Chapter IX: Front Matter (9)

You must not, from this measure, think the alarm greater than it
is. The step is principally founded on the total inadequacy of our
military force to the necessary exertions.

At the time that the order is sent, directions will be given to
the Lord-Lieutenant immediately to assemble the serjeants, &c., and
to place the arms under proper guard. I am, as you will easily
believe, too much hurried to be able to go into more details.

We have nothing new from abroad.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

I am afraid all visits to Dropmore are quite out of the question.

I do not understand what you say in one of your letters about
quarters instead of lodging.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Saturday, Dec. 1st, 1792.
MY DEAR BROTHER,

The King's orders are this day given to embody the two-thirds of
all the Militias of the counties on the east coast from Scotland to
London, which, together with Cumberland, Westmoreland and Kent,
give us a strength of about five thousand one hundred men.

Parliament will meet on Thursday sev'nnight. Before that time, I
conclude I shall see you here. I am really so occupied, as not to
have a moment to spare.

Dumourier is advancing towards Liege; and I think if some blow is
not already struck by their small force from Ostend against
Flushing, the season secures Holland for some months, during which
much must happen of all sorts.

We have, I trust, secured the Tower and the City, and have now
reason to believe that they are alarmed, and have put off their
intended visit; but we are prepared for the worst.

Ever yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Whitehall, Dec. 5th, 1792.
MY DEAR BROTHER,

We determined last night to call out, in addition to the regiments
already ordered, the Militias of the maritime counties from Kent to
Cornwall, inclusive, and those of Berks, Bucks, Herts, and Surrey.
You will, in consequence, receive by this messenger the warrant and
letter for that purpose. The reason of the addition is partly the
increasing prospect of hostilities with France, and partly the
motives stated in your letter. Our object at first was to limit the
number, in order not to give too great an alarm. The spirit of the
people is evidently rising, and I trust that we shall have energy
enough in the country to enable the Government to assert its true
situation in Europe, and to maintain its dignity.

We shall certainly proceed to business on Thursday; but how long we
shall sit, it is impossible as yet to decide. I think the present
idea is to bring forward the bills immediately which are necessary
for strengthening the hands of Government. Hitherto, we have every
reason to be satisfied with the impression our measure has made.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

Parliament stood prorogued to the 3rd of January; but it was convened by proclamation on the 3rd of December, in consequence of the urgent necessity that existed for adopting immediate measures of internal defence. On the 17th, Lord Grenville introduced his Alien Bill; and two other measures were rapidly passed for interdicting the circulation of French assignats, and preventing the exportation of naval stores and ammunition.

The signs of the future were now darkening the horizon. The French Republic sent over an ambassador extraordinary, under the title of Minister Plenipotentiary, to demand of England whether France was to consider her as a neutral or a hostile power. Lord Grenville refused to negotiate with him in a character which England could not acknowledge; but intimated that if France was desirous of maintaining peace with Great Britain, she must renounce her views of aggression and aggrandizement, and confine herself to her own territory, without insulting other Governments, without disturbing their tranquillity, without violating their rights.

The sequel need not be detailed. The King of France was brought to trial, sentenced to death, and beheaded. This terrible catastrophe terminated the mission of the French Ambassador, who was informed by Lord Grenville that he could no longer remain in this kingdom in a public character, and ordered to retire within eight days. In a week from that time, the Convention passed a decree declaring the Republic of France at war with the King of England and the Stadtholder of Holland.

1793.

CAUSES AND OBJECTS OF THE WAR--SECESSIONS FROM THE OPPOSITION--REVERSES IN HOLLAND--DISASTERS OF THE ALLIES--STATE OF FRANCE AT THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR.

The policy of England in reference to the proceedings in France had hitherto been that of a conservative neutrality. The letter of Lord Grenville to the Marquis of Buckingham, dated 7th November, 1792, to which attention has been specially directed, clearly and unequivocally establishes that fact. Had the motive commonly imputed to Ministers, of having entered into the war for the vindication of the monarchical principle and the restoration of the Bourbons, been really the actuating object, it would have appeared in these confidential communications. Not only, however, is there no such motive avowed or contemplated, but, on the contrary, Lord Grenville declares that the greatest source of pride and satisfaction he finds on reviewing the line of conduct he had acted upon throughout that reign of anarchy, is in the reflection that he had kept England out of it. Up to the last moment, so long as France confined her public acts and the dissemination of her new doctrines to her own territory, the English Government remained merely a spectator of events in which she took no part, and evinced no concern. The case was altered when France invaded Holland, and passed a decree fraternizing with the people of other countries, and offering them assistance to procure their liberties. These were the measures of oppression and aggrandizement referred to by Lord Grenville in his communications with the French Envoy; and upon these grounds, and these grounds alone, England accepted and prosecuted the war.

Immediately after the declaration of hostilities by the Convention, the King sent a message to Parliament explicitly declaring the causes of the war, which were, the occupation by the French of the Scheldt, the exclusive navigation of which had been guaranteed by treaty to the Dutch; the fraternizing decree which invited the people of other countries to revolutionize their Governments; and the danger with which Europe was threatened by the progress of the French arms. In one aspect this was a war of principles; in another, it was a war of self-defence. In both, it was just and inevitable. Even the Opposition admitted the validity of the grounds on which it proceeded, although they could not resist the temptation of assailing the Minister, while they adopted his measures. The resolutions founded on the message were carried with scarcely a shadow of objection in either House of Parliament. The people of all classes were wholly with Mr. Pitt. Amongst the last to be convinced was Mr. Wilberforce, who had a moral aversion to all wars, but who ultimately expressed himself converted to the necessity of war on this occasion.

The effect of the message from the King was remarkable. Numbers of the most influential men, who had previously voted with the Opposition, passed over to the Ministerial benches, including Burke and Wyndham, and the Lords Portland, Spencer, Fitzwilliam, Loughborough, and many other peers and commoners. Lord Loughborough, who had so often run in couples with Thurlow, was now appointed to succeed him on the Woolsack; and Ministers, acquiring augmented strength from all quarters, addressed themselves vigorously to the task of preparation.

The letters of this year are scanty, but not unimportant, in their references to passing events. Taken in connection with the history of the period, which is too familiar to require any further elucidation, they will be found to throw a new light upon some points of contemporary interest.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Whitehall, Jan. 19th, 1793.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

It is at length settled that Lord Loughborough shall take the Seals
on Wednesday. He has written a long letter to the Duke of Portland,
which has not been answered. It is as yet very difficult to say
what proportion of the _ci-devant_ Opposition will follow Lord
Loughborough's example, and join Government avowedly, but I am
inclined to hope a pretty large one. The Prince of Wales has also
written to the Duke of Portland, and sent a message to us,
declaring his intention to join Government. I have not seen the
letter, but _my informant_, to whom it was shown yesterday morning
by the Duke of York, told me it was proper and explicit.

424 against the referring the judgment to the Assemblees Primaires,
283 for it.

The first question, of guilty, decided almost unanimously; the
third, that punishment should be inflicted, was deferred to the
10th.

Brissot's report, which you will see in the French papers, seems
well enough calculated for our purpose. The thing must now come to
its point in a few days; and we shall, I trust, have appeared to
the public here to have put the French completely _dans leur tort_.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Whitehall, June 12th, 1793.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

In consequence of what you requested in the conversation we had at
Dropmore, I write to mention to you that the vacant Ribands are
to-day to be given to Lord Salisbury, Lord Westmoreland, and Lord
Carlisle. I did not learn this yesterday till it was too late to
write to you. With respect to what you mentioned to me of your own
intentions, you know too well what my opinion is, and how anxiously
I am impressed with that opinion, to make me feel it right to urge
you with what could only be a repetition of all I have already
stated. But I wish to make it my earnest request to you that you
will not take any actual step till you have seen Pitt. I have not
told him anything of your idea of taking any measure on this
occasion but I have stated to him in general terms the uneasiness
you still seemed to feel on the subject of the former request, and
the possibility that this impression might be strengthened,
supposing Lord Camden's death to produce that sort of arrangement
to which you had so handsomely consented, but which might,
nevertheless, bring the other idea more forward in your mind.

His plan was (if he had not been hindered by the gout) to have run
down to Somersetshire for a week, at the close of the business in
the House of Commons, and to have been back before he could almost
be known to be gone. He had then intended to take Winchester in his
way. I have not seen him for several days, and cannot therefore say
whether this idea still holds, but at all events there could be no
difficulty in your coming to town for a day or two for that
purpose.

I urge this because I know you may fully rely upon his friendship,
and that even if he should not be able to alter the thing itself,
which I am sure I know not how he can, it is still, in my opinion,
very desirable that you should not take so marked a step without
hearing the advice of those who love you best, supposing even that
after all you should not be influenced by their reasoning upon it.

I say nothing about myself in all this, because I am sure you
believe me truly sensible of your constant and unvaried affection
to me, and unwilling to intrude upon you repetitions which I must
fear would be useless. But you will not attribute it to
indifference or unconcern about the thing itself, which, God knows,
are sentiments the reverse of what I feel upon it.

We have no news of any material event at the army. The siege was to
be opened on Monday, and they seem to entertain very sanguine ideas
indeed as to its speedy success. I have some doubt whether the
report from Paris, respecting Marat's new revolution, is to be
credited, though all the late accounts from thence seemed to
indicate an approaching crisis. I have a confused account from the
Hague, of the Duke of Brunswick having gained a decisive advantage
over the army that was Custine's. But it is not distinct enough to
place much reliance upon it.

Mudge is returned by the way of China with despatches from
Vancouver. I have not yet seen them, but I understand, generally,
that some difficulty arose about the restitution of Northa. It is
not, however, of a nature to create any real embarrassment. He has
brought a letter for poor Lady Camelford from her son, whom he
tells me he left in great health and spirits. We have not opened
it, but wait till Lord C. comes, which I hope will be about the end
of this month at latest. From what he says, Vancouver's expedition
is likely to continue so much longer, that I think of proposing to
Lady C. that her son should return by the first opportunity, in
order to go into some larger ship, which at his age now will
clearly be desirable. He will have served his time before he can
hear from Europe. Juan de Fuca's inlet is explored, and found to be
closed with high lands.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, Sept. 11th, 1793.
MY DEAR BROTHER,

I am sorry to acquaint you that we have unpleasant accounts from
the army, and the more unpleasant from their uncertainty. All that
seems to be certain is, that the Duke of York thought himself
obliged to raise the siege of Dunkirk, at least for the present, in
consequence of an attack which I imagine to have taken place on the
evening of the 7th; and which must, of course, have been bloody,
and the event unfavourable to us. We have no direct account from
the army, but the report is that of an officer of the navy, who
comes, I understand, from Nieuport, and states that he had
prevented any other letters from coming over, in order to prevent
the spreading an alarm till the official accounts arrive.

There is also a letter from Watson, the Commissary-General, which
seems to confirm the intended retreat, and says that he has
provisions, &c., enough in the rear of the army; but he mentions no
particulars of what has happened, except that he says the spirit of
the troops is good--that they have suffered, but have not been
beaten. His letter is from Furnes, on the 8th.

I am sorry for the suspense in which this must leave you, as it
does us. If we hear more before the post goes out, I will add a
line to this letter.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

I should have added, that the same officer brings the account that
they had got at Ostend of the capture of Quesnoy, which I credit,
because my last letters from the Austrian army state the fall of
that place as certain within a very few days. This is the more
important, as P. Cob. would then be at liberty to march towards
Flanders, if necessary.

Since I wrote the above, I have seen the narrative of the officer
in question--Lieutenant Popham. It is long, and full of little
details; but the result of the whole is, that he was going, by
Macbride's orders, to communicate with the Duke of York, and turned
back on account of the news he heard; that he met on the road
parties of our cavalry _evacuating Furnes_ on the 8th, and many
wounded soldiers going to Ostend; but he does not appear to have
collected accounts of what had happened, and indeed it is most
probable that individuals could not give any general information.
It does not appear whether they were going from Furnes by orders or
not.

Five, P.M.

I have just got the enclosed letter to Bruges from a young man I
sent as Secretary to Sir James Murray; and as it is very doubtful
whether I shall get the particulars time enough to send you
anything further, I would not omit letting you have this, which
will at least put you at ease for individuals. You will observe it
is dated from Furnes, on the 9th. It is brought by an officer
charged with the despatches.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Dropmore, Sept. 15th, 1793. At Night.
MY DEAR BROTHER,

You will receive with this letter, which will be sent you from
London, the good and the bad accounts together. For the Flanders
war, I fear the latter overbalance the former; there is, however,
in my opinion, very little reason to be discouraged at these
checks, which must be expected whenever the French took the
resolution to leave the sieges on the side of Hainault to their
fate, in order to break in upon the line of communication. This
must have happened equally if the combined armies had remained
together, and undertaken a joint operation; and the proposed plan
had the advantage of being the only one whose success would have
remedied this inconvenience, resulting from the nature of an attack
from an open country against such a barrier.

It must be left to military decision what is precisely the best
point of attack, combined or separate, which now remains; but the
loss of Menin as a post of communication does not tend to lessen
the difficulties of any plan, and I am decidedly averse to anything
that shall hazard the delaying the West India expedition, for
which, when you consider how much is to be done there, you will not
think a whole season too much.

After all, a few towns more or less in Flanders are certainly not
unimportant; but I am much mistaken in my speculation, if the
business at Toulon is not decisive of the war. Only let your own
mind follow up all the consequences of that event, and you will, I
believe, agree with me that the expression I have used is not too
sanguine. We have news that the people of Lyons have defeated
Dubois Cranee, with a loss to the latter, as it is said, of four
thousand men. Allow this to be exaggerated, as I suppose it is, but
take the fact to be true that he has been defeated, and it is
everything to us. The next month or six weeks will be an anxious
period, and big with events.

You asked me some time ago about Parliament, and that with a view
to your own motions. Nothing can, of course, be absolutely fixed on
that subject; but I think it highly improbable that Parliament
should meet before January. I heartily wish that we may arrange it
so as to meet, though in the present moment I should be afraid even
of such a distance as Stowe. At all events, when your camp breaks
up, I trust you will take Dropmore in your way, as indeed I believe
it will lay directly in your road, if you come by town, and not far
out of it, if you go straight to Stowe.

My dear wife desires best love to you and Lady B. Lady Camelford
is, I think, better than we could have hoped.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

16th.

This ought to have gone to-day, and I am sorry to find it this
evening in one of my boxes here. We have nothing new to-day, except
the account of the murder of the King of Poland, which is believed.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Walmer Castle, Oct. 1st, 1793.
MY DEAR BROTHER,

Your letter of the 27th followed me here yesterday, and I have just
received that of the 29th. With respect to the first, I can only
say that I have by this post sent your letters to Pitt, and am very
sure that if it depends on him, what you wish will be done.

Lord Amherst's answer of the reduced state of the regiments at home
is, however, surely not quite so much out of the way as you state
it. It is a great pity that your _protege_ is in Canada, where no
promotion can be going forward, and from whence, I conclude, he
cannot be brought into regiments upon actual service. Sir C. Grey
conveyed to me the other day a wish to know whether there was any
officer in his army that I felt interested about; but I know of
none that I should think it worth laying myself under an obligation
for. If Talbot had happened to be in one of the regiments in Nova
Scotia, he would probably have been in this predicament; but I
suppose the force in Canada is little likely to be weakened, in the
present state of America.

I am delighted to find that you are so well pleased with the
manifesto. I have hardly had time yet to consider your observations
on the particular passages you have marked, but I will do so, and
am much obliged to you for the trouble.

The Duke of Richmond will, I am persuaded, not resign in the
present moment, though he has been talking and doing foolishly. As
far as I can learn, there is no sort of ground for the accusation
of delay on his part relative to Dunkirk. When I see you, I can
_say_ on that subject what for many reasons I do not choose to
write. _Au reste_, the Duke of Richmond's campaign seems completely
to have annihilated the little popularity he ever had; and though I
am satisfied he will not resign till after the meeting of
Parliament, and perhaps till after the session is over, I am
equally persuaded he will not continue another year in the Cabinet.

We are sending Hessians to Toulon, and shall soon have there a
really respectable force; the interval is the only thing to be
feared; but Mulgrave's being there is a great comfort to me; as
great, indeed, _entre nous_, as if I knew the new Governor was
actually arrived there. We have nothing like force enough for all
the objects that present themselves, and you know my settled
aversion to undertaking little points of detail; some of which
might succeed, but the result of the whole must be to cut to pieces
the small force we have, without adequate success. Besides this,
the reliance on the dispositions of the country, with the single
exception of Toulon, pressed as it was by famine at one door, and
the guillotine at the other, has always failed us.

I believe it is true, that almost in every part of France they
detest the Convention, but that they are quite incapable of giving
any solid footing in the country.

Ever yours most affectionately,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM

Walmer Castle, Oct. 11th, 1793.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I was just going to write to you when I received your letter. My
present plans are to return to town about Tuesday next, and to get
to Dropmore by dinner on Friday, if possible; but I would not wish
you to let _your_ dinner depend on that. I conclude, from what you
say of your having been reviewed, that you will be able to get away
soon, and it will be a great gratification to us both to see you,
especially if, as I hope, Lady Buckingham comes with you. Lady
Camelford writes to Anne that she much wishes to see you, and if
she knows of the time of your coming will endeavour to contrive to
be with us. I return you Freemantle's letter, for fear of
accidents. You have, perhaps, guessed that it anticipates part of
what I had to say to you, but I hope you have also felt the
singularly embarrassing situation in which the King's Ministers are
placed in this respect, with the cause of Royalty to defend, and
with the great obligations they owe to the extreme liberality and
honour of the King's conduct towards them. They are obliged,
therefore, to say nothing, and to let nothing be said: and indeed I
hardly know what I should wish to be said, so great is the
difficulty in all respects. I know I may reckon upon your
discretion, not only in saying nothing from me, but also in saying
as little as possible from yourself, which would not fail to be
repeated, and to be ascribed to me. We will talk this over fully
when I see you, and I really much wish to know what you think ought
ultimately to be done on the subject. You will have seen that it is
not the camp of Mauberge, but the advanced posts that had been
unsuccessfully attacked. The attack of the camp itself was to take
place somewhere about this time, and yesterday the British troops
marched to Cysoing, where they thought it not improbable they might
be engaged with the French, who are collecting at Bouchain and
Cambray.

George Nugent had written to me twice on the subject of his
proposal, and I sent him Lord Amherst's answer, which is negative,
at least for the present. He seems to have an invincible aversion
to new corps, I fancy, from all the badgering he got upon that
subject last war. He now states only the plea of seniority, that
the number intended to be raised is filled up by older
Lieutenant-Colonels. I fancy Nugent had not received my letter when
he wrote to you.

The language of the Convention looks as if some serious attack
might be expected here; serious at least as they intend it, but
ridiculous, I trust, it will prove. An attempt in force requires
preparations they have not, and a superiority in naval force which
they certainly have not. Buccaneering expeditions I take to be
practicable, with only the certainty of much greater loss to
themselves than to us. They would be unpleasant in their effect
here, but what help.

I have profited of your advice about the manifesto, and now send
you the English translation which I have prepared, with the
transpositions you recommended. I do not think it reads as well in
English as in French, which I am sorry for, as it must be read in
English by John Bull, whose approbation of my writings I should
like to retain. I hardly know how to ask you to correct, as it must
be a translation, and a literal one. But mark what you dislike, and
I will try if, retaining the translation, it can be altered. I have
kept _guerre defensive_ and that _pour cause_: which indeed you may
guess, when you see in the papers that His Prussian Majesty is
returned to Berlin, and when I tell you that we had no previous
notice of his journey.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, Nov. 21st, 1793.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I had already spoken to Pitt upon the idea of G. Nugent's being
appointed one of the aides-de-camp, if the promotion mentioned by
him should take place. I have reason to be sure, that for the
present no idea exists of that promotion. If it had, I should
certainly have pressed his declining the offer of the corps;
because, though that is no absolute bar according to any rule, yet
it may, certainly, in the King's mind, stand in his way; and such
exceptions as Lord Chenton and Lord Rawdon do not prove much. I am
very confident, that, as it is, whatever can be done by Pitt will
be done, if the promotion should hereafter take place; but I am
sure you know that the King's Ministers do not name his
aides-de-camp; and that the pressing such a request, beyond a
certain point, makes difficulties in his mind, instead of removing
them. Besides his wish to oblige you, Pitt is personally
well-disposed towards Nugent, and I have reason to think that Lord
Amherst is so too.

Sir James Murray will, I think, not continue in his present
situation; and the mode of removing him, will probably be by
putting him at the head of some corps; but this is not yet
mentioned to him, and, therefore, I rely on your not speaking of it
to any one else. I do not know whether, in that case, the King will
fill up his place as aide-de-camp, or not; but one vacancy cannot
be expected to make room for Nugent, who is at the end of his year;
besides, the natural claim which Manners has on the King. It is,
therefore, I think, better on the whole, that Nugent should go on
with his corps.

With respect to your lesser army jobs, I say nothing about them,
because I really do not understand them, and am unable to judge of
the facility or difficulty of Lord Amherst's complying with them.
It is useless for me to talk about Pitt's share in all this, though
I certainly do not think it very fair that he should bear on his
shoulders all the grievances of cornetcies and lieutenancies, which
Lord Amherst or any other Commander-in-chief is sure to create.

I have spoken about the _precis_, and you will certainly have them
whenever there is news to send. The army is safe, and I hope quiet,
in its winter quarters. Lord Moira sets out to-morrow morning, and
will find everything ready for him at Portsmouth. You see how right
you was about the impossibility of keeping secret at Portsmouth the
new destination of this force. Luckily, it is so ready, that the
thing itself will take place even now as soon as the news can reach
Paris.

Lord Malmesbury is going to Berlin, to bring our good ally to a
point--ay or no. I think it will end in no.

I certainly will not forget my engagement; and I still hope we
shall find a Saturday and Sunday for Stowe.

God bless you, my dear brother, and believe me

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, Dec. 12th, 1793.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

At your request, I certainly will do a thing extremely disagreeable
to myself, by putting into Mr. Pitt's hands the letter you desire
me to show him. In any case where _you_ or _yours_ could have the
smallest interest, I should never consider whether a compliance
with your wishes is or is not pleasant to me; but I freely own,
that I hardly think you would be repaid, by Mr. Pigott's getting
his company, for the uneasiness I feel in being made (unprofitably,
too, as I think, even to the object) the channel of such a
communication between two persons whom I have so much reason to
love and value.

The accounts of the Duke of Brunswick's victory, though they have
not come to us from any channel that we can consider as strictly
official, are such as to leave no doubt of the fact. There appears
to have been different actions for three days, from the 29th of
November to the 1st of December; and on the last of these days the
victory was obtained, which persons, pretty well informed, seem to
consider as decisive of the fate of Landan. The great object of the
French was to relieve that place, and surround Wurmser; and in both
they have failed, having been repulsed in a last attack they made
on the latter the 1st instant. It appears likely now that little
more will be done on that frontier till Landan is obliged to
surrender; nor anything after that.

All our expectations are turned towards Brittany; but the news from
that quarter is by no means favourable, as far as it goes. The
Royalist army appears unable to make any siege, or even to continue
twenty-four hours in the same place; and this for want of
provisions. There is, besides, among them much disunion, and a
total want of discipline; and they seemed to have formed the
resolution of retiring inwards into France. Whether they will be
deterred from this by the communications since made to them, and by
the knowledge of our force being actually at their doors, remains
to be seen.

I did not send you the account of the failure of all our hopes,
from Lord Howe. I was not in town; and if I had been, I do not know
whether I was not too much vexed to write. He is still off Ushant;
so that the idea of sending out the second fleet is, for the
moment, at least, out of the question. Some of those ships are, as
you know, destined for other services; and the whole, without Lord
Howe, would not be strong enough to meet the Brest fleet; and with
him, would be much too strong.

The business of St. Domingo is highly important. The possession of
the Mole, though not beyond what we had looked to, is much beyond
my hopes. Dansey's letter to Williamson expresses much confidence
of maintaining himself there, with such a force, as I trust, by
this time, and long before, he actually has there.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

At the close of the year France was stronger than at the commencement. The destruction of her navy at Toulon was the principal reverse she suffered. On the other side the allies had encountered defeat at almost every point; the Prussians compelled to retreat to Mentz, the Imperialists driven beyond the Rhine, and the English forced to raise the siege of Dunkirk. The enthusiasm of the masses, sustained by these successes, and acted upon by the popular appeals of the Jacobins, placed at the disposal of the Republic an enormous physical force, which the whole winter was occupied in augmenting and organizing for the campaigns of the ensuing year.

1794.

PREPARATIONS IN ENGLAND FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR--INACTIVITY OF THE AUSTRIANS--LORD SPENCER AND MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE SENT ON A MISSION TO VIENNA--HOSTILE RESOLUTIONS OF THE OPPOSITION--SEVERAL OF THE LEADING WHIGS JOIN THE ADMINISTRATION--LORD CORNWALLIS APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND ON THE CONTINENT--PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS--LORD FITZWILLIAM NOMINATED TO THE LORD-LIEUTENANCY OF IRELAND--HIS CONDUCT ON THAT OCCASION.

Parliament was convened on the 21st of January, 1794; and the Speech from the Throne expressed a sanguine hope on the part of His Majesty that the resources of France would be speedily exhausted. There was certainly little in the operations of the last year upon which the country could be congratulated; and the only remaining encouragement that could be held out was in reference to the future. The prodigious exertions of the Republic undoubtedly justified the expectation, that she could not long continue to meet the increasing demands which the extension of the war was making upon her means and energies; but it was difficult, in the heat and excitement of the conflict, to form an adequate estimate of the devotion with which the French were prepared to follow up their successes. A series of fortunate incidents and some brilliant achievements had inflamed the national vanity to such a height of exultation as to produce a perfect military mania in all parts of the country; and when Mr. Pitt, in the course of the opening debate, declared that "France had been converted into an armed nation,"--an expression that elicited much criticism at the time--he described accurately the exact state of the people, and the lengths they were prepared to go in the assertion of the principles they had baptized in the blood of the Sovereign.

There were not wanting persons in England who sympathized with the republicans of France, and regarded their martial spirit with something of the admiration which the impassioned and the thoughtless bestow upon gallantry and heroism. But the bulk of the nation entertained a different opinion, and viewed with alarm and detestation the sanguinary excesses by which the war was initiated and sustained. While the former class, few in number, and confined chiefly to the lowest dregs of the population, continued to give occupation to the Government at home, the latter were ready to make any sacrifices the exigency of circumstances required to support the policy of the Government abroad.

Parliament unanimously voted an augmentation of eighty-five thousand men to the navy, and sixty thousand to the army. Ample preparations in other respects were made for the approaching operations; and, amongst the extraordinary measures resorted to, arrangements were made for augmenting the Militia, and raising voluntary subscriptions for the maintenance of the war. The spirit of the country was awakened to the defence of those constitutional principles which presented the surest safeguard for the public liberties; and the delusions which at first had seized upon the factious and discontented rapidly vanished as the war advanced. Success alone was wanted to confirm the confidence of the people; but as yet the genius and headlong valour of France was in the ascendant, and the solid endurance of England was doomed to a long and harassing term of fluctuating fortunes.

The Correspondence traces some of the principal events of the year; and maps out in advance the plans and difficulties of Ministers, by which we are admitted, so to speak, to the deliberations of the Cabinet upon nearly every fresh exigency that arose in the course of the campaigns.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Charles Street, Jan. 1st, 1794.
MY DEAR BROTHER,

I had no sooner received your letter, than I communicated it to
Lord Grenville; and desired him to write to you as soon as he
could. It gives me great pain to see, by the language of it, how
very much your mind is oppressed and disturbed in the impression
under which you write. Of the proposition which you suggest, it
certainly does not in any shape become me to offer any opinion; I
am precluded from doing so, both by the magnitude of the question,
and by its being of a nature upon which I cannot have either the
pretence or the means of exercising any judgment; and I so
expressed myself to Lord Grenville, when I read your letter to
him; all that, on my part, can be for me to do is, what I am sure
you will believe is the honest feeling of my mind, to express to
you the anxious and earnest wish of my heart, that all disquietude
and uneasiness may vanish from your mind; and that you may heartily
and happily continue to co-operate with Lord Grenville and Pitt, at
a time when the greatest interests which this country ever knew
seem to me to be at stake. For myself, you know that I am but a
private man, and have no other concern in these great public
questions, than that sense of common danger and common interest,
which ought, I think, to produce but one common voice in the
country. Mr. Wilberforce, you see, thinks otherwise, but does not
change my opinion by having changed his.

I am much obliged to you for the naval letter, which the post of
to-day brings me from Stowe; I will make the use of it which you
allow me to do, and will then return it to you. I hope Dr. Pegge
will find Lady B. better. I take for granted we shall soon meet
here.

I hear no news.

God bless you, my dear brother.

P.S.--As soon as I heard from you to-day (which was very late, as I
had gone out before the post came in), I sent to Lord G., to tell
him that if he wrote to-day, he must direct to Stowe.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, Jan. 30th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I believe Pitt's budget is finished, as it is to be opened on
Wednesday. I have, however, sent him your project; though I do not
conceive favourably of it, as the object appears so small, and
such a nest of hornets to be brought upon one by it.

The French seem certainly disposed to try their scheme of invasion.
This leads to the necessity of some augmentation of interior force,
and possibly some of our last year's plans will be resorted to. Our
best defence is unquestionably our water-guard, which is very
strong, and will, I trust, every day get stronger. In the meantime,
Lord Moira's force stationed at Cowes, and with its transports
ready to put to sea at the shortest notice, is no inconsiderable
check upon them.

I have no faith in their attacking Flanders; but rather believe
they will wait our attack. But two Dutch, and as many Flanders
mails are due.

Mack returns to the army to the great joy of every one. We expect
him over here every day.

Ever my dear brother's
Most affectionately,
G.

The Budget was brought forward by Mr. Pitt on the 2nd of February. It estimated the total supply for the year at twenty millions; and proposed for the ways and means a loan of eleven millions, and the imposition of some new taxes.

Here was the first great pressure of the war on the industry of the people. It was a trying moment with Government; but the demands of the Minister were, nevertheless, heartily responded to. The interior force of the kingdom at this time amounted to one hundred and forty thousand men; and the foreign troops in British pay to forty thousand more. The augmentation of the Militia, which was not carried into effect till the following month, was now occupying the consideration of Government.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, Feb. 1st, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

The idea of augmentation which I think most practicable, is that of
militia cavalry, to be raised by volunteers, in the same manner as
the additional companies in the last war, but to a much larger
extent than you mention in your letter. Dundas told me two days
since that he had been looking for your plan of last year, but had
mislaid it. Have you a copy? It does not seem advisable to broach
this idea much in conversation or discussion with Lord-Lieutenants
and Colonels till it is to a degree matured; for the St. Albans'
meeting, though very good for supporting a measure resolved upon,
or even for arranging particular details of a plan, of which the
outlines are already fixed, is but a bad place to prepare the plan
itself. As far as I am capable of judging, I think that the natural
defence of this country against an enemy once landed, is by the
immense irregular cavalry that might be collected, and formed round
small bodies of disciplined horse. This, of course, does not
exclude the necessity of some infantry to oppose the enemy in
front, while the cavalry harass his flanks and rear, and while your
naval force, even supposing it unable to have prevented the
landing, cuts off all possibility of supplies from France. We are
preparing, partly with the latter view, and partly as a means of
defence where frigates cannot act, a formidable force of gun-boats.

You say that all this is superfluous, and that the attempt will not
be made. I think its being made or not depends wholly on the other
employment which we can find for their force, and this depends on
points which we cannot command; viz.: internal commotion, and the
exertions of the German Powers on the side of the Rhine.

That they are making preparations with a view to having the thing
in their power is unquestionable, and we should be very deficient
in our duty if we did not put the country in a state to be prepared
for all events.

The employment of Lord Moira's force, and its future destination,
depend on plans of continental operations, but in the meantime its
effect is almost beyond calculation in its present position,
menacing everything from Dunkirk to Brest, and defending everything
from Yarmouth to the Land's End. You will see this in a minute, if
you compare the facility of moving that force, either by land or
sea, with the efforts of the same sort that the enemy can make,
either offensively or defensively.

We cannot have too much force anywhere, but if I am not very
sanguine, Sir C. Grey has already a force beyond what the service
requires; and it is likely that he will still be reinforced without
breaking up Lord Moira's army, which I consider as the most
usefully employed, and telling the most effectually against the
enemy of any troops now in our service.

I will send your artillery plan to Dundas.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, July 9th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I am sincerely sorry to see that you do not entertain the same
hopes as I do of good from the new arrangements. I confess I think
it so great an object to have annihilated all distinction of
parties in this country among those who are attached to the present
order of things; and I feel that the late events abroad have given
so much more importance to this point, with a view to the internal
situation of this country, than it had before, that I cannot help
feeling very sanguine as to the consequences of the steps now taken
with that view. God only knows which of us is right, and time only
can show. In the meantime, _jacta est alea_, and we must abide by
it.

On the subject of war and peace, you state very truly, that nothing
is less probable than that peace should now be in our option. The
retreat to Antwerp has been decided, not by opinions here, nor even
by those of the Duke of York and Lord Cornwallis, but by the
necessity consequent upon the Austrian movements. Whether those
movements were right, I am not enough of a soldier, nor enough
informed as a statesman, to pretend to form an opinion. The
immediate effect of them is not necessarily the abandoning the
towns taken last year, which are in a state to maintain themselves
long, and to impede many of the operations of the enemy. Nor, as
long as the Austrians maintain their line from Louvain to Namur, is
the possibility of succouring them considered as desperate. What I
most fear in the present moment is the effect of despondency here
and abroad, without which I should see no reason why we should not,
as you suggest, fight the country over and over again, inch by
inch, with means and resources for carrying on the war, such as are
out of all comparison superior to those of the enemy. It would have
been a flattering and glorious thing, and a brilliant success, to
have terminated the war by the favourable result of a plan of
offensive operation in Flanders. If that has failed, I am very far
from thinking this a reason for abandoning a cause in the issue of
which I consider our existence as implicated. If we listen to the
ideas of peace in the present moment (even supposing it were
offered), it can be only because we confess ourselves unable to
carry on the war. Such a confession affords but a bad security
against the events which must follow, in Flanders, in Holland, and
(by a very rapid succession) in this island.

I do not know from whence the papers have got the idea of Lord
Camelford's return. He is not come, nor any officer or despatch,
from Vancouver, but I understand the ship has been heard of in
October last, all well. Many thanks for the offer of Paddington,
which we may probably be glad to avail ourselves of.

Ever, my dear brother,
Most affectionately yours,
G.

We have nothing new from Lord Hood; and I am told that officers who
know the coast do not speak favourably of the chance of doing
anything against the French fleet in their present situation.

The failure of the Imperialists had thrown a serious damp on the spirits of the allies. It appears to have been thought the Austrians had not shown sufficient energy and determination; and it was resolved to send over Lord Spencer and Mr. Thomas Grenville to Vienna, in the hope of inducing them to make more vigorous exertions. A subsequent letter from Mr. Thomas Grenville to the Duke of Portland contains an admirable report of the progress of the mission.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, July 19th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

Tom has, I know, mentioned to you the Commission which he has
undertaken--jointly with Lord Spencer--to endeavour to encourage
our Austrian allies to a little more exertion and energy, which,
after all the late events, I continue persuaded is _the only_
thing wanting to ensure success, instead of such a series of
retreats as the last month has shown. God knows whether they will
succeed; but it is an infinite satisfaction to me to see his
talents employed in the public service, and to be corresponding
with him on subjects of this nature. The rest of our public events
are just such as you see them in the papers.

Lord Cornwallis is returned, speaking highly of the Duke of York,
and far otherwise of the Austrian Generals, to whom he, and all
mankind in Flanders, impute all that has happened. It is a
whimsical circumstance, and hardly to have been foreseen, that in a
war which we carry on conjointly with Austria, the great want which
we experience should be that of Austrian Generals, of capacity
sufficient to command the excellent troops which are acting in the
Netherlands.

My American negotiation is, I think, going on promisingly. I have
nothing else to tell you; and am, indeed, so completely knocked up
by this last week's fagging, as hardly to be able to write at all.
This evening I am going to Dropmore, for a little respite.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

(Private.) Vienna, August 24th, 1794.
DEAR DUKE OF PORTLAND,

It had been very much my intention to have written to you by our
messenger of the 16th instant, because, although our despatches
have been very much detailed, and have not, therefore, left much to
be said in private letters, it is upon these occasions, I know,
some satisfaction to hear that nothing remains behind, which is
material to the subject; but having been hitherto prevented, by the
very entire occupation of our time here, I take the opportunity of
writing to you, a little at large, by the messenger who is going to
England to-night.

You know that upon the slight view which the shortness of the time
allowed me to take of the business in question here, I was
persuaded that we probably might, in some degree, succeed in our
expedition; because, if the course of things here could not be
improved by our journey, yet I should consider the being able to
ascertain what that state was, as an object very useful to pursue,
and one which, if pursued with attention, we might probably succeed
in possessing ourselves of. How far we have already obtained this
information you will have seen by the communications which we have
made; and I much fear that our journey will not produce any
advantage of a more solid and substantial description. To say that
it might not be possible to procure from the Government here a
formal consent to such an arrangement as we have to propose, is
more than I would assert: although, the condition which they
positively insist upon of being paid for it by loan and subsidy, as
well as all the difficulties which they throw upon the subject of
the proposed barrier, and upon that of acting in the Netherlands,
might well seem to justify the opinion of its being improbable that
anything like the proposed arrangement would be consented to. But
the misfortune is, that--in my judgment, at least--the evil lies
much deeper, and is such as would leave me little hope of seeing
any effectual purpose served, even by the signature of a Convention
between the two Courts.