Chapter XVIII: 1860—December (2)

It was, then, on the President’s first draft of an answer to the South Carolina commissioners, after the secession ordinance had been passed, and upon nothing that had previously occurred, that the cabinet crisis arose. On the evening of December 29th, the President’s proposed draft of an answer to the commissioners was read to the cabinet. It was not much discussed, for it was not the habit of the ministers to criticise state papers which the President had himself prepared. But on the following day, Judge Black informed Mr. Toucey, the Secretary of the Navy, of his purpose to resign, if this paper, as written by the President, should be delivered to the commissioners. The President sent for Judge Black, and handed him the paper, with a request that he modify it to suit himself, and return it immediately. Judge Black then prepared his memorandum for the President’s consideration, in which Mr. Holt and Mr. Stanton concurred. The answer, which was to be sent to the commissioners, was modified accordingly, and when sent it read as follows:[90]

Footnote 90:

Mr. Jefferson Davis has erroneously given to this letter the date
of December 30th. Its true date was December 31st. (See Mr.
Davis’s Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, vol. I., p.
592.)

[ANSWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSIONERS.]

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1860.

GENTLEMEN:—

I have had the honor to receive your communication of 26th inst.,
together with a copy of your “full powers from the Convention of
the people of South Carolina,” authorizing you to treat with the
Government of the United States on various important subjects
therein mentioned, and also a copy of the ordinance bearing date
on the 20th inst., declaring that “the union now subsisting
between South Carolina and other States, under the name of 'the
United States of America,' is hereby dissolved.”

In answer to this communication, I have to say that my position as
President of the United States was clearly defined in the message
to Congress of the 3d instant. In that I stated that, “apart from
the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the
Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations
between the Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been
invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change
the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to
acknowledge the independence of that State. This would be to
invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the
dissolution of the confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign
States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign
_de facto_ government—involving no such responsibility. Any
attempt to do this would, on his part, be a naked act of
usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress the
whole question, in all its bearings.”

Such is my opinion still. I could, therefore, meet you only as
private gentlemen of the highest character, and was entirely
willing to communicate to Congress any proposition you might have
to make to that body upon the subject. Of this you were well
aware. It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be
made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possesses the
power, as to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the
parties in regard to the possession of the Federal forts in the
harbor of Charleston, and I, therefore, deeply regret that, in
your opinion, “the events of the last twenty-four hours render
this impossible.” In conclusion, you urge upon me “the immediate
withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston,” stating
that, “under present circumstances, they are a standing menace,
which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our present
experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue
questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.”

The reason for this change in your position is that, since your
arrival in Washington, “an officer of the United States acting as
we (you) are assured, not only without your (my) orders, has
dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering, to a most
important extent, the condition of affairs under which we (you)
came.” You also allege that you came here “the representatives of
an authority which could at any time within the past sixty days
have taken possession of the forts in Charleston harbor, but which
upon pledges given in a manner that we (you) cannot doubt,
determined to trust to your (my) honor rather than to its own
power.”

This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those alleged
pledges, and in what manner they have been observed. In my message
of the 3d of December last, I stated, in regard to the property of
the United States in South Carolina, that it “has been purchased
for a fair equivalent 'by the consent of the legislature of the
State, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,' etc., and
over these the authority 'to exercise exclusive legislation' has
been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not
believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States
from this property by force; but, if in this I should prove to be
mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders
to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency, the
responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the
heads of the assailants.” This being the condition of the parties
on Saturday, 8th December, four of the representatives from South
Carolina, called upon me and requested an interview. We had an
earnest conversation on the subject of these forts, and the best
means of preventing a collision between the parties, for the
purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for
prudential reasons, that it would be best to put in writing what
they said to me verbally. They did so accordingly, and on Monday
morning the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper
signed by all the representatives from South Carolina, with a
single exception, of which the following is a copy:

“TO HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES BUCHANAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

“In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express
to you our strong convictions that neither the constituted
authorities, nor any body of the people of the State of South
Carolina, will either attack or molest the United States forts in
the harbor of Charleston, previously to the action of the
convention, and, we hope and believe, not until an offer has been
made, through an accredited representative, to negotiate for an
amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and the
Federal Government, provided that no reinforcements shall be sent
into those forts, and their relative military _status_ shall
remain as at present.

”JOHN MCQUEEN,
“WILLIAM PORCHER MILES,
”M. L. BONHAM,
“W. W. BOYCE,
”LAWRENCE M. KEITT.

“WASHINGTON, December 9, 1860.”

And here I must, in justice to myself, remark that, at the time
the paper was presented to me, I objected to the word “provided,”
as it might be construed into an agreement on my part, which I
never would make. They said that nothing was further from their
intention; they did not so understand it, and I should not so
consider it. It is evident they could enter into no reciprocal
agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have
authority to do this, and were acting in their individual
character. I considered it as nothing more, in effect, than the
promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for
the purpose expressed. The event has proved that they have
faithfully kept this promise, although I have never since received
a line from any one of them, or from any member of the convention
on the subject. It is well known that it was my determination, and
this I freely expressed, not to reinforce the forts in the harbor
and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually
attacked, or until I had certain evidence that they were about to
be attacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered
it as a happy omen that peace might still be preserved, and that
time might thus be gained for reflection. This is the whole
foundation for the alleged pledge.

But I acted in the same manner I would have done had I entered
into a positive and formal agreement with parties capable of
contracting, although such an agreement would have been, on my
part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible.

The world knows that I have never sent any reinforcements to the
forts in Charleston harbor, and I have certainly never authorized
any change to be made “in their relative military _status_.”

Bearing upon this subject, I refer you to an order issued by the
Secretary of War, on the 11th instant, to Major Anderson, but not
brought to my notice until the 21st instant. It is as follows:

“Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson, First
Artillery, commanding Fort Moultrie, South Carolina:

“You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a
collision of the troops with the people of this State shall be
avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with
reference to the military force and forts in this harbor, which
shall guard against such a collision. He has, therefore, carefully
abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any
measures which might add to the present excited state of the
public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he
feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain
possession of the public works, or to interfere with their
occupancy. But, as the counsel of rash and impulsive persons may
possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems
it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so
unhappy a contingency. He has, therefore, directed me, verbally,
to give you such instructions.

“You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend
to provoke aggression; and, for that reason, you are not, without
evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which
could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude; but
you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor and, if
attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The
smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy
more than one of the three forts; but an attack on, or an attempt
to take possession of, either of them will be regarded as an act
of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of
them which you deem most proper to increase its power of
resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive
steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed
to a hostile act.

”D. P. BUTLER, Assistant Adjutant General.

“FORT MOULTRIE, SOUTH CAROLINA, December 11, 1860.

“This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell.

“JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War.”

These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson
before his removal to Fort Sumter, with a single exception in
regard to a particular which does not, in any degree, affect the
present question. Under these circumstances it is clear that Major
Anderson acted upon his own responsibility, and without authority,
unless, indeed, he had “tangible evidence of a design to proceed
to a hostile act” on the part of the authorities of South
Carolina, which has not yet been alleged. Still he is a brave and
honorable officer, and justice requires that he should not be
condemned without a fair hearing.

Be this as it may, when I learned that Major Anderson had left
Fort Moultrie, and proceeded to Fort Sumter, my first promptings
were to command him to return to his former position, and there to
await the contingencies presented in his instructions. This could
only have been done, with any degree of safety to the command, by
the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. But before any
steps could possibly have been taken in this direction, we
received information, dated on the 28th instant, that “the
Palmetto flag floated out to the breeze at Castle Pinckney, and a
large military force went over last night (the 27th) to Fort
Moultrie.” Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting
or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you
have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without,
but against my orders, on the very next day after the night when
the removal was made, seized by a military force two of the three
Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and have covered them
under their own flag, instead of that of the United States. At
this gloomy period of our history, startling events succeed each
other rapidly. On the very day (the 27th instant) that possession
of these two forts was taken, the Palmetto flag was raised over
the Federal custom house and post office in Charleston; and on the
same day every officer of the customs—collector, naval officer,
surveyor, and appraisers—resigned their offices. And this,
although it was well known, from the language of my message, that
as an executive officer I felt myself bound to collect the revenue
at the port of Charleston under the existing laws. In the harbor
of Charleston we now find three forts confronting each other, over
all of which the Federal flag floated only four days ago; but now,
over two of them this flag has been supplanted, and the Palmetto
flag has been substituted in its stead. It is under all these
circumstances that I am urged immediately to withdraw the troops
from the harbor of Charleston, and am informed that, without this,
negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do.
Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible
contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any
communication between myself and any human being. But the
inference is, that I am bound to withdraw the troops from the only
fort remaining in the possession of the United States in the
harbor of Charleston, because the officer then in command of all
the forts thought proper, without instructions, to change his
position from one of them to another. I cannot admit the justice
of any such inference.

At this point of writing I have received information, by telegram,
from Captain Humphreys, in command of the arsenal at Charleston,
that “it has to-day (Sunday the 30th) been taken by force of
arms.” It is estimated that the munitions of war belonging to the
United States in this arsenal are worth half a million of dollars.

Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add
that, while it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter, as a portion of
the public property of the United States, against hostile attacks
from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I may
possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defence can
be construed into a menace against the city of Charleston.

With great personal regard, I remain, yours very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

In all that related to this cabinet crisis of December 29th, I can see nothing but the prompt action of a wise statesman and a patriotic President, in preventing a disruption of his cabinet upon a draft of a State paper, in which expressions had been used that might have given rise to inferences which the President never intended should be drawn. Among all Mr. Buchanan’s claims to stand in history as a great man, be the criticisms made by the three members of his cabinet on his proposed answer to the South Carolina commissioners more or less important, there is no one act which better entitles him to that rank, than the sacrifice which he made on this occasion of all pride of opinion in respect to the best mode of doing what he and his advisers alike meant to do, in order that the country might not, at this critical juncture, be deprived of the services of men whose services were important to her, and in order that the Government of the Union might not be placed in a false position. He had formed no new policy on the subject of secession, or any new views of his public duty. He never had but one policy, from the beginning of the secession movement to the 4th of March, 1861. Of that policy no concession of the right of secession, or of any claim founded on it, ever formed a part.[91]

Footnote 91:

In the _North American Review_, during the year 1879, certain
papers were published under the title of “Diary of a Public Man,”
without disclosure of the authorship. These papers purported to be
passages from a diary kept by a person in some public, or _quasi_
public, position in Washington, during the autumn and winter of
1860-61. Inquiry by the author of this work has failed to elicit
any information of the name of the writer, the editor of the
_Review_ declining to disclose it. The statements made in these
papers are therefore anonymous, and readers will judge how far
they should be regarded as reliable materials of history. There
is, however, one of these statements, which it is my duty to
notice, because the unknown writer professes to make it on the
authority of Senator Douglas. It purports to have been committed
to writing on the 28th of February, 1861, and is as follows:
“Before going, Senator Douglas had a word to say about President
Buchanan and the South Carolina commissioners. He tells me that it
has now been ascertained that the President nominated his
Pennsylvania collector at Charleston on the very day, almost at
the very moment, when he was assuring Colonel Orr, through one of
his retainers, that he was disposed to accede to the demands of
South Carolina, if they were courteously and with proper respect
presented to him. They rewrote their letter accordingly, submitted
it to the President’s agents, who approved it and sent it to the
White House. This, Senator Douglas says, was on January 3d, in the
morning. The commissioners spent the afternoon in various places,
and dined out early. On coming in, they found their letter to the
President awaiting them. It had been returned to them by a
messenger from the White House, about three o'clock P. M., and on
the back was an indorsement, not signed by any one, and in a
clerkly handwriting, to the effect that the President declined to
receive the communication. They ordered their trunks packed at
once, and left for home by way of Richmond, on the four o'clock
morning train, feeling, not unreasonably, that they had been both
duped and insulted.”—(_North American Review_, vol. cxxix, p.
269.)

There are a very few grains of truth in this story, mixed with a
great deal of untruth. Mr. Douglas may have found it floating
about Washington, and may have repeated it to the diarist who
remains shrouded in mystery. The nomination of a collector for the
port of Charleston was made to the Senate on the same day on which
the President returned the letter of the commissioners. This was
on the 2d of January, not the 3d. But it cannot be true that the
President, through any channel, assured Colonel Orr that he was
disposed to accede to the demands of South Carolina, if
courteously and with proper respect presented to him; or that they
had written one letter which was in improper terms, and then wrote
another in proper terms, and sent it, after it had been submitted
to “the President’s agents,” and been by them received. The actual
occurrence was as follows: The sole personal interview which the
President had with the commissioners was on the 28th of December.
On the 29th they presented to him in writing their demand for the
withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston as a
preliminary step to any negotiation. On the 31st the President’s
answer, settled in a meeting of the cabinet, was transmitted to
them. It was a positive and distinct refusal to withdraw the
troops. The reply of the commissioners, dated on the 2d of
January, reached the White House at about three o'clock on that
day, while the cabinet was in session. “It was,” says Mr.
Buchanan, “so violent, unfounded, and disrespectful, and so
regardless of what is due to any individual whom the people have
honored with the office of President, that the reading of it in
the cabinet excited much indignation among all the members.”
(Buchanan’s Defence, p. 183.) The President thereupon wrote upon a
slip of paper, which is now before me, the following words: “This
paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character
that he declines to receive it.” This slip he handed immediately
to his private secretary, to be indorsed on the commissioners'
letter. Of what then happened, I find the following memorandum in
the handwriting of the secretary:

JANUARY 2, 1861.

The paper which, I am told, came in this envelope, was handed to
me by the President at about 3:30 o'clock, with instructions to
enclose it in an envelope and direct it to Hon. R. W. Barnwell,
James H. Adams and James S. Orr, and to deliver it to them or
either of them. I directed it accordingly, and proceeded to the
lodgings of the gentlemen addressed in Franklyn Row. I was
informed at the door by a servant that neither of the gentlemen
were in. Having met Mr. Trescot at the door, I inquired whether
he would receive the paper. He declined to do so, on the ground
that he had no official connection with the gentlemen to whom it
was addressed. At my request he then proceeded with me to the
room which these gentlemen occupied for business purposes, and,
also at my request, witnessed the deposit of the paper upon a
table in that room; the same room in which I found two of the
gentlemen—Messrs. Barnwell and Adams—on a previous occasion
(Monday last), when I delivered to the first-named gentleman a
letter similarly addressed from the President. While I was in
the room Hon. Jefferson Davis and Senator Wigfall came in, the
first of whom certainly, and the latter probably, did see the
paper deposited, as stated. This memorandum made within an hour
after the delivery or deposit of the paper. 68

A. J. GLOSSBRENNER,
Private Secretary to the President.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE.

The next thing that happened was, that after the reading in the Senate of the President’s special message of January 8th, Mr. Jefferson Davis produced and had read in the Senate, a copy of the commissioners' insulting letter. “Such,” says Mr. Buchanan, “was the temper of that body at the time, that it was received and read, and entered upon their journal...... It is worth notice, that whilst this letter of the commissioners was published at length in the _Congressional Globe_, among the proceedings of the Senate, their previous letter to the President of the 28th of December, and his answer thereto of the 31st, were never published in this so-called official register, although copies of both had accompanied his special message. By this means, the offensive letter was scattered broadcast over the country, whilst the letter of the President, to which this professed to be an answer, was buried in one of the numerous and long after published volumes of executive documents.”[92] The story related to the unknown diarist, as he says, by Senator Douglas, implies that the commissioners, at some time between the 31st of December and the 2d of January, wrote an uncourteous and improper reply to the President’s letter of December 31st, and then substituted for it a courteous and proper one, which they submitted to “the President’s agents,” who approved of it and sent it to the White House! That the President, through any agent, had signified to the commissioners that he was disposed to accede to their demands, if presented in courteous and proper terms, is an assertion that is contradicted by the whole tenor of his letter of December 31st, and by his uniform and steady refusal to entertain the proposition of an executive surrender of the forts to South Carolina. Down to the moment when the commissioners received the President’s letter of December 31st, he had no occasion to make with them any condition relating to the _manner_ of their reply; and to suppose that at any time he meant to allow his compliance with their demands to turn upon the language in which they presented them, is simply absurd. What he may have signified to them was, that he would refer their demands to Congress; not that he would entertain and act upon them himself. This we know that he did, at the personal interview on the 28th of December; and he did it in order “to bring the whole subject before the representatives of the people in such a manner as to cause them to express an authoritative opinion on secession and the other dangerous questions then before the country, and adopt such measures for their peaceable adjustment as might possibly reclaim even South Carolina herself; but whether or not, might prevent the other cotton States from following her evil and rash example.”[93] The President did not expect that Congress would authorize him to surrender the forts; but he did believe that it would be beneficial to have Congress declare that the whole doctrine of secession was one that could not be accepted by any department of the Federal Government, as he had declared that it could not be accepted by the Executive. The South Carolina commissioners, in their letter of December 28th, claimed that the State has “resumed the powers she delegated to the Government of the United States, and has declared her perfect sovereignty and independence;” that unless Major Anderson’s removal to Fort Sumter was explained in a satisfactory manner, they must suspend all discussion of the arrangements by which the mutual interests of this independent State and the United States could be adjusted; and then, as a preliminary to any negotiation, they urged the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston, with a distinct intimation of a “bloody issue” if this should be refused. The President was thus brought to the alternatives of an Executive admission of the independence of South Carolina, by reason of her secession, and a withdrawal of the troops as a consequence, or a bloody issue of questions that ought to be settled amicably. The President’s answer of the 31st of December, being a rejection of what was demanded of him, although entirely courteous, so irritated the commissioners that they wrote the reply which he returned to them.[94] The truth is, that this reply contained so many offensive and unfounded imputations of past bad faith on the part of the President, that it was impossible for him to receive it. The grossest of these imputations I have already dealt with.

Footnote 92:

Buchanan’s Defence, p. 184.

Footnote 93:

Buchanan’s Defence, p. 184.

Footnote 94:

A copy of this intended reply may be found in Mr. Jefferson
Davis’s work, vol. i., Appendix G.

The diarist of the _North American Review_ has related another story, on the authority of a person whose name, as well as his own, he conceals, which imputes to Major Anderson a motive of a most extraordinary character, for taking possession of Fort Sumter. We thus have the anonymous fortified by the anonymous—_ignotum per ignotum_—as the historical basis of belief. The statement is that the diarist’s informant, who had just come from Montgomery and had passed through Charleston, where he conversed with Major Anderson, told the diarist, on the 6th of March (1861), in Washington, that Anderson intended to be governed in his future course by the course of his own State of Kentucky; that if Kentucky should secede, Anderson would unhesitatingly obey the orders of a Confederate secretary of war; that he meant to retain the control of the position primarily in the interests of his own State of Kentucky; and that for this reason he removed from Fort Moultrie where he was liable to be controlled by the authorities of South Carolina.[95] The diarist took his informant to President Lincoln, who heard the tale repeated, but parried it by one or two of his characteristic jests, and the diarist was disappointed in not being able to divine how Mr. Lincoln was affected by the narrative. It will require something more than this kind of unsupported and unauthenticated nonsense to destroy Major Anderson’s reputation as a loyal officer of the United States. What he might have done with his commission, in case Kentucky had joined the Southern Confederacy, is one thing. What he would have done with Fort Sumter is a very different matter. His answer to a letter of General Dix does not accord with the account of his intentions given by the unknown informant of the unknown diarist.[96]

Footnote 95:

_A North American Review_, vol. cxxix, pp. 484-485.

Footnote 96:

See the correspondence between General Dix and Major Anderson,
_post_.