Chapter XIV: Front Matter (14)

I find that Mr. Dundas considers himself to have given sufficient
intimation to Lord Hobart of the intended arrangements, as far as
they could affect his Lordship, by having enclosed to him, in a
despatch forwarded overland some months ago, a copy of the letter
addressed by Mr. Dundas to the Chairman of the Court of Directors
on the subject of Lord Hobart's pretensions to a mark of the
respect of the Company in the event of a change in the Government
of India.

To whatever situation I may be destined, whether to Madras or
Bengal, the maintenance of Lord Hobart's credit and reputation will
always be a leading object of my wishes; and I trust, before I
leave England, that I shall have the satisfaction of receiving your
advice with respect to the most effectual mode of combining the
accomplishment of that object with ideas, in some degree different
from those which have governed the policy of Lord Hobart's
administration at Madras in more than one material branch of the
public service.

I am, Sir, with great respect and esteem,
Your most faithful and humble servant,
MORNINGTON.

LORD MORNINGTON TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Hertford Street, July 19th, 1797.
MY DEAR LORD,

I assure you that I felt no difficulty or delicacy whatever in
communicating your letter to Mr. Pitt as soon as I received it, and
I flatter myself that throughout the whole of the arrangement
relative to India I have never been found deficient in any mark of
regard for my old friend Hobart's interest or honour. Mr. Pitt
authorized me to inform you that he would very soon write both to
you and to Lord Hobart; and to that letter, whenever you receive
it, I must refer you for the detail of facts on which Mr. Pitt is
more competent to afford explanation than I. I must however
declare, in justice both to Pitt and Dundas, that I see nothing in
the conduct of either to justify the least suspicion of any other
than the most cordial sentiments of good-will towards Hobart. I
have said the same thing to Mr. Sullivan, whom you will probably
see, and stated the grounds of my opinion at large. Mr. Pitt does
not appear to admit that Lord Hobart's interests ever have been or
can be made matter of negotiation. He says he has acted in the
whole transaction, and will continue to act, conformably to his
sense of public duty, and his unaltered feelings of friendship for
Lord Hobart, to whom he will not fail to give a full statement of
all his conduct. I believe Mr. Dundas's view of the subject to be
nearly the same; but not being at liberty to communicate your
letter to him, I have not been enabled to enter so fully with him
into the discussion of its contents. However, I can inform you that
his favourable intentions towards Lord Hobart remain precisely the
same.

Mr. Sullivan will immediately communicate in person with Mr. Dundas
on all the points of this business, and you will learn the result
from him.

Nothing but the continual hurry and interruptions to which I am at
present exposed could justify my having delayed so long the
acknowledgment of your kind letter. Pray, my dear Lord, accept my
cordial thanks for the many marks of friendship which it contains.
I do not expect to sail before September, and you may be assured
that I will make it my business to see you before my departure.

Ever, my dear Lord,
Yours most sincerely and affectionately,
MORNINGTON.

The remaining letters of the year refer at intervals to the events in progress on the continent; events which occupy so large and prominent a space in history, as to render any detailed allusion to them unnecessary.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, April 28th, 1797
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I have this day seen Dutheil, and to-morrow I am to see the other;
but there has been a blunder about it, or I should long since have
seen him. I hardly know how to credit all I hear on that subject,
and yet I must say I hear it from all quarters, agreeing in the
essentials, though varying a little as to sub-divisions, according
to the dispositions of the informants.

I hardly know how to tell myself, under these circumstances, what I
wish about Hammond's mission, because the panic here is so
disgraceful, that the country will not allow us to do them justice.
If I thought others _would_ do them that justice, my resolution
would soon be taken; but I have not nerves to plunge my country
into the horrors of a Jacobin Government to save myself the
unpleasant task of being compelled to do worse for them than I am
sure I could if they would but be quiet and suffer themselves to be
saved. It is a curious speculation in history to see how often the
good people of England have played this game over and over again,
and how incorrigible they are in it. To desire war without
reflection, to be unreasonably elated with success, to be still
more unreasonably depressed by difficulties, and to call out for
peace with an impatience which makes suitable terms unattainable,
are the established maxims and the regular progress of the popular
mind in this country. Yet, such as it is, it is worth all the other
countries of the world put together, so we must not too much
complain of it.

I am grieved to hear that your dear son has had another relapse,
and should be extremely obliged to you if, whenever you can send me
a better account, as I trust you will be able to do, you would let
me have a line.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, May 3rd, 1797.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

The Paris papers arrived this morning seem to confirm, beyond a
doubt, the signature of peace with the Emperor. We know nothing
more of it than you will find in those papers. The last accounts
from Vienna which I have received were of the 17th, and they looked
more like war than peace; but not enough so to give me any reason
to doubt the fact.

The task which is now left to us, is no doubt arduous and
difficult. It would not be in the least so with a country united,
and feeling its own strength: but to contend against dejection,
cowardice and disaffection at home, aiding a powerful enemy from
without, is not a light or easy matter. It must, however, be tried;
for I have no conception that any other use can be made of this
event by the Directory, than that of exacting from us concessions,
which I trust neither the country nor Parliament will bring
themselves to listen to.

I hope you are all going on well at Stowe, and that your invalid is
recovering. Have you seen my Prince? He is sensible, and well
informed; though not exactly the picture of a young lover.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, May 5th, 1797.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

The messenger is arrived this morning, and has brought us the
confirmation of the Paris reports. The preliminaries were signed on
the 18th; but we are still uninformed of the particulars of the
conditions, except that they contain a stipulation for a Congress
at Berne, to which the allies of the two parties are to be invited.
I believe, from what I can collect from the very defective
information which has yet reached us, that the articles have been
drawn in so much haste and confusion, and by persons so little used
to transact points of this nature, that they are unintelligible,
and require explanation before they can be made public, or even
communicated to other Courts. Thugut has resigned--this step having
been taken in contradiction to his opinion--and a Count Cobenzl,
now Austrian Minister at Petersburg, is supposed to be destined to
succeed him. This is, in the whole of it, a great event, and big
with the greatest consequences, whether good or bad--_caliginosa
nocte premit Deus_.

You cannot see the state of Ireland more gloomily than I do.
Possibly, if we have peace, that may leave us more at liberty to
act in that quarter; but even then, what force have we? and to what
objects are we to direct it, when the gentlemen are all flying from
their duty, and either joining the adverse standard, or at best
deserting their posts?

I rejoice to hear so good an account of your son, and I trust the
attack is now over, though the recovery of strength must naturally
be very slow.

Ever, my dear brother,
Most affectionately yours,
G.

Wells's ship's crew being harangued by him refused to cheer with
the other ships, till the 'Glory' loaded her guns to fire upon her.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Charles Street, May 9th, 1797.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I cannot express to you my disappointment in the Portsmouth news,
which I found upon my return to town yesterday evening. By the post
of Saturday, the letters from the fleet were better than they had
ever been; and the officers themselves seemed in much better heart
and spirits. On Sunday, however, it broke out afresh:
representations were handed about, complaining that the speeches of
Lord Howe, Lord Spencer and the Duke of Clarence, were meant to
disappoint the seamen of what had been promised them, and it was
suggested that the 'Marlborough' was to be kept back, and made an
example of when the fleet had sailed. Upon these pretences, the
delegates began going round to each ship: Colpoys told his crew he
would not admit them; they mutinied, and he ordered his marines to
fire, who did so, and badly wounded four mutineers; but the fire
was returned by the crew, who overpowered the officers and the
marines, confined Colpoys, and threatened to hang Lieutenant Bover.
To save him, Colpoys asserted that Bover had been ordered so to act
by him, and that he had an order for this discipline from the
Admiralty, which order he gave to the delegates. The order was a
very proper order from the Admiralty to every captain, requiring
him to give no cause of complaint to the men on the subject of
provisions, requiring him to keep up a proper discipline, and to
exert a proper spirit in resisting any appearance of mutiny. This
order, we since hear, is stated as an act of treachery in the
Admiralty as against the seamen.

Upon this tumult in the 'London,' the crews of the other ships
took possession of the arms, and many confined their officers to
their cabins. The post of to-day brings no new or different state
of things, except an account that three of the mutineers are dead
in Haslar Hospital of their wounds; and that Campbell, Nichols,
Talbot, one or two other captains, and many lieutenants, have been
put on shore at St. Helen's.

A messenger was dispatched last night with the news of the vote of
the House of Commons having passed unanimously, but it is doubtful
whether in this high wind he could get to the fleet; and all these
circumstances show so little colour or pretence of real complaint,
that I cannot help fearing the evil is more deeply rooted in the
influence of Jacobin emissaries and the Corresponding Society, and
to their machinations the vote of yesterday will afford no answer.
Upon the whole, this is the worst state of things which I have
seen. The ground of the mischief is not known to the officers, and
as far as I can see, they have no heart or nerves to meet this
formidable calamity. With this wind they might have sailed; but
with what has happened in the 'London,' and with so many officers
put on shore, one can hardly now wish the fleet to sail.

The last accounts from Brest announce about twenty sail, but not in
a very forward state of readiness; but this state of our fleet
cannot be news to them, and they will doubtless profit of an
opportunity which perhaps they have themselves created.

At half-past one no news was come. If I hear more before the post
goes out, I will add it.

God bless you, dearest brother.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Charles Street, May 11th, 1797.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

Great anxiety again prevailed here by an account which arrived at
midnight, that the delegates were on board the 'London,' and it
was feared they were urging for the execution of Colpoys and his
captain; but a few hours afterwards, news arrived that Colpoys'
crew had resisted the delegates; that even the most mutinous ships,
viz. the 'Duke' and 'Mars,' were returned to their duty, and that
most of the ships had desired their officers to join them again. I
have also read a letter from Payne, who writes in high spirits, and
says that there is now a complete hostility on the part of the
well-affected as against the mutineers, and that he has just spoke
a cutter from the 'Queen Charlotte' with twenty or thirty
well-affected men on board, who were going to every ship in the
fleet, to insist upon everything being quiet, and upon their going
instantly to sail in quest of the French. Lord Howe would arrive
about nine this morning, with a warrant under the King's
sign-manual, for making such final arrangement as might be
necessary for the sailing of the fleet, if he should find it so
disposed to sail. Not a word from Lord Bridport, except to
acknowledge the communication of the Act of Parliament!

Under these circumstances, there is every reason to suppose that
one may hope the immediate storm is a little blown over, and that
no new resource need be looked for such as you suggest; but the
apprehension of my mind is still extremely great, because I am more
and more convinced that Jacobin management and influence is at the
bottom of this evil; and till that influence is traced and rooted
out, there is, in my view, no chance of safety. The tampering with
the soldiers by conversation and handbills is another unanswerable
proof of the system by which all this mischief moves forward; and
the activity of Brest in the last accounts, seems to confirm, as
far as such preparation can, their knowledge of, if not their
participation in, this mischief.

Orde has written from Plymouth, that he hopes to get the ships
there to sea before any communication is had of this new mutiny.

Things look badly, as I believe, in Ireland; but those of
Government, whom I ever see, are so entirely occupied, that I write
to you more from my own guess than from their communication.

God bless you, dearest brother.

I know no foreign news of any sort, nor have I seen William these
three or four last days.

A third effort to effect a pacification with France had been entered upon by Lord Grenville in the month of June. On this occasion his Lordship addressed a direct application to M. de la Croix, expressing his readiness without delay to open a discussion of the views and pretensions of both parties. To this communication M. de la Croix replied by accepting the proposal; and the town of Lisle was appointed for the meeting of the ambassadors.

Lord Malmesbury was again appointed on the part of England; and it became evident at once that his re-appearance in that capacity was not very satisfactory to the French Government, M. de la Croix coldly signifying the consent of the Directory to negotiate with Lord Malmesbury, but adding that another choice would have augured more favourably for the speedy conclusion of peace.

The conference at Lisle seems to have taken its colour all throughout from this preliminary distrust of the English envoy. It lasted up to the 17th of September; and ended as it began, in a fruitless debate about Lord Malmesbury's powers to treat in full. In the meanwhile, the event known by the name of the Revolution of Fructidor took place in Paris, the meeting was broken up, and Lord Malmesbury left Lisle on the 18th of September.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, Sept. 20th, 1797.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

Late last night we got a messenger from Lord Malmesbury, with an
account that he was ordered away from Lisle, and was on his way to
London, where he arrived this morning. It is not easy to say
beforehand what effects it will produce here, where people's
spirits are so susceptible of alarm and depression; but I really
think, in the manner of doing the thing, the Directory have done
everything they could to play our game.

The dissatisfaction will be great in France, but they seem, for the
moment, completely masters there. Ireland is our weakest point, and
to that our attention must be most directed; for anything else I
have very little apprehension.

I think it probable that the consequences of this new state of
things will be to detain me in and about town, and to put an end to
my hopes of a journey to Stowe or Wotton; but I am not yet quite
sure as to this. I hope we shall not be in a hurry to meet
Parliament, as I understand that it will not be necessary, in point
of finance, till about the middle of November. Between this and
that time many things may still happen to raise people's spirits,
which I should fear would in the present moment be much depressed,
whatever pains we took to raise them.

Ever, my dearest brother, most affectionately yours,
G.

1798.

CONDITION OF ENGLAND--PLANS FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENCES--THE AUGMENTATION OF THE MILITIA--VOLUNTARY SUBSCRIPTIONS--A REBELLION BREAKS OUT IN IRELAND--LORD CORNWALLIS SUCCEEDS LORD CAMDEN AS LORD-LIEUTENANT--LORD BUCKINGHAM VOLUNTEERS FOR IRELAND--DIFFERENCES WITH LORD CORNWALLIS--MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE IS APPOINTED ON A MISSION TO VIENNA AND BERLIN.

A rebellion in Ireland, and a threat of invasion from France, for which active preparations were making on the coast and in the Channel, almost exclusively absorbed the attention of Government at the beginning of the year 1798, and demanded all the resources which the devotion of the people could contribute to the protection of the country. The extremity of the public danger had the effect of uniting all classes in a combined effort for self-preservation; and the national enthusiasm was pronounced so strongly and unanimously on this point, that the heads of the Opposition, shattered and enfeebled, retired from the fruitless contest they had been so long waging against the Administration, and left Mr. Pitt and his colleagues in almost undisturbed possession of both Houses of Parliament.

But security was not to be purchased without great sacrifices. The expenditure of the past year had amounted to the enormous sum of twenty-five millions and a half; and Mr. Pitt found it necessary, in order to provide a supply equal to the emergencies of the future, to introduce an entirely new system of finance. He proposed to triple the amount of the existing assessed taxes, with a limitation, restraining the maximum of taxation to the tenth of each person's income; and to borrow the remainder of what was required without creating any additional debt, by appropriating the produce of the sinking fund.

There was a violent resistance in both Houses to this plan; Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan, and others, who had previously seceded, re-appearing in their places for the express purpose of opposing it; but it was carried, nevertheless, by large majorities. Several other measures, to provide means for carrying on the war, and strengthening the national defences, were also introduced; and at no period, since the commencement of hostilities, was public opinion declared so energetically in favour of the ministerial policy. Numerous circumstances contributed to feed the popular ardour as the year advanced. Splendid naval victories inspired the highest confidence in the ultimate issues of the war; commerce once more resumed its former activity; the harvest was unusually abundant; and all branches of trade and industry reached a height of prosperity that completely relieved the depression under which they had suffered during the preceding year.

The most active measures were set on foot to promote the common object of protecting the empire against foreign invasion and domestic treason. The most prominent of them was a plan for augmenting the Militia, afterwards matured and introduced by Mr. Dundas; and the collection of subscriptions towards the formation of a national defence fund. No greater proof could be given of the zeal of the people, at a period when their burthens were already so excessive, than the munificence and promptitude of their contributions on this occasion. At a meeting of bankers and merchants held in the open square of the Royal Exchange, upwards of forty-six thousand pounds were collected on the spot; the King subscribed L20,000; the Queen L5,000; numerous mercantile firms and private individuals contributed large sums, varying from L3,000 to L10,000; and the Bank of England, the noble tribute of L200,000. That this urgent necessity should have pressed heavily upon those public men whose position made a heavy demand upon their patriotism, was to be expected, and in some instances, sacrifices were made to an extent which rendered unavoidable the reduction of their domestic establishments; but no considerations of personal inconvenience were suffered to interfere with the paramount claims of duty. The subjoined letters throw considerable light on these transactions, and are of especial interest from the minute details they present respecting the measures that were adopted in this great emergency for augmenting and organizing the Militia force of the kingdom.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, Feb. 2nd, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I saw yesterday in Pitt's hands your letter to him. The sacrifice
you make is certainly very great, and such as I could not have
thought myself at liberty to advise, though I am glad on the whole
that your determination is such as it is; not that I am very much
attached (but quite the contrary) to the idea of raising public
supplies by voluntary contributions, and still less by
contributions _soi-disant_ voluntary, but in reality extorted by
popular clamour and prejudice. But after that business has been
carried as far as it has, it would have been too invidious for you
to have put yourself in a breach which I think ought never to have
been made. I am much concerned at what you say in your letter to
Pitt respecting the personal inconvenience to which this step will
subject you, and particularly as to the idea of your doing anything
that can look like an avowed intention of suspending your residence
at Stowe. It seems to me that nothing is more natural than that
this state of things should lead to reduction of your
establishments; and I believe in so doing you will only follow a
very general example, though I appear to be selected as a much more
striking instance of it than I have yet been able, with my best
endeavours, to make myself. It will also be very easy for you,
quartered in Essex, to be as much or as little as you please at
Stowe in the course of the year; but any avowal of quitting that
residence would, I think, do you a needless injury.

You will receive in a day or two the circular letter for calling
out the supplementary Militia, with the explanation of the manner
in which this is intended to be executed, so as to make it a
_muster_ of the whole, but an embodying only of a part.

War with America and Portugal seems quite determined on at Paris;
nor do I see how Denmark can keep herself out of the scrape,
though she will most certainly do her best. The general opinion is
that Mulin has established his superiority over Barras and
Buonaparte. There can be no doubt of the intention to invade us
here or in Ireland, or both.

The capture of the packet leaves us still without official or
direct accounts from the West Indies, but all the accounts we get
are favourable.

I enclose you, in confidence, a paper, which I think will be
interesting to you. You will be so good as _not to have seen_ it,
and to return it to me. It is of course to be kept under lock and
key. It is unpublished, and meant to remain so.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Charles Street, April 27th, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

It is only from your letter to William that I have learnt what is
the actual state of the discussion which you had begun upon the
subject of the flank companies of the Militia, and very sorry I am
to find that it is likely to take any shape which can be unpleasant
or disagreeable to you. The measure itself is one which I have
understood to be one of the few measures upon which, in point of
necessary military preparation, all our officers are agreed, and
which, if I recollect right, you yourself are as strongly inclined
to as anybody, though not precisely in the mode recommended by the
Commander-in-chief; if the objections which you felt on the point
of _Militia_ establishment had been equally felt and adopted by the
generality of the commanding officers of Militia, some way or other
must, I suppose, have been found to accommodate the difficulties of
such a representation; but in the present instance (as far as I
could collect from Fortescue, who was at a pretty numerous meeting
of all the Militia commanders who were in town), there was not any
one of those who did not express their readiness to adopt this
plan, and their approbation of it; so that, in fact, this matter,
so far from being taken up by the generality of commanding officers
in the same light in which you had objected to it, has really the
sanction of every commanding officer, except, as I am told, Lord
Berkeley, Lord Carnarvon and yourself.

Under these circumstances, much as I regret that any arrangement
could be proposed and could be likely to be carried, which is so
disagreeable to you, you will, however, I am sure, agree with me
that it stands upon very different ground, when it stands upon the
ground of individual opinions, from what it would have done if it
had been taken up by the whole or the majority or a large part of
the Militia. My best hopes are that some mode may yet be found
which may place your own regiment in the shape that you had wished;
and William has, I know, taken all the pains he can to urge the
adoption of all or of any of the modifications of this order, which
may make it less objectionable to you; and I cannot therefore but
hope that his zeal and anxiety in this will carry it to a better
shape for you as far as you are immediately interested. But we live
in times of such pressing public duty, and the military post to
which you are called and in which you are placed, is one so forward
both in danger and in honourable distinction to you, that I should
not do my duty by you if I did not (however uncalled upon for that
opinion) add that, in my poor judgment, no state of military
arrangements or orders can for a moment admit of the possibility of
your giving up your command in an hour of danger, as immediate as
that in which I write. I know you will give me credit for the
honesty of this opinion, as well as for the affection which calls
it forth from me.

God bless you, my dearest brother.
Ever most affectionately yours,
T. G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, April 27th, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

On receiving your letter to Pitt, I sent it to him, and have since
seen him and Dundas. I understand from them that you have been
misinformed about the idea of their intending to bring in any new
Bill on the subject of forming the flank companies of Militia into
light infantry battalions, as the opinion both of the Attorney and
Solicitor-General is quite clear on the interpretation of the
present law. With respect to the measure itself, I must say that as
far as I understand it, my opinion is and always has been clearly
for it. But what is much more important is, that the Duke of York,
all the Generals of districts and Lord Cornwallis, the only
military Cabinet Minister, all put the salvation of the country
upon it. In this situation I do not think that Pitt, or Dundas, or
any of us, could take upon ourselves the responsibility of omitting
a measure, stated to be clearly within the law, and in which so
large a proportion of the Militia officers are disposed to
acquiesce with cordiality and cheerfulness.

Nothing certainly can be further from their wishes, even as public
men only, than to place you in any unpleasant or difficult
situation; but you will not think this a moment when points of real
importance can be given up to personal considerations of regard and
good-will.

It has occurred, that adopting the measure generally, the
application of it to your particular regiment might be avoided, by
permitting you to form a separate light infantry battalion, under
the command of Fremantle, he being an army officer, and one whom
the Duke of York himself allows to be as fit for that purpose as
any he could select; and that this permission may, under certain
circumstances and conditions, be extended to other colonels
desirous of taking that mode preferably to the other.

But this is not without its difficulty, nor is it possible for any
man, beforehand, to engage for the Duke of York's consent to a
measure, on which he has so much right not only to have _voix au
chapitre_ but to have a voice nearly decisive, so long as his
regulations do not interfere with the law. All, therefore, that I
can say is, that I am persuaded Dundas will do whatever he can to
promote this arrangement, the only solution that I see to
difficulties, one side of which, in the alternative stated by you,
present consequences to which I am very sure, whatever else
happens, you will never bring yourself to look. If I had the least
doubt upon that point, I certainly could and should say much of the
time, of the situation of the country, of the local position of
your regiment in its present quarters, and of the possibility of
any man, under such circumstances, resigning a command because he
disapproves in his own judgment, even supposing him right in that
judgment, of a military order which the Commander-in-chief has
clearly a right to give, and for the omission, as well as the
giving of which, he and the Government are exclusively responsible.

I know nothing more of the supplementary Militia than that they are
to be immediately called out.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Dropmore, May 1st, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I got your letter here last night. I should not have gone out of
town even for one day, if I had not understood from Dundas that the
Duke of York, though quite determined against adopting the
substitution you propose, seemed to think that in order to avoid
putting you under difficulties of any sort, he could forbear to
make the demand on your regiment.

I do not say that I like this expedient, but I see no other without
his abandoning a measure which, for one, I should be very sorry to
see abandoned, believing, as I do, that things of much more
importance than the matter of any legal question of a Militia Act,
depend upon it. I really believe that you are not accurately
informed when you speak of the wishes of the Militia in general
being against this measure. But on this point you have certainly
better means of knowing individual opinions than I can have. On the
legal point, the opinion of the King's law servants must of course
be the only guide for a Commander-in-chief, even if he were not a
Prince of the blood, but much more when he is so, and consequently
not supposed to enter into discussions of that sort, or to be
responsible for them.

I grieve that in these times you should set the example of raising
these questions; but I am confident you would not do so if you did
not think it right. I own I should have thought that any idea of
_disobeying, as a Militia officer_, a command of the
Commander-in-chief, was out of the question in the present moment,
and that if the case (I had almost said) which you yourself put,
had occurred, that of being ordered to embark on board Lord
Bridport's fleet, you would have done so, with a protest of _ne
trahatur in exemplum_.

Dundas will, as I understand from him, explain to you what he
considers to be the case about your letter, which he states to me
to have been an official letter addressed, I think, to P. W. Howe
or his Adjutant-General, and which therefore he did not consider in
any other light than as an accurate statement of the doubt given in
officially and meant to be so considered. But all this is of very
little consequence in comparison of that of the light in which the
thing itself places you, if it were possible that you could adopt
the resolution you speak of.

I take it for granted that Dundas's Bill is meant only to extend to
British subjects, or may easily be so limited. As such, it is
surely highly advantageous in the present moment to have the
services of the men who, of all British officers, have seen the
most real service.

I do not think that the Vienna news at all lessens the expediency
of calling out the remaining third of the Militia. It is highly
probable that the French, seeing that they cannot hope to contend
again with England and Austria joined together, may determine to
accelerate their attack on us, and put the whole on that one
desperate issue.

Ever, my dearest brother,
Most affectionately yours,
G.

The insurrection in Ireland was now approaching the moment which had been arranged by the rebels for the final move upon the capital. The whole plan of the rising, which was to have taken place on the 23rd of May, appeared in the details of a paper found upon the person of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, whose capture on the 19th frustrated the designs of the infatuated conspirators. Measures of the most careful precaution had been previously taken by the Government. Sir Ralph Abercromby, who had been in command of the army, and expressed a wish to retire, was replaced by General Lake, whose knowledge of the country afforded the strongest assurance of success in the vigorous proceedings it became necessary to adopt.

The presence of the military in the disturbed districts, and the numerous seizures of arms and arrests of members of the provincial committees that were organized over the country, had considerably deranged the plans and weakened the resources of the confederacy previously to the arrest of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, which effectually crushed the hopes of the rebels, although for some months afterwards they carried on a sort of flying campaign, with a desperation and ferocity that constantly baffled the operations of the regular troops. Lord Edward Fitzgerald died on the 3rd of June from the effects of the wounds he received in the frantic resistance he offered to the persons who arrested him.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, May 25th, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

Accounts of a very satisfactory nature have been received here this
morning from Dublin. They were upon the very brink of an
insurrection, which was to have taken place on the 22nd. They had
intelligence of it, and by the arrest of Lord Edward Fitzgerald and
the two Sheares's, who were at the head of the plot, they have not
only disconcerted this plan, but have procured indisputable
evidence for proceeding against these traitors, and have now, I
trust, the certainty of convicting them. A special Commission is
preparing for the purpose of bringing them to trial as speedily as
possible, but it will require about a month before all the forms
can be got through. We are sending back O'Connor to them, and it is
probable that his trial may be included in the same Commission.

They write on the 21st, in the best possible spirits, from the
Castle. The attack was intended against Chapelizod, the magazine in
the Phoenix, and the Castle, at the same time; and in order to
increase the confusion, the houses of some of the leading people
were also to have been attacked, and the individuals, at the head
of whom of course was the Chancellor, were to be put to death. The
camp near Dublin was also to be assaulted.

In the desk of one of the Sheares's was found the proclamation
ready drawn, which was to be issued for the establishment of the
Republican Government.

A letter was written on the 21st, to the Lord Mayor of Dublin, by
Lord Castlereagh, to acquaint him with this design, and to order
him to make search for arms, &c., and a message was to be sent to
Parliament the 21st or 22nd. They are not quite sure that the idea
of the insurrection was abandoned, even after this blow-up; but
they were so completely on their guard, that there was nothing to
be apprehended.

You will have seen that Lord E. F. made a desperate resistance when
he was taken. It is, however, supposed that Ryan will recover,
though stabbed in the belly. They had already taken about two
thousand pikes in Dublin alone, and great numbers in the adjacent
counties. On the whole, I trust that with vigorous measures, such
as every one will feel this crisis requires, the seeds of the
rebellion will be crushed.

I think there are full grounds to proceed against Lord Thanet and
Co. for a conspiracy to rescue, as well as for the riot. O'Connor's
acquittal is imputed to Miller's charge, and _that_ to his being
completely exhausted, so as to omit some of the most material
points in the evidence.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, June 1st, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I did not answer your letter earlier, because I waited to know the
opinion of others on the subject of the proposal which you mention.
I find that there is a very strong apprehension of creating by it
dissatisfaction among the Militia, and of impeding the future
raising and augmentation of that force. For it is reasoned thus:
although in the present moment the public spirit is so high that it
is probable a very large part would readily concur in a similar
proposition, yet there would certainly be many individuals, and
perhaps some bodies among them, who would be reluctant to alter
their original terms of service. These persons would hardly be
placed in a fair situation, because although the option would still
nominally be left to them; yet that would be attended with so much
odium, and would so much carry the appearance of backwardness, that
any persons in such a time as this, and particularly persons
engaged in military service, would naturally be very unwilling to
expose themselves to it. By this means, all security and confidence
in the original terms of enlistment would be lost, and both
officers and men, deliberating about entering into the Militia,
would do it with the idea that they might continually be called
upon to serve out of the kingdom, which would destroy the whole
Militia system.

Besides this, another objection strikes me, which I think perhaps
even stronger than the preceding. It is that of the loss of
security to this country, both in point of fact and opinion, from
rendering that force applicable otherwise than to the immediate
protection of Great Britain. I hope that in all cases we should
have done our best, according to such judgment as we could form at
the time: but I will fairly own to you that I do not myself believe
that England would have been now as secure as I trust it is, if we
had possessed the power of disposing of the Militia regiments for
Channel or Irish service, and much less if that power had also been
extended to the continent in general.

A third argument I think of little weight, but I know from what I
have heard in general conversation on the subject, that it would
make considerable impression among a particular class of men. The
Militia is now raised by a sort of direct burthen on the landed
interest, who are reconciled to it from the apparent and visible
protection which their property derives from it. Whereas, if it was
applied to purposes of more general, though possibly greater,
public advantage, that would be called _unfair_ upon the counties,
as the term now is, and we should infallibly have proposals for
throwing the whole burthen, in all its various shapes, more equally
on the general mass of property within the kingdom.

For all these reasons, tempting as it would be in the present state
of the war, to avail ourselves of the service of that which
constitutes the greatest part of our regular force for the purpose
of those operations, with the necessity of which we are thoroughly
impressed, yet I really do not think, nor is it thought by others,
that we can prudently attempt it.

A more limited idea has occurred to me, in which I think your zeal
might be useful in the way of example. It is this. In any case of
invasion (which is by no means to be put out of the question,
however the public love to flatter themselves about it) I think it
is evident that there might, and probably would be, much boat
service. It is by no means impossible that, even in the very act of
landing, they might have to be opposed by gun-boats, _et id genus
omne_, and that troops would be wanted for that service. If landed,
and having taken Dumourier's "_position on the coast_" to wait for
reinforcements and provisions, perhaps the General who commands our
force in that quarter may wish to attack them from the sea, without
waiting for the certain arm of starvation which would be hanging
over them. The same principle applies to the defence of our tide
rivers, harbours, &c. Now, for all this, I should think it would be
highly useful that our troops should in some degree be trained to
this boat work, and though perhaps an inland regiment of Militia
might not be thought the best to begin with, yet by suggesting this
idea to Sir W. Howe, and expressing your readiness and that of your
regiment to lend yourselves to it, an example might be set to
others and a very useful practice introduced.

I wrote this early in the morning and before the arrival of the
post, so that I do not know whether there will be any accounts from
Dublin. If there are, I will add them before I close this letter.
Those of yesterday were, as I understood from the Duke of P. and
King, perfectly good, but I did not see them. The only thing that
appears at all distressing is that the communication with the south
was still interrupted, and although this may arise from the
disturbed state of any one point through which the roads pass, yet
it is productive of uneasiness, and may afford opportunities for
spreading alarms in the south, the consequences of which might be
very serious. No disturbance had shown itself in the north.

Buonaparte is gone to Toulon instead of Rastadt, and it is now
publicly declared at Paris that his object is Cadiz, Portugal, or
Ireland. If we are not more than commonly unfortunate, _il trouvera
a qui parler en chemin_.

I do not think Pitt could avoid answering Fremy's call, and as it
has turned out it is certainly better as it is. One shudders to
think what might have happened.

Ever most affectionately yours,
G.

I do not enclose the "Gazette," because I conclude you have it.
There was nothing else of any importance from Ireland last night,
and nothing at all this morning.

In the month of June, Lord Cornwallis, upon whose military talents the Cabinet placed great reliance, was appointed to succeed Lord Camden in the government of Ireland; and the Irish Secretaryship was again offered to Mr. Thomas Grenville, and declined.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Aylesbury, June 11th, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

By a letter from Cleveland Row which I have this moment received, I
find the Irish storm, which I told you I had seen gathering, is
likely to fall as I had expected it. It is settled that Lord
Cornwallis is to go Lord-Lieutenant, and in case of Pelham's
declining on account of his health, I see I shall be urged in the
strongest manner possible to fill his situation there. I have
already talked this matter so much over with you, and you know so
entirely, both my utter aversion to it, and my reluctance to
decline any personal risk or inconvenience in these critical times,
that I cannot on either side add anything upon this subject; but
upon a matter of so much anxiety and importance to me, a matter too
of which you are in every respect qualified to give me so good an
opinion, you will not be surprised at the solicitude which I
express to know all that you may think about it. Perhaps it may not
come in question, if Pelham is strong again and in health, but if
it does, as very possibly it may, I cannot enough say how desirous
I shall be to discuss the whole matter with you; and as time may
press in the instant of its being proposed, I know that you will
readily turn this in your mind in the present moment. I shall be in
town on Thursday, which being a fair day here, ends our eight days'
exercise; it has passed very prosperously, they do extremely well,
and have been from seventy to eighty out, and working every day
seven or eight hours. We go on to beat the rebels in Ireland, but
we beat them into soldiers.

God bless you, dearest brother.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, June 13th, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I do not hear of any Irish news this morning; if there is any, I
will add it before I close this letter. I entirely agree with you
in thinking the situation of Irish Secretary to be in rank and
estimation much below Tom's calibre. In point of real utility and
scope for displaying the powers of his mind, God knows it is
difficult, extensive, and important enough for the talents of the
greatest man this country ever saw. It is, however, as you will
have learnt by my note of yesterday, out of the question; and
Pelham's rank is too much on a level with his, to admit of the idea
of interposing Tom or Lord D. between Lord C. and him.

When I wrote yesterday, I had not seen Nugent's letter, nor indeed
heard much of the particulars, as you will have seen from my
letter. I think nothing can be better than Nugent's conduct seems
to have been, and his letter is extremely manly, distinct and
judicious. But what a picture does it offer of our officers! I
believe I do not know _this_ Lumley; but I do not, as far as I
_have_ known them, think that there is one of the race fit to be
trusted with the command of a patrole of watchmen, from Lord
Scarborough downwards. Walpole I had long known, and certainly I
should have said the same of him. What a calamity it is, that our
army has not yet been taught that the command of troops in moments
of difficulty and danger requires skill and knowledge, and is not a
faculty bought with a commission at the regulated price.

_Je vois tres en noir_ about this Irish business; but with me that
feeling never has, I trust, operated otherwise than as an
incitement to greater exertion, "to bate no jot of heart, or hope,
but still bear up, and steer right onward." We have gone through
such scenes as this country has never before known; where we have
been wanting in firmness, we have suffered for it; where we have
shown courage adequate to the danger, God has borne us through it;
and so I trust He will do. At all events, our lives, and honour,
and the existence of our country, are staked upon the issue, and
nothing but resolution can save us.

I saw with the greatest pleasure the address of your regiment. I am
happy it has taken that shape, because I think it the least
exceptionable, and still am inclined to the measure. If it
depended on my choice alone, I do not think many hours would pass
over before you would be in march.

It really looks as if Buonaparte was after all in sober truth going
to Egypt: and Dundas seems to think the scheme of attacking India
from thence not so impracticable as it may appear. I am still
incredulous as to the latter point, though as to the former I am
shaken. But as Buonaparte on the 23rd was still off Toulon, and as
Lord St. Vincent must have detached on the 21st at latest, there is
much reason to hope that Nelson may destroy all these visions, be
they what they may. From the coasts of Normandy and Brittany the
troops are in great part withdrawn--they do the Germans too much
honour!

Ever yours,
G.

One of the plans of Ministers (which appears to have originated with Lord Buckingham) for inspiring confidence in Ireland, was to send over a few regiments of English Militia, during the continuance of the disturbances. Lord Buckingham was the first colonel of an English Militia regiment that volunteered upon that service, and, remembering the position he had on two former occasions occupied in Ireland, his example in taking the lead on such an occasion was productive of the happiest effects in awakening the zeal of others.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, June 28th, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I this morning received your letter from Liverpool. I rejoice to
think that the Wexford news will probably make your stay at Dublin
of no long continuance, and much as I regret the present
inconvenience to yourself, yet I will own that it is gratifying to
me that this news did not arrive time enough to stop your
embarkation. I consider it as very important on many accounts that
some of the British Militia regiments should actually arrive in
Ireland, and I would not willingly forego the pride of knowing that
your regiment was the first of them. We have no news here of any
kind; indeed Ireland has engaged the whole attention of everybody
here, and left us no leisure to think of anything else except to
cast now and then a longing wish to the Mediterranean. We have, as
you will have heard from my brother, accounts of Nelson's being
actually in the Mediterranean, and such particulars as seem to
leave no doubt of his having been joined by the ten of the line and
the fifty under Trowbridge. I am more and more convinced that
Buonaparte's intention was only to proceed to Corsica and to wait
there the event of the negotiations, hanging upon the rear of
Naples and Tuscany, but without any other _present_ object, and
then to be determined by circumstances as to the future destination
of his fleet, for Portugal, Great Britain, Ireland, or the West
Indies. If we have tolerable luck, Nelson will disappoint all these
plans.

When you see Lord Clare, pray tell him that in consequence of his
having been spoken of by the Duke of Bedford and Lord Holland last
night in a manner extremely galling to my feelings, I took the
opportunity to express the sentiments which I believe he knows I
entertain of his character and conduct. This passed with the doors
of the House shut, so that he will not see any account of it in the
papers. He will not suppose that I claim any thanks for a bare act
of duty and justice, nor should I have wished it to be mentioned to
him from me, if I had not thought it just possible that he might
hear of the attack, in which case I should have felt much concern
if he had not at the same time known that it had been treated with
as much indignation and scorn as it merited.