Chapter III (1)

1852-1853.

PERSONAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT ELECT AND WITH MR.
MARCY, HIS SECRETARY OF STATE—BUCHANAN IS OFFERED THE MISSION TO
ENGLAND—HIS OWN ACCOUNT OF THE OFFER, AND HIS REASONS FOR
ACCEPTING IT—PARTING WITH HIS FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS IN
LANCASTER—CORRESPONDENCE WITH HIS NIECE.

The private correspondence between Mr. Buchanan and the new President, General Pierce, and his Secretary of State, will best explain his relations to this administration; and he has himself left a full record of the circumstances under which he accepted the mission to England in the summer of 1853.

[FROM GENERAL PIERCE.]

CONCORD, N. H., November 1, 1852.

MY DEAR SIR:—

Your kind letter of the 26th instant was received yesterday.

Your conclusion as to attending the meeting at Tammany Hall was what I
should have expected, marked by a nice sense of the fitness of things.

The telegraphic despatches received late this evening would seem to
remove all doubt as to the result of the election. Your signal part in
the accomplishment of that result is acknowledged and appreciated by
all. I hope to have the pleasure of meeting you at no distant day.

Your friend,
FRANK PIERCE.

[FROM GENERAL PIERCE.]

CONCORD, N. H, December 7, 1852.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I have been hoping ever since the election that I might have a
personal interview with you, if not before, certainly during the
present month. But the objections to such a meeting suggested by you
while I was at the sea-shore now exist, perhaps even with greater
force than at that time. With our known pleasant personal relation a
meeting would doubtless call forth many idle and annoying speculations
and groundless surmises.

An interchange of thoughts with Colonel King (whose returning health
is a source of great joy to me) would also be peculiarly pleasant and
profitable, but here, again, there are obstacles in the way. He cannot
come North, and I cannot go to Washington. Communication by letter is
still open. My thoughts for the last four weeks have been earnestly
turned to the formation of a cabinet. And although I must in the end
be responsible for the appointments, and consequently should follow my
own well-considered convictions, I cannot help saying often to myself
how agreeable it would be to compare conclusions upon this or that
point with Mr. Buchanan. I do not mean to trouble you with the many
matters of difficulty that evidently lie in my path. So far as I have
been able to form an opinion as to public sentiment and reasonable
public expectation, I think I am expected to call around me gentlemen
who have not hitherto occupied cabinet position, and in view of the
jealousies and embarrassments which environ any other course, this
expectation is in accordance with my own judgment, a judgment
strengthened by the impression that it is sanctioned by views
expressed by you. Regarding you with the confidence of a friend, and
appreciating your disinterested patriotism as well as your wide
experience and comprehensive statesmanship, I trust you will deem it
neither an intrusion nor annoyance when I ask your suggestions and
advice.

If not mistaken in this, you will confer a great favor by writing me,
as fully as you may deem proper, as to the launching (if I may so
express myself) of the incoming administration, and more especially in
regard to men and things in Pennsylvania. In relation to appointments
requiring prompt action after the inauguration, I shall, as far as
practicable, leave Concord with purposes definitely formed, and not
likely to be changed.

Should you deem that I ought not thus to tax you, burn the letter, but
give me, as of yore, your good will and wishes.

I shall regard, as you will of course, whatever passes between us as
in the strictest sense confidential.

Very truly, your friend,
FRANK PIERCE.

[MR. BUCHANAN TO GENERAL PIERCE.]

WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, December 11, 1852.

MY DEAR SIR:—

Your favor of the 7th instant reached me last evening.

You do me no more than justice in “regarding me with the free
confidence of a friend,” and I can say in all sincerity that, both for
your own sake and that of the country, I most ardently desire the
success of your administration. Having asked my suggestions and advice
“as to the launching of the incoming administration,” I shall
cheerfully give it, with all the frankness of friendship.

Your letter, I can assure you, has relieved me from no little personal
anxiety. Had you offered me a seat in your cabinet one month ago,
although highly gratified as I should have been with such a
distinguished token of your confidence and regard, I would have
declined it without a moment’s hesitation. Nothing short of an
imperative and overruling sense of public duty could ever prevail upon
me to pass another four years of my life in the laborious and
responsible position which I formerly occupied. Within the past month,
however, so many urgent appeals have been made to me from quarters
entitled to the highest respect, to accept the State Department, if
tendered, and this, too, as an act of public duty, in view of the
present perplexed and embarrassing condition of our foreign relations,
that in declining it, I should have been placed in an embarrassing
position from which I have been happily relieved by your letter.

But whilst I say this in all sincerity, I cannot assent to the
correctness of the general principle you have adopted, to proscribe in
advance the members of all former cabinets; nor do I concur with you
in opinion, that either public sentiment or public expectation
requires such a sweeping ostracism. I need scarcely, therefore, say
that the impression which you have derived of my opinion in favor of
this measure, from I know not whom, is without foundation. I should be
most unjust towards my able, enlightened and patriotic associates in
the cabinet of Mr. Polk, could I have entertained such an idea. So far
from it that, were I the President elect, I should deem it almost
indispensable to avail myself of the sound wisdom and experienced
judgment of one or more members of that cabinet, to assist me in
conducting the vast and complicated machinery of the Federal
Government. Neither should I be diverted from this purpose by the
senseless cry of “Old Fogyism” raised by “Young America.”

I think the members of Mr. Polk’s cabinet should be placed upon the
same level with the mass of their fellow-citizens, and neither in a
better nor a worse condition. I am not aware that any of them, unless
it may be Governor Marcy, either expects or desires a cabinet
appointment; and certainly all of them will most cheerfully accord to
you the perfect right of selecting the members of your own cabinet.
Still, to be excluded from your consideration, merely because they had
happened to belong to Mr. Polk’s cabinet, could not be very gratifying
to any of them.

To apply your own metaphor, “the launching of the incoming
administration” will, perhaps, be a more important and responsible
duty than has ever fallen to the lot of any of your predecessors. On
the selection of the navigators to assist you in conducting the vessel
of State, will mainly depend the success of the voyage. No matter how
able or skilful the commander may be, and without flattery, I
cheerfully accord to you both ability and skill, he can do but little
without the aid of able and skilful subordinates. So firmly am I
convinced of this truth, that I should not fear to predict the result
of your administration as soon as I shall learn who are the members of
your cabinet. In former times, when the Government was comparatively
in its infancy, the President himself could supervise and direct all
the measures of any importance arising under our complex but most
excellent system of government. Not so at present. This would no
longer be possible, even if the day consisted of forty-eight instead
of twenty-four hours. Hence, from absolute necessity, the members of
your administration will exercise much independent power. Even in
regard to those questions submitted more directly to yourself, from
want of time to make minute examinations of all the facts, you must
necessarily rely much upon the representations of the appropriate
Secretary. My strong and earnest advice to you, therefore, is not to
constitute your cabinet with a view to harmonize the opposite and
fleeting factions of the day; but solely with the higher and nobler
view of promoting the great interests of the country and securing the
glory and lasting fame of your own administration. You occupy a proud
and independent position, and enjoy a popularity which will render any
able and honest Democrat popular who may be honored by your choice for
a cabinet station, provided they are properly distributed over the
Union. In this respect, you are placed in a more enviable position
than almost any of your predecessors. It was a maxim of old Simon
Snyder, the shrewd and popular Governor of our State, that the very
best man ought to be selected for the office, and if not popular at
the moment, he would soon render himself popular. In view of these
important considerations, I would earnestly recommend to you the
practice of General Washington, never finally to decide an important
question until the moment which required its decision had nearly
approached.

I know that a state of suspense is annoying to the human mind; but it
is better to submit to this annoyance for a season than to incur the
risk of a more permanent and greater evil.

You say that you will leave Concord “with purposes definitely formed
and not likely to be changed.”

But is Concord the best locality in the world for acquiring reliable
information and taking extended views of our whole great country? To
Boston I should never resort for this purpose. Pardon me for
suggesting that you ought not to have your resolution definitely fixed
until after your arrival in Washington. In that city, although you
will find many interested and designing politicians, there are also
pure, honest and disinterested Democratic patriots.

Among this number is Colonel King, whom you so highly and justly
commend. He is among the best, purest and most consistent public men I
have ever known, and is also a sound judging and discreet counsellor.
You might rely with implicit confidence upon his information,
especially in regard to the Southern States, which I know are at the
present moment tremblingly alive to the importance of your cabinet
selections. I might cite the example of Mr. Polk. Although in council
with General Jackson, he had early determined to offer me the State
Department, yet no intimation of the kind was ever communicated to me
until a short time before his arrival in Washington, and then only in
an indirect manner; and in regard to all the other members of his
cabinet, he was wholly uncommitted, until the time for making his
selections had nearly approached.

It is true, he had strong predilections in favor of individuals before
he left Tennessee, but I do not think I hazard much in saying, that
had these been indulged, his administration would not have occupied so
high a place as it is destined to do in the history of his country.

One opinion I must not fail to express; and this is that _the cabinet
ought to be a unit_. I may say that this is not merely an opinion of
mine, but a strong and deep conviction. It is as clear to my mind as
any mathematical demonstration. Without unity no cabinet can be
successful. General Jackson, penetrating as he was, did not discover
this truth until compelled to dissolve his first cabinet on account of
its heterogeneous and discordant materials. I undertake to predict
that whoever may be the President, if he disregards this principle in
the formation of his cabinet, he will have committed a fatal mistake.
He who attempts to conciliate opposing factions by placing ardent and
embittered representatives of each in his cabinet, will discover that
he has only infused into these factions new vigor and power for
mischief. Having other objects in view, distinct from the success and
glory of the administration, they will be employed in strengthening
the factions to which they belong, and in creating unfortunate
divisions in Congress and throughout the country. It was a regard to
this vital principle of unity in the formation of his cabinet which
rendered Mr. Polk’s administration so successful. We were all personal
and political friends, and worked together in harmony. However various
our views might have been and often were upon any particular subject
when entering the cabinet council, after mutual consultation and free
discussion we never failed to agree at last, except on a very few
questions, and on these the world never knew that we had differed.

I have made these suggestions without a single selfish object. My
purpose is to retire gradually, if possible, and gracefully from any
active participation in public affairs, and to devote my time to do
historical justice to the administration of Mr. Polk, as well as to
myself, before the tribunal of posterity. I feel, notwithstanding, a
deep and intense interest in the lasting triumph of the good old cause
of Democracy and in that of its chosen standard bearer, to whose
success I devoted myself with a hearty good will.

The important domestic questions being now nearly all settled, the
foreign affairs of the Government, and especially the question of
Cuba, will occupy the most conspicuous place in your administration. I
believe Cuba can be acquired by cession upon honorable terms, and I
should not desire to acquire it in any other manner. The President who
shall accomplish this object will render his name illustrious, and
place it on the same level with that of his great predecessor, who
gave Louisiana to the Union. The best means of acquiring it, in my
opinion, is to enlist the active agency of the foreign creditors of
Spain, who have a direct interest in its cession to the United States.
The Rothschilds, the Barings, and other large capitalists now control,
to a great extent, the monarchies of continental Europe. Besides,
Queen Christina, who is very avaricious and exercises great influence
over her daughter, the queen of Spain, and her court, has very large
possessions in the island, the value of which would be greatly
enhanced by its cession to the United States. Should you desire to
acquire Cuba, the choice of suitable ministers to Spain, Naples,
England and France will be very important. Mr. Fillmore committed a
great outrage in publishing the Cuban correspondence. Had he, however,
not suppressed a material portion of my instructions to Mr. Saunders,
every candid man of all parties would have admitted, without
hesitation, that under the then existing circumstances it was the
imperative duty of Mr. Polk to offer to make the purchase. Indeed, I
think myself, it was too long delayed.

In my opinion, Mr. Clayton and Mr. Webster have involved our relations
with England in serious difficulties by departing from the Monroe
doctrine.

In Pennsylvania we have all been amused at the successive detachments
of those whom we call guerillas, which have visited Concord to assure
you that serious divisions exist among the Democracy of our State.
There never was anything more unfounded. The party is now more
thoroughly united than it has ever been at any period within my
recollection. Whilst the contest continued between General Cass and
myself, many honest Democrats, without a particle of personal or
political hostility to me, preferred him and espoused his cause simply
because he had been the defeated candidate. That feeling is at an end
with the cause which gave it birth, and these honest Democrats as
heartily despise the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, the ——, etc.,
etc., as do my oldest and best friends. In truth the guerillas are now
chiefs without followers. They are at present attempting to galvanize
themselves at home through the expected influence of your
administration. Their tools, who will nearly all be applicants for
office, circulate the most favorable accounts from Concord. They were
scarcely heard of previous to the October election, which was the
battle of the 23d December; but if we are to believe them, they
achieved the victory of the 8th January. These are the men who
defeated Judge —— at the election in October, 1851, by exciting
Anti-Catholic prejudices against him, and who have always been
disorganizers whenever their personal interests came in conflict with
the success of the party. Thank Heaven, they are now altogether
powerless, and will so remain unless your administration should impart
to them renewed vigor. Their principal apprehension was that you might
offer me a seat in your cabinet, but for some time past they have
confidently boasted that their influence had already prevented this
dreaded consummation.

Their next assault will be upon my intimate friend, Judge ——, who
will, I have no doubt, be strongly presented to you for a cabinet
appointment. The Judge is able, honest and inflexibly firm, and did,
to say the very least, as much as any individual in the State to
secure our glorious triumph. I might speak in similar terms of ——. To
defeat such men, they will lay hold of ——, Mr. ——, or any other
individual less obnoxious to them, and make a merit of pressing him
for a cabinet appointment from Pennsylvania.

They calculate largely upon the influence of General Cass, who,
strangely enough, is devoted to them, although their advocacy rendered
it impossible that he should ever be nominated or elected by the vote
of the State.

As a private citizen, I shall take the liberty of recommending to you
by letter, at the proper time, those whom I consider the best
qualified candidates for different offices within our State, and you
will pay such attention to my recommendations as you may think they
deserve. I would not, if I could, exclude the honest friends of
General Cass from a fair participation.... They are and always have
been good Democrats, and are now my warm friends. But I shall ever
protest against the appointment of any of the disorganizers who,
professing Democracy, defeated Judge ——, and not content with
advocating General Cass in preference to myself, which they had a
perfect right to do, have spent their time and their money in abusing
my personal character most foully and falsely.

Even ——, the editor of the ——, whose paper was almost exclusively
devoted to the propagation of these slanders, to be circulated under
the frank of Senator —— throughout the South, for they had no
influence at home, is a hopeful candidate for office, as they profess,
under your administration.

I have now, from a sense of duty, written you by far the longest
letter I ever wrote in my life, and have unburdened my mind of a
ponderous load. I have nothing more to add, except a request that you
would present me kindly to Mrs. Pierce, and believe me to be always,
most respectfully,

Your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.

[GENERAL PIERCE TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

CONCORD, N. H., December 14, 1852.

MY DEAR SIR:—

Language fails me to express the sincere gratitude I feel for your
kind and noble letter of the 11th inst. I cannot now reply as I ought,
but lose no time in expressing my deep sense of obligation. I ought,
in justice to the citizens of Pennsylvania who have visited Concord
during the summer and autumn, to say that I do not recollect a single
individual who has ventured to make a suggestion in relation to
yourself, calculated in the slightest degree to weaken my personal
regard.

It is far from my purpose to hasten to any conclusion in relation to
my cabinet.

It is hardly possible that I can be more deeply impressed than I now
am as to the importance of the manner in which it shall be cast, both
for the interests of the country and my own comfort. I cannot,
however, view the advantages of my presence at Washington in the same
light with yourself, though having no object but the best interests of
our party and the country; personal inclination and convenience will,
if I know it, have no weight upon my course in any particular.

I must leave for a future time many things I desire to say. Do you
still anticipate passing a portion of the winter at the South?

With sincere regard, your friend,
FRANK PIERCE.

[MARCY TO BUCHANAN.]

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1853.

MY DEAR SIR:—

If not a matter of strict duty, I choose to regard it as a proper
thing to explain my movements to you. A few days after the late
Presidential election, I went south with my son Edmund, about whose
condition as to health I had become alarmed, and am still very
solicitous. In the first week of February, he took a steamer for some
of the West India Islands, and I concluded it to be my duty to return
to my deserted family at Albany. I arrived at Richmond, Virginia,
about the 20th of February, with a disposition to pass on to the North
without going through Washington. As I had never done anything at that
place for which I ought to be ashamed (or rather I thought I had not),
it appeared to me it would be cowardly to run around or through it. I
was very much inclined to go and perchance to stop there a few days.
The doubts which distracted me in regard to my course were almost
entirely removed by a letter from a person whom I had never seen,
suggesting that it might be well for me to be in Washington about the
20th ult. On my appearance there a rumor suddenly arose that I was
certainly to be one of the new cabinet, and the same liberty was taken
with the names of several other persons. I have heard in an
unauthentic way that you had been wise enough to take precautions
against such a use of your name. It is now generally believed here,
and I believe it myself, that I may be in the cabinet of the incoming
administration, and (to confess all) I have been weak enough to make
up my mind to accept a seat if offered one in it. Should it be the
place you filled with so much ability, I may be rash enough not to
decline it. I have told you all; here I am and here I am likely to be,
for a brief period at least.

I do not think you will approve of what I have done. I hope you will
not severely censure me, or the judgment which will put me where I
expect to be. If it is an error, either on my part or that of another,
there are some circumstances to excuse it, but I have not time to
present them in detail.

I hope to have a frank and free intercourse with you. I will go
further, I hope to have—what I know I shall much need—the aid in some
emergencies of your greater experience and better knowledge. It will
give me sincere pleasure to hear from you.

Yours truly,
W. L. MARCY.

On the 30th of March (1853), the President wrote to Mr. Buchanan and requested him to accept the mission to England. In his reply, Mr. Buchanan postponed a final answer, and what ensued appears from the following detailed account, which remains in his hand-writing.

Although gratified with this offer, I felt great reluctance in
accepting it. Having consulted several friends, in whose judgment I
have confidence, they all advised me to accept it, with a single
exception (James L. Reynolds). I left Lancaster for Washington on
Thursday, 7th April, wholly undecided as to my course. On Friday
morning (8th April) I called upon the President, who invited me to
dine with him “_en famille_” that day. The only strangers at the table
were Mr. John Slidell and Mr. O’Conor. After the dinner was over the
President invited me up to the library, where we held the following
conversation:

I commenced by expressing to him my warm and grateful acknowledgments
for the offer of this most important mission, and said I should feel
myself under the same obligations to him whether it was accepted or
declined; that at my age, and contented and happy as I was at home, I
felt no disposition to change my position, and again to subject myself
to the ceremonious etiquette and round of gaiety required from a
minister at a foreign court.

Here the President interrupted me and said: “If this had been my only
purpose in sending you abroad, I should never have offered you the
mission. You know very well that we have several important questions
to settle with England, and it is my intention that you shall settle
them all in London. The country expects and requires your services as
minister to London. You have had no competitor for this place, and
when I presented your name to the cabinet they were unanimous. I think
that under these circumstances I have a right to ask you to accept the
mission.”

To this I replied that Mr. Polk was a wise man, and after deliberation
he had determined that all important questions with foreign nations
should be settled in Washington, under his own immediate supervision;
that he (President Pierce) had not, perhaps, seriously considered the
question.

He promptly replied that he had seriously considered the question, and
had arrived at the conclusion that better terms could be obtained in
London at the seat of power than through an intermediate agent in this
country; and instanced the Oregon negotiation as an example.

From this opinion I did not dissent, but asked: “What will Governor
Marcy say to your determination? You have appointed him Secretary of
State with my entire approbation; and I do not think he would be
willing to surrender to your minister at London the settlement of
these important questions, which might reflect so much honor upon
himself.”

He replied, with some apparent feeling, that he himself would control
this matter.

I interposed and said: “I know that you do; but I would not become the
instrument of creating any unpleasant feelings between yourself and
your Secretary of State by accepting the mission, even if I desired
it, which is not the case.”

He replied that he did not believe this would be the case. When he had
mentioned my name to the cabinet, although he did not say in express
terms I should be entrusted with the settlement of these questions,
yet from the general tone of his remarks they must have inferred that
such was his intention. He added, that after our interview he would
address a note to Governor Marcy to call and see him, and after
conversing with him on the subject he would send for me.

I then mentioned to him that there appeared to me to be another
insurmountable obstacle to my acceptance of the mission. I said: “In
all your appointments for Pennsylvania, you have not yet selected a
single individual for any office for which I recommended him. I have
numerous other friends still behind who are applicants for foreign
appointments; and if I were now to accept the mission to London, they
might with justice say that I had appropriated the lion’s share to
myself, and selfishly received it as an equivalent for their
disappointment. I could not and would not place myself in this
position.”

His answer was emphatic. He said: “I can assure you, if you accept the
mission, Pennsylvania shall not receive one appointment more or less
on that account. I shall consider yours as an appointment for the
whole country; and I will not say that Pennsylvania shall not have
more in case of your acceptance than if you should decline the
mission.” I asked him if he was willing I should mention this
conversation publicly. He said he would rather not; but that I might
give the strongest assurances to my friends that such would be his
course in regard to Pennsylvania appointments.

We then had a conversation respecting the individual appointments
already made in Pennsylvania, which I shall not write. He told me
emphatically, that when he appointed Mr. Brown collector, he believed
him to be my friend, and had received assurances to that effect;
although he knew that I greatly preferred Governor Porter. He also had
been assured that Wynkoop was my friend, and asked if I had not
recommended him; and seemed much surprised when I informed him of the
course he had pursued.

I then stated, that if I should accept the mission, I could not
consent to banish myself from my country for more than two years. He
replied, that at the end of two years I might write to him for leave
to return home, and it should be granted; adding, that if I should
settle our important questions with England at an earlier period, I
might return at the end of eighteen months, should I desire it.

The interview ended, and I heard nothing from the President on Friday
evening, Saturday or Sunday, or until Monday morning. In the mean
time, I had several conversations with particular friends, and
especially with Mr. Walker (at whose house I stayed), Judge Campbell
and Senator Bright, all of whom urged me to accept the mission. The
latter informed me that if I did not accept it, many would attribute
my refusal to a fear or an unwillingness to grapple with the important
and dangerous questions pending between the United States and Great
Britain.

On Sunday morning, April 10th, the _Washington Union_ was brought to
Mr. Walker’s, from which it appeared that the session of the Senate
would terminate on the next day at one o’clock, the President having
informed the Committee to wait upon him, that he had no further
communications to make to the body. At this I was gratified. I
presumed that the President, after having consulted Governor Marcy,
had concluded not to transfer the negotiations to London; because it
had never occurred to me that I was to go abroad on such an important
mission without the confirmation of the Senate. Mr. Walker and myself
had some conversation on the subject, and we agreed that it was
strange the Senate had been kept so long together without submitting
to them the important foreign appointments; as we both knew that in
Europe, and especially in England, since the rejection of Mr. Van
Buren’s appointment, a minister had not the proper prestige without
the approbation of the co-ordinate branch of the Executive power.

On Sunday morning, before dinner-time, I called to see Jefferson
Davis.[6] We had much conversation on many subjects. Among other
things, I told him it was strange that the foreign appointments had
not been agreed upon and submitted to the Senate before their
adjournment. He replied that he did not see that this could make any
difference; they might be made with more deliberation during the
recess. I said a man was considered but half a minister, who went
abroad upon the President’s appointment alone, without the consent of
the Senate, ever since the rejection of Mr. Van Buren. He said he now
saw this plainly; and asked why Marcy had not informed them of
it,—they trusted to him in all such matters. The conversation then
turned upon other subjects; but this interview with Mr. Davis, sought
for the purpose of benefiting my friend, John Slidell, who was then a
candidate for the Senate, has doubtless been the cause why I was
nominated and confirmed as minister to England on the next day.

Footnote 6:

Mr. Davis was Secretary of War.

On Sunday evening a friend informed Mr. Walker and myself that a
private message had been sent to the Senators still in town,
requesting them not to leave by the cars on Monday morning, as the
President had important business to submit to them. This was
undoubtedly the origin of the rumor which at the time so extensively
prevailed, that the cabinet was about to be dissolved and another
appointed.

On Monday morning, at ten o’clock, I received a note from Mr.
Cushing,[7] informing me that “the President would be glad to see me
at once.” I immediately repaired to the White House; and the President
and myself agreed, referring to our former conversation, though not
repeating it in detail, that he should send my name to the Senate. If
a quorum were present, and I should be confirmed, I would go to
England; if not, the matter was to be considered as ended.
Thirty-three members were present, and I was confirmed. On this second
occasion, our brief conversation was of the same character, so far as
it proceeded, with that at our first interview. He kindly consented
that I should select my own Secretary of Legation; and without a
moment’s hesitation, I chose John Appleton, of Maine, who accepted the
offer which I was authorized to make, and was appointed. I left
Washington on Tuesday morning, April 12th.

Footnote 7:

Attorney General.

At our last interview, I informed the President that I would soon
again return to Washington to prepare myself for the performance of my
important duties, because this could only be satisfactorily done in
the State Department. He said he wished to be more at leisure on my
return, that he might converse with me freely on the questions
involved in my mission; he thought that in about ten days the great
pressure for office would relax, and he would address me a note
inviting me to come.

I left Washington perfectly satisfied, and resolved to use my best
efforts to accomplish the objects of my mission. The time fixed upon
for leaving the country was the 20th of June, so that I might relieve
Mr. Ingersoll on the 1st of July.

I had given James Keenan of Greensburg a strong recommendation for
appointment as consul to Glasgow. As soon as he learned my appointment
as minister to England, he wrote to me on the 14th of April, stating
that the annunciation of my acceptance of this mission had created a
belief among my friends there that no Pennsylvanian could now be
appointed to any consulship.

On the 16th of April, I wrote to him and assured him, in the language
of the President, that my appointment to the English mission would not
cause one appointment more or one appointment less to be given to
Pennsylvania than if I had declined the mission.

In answer, I received a letter from him, dated April 21st, in which he
extracts from a letter from Mr. Drum, then in Washington, to him, the
following: “I have talked to the President earnestly on the subject
(of his appointment to Glasgow), but evidently without making much
impression. He says that it will be impossible for him to bestow
important consulships on Pennsylvania who has a cabinet officer and
_the first and highest mission_. Campbell talks in the same strain;
but says he will make it his business to get something worthy of your
acceptance.”

For some days before and after the receipt of this letter, I learned
that different members of the cabinet, when urged for consulates for
Pennsylvanians, had declared to the applicants and their friends that
they could not be appointed _on account of my appointment to London_,
and what the President had already done for the State. One notable
instance of this kind occurred between Colonel Forney and Mr. Cushing.
Not having heard from the President, according to his promise, I
determined to go to Washington for the purpose of having an
explanation with him and preparing myself for my mission. Accordingly,
I left home on Tuesday, May 17th, and arrived in Washington on
Wednesday morning, May 18th, remaining there until Tuesday morning,
May 31st, on which day I returned home.

On Thursday morning, May 19th, I met the President, by appointment, at
9½ o’clock. Although he did not make a very clear explanation of his
conversation with Mr. Drum, yet I left him satisfied that he would
perform his promise in regard to Pennsylvania appointments. I had not
been in Washington many days before I clearly discovered that the
President and cabinet were intent upon his renomination and
re-election. This I concluded from the general tendency of affairs, as
well as from special communications to that effect from friends whom I
shall not name. It was easy to perceive that the object in
appointments was to raise up a Pierce party, wholly distinct from the
former Buchanan, Cass, and Douglas parties; and I readily perceived,
what I had before conjectured, the reason why my recommendations had
proved of so little avail. I thought I also discovered considerable
jealousy of Governor Marcy, who will probably cherish until the day of
his death the anxious desire to become President. I was convinced of
this jealousy at a dinner given Mr. Holmes, formerly of South
Carolina, now of California, at Brown’s Hotel on Saturday, May 21st.
Among the guests were Governor Marcy, Jefferson Davis, Mr. Dobbin, and
Mr. Cushing. The company soon got into high good humor. In the course
of the evening Mr. Davis began to jest with Governor Marcy and myself
on the subject of the next Presidency, and the Governor appeared to
relish the subject. After considerable _bagatelle_, I said I would
make a speech. All wanted to hear my speech. I addressed Governor
Marcy and said: “You and I ought to consider ourselves out of the list
of candidates. We are both growing old, and it is a melancholy
spectacle to see old men struggling in the political arena for the
honors and offices of this world, as though it were to be their
everlasting abode. Should you perform your duties as Secretary of
State to the satisfaction of the country during the present
Presidential term, and should I perform my duties in the same manner
as minister to England, we ought both to be content to retire and
leave the field to younger men. President Pierce is a young man, and
should his administration prove to be advantageous to the country and
honorable to himself, as I trust it will, there is no good reason why
he should not be renominated and re-elected for a second term.” The
Governor, to do him justice, appeared to take these remarks kindly and
in good part, and said he was agreed. They were evidently very
gratifying to Messrs. Davis, Dobbin, and Cushing. Besides, they
expressed the real sentiments of my heart. When the dinner was ended,
Messrs. Davis and Dobbin took my right and left arm and conducted me
to my lodgings, expressing warm approbation of what I had said to
Governor Marcy. I heard of this speech several times whilst I remained
at Washington; and the President once alluded to it with evident
satisfaction. It is certain that Governor Marcy is no favorite.

I found the State Department in a wretched condition. Everything had
been left by Mr. Webster topsy turvy; and Mr. Everett was not
Secretary long enough to have it put in proper order; and whilst in
that position he was constantly occupied with pressing and important
business. Governor Marcy told me that he had not been able, since his
appointment, to devote one single hour together to his proper official
duties. His time had been constantly taken up with office-seekers and
cabinet councils. It is certain that during Mr. Polk’s administration
he had paid but little attention to our foreign affairs; and it is
equally certain that he went into the Department without much
knowledge of its appropriate duties. But he is a strong-minded and
clear-headed man; and, although slow in his perceptions, is sound in
his judgment. He may, and I trust will, succeed; but yet he has much
to learn.

Soon after I arrived in Washington on this visit, I began seriously to
doubt whether the President would eventually entrust to me the
settlement of the important questions at London, according to his
promise, without which I should not have consented to go abroad. I
discovered that the customary and necessary notice in such cases had
not been given to the British government, of the President’s intention
and desire to transfer the negotiations to London, and that I would go
there with instructions and authority to settle all the questions
between the two governments, and thus prepare them for the opening of
these negotiations upon my arrival.

After I had been in Washington some days, busily engaged in the State
Department in preparing myself for the duties of my mission, Mr. Marcy
showed me the project of a treaty which had nearly been completed by
Mr. Everett and Mr. Crampton, the British minister, before Mr.
Fillmore’s term had expired, creating reciprocal free trade in certain
enumerated articles, between the United States and the British North
American provinces, with the exception of Newfoundland, and regulating
the fisheries. Mr. Marcy appeared anxious to conclude this treaty,
though he did not say so in terms. He said that Mr. Crampton urged its
conclusion; and he himself apprehended that if it were not concluded
speedily, there would be great danger of collision between the two
countries on the fishing grounds. I might have answered, but did not,
that the treaty could not be ratified until after the meeting of the
Senate in December; and that in the mean time it might be concluded at
London in connection with the Central American questions. I did say
that the great lever which would force the British government to do us
justice in Central America was their anxious desire to obtain
reciprocal free trade for their North American possessions, and thus
preserve their allegiance and ward off the danger of their annexation
to the United States. My communications on the extent and character of
my mission were with the President himself, and not with Governor
Marcy; and I was determined they should so remain. The President had
informed me that he had, as he promised, conversed with the Governor,
and found him entirely willing that I should have the settlement of
the important questions at London.

The circumstances to which I have referred appeared to me to be
significant. I conversed with the President fully and freely on each
of the three questions, viz: The reciprocal trade, the fisheries, and
that of Central America; and endeavored to convince him of the
necessity of settling them all together. He seemed to be strongly
impressed with my remarks, and said that he had conversed with a
Senator then in Washington, (I presume Mr. Toucey, though he did not
mention the name,) who had informed him that he thought that the
Senate would have great difficulty in ratifying any treaty which did
not embrace all the subjects pending between us and England; and that
for this very reason there had been considerable opposition in the
body to the ratification of the Claims Convention, though in itself
unexceptionable.

The President said nothing from which an inference could be fairly
drawn that he had changed his mind as to the place where the
negotiation should be conducted; and yet he did not speak in as strong
and unequivocal terms on the subject as I could have desired. Under
all the circumstances, I left Washington, on the 31st of May, without
accepting my commission, which had been prepared for me and was in the
State Department. On the 5th of June I received a letter from Governor
Marcy, dated on the first, requesting me to put on paper my exposition
of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty. In this he says nothing about my
instructions on any of the questions between this country and England,
nor does he intimate that he desires my opinion for any particular
purpose. On the 7th of June I answered his letter. In the concluding
portion of my letter, I took the occasion to say: “The truth is that
our relations with England are in a critical condition. Throw all the
questions together into hotchpot, and I think they can all be settled
amicably and honorably. The desire of Great Britain to establish free
trade between the United States and her North American possessions,
and by this means retain these possessions in their allegiance, may be
used as the powerful lever to force her to abandon her pretensions in
Central America; and yet it must be admitted that, in her history, she
has never voluntarily abandoned any important commercial position on
which she has once planted her foot. It cannot be her interest to go
to war with us, and she must know that it is clearly her interest to
settle all the questions between us, and have a smooth sea hereafter.
If the Central American question, which is the dangerous question,
should not be settled, we shall probably have war with England before
the close of the present administration. Should she persist in her
unjust and grasping policy on the North American continent and the
adjacent islands, this will be inevitable at some future day; and
although we are not very well prepared for it at the present moment,
it is not probable that we shall for many years be in a better
condition.”

I also say in this letter to Governor Marcy, that “bad as the treaty
(the Clayton and Bulwer treaty) is, the President cannot annul it.
This would be beyond his power, and the attempt would startle the
whole world. In one respect it may be employed to great advantage. The
question of the Colony of the Bay of Islands is the dangerous
question. It affects the national honor. From all the consideration I
can give the subject, the establishment of this Colony is a clear
violation of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty. Under it we can insist
upon the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Bay of Islands. Without
it we could only interpose the Monroe doctrine against this colony,
which has never yet been sanctioned by Congress, though as an
individual citizen of the United States, I would fight for it
to-morrow, so far as all North America is concerned, and would do my
best to maintain it throughout South America.”

This letter of mine to Governor Marcy, up till the present moment,
June 25, has elicited no response. It may be seen at length in this
book.

Having at length determined to ascertain what were the President’s
present intentions in regard to the character of my mission, I
addressed him a letter, of which the following is a copy, on the 14th
June.

[TO HIS EXCELLENCY, FRANKLIN PIERCE.]

(Private.) WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, June 14,
1853.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I have this moment received yours of the 11th instant, and now enclose
you Mr. Appleton’s resignation. I cannot imagine how I neglected to do
this before. It will be very difficult to supply his place.

If you have changed your mind in regard to the place where our
important negotiations with England shall be conducted, you would
confer a great favor upon me by informing me of this immediately. I
stated to you, in our first conversation on the subject, that Mr.
Polk, after due deliberation, had determined that such negotiations
should be conducted under his own eye at Washington; and it would not
give me the slightest uneasiness to learn, that upon reconsideration,
such had become your determination. I should, however, consider it a
fatal policy to divide the questions. After a careful examination and
study of all these questions, and their mutual bearings upon each
other and upon the interest of the two countries, I am fully convinced
that they can only be satisfactorily adjusted all together. Indeed,
from what you said to me of your conversation with a Senator, and from
what I have since learned, I believe it would be difficult to obtain
the consent of two-thirds of the Senate to any partial treaty. The
South, whether correctly or not, will probably be averse to a
reciprocity treaty confined to the British North American possessions;
and it would be easy for hostile demagogues to proclaim, however
unjustly, that the interests of the South had been bartered away for
the fisheries. But the South might and probably would be reconciled to
such a treaty, if it embraced a final and satisfactory adjustment of
the questions in Central America.

If you have changed your mind, and I can imagine many reasons for
this, independently of the pressure of the British minister to secure
that which is so highly prized by his government,—then, I would
respectfully suggest that you might inform Mr. Crampton, you are ready
and willing to negotiate upon the subject of the fisheries and
reciprocal trade; _but this in connection with our Central American
difficulties_;—that you desire to put an end to all the embarrassing
and dangerous questions between the two governments, and thus best
promote the most friendly relations hereafter;—and that you will
proceed immediately with the negotiation and bring it to as speedy a
conclusion as possible, whenever he shall have received the necessary
instructions. Indeed, the treaty in regard to reciprocal trade and the
fisheries might, in the mean time, be perfected, with a distinct
understanding, however, that its final execution should be postponed
until the Central American questions had been adjusted. In that event,
as I informed you when at Washington, if you should so desire, I shall
be most cordially willing to go there as a private individual, and
render you all the assistance in my power. I know as well as I live,
that it would be vain for me to go to London to settle a question
peculiarly distasteful to the British government, after they had
obtained, at Washington, that which they so ardently desire.

I write this actuated solely by a desire to serve your administration
and the country. I shall not be mortified, in the slightest degree,
should you determine to settle all the questions in Washington.
Whether [you do so] or not, your administration shall not have a
better friend in the country than myself, nor one more ardently
desirous of its success; and I can render it far more essential
service as a private citizen at home than as a minister to London.

With my kindest regards for Mrs. Pierce, and Mrs. Means,

I remain, very respectfully, your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.

P.S.—I should esteem it a personal favor to hear from you as soon as
may be convenient.

From the important character of this letter and the earnest and reiterated request which I made for an early answer, I did not doubt but that I should receive one, giving me definite information, with as little delay as possible. I waited in vain until the 23d June; and having previously ascertained, through a friend, that my letter had been received by the President, I wrote him a second letter on that day, of which the following is a copy.

[TO HIS EXCELLENCY, FRANKLIN PIERCE.]

WHEATLAND, near LANCASTER, June 23, 1853.

MY DEAR SIR:—

Not having yet been honored with an answer to my letter of the 14th
inst., I infer from your silence, as well as from what I observe in
the public journals, that you have finally changed your original
purpose and determined that our important negotiations with England
shall be conducted under your own eye at Washington, and not in
London. Anxious to relieve you from all embarrassment upon the
subject, I desire to express my cordial concurrence in such an
arrangement, if it has been made; and I do this without waiting longer
for your answer, as the day is now near at hand which was named for my
departure from the country.[8] Many strong reasons, I have no doubt,
exist, to render this change of purpose entirely proper and most
beneficial for the public interest. I am not at all surprised at it,
having suggested to you, when we conversed upon the subject, that Mr.
Polk, who was an able and a wise man, had determined that our
important negotiations with foreign powers, so far as this was
possible, should be conducted at Washington, by the Secretary of
State, under his own immediate supervision. With such a change I shall
be altogether satisfied, nay, personally gratified; because it will
produce a corresponding change in my determination to accept the
English mission.