Chapter XXII: 1861—January, February, and March (1)

THE “PEACE CONVENTION”—FORT SUMTER—THE STAR OF THE WEST FIRED UPON
IN CHARLESTON HARBOR—ANDERSON’S TEMPORARY TRUCE—THE HARBOR OF
PENSACOLA AND FORT PICKENS—THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
EX-PRESIDENT TYLER AND PRESIDENT BUCHANAN.

The vote of the Senate on the 16th of January, by which Mr. Crittenden’s resolution was defeated by the tactics of the Republicans, aided by six of the Southern Senators, made it apparent that some extraordinary interposition could alone save the Union. For such interposition there was still time, if it could be promptly exerted, and Congress could be induced to listen to it. It came from the State of Virginia, and as Mr. Buchanan has given a succinct and accurate account of this movement, which resulted in the assembling at Washington of the body called “The Peace Convention,” I transcribe it into these pages:

These great and powerful commonwealths [the border States] still
remained faithful to the Union. They had hitherto stood aloof from
secession, and had manifested an earnest desire not only to remain
in the Union themselves, but to exert their powerful influence to
bring back the seceding sisters. Virginia had ever ranked as chief
among the Southern States, and had exercised great influence over
their counsels. She had now taken the lead in the grand design to
save the Union, and it became the duty of the President to render
her all the aid in his power in a cause so holy. Every reflecting
man foresaw that if the present movement of Virginia should fail
to impress upon Congress and the country the necessity for
adopting a peaceful compromise, like that proposed by Mr.
Crittenden, there was imminent danger that all the border slave
States would follow the cotton States, which had already adopted
ordinances of secession, and unite with them in an attempt to
break up the Union. Indeed, as has been already seen, the Virginia
legislature had declared that, in case of failure, such a
dissolution was “inevitable.”

The Peace Convention met on the 4th February.[109] It was
composed of one hundred and thirty-three commissioners,
representing twenty-one States. A bare inspection of the list
will convince all inquirers of the great respectability and just
influence of its members. Among them there were many venerable
and distinguished citizens from the border States, earnestly
intent upon restoring and saving the Union. Their great object
was to prevail upon their associates from the North to unite
with them in such recommendations to Congress as would prevent
their own States from seceding, and enable them to bring back
the cotton States which had already seceded. It will be
recollected that on the 4th February, when the Peace Convention
assembled, six of the cotton States, South Carolina, Alabama,
Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, and Florida, had already
adopted ordinances of secession; and that but four days
thereafter (8th February) deputies from these States had adopted
and published at Montgomery, Alabama, a Provisional Constitution
for the so-called Confederate States. The Union was then
crumbling to pieces. One month only of the session of Congress
remained. Within this brief period it was necessary that the
Convention should recommend amendments to the Constitution in
sufficient time to enable both Houses to act upon them before
their final adjournment. It was also essential to success that
these amendments should be sustained by a decided majority of
the commissioners both from the Northern and the border States.
It was, however, soon discovered that the same malign influence
which had caused every Republican member of Congress to oppose
the Crittenden Compromise, would probably defeat the patriotic
purpose for which the Convention had assembled.

Footnote 109:

_Cong. Globe_, 1860-61, p. 125.

On Wednesday, the 6th February, a resolution was adopted,[110] on
motion of Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky, to refer the resolutions of
the General Assembly of Virginia, and all other kindred subjects,
to a committee to consist of one commissioner from each State, to
be selected by the respective State delegations; and to prevent
delay they were instructed to report on or before the Friday
following (the 8th), “what they may deem right, necessary, and
proper to restore harmony and preserve the Union.”

Footnote 110:

Official Journal of the Convention, pp. 9 and 10.

This committee, instead of reporting on the day appointed, did not
report until Friday, the 15th February,[111] and thus a precious
week was lost......

Footnote 111:

Ibid., p. 42.

The amendments reported by a majority of the committee, through
Mr. Guthrie, their chairman, were substantially the same with the
Crittenden Compromise; but on motion of Mr. Johnson, of Maryland,
the general terms of the first and by far the most important
section were restricted to the _present_ Territories of the United
States.[112] On motion of Mr. Franklin, of Pennsylvania, this
section was further amended, but not materially changed, by the
adoption of the substitute offered by him. Nearly in this form it
was afterwards adopted by the Convention.[113] The following is a
copy: “In all the present Territory of the United States north of
the parallel of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes of north
latitude, involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, is
prohibited. In all the present Territory south of that line, the
status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now
exists, shall not be changed; nor shall any law be passed by
Congress or the Territorial legislature to hinder or prevent the
taking of such persons from any of the States of this Union to
said Territory, nor to impair the rights arising from said
relation; but the same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in
the Federal courts, according to the course of the common law.
When any Territory north or south of said line, within such
boundary as Congress may prescribe, shall contain a population
equal to that required for a member of Congress, it shall, if its
form of government be republican, be admitted into the Union on an
equal footing with the original States, with or without
involuntary servitude, as the Constitution of such State may
provide.”

Footnote 112:

Ibid., p. 21.

Footnote 113:

Ibid., p. 70.

Mr. Baldwin, of Connecticut, and Mr. Seddon, of Virginia, on
opposite extremes, made minority reports, which they proposed
to substitute for that of the majority. Mr. Baldwin’s report
was a recommendation “to the several States to unite with
Kentucky in her application to Congress to call a convention
for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, to be submitted to the legislatures of the several
States, or to conventions therein, for ratification, as the
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by
Congress, in accordance with the provisions in the fifth
article of the Constitution.”[114]

Footnote 114:

Official Journal, pp. 24 and 25.

Of the two modes prescribed by the Constitution for its own
amendment, this was the least eligible at the existing crisis,
because by far the most dilatory. Instead of calling upon
Congress, then in session and which could act immediately, to
propose specific amendments to the legislatures of the several
States, it adopted the circuitous mode of requesting these
legislatures, in the first instance, to apply to Congress to call
a convention. Even should two-thirds of them respond in the
affirmative to this request, the process would necessarily
occasion a delay of years in attaining the object, when days were
all-important. This would entirely defeat the patriotic purpose of
the Peace Convention. It was called to obtain, if possible, a
direct vote of two-thirds of both Houses before the end of the
session in favor of such amendments as it might recommend. Could
such a vote be obtained, it was confidently expected by the
friends of the Union that its moral influence would, for the
present, satisfy the border States; would arrest the tide
beginning to rise among their people in favor of secession, and
might enable them to exercise an effective influence in reclaiming
the States which had already seceded. Affairs were then so urgent
that long before the State legislatures could possibly ask
Congress to call a convention as required by Mr. Baldwin’s
proposition, the cause of the Union might be hopeless. It was,
therefore, rejected.

This proposition of Mr. Baldwin, evasive and dilatory as it was,
nevertheless received the votes of eight of the twenty-one
States.[115] These consisted of the whole of the New England
States, except Rhode Island, and of Illinois, Iowa and New York,
all being free States. This was an evil omen.

Footnote 115:

Ibid., p. 63.

The first amendment reported by Mr. Seddon differed from that of
the majority, inasmuch as it embraced not only the present but all
future Territories.[116] This was rejected.[117] His second
amendment, which, however, was never voted upon by the Convention,
went so far as distinctly to recognize the right of secession.

Footnote 116:

Official Journal, pp. 26, 27 and 28.

Footnote 117:

Ibid., p. 28.

It cannot be denied that there was in the convention an extreme
Southern rights element, headed by Mr. Seddon. This manifested
itself throughout its proceedings. These show how naturally
extremes meet. On more than one important occasion, we find the
vote of Virginia and North Carolina, though given in each case by
a bare majority of their commissioners, side by side with the vote
of Massachusetts and Vermont. It would be too tedious to trace the
proceedings of the Convention from the report of the committee
made by Mr. Guthrie until its final adjournment. It is sufficient
to say that more than ten days were consumed in discussion and in
voting upon various propositions offered by individual
commissioners. The final vote was not reached until Tuesday, the
26th February, when it was taken on the first and vitally
important section, as amended.[118]

Footnote 118:

Ibid., p. 70.

This section, on which all the rest depended, was negatived by a
vote of eight States to eleven. Those which voted in its favor
were Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and Tennessee. And those in the negative were
Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
York, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Vermont and Virginia. It is
but justice to say that Messrs. Ruffin and Morehead, of North
Carolina, and Messrs. Rives and Summers, of Virginia, two of the
five commissioners from each of these States, declared their
dissent from the vote of their respective States. So, also, did
Messrs. Bronson, Corning, Dodge, Wool and Granger, five of the
eleven New York commissioners, dissent from the vote of their
State. On the other hand, Messrs. Meredith and Wilmot, two of the
seven commissioners from Pennsylvania, dissented from the majority
in voting in favor of the section. Thus would the Convention have
terminated but for the interposition of Illinois. Immediately
after the section had been negatived, the commissioners from that
State made a motion to reconsider the vote, and this prevailed.
The Convention afterwards adjourned until the next morning. When
they reassembled (February 27), the first section was adopted, but
only by a majority of nine to eight States, nine being less than a
majority of the States represented. This change was effected by a
change of the vote of Illinois from the negative to the
affirmative, by Missouri withholding her vote, and by a tie in the
New York commissioners, on account of the absence of one of their
number, rendering it impossible for the State to vote. Still,
Virginia and North Carolina, in the one extreme, and Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont, in the other,
persisted in voting in the negative. From the nature of this vote,
it was manifestly impossible that two-thirds of both Houses of
Congress should act favorably on the amendment, even if the delay
had not already rendered such action impracticable before the
close of the session.

It would be useless to refer to the voting on the remaining
sections of the amendment, which were carried by small
majorities.[119] The Convention, on the same day, through Mr.
Tyler, their president, communicated to the Senate and House of
Representatives the amendment they had adopted, embracing all the
sections, with a request that it might be submitted by Congress,
under the Constitution, to the several State legislatures. In the
Senate this was immediately referred to a select committee, on
motion of Mr. Crittenden. The committee, on the next day (28th
Feb.),[120] reported a joint resolution (No. 70) proposing it as
an amendment to the Constitution, but he was never able to bring
the Senate to a direct vote upon it.[121] Failing in this, he made
a motion to substitute the amendment of the Peace Convention for
his own.[122] This he prefaced by declaring that he looked upon
the result of the deliberations of that body “as affording the
best opportunity for a general concurrence among the States, and
among the people.” He, therefore, “had determined to take it in
preference to his own proposition, and had so stated to many of
the members of the Convention.” He further said that he had
“examined the propositions offered by that Convention; they
contain, in my judgment, every material provision that is
contained in the resolution called the Crittenden Resolution.” He
also had adopted this course “out of deference to that great body
of men selected on the resolution of Virginia, and invited by
Virginia herself. The body having met, and being composed of such
men, and a majority of that Convention concurring in these
resolutions, I think they come to us with a sanction entitling
them to consideration.” Mr. Crittenden’s reasons failed to
convince the Senate, and his motion was rejected by a large
majority (28 to 7).[123] Then next in succession came the
memorable vote on Mr. Crittenden’s own resolution, and it was in
its turn defeated, as we have already stated, by a majority of 20
against 19.

Footnote 119:

Senate Journal, pp. 332, 333.

Footnote 120:

Ibid., p. 437.

Footnote 121:

Ibid., p. 384.

Footnote 122:

_Cong. Globe_, 1860-’61, p. 1404.

Footnote 123:

Senate Journal, p. 386.

We cannot take leave of this venerable patriot, who so wisely
appreciated the existing danger, without paying a just tribute to
the vigor and perseverance of his repeated efforts to ward off
from his country the direful calamity of disunion and civil war.
Well did he merit the almost unanimous vote of the Virginia
Convention, on the 11th March, tendering him the thanks of the
people of Virginia for “his recent able, zealous, and patriotic
efforts in the Senate in the United States, to bring about a just
and honorable adjustment of our national difficulties.”[124] This
vote, we may remark, was far from being complimentary to the
conduct of a majority of their own commissioners (Messrs. Tyler,
Brockenbrough, and Seddon) in the Peace Convention.

Footnote 124:

_National Intelligencer_, March 14, 1861.

In the House of Representatives, the amendment proposed by the
Convention was treated with still less respect than it had been by
the Senate.[125] The Speaker was refused leave even to present
it.[126] Every effort made for this purpose was successfully
resisted by leading Republican members. The consequence is that a
copy of it does not even appear in the Journal.

Footnote 125:

_Cong. Globe_, pp. 1331, 1332, 1333.

Footnote 126:

House Journal, pp. 446, 448, 449.

Although the amendment was somewhat less favorable to the South,
and ought, therefore, to have been more acceptable to the North
than the Crittenden amendment, yet, like this, it encountered the
opposition of every Republican member in both Houses of Congress.
Nevertheless, it presented a basis of compromise which, had it
been conceded by the North, might and probably would, have been
accepted by the people of the border States, in preference to the
fearful alternative of their secession from the Union.

However urgent were the reasons for the adoption by Congress of the Crittenden Compromise, or the propositions submitted to it by the Peace Convention, the question now recurs whether the President in the meantime did his duty and his whole duty, in keeping a vigilant eye upon the proceedings in South Carolina and other Southern States. To answer this question, it is necessary to go back to the point of time at which the first commissioners from South Carolina left Washington without having obtained from the President a promise to withdraw Major Anderson’s force from the harbor of Charleston, or any stipulation not to send him reinforcements. This point of time is the 2d day of January, 1861, the day on which the commissioners dated their reply to the President’s letter of December 31st; a reply couched in terms so disrespectful and arrogant that by the unanimous advice of the cabinet it was returned to them as a paper unfit to be received. “From that time forward,” says Mr. Buchanan, “all friendly political and personal intercourse finally ceased between the revolutionary Senators and the President, and he was severely attacked by them in the Senate, and especially by Mr. Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse had been of the coldest character ever since the President’s anti-secession message at the commencement of the session of Congress.”[127]

Footnote 127:

Letter of October 28, 1862, in the controversy with General Scott,
published in the _National Intelligencer_ of November 1, 1862. As
a specimen of the intercourse between the President and the
secession Senators, after the messages of December 3d and January
8th, take the following notes:—

[JOHN SLIDELL TO PRESIDENT BUCHANAN.]

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I have seen in the _Star_, and heard from other parties, that
Major Beauregard, who had been ordered to West Point as
Superintendent of the Military Academy, and had entered on the
discharge of his duties there, had been relieved from his command.
May I take the liberty of asking you if this has been done with
your approbation? Very respectfully, yours,

JOHN SLIDELL.

[PRESIDENT BUCHANAN TO JOHN SLIDELL.]

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR:—

With every sentiment of personal friendship and regard, I am
obliged to say, in answer to your note of Sunday, that I have full
confidence in the Secretary of War; and his acts, in the line of
his duty, are my own acts, for which I am responsible.

Yours, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.

The first event occurring at this time in the Executive Department, which it is important to notice here, was an application made by General Scott to the President, on Sunday, the 30th of December, by the following note:

December 30, 1860.

Lieutenant General Scott begs the President of the United States
to pardon the irregularity of this communication. It is Sunday,
the weather is bad, and General Scott is not well enough to go to
church. But matters of the highest national importance seem to
forbid a moment’s delay, and, if misled by zeal, he hopes for the
President’s forgiveness.

Will the President permit General Scott, without reference to the
War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two
hundred and fifty recruits, from New York harbor, to reinforce
Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles,
ammunition, and subsistence stores?

It is hoped that a sloop-of-war and cutter may be ordered for the
same purpose as early as to-morrow.

General Scott will wait upon the President at any moment he may be
called for.

The President’s most obedient servant,
WINFIELD SCOTT.

General Scott was evidently not aware, when he wrote this note, that the late Secretary of War, Floyd, was out of office. The President, having substituted Mr. Holt in his place as Secretary _ad interim_, was under no necessity whatever to act without the knowledge of that Department. He proceeded therefore to act promptly and in the usual manner upon the General’s recommendation. He received the General’s note on the evening of Sunday, the 30th of December. On the morning of Monday, the 31st, he gave instructions to the War and Navy Departments; the orders were issued on that day; and in the evening General Scott called upon the President and informed him that the Secretaries had issued the orders and that they were in his (the General’s) possession. The orders were that the sloop-of-war Brooklyn, with troops, military stores, and provisions, was to sail forthwith from Fortress Monroe to Fort Sumter. It could not be true, therefore, as was afterwards asserted by General Scott, that “the South Carolina commissioners had already been many days in Washington and no movement of defence (on the part of the United States) was permitted.” The commissioners arrived in Washington on the 27th of December. On the 30th they received the President’s answer. General Scott’s request was made to the President on the 30th, and on the 31st the orders for the Brooklyn to sail were in his hands. The commissioners’ insolent reply to the President was not delivered to him until the 2d of January. The Brooklyn was already under orders, but the orders were not despatched from Washington on the 31st for a reason that will presently appear.

It is now to be stated how a mercantile steamer, The Star of the West, came to be substituted for the Brooklyn, and to sail on this expedition. And here General Scott’s memory was utterly at fault in 1862. He then publicly stated that the President refused to allow any attempt to be made to reinforce Fort Sumter, because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina commissioners; and that “afterwards Secretary Holt and myself [General Scott] endeavored, in vain, to obtain a ship-of-war for the purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the passenger steamer Star of the West.” It is most extraordinary that the General should have made this misstatement. The Star of the West was substituted for the Brooklyn by his own advice. “At the interview already referred to,” says Mr. Buchanan, “between the General and myself, on the evening of Monday, the 31st of December, I suggested to him that, although I had not received the South Carolina commissioners in their official capacity, but merely as private gentlemen, yet it might be considered as an improper act to send the Brooklyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumter until I had received an answer from them to my letter of the preceding day; that the delay could not continue more than forty-eight hours. He promptly concurred in this suggestion as gentlemanly and proper, and the orders were not transmitted to the Brooklyn on that evening. My anticipations were correct, for on the morning [afternoon] of the 2d of January I received their insolent note, and sent it back to them. In the meantime, however, the General had become convinced, on the representations of a gentleman whom I forbear to name, that the better plan, as the Secretaries of War and the Navy informed me, to secure secrecy and success, and reach the fort, would be to send a fast side-wheel steamer from New York with the reinforcement. Accordingly, the Star of the West was selected for this duty. The substitution of this steamer for the Brooklyn, which would have been able to defend herself in case of attack, was reluctantly yielded by me to the high military judgment of General Scott.”[128]

Footnote 128:

Letter from Mr. Buchanan to the _National Intelligencer_, October
28, 1862.

In consequence of this change, a short time had to elapse before the Star of the West, then at New York, could take on board the reinforcements. She sailed from New York on the 5th of January. On that day General Scott sent a despatch to his son-in-law, Colonel Scott, to countermand her departure, but it was not received until after she had gone to sea. The countermand was given for two reasons: first, because a despatch received by Mr. Holt on that day from Major Anderson stated in effect that he felt secure in his position; and secondly, and more emphatically, because on the same evening information reached the War Department that a heavy battery had been erected among the sand hills, at the entrance of Charleston harbor, capable of destroying any unarmed vessel that might attempt to enter.[129] Satisfied that there was no present necessity for sending reinforcements, and that when sent they ought to go in a vessel of war, the Government, with General Scott’s full concurrence,[130] after learning that the countermand had not reached the Star of the West before she sailed, took steps to overtake her. The following memorandum now lies before me:

Footnote 129:

See a statement published by Mr. Holt in the _National
Intelligencer_, dated March 5, 1861.

Footnote 130:

When General Scott wrote and published, in 1862, his criticisms on
Mr. Buchanan’s course, he said that the Star of the West, “but for
the hesitation of the master, might, as is generally believed,
have delivered at the fort the men and subsistence on board.” He
had forgotten that he had sent his own order to the commander of
the troops on board that vessel, which would inform him that the
Brooklyn was coming to aid and succor him, and that in case he
could not land at Fort Sumter, he was to turn back and land his
troops at Fort Monroe and discharge the ship! With what propriety
then could the General blame the master of the ship for not making
an attempt which the General knew he could not make without the
support of the Brooklyn?

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE HON. SECRETARY OF WAR.

A despatch was forwarded, night of January 7, through the agency
of the Navy Department, to the officer commanding recruits on
board the steamship Star of the West, in almost exactly these
words:

“This communication will be handed you by the Commander of the
United States Steamer sloop-of-war Brooklyn.

“The object of his mission is twofold. _First_, to afford aid and
succor in case your ship be shattered or injured; _second_, to
convey this order of recall, in case you cannot land at Fort
Sumter, to Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, there to await further
orders.

“In case of your return to Hampton Roads, send a telegraphic
message here at once from Norfolk.

”WINFIELD SCOTT.

“P. S.—Land your troops at Fort Monroe and discharge the ship.

“W. S.”

The Star of the West arrived off the harbor of Charleston on the 9th of January, and being fired upon as she was attempting to enter the harbor, by order of Governor Pickens, she returned without entering. It is, therefore, now necessary to go forward, and covering everything that was done or omitted by the President thereafter, in regard to Fort Sumter, to inquire into another charge made by General Scott in 1862, that the President was under the embarrassment of a truce or armistice, which continued for the remainder of the administration. It seems that late in the month of January, there was a project considered, between the General, Secretaries Holt and Toucey, and certain naval officers, with the knowledge of the President, for sending three or four small steamers belonging to the coast survey to the relief of Fort Sumter. General Scott, in 1862, declared that he had but little doubt this expedition would have been successful, but that it was “kept back by something like a truce or armistice, made here, embracing Charleston and Pensacola harbors, agreed upon by the late President and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, etc., and this truce lasted to the end of that administration.”

It is perhaps not remarkable that the history of this period of Mr. Buchanan’s administration should have been so widely misunderstood, when one considers the nature of the materials from which the history thus far written has been derived. General Scott, from his official position, knew that no truce or armistice whatever was entered into by the President with anybody, embracing the two harbors of Charleston and Pensacola; that in regard to Pensacola, there was a special arrangement, in no way connected with the state of things in Charleston; and that in regard to Charleston, there was only a temporary agreement between Major Anderson and Governor Pickens, that was terminable on a certain event, and that lasted but for a short time. To separate things entirely distinct in their nature, but which General Scott saw fit to blend together in making his imputations upon the President’s conduct, is now my imperative duty.

The only truce that was made in reference to Charleston was an actual truce of arms made between Governor Pickens and Major Anderson, on the 11th of January, 1861, without the President’s previous knowledge, and consequently it could not have been the result of any conference between the President and certain secessionists then in Washington or elsewhere. The Star of the West, sailing under the American flag, was fired upon and turned back on the 9th of January. This outrage required Major Anderson’s instant notice. If he had immediately opened fire from Fort Sumter upon the adjacent batteries which sent their shot across the bow of that vessel, he would have been justified by his position as an officer of the United States commanding a fort which existed for the protection of all vessels having a right to enter the harbor, and especially for the protection of all vessels bearing the flag of the United States. He was under no obligation whatever to recognize South Carolina as a power foreign to the United States; but if he had chosen, he might have considered the firing on this vessel as an act of war, which South Carolina had instituted against the United States. He took what he considered as the most prudent course that was open to him. He sent a flag of truce to the Governor, stating that he presumed the act was unauthorized, and therefore that he had not returned the fire, but demanding an official disavowal of the act within a reasonable time, otherwise he should consider it an act of war and should fire on any vessel within the reach of his guns which might attempt to enter or leave the harbor. It is quite evident that if he had adhered to this purpose, the civil war would then have commenced; for the attitude of South Carolina was that of a power claiming complete independence of the United States, and her preparations for driving the United States out of the harbor were prosecuting with great vigor. But the affair took an unexpected, although for the moment it may have been a fortunate turn. The Governor did not disavow, but justified, the act of firing on the Star of the West, and on the 11th of January he sent two members of his executive council to Major Anderson, with instructions to present to him “considerations of the gravest public character, and of the deepest interest to all who deprecate the improper waste of life, to induce the delivery of Fort Sumter to the constituted authorities of South Carolina, with a pledge on its part to account for such public property as may be in your charge.”

It is difficult now to look back upon those transactions, and to describe them with the coolness which history should preserve. Without the least consideration for the duty incumbent upon the President of the United States under his official oath, the “constituted authorities of South Carolina” assumed from the first a position which they calculated, not without reason, would be supported by the secession leaders of the other cotton States. Their attitude was that their secession ordinance had completely severed the State from all connection with the United States; that the latter power was an intruder in her dominions, holding fortifications which were a standing affront to the dignity and a peril to the safety of the State; that these fortifications must be surrendered to the paramount territorial sovereignty of the State; and that as to the property of the United States which they contained, the State would account for it. The alternative plainly presented was that war must ensue, if these demands were not complied with. It is almost impossible to understand how sane men could have imagined that the Executive Government of the United States could be made to yield to such a demand; but the explanation is to be found in the three facts, that the South Carolina leaders meant to make the issue on the whole doctrine of secession in such a shape as would secure the support of some other States and their representatives in Washington; that they had reason to count confidently upon the support of the latter; and that they believed that President Buchanan could be induced or driven into a compliance with their demands, if they presented the alternatives of a complete admission of their right to secede peaceably on the one hand, and civil war on the other.

Perhaps the only thing that Major Anderson could prudently do, after what he considered as a demand upon him for a surrender of the fort, was to do precisely what he did, namely, to refer the whole matter to Washington. His answer to the Governor, sent on the same day, was that he could not comply with the demand, but that “should your Excellency deem fit, prior to a resort to arms, to refer the matter to Washington, it would afford me the sincerest pleasure to depute one of my officers to accompany any messenger you may deem proper to be the bearer of your demand.” This proposition was accepted by the Governor, and he commissioned the Attorney General of the State, the Hon. J. W. Hayne, to proceed to Washington and make the same demand on the President that had been made on Major Anderson. Major Anderson, on his part, sent one of his officers, Lieutenant J. Norman Hall, as his deputy, to await the President’s decision. The two gentlemen arrived in Washington together, on the evening of January 13th, 1861.

There was thus established between Major Anderson and the Governor of South Carolina a temporary truce of arms, which related to no locality but the harbor of Charleston, and would terminate when Major Anderson should receive his instructions how to act. On the one side, South Carolina, in an armed attitude, demands of Major Anderson the surrender of a fort of the United States, with a plain intimation that if he does not surrender it he must be driven out of it. On the other hand, Major Anderson, who, as the commanding officer of the United States in that harbor, has a just cause for retaliation on account of the attack on the Star of the West, proposes a suspension of all hostilities until he can receive the instructions of his Government. The proposal being accepted and acted upon, the circumstances constituted what President Buchanan, with entire accuracy, and citing the language of Vattel, calls “a partial truce, under which hostilities are suspended only in certain places.”[131] But the President was greatly surprised by this state of things. The truce made it alike impossible for Major Anderson to ask for, or the Government to send him, reinforcements, while it lasted. All that could be done by the President was to learn what the South Carolina messenger or envoy had to say, and then to decide again that Fort Sumter could not and would not be surrendered. When this had been done, the truce would be ended.[132]

Footnote 131:

Buchanan’s Defence, p. 144.

Footnote 132:

See Ex. Doc., H. R., vol. ix., No. 61. The reader who consults the
documents without prejudice cannot fail to be struck with the
arrogance of tone and the extreme nature of the demands, that mark
all the papers that emanated from the South Carolina authorities
at this period. Nor can he fail, I think, to see that President
Buchanan, while he exercised great patience, bore himself
throughout with the dignity that belonged to his position. When a
paper became too outrageous to be tolerated, it was promptly
returned.

Colonel Hayne called upon the President on the morning of the 14th of January, stating that he bore a letter from Governor Pickens to the President, which he would deliver in person on the next day. Remembering his experience with the former commissioners from South Carolina, the President declined to hold any conversation with Colonel Hayne on the subject of his errand, and requested that all communications should be made in writing, to which Colonel Hayne assented. On the 15th the Governor’s letter was not delivered to the President; it was held back on the advice of certain Southern Senators. The following memorandum, drawn up by the President on the 16th, will explain what those Senators were then trying to accomplish:

Wednesday afternoon, at 4 P. M., January 16.

Senator Clay (of Alabama) called. He began by assigning reasons
why I should withdraw Major Anderson and his troops from Fort
Sumter. I told him that it was quite out of the question for me to
hold verbal communication on this subject. Although I relied
implicitly upon his honor, yet there would be mistakes with the
best intentions. He concurred in this opinion, but said he would
never repeat to any human being what had passed between him and
me. I thought, however, I would leave no room for doubt on the
important point, and I told him I would not, under any
circumstances, withdraw the troops from Fort Sumter. He spoke of
the inauguration of civil war in Charleston as a dreadful
calamity. I answered that the troops were there in a small number,
in the possession of a fort which I firmly believed belonged to
the United States, to act purely on the defensive; and if
assaulted by the authorities of South Carolina, on them would rest
the exclusive responsibility of commencing civil war. I believed
South Carolina still to be a part of the Confederacy.

He then (and I am not certain he did not mention it before) said
he had come from the seceding Senators to suggest to me some plan
by which the effusion of human blood might be spared at
Charleston. I told him any proposition of this kind must be
reduced to writing—that without this I could not consider it.
Still, he went on and said there was a truce agreed upon, so long
as Colonel Hayne was here. I told him I had understood that there
had been. He said they wanted him to remain a few days, and submit
a proposition to the government of South Carolina, to agree that
Major Anderson should be placed in his former position; that the
Government should have free access to him; that he should buy all
the provisions he wanted in Charleston; and that he should not be
disturbed if I would not send him additional reinforcements. I
again said that I could not take any proposition into
consideration unless it were reduced to writing. He said he
understood this perfectly. But [he] went on to say that the truce
might be extended until the meeting at Milledgeville, or even till
the 4th March. I told him that the truce would continue until
Colonel Hayne left here, which I supposed would be in a few days;
that Lieutenant Hall had been informed by Colonel Hayne that he
might go to see his sick sister in New York, provided he was back
on Friday evening. I told him I could say nothing further on the
subject of the truce, nor could I express any opinion on the
subjects to which he had referred, unless the proposition were
reduced to writing, and presented to me in a distinct form. He
said I need be under no apprehensions as to the security of the
fort. He had just come from Jefferson Davis, who said it could not
be taken; and Lars Anderson had informed him that Major Anderson
said he did not require reinforcements. He got up and said he
would go to those who had sent him, and it would be for them to
decide upon the proposition. I then said to him, emphatically,
that Colonel Hayne could not possibly be authorized to send any
propositions to Charleston until they had been first submitted to
myself and cabinet and agreed to. He said certainly not, that this
was a necessary preliminary. I repeated again that I could not
even consider any verbal proposition. He said he understood that
perfectly; that he would not have anything to do with it himself
without this. He then asked me when the cabinet would meet. He
believed it was to-morrow, and they would not have time to come to
an understanding so soon. I said that the regular day was Friday.
He said that would give them time, and so he went away.

In the course of conversation I told him that I felt as much
anxiety to prevent a collision and spare the effusion of blood as
any man living; but this must be done in consistency with the
discharge of all my duties as laid down in my annual message and
my late special message. That I could not, and would not, withdraw
Major Anderson from Fort Sumter.

What ensued after this interview between the President and Senator Clay can be best related in the President’s own words. Every statement that he makes in the following narrative is founded on and supported by the written correspondence.

Colonel Hayne, the commissioner from South Carolina, as already
stated, arrived in Washington on the 13th January. He bore with
him a letter from Governor Pickens addressed to the President. On
the next morning he called upon the President, and stated that he
would deliver this letter in person on the day following. The
President, however, admonished by his recent experience with the
former commissioners, declined to hold any conversation with him
on the subject of his mission, and requested that all
communications between them might be in writing. To this he
assented. Although the President had no actual knowledge of the
contents of the Governor’s letter, he could not doubt it contained
a demand for the surrender of the fort. Such a demand he was at
all times prepared peremptorily to reject. This Colonel Hayne must
have known, because the President had but a fortnight before
informed his predecessors this was impossible, and had never been
thought of by him in any possible contingency. The President
confidently expected that the letter would be transmitted to him
on the day after the interview, when his refusal to surrender the
fort would at once terminate the truce, and leave both parties
free to act upon their own responsibility. Colonel Hayne, however,
did not transmit this letter to the President on the 15th January,
according to his promise, but withheld it until the 31st of that
month. The reason for this vexatious delay will constitute a
curious portion of our narrative, and deserves to be mentioned in
some detail. (_Vide_ the President’s message of 8th February,
1861, with the accompanying documents, Ex. Doc., H. R., vol. ix.,
No. 61.)

The Senators from the cotton States yet in Congress appeared,
strangely enough, to suppose that through their influence the
President might agree not to send reinforcements to Fort Sumter,
provided Governor Pickens would stipulate not to attack it. By
such an agreement they proposed to preserve the peace. But first
of all it was necessary for them to prevail upon Colonel Hayne not
to transmit the letter to the President on the day appointed,
because they well knew that the demand which it contained would
meet his prompt and decided refusal. This would render the
conclusion of such an agreement impossible.

In furtherance of their plan, nine of these Senators, with
Jefferson Davis at their head, addressed a note to Colonel Hayne
on the 15th January, requesting him to defer the delivery of the
letter. They proposed that he should withhold it until they could
ascertain from the President whether he would agree not to send
reinforcements, provided Governor Pickens would engage not to
attack the fort. They informed the Colonel that should the
President prove willing in the first place to enter into such an
arrangement, they would then strongly recommend that he should not
deliver the letter he had in charge for the present, but send to
South Carolina for authority from Governor Pickens to become a
party thereto. Colonel Hayne, in his answer to these Senators of
the 17th January, informed them that he had not been clothed with
power to make the arrangements suggested, but provided they could
get assurances with which they were entirely satisfied that no
reinforcements would be sent to Fort Sumter, he would withhold the
letter with which he had been charged, refer their communication
to the authorities of South Carolina, and await further
instructions.

On the 19th January this correspondence between the Senators and
Colonel Hayne was submitted to the President, accompanied by a
note from three of their number, requesting him to take the
subject into consideration. His answer to this note was delayed no
longer than was necessary to prepare it in proper form. On the 22d
January it was communicated to these Senators in a letter from the
Secretary of War. This contained an express refusal to enter into
the proposed agreement. Mr. Holt says: “I am happy to observe
that, in your letter to Colonel Hayne, you express the opinion
that it is ‘especially due from South Carolina to our States, to
say nothing of other slaveholding States, that she should, so far
as she can consistently with her honor, avoid initiating
hostilities between her and the United States or any other power.’
To initiate such hostilities against Fort Sumter would, beyond
question, be an act of war against the United States. In regard to
the proposition of Colonel Hayne, ‘that no reinforcements will be
sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that public peace will
not be disturbed by any act of hostility towards South Carolina,’
it is impossible for me to give you any such assurances. The
President has no authority to enter into such an agreement or
understanding. As an executive officer, he is simply bound to
protect the public property so far as this maybe practicable; and
it would be a manifest violation of his duty to place himself
under engagements that he would not perform this duty, either for
an indefinite, or limited, period. At the present moment it is not
deemed necessary to reinforce Major Anderson, because he makes no
such request and feels quite secure in his position. Should his
safety, however, require reinforcements, every effort will be made
to supply them.”

It was believed by the President that this peremptory refusal to
enter into the proposed agreement, would have caused Colonel Hayne
immediately to present the letter he had in charge and thus
terminate his mission, thereby releasing both parties from the
obligations of the truce. In this expectation the President was
disappointed. The secession Senators again interposed, and advised
Colonel Hayne still longer to withhold the letter from the
President, and await further instructions from Charleston. In his
answer of 24th January to their note containing this advice, he
[Col. Hayne] informs them that although the letter from the
Secretary of War “was far from being satisfactory,” yet in
compliance with their request he “would withhold the communication
with which he was at present charged, and refer the whole matter
to the authorities of South Carolina, and would await their
reply.” On the 30th this reply was received, and on the next day
Colonel Hayne transmitted to the President the letter of Governor
Pickens demanding the surrender of the fort, with a long
communication from himself. This letter is dated “Headquarters,
Charleston, January 12, 1861,” and is as follows:

“SIR:—

“At the time of the separation of the State of South Carolina
from the United States, Fort Sumter was, and still is, in the
possession of troops of the United States, under the command of
Major Anderson. I regard that possession as not consistent with
the dignity or safety of the State of South Carolina, and have
this day [it was the day previous] addressed to Major Anderson a
communication to obtain possession of that fort by the
authorities of this State. The reply of Major Anderson informs
me that he has no authority to do what I required, but he
desires a reference of the demand to the President of the United
States. Under the circumstances now existing, and which need no
comment by me, I have determined to send to you Hon. I. W.
Hayne, the Attorney-General of the State of South Carolina, and
have instructed him to demand the delivery of Fort Sumter, in
the harbor of Charleston, to the constituted authorities of the
State of South Carolina. The demand I have made of Major
Anderson, and which I now make of you, is suggested by my
earnest desire to avoid the bloodshed which a persistence in
your attempt to retain possession of that fort will cause, and
which will be unavailing to secure to you that possession, but
induce a calamity most deeply to be deplored. If consequences so
unhappy shall ensue, I will secure for this State, in the demand
which I now make, the satisfaction of having exhausted every
attempt to avoid it.

“In relation to the public property of the United States within
Fort Sumter, the Hon. I. W, Hayne, who will hand you this
communication, is authorized to give you the pledge of the State
that the valuation of such property will be accounted for by this
State, upon the adjustment of its relations with the United
States, of which it was a part.”

On the 6th February, the Secretary of War, on behalf of the
President, replied to this demand, as well as to the letter of
Colonel Hayne accompanying it. Our narrative would be incomplete
without this admirable and conclusive reply. It is as follows:

“WAR DEPARTMENT, February 6, 1861.[133]

“SIR:—

“The President of the United States has received your letter of
the 31st ultimo, and has charged me with the duty of replying
thereto.

“In the communication addressed to the President by Governor
Pickens, under date of the 12th January, and which accompanies
yours now before me, his Excellency says: ‘I have determined to
send to you the Hon. I. W. Hayne, the Attorney General of the
State of South Carolina, and have instructed him to demand the
surrender of Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston, to the
constituted authorities of the State of South Carolina. The demand
I have made of Major Anderson, and which I now make of you, is
suggested because of my earnest desire to avoid the bloodshed
which a persistence in your attempt to retain possession of that
fort will cause, and which will be unavailing to secure to you
that possession, but induce a calamity most deeply to be
deplored.’ The character of the demand thus authorized to be made
appears (under the influence, I presume, of the correspondence
with the Senators to which you refer) to have been modified by
subsequent instructions of his Excellency, dated the 26th, and
received by yourself on the 30th January, in which he says: ‘If it
be so that Fort Sumter is held as property, then, as property, the
rights, whatever they may be, of the United States, can be
ascertained, and for the satisfaction of these rights the pledge
of the State of South Carolina you are authorized to give.’ The
full scope and precise purport of your instructions, as thus
modified, you have expressed in the following words: ‘I do not
come as a military man to demand the surrender of a fortress, but
as the legal officer of the State—its Attorney General—to claim
for the State the exercise of its undoubted right of eminent
domain, and to pledge the State to make good all injury to the
rights of property which arise from the exercise of the claim.’
And lest this explicit language should not sufficiently define
your position, you add: ‘The proposition now is that her [South
Carolina’s] law officer should, under authority of the Governor
and his council, distinctly pledge the faith of South Carolina to
make such compensation, in regard to Fort Sumter and its
appurtenances and contents, to the full extent of the money value
of the property of the United States, delivered over to the
authorities of South Carolina by your command.’ You then adopt his
Excellency’s train of thought upon the subject, so far as to
suggest that the possession of Fort Sumter by the United States,
‘if continued long enough, must lead to collision,’ and that ‘an
attack upon it would scarcely improve it as property, whatever the
result; and if captured, it would no longer be the subject of
account.’

“The proposal, then, now presented to the President, is simply an
offer on the part of South Carolina to buy Fort Sumter and
contents as property of the United States, sustained by a
declaration in effect, that if she is not permitted to make the
purchase, she will seize the fort by force of arms. As the
initiation of a negotiation for the transfer of property between
friendly governments, this proposal impresses the President as
having assumed a most unusual form. He has, however, investigated
the claim on which it professes to be based, apart from the
declaration that accompanies it. And it may be here remarked, that
much stress has been laid upon the employment of the words
‘property’ and ‘public property’ by the President in his several
messages. These are the most comprehensive terms which can be used
in such a connection, and surely, when referring to a fort or any
other public establishment, they embrace the entire and undivided
interest of the Government therein.