Chapter XI: Front Matter (11)

The difficulties of the negotiation in which Lord Spencer and Mr. Thomas Grenville were engaged, are very clearly stated in the following letter. It is perfectly evident from these curious revelations, that Austria and Prussia were pursuing a crooked and evasive policy in their diplomacy with England, that the vacillations and infirmity of purpose they betrayed left them open to the suspicion of insincerity, and that the affairs of both Courts were conducted by Ministers utterly deficient in all qualities of firmness and judgment, which the occasion imperatively demanded.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

(Private.) Vienna, Sept. 1st, 1794.
MY DEAR BROTHER,

If M. de Thugut is waiting with impatience the result of M. de
Merey's negotiation, you will easily believe that we have no less
impatience to know your decisions upon that subject, though you
will have seen that Lord Spencer and I have not been able to teach
ourselves to wish that the pecuniary demands may, or ought to be,
gratified by us. If they had confined themselves to asking only
such a temporary assistance as might have given a more immediate
spring to the vigorous movement which we are urging them to make, I
should have been as little disposed as anybody could to withhold
any practicable facilities of that description; but to the extent
to which they steadily continue to point, I own I feel myself too
little satisfied as to the equity of their claim upon us, and as to
the probability of their acting fairly and manfully up to the great
exertions which they ask from us, to entertain much disposition
towards those demands.

They dwell certainly upon the difference which they state between
loan and subsidy, and wish to prove to us that their offer of
security upon the revenues of the Low Countries should, at least by
us (who always insist on those territories remaining in the House
of Austria), be accepted as a good and ample mortgage for the
repayment of the sums which they want for this year and the next;
but if it is true that they do not feel interested at heart in
these possessions, or if they think us so earnest in our wishes on
this subject, that they may safely throw the whole weight of it
upon us, their offer of a _hypotheque_ on those possessions takes a
much more suspicious character; nor is it, perhaps, an unreasonable
jealousy on my part to apprehend that they may wish you to have a
mortgage of two millions on the Netherlands, as an inducement to
you hereafter to give up some of your French acquisitions in the
West Indies, in order to recover for them a country, in which you
will have a larger pecuniary stake, added to the ordinary course of
political observations.

Much at least of Thugut's conversation would seem to tally with
this view of the matter. It is observable that he perpetually
recurs to its being a settled point, that _de facon ou d'autre_ the
Netherlands will be secured to Austria at the peace, and yet he
never seems (in his view of the military operations to be pursued)
to consider them as a main object of defence, and is so little
disposed to make them so, that he expresses much reluctance at the
idea proposed, of engaging Austria to furnish so large an army, _to
act in that country_, which he thinks might be better employed
elsewhere. Add to this, his remarking that England might be
satisfied by the irrecoverable detriment done to the navy and
commerce of France, and his contrasting the difference in point of
acquisitions made by Great Britain, with the total failure on the
side of Austria; and it is no great refinement to suspect the whole
of this to lead to an expectation that we may better buy back the
Netherlands for them, than put them to the expense of defending
them or regaining them; and that we should have an additional
motive for sacrificing some of our conquests to this object, if we
have two millions of money mortgaged upon it.

Of the advantage which may be expected at home from adopting this
shape of lending upon security, rather than of furnishing a direct
subsidy, I do not well know how to judge; but unless the security
could be shown to be in itself substantial, and of a nature to be
easily got at by those to whom it was due, I should doubt whether
the public at home would be better reconciled to it than to a
direct and acknowledged subsidy. The very small proportion of
effect produced by the large payments this year to the King of
Prussia, will create much indisposition to the incurring of a
similar expense again, unless it can be shown to promise, upon good
probable grounds, a much better return than we have had; and,
generally speaking, I cannot but fear that the mere difference in
point of exertion which we can hope from this country, may not turn
out to be worth the purchase-money in the estimation of the country
at large, though I should hope they might easily acquiesce in a
very considerable exertion, if a great manifest exertion of
strength, fairly disposable to the course of the war, could be
procured by pecuniary aids. What inducement there may be to this
measure, from any apprehension of the Emperor's withdrawing from
the war, is another part of the question, upon which I can form no
more correct judgment than belongs to the observation of a very
short residence here.

Lord Malmesbury hints to me a suspicion of a proposed concert
between the Emperor and the King of Prussia, to compel the Maritime
Powers to make peace, though he appears to give no great credit to
it. Certain it is, that in the month which we have past here, one
of the most striking features of the conversation, both of
Ministers and individuals, has been a hatred and aversion to
Prussia, by Thugut, too, particularly marked towards Lucchesini, of
whom he never scruples to speak to us in terms of the most
unqualified dislike; so that as far as can be collected from what
we hear, there ought to be no ground to suspect any plan of
intimate concert between his Court and Berlin.

It is possible, to be sure, that independently of any such concert,
the Government here, if unassisted by money from us, might
endeavour to withdraw from the prosecution of the war; but, as we
have had no reason to expect any ultimate success to the
propositions which _we_ brought here, we have endeavoured, as much
as possible, to learn what their conduct would be in failure of the
proposed Convention, and to consider them in all that we have said
as equally bound to continue in their co-operations with us
according to the existing agreement, whether any new arrangement
should succeed or not. To this view they have not only acceded
always in distinct terms, when urged by us, but they have
frequently stated this of their own accord, confining themselves
only to the observation, that their means are limited, and will no
longer allow of the exertions which they wish; but solemnly
protesting against any present idea of peace, and always expressing
their belief that Prussia is now desirous of peace being made,
because, in the present situation of things, it might probably be
made to the disadvantage of Austria. Unless, therefore, their
opinions should be disguised to a degree which I cannot well
believe, or should undergo an entire change, I do not see what
ground there is to suspect in them any intention of abandoning the
war, though I can entertain no great hopes of such a vigorous
prosecution of it as we might wish and expect from them.

There is but one opinion as to the Emperor's inclinations on this
subject, and if his personal character had steadiness enough to
influence the Government, his disposition to the true principles of
the war would be a great security to us; at present, however, it is
of little or no avail; and it is much to be lamented in times like
the present, that though there is no dislike entertained to him,
there is not either the respect or consideration which ought to be
attached to his situation, to make it tell with any of the effects
one wishes to derive from it. With respect to his Ministers, you
have seen too much of our remarks upon the striking features of
their conduct, to make it necessary for me in every letter to
repeat them. Thugut is certainly the only efficient Minister here:
very diligent and laborious in his office, he seems to have
acquired an influence here by being the only man of business about
the Court; and with this recommendation has reached a situation
which the nobility of the country are mortified to see him hold,
because he has no pretensions to hereditary rank, and because they
have been used to see that office for many years filled by Prince
Kavnitz. What _we_, however, miss in him is, either the disposition
or capacity to see the present great crisis of Europe upon the
large scale on which it should be looked at by the leading Minister
of this empire; instead of which, we see in all our discussions a
cold, narrow, and contracted view of this subject, infinitely too
languid and little for the object, and made peculiarly unfavourable
to our propositions, by the disinclination which he certainly feels
to concur heartily with us in the great interests attached to the
Austrian possession of the Low Countries. We have, it is true,
obtained from him assurances of concerting an immediate plan for
the relief of Valenciennes; but even this has not been obtained
without many discouraging tokens of that total want of manly energy
and direct dealing, without which all co-operation must necessarily
be languid and feeble: always taking merit for having sent the most
distinct orders to try the relief of Valenciennes, yet never taking
the obvious mode of satisfying us by communicating those orders to
us; maintaining as an argument for the loan, that without it the
army cannot move, yet at the same time resisting our objections of
the delay of waiting for answers from M. de Merey, by stating this
movement as being actually in great forwardness, and not depending
upon the loan for its execution; acquiescing in the change of
command urged by us, and yet ever since that event reminding us
that in his opinion this very change may defeat the operation which
we wished to assist by it; gratifying our impatience at one time by
counting up the days to the probable time of the desired movement,
and then again stating that Clairfayt's army may be weakened too
much to attempt it by his detaching, perhaps considerably, towards
the side of Treves; complaining that the Austrians had been
prevented from sending Blankenstein's corps towards Flanders, as
they wished, by the Prussians having engaged it in their line of
defence, and yet refusing to us a corps much more inconsiderable,
and not involved in the objection--I mean the corps of Conde--a
corps, too, which, as I have before observed, from their own
statement of their want of money, they should have been glad to
have seen transferred to the pay of another country.

These, and many other such traits of inconsistency, I advert to
only as being descriptive of the very unsatisfactory manner in
which our business is discussed, always providing on their side
apologies for future failures, instead of means of success, and
projects of vigour and enterprize. Yet though the shortness of our
possible residence here makes this inanimate character of the
Government a bar to that immediate spirit and alacrity which, for
the purposes of the present crisis, it was highly desirable to
create here, so as to act upon instantaneously; much, I should
suppose, may be done after our return, by any person of steadiness
and activity, in the course of an established residence here, there
being certainly fair grounds for the most intimate union between
the two countries, and appearances enough of general inclination
towards it, though traversed for the present by their hopes of
fighting at our cost, and by the unfavourable turn of M. Thugut's
mind upon the subject of the Netherlands. For this purpose, the
sooner a regular Minister is appointed here the better; because
though the opening of the subsequent campaign is at present distant
enough, the dilatory habits of this Government make every moment
more precious than it should be; and the points, both of the
barrier and the Dutch indemnity, may be found longer in discussion
than they were expected to be when I left London, particularly upon
the former of those two subjects, on which the future possession
of Dunkirk and Givet must, perhaps, be distinctly explained.

We have heard of Lord Malmesbury's intention to quit Frankfort on
the 10th of September, and we have read the formal acceptance,
signed by him, of the military concert of the 26th July; you will
already have seen, in our despatch No. 5, our apprehensions of the
inconvenience of placing Clairfayt's army in any state of
dependance upon the Prussian line, as we are always afraid that the
Prussians may, by a nominal concert upon this subject, become a
real hindrance, and throw difficulties in the way of the proposed
enterprise for the relief of Valenciennes. In this view, therefore,
we had certainly rather have seen Lord Malmesbury remaining at
least till the movement in question had actually been carried into
effect; and the more so, as we have always kept their fears a
little quiet here, by promising that Lord Malmesbury, at Frankfort,
should look to and strictly watch the operations of Marshal
Mollendorff's army. I take for granted, however, that you will
provide as well as you can against the inconveniences which in this
shape may arise, and we shall likewise mention it to Lord M.

Ever, my dear brother,
Most affectionately yours,
T. G.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

(Private.) Vienna, Sept. 15th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

You will receive enclosed with this a letter, which I had already
written before the arrival of your last despatches, and which can
only be useful by showing you all that occurred to me upon the
former view of the subject. The conditions which are now attached
to the two questions of loan and subsidy, appear certainly to be
the best which could have been imagined for promising a fair use of
the troops for which we are desired to pay, and would probably
appear to the country to be so, besides really furnishing all the
means which can be supplied to this great stake which we are
compelled to play for. What has passed upon these propositions, you
will have seen pretty amply in the public despatch, which is
written so much at length as to require no great additional
comment. It is manifest, that instead of complying with all the
conditions proposed, they could not easily be brought to consent to
any one of them. Upon the subject of command, there is a soreness
which would be an insuperable bar to the idea of a large combined
force (chiefly Austrian) acting under any English General; and yet
there is so little hope of their acting vigorously under any other,
that the choice lies between two extreme difficulties.

Under the pressure of your letter, which led us to imagine that
Lord Cornwallis is actually gone to Flanders, we have done and said
all that was in any shape likely to assist his situation there; at
the same time, from Wyndham's letter, and from the fall of
Valenciennes, it is possible that his journey may still have been
delayed. Instead, therefore, of writing to him in Flanders, as you
suggested, we have given a letter for him to Colonel Ross, who will
find him either on this or the other side of the water, and will be
best able to communicate to him whatever intelligence from hence it
is material for him to know.

They do not talk heartily here of Clairfayt's co-operating, though
they do not plainly refuse it; and I fear it is but too likely that
they will satisfy their dignity by keeping their army entirely
distinct from ours, a determination which may perhaps but too much
assist the views of the French, if they really make a vigorous
attack upon Holland. All that we could do by threats, entreaties,
and remonstrances, on this very important point we have done, and
will continue to repeat while we stay here.

Upon the subject of transferring the subsidy, I believe they are in
earnest when they say it is out of their power to engage for any
considerable subsidy from the empire to the King of Prussia; and if
it is true that they are now under the necessity of ascertaining
what are their means for the next campaign, it may be true that
they cannot act upon the uncertain speculation of receiving so much
from us as they could promise for the King of Prussia. I know not
whether I am right, but I have thought once or twice that Thugut
has spoken with some marks of dislike to-day to Comte Stahremberg,
whom he appears to suspect of having broached this proposition at
London; to prevent any confirmation of this suspicion, we have not
in any manner quoted Comte Stahremberg in our conferences; and as I
believe you are satisfied with him, I hope I misinterpret the word
or two which Thugut dropped upon this matter.

We are come back again (upon the failure of our overtures) to the
hearing of a reduced scale of military operations, an idea more
like a haberdasher of small wares than the Minister of a great
empire. What the supposed plan of this _contracted_ war is to be, I
never have been able to learn; and, indeed, it requires all the
good temper one can muster to make so discouraging an inquiry.

Meanwhile, orders are said to be already issued for raising sixty
thousand new recruits in the hereditary states of Austria, but no
hopes are given of assistance from Hungary, where the harvest has
been, in many places, uncommonly deficient.

We have done what we could to urge them to be active in Sardinia,
now the French appear to be retiring; and though an invincible
prejudice to that quarter prevents Thugut from doing all he might,
yet he expresses a readiness to concur in an attack upon Nice, if
the English fleet would co-operate, as soon as the equinoctial
snows have fallen to guard the mountains of the Milanes.

There are, however, bad reports of Kosciusko declaring war against
Austria, which will be both a reason and a pretext for suspending
enterprise, if any would otherwise be undertaken. The Duc de Guiche
has a project of collecting the Gardes du Corps, of which he says
he thinks he could soon muster twelve hundred. He and the French
here are grown very anxious about Comte d'Artois' journey to
Rotterdam. We expect impatiently to hear from you of our return.

With respect to Vienna, Lord Spencer having considered this
business as now come to a point, which requires some new shape and
fresh regular negotiation, writes to request leave to return home,
and only waits for it to set out immediately. In that request
(after all the consideration which I can give to it) I feel that I
must likewise beg to be included, so as to return with him at the
same time. The line of foreign mission is one to which I own I
cannot reconcile myself; it leads certainly to a claim for future
competency, but it seems to me little likely to assist those views
of honest ambition, which are certainly, though I hope to no
improper degree, still more forward in my mind than those of
emolument. In this view it was, that upon a former occasion of
arrangement, I had declined the Hague, which certainly is the first
of all the situations in that line, but which still has the
objection of banishing from all connections, social as well as
political, and of cutting across all other expectations except
those of an invalid upon half-pay.

I believe I need not tell you, that upon the proposition which you
suggest of my staying here only to make the detail of the new
arrangements for next year, I certainly would not have refused it,
if I had thought that I could more usefully transact that point for
you; but I am really firmly persuaded, that the only chance of any
good being done here, is by some active and intelligent man
_taking root here_, and acquiring over these Ministers by the
vigour and perseverance of his own mind, influence enough to supply
the total want of it in theirs; but as this must be a work of some
time, so it seems highly important that it should immediately be
undertaken in that regular established shape in which alone it is
likely to succeed, and to which I could very little contribute by
protracting my departure two or three months beyond that of Lord
Spencer; besides, too, that if Ireland is to be looked at, I have
not much time to lose with a view to that subject. Certainly no man
can be more sensible than I am to the _desagremens_ of the Irish
Secretaryship; and if the political arrangements which have taken
place, had admitted of my occupying any situation of business at
home, there is scarce any which I should not prefer to it. I am,
however, very ready to confess, that at the present moment I do not
see any such opening likely to be easily made; and, therefore, the
question is as with respect to myself, whether, even with all my
dislike to the situation, it may not be right that I should take
it, and trust to the course of events to supply hereafter some
other situation more eligible. What much inclines me to this is,
that I shall be able to preserve a much nearer and closer
connection with my family and friends, whom I shall at times have
an opportunity of seeing, and that the business itself may become
in one light highly interesting to me, if I see in it the means of
making myself essentially useful upon a subject certainly not
unimportant.

I am not without considerable apprehensions, as you know, with
respect to the practicability of all that in theory one wishes to
be done in that country; but of those difficulties, it is useless
now to speak. Upon the whole, therefore, I have thought it best to
accept of Lord Fitzwilliam's offer, and have accordingly written to
say so.

I will not unnecessarily add to this letter, as I expect to see you
so soon: we calculate that in about twenty-six days we shall
receive from you our answer, with permission to return; and that we
shall be enabled to set out between the 15th and 20th of October at
latest. Happy, indeed, I am to find, by the conclusion of your
letter, that everything is going on at home upon as good a footing
as we could wish. Every day's experience confirms me in the
conviction, that with the present arrangement of Government, the
peace and prosperity of the country must stand and fall; and
however threatening may be the prospect from without, as long as
everything keeps so right within, I shall continue to be of good
heart.

I am ashamed of having written so much about myself, or rather I
should be so if I was not writing to you; but I have confidence in
your kindness and affection.

God bless you, my dear brother.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

(Private.) Vienna, Sept. 15th, 1794.
DEAR DUKE OF PORTLAND,

The impatience which we know that you must all have in England to
hear the result of your last determinations, leaves me no time to
add to what is contained in our despatches; but having had occasion
to write to Lord Fitzwilliam upon his having offered to me and
pressed upon me the Secretaryship in Ireland, I cannot let the
messenger go without a few words likewise to you upon that subject,
to tell you that I have left that to your decision and to his;
having only added such expressions of my own views and inclinations
as I know your friendship for me will lead you to view in their
proper light. My objections to the situation of Secretary in
Ireland you very well know, because even all my desire of making
myself useful to you could not, twelve years ago, overcome those
objections. I am, however, so persuaded that, in this moment, it is
every man's duty to take his task without consulting his
inclination, that if, all things considered, you agree with Lord
Fitzwilliam in thinking that I had best go to Ireland, I will
certainly try it.

You will, I am sure, forgive me for adding that, if the future
course of political arrangements (according as facilities may
occur) should admit of my being usefully employed at home, my wish
and preference to any such arrangement will not, I am sure, be
overlooked by my friends in England.

Ever, my dear Duke,
Most sincerely yours,
T. G.

That some inconvenience had already arisen, and that more was yet likely to arise, from the nomination of Lord Fitzwilliam to the government of Ireland, will be seen from a letter addressed by Lord Grenville to his brother at Vienna. It had been clearly understood all along, that Lord Fitzwilliam's appointment could not be confirmed until some suitable provision should have been made for Lord Westmoreland, who had accepted the office of Lord-Lieutenant on that express condition; yet the friends of Lord Fitzwilliam, in their eagerness to make known the accession of their party to power amongst their allies in Ireland, committed the indiscretion of talking publicly about the approaching change, before any arrangements had been concluded, or could be concluded, respecting Lord Westmoreland. The immediate effect of these premature announcements was to embarrass the Cabinet, and irritate the feelings and compromise the position of the Lord-Lieutenant. Worse effects followed soon afterwards.

LORD GRENVILLE TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Sept. 15th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I am so late, that I have hardly time to write this private letter
to you, nor, indeed, have I much to add to my despatches.

There is, however, one point which it is material that you should
know for your own satisfaction. The despatches, as now drawn, bear
very much the appearance of contracted operations in Flanders,
without any very distinct statement of an intention to extend our
plans elsewhere. The reason is, that we doubt whether we ought to
trust the Government at Vienna with our secret in this respect. The
failure of our expected operations in Flanders, where we had hoped
to engage the principal attention of the enemy for the next month,
makes it impossible to try, with the small force of which we now
have the disposal, any operations of consequence in the Vendee; and
a weak and ineffectual effort there would both betray and dispirit
those whom we wish to support. We have therefore, for the present,
renounced the idea of doing more than barely trying to throw in
arms and supplies; and we reserve our attack for the spring, when,
if our present expectations do not deceive us, we shall have the
means of disposing of a very large force, independent of _emigres_,
&c.

In this way, the two parts of the war will operate as a diversion
one to the other, and we shall be able to push that, whichever it
may be, when we shall appear at the time most likely to succeed.
That will probably be the quarter where we act alone, and have
neither to depend on Prussian faith nor Austrian energy.

It is in the meantime discouraging to see how fair an opportunity
is lost by our not being able to profit of the present state of
things in France. God knows what may happen between this and the
spring. It does not appear to me that there is any foundation for
the report of the young King's death. If it was true, it would
solve at once the question of the acknowledgment of the Regent,
which Spain has formally proposed to us.

You will have received my letter on the point on which you asked my
opinion. If the decision is likely to go in favour of Ireland, I
heartily wish you were here, as I am afraid that there is less
discretion on that subject than there should be. The intended
successor to Lord W. is talked of more openly than I think useful,
at a time when there is yet no arrangement made for his quitting
his station. But what is worse than that, ideas are going about,
and are much encouraged in Dublin, of _new systems_ there, and of
changes of men and measures. Whatever it may be prudent to _do_ in
that respect, I know that you will agree with me that, till the
time comes when that question is to be considered, with a view to
acting upon it immediately, the less is _said_ about it the better,
in every point of view. When I see you, we can talk this over more
easily than by letters between Vienna and London; and yet I have
heard so much of it lately, that I almost wish it were possible for
you, even at that distance, to write something that might suggest
the necessity of caution; and that something you might even ground
upon the paragraphs in the papers, which, as you may have seen,
have been full of speculations upon it, particularly since
Ponsonby's journey here.

The notion of seeing your personal quiet and happiness committed in
this business, makes me feel more anxious about it than I otherwise
should, though it is otherwise sufficiently important, and that in
more than one point of view.

God bless you, my dearest brother, and believe me

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

St. James's Square, Sept. 17th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I have forwarded your letter to Tom, who will, I think, probably
set out from Vienna soon after the receipt of it. I should have
been very glad if I could have engaged him to stay there, but that,
I think, seems out of the question. I am not more sanguine in his
success than he is himself; and if my conjecture is right, at least
you will have the satisfaction of knowing that a subsidy is not
given to Austria. I own myself that if the situation of affairs
there had been such that one could, with propriety, have been
given, with a reasonable hope of adequate exertion in return, I
should never have signed any other instrument with as much pleasure
as the warrant for ratifying that agreement, whatever had been the
consequences of it. I have no other view of the contest in which we
are engaged, nor ever have had, than that the existence of the two
systems of Government is fairly at stake, and in the words of St.
Just, whose curious speech I hope you have seen, that it is perfect
blindness not to see that in the establishment of the French
Republic is included the overthrow of all the other Governments of
Europe. If this view of the subject is just, there can be worse
economy than that which spares the expense of present exertion, and
incurs the probability of increased risk, and the necessity of
protracted efforts. I believe, however, that all this reasoning
applies, in this instance at least, to a case which will not exist.

Our letters from Holland yesterday announced the execution of
Barrere and Co.; but so many false reports have come from thence,
that I do not give much faith to this, except from the probability
of the thing itself. The weakness which this state of things at
Paris occasions, in their efforts in the Low Countries, is very
encouraging, and would be much more so, if we were but in a
situation to profit of it.

Mulgrave's expedition has, I believe, completely performed its
object, and averted all danger for the present from that quarter.
The corps will now be broken up. In that event, Nugent has been
thought of to go to the West Indies with the command of a brigade,
and the local rank of Brigadier-General. I have taken it for
granted that this will be a thing agreeable to him, and have
therefore promoted it as far as I could, because it gives him the
opportunities of showing himself both in service and in command. If
you see it in the same light, perhaps, you would prefer throwing
out the idea to him before it is formally proposed to him, as he
might have difficulty in declining any proposal of service, even if
for any reason that I do not foresee this destination was not
agreeable to him.

I rejoice to think that your King's guard is almost over, which I
imagine must have been a troublesome business enough.

God bless you, my dearest brother.

The straw was now beginning to move in the direction of Ireland. Mr. Ponsonby and his friends made no concealment of the expectations they founded upon the advent of Lord Fitzwilliam; and reports were creeping out, that with the change of men would come an entire change of measures.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Dropmore, Sept. 27th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I received your letter here yesterday, and write this because what
you say on two material points of the public situation of affairs,
impels me to it, though I well know how impossible it is within the
compass of a letter to discuss such questions, or even to state the
mere grounds of the considerations on which they depend. I see so
much all around us of the gloomiest colour, that I am on that
account, perhaps, more sensible to the manner in which you seem to
view our situation. I cannot, however, be much surprised at the
confidence which you seem to feel as to the possibility of our
seeing the storm break all round us, and remaining untouched by it,
because such appears to be the prevailing sentiment here, as well
as in every other part of Europe: every country, and almost every
individual, seeming to reason and to act in the hope of such an
exception being made in their favour during the general ruin which
they see impending over others. I am, however, not the less
convinced of the truth of my own opinion, which is unhappily
already confirmed by too many instances of the effects which this
delusive security, as I think it, has produced, and is daily
producing. I can see no grounds, in the state of this country, to
hope for such an exception in our favour, and I do verily believe
that we must prepare to meet the storm here, and that we must not
count upon the continuance of a state of domestic tranquillity
which has already lasted so much beyond the period usually allotted
to it in the course of human events. I trust that we shall at least
meet it with more firmness than our neighbours, but even in order
to do this, we ought not to blind ourselves at the moment of its
approach. It seems too probable that it is decreed by Providence
that a stop should be put (for reasons probably inscrutable to us)
to the progress of arts and civilization among us. It is a
melancholy reflection to be born to the commencement of such a
scene, and to be called to bear a principal share in it, but I
trust we may hope that our strength may be proportioned to our
trial.

With respect to what you say of Ireland, I am not ignorant of the
reports upon the subject, though perhaps a little mortified at the
facility with which you seem to have given credit to them. I know
of no such measure as you say we _have adopted_. I have never
varied in my opinion as to the impolicy of the conduct held in
Ireland during the time of Lord Rockingham's Administration, nor
do I believe that any one is disposed to repeat that conduct now.
On the other hand, I must say that I think we, least of all people,
and yourself less than any man existing, have reason to feel any
particular interest in a system which experience has always shown,
at least in our time, to be neither able nor disposed to carry any
support to English Government whenever England can think such
support material. It has long appeared to me, and I believe to you
also, that to make the connexion with Ireland permanently useful to
Great Britain, that connexion must be strengthened by a systematic
plan of measures, well considered and steadily pursued. Whether the
present moment, or any other moment that is in near prospect, would
be favourable to such a plan, is another and a more difficult
question; but I am sure that every year that is lost increases the
hazard of our situation as with respect to Ireland. These points I
feel as those which are truly important to England, are not
questions of power or advantage to Lord Shannon, or Mr. Ponsonby,
or any other individual, or set of individuals there. And with this
impression, I certainly have not for one consented, as you express
it, to surrender Ireland to the Duke of P. and Lord F. under the
government of Mr. Ponsonby; but neither can I conceive what other
interest you or I have, or ought to have, on that subject, except
that Ireland should be so managed, if possible, as not to be an
additional difficulty in our way, when so many others are likely to
occur.

I have not often as much leisure as I have found to-day to put
these ideas on paper. Do not think me dispirited by what has
happened. I see the extent of our danger, and think that danger
much greater than it is commonly apprehended; but the effect of
that opinion on my mind is no other than that of increasing the
conviction with which I was before impressed, of the necessity of
perseverance and exertion. France and Spain and the Netherlands,
and Geneva, most of all (small as it is), show us that this danger
is not to be lessened by giving way to it, but that courage and
resolution are in this instance, as in most others, the surest
roads to self-preservation.

I have written this with more than usual seriousness, because such
is the state of my mind, which I am accustomed to open to you
without reserve, and such as it is at the moment of my writing or
conversing with you.

When are we likely to meet? I suppose that your campaign will not
last much beyond the King's journey. You will not, I hope, forget
that this place is your best inn, whether you go to Stowe or to
town; but you must give me a few days' notice, that I may be sure
to be here. God bless you.

The progress of the negotiations on the continent, and the weakness of Austria and Prussia, mixed up with no inconsiderable amount of indecision and duplicity, are freely commented upon in letters from Mr. Grenville and Lord Malmesbury. Want of power, and want of will--fear, hesitation, and imbecility--were so conspicuous in the conduct of these Courts, as to destroy all confidence in their professions. The character drawn by Lord Malmesbury of the King of Prussia--which the reader will find confirmed in the subsequent communications of Mr. Grenville--shows how little reliance, under any circumstances, could be placed on His Majesty's co-operation.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

(Private.) Vienna, Sept. 22nd, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

The course of this last week has been employed--as you will have
seen from our despatch--in very long, but fruitless arguments on
our parts. The proposal which we send to you, has no other
recommendation than that of its having been strenuously resisted
by us, and steadily persisted in by them. If the fact really was,
as they are disposed to consider it, that England--at no risk and
no expense--could, in the shape of this guarantee, furnish means to
Austria, without which they must consider themselves as beat, and
act too under that impression, to their own certain ruin, and to
the great probable danger of Holland; if, I say, all this mischief
could be prevented without any real expense to England, the
question would seem to me very different from what it now is. But,
I confess, that I have not been able to make out of their
conversation on this subject any of that security on these points
which they must insist upon. They say, provision can be made by
which the interest of this money can be punctually secured, to be
paid strictly when due to the commissaries of the English army, or
any other persons appointed to receive it; yet what those
provisions are which provide for that security, I do not make out,
nor do they seem able to describe. I state to them that Mr. Pitt
must find ways and means for the payment of the interest of this
loan, which must increase the first shape of our annual expenses,
whether they are afterwards honestly repaid or not; but they
maintain that M. Desardroui can settle this somehow or other,
though how they have not by any means explained; perhaps M.
Desardroui has been more fortunate with Mr. Pitt.

One considerable difficulty in regard to this proposition seems to
be the influence which this loan might have upon their wish to
regain the Low Countries--a wish which we already think too weak in
their minds, and which would probably become weaker from the
reflection that the income of those revenues was already mortgaged
for a considerable sum. It was with a view to this that I dropped
to them the notion of their giving a larger security, and asking a
smaller loan, as well as complying with the requisitions of
augmented force and British command. The general security you see
they do consent to give; but, until I hear some more distinct
explanation, I shall still fear that they mean to throw the whole
security upon the Netherlands. They are still quarrelling more
every day with everything that is Prussian: they have stopped a
large magazine of blue cloth from Prussia to Switzerland, which
they say they know is destined to France; and the King of Prussia
threatens, in consequence, to stop some of their supplies in their
passage to their armies. Thugut said of the King of Prussia to-day,
with some truth and some humour, that all he wanted was to save the
whole of his army, to conquer Poland without the loss of a man, and
in reward to receive from us a pension of a million and a half per
annum. If half that sum would purchase from him thirty thousand
troops absolutely at our disposal, to make with British, Hessian
and Dutch an army under English orders of one hundred thousand men,
for the side of Holland; and that the other half--viz.:
L700,000--given in the way of subsidy to Austria, could give it
good heart to make a vigorous offensive campaign, I know not
whether my inclinations would not lead me to the experiment; but
their wants here are so great, and their resources, or at least
their spirit and exertions, so reduced, that the prospect is
certainly very discouraging. They seem full of new fears about the
Turks, and express much expectation that our Minister at
Constantinople will make great efforts to keep all quiet there.

I believe I told you there were apprehensions of the Poles, under
Kosciusko, breaking with the Austrians. A small affair had taken
place, but it is said to be amicably settled, and to be, for the
present, safe on that side. We are anxiously expecting our
permission to return; and I depend now upon seeing you so soon,
that I will not unnecessarily protract this letter.

I know not who you are sending here; but we have taken great pains
to keep alive in them here the most favourable dispositions that we
could; and as far as appearances can be depended on--if the
pecuniary demands were out of the question--nothing can be more
promising than their general language and professions are, of
earnestly desiring to establish the most intimate union between the
two Courts.

God bless you, my dearest brother.

LORD MALMESBURY TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Frankfort, Oct. 2nd, 1794.
DEAR GRENVILLE,

I have written to Lord Spencer all I have to write officially. I
fear I have mixed up a little bile with my intelligence; but the
times are bilious, and it is beyond the compass of my patience to
see the great stake we are playing for lost by imbecility,
treachery, and neglect, without betraying a few symptoms of
discontent. It is really deplorable that we should be the only
nation in Europe who are up to the danger of the moment, and that
the minds of all the other Cabinets are either so tainted with
false principles, or are so benumbed, that it is impossible to work
upon them. It is manifest, from the most undoubted information,
that the interior of France is in a state of the greatest disorder
and confusion; that the successes of the armies are the only cause
of this confusion not breaking out in the shape of a civil war; and
that if we could at this moment obtain any one brilliant success,
that the whole fabric would fall to pieces.

It is said that H. P. M. will come here, and that when he does
come, things will take another turn. I doubt one and the other. Any
means will be employed at Berlin to keep him there, and if these
should not succeed, any means will be employed here to persuade him
to approve all that has been done, and to follow up the same line
of conduct. I know from experience the weakness of his character,
and the facility with which he gives way to the last advice. I know
also by experience that his assurances cannot be depended on, and
that his conduct does not always correspond with his promises. It
is from your mission and from your Court that I expect any good. I
am free to confess (still under the influence of that vile thing
called experience) that my hopes are not very sanguine.

Lord Howe is returned to Torbay. This is all I hear from England.
Nobody writes to me, since everybody supposes me on the road. Mr.
Braddye gave me your letter an hour ago, I will do all I can to
make Frankfort pleasant to him, but this is almost as impossible as
to make the Prussians act.

I probably shall be here still a fortnight. I will write again
soon.

Ever yours most truly and sincerely,
MALMESBURY.

The curious revelations that are made in the next letter respecting Ireland are of infinite value in enabling us to estimate correctly the events that afterwards took place in that country under Lord Fitzwilliam's government, and the circumstances which led to its abrupt termination. Two important facts are authenticated in this communication: the first, that Lord Fitzwilliam, before he assumed the government, and even before his appointment to it was advanced so far as the removal of his predecessor, had not only determined upon the introduction of a new system, involving extensive changes of policy and persons, but that he had made known his determination to the heads of that party in Ireland who had obstructed Lord Buckingham on the Regency question; and the second, that this determination was formed without any previous concert with Mr. Pitt and the Cabinet, and to a great extent in opposition to their known and avowed principles.

LORD GRENVILLE TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

(Private.) Dover Street, Oct. 15th, 1794.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I think it probable that you may receive with this letter, others
mentioning to you the unhappy misunderstanding which has clouded
all our prospects, and which seems to threaten the worst
consequences to that system, from the permanence of which I had
looked, as you did, for the safety of this country, under all the
difficulties of our present situation. Everything has continued up
to this hour to go on in the most satisfactory manner, with the
single exception of this unfortunate subject of Ireland, which now
is brought to that sort of point which must, as I fear, unavoidably
produce the immediate dissolution of the union, which we were both
so anxious to maintain and perpetuate.

It would be difficult for me to give you an exact account how this
mischief has originated, because I am of course ignorant of the
manner in which the Duke of P. and Lord F. received the
impressions, on which they appear to have acted. About the time I
wrote my last letter to you, or rather earlier, reports came round
to Pitt and myself that the party who had acted in opposition in
Ireland, and particularly Ponsonby and Grattan, had held the
strongest language respecting assurances received by them from the
Duke of P. and Lord F., that the latter was immediately to be
declared Lord-Lieutenant, that Mr. Pitt had given Ireland over
entirely to them, and that a new system of measures and men was to
be adopted. In these reports particular persons were mentioned as
being to be dismissed, and amongst these the Chancellor. The only
impression which these produced on my mind was, that Lord F. had
talked too soon of his intended appointment, as it had been
uniformly explained that he could not be named till some provision
was found for Lord W., the fact being that when the latter went to
Ireland he accepted that situation, on an express engagement that
he should return to one not less advantageous than the Post-Office,
which he then quitted. I imagined also that in his communications
with persons, whose support to a new Government in Ireland we all
wished to secure, he had been less guarded than he might have been,
and had given in his conversation more way to ideas stated by them
than it could be prudent to do. And in this impression I wrote to
you, thinking all the rest to proceed only from the usual
exaggeration of reports of this nature, particularly in Ireland;
and feeling confident that before any measure was really determined
upon, we should have an opportunity of discussing it fully, and of
weighing the proposed advantages of it against the very great
objections which naturally and at first sight occur.

Soon after this we heard that Lord F. had actually taken such steps
in Ireland as marked his persuasion of his being immediately to be
appointed, and as gave on that account great offence to Lord W., to
whom no communication of that nature had yet been made on our part,
because we saw no such opening as it would have been necessary to
hold out to him when such communication was made.

While we were doubting what step it might be best to take on this
subject, to avoid giving any ground of uneasiness or
dissatisfaction, the Duke of P. wrote to Pitt to urge the immediate
appointment of Lord F. as a thing already determined upon, and
without taking any notice of the necessity of the previous
arrangement for Lord W. This led to intercourse upon the subject,
and it is only since that time that we have found ourselves
apprized of all the difficulties of the subject, and of the extent
of the misunderstanding which prevails respecting it.

It appears that Lord F. has (on whatever grounds) announced to his
friends in Ireland his immediate destination for that country, in
such a manner as makes him now think that his appointment cannot
even be postponed without discredit to himself, and that he cannot
any longer continue in the King's service in any other situation
than that of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.