at the time they began. In this country the large department stores have introduced this system and have thus been able to give their customers lower prices, and by so much have lessened the motive for consumers’ co-operation. The educative effects of successful co-operation upon the participators in developing habits of thrift, careful management and a knowledge of business principles, is one of the chief advantages of the system. The ultimate ideal of enthusiastic co-operators does not, however, stop short of a mere saving in price. The goal is stated as follows by the Right Relationship League of America, which has several co-operative stores in the Northwest: Consumers’ co-operation is merely the first step which “will lead next to co-operative production, next to public ownership of natural resources and finally to complete industrial and economic equality, social and political right relationship--the Kingdom of God on Earth.”

The defects of co-operation have already been suggested in the account of their failure. In the first place, the importance and need of intelligent and efficient management are usually underrated by workingmen. They are unwilling to pay high salaries and as a consequence lose the best men and secure inefficient service. Co-operation has therefore succeeded best in retail trade where the processes are comparatively simple, or in those branches of production 118 where industry counts for most and management for least. But even if it were possible to secure an efficient and progressive manager for a co-operative shop, it is found very difficult for a man chosen by the workmen to enforce discipline among them. A second disadvantage is the difficulty of securing capital. Where, as in many branches of large-scale manufacturing today, the average investment of capital amounts to more than $1,000 per employe, the impossibility of obtaining this by the contributions of the workers is obvious. Nor are capitalists usually willing to lend to such organizations, as the risks are too great. To meet this difficulty Ferdinand Lassalle, a German socialist, proposed that the state should advance the necessary capital to associations of workmen. But the experience so far with productive co-operation would seem to suggest that the social benefits would not equal the waste of public capital. There is danger also that if successful the co-operative associations would tend to become monopolies; they are profit-seeking societies and would probably not differ materially in their methods from ordinary joint stock enterprises.

It seems impossible, therefore, to expect from co-operation a final solution of the labor problem, such as John Stuart Mill, for instance, hoped for. Where successful, it has succeeded in distributing profits among a larger number of persons than would otherwise have received them. Its educative and moral effects, moreover, in the appeals which it makes to higher motives and to character, are of the highest value. But as an industrial system of enterprise it cannot supplant the present system as long as the manager of industry is needed. Today he performs a useful social service and profits are his pay therefor. If he is to be eliminated, society must first be raised to a higher plane of efficiency, intelligence, and morality. But just because it makes these high demands upon the members of the laboring class, attempts 119 at co-operation should receive all reasonable encouragement.