Chapter V

1853-1856.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH LORD CLARENDON—THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY AND
AFFAIRS IN CENTRAL AMERICA—THE CRIMEAN WAR AND THE NEW BRITISH
DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE PROPERTY OF NEUTRALS.

The reader has seen that when Mr. Buchanan left home to undertake the duties of United States minister in England, it was the understanding between the President and himself that he should have full power to deal with the Central American question in London, and that the fishery and reciprocity trade questions would be reserved to be dealt with by the Secretary of State.[15]

Footnote 15:

Full powers in regard to the Central American question were
afterwards transmitted to him at London.

But of course the President expected to be informed from time to time of the steps taken in the negotiation concerning the affairs of Central America, and Mr. Buchanan both expected and desired to receive specific instructions on this and all other topics in the relations of the two governments that might be discussed in the course of his mission. It was at a very interesting and critical period in the affairs of Europe that he arrived in England. Although the war between England and France, as allies of Turkey, on the one side, and Russia on the other, known as the Crimean war, was still in the distance, its probability was already discernible. How this great disturbance affected the pending questions between the United States and England, and introduced a new and unexpected difficulty in their relations, will appear as I proceed.

Mr. Buchanan, according to his invariable habit in all important transactions, kept the records of his mission with great care. Transcripts of the whole are now before me, in two large MS. volumes; and they form a monument of his industry, his powerful memory, and his ability as a diplomatist. The greater part of his negotiations with Lord Clarendon were carried on in oral discussions at official but informal interviews. Regular protocols of these discussions were not made, but they were fully and minutely reported by Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Marcy, as they occurred; and it is most remarkable with what completeness, after holding a long conversation, he could record an account of it. These conversations show, too, how wide was his range of vision in regard to the affairs of Europe, of Cuba, of Central America, and of all the topics which he had to discuss; how well versed he was in public law, and how thoroughly equipped he was for the position which he occupied. It is not strange that he should have left in the minds of the public men in England who had most to do with him, an impression that he was a statesman of no common order.[16] His first official interview with Lord Clarendon took place on the 22d of September, 1853. It had been, and continued to be, very difficult to get the attention of the English secretary to the questions pending between the United States and England, on account of the critical state of the Turkish question; and when Lord Clarendon did have a conference with Mr. Buchanan, he did not profess to be so well informed on the affairs of Central America as he felt that he ought to be, although Mr. Buchanan found him attentive, courteous and able. In the course of many interviews, occurring from time to time between the 22d of September, 1853, and the 16th of March, 1854, at which last date Lord Clarendon communicated to Mr. Buchanan the declaration which had been prepared for the queen’s signature, specifying the course which she intended to pursue towards neutral commerce during the war with Russia, then already declared,—topics that are now of great historical interest, and some of which have still a practical importance, were discussed with great frankness and urbanity. They related at first to the Central American questions, and the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the fisheries and reciprocity of trade, Cuba and its slavery, slavery in the United States, and the inter-state relations of Europe. As the war approached, and when it was finally declared, the principles of neutrality, privateering, and many other topics came within the range of the discussion; and it was very much in consequence of the views expressed by Mr. Buchanan to Lord Clarendon, and by the latter communicated to the British cabinet, that the course of England towards neutrals during that war became what it was. When Lord Clarendon, on the 16th of March, 1854, presented to Mr. Buchanan a _projet_ for a treaty between Great Britain, France and the United States, making it piracy for neutrals to serve on board of privateers cruising against the commerce of either of the three nations, when such nation was a belligerent, the very impressive reasons which Mr. Buchanan opposed to it caused it to be abandoned.[17]

Footnote 16:

I cannot find room in this volume for these very interesting and
graphic despatches. It is not improbable that the two volumes of
this biography will be followed by a supplemental volume, in which
they can be fully given. The Government of the United States has
never published more than a small part of them.

Footnote 17:

I find in Mr. Buchanan’s private memorandum book the account of
this matter in his handwriting, given in the text. It is much more
full than that contained in his despatches to Mr. Marcy.

Thursday, March 16, 1854.

Called at the Foreign Office by the invitation of Lord Clarendon.
He presented me a printed treaty in blank, which he proposed
should be executed by Great Britain, France and the United States.
The chief object of it was that all captains of privateers and
their crews should be considered and punished as pirates, who,
being subjects or citizens of one of the three nations who were
neutral, should cruise against either of the others when
belligerent. The object undoubtedly was to prevent Americans from
taking service in Russian privateers during the present war. We
had much conversation on the subject, which I do not mean to
repeat, this memorandum being merely intended to refresh my own
memory. His lordship had before him a list of the different
treaties between the United States and other nations on this
subject.

I was somewhat taken by surprise, though I stated my objections
pretty clearly to such a treaty. Not having done justice to the
subject in my own opinion, I requested and obtained an interview
for the next day, when I stated them more fully and clearly. The
heads were as follows:

1. It would be a violation of our neutrality in the war to agree
with France and England that American citizens who served on board
Russian privateers should be punished as pirates. To prevent this,
Russia should become a party to the treaty, which, under existing
circumstances, was impossible.

2. Our treaties only embraced a person of either nation who should
take commissions as privateers, and _did not extend to the crew_.
Sailors were a thoughtless race, and it would be cruel and unjust
to punish them as pirates for taking such service, when they often
might do it from want and necessity.

3. The British law claims all who are born as British subjects to
be British subjects forever. We naturalize them and protect them
as American citizens. If the treaty were concluded, and a British
cruiser should capture a Russian privateer with a naturalized
Irishman on board, what would be the consequence? The British law
could not punish him as an American citizen under the treaty,
because it would regard him as a British subject. It might hang
him for high treason; and such an event would produce a collision
between the two countries. The old and dangerous question would
then be presented in one of its worst aspects.

4. Whilst such a treaty might be justly executed by such nations
as Great Britain and the United States, would it be just, wise or
humane to agree that their sailors who took service on board a
privateer should be summarily tried and executed as pirates by
several powers which could be named?

5. _Cui bono_ should Great Britain make such a treaty with France
during the existing war. If no neutral power should enter into it
with them, it could have no effect during its continuance.

6. The time may possibly come when Great Britain, in a war with
the despotisms of Europe, might find it to be exceedingly to her
interest to employ American sailors on board her privateers, and
such a treaty would render this impossible. Why should she
unnecessarily bind her hands?

7. The objections of the United States to enter into entangling
alliances with European nations.

8. By the law of nations, as expounded both in British and
American courts, a commission to a privateer, regularly issued by
a belligerent nation, protects both the captain and the crew from
punishment as pirates. Would the different commercial nations of
the earth be willing to change this law as you propose, especially
in regard to the crew? Would it be proper to do so in regard to
the latter?

After I had stated these objections at some length on Friday, the
17th of March, Lord Clarendon observed that when some of them were
stated the day before, they had struck him with so much force
after reflection, that he had come to the office from the House of
Lords at night and written them down and sent them to Sir James
Graham. In his own opinion the treaty ought not to be concluded,
and if the cabinet came to this conclusion the affair should drop,
and I agreed I would not write to the Department on the subject.
If otherwise, and the treaty should be presented to the Government
of the United States, then I was to report our conversation.

In the conversation Lord Clarendon said they were more solicitous
to be on good terms with the United States than any other nation,
and that the project had not yet been communicated even to France.

(Vide 1 Kent’s Commentaries, 100. United States Statutes at large,
175, Act of March 3d, 1847, to provide for the punishment of
piracy in certain cases. Mr. Polk’s message to Congress of
December 8, 1846.)

General conversation about privateering.

The object of the treaty was to change the law of nations in this
respect, and Lord Clarendon said that if England, France and the
United States should enter into it, the others would soon follow.
The project contained a stipulation that the person who took a
commission as a privateer should give security that he would not
employ any persons as sailors on board who were not subjects or
citizens of the nation granting the commission.

March 22, 1854. At her majesty’s drawing-room this day, Lord
Clarendon told me that they had given up the project of the
treaty, etc., etc.

The whole object of the negotiation in reference to the affairs of Central America was to develop and ascertain the precise differences between the two governments in regard to the construction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. As the negotiation had become interrupted by the war with Russia, and as it was not probable that it could be brought to a definite issue while that war continued, Mr. Buchanan desired to return home. But Mr. Marcy earnestly desired him to remain, saying in answer to his request to be relieved: “The negotiation cannot be committed to any one who so well understands the subject in all its bearings as you do, or who can so ably sustain and carry out the views of the United States.” Mr. Buchanan therefore remained and pressed upon Lord Clarendon a further discussion of the subject, saying in a formal note:

“The President has directed the undersigned, before retiring from
his mission, to request from the British government a statement of
the positions which it has determined to maintain in regard to the
Bay Islands, the territory between the Sibun and Sarstoon, as well
as the Belize settlement and the Mosquito protectorate. The long
delay in asking for this information has proceeded from the
President’s reluctance to manifest any impatience on this
important subject whilst the attention of her Majesty’s government
was engaged by the war with Russia. But as more than a year has
already elapsed since the termination of the discussion on these
subjects, and as the first session of the new Congress is speedily
approaching, the President does not feel that he would be
justified in any longer delay.”

There had been submitted by Mr. Buchanan to Lord Clarendon on the 6th of January, 1854, a detailed statement of the views of the United States, which was not answered until the 2d of May following. On the 22d of July Mr. Buchanan made an elaborate reply, containing a historical review of all the matters in dispute. It reduced the whole controversy respecting the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to the following points:

What, then, is the fair construction of the article? It embraces
two objects. 1. It declares that neither of the parties shall ever
acquire any exclusive control over the ship canal to be
constructed between the Atlantic and the Pacific, by the route of
the river San Juan de Nicaragua, and that neither of them shall
ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same or
in the vicinity thereof. In regard to this stipulation, no
disagreement is known to exist between the parties. But the
article proceeds further in its mutually self-denying policy, and
in the second place, declares that neither of the parties ‘will
occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any
dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any
part of Central America.’

We now reach the true point. Does this language require that Great
Britain shall withdraw from her existing possessions in Central
America, including ‘the Mosquito coast?’ The language peculiarly
applicable to this coast will find a more appropriate place in a
subsequent portion of these remarks.

If any person enters into a solemn and explicit agreement that he
will not “occupy” any given tract of country then actually
occupied by him, can any proposition be clearer, than that he is
bound by his agreement to withdraw from such occupancy? Were this
not the case, these words would have no meaning, and the agreement
would become a mere nullity. Nay more, in its effect it would
amount to a confirmation of the party in the possession of that
very territory which he had bound himself not to occupy, and would
practically be equivalent to an agreement that he should remain in
possession—a contradiction in terms. It is difficult to comment on
language which appears so plain, or to offer arguments to prove
that the meaning of words is not directly opposite to their
well-known signification.

And yet the British government consider that the convention
interferes with none of their existing possessions in Central
America; that it is entirely prospective in its nature, and merely
prohibits them from making new acquisitions. If this be the case,
then it amounts to a recognition of their rights, on the part of
the American Government, to all the possessions which they already
hold, whilst the United States have bound themselves by the very
same instrument, never, under any circumstances, to acquire the
possession of a foot of territory in Central America. The
mutuality of the convention would thus be entirely destroyed; and
whilst Great Britain may continue to hold nearly the whole eastern
coast of Central America, the United States have abandoned the
right for all future time to acquire any territory, or to receive
into the American Union any of the states in that portion of their
own continent. This self-imposed prohibition was the great
objection to the treaty in the United States at the time of its
conclusion, and was powerfully urged by some of the best men in
the country. Had it then been imagined that whilst it prohibited
the United States from acquiring territory, under any possible
circumstances, in a portion of America through which their
thoroughfares to California and Oregon must pass, and that the
convention, at the same time, permitted Great Britain to remain in
the occupancy of all her existing possessions in that region,
there would not have been a single vote in the American Senate in
favor of its ratification. In every discussion it was taken for
granted that the convention required Great Britain to withdraw
from these possessions, and thus place the parties upon an exact
equality in Central America. Upon this construction of the
convention there was quite as great an unanimity of opinion as
existed in the House of Lords, that the convention with Spain of
1786 required Great Britain to withdraw from the Mosquito
protectorate.

As Lord Clarendon in his statement had characterized “the Monroe Doctrine” as merely the “dictum of its distinguished author,” Mr. Buchanan replied that “did the occasion require, he would cheerfully undertake the task of justifying the wisdom and policy of the Monroe doctrine, in reference to the nations of Europe as well as to those on the American continent;” and he closed as follows:

But no matter what may be the nature of the British claim to the
country between the Sibun and the Sarstoon, the observation
already made in reference to the Bay Islands and the Mosquito
coast must be reiterated, that the great question does not turn
upon the validity of this claim previous to the convention of
1850, but upon the facts that Great Britain has bound herself by
this convention not to occupy any part of Central America, nor to
exercise dominion over it; and that the territory in question is
within Central America, even under the most limited construction
of these words. In regard to Belize proper, confined within its
legitimate boundaries, under the treaties of 1783 and 1786, and
limited to the usufruct specified in these treaties, it is
necessary to say but a few words. The Government of the United
States will not, for the present, insist upon the withdrawal of
Great Britain from this settlement, provided all the other
questions between the two governments concerning Central America
can be amicably adjusted. It has been influenced to pursue this
course partly by the declaration of Mr. Clayton on the 4th of
July, 1850, but mainly in consequence of the extension of the
license granted by Mexico to Great Britain, under the treaty of
1826, which that republic has yet taken no steps to terminate.

It is, however, distinctly to be understood that the Government of
the United States acknowledge no claim of Great Britain within
Belize, except the temporary ‘liberty of making use of the wood of
the different kinds, the fruits and other products in their
natural state,’ fully recognizing that the former ‘Spanish
sovereignty over the country’ now belongs either to Guatemala or
Mexico.

In conclusion, the Government of the United States most cordially
and earnestly unite in the desire expressed by ‘her majesty’s
government, not only to maintain the convention of 1850 intact,
but to consolidate and strengthen it by strengthening and
consolidating the friendly relations which it was calculated to
cement and perpetuate.’ Under these mutual feelings, it is deeply
to be regretted that the two governments entertain opinions so
widely different in regard to its true effect and meaning.

In this attitude the controversy was necessarily left by Mr. Buchanan, when his mission finally terminated; and its further history, so far as he is concerned in it, belongs to the period when he had become President of the United States.