Chapter XXIII: 1861—January, February, and March

INTERVENTION OF VIRGINIA TO PREVENT A COLLISION OF ARMS—EX-PRESIDENT
TYLER’S MISSION TO THE PRESIDENT—THE PRESIDENT’S PREPARATIONS TO
REINFORCE ANDERSON, IN CASE OF NECESSITY—THE MONTGOMERY CONGRESS
AND THE CONFEDERATE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT—MR. LINCOLN’S JOURNEY
TO WASHINGTON—THE NEGLECTS OF CONGRESS.

To a right understanding of these complicated affairs that were occurring in the months of January and February, many threads require to be taken up separately, and interwoven in the narrative. The last messenger or envoy from South Carolina, Colonel Hayne, was in Washington from the 13th of January to the 8th of February, during which period, as the reader has seen, the President’s hands were so far tied by Major Anderson’s truce, that reinforcements could not be sent to him while it lasted. But after this temporary truce began, and before it terminated, there occurred another intervention, altogether different from that of any of the Senators. This was the action of the General Assembly of Virginia, which, besides instituting the Peace Convention, took, at the same time, a step which interposed an insurmountable obstacle to the reinforcement of Fort Sumter, unless it should be attacked, or be in immediate danger of attack. There is no reason to doubt that what the State of Virginia then did was done in entire good faith, and with an honorable and beneficent purpose to preserve the peace of the country. At all events, the President was not at liberty to regard her action in any other light, nor was he disposed to do so.

On the 19th of January, ten days after the affair of the Star of the West, and six days after the arrival of Colonel Hayne in Washington, the General Assembly of Virginia, among their other proceedings, appointed ex-President Tyler a commissioner to the President of the United States, and Judge John Robertson a commissioner to the State of South Carolina and the other States which had seceded, or might thereafter secede, with instructions to procure a mutual agreement to “abstain from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms between the States and the Government of the United States,” pending the proceedings of the Peace Convention. Mr. Tyler, who was also a member of the Peace Convention, arrived in Washington on the 23d of January, two weeks before the departure of Col. Hayne. On the following day, he presented the resolutions of his State to the President, at the same time assuring him that the efforts of Virginia to secure peace and a reconstruction of the basis of the Union depended for their success on her being allowed to conduct them undisturbed by any outside collision. The resolutions of Virginia requested the President, and not Congress, to enter into the proposed agreement. The President, already informed unofficially of the tenor of the resolutions, was then preparing a special message to Congress on the subject.[137] What occurred at this first interview between Mr. Tyler and the President will appear from the following memorandum the original of which is in the President’s handwriting:

Thursday morning, January 24, 1861.

Mr. Tyler called and delivered me his credentials, and we had a
conference. I foreshadowed to him the principal points of my
message as [it was] delivered. He preferred that I should enter
into the arrangement myself. We discussed this question for some
time, and I was decided that I had no power. He then expressed an
apprehension that my message might precipitate action in Congress.
I told him I thought not. I sent for Governor Bigler that he might
consult him on this point, but Governor Bigler had gone to the
Senate.

Friday morning, 25th.

Mr. Tyler called again, and Mr. Bigler came. I read to him the
principal points of the message. He was anxious it should be sent
that day, and I immediately proceeded to put it in form. I told
him it should be sent in that day, or at latest on Saturday
morning. But the Senate adjourned over till Monday at an early
hour, and my purpose was thus defeated.

Footnote 137:

Message of January 28, 1861.

Mr. Buchanan has said that while he had no constitutional power to enter into the agreement proposed, it was due to its intrinsic importance and to the State of Virginia, which had manifested so strong a desire to restore and preserve the Union, that the proposal should be submitted to Congress.[138]

The President, accordingly, in his message of the 28th January,
submitting the Virginia resolutions to Congress, observed in
regard to this one, that “however strong may be my desire to enter
into such an agreement, I am convinced that I do not possess the
power. Congress, and Congress alone, under the war-making power,
can exercise the discretion of agreeing to abstain ‘from any and
all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms’ between this
and any other Government. It would, therefore, be a usurpation for
the Executive to attempt to restrain their hands by an agreement
in regard to matters over which he has no constitutional control.
If he were thus to act, they might pass laws which he would be
bound to obey, though in conflict with his agreement. Under
existing circumstances, my present actual power is confined within
narrow limits. It is my duty at all times to defend and protect
the public property within the seceding States, so far as this may
be practicable, and especially to employ all constitutional means
to protect the property of the United States, and to preserve the
public peace at this the seat of the Federal Government. If the
seceding States abstain ‘from any and all acts calculated to
produce a collision of arms,’ then the danger so much to be
deprecated will no longer exist. Defence, and not aggression, has
been the policy of the administration from the beginning. But
whilst I can enter into no engagement such as that proposed, I
cordially commend to Congress, with much confidence that it will
meet their approbation, to abstain from passing any law calculated
to produce a collision of arms pending the proceedings
contemplated by the action of the General Assembly of Virginia. I
am one of those who will never despair of the Republic. I yet
cherish the belief that the American people will perpetuate the
union of the States on some terms just and honorable for all
sections of the country. I trust that the mediation of Virginia
may be the destined means, under Providence, of accomplishing this
inestimable benefit. Glorious as are the memories of her past
history, such an achievement, both in relation to her own fame and
the welfare of the whole country, would surpass them all.”

This noble and patriotic effort of Virginia met no favor from
Congress. Neither House referred these resolutions of her General
Assembly to a committee, or even treated them with the common
courtesy of ordering them to be printed. In the Senate no motion
was made to refer them, and the question to print them with the
accompanying message was debated from time to time until the 21st
February,[139] when the Peace Convention had nearly completed its
labors, and after this no further notice seems to have been taken
of the subject. In the House the motion to refer and print the
Virginia resolutions, made by Mr. Stanton, of Ohio, on the day
they were received, was never afterwards noticed.[140] This
mortifying neglect on the part of the Representatives of the
States and of the people, made a deep and unfortunate impression
on the citizens of Virginia.[141]

Footnote 138:

Buchanan’s Defence, p. 206.

Footnote 139:

_Cong. Globe_, pp. 590, 636.

Footnote 140:

H. J., p. 236. _Cong. Globe_, p. 601.

Footnote 141:

Buchanan’s Defence, pp. 207, 208.

The President having laid this whole matter before Congress, with whom it appropriately belonged, the question now recurs whether he omitted any thing that it was in his power to do, during the session of the Peace Convention. It was manifestly his duty to be prepared, to the extent of all the means at his command, when Anderson’s truce had terminated, to send him reinforcements, should Anderson request them, or should it be known from any other quarter that Fort Sumter was in danger of attack. Congress might not, as it did not, assume any part of its just responsibility; and it was not known until some days after the termination of Major Anderson’s truce, on the 6th of February, that the Governor of South Carolina had determined to respect the wishes of the Virginia Legislature, and refrain from attacking the fort while the Peace Convention was sitting.[142]

Footnote 142:

Buchanan’s Defence, p. 209.

Without waiting to know how Congress might treat this proposal of the Virginia General Assembly, the President, on the 30th of January, addressed the following note to the Secretary of War, Mr. Holt:

WASHINGTON, January 30th, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR:—

It is time we should have decided whether it is practicable with
the means in our power, considering the obstacles interposed in
the harbor of Charleston, to reinforce Major Anderson at Fort
Sumter, should the action of the authorities of South Carolina, or
his request, render this necessary. The high military attainments
and just reputation of General Scott render his advice on this
subject of the greatest importance. Should reinforcements be
deemed practicable, then, in consultation with him, a plan ought
to be devised in advance to accomplish the object. I should be
gratified to see General Scott, the Secretary of the Navy, and
yourself, at twelve o’clock to-day, or any other hour most
convenient to yourselves, to talk over this and other matters.

Your friend very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.

The result of the conference appointed by this note has been given by Mr. Buchanan himself:

After several consultations, an expedition for this purpose was
quietly prepared at New York, under the direction of Secretary
Toucey, for the relief of Fort Sumter, the command of which was
intrusted to his intimate friend, the late lamented Commander Ward
of the navy. This gallant officer had been authorized to select
his own officers and men, who were to rendezvous on board the
receiving-ship, of which he was then in command. The expedition
consisted of a few small steamers, and it was arranged that on
receiving a telegraphic despatch from the Secretary, whenever the
emergency might require, he should, in the course of the following
night, set sail for Charleston, entering the harbor in the night,
and anchoring if possible under the guns of Fort Sumter.

It is due to the memory of this brave officer to state that he had
sought the enterprise with the greatest enthusiasm, and was
willing to sacrifice his life in the accomplishment of the object,
should such be his fate, saying to Secretary Toucey, this would be
the best inheritance he could leave to his wife and children.[143]

Footnote 143:

Buchanan’s Defence, p. 210.

This expedition did not sail. It consisted of a few small vessels borrowed from the Treasury Department, with two or three hundred men. While it was preparing, the Peace Convention was in session; and as it had become known to the President that the authorities of South Carolina were then respecting the appeal of the General Assembly of Virginia to avoid collision, it would have broken up the Peace Convention to send reinforcements to Major Anderson, unless he asked for them; and it would inevitably have led to an immediate assault upon the fort, which would have been the signal for a civil war. These considerations caused some delay in issuing the orders to Commander Ward. In point of fact, Major Anderson not only did not ask for reinforcements, but on the 30th of January, the day on which the President summoned the Secretaries of War and the Navy and General Scott to a conference, Anderson wrote to the War Department that he hoped no attempt would be made to throw in supplies; that it would do more harm than good. From later advices received from him, it became apparent that this small expedition under Commander Ward could not enter the harbor of Charleston without a fearful sacrifice of life. It was therefore kept back, but kept in readiness, at New York, until the 5th day of March, on which day President Lincoln was fully informed of it, and of the circumstances which had prevented its sailing, by the retiring Secretary of War, Mr. Holt, with the concurrence of President Buchanan.

Without anticipating, however, what occurred on the last day of Mr. Buchanan’s administration, and on the day following, it is only needful to say here that Fort Sumter remained unmolested by any actual attack, until some time after Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration, although the disposition of the authorities of South Carolina continued to be as hostile as ever. On the 4th of February, a Congress of the States which had then seceded was held at Montgomery in Alabama. These were the States of South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia and Louisiana. The delegates to this Congress were appointed by conventions of their respective States. This body framed a provisional constitution for the new Confederacy, which they styled the “Confederate States of America.” It was adopted by the Congress on the 8th of February, and was to continue in force for one year, unless it should be superseded at an earlier period by a permanent organization. Jefferson Davis was elected President, and Alexander H. Stephens Vice President, of the new Confederacy. No popular election of Congress was ordered, but the legislative powers were vested “in this Congress now assembled, until otherwise ordered.”[144]

Footnote 144:

The reader who desires to examine the provisional constitution
will find it in Mr. Jefferson Davis’s work on the Rise and Fall of
the Confederate Government, Appendix.

The authorities of South Carolina immediately began to look to the Montgomery government for direction. On the 14th of February, a telegraph operator in Augusta, Georgia, transmitted a despatch from Charleston to Montgomery, urging the Southern Congress to do something definite in regard to Fort Sumter, and asking whether the Congress would appoint a General to lead the attack, or whether it should be done under the superintendence of Governor Pickens, who said, “the fort must be taken before Lincoln takes his seat.”[145] Comparing the date on which information of this despatch reached President Buchanan (February 19th), with what was taking place in Washington at that time, it will appear that the administration could not, while the Peace Congress was still in session, do anything more than to prepare secretly the small expedition under Commander Ward, and hold it in readiness to sail, whenever Major Anderson should signify that he considered his position as insecure. From information which reached the President from other quarters, he was satisfied that the Montgomery Congress would not approve of the taking of Fort Sumter before Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration. The great body of the persons composing the Montgomery government were too cool and too wary in their plans to promote, at that time, the hasty and hot-headed schemes of their friends in South Carolina. They were still bent upon procuring the peaceable assent of the Federal Government to the separation of their States from the Union.[146]

Footnote 145:

My authority for this statement is a letter written on the 19th of
February to President Buchanan from Philadelphia, by an intimate
friend of his, giving an extract from a letter from the telegraph
operator, dated at Augusta on the 14th, and reciting the substance
of the despatch which the operator had that day forwarded. The
letter reached Mr. Buchanan on the same day on which it was
written.

Footnote 146:

On the 15th of February, the Montgomery Congress provided for the
appointment by their President-elect of three commissioners to the
Federal Government, for the negotiation and settlement of a
peaceful separation.

They did not mean to initiate a war, although most of them saw clearly that there _would be_ war, while they denied that there _ought to be_ one. At all events, they meant to have it appear to the world that they had done everything they could to procure a peaceable acquiescence in their secession from the Union. Under these circumstances, President Buchanan, who now had less than three weeks of his official term remaining, and who could not anticipate that commissioners of the new Confederacy would reach Washington while he was President (they were not appointed until the 25th of February), could only leave the position of things in regard to Fort Sumter in the best possible attitude for his successor. This attitude was, to hold privately all the means that the Government then had for relieving Fort Sumter, in readiness, to be used by his successor as circumstances might require.

In the mean time, as the 4th of March was drawing near, Mr. Lincoln, the President-elect, was making his journey from Springfield towards Washington, delivering public speeches on the way, the tenor of which was that retaining the forts and other property of the United States in the seceded States was not coercion, that there need be no war, and that there was no occasion for any alarm, as “nobody was hurt.” From these strange utterances of Mr. Lincoln, as he approached the capital, the only inference that could be drawn was that he considered the country to be in no danger, and that there would be no occasion to use force. It has been claimed, and not without some reason, that Mr. Lincoln’s speeches on this journey encouraged the secessionists to believe that they could negotiate a peaceable and final separation of their States from the Union. But at all events, Mr. Lincoln’s travelling speeches justified the course that had been pursued by Mr. Buchanan; for Mr. Lincoln’s attitude as the incoming President was that the use of force must be confined to the preservation of the property of the United States in the seceded States, against all attempts to forcibly dispossess the Federal Government. How the war was precipitated, after Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration, is a distinct topic. On the day of his inauguration, he was perfectly at liberty, so far as depended upon anything done or forborne by his predecessor, to refuse all communication with the Montgomery commissioners, and to use all the means that his predecessor had ever had for reinforcing Fort Sumter. He was doubtless surprised, as his predecessor was, by being informed on the 5th day of March, that Fort Sumter could not be held without a force of fifteen or twenty thousand men, to destroy the batteries that had been erected around it; and had the Congress, which expired on the day of his inauguration, made the provisions for the emergency which Mr. Buchanan urged upon them, no member of Mr. Lincoln’s administration would have had any occasion to temporize with the Southern commissioners in any form, concerning the retention of that fortress.

And here it may be well to recapitulate distinctly what President Buchanan urged Congress to do and what it neglected to do. He has himself so clearly stated this, that I cannot do better than to quote his words:

We have already seen that Congress, throughout the entire session,
refused to adopt any measures of compromise to prevent civil war,
or to retain first the cotton or afterwards the border States
within the Union. Failing to do this, and whilst witnessing the
secession of one after another of the cotton States, the
withdrawal of their Senators and Representatives, and the
formation of their Confederacy, it was the imperative duty of
Congress to furnish the President or his successor the means of
repelling force by force, should this become necessary, to
preserve the Union. They, nevertheless, refused to perform this
duty, with as much pertinacity as they had manifested in
repudiating all measures of compromise.

1. At the meeting of Congress, a Federal Judiciary had ceased to
exist in South Carolina. The District Judge, the District
Attorney, and the United States Marshal had resigned their
offices. These ministers of justice had all deserted their posts
before the act of secession, and the laws of the United States
could no longer be enforced through their agency. We have already
seen that the President, in his message, called the attention of
Congress to this subject, but no attempt was made in either House
to provide a remedy for the evil.

2. Congress positively refused to pass a law conferring on the
President authority to call forth the militia, or accept the
services of volunteers, to suppress insurrections which might
occur in any State against the Government of the United States. It
may appear strange that this power had not long since been vested
in the Executive. The Act of February 28, 1795,[147] the only law
applicable to the subject, provides alone for calling forth the
militia to suppress insurrections against State governments,
without making any similar provision for suppressing insurrections
against the Government of the United States. If anything were
required beyond a mere inspection of the act to render this clear,
it may be found in the opinion of Attorney General Black, of the
20th November, 1860. Indeed, it is a plain _casus omissus_. This
palpable omission, which ought to have been instantly supplied,
was suffered to continue until after the end of Mr. Buchanan’s
administration, when on the 29th July, 1861, Congress conferred
this necessary power on the President.[148] The framers of the Act
of 1795 either did not anticipate an insurrection within any State
against the Federal Government, or if they did, they purposely
abstained from providing for it. Even in regard to insurrections
against a State government, so jealous were they of any
interference on the part of the Federal Government with the rights
of the States, that they withheld from Congress the power to
protect any State “against domestic violence,” except “on the
application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened).” Under the Act of 1795,
therefore, the President is precluded from acting, even upon his
own personal and absolute knowledge of the existence of such an
insurrection. Before he can call forth the militia for its
suppression, he must first be applied to for this purpose by the
appropriate State authorities, in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution. It was the duty of Congress, immediately after their
meeting, to supply this defect in our laws, and to confer an
absolute authority on the President to call forth the militia, and
accept the services of volunteers, to suppress insurrections
against the United States, whenever or wherever they might occur.
This was a precautionary measure which, independently of existing
dangers, ought long since to have formed a part of our permanent
legislation. But no attempt was ever made in Congress to adopt it
until after the President’s special message of the 8th January,
1861, and then the attempt entirely failed. Meanwhile the aspect
of public affairs had become more and more threatening. Mr.
Crittenden’s amendment had been defeated before the Committee of
Thirteen, on the last day of December; and it was also highly
probable that his proposition before the Senate to refer it to a
vote of the people of the States, would share the same fate. South
Carolina and Florida had already seceded, and the other cotton
States had called conventions for the purpose of seceding. Nay,
more, several of them had already seized the forts, magazines, and
arsenals within their limits. Still all this failed to produce any
effect upon Congress. It was at this crisis the President sent his
special message to Congress (8th January, 1861), by which he
endeavored to impress them with the necessity for immediate
action. He concealed nothing from them. Whilst still clinging to
the fading hope that they might yet provide for a peaceful
adjustment of our difficulties, and strongly recommending this
course, he says: “Even now the danger is upon us. In several of
the States which have not yet seceded, the forts, arsenals, and
magazines of the United States have been seized. This is by far
the most serious step which has been taken since the commencement
of the troubles...... The seizure of this property, from all
appearances, has been purely aggressive, and not in resistance to
any attempt to coerce a State or States to remain in the Union.”
He also stated the well-known fact that our small army was on the
remote frontiers, and was scarcely sufficient to guard the
inhabitants against Indian incursions, and consequently our forts
were without sufficient garrisons.

Footnote 147:

1 Stat. at Large, p. 424.

Footnote 148:

12 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 281.

Under these circumstances he appeals to Congress in the following
language: “But the dangerous and hostile attitude of the States
toward each other has already far transcended and cast in the
shade the ordinary executive duties already provided for by law,
and has assumed such vast and alarming proportions as to place the
subject entirely above and beyond executive control. The fact
cannot be disguised that we are in the midst of a great
revolution. In all its great bearings, therefore, I commend the
question to Congress, as the only human tribunal, under
Providence, possessing the power to declare war, or to authorize
the employment of military force in all cases contemplated by the
Constitution; and they alone possess the power to remove
grievances which might lead to war, and to secure peace and union
to this distracted country. On them, and on them alone, rests the
responsibility.”

Congress might, had they thought proper, have regarded the
forcible seizure of these forts and other property, including that
of the Branch Mint at New Orleans, with all the treasure it
contained, as the commencement of an aggressive war. Beyond
question the cotton States had now committed acts of open
hostility against the Federal Government. They had always
contended that secession was a peaceful constitutional remedy, and
that Congress had no power to make war against a sovereign State
for the purpose of coercing her to remain in the Union. They could
no longer shelter themselves under this plea. They had by their
violent action entirely changed the position they had assumed; and
instead of peacefully awaiting the decision of Congress on the
question of coercion, they had themselves become the coercionists
and assailants. This question had, therefore, passed away. No
person has ever doubted the right or the duty of Congress to pass
laws enabling the President to defend the Union against armed
rebellion. Congress, however, still shrunk from the responsibility
of passing any such laws. This might have been commendable had it
proceeded from a sincere desire not to interpose obstacles to a
compromise intended to prevent the effusion of fraternal blood and
restore the Union. Still, in any event, the time had arrived when
it was their duty to make at the least contingent provisions for
the prosecution of the war, should this be rendered inevitable.
This had become the more necessary as Congress would soon expire,
and the new Congress could not be convened for a considerable
period after the old one had ceased to exist, because a large
portion of the Representatives had not then been elected. These
reasons, however, produced no effect.

The President’s special message[149] was referred, two days after
its date (10th January), by the House of Representatives to a
special committee, of which Mr. Howard, of Michigan, was chairman.
Nothing was heard from this committee for the space of twenty
days. They then, on the 30th January, through Mr. John H.
Reynolds, of New York, one of its members, reported a bill[150]
enabling the President to call forth the militia or to accept the
services of volunteers for the purpose of protecting the forts,
magazines, arsenals, and other property of the United States, and
to “recover possession” of such of these as “have been or may
hereafter be unlawfully seized or taken possession of by any
combination of persons whatever.” Had this bill become a law, it
would have been the duty of the President at once to raise a
volunteer or militia force to recapture the forts which had been
already seized. But Congress was not then prepared to assume such
a responsibility. Mr. Reynolds accordingly withdrew his bill from
the consideration of the House on the very day it was reported. On
his own motion it was recommitted, and thus killed as soon as it
saw the light. It was never heard of more.

Footnote 149:

_Cong. Globe_, p. 316.

Footnote 150:

Ibid., p. 645, bills of H. R., No. 698.

Then, after another pause of nineteen days, and only a fortnight
before the close of the session, the Committee on Military
Affairs, through Mr. Stanton, of Ohio, their chairman, on the 18th
February reported another bill[151] on the subject, but of a more
limited character than that which had been withdrawn. It is
remarkable that it contains no provision touching the recovery of
the forts and other property which had been already seized by the
delinquent States. It did no more than provide that the powers
already possessed by the President, under the Act of 1795, to
employ the militia in suppressing insurrections against a State
government, should be “extended to the case of insurrections
against the authority of the United States,” with the additional
authority to “accept the services of such volunteers as may offer
their services for the purpose mentioned.” Thus all hostile action
for the recovery of the forts already seized was excluded from the
bill. It is difficult to conceive what reasonable objection could
be made to this bill, except that it did not go far enough and
embrace the forts already seized; and more especially as when it
was reported we may recollect that the Confederate Congress had
already been ten days in session at Montgomery, Alabama, and had
adopted a Provisional Constitution. Notwithstanding all this, the
House refused to act upon it. The bill was discussed on several
occasions until Tuesday, 26th February. On that day a motion was
made by Mr. Corwin, of Ohio, to postpone its consideration until
Thursday, the 28th February.[152] Mr. Stanton, the reporter of the
bill, resisted this motion, stating that such a postponement would
be fatal to it. “It will,” said he, “be impossible after that to
have it passed by the Senate” (before the 4th March). He,
therefore, demanded the ayes and noes; and notwithstanding his
warning, Mr. Corwin’s motion prevailed by a vote of 100 to 74, and
thus the bill was defeated.

Footnote 151:

Ibid., p. 1001. bill 1003, H. R.

Footnote 152:

_Cong. Globe_, p. 1232.

It may be proper to observe that Mr. Corwin, whose motion killed
the bill, was a confidential friend of the President elect, then
present in Washington, and was soon thereafter appointed minister
to Mexico.

But even had Congress passed this bill, it would have proved
wholly inefficient for want of an appropriation to carry it into
effect. The Treasury was empty; but had it been full, the
President could not have drawn from it any, even the most trifling
sum, without a previous appropriation by law. The union of the
purse with the sword, in the hands of the Executive, is wholly
inconsistent with the idea of a free government. The power of the
legislative branch to withhold money from the Executive, and thus
restrain him from dangerous projects of his own, is a necessary
safeguard of liberty. This exists in every government pretending
to be free. Hence our Constitution has declared that “no money
shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of
appropriations made by law.” It is, therefore, apparent that even
if this bill had become a law, it could not have been carried into
effect by the President without a direct violation of the
Constitution.

Notwithstanding these insuperable obstacles, no member of either
House, throughout the entire session, ever even proposed to
raise or appropriate a single dollar for the defence of the
Government against armed rebellion. Congress not only refused to
grant the President the authority and force necessary to
suppress insurrections against the United States, but the
Senate, by refusing to confirm his nomination of a collector of
the customs for the port of Charleston, effectually tied his
hands and rendered it impossible for him to collect the revenue
within that port. In his annual message he expressed the opinion
that “the same insuperable obstacles do not lie in the way of
executing the [existing] laws for the collection of customs on
the seaboard of South Carolina as had been interposed to prevent
the administration of justice under the Federal authority within
the interior of that State.” At all events he had determined to
make the effort with the naval force under his command. He
trusted that this might be accomplished without collision; but
if resisted, then the force necessary to attain the object must
be applied. Accordingly, whilst informing Congress “that the
revenue still continues to be collected as heretofore at the
custom house in Charleston,” he says that “should the collector
unfortunately resign, a successor may be appointed to perform
this duty.” The collector (William F. Colcock) continued
faithfully to perform his duties until some days after the State
had seceded, when at the end of December he resigned. The
President, immediately afterwards, on the 2d January, nominated
to the Senate, as his successor, Mr. Peter McIntire, of
Pennsylvania, a gentleman well qualified for the office. The
selection could not have been made from South Carolina, because
no citizen of that State would have accepted the appointment.
The Senate, throughout their entire session, never acted upon
the nomination of Mr. McIntire; and without a collector of
customs duly appointed, it was rendered impossible for the
President, under any law in existence, to collect the revenue.

But even if the Senate had confirmed Mr. McIntire’s nomination, it
is extremely doubtful whether the President could lawfully have
collected the revenue against the forcible resistance of the
State, unless Congress had conferred additional powers upon him.
For this purpose Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, on the 3d January,
1861,[153] the day after Mr. McIntire’s nomination to the Senate,
reported a bill from the Judiciary Committee, further to provide
for the collection of duties on imports. This bill embraced
substantially the same provisions, long since expired, contained
in the Act of 2d March, 1833, commonly called “the Force Bill,” to
enable General Jackson to collect the revenue outside of
Charleston, “either upon land or on board any vessel.” Mr.
Bingham’s bill was permitted to slumber on the files of the House
until the 2d March, the last day but one before Congress
expired,[154] when he moved for a suspension of the rules, to
enable the House to take it up and consider it, but his motion
proved unsuccessful. Indeed, the motion was not made until so late
an hour of the session that even if it had prevailed, the bill
could not have passed both Houses before the final adjournment.
Thus the President was left both without a collector of customs,
and most probably without any law which a collector could have
carried into effect, had such an officer existed. Mr. Bingham’s
bill shared the fate of all other legislative measures, of
whatever character, intended either to prevent or to confront the
existing danger. From the persistent refusal to pass any act
enabling either the outgoing or the incoming administration to
meet the contingency of civil war, it may fairly be inferred that
the friends of Mr. Lincoln, in and out of Congress, believed he
would be able to settle the existing difficulties with the cotton
States in a peaceful manner, and that he might be embarrassed by
any legislation contemplating the necessity of a resort to hostile
measures.

Footnote 153:

_Cong. Globe_, p. 236, bills H. R., No. 910.

Footnote 154:

H. Journal, p. 465.

The 36th Congress expired on the 3d March, 1861, leaving the law
just as they found it. They made no provision whatever for the
suppression of threatened rebellion, but deliberately refused to
grant either men or money for this purpose. It was this violation
of duty which compelled President Lincoln to issue a proclamation
convening the new Congress, in special session, immediately after
the attack on Fort Sumter.[155]

Footnote 155:

Buchanan’s Defence, p. 153, _et seq._

It is proper to state that President Lincoln did not accord to the Montgomery Commissioners any official reception as representatives of an independent government. But as will hereafter appear, his Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, through the intervention of distinguished persons in Washington, held much informal intercourse with them in regard to the evacuation of Fort Sumter, the result of which was that the commissioners left Washington believing, or professing to believe, that they had been duped by a promise to withdraw the troops, which had not been fulfilled, but, on the contrary, that secret preparations were making by Mr. Lincoln’s government to send reinforcements. This has always been assigned as the excuse for the attack on Fort Sumter.[156]

Footnote 156:

In the 1st vol. of Mr. Jefferson Davis’s work, “Rise and Fall of
the Confederate Government,” will be found a full statement of the
Confederate side of the story relative to the intercourse between
the commissioners and Mr. Seward. I refer to it without either
assent or dissent, as it is not my province to examine the truth
or falsity of the charge made against the Lincoln administration.
It will be seen from the letters written by Mr. Stanton to Mr.
Buchanan during March and the early part of April (quoted _post_),
what opinion Mr. Stanton formed from all the information that he
could obtain, respecting the course of the new administration.