Chapter X: Front Matter (10)

I do not know of any good ground for believing the common report of
treachery, either in the civil or military government of the
country; but I know, that if the principle upon which our
Government act in the prosecution of the war is not cordially felt
here--if the greatness of those interests, which we think now at
stake, is not to the same degree here considered as being of the
very essence and existence of all regulated government, a
Convention will not give them a livelier perception of this common
danger, or teach them to see in it a crisis such as demands greater
energy and exertions, than any other state of things could call
for. But this common principle is not all that is wanting in the
present case: we think, in England, that the preservation of the
Austrian Netherlands is an object important to us as providing a
defence for Holland, and important to the Court of Vienna as
forming a rich and considerable possession to the House of Austria,
and, therefore, making an object of common interest, though
touching Austria still more sensibly than England. If this obvious
view of the interests of both countries prevailed in the
Governments of both--as one might rationally expect that it
would--it would naturally furnish, by common consent, a very
leading and governing motive, as well to the operations of the war,
as to the ultimate issue of it. This, however, is not the view
which is entertained here, or which I can persuade myself is really
acted upon by those whose influence is decisive here.

M. de Thugut, the efficient Minister of this Court, is personally
very much disposed (and long has been so) to the old project of an
exchange of the Netherlands; and though that project appears to be
laid aside for the purpose of conciliating Great Britain and
Holland, yet it is evident that M. de Thugut's opinions are such as
lead him to set but little value upon the possession of the
Netherlands, and, therefore, that every circumstance, either of
expense or of military enterprise, which looks towards the
acquisition and defence of those provinces, is as much discouraged
by him as he can venture to do, without openly declaring the whole
bias of his mind: and it is very remarkable that, much as we have
made it our business to press this to him in all our conversations,
we have never yet been able to draw from him even a cold assent to
the idea of the Low Countries being of any real value in themselves
to the Emperor; though he sometimes feebly admits that, with a
considerable addition to them, they might be made so.

It may be said, that a Convention might engage them on this point,
whatever their inclinations may be; but the answer is, first, that
in point of fact they do object to bind themselves to the employing
one hundred thousand men _in the Netherlands_, though they have not
finally refused it; and secondly, that be there what agreement
there may, the only substantial security for a hearty co-operation
in fighting for that country, or for any manly system to be adopted
hereafter for the preservation of it, must arise from a sense--in
the owners--of the value of its possession, and not from the words
employed in any treaty respecting it. I am aware that part of the
indifference which I so much remark in M. de Thugut may be
affected, for the purpose of throwing the whole weight of the
defence of the Low Countries upon the Maritime Powers; but if that
is his policy, he must mean to support it by abstaining from any
vigorous exertions in behalf of it, and in the end, whether his
coolness and inactivity shall have been produced by a real or
disguised opinion, the result will equally have been fatal to that
earnest and animated concert, which is so much to be wished for on
this occasion.

You see that I have so far considered the Convention, as taking
place upon the terms proposed by us; but you will have known, long
before you receive this letter, that they have persisted from the
first in asking, as indispensable conditions, that their loan must
be completely satisfied in England to enable them to answer the
demands of this year, and that they must receive from England a
considerable subsidy for next campaign, if it is expected that they
should act vigorously in the prosecution of the war, which they
assert themselves to be utterly unable to do without pecuniary
assistance from England. We have urged them very ineffectually on
this point: they declare that they have good hopes of M. de Merey's
succeeding in obtaining these demands at London, and the
negotiation actually hangs upon the report which they hourly expect
from him on this subject; though we have repeatedly told them that
their expectation was hopeless, and that, meanwhile, the delay
occasioned by it might be fatal to those exertions which required
immediate action and enterprise.

What decision the Cabinet will make upon this heavy demand of
subsidy, is doubtless a very important question, of which they will
be the fit and competent judges; but if that question simply turned
upon the supposed probability of our being able to purchase, even
at that dear rate, a proportionate degree of energy and activity in
the war from this Government, I confess I do not hesitate to say
that, from what I see here, I should not believe, if the experiment
is tried, it will well answer their expectations. There is no soul
in the bodies of these men--none, at least, which is alive to the
magnitude of all the objects now at stake, or which leads them to
share with you, as it ought the great points of common danger and
common interest; and while these mainsprings are wanting, it is in
vain to look for such movements and effects as cannot be produced
without them. If this radical defect did not exist; if the
Government here was as earnest as it ought to be in its
contemplation of this war, but really was without the means of
prosecuting it; if it acknowledged and took its proper interest in
the possession of the Netherlands, and asked your assistance to
that object, only because they had exhausted all their own
resources, there might be great inducements to hope that, in
furnishing to them the supply which they wish, you might on your
side expect all the active effects which ought to be produced by
it; but I know not how to hope that a subsidy will give vigour to
their councils or enterprise to their armies; still less can I hope
that a subsidy, given for the preservation of the Netherlands, will
teach them to put a proper value upon those possessions on their
own account, though it certainly would teach them how highly you
value their retaining them on your account.

All M. de Thugut's conversation, even upon the idea of the subsidy
taking place, is evidently adverse to the prosecuting of the war in
the Netherlands; and even when the danger of Holland is urged as a
powerful argument for this course, he very coldly answers that,
supposing the French to succeed in Holland for a time, they would
be glad enough to relinquish it if the arms of the allies were
successful in the interior of France. How, then, can one easily
hope that the payment of a subsidy will reconcile views so
remote--as I apprehend these are--from the wishes of the English
Cabinet, or prevent much of thwarting and contradiction in the
operations of the campaign? I confess that I suspect this
disinclination to the defence of the Netherlands to arise, not only
from a habit of undervaluing them, but partly, too, from a
persuasion that the Maritime Powers must and will, at their own
expense, protect them; and partly, also, from a narrow and timid
view of collecting the whole Austrian force on the German frontier,
so as to be more immediately ready for the defence of the imperial
dominions, as well as to have less reason to fear in their jealousy
of the intentions of the King of Prussia.

Upon this latter point the difficulties are, perhaps, much more
likely to be increased than to be relieved, by transferring the
Prussian subsidy to the army of Austria, because the Court of
Berlin will doubtless express great dissatisfaction at that
measure; and everything which excites their apprehension here, will
naturally more or less interfere with the energy of their
operations against France. I do not mean that these arguments would
be stated as reasons against their acting up to the conditions of
the subsidy; but I fear they would nevertheless be found to have
too much influence and effect in practice.

The objections which have seemed to me to arise against a large
subsidy to Austria--from the little hope which I should have of its
producing from hence that exertion of force, and that course of
military operations which, with a view to Holland, we should think
ourselves fully entitled to--are of course much increased by my
apprehension of the bad and dangerous consequences which would
affect our Government at home, from a second disappointment of so
costly an experiment, which I must hope need not be considered as
necessary to the prosecution of the war.

If it is true--as it may, perhaps, be found--that much of the
languor and apathy of this Court arises out of a confidence in the
greatness of our exertions, which may allow them to be sparing of
their own, if (as there is reason to believe) they have still the
fair means of recruiting their armies and maintaining their present
military force, is it not to be hoped that the necessity of the
case will rouse them to the use of those means, when they see no
other prospect of safety open to them? They sometimes talk stoutly
of all that they would do by arming the empire, and other vigorous
measures, in case the French succeeded in forcing their way to
menace Germany. But why are these exertions to be reserved for any
other situation of things? and why are we to pay them a million and
a half, rather than put them to the full extent of all their own
exertions and resources? Nor is it, perhaps, to be overlooked, in
this view of the subject, that the crooked policy of Prussia would
perhaps acquiesce in the loss of his own subsidy much more readily,
if he does not see it given to Austria, but has the satisfaction of
seeing Austria fight her own battles with her own men and money.
They always insist here, too, that they are sure the King of
Prussia, even if his bargain should not be renewed with England,
will not withdraw entirely from the war, and still less will take a
part hostile to the combined Powers. And whether this speculation
of theirs is true or not, while they believe it, they are more at
liberty to act solely against France, without fearing any attack
from the quarter of Berlin.

The great danger, perhaps, of trying another campaign without
subsidizing either Prussia or Austria, might first be found with
respect to Holland (at least, if the Government here act as they
threaten in the case of being unsubsidized), by their withdrawing
of the Austrian army from the neighbourhood of Maestricht, and
contracting their defence to the limits of their German frontier.
But even if they did so--which may be much doubted--might not
England and Holland, at a smaller expense than that paid to the
King of Prussia, subsidize an army of auxiliary troops to act for
the defence of Holland, and for carrying on the war in the
Netherlands, and have that army really and effectually at their own
disposal, and doing the service which they were paid for. How far
this may be practicable, I do not pretend to judge. If it is so,
nobody could doubt that it would be an expense more grateful to the
public of our own country than that of paying for a force which we
cannot bring as we ought into action, and which we must consider as
compelled by their own interests to continue the war, whether we
pay them or not for doing so. By subsidizing Austria, we acquire no
greater force than that of the last campaign, and we put the
justification of that enormous expense upon the unpromising chance
of a vigour and energy on their part such as they appear to be
altogether incapable of exerting, unless under the pressure of such
a danger as would force them to act without hiring them to do so.

The length of this letter is such as I am really ashamed to add to.

Lord Spencer writes to Lord Grenville by the same opportunity.
Neither he nor I see much prospect of making ourselves useful in
the shape and with the views proposed, and we are therefore
naturally anxious to see the ordinary course resumed in some other
person, and any such arrangements taken as may admit of our return
as soon as without inconvenience might be. We speak the more
directly on this matter, from the entire and perfect agreement of
our view of it, and our opinions concerning it; at the same time,
if, in your determinations at home, it should seem to you that Lord
Spencer can and ought to stay longer, with any fair prospect of
such advantages to this great subject as his peculiar situation
alone could promise, I do not doubt but that he would consent to
protract his stay a little longer; and while he does, I certainly
will not ask to desert him, _bien entendu_, that I cannot think of
staying one hour after him.

Ever, my dear Duke,
Very truly and faithfully yours.

The session had been protracted to the beginning of July, not merely by the interest of passing occurrences, but by the efforts of the Opposition to damage the character and embarrass the action of Ministers. The most remarkable of these movements was a string of resolutions moved in the Upper House by the Duke of Bedford, and in the Lower by Mr. Fox, and urged upon the consideration of both Houses with an amount of ability that could not have failed of its object, had that object been a sound one, or sustained by the public opinion of the country. The main purpose was to obtain from Parliament a protest against the war, and to compel the Government to enter into proposals for a peace with France. After setting forth that the policy of the Administration had been that of strict neutrality before the commencement of hostilities, and that, after the declaration of war, Ministers adopted the policy of resistance to the ambition and aggrandisement of France, the resolutions went on to state, that at the beginning of the war it was considered a matter of general concern in which His Majesty was to have the cordial co-operation of the powers united with him by the ties of interest and alliance; that His Majesty had not received that co-operation; that Russia had not contributed in any shape to the common cause; that Denmark and Sweden had coalesced to defend themselves against any attempt to force them into it; that Venice and Switzerland remained neuter; that Sardinia was subsidized merely to act on the defensive; and that Great Britain was loaded with a subsidy which ought properly to be borne by Prussia; and, finally, that the time was now come when peace might be secured on a permanent basis, and that it was the duty of His Majesty's Ministers to avail themselves of the opportunity.

There was some truth in these statements, although the general deduction was erroneous, and the colouring throughout false. The allies had not given that cordial co-operation to Great Britain which they were bound to do, and Prussia had evaded the onus of the coalition. Mr. Thomas Grenville's letter to the Duke of Portland discovers a great deal more than was known to the Duke of Bedford or Mr. Fox in illustration of these facts; and the correspondence that follows, which is of the highest importance from the confidential character of its details, confirms them. But the attempt to cast the responsibility of these circumstances upon the English Cabinet was equally ungenerous and unjust. The policy of Ministers had undergone no change, except that which was contingent upon the altered situation of affairs. To preserve a strict neutrality in the face of a declaration of war, was clearly impossible; and to abandon the war, from an abstract desire for peace, at a time when the common enemy had gained enormous advantages, and were menacing the tranquillity and liberties of other nations, and threatening an invasion of England, would have precipitated results the very reverse of those contemplated by the Opposition. To have made proposals to France on what the resolutions termed "equitable and moderate conditions of reconciliation," would have involved two serious difficulties--the negotiation, in the first place, with a Government of anarchy which England had justifiably refused to treat with from the outset; and, in the second place, the admission of the power of France to dictate terms which England could not accept without degradation, or refuse without aggravating the existing grounds of hostility. Circumstances might arise--such as a change in the Government--to obviate the former difficulty; but the latter was insuperable. It would have been inconsistent with the principles upon which the war was undertaken to have proposed or submitted to any conditions which France, exulting over her recent successes, could have been expected to approve; and the result of such a negotiation at such a moment must have been, in any event, fruitless and inglorious. The decision of Parliament was unequivocal and decisive. The Duke of Bedford's motion was lost on the question of adjournment, and Mr. Fox's thrown out by a majority of 210 against 57 votes. The influence of the Opposition was overthrown. The country was against them, and their ranks were daily weakened by secessions. So strongly and unanimously had the Parliament pronounced its judgment in favour of the maintenance of the war, that His Majesty at the close of the session was enabled to urge both Houses "to persevere with increased vigour and exertion in the present arduous contest against a power irreconcilably hostile in its principles and spirit to all regular and established government."

Immediately after the close of the session, some changes took place in the _materiel_ of the Administration, arising out of the accession of power the Ministry had obtained by the adhesion of some of the leading Whigs. The Duke of Portland (to whom Mr. Thomas Grenville addressed his first letters from Vienna) was appointed Third Secretary of State; Earl Fitzwilliam, Lord President of the Council; Earl Spencer, Privy Seal; and Mr. Wyndham, Secretary at War. Further changes took place before the close of the year, when Lord Fitzwilliam accepted the Government of Ireland, and was succeeded as President of the Council by Earl Mansfield. Lord Spencer, at the same time, was placed at the head of the Admiralty; and Lord Chatham, the brother of the Premier, who had for some years occupied that department, was made Lord Privy Seal.

The junction with the Whigs was, as far as it went, a new coalition; but, under the circumstances which led to it, a coalition of a very different character from that which had been entered into by Mr. Fox and Lord North. The old elements of the Cabinet still held the ascendancy; and although some sincere friends of Mr. Pitt doubted the prudence of admitting the Whigs to office, no actual disturbance of the existing system was apprehended from it. All agreed upon the question of the war--the one great question upon which agreement was essential to the repose and security of the country. In forming this alliance, however, another question had been overlooked, which was now daily rising into importance, and upon which the Whigs differed widely from Mr. Pitt, not so much in principles, as in the time and mode of their application. That question, the clog and difficulty of every Administration, was Ireland. But the moment had not yet arrived when the dangers of this question became manifest.

The following series of letters trace the whole course of the negotiations going forward on the continent, and exhibit in minute detail the actual position in which England stood in her relation to the rest of the allies, and the incessant energy she exerted in vain to awaken them to a just sense of their obligations.

LORD GRENVILLE TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

(Private.) St. James's Square, Aug. 26th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I have to acknowledge your private letters, which I do not attempt
to answer by this conveyance for obvious reasons, and only write
that you may not receive my public despatch without a line to tell
you that your private letters have reached me, and that I will
state to you, by a safer opportunity, what occurs to me upon them.
I am a little out of humour with you for not telling me how you
bore your journey, and how you are, but I am willing to hope it has
not renewed any symptoms of your former complaint. There never was
such a succession of cross-incidents as seem to have accompanied
every part of poor Merey's mission, and I fear his loss is a
serious one to us all. What do you think of Robespierre's death? I
look upon it as a very favourable event, not from any opinion that
I ever entertained of his personal talents, but because those who
succeed him are evidently under the necessity of lowering the
despotism of the Revolutionary Government, and of giving up thereby
the great instrument with which they worked. A strong proof of
this, and a circumstance very favourable in itself, is, that
instead of a Committee of six or eight efficient persons who
conducted the Government in all its branches, and with absolute
power, they have already been obliged to institute twelve
Committees, who are to be chosen with a sort of rotation, those who
go out not being re-eligible. This is, in fact, a substitution of
the weakest possible form of Executive Government in lieu of the
strongest.

God bless you, my dearest brother, and believe me
Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

We have received this morning accounts from Italy, mentioning the
reduction of Calvi. You will probably have heard it by this time.

It was in the beginning of this month of August, that the Duke of York, at that time stationed at Breda, retreated before the French towards Bois-le-Duc; and afterwards, upon the advance of General Pichegru, crossed the Maese, and took up a fresh position near Grave. Seeing the necessity of placing the conduct of the campaign in more experienced hands, Ministers now proposed to give the command in chief to Lord Cornwallis; but before this step could be finally resolved upon, it was necessary to consult the feelings of His Majesty on the subject. Mr. Pitt therefore submitted a statement to the King, assigning the reasons which induced him to urge the appointment of Lord Cornwallis upon His Majesty's consideration; and suggesting that Mr. Wyndham should be sent on a mission to the army. The following was His Majesty's answer:

Weymouth, August 27th, 1704. Thirty-five minutes past One, P.M.

I have this instant received Mr. Pitt's letter accompanying the
Paper of Considerations, which I undoubtedly should wish to keep;
but not knowing whether Mr. Pitt has a fair copy of it, I have
thought it safest to return.

Whatever can give vigour to the remains of the campaign, I shall
certainly as a duty think it right not to withhold my consent; but
I own, in my son's place, I should beg my being allowed to return
home, if the command is given to Lord Cornwallis, though I should
not object to the command being entrusted to General Clairfayt.
From feeling this, I certainly will not write, but approve of Mr.
Wyndham's going to the army, and shall be happy if my son views
this in a different light than I should.

I will not delay the messenger, as I think no time ought to be lost
in forming some fixed plan, and that the measure of sending Mr.
Wyndham is every way advantageous.

GEORGE R.

It is hardly necessary to observe that Mr. Wyndham was sent upon his mission; and that the Duke of York, having met some further reverses, which almost incapacitated the troops from acting even on the defensive, shortly afterwards returned to England.

LORD GRENVILLE TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

(Private.) St. James's Square, Aug. 29th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

The despatch which you will receive by this messenger, and the
letter which Wyndham has promised to write to you from the British
head-quarters, will explain to you the whole of the system which we
have adopted, as affording the only hope of vigorous or successful
exertion. The Austrian Government is already prepared for your
proposal, respecting the giving to Lord Cornwallis the command of
the whole combined force, as Count Starhemberg is apprized of it,
having, indeed, himself in a great degree suggested the measure, on
some general hints which I threw out to him, in order to try the
ground. For the moment, the great point seems to be to bring them
to acquiesce in the virtual command which his rank of Field-Marshal
will give him over Clairfayt, and to send positive orders to the
latter to that effect; and if there should be any difficulty in
Clairfayt's submitting to this, then to let Clairfayt absent
himself for the moment, and leave the Austrian troops under the
command of some officer whose standing will occasion no difficulty
in this respect. You will observe that, by virtual command, we mean
precisely the same deference as the Duke of York has shown to the
Prince of Coburg, not extending to any of the points of military
etiquette by which command is usually rendered ostensible, but
going to the effect of complying with his suggestions respecting
the mode of executing the operations agreed upon in concert, when
the instructions of his Court do not interfere with such
suggestions. Before you receive this letter, Lord Cornwallis will
probably be on the spot; and it is therefore urgent, to prevent the
first beginnings of dissension, that no time should be lost in
making the Austrians give their orders to Clairfayt. Knowing the
delay of that Government, and the difficulty of getting them to
adopt any decided line of conduct, we have thought it best to do
the thing first, and afterwards to try to obtain their consent to
it. If you succeed, or, indeed, in any case, it will be useful that
you should write directly to Lord C. upon the subject, as that may
save a week, at a time when a week's delay might be of the utmost
importance.

With respect to the Duke of York, Wyndham will probably tell you in
confidence how he succeeds in his negotiation. It certainly is a
pretty strong instance of zeal and desire to facilitate whatever
can promote the cause, when he undertakes a task of no less
difficulty than the reconciling the mind of a young Prince to a
supercession in his military command, and that too at the precise
moment of moving forwards, after so mortifying a retreat. I am,
however, not without hopes of his success; and, at all events, the
moment was too critical to suffer any consideration to interfere
with the only means of salvation that appeared practicable.

With respect to the languor of the Austrian Government, and the
doubt whether even money will obtain from them decisive efforts, we
have strongly felt the force of all that you have stated on that
head. But we are inclined to flatter ourselves, that if we once
obtain so large a force as is mentioned in my despatch, and can put
that force, in addition to our own, under the absolute and supreme
direction of such a man as Lord Cornwallis, we shall at least be
able to say to ourselves, whatever be the result, that we have done
everything that it was possible to do; and without trying this
measure, I confess for one that I should not have that sentiment in
my mind. I lament that we have thought ourselves obliged to bring
forward the discussion of a precise barrier, and yet I do not see
how it could be avoided. But the impression may be very bad on
their minds, if we appear to be narrowing the benefits which they
are to derive from exertion, instead of animating them by the hope
of increased advantage. I have not dwelt on this point in my
despatch, as you mention that you intended to write further upon
it.

When the idea of transferring the subsidy was opened to me by
Starhemberg, from Merey's instructions it was expressly stated, as
a part of the plan, that the empire could be made to subsidize the
Prussian troops; and this agrees with every information we receive
on the subject, all which concur in stating the efforts of the
empire, particularly in money, as being very far below what they
could be brought to make by the joint exertions of Austria and
Prussia. But on my pressing Starhemberg for further detail on this
point, he has always avoided it, assuring me, whether truly or not,
that he found no particulars respecting it among Merey's papers.
You will see that in the despatch we make the whole dependent on a
complete and _bona fide_ execution of this point, and my language
to him has always been of the same nature. But I confess that it is
on this point that I feel the strongest apprehensions, and I much
fear that Austria will both be disposed to evade it, and, in truth,
unable to accomplish it. Should this be the case, the whole plan
must be abandoned; and we should, I believe, in that event, be
disposed to turn our subsidy to the object of raising other force,
of whatever nature, so as, if possible, to form a separate British
and Dutch army, destined to act under Lord Cornwallis, without the
pretence or show of concert with either of the German Powers.

With respect to your remaining at Vienna, you will easily conceive,
that having a project of this nature to propose, none of us thought
we should give it its fair chance if we put it into other hands
than those in which the business now is. We allow for your natural
desire of quitting a scene which, God knows, must be mortifying
enough to men who feel how much of the safety of Europe depends on
the conduct of the Austrian Government, and who see how unfit that
Government is to be trusted with the interests of the smallest
corporation. But we are confident that as long as there may remain
the hope of doing so much good as would, we trust, be done by the
complete success of the present plan, you will not be unwilling to
give your assistance to it.

With respect to what you mention about yourself, you know my wishes
on the subject, but I certainly will not urge them beyond what you
are disposed to do. The proposal Lord Fitzwilliam makes to you is,
I fairly own, in my apprehension, one less eligible than that of
Vienna; but I fear a nearer view of that Court has rather
strengthened than diminished your indisposition to that situation.
You know, as well as I do, all the _desagremens_ belonging to the
post of Irish Secretary; but it is certainly an important and
honourable one, and such as to afford you ample room for showing
yourself such as you are: more, perhaps, than many others which
commonly rank higher in public estimation. My objection to it is
the banishment, which obtains as much as in the foreign missions,
and certainly to the most disagreeable of all countries. I do not
know well how to make myself quite a disinterested adviser; but if
I was to give you fairly the result of my thoughts upon it, I
should still beg you to look at the foreign line, and if that must
not be, I should then say _yes_ to the question of Ireland.

Supposing that _yes_ were decided, let me ask you whether your
remaining some time longer at Vienna, so as finally to conclude,
not the leading points only, but all the details of the arrangement
now in question, and of the preparations for the active scene of
next year, is wholly out of the question? It seems very clear that
no arrangement will happen before that time which can change the
Irish Government, and in the meanwhile you would be honourably and
_most usefully_ employed. I have, however, not hinted this idea to
any individual, nor will I. If all this is wholly out of the
question, I conclude that my reply to your answer to these
despatches, will bring to Lord Spencer and you the King's
permission to return to England.

It would be very satisfactory to you to see how well things are
going on here, and how completely our hopes have been realized on
the subject which employed so much of our time and thoughts this
summer.

God bless you, my dearest brother.

At this time, the new changes in the Administration, already alluded to, were under discussion in the Cabinet; and, amongst the rest, it was proposed that the government of Ireland should be offered to Lord Fitzwilliam. As soon as this appointment was suggested, his Lordship wrote to Mr. Thomas Grenville to offer him the office of Secretary.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO EARL FITZWILLIAM.

(Private.) Vienna, Aug. 30th, 1794,
DEAR LORD FITZWILLIAM,

You will already have heard enough of our proceedings here to give
you no considerable expectations of any great good to be done here;
and if you happen to have been in London, and to have read a very
tedious and long letter which I wrote on the 24th to the Duke of
Portland, you will have seen there, more at large than it is
necessary to repeat, the general view and impression of our minds
as to the business with which we are charged; and the little ground
which there appears to us for hoping that even by satisfying their
pecuniary demands, we could depend upon such exertions being made
in consequence, as the country would expect in return for expense
of so great and heavy a scale. It is very true, to be sure, that in
this as well as in many other cases, the difficulties present
themselves something more readily than the remedies to them, yet
upon the question of the subsidy, if we are right in our
conception that it would not probably produce, either in degree or
in shape, that energy and cordial co-operation which we are looking
for, perhaps no difficulty could be much more serious than that of
engaging ourselves at home in an expense, the disappointment of
which might produce in the minds of the public an effect, both with
respect to the war itself and with respect to the Government which
supports it, of the most perilous description. It is very true that
great objects must sometimes be pursued at great hazards, and
nobody is more ready than I to acknowledge that a greater object
cannot be found than the successful prosecution of this war; but
the peculiar question of subsidy seems to me to apply chiefly to
the mode of carrying on the war, and, I would hope, not to the
entire decision of pursuing or abandoning it.

I will not again go over the same detail which I pursued in my
letter to the Duke of Portland, but satisfy myself with recalling
to your observation, that the Government here, in speaking of the
exertions which they should be driven to the necessity of making,
if the French should threaten the German empire, plainly admitted
that they do still possess resources capable of being applied to
such critical exigencies, and in this confession show pretty
plainly that nothing but the necessity of the case will drive them
to the use of those means. Is it not then probable that a much
greater exertion may be made by that necessity existing in our
refusal of subsidy, than will be made by such pecuniary assistance
being given, as may relieve them from the necessity of making any
exertion of their own?

If the immediate alarm on the side of Holland seems to be a
considerable inducement to the grant of the subsidy, in order to
interest Austria in that very important defence of which the
Netherlands make so essential a part, it should not, on the other
hand, escape notice, that all our observation on their language and
views would lead us very much to doubt how far they would
cordially concur in the defence of the Netherlands, even though
they might consent to do so in the words of their contract;
whatever value they may or may not themselves put upon the
possession of the Low Countries, they always argue and act under
the manifest persuasion, that the Maritime Powers are alone
interested enough in this point to secure its being ultimately
carried, and they give it pretty plainly to be understood, that
they mean to depend upon us for that object. Under this view, they
seem to me always disposed to consider the operations of the
Austrian army in another campaign as likely to be concentered for
efforts from the German frontier, by which means they will have a
more collected force more immediately applying to the Imperial
dominions, and better suited to the jealousies which they entertain
of the King of Prussia, but certainly not best adapted to the
defence of Holland, and the recovery of Brabant.

Perhaps I may be considered as carrying these suspicions too far,
but I own I cannot help fearing too, that the suggestion made by
them of mortgaging the Low Countries to us, is not as security for
the money in question in this and the next campaign, is not a _bona
fide_ offer of their best security, but is considered by them as a
fresh motive for interesting us in their possession of those
territories, and as contributing the more to make that object our
business, by either taking upon ourselves the whole defence of
them, or, what they rather look to, by our purchasing the cession
of them at the peace, by some of the acquisitions which Great
Britain has made in the war: a measure which they may have the more
hope for our concurrence in, if we have two millions lent out upon
the security only of the Austrians regaining those territories at
the peace.

Do not believe that these impressions are taken from any starving
principle of economy, or from a too timid apprehension of the
unpopularity of a subsidy in England; but be assured, that even if
there should be no difficulty at home as to this demand being
acquiesced in, I should retain the same doubts as to any
expectation of proportionate advantages resulting from it, and
should be inclined to believe that even if the whole amount of the
subsidy was to be expended, it might be more advantageously used in
the purchase of Hessians, Swiss, or any other such troops
absolutely at our disposal, in addition to the Austrians, than in
the proposed purchase of increased vigour and activity in the
government and army of this country: you cannot buy what they have
not to sell.

Sept. 14th, 1791.

The former part of this letter had already been written before I
received yours of the 11th of August, which did not reach me till
the 2nd instant. I am very sincerely rejoiced to find by it that
you have made your decision for Ireland, because I believe that
much good may be done there, by your taking that heavy load upon
your shoulders; and although you are wanted enough both in London
and Yorkshire, I am persuaded that for public objects you are still
most wanted at Dublin. I am not enough acquainted with the interior
there, to judge how far the means (as Government now stands) are
competent to the end, or to what degree you may be able to supply
all those links of connection between the two countries, which have
latterly appeared to be very much worn away and broken through. I
presume that it will be found easy enough to continue the same
negative course of administration, and that it will be a work of
great difficulty and delicacy for you to do all that you will think
should be done; I am, therefore, from a strong persuasion of the
arduousness of the task, well pleased to know that it is in such
good hands.

With respect to my undertaking the office of Secretary, I am very
far from being confident that I should be able to make myself, in
that situation, as useful to you as it undoubtedly should be made.
You know it is not the first moment in which I have expressed my
doubts as to that employment, since it is twelve years ago that the
same objections presented themselves to me; and if I still feel the
weight of them, it is not from any disinclination to pull at my oar
in the galley, or from any reluctance to take part in public
measures at a time when I think, as you do, that everything is at
stake; on the contrary, I confess that, all other considerations
put apart, I shall be gratified in making myself actively one of a
system with which the prosperity of the country will, I am
persuaded, be to stand or fall; and I shall be best gratified by
doing this in whatever shape it could be hoped that I should be
serviceable. To foreign mission, I own I know not how to reconcile
myself; and for Ireland, besides my own disinclination to it, I
should have thought Pelham better suited, as I have often told you.
But my own opinion upon this, as upon all other subjects, gives way
to the better judgment of my friends; and if the Duke of Portland
and you think, that in the present state of things, I should do
best to go to Ireland, I cannot say that I will not try it; sure I
am that your going there gives to the situation every advantage
which I can receive in it, and that if my engaging in it could
succeed, it is on every account as promising and gratifying to me
with you, as the situation itself can be made. Thus, therefore, it
stands, that my own inclination, if no difficulties stood in the
way, would rather lead me to any such employment at home as I might
be fit for, when any such offered itself; but no such destination
being easily found, if the Duke of Portland and you think it any
way desirable that I should go to Ireland, I will certainly
undertake it, and do the best I can in it; trusting always, that if
hereafter, when you are settled on your Irish throne, the chance of
events should make any home-situation of business practicable for
me, you would not object to any such arrangement if it could be
found.

The long delay which has prevented my sending a messenger when I
wrote the first sheet of this letter, has now so altered the events
of the negotiation that it is hardly worth sending to you, except
as a proof that want of opportunity, and not want of punctuality,
has prevented my letter reaching you at an earlier period.

The loss of the fortresses, at a moment when they had been
reluctantly induced here to make an effort to save them, is
vexatious in the extreme. They threaten the vengeance of a
court-martial on the officers who surrendered Valenciennes; but
what will that avail towards recovering these great objects, which
were equally material, both to the regaining of the Netherlands,
and to their security when reconquered?

The hopeless inactivity of this Court is too long a theme to write
upon, and will continue, I fear, to be a fertile source of
uneasiness. It is shocking to foresee that their assistance may be
as much wanted to save Holland as it was to save Valenciennes, and
may likewise be retarded till it is equally ineffectual.

I expect to be in England towards the 12th or 15th of November.

Ever very faithfully and affectionately yours,
T. G.

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO MR. T. GRENVILLE.

Camp, Weymouth, Aug. 31st, 1794.
MY DEAR BROTHER,

I have just received your letter of the 16th from Vienna, and am
glad to find from it that you are as well as I wish you to be, and
as sanguine as any one could wish who is less desponding than
myself. I fear that very much of your difficulty is insuperable,
for I have no idea that it is possible to induce the Imperial
Government to exert themselves more for the _recovery_ of Brabant
than they did for the _preservation_ of it. Various circumstances
(some of which you have stated) co-operated to the scandalous
dereliction of a country, which all former history proves to us
might have been defended (even for a losing campaign) with one half
of the allied force; and it is no part of my creed that the zeal or
activity of the Austrian Ministry (even if they act with good
faith) can replace us by the end of November where we were last
year. But if it is to be proposed to us to add Austria to the list
of powers subsidized, and to call upon Great Britain, the _ally_ of
the war, to consider herself as the only principal in it, I fear
that the proposition will meet with every difficulty, and (if
acceded to) with as little success as the subsidy paid to Prussia.
You will then ask me for my solution of this difficulty; and I will
fairly own that I see none, but in endeavouring to stimulate
Austria, by showing them clearly that we will not take the whole
upon our back; and that we can better keep the wolf out of our
house, than they can out of theirs, if the war is to be defensive.

As to the military operations of the Prince of Saxe Coburg, I make
no doubt that he has done very ill; indeed, it seems difficult to
conceive that his groom could have done worse. But I fear that the
ignorance or treachery of the German Generals goes much deeper than
you imagine, for I do not recollect one instance in the course of
this campaign--and perhaps not one in the last--in which they
answered the expectation formed of them. Again, if we imagined that
by protracting the war we might exhaust the enemy, though I might
not agree as to the prospect of success, I could understand it as a
system; but in that case, the war would have been defensive, and
co-operation settled to that object, instead of abandoning the Duke
of York to certain ruin, if the winds and the circumstances of this
country had not permitted Lord Moira's army to arrive just (and
only just) in time to cover their retreat, and communication. These
points are all mysterious to us lookers-on, and perhaps not much
more clear to you at Vienna. The only point clear and indisputable
is, that we begun the campaign offensively in the south-west point
without securing West Flanders; that we undertook by defensive
positions to cover it; and notwithstanding the very slow progress
of the French, which gave us full and ample time, it was lost for
want of sufficient force on the western flank of our combined
force, and for want of co-operation, either of defensive retreat,
or of mutual support in a systematic evacuation of a country so
very tenable. Now, if all this is proposed to be cured by changing
the Commander, and by taking the Austrians into British pay, I fear
that I shall be one of the first to cry out against such a measure,
which cannot in the least tend to remove those difficulties, and
will superinduce many others on the continent, and others more
serious at home, to which you cannot be a stranger. If the object
be to add to our force, we do not accomplish it by changing the
Paymaster or Commander of the troops; but we may obtain a very
considerable force under our immediate and actual command, by
adding to the levies of French troops; or, in plain terms, by
raising an immense French army in British pay, who would not be
liable to be called off _a la Prussienne_ to schemes of plunder, or
possibly of home defence, in the moment in which they are the most
wanted by us. I have taken some pains to get information on this
subject; and I verily believe, that if we take the small remnant of
the Prince of Conde's army into our pay, with him at the head of it
as a foundation, we may in a very short time increase it to
twenty-five, or perhaps thirty thousand men, which, added to our
British, Hessian and Hanoverian army, would effectually support the
Dutch in covering Holland, and would enable us to make a very
serious diversion either in Normandy or in Poitou.

I have written upon this subject more at large than I at first
intended, but it is very difficult to compress it; and having found
it difficult to reconcile the conduct of Ministry in the
management of this campaign to my own feelings, or the plan (so far
as I understand it from common report) of reconquering Brabant for
the Emperor by an Austrian army in British pay, or of assisting
Holland by a force of the same nature on which the experience of
two campaigns shows how little we can depend, I have not thought it
fair to withhold these opinions from you, having stated them to my
other brother as soon as I heard of your mission (and from public
report of the objects of it) to Vienna. But be assured, my dear
brother, that I do not feel the less warmly for your credit, and
for the success of your negotiation (whatever it may be) as far as
the question is personal to yourself. I have always seen, with very
sincere regret, your talents useless to the public; and I am happy,
on every account, that you have found an opportunity of showing
them in co-operation with my brother William, who seemed so happy
in this proof of your confidence and affection.

I feel, as I ought, your anxiety about the yeomanry. I have the
satisfaction of hearing that they go on very well, but of course
meeting very seldom, because of the harvest. Their numbers,
however, increase; and are, as near as can be, as follows:

Captains. Lieutenants. 2nd ditto. Qr. Masters. Numbers.
Lt.-Col. Grenville Fremantle Grubb ---- 47
Praed Mansell Higgins Cooch 60
Sir J. Dashwood W. Hicks T. Mason Clarke 43
Drake K. Mason Clerk ---- 37
Sir W. Young Ch. Clowes L. Way Quanne 29

Most of them have got their swords, and have returned their
pistols, which were most scandalously bad; they have got their
appointments, and (except Young's troop) they come on very well. I
am, however, tied by the leg to Weymouth, while the King is here,
and cannot stir. He is in wonderful health; but very unruly as to
the common precautions which ought to be taken, and which keep me
in constant hot water, notwithstanding our incessant rains. Lord
Howe passed Portland yesterday with thirty-three sail of the line,
and three Portuguese ships; of which one ran foul of the
'Barfleur,' and stove in her bows so as to force her to return to
Portsmouth. All the sea prisoners lately taken, say, that Barrere
is determined to force the Brest fleet of thirty-five sail to sea.
Sir J. B. Warren's last prisoners say, that they were brought from
the interior to Brest, and embarked _handcuffed_; another account
states, that sixteen thousand men have been sent to Brest _en
requisition_, since Lord Howe's action. Our line of battle is
thirty-seven sail, including what is to join at Plymouth; from
which deduct two ships not ready, and the 'Barfleur,' his number
will be thirty-four. He will probably fall in with your friend,
Lord Macartney, who is coming back with "_the Emperor's copy of
verses_," and left St. Helena on the 6th of July with nineteen East
India ships.

Adieu, my dear brother,
Ever most affectionately yours,
N. B.

Sept. 5th, 1794.

P.S.--This letter was begun five days ago, but I have been for the
last four days confined, and very ill from an epidemic, which is
running all over England. It is not confined to the army, and it
has not been fatal, but very painful. I have got clear of it, but I
have above forty men ill of it at this moment. Adieu.