Chapter XX: Introduction

The almost studied indifference of the American people toward reasonable preparation for the contingency of war makes more urgent the duty of all officers or those who hope to become officers, to do all in their power in advance to prepare themselves and those committed to their care for the immense responsibilities that will rest upon them when the storm bursts upon the nation.

The modern theory of war as exemplified in the practice of the so-called military nations, is that all the resources of the state--moral, physical and intellectual--should be at the disposal of the government for use in case of war. War is the most critical condition of the modern state with its highly developed and peculiarly sensitive and vulnerable industrial and commercial systems. For the successful prosecution of a conflict on which the very fate of the nation may depend, every ounce of its strength should be available. The aim is to strike immediately with all the force at the nation’s command. That state is best prepared which can most rapidly bring to bear its resources in men and materials. In this modern theory is involved the principle that every able-bodied male citizen owes to the state the obligation of service. This principle is not incompatible with democratic ideals and is recognized in theory by our own constitution. Personal service to be truly effective must be universal, compulsory and regular. It constitutes the true and only solution of the problem of adequate defense. All other solutions are makeshifts resulting from the attempt to get something without paying the cost. All have been tried again and again by the United States and other countries, and all have invariably been found wanting.

War today is one of the most highly developed of the arts--the field of the expert and the professional. This being the case there is more than ever before a need for adequate preparation in advance of the outbreak of war. The unprepared people or government who now-a-days find themselves on the brink of hostilities with a nation that is trained for the struggle, must expect inevitably to pay a severe national penalty.

The preparation of a nation for war is of two kinds; one of material things, the construction of forts, arsenals, fabrication of weapons, munitions, etc., the other the training of its people. While both are essential, the latter is the more important, as well as the more difficult to provide. The American people, in fancied security, have steadfastly refused to pass laws or vote funds for adequate military preparation, either in materiel or personnel. It is evident that we regard the risk as insufficient to warrant the insurance, and we prefer to court war and pay its cost in blood and pensions, not to mention the risk of huge indemnities and the loss of valuable territory, national prestige and honor. We insure our own insignificant lives and pitiful possessions but refuse to insure the life of the nation.

The systematic and intelligent progress that has marked our industrial growth has been conspicuously lacking in our military affairs. “Whether we may be willing to admit it or not,” says General Upton, “in the conduct of war we have rejected the practice of European nations and, with little variation, have thus far pursued the policy of China.”

As to the amount of the risk involved in our policy of national defense or, as some would say, our lack of policy, it has increased by leaps and bounds with the constantly augmented military strength of the other great nations of the earth. This strength is hundreds of times as great as in the days of our thirteen colonies. The seas, which we have hitherto regarded as barriers for our protection, are today favorable avenues for the transport of troops and materials. As to the imminence of the risk we may gain an insight from contemplation of the present situation in Europe, and consideration of the effect of our vast undefended territory and wealth upon the envy and cupidity of other powerful states less fortunately situated than ourselves.

Preparedness for national defense, says Hudson Maxim, is simply a quarantine against the pestilence of war.

The best training for war is, of course, the actual experience of warfare; but for practical purposes this school is too limited to be of much assistance to the actors in person. If a reasonable period of peace intervenes between wars the actors of one war are to a very limited extent only, those having experience of the previous conflict. Even the general lessons of war are too quickly set aside. How little military knowledge has the present generation of Americans to show for the priceless expenditure of the Nation in the unsurpassed school of the Civil War. Wars are fought by the very young men of the country, and this is true not only of the rank and file but also of the majority of the commanders. The hope of the nation lies therefore, in its youth, and how shall this youth be trained?

The duty devolves upon the older officers. There is no higher mission for older officers in time of peace than the systematic development of the talents of the younger officers entrusted to their care. These young officers will be the leaders in the next great war and the fate of the nation may indeed depend upon them. The nation, therefore, has every right to demand of the superiors that nothing will be left undone that may prepare these youths for the trial. Thus will the superiors be exerting their powerful influence upon the course of the coming war. The methods available are the study of history, working of map problems, and terrain exercises, tactical rides or walks, the war game--all in connection with field maneuvers with troops.

Correct training for service in campaign must aim to develop the sound characteristics of the individual, rather than to bind him to a system. The eternal fighting unit being the man, and no two men being created alike, anything which unduly hampers the initiative or self reliance of the officer, though intended as an aid, is in fact a restraint. Hence the caution cannot be too oft repeated that the officer must exert himself to keep aloof from rigid forms or models or precedents because, as in the military service there are no actual equals in rank, so there is no complete precedent for a military situation. Each situation is unique, as is also the man who meets it.

Nevertheless in the broad training of large numbers of young men the whims of the individual must not be confused with his sound characteristics, lest the results of his training be as a crop of weeds. The desire to develop the essential traits of each individual’s character is not a reason for haphazard instruction or lack of system. Those charged with the education of officers can accomplish broader results if their methods are based on systematic effort with the fundamental idea that the system is an aid to the individual, rather than that the individual is an agent of the system.

Outside of campaign the officer obtains his schooling from the experience of handling men and from individual study. These sources are complementary, neither is complete without the other. The commander receives his education not only in the saddle, but at his desk. It is fortunate that this is so, because if outdoor maneuvers with troops were alone of value, the greater part of his time would have to be spent unprofitably. And no single effort expended in the peace training of officers will give greater results in the supreme test of war than the inculcation of habits of ceaseless industry.

On Von Moltke’s estimate of the value of tactical problems as a preparation for war we get an interesting side-light in an incident related of him by a French officer who, prior to the Franco-Prussian War, was on a mission to Berlin. Von Moltke was speaking of the decadence of French military training at that time, and he said to the officer: “Have you even the superficial smattering of the elements of the military art? I am tempted to doubt it. I wager that you do not know the most valuable piece of furniture of an officer in garrison. Come with me,” and so saying the old Prussian led his visitor into a small bed chamber suitable for a sub-lieutenant, containing a small bed without curtains, three straw chairs, shelves of books from floor to ceiling, and in the center a blackboard on an easel, the floor littered with pieces of chalk. “It is with this,” said Von Moltke, “that we beat our adversaries every morning, and as for art, here is all we want,” and he exhibited a series of topographic sketches.

The purpose then of this volume is to supply in compact form the help needed by the instructor,--or the student working alone--in the applicatory method of study. It is not intended as a text alone; its principal rôle is that of a guide to those engaged in the study of practical problems in tactics, either as instructor or student--for the preparation or solution of those problems. It is believed to be the only single work overlooking, from this point of view, the entire field of minor tactics. Nearly everything contained in this volume can be found elaborated in special treatises, but time is of value to the military student and this work gives in a single volume authoritatively the data that must otherwise be searched for through a small library. The organizations used in the text are those of the American service, but the tactical principles discussed are of general application. They pertain however, primarily to systematic organized warfare against a civilized foe, and have but a limited application to “bushwhacking,” guerrilla and savage warfare. Furthermore they are applicable especially to the warfare of the open field, with its rapid changes in situation, rather than the trench deadlocks so nearly akin to siege warfare which, under modern conditions, may often characterize the operations of highly trained belligerents in large forces of nearly equal strength. Many minor details given in Field Service Regulations, Infantry Drill Regulations, and other manuals, are of necessity omitted. This volume is not intended to take the place of the authorized government publications.

The apparently deliberate evasion of definite or even approximate statements as to formations, strength, distances, intervals, etc., and the frequent repetition of the phrase, “this depends upon circumstances,” which characterize many writings on the subject of tactics, give rise to a desire, frequently expressed, for more specific information on these and similar matters. So far as seemed practicable the authors have endeavored herein to satisfy this desire. This is done with the full knowledge that warfare cannot be pursued as an exact science, and that the endeavor to be specific may in some instances elicit criticism.

Whatever one attempts he should be familiar with the methods which have characterized good practice in that particular line of endeavor. When confronted with a specific case the individual searches for the underlying principles which find application therein, and it is here that his resourcefulness and originality are called into play. The authors in each case discussed have endeavored to state clearly all the principles which may be applicable, giving at the same time some concrete illustrations in figures, distances, etc., of simple cases. These illustrations are not to be considered as models or patterns. Their purpose is solely that of illustrating the manner in which the stated principles are exemplified by a stated case.

For the officer charged with the conduct of garrison schools, militia instruction, field maneuvers, war games, the preparation of lectures and problems, etc., it is believed this volume will form a valuable ready reference. And of equal importance will it be to the officer of the army or militia, compelled for any reason to study alone. To such, the book is a silent instructor, a guide, a critic. To officers preparing for promotion examination, and to those at the Service Schools or in preparation therefor, it has special application.

If merit be found in the work, the credit is due to the large number of officers of the army, many of them recognized authorities, with whose assistance and under whose advice, inspiration, and guidance it has been produced. Criticisms or suggestions for improvement will be appreciated by the authors.

ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

The following organization is a simple summary of that given in Field Service Regulations, 1914, (F.S.R.), as amended by the Act of June 3, 1916.

A typical _army corps_ consists of:

Headquarters
2 or more infantry divisions
1 or more cavalry brigades or a cavalry division
1 field artillery brigade
1 telegraph battalion
1 field signal battalion

There will be included such ammunition, supply, engineer and sanitary trains as the President may deem necessary. A corps is the appropriate command of a Lieutenant General.

A typical _infantry division_ consists of:

Headquarters
3 infantry brigades
1 regiment of cavalry
1 brigade of field artillery
1 regiment of engineers
1 field signal battalion
1 aero squadron
1 ammunition train
1 supply train
1 engineer train
1 sanitary train

A division is the appropriate command of a Major General.

A typical _cavalry brigade_ consists of the headquarters and three cavalry regiments. When the brigade acts independently, horse artillery may be attached.

A typical _cavalry division_ consists of:

Headquarters
3 cavalry brigades
1 regiment of field artillery (horse)
1 battalion of engineers (mounted)
1 field signal battalion (mounted)
1 aero squadron
1 ammunition train
1 supply train
1 engineer train
1 sanitary train
A light bridge train and 1 or more pack trains are attached when
necessary.

A _brigade_ consists of 3 regiments (inf. or cav.) When operating alone or independently it usually has auxiliary troops attached. A brigade is the appropriate command of a Brigadier General.

_Line of communications._ For each army corps or important expeditionary force about to take the field, a _base_ is selected and equipped and a service of the _line of communications_ established, both under the control of the commander of the army corps or expeditionary force.

The _staffs_ of brigades and higher units shall be as prescribed by the President of the United States. Typical _staffs_ are as follows:

Brigade, including cavalry brigade
1 brigade adjutant, major (1 civilian clerk)
2 aides, lieutenants

Division, including cavalry division
1 chief of staff, colonel
2 assistant chiefs of staff, majors or captains
1 division adjutant, major
1 division inspector, major
1 judge advocate, major
(for above, 6 civilian clerks)
1 chief quartermaster, lieut. colonel
1 chief surgeon, lieutenant colonel
3 aides, captains or lieutenants

When necessary the commanders of the engineers and signal troops may be directed, in addition to their other duties, to act, respectively, as chief engineer and chief signal officer. When a division acts independently, a chief engineer, (lieutenant colonel) may be detailed on the staff of the division commander.

Corps.
1 chief of staff, brigadier general
1 adjutant general, colonel
1 inspector general, colonel
1 judge advocate, colonel or lieutenant colonel
1 chief quartermaster, colonel
1 chief surgeon, colonel
1 chief engineer, colonel
1 chief ordnance officer, colonel, or lieutenant colonel
1 chief signal officer, colonel or lieutenant colonel
3 aides, with the rank of lieutenant colonel
(each of the above is assisted by one or more subordinates
and the necessary clerical force)

_Details of organization._

INFANTRY.

A company:
1 captain
1 1st lieutenant
1 2d lieutenant
100 enlisted men
Provided: That the President may increase each company by
50 enlisted men

A machine gun company:
1 captain (mounted)
1 1st lieutenant (mounted)
2 2d lieutenants (mounted)
53 enlisted men
4 guns (2 platoons)

A battalion:
1 major (mounted)
1 adjutant (mounted)
4 companies

A regiment:
1 colonel (mounted)
1 lieutenant colonel (mounted)
headquarters company, 1 captain, 58 enlisted men (8 mounted);
includes part of the noncommissioned staff of regiment and
battalions band, mounted orderlies, etc. supply company,
2 officers, 10 enlisted men, and one wagoner for each
authorized wagon of field and combat trains
3 battalions
1 machine gun company

CAVALRY.

A troop:
1 captain
2 lieutenants
70 enlisted men (4 platoons)
Provided: That the President may increase each troop by
35 enlisted men

A machine gun troop:
4 officers
70 enlisted men
4 guns (2 platoons)

A squadron:
1 major
1 adjutant
4 troops

A regiment:
1 colonel
1 lieutenant colonel
2 veterinarians
headquarters troop, 1 captain, 54 enlisted men;
includes part of the non-commissioned staff of regiment
and squadrons, band, orderlies, etc. supply troop, 3 officers,
10 enlisted men and one wagoner for each authorized wagon of
field and combat trains
3 squadrons
1 machine gun troop

FIELD ARTILLERY.[1]

A battery:
1 captain
4 lieutenants
126 enlisted men
4 guns
12 caissons
(A mountain battery includes also 1 packmaster,
1 assistant packmaster and 3 cargadores)
Provided: That the President may increase each battery
by 64 enlisted men

A battalion:
1 major
1 captain
3 batteries for light or mountain artillery, 2 batteries
for horse or heavy field

A regiment of 2 battalions:
1 colonel
1 lieutenant colonel
1 captain
2 veterinarians
headquarters company, 2 officers, 67 enlisted men;
includes part of the non-commissioned staffs of regiment
and battalions, band, orderlies, etc. supply company,
2 officers, 10 enlisted men and 1 wagoner for each
authorized wagon of field and combat trains.
2 battalions. The number of battalions may be increased
with corresponding changes in the headquarters and
supply companies.

[Footnote 1: Field artillery includes mountain, light, horse, and heavy artillery (field and siege types).]

The organization of horse artillery is similar to that of light artillery. Most of the men are individually mounted. (See also “Artillery tactics,” Chapter VIII.)

ENGINEERS.

A company:
1 captain (mounted)
3 lieutenants (mounted)
109 enlisted men (24 mounted)
Provided: That the President may increase each company
by 55 enlisted men.

A mounted company:
1 captain
3 lieutenants
74 enlisted men
Provided: That the President may increase each mounted
company by 37 enlisted men

A battalion:
1 major (mounted)
1 captain (mounted)
1 battalion sergeant major
3 master engineers, junior grade
3 companies

A mounted battalion:
1 major
2 captains
1 1st lieutenant
1 veterinarian
1 master engineer, senior grade
3 master engineers, junior grade
non-commissioned staff
3 mounted companies

A regiment:
1 colonel (mounted)
1 lieutenant colonel (mounted)
non-commissioned staff
2 master engineers, senior grade
1 wagoner for each authorized wagon of field and combat trains
2 battalions

Note.--Mounted engineers have no regimental organization.

A company with bridge equipage usually has 3 divisions of bridge equipage. A battalion has therefore 9 divisions of bridge equipage, 3 light and 6 heavy. One division of the heavy equipage (225 ft. of bridge) has 16 wagons and 84 mules. One division of the light equipage (186 ft. of bridge) has 14 wagons and 56 mules.

SIGNAL CORPS.

The President is authorized to organize such numbers of companies, battalions and aero squadrons of the Signal corps as the necessities of the service may demand. Typical organizations are as follows:

Wire company: (all mounted)
1 captain
2 lieutenants
75 enlisted men
6 wire carts
1 instrument wagon

Radio company: (all mounted)
1 captain
2 lieutenants
75 enlisted men; 2 platoons of 2 radio sections each
(2 wheel and 2 pack)
3 combat wagons (2 radio, 1 instrument)
6 pack mules

Field battalion:
1 major
1 adjutant
n. c. staff
4 mounted orderlies
4 field wagons
1 shop wagon
2 companies, 1 wire and 1 radio

A wire company of signal troops has two platoons of two wire sections each. The wire section has 5 miles of wire (single conductor, ground return) and instruments (telegraph and telephone) for 4 stations. Each radio section can set up one station, having a radius of about 200 miles for wheel sections and 30 miles for pack sections. The distances are subject to great variations. (See also F. S. R. 1914.)

TRANSPORTATION.

Wagon company:
36 enlisted personnel
112 draft mules
6 saddle mules
27 wagons

Auto truck company:
37 enlisted personnel
27 auto trucks, freight
1 auto truck, supply

Pack train:
14 enlisted personnel
50 pack mules
14 saddle mules

Note:--The tables of organization are subject to change from time to time. The latest tables of organization issued by the War Dept. should be consulted for details.

WAR STRENGTH, IN ROUND NUMBERS, ROAD SPACE, AND DIMENSIONS OF CAMPS. --(F. S. R., 1914.)

------------------------------+-----------------+---------+
| War strength, | |
| in | |
| round numbers | |
Units. +--------+--------+ |
| | |Vehicles,|
| | | guns. |
| Men. |(horses | |
| |mules). | |
------------------------------+--------+--------+---------+
Divisions: | | | |
Infantry | 22,000 | 7,500 | 900 |
Calvary | 10,000 | 12,000 | 500 |
Brigades: | | | |
Infantry | 5,500 | 520 | 67 |
Cavalry | 2,500 | 2,900 | 53 |
Artillery | 2,300 | 2,300 | 257 |
Smaller units (including | | | |
attached sanitary troops):| | | |
Infantry regiment | 1,860 | 170 | 22 |
Cavalry regiment | 1,250 | 1,430 | 26 |
Field artillery, light, | | | |
regiment | 1,150 | 1,150 | 128 |
Field artillery, horse, | | | |
regiment | 1,150 | 1,150 | 131 |
Field artillery, heavy, | | | |
regiment | 1,240 | 1,340 | 131 |
Field artillery, mountain, | | | |
regiment | 1,100 | 1,160 | |
Engineers, pioneer battalion| 490 | 160 | 12 |
Engineers, pioneer | | | |
battalion (mounted) | 270 | 370 | 11 |
Engineers, ponton | | | |
battalion | 500 | 820 | 145 |
Signal troops, field | | | |
battalion | 160 | 200 | 15 |
Signal troops, field cavalry| | | |
battalion | 170 | 200 | 11 |
Signal troops, aero | | | |
squadron (including | | | |
landing place 150 | | | |
yards by 350 yards) | 90 | | 16 |
Trains: | | | |
Infantry division-- | | | |
Ammunition | 260 | 750 | 162 |
Supply | 190 | 630 | 126 |
Sanitary[2] | 530 | 500 | 90 |
Engineer | 10 | 40 | 9 |
Cavalry division-- | | | |
Ammunition | 60 | 140 | 33 |
Supply | 220 | 860 | 75 |
Sanitary | 300 | 300 | 53 |
-------------------------------+--------+--------+---------+
------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| |
| Length of columns. |
| |
------------------------------+------------+----------+------------+
| | | |
| Organiz- | | Ammunition |
| ations, | + Field | supply, |
Units. | including | trains | sanitary, |
| combat | without | and |
| trains. | distance | engineer |
| | | trains. |
------------------------------+------------+----------+------------+
Divisions: | | | |
Infantry | 9.5 mi. | 11.0 mi. | 3.5 mi. |
Calvary | 8.0 mi. | 9.5 mi. | 1.5 mi. |
Brigades: | | | |
Infantry | 1.7 mi. | 2.0 mi. | |
Cavalry | 1.5 mi. | 1.9 mi. | |
Artillery | [3]2.6 mi. | 2.9 mi. | |
Smaller units (including | | | |
attached sanitary troops):| _Yards._ | _Yards._ | _Yards._ |
Infantry regiment | 970 | 1,150 | |
Cavalry regiment | 1,310 | 1,640 | |
Field artillery, light, | | | |
regiment | [4]1,720 | 2,800 | |
Field artillery, horse, | | | |
regiment | 1,960 | 3,160 | |
Field artillery, heavy, | | | |
regiment | 2,240 | 3,660 | |
Field artillery, mountain, | | | |
regiment | 1,520 | 2,540 | |
Engineers, pioneer battalion| 410 | 470 | |
Engineers, pioneer | | | |
battalion (mounted) | 350 | 440 | |
Engineers, ponton | | | |
battalion | 3,360 | 3,480 | |
Signal troops, field | | | |
battalion | 310 | 370 | |
Signal troops, field cavalry| | | |
battalion | 240 | 300 | |
Signal troops, aero | | | |
squadron (including | | | |
landing place 150 | | | |
yards by 350 yards) | 140 | 200 | |
Trains: | | | |
Infantry division-- | | | |
Ammunition | | | 2,440 |
Supply | | | 2,000 |
Sanitary | | | 1,530 |
Engineer | | | 150 |
Cavalry division-- | | | |
Ammunition | | | 500 |
Supply | | | 1,200 |
Sanitary | | | 890 |
------------------------------+------------+----------+------------+
--------------------------------+-----------------------
| Contracted camping
| space (troops
| and trains).
------------------------------+------------+------------
| |
Units. | | Approximate
| | number
| Yards. | of
| | acres.
| |
| |
------------------------------+-------------+------------
Divisions: | |
Infantry | | 180
Calvary | | 150
Brigades: | |
Infantry | | 19
Cavalry | | 18
Artillery | | 30
Smaller units (including | |
attached sanitary troops):| |
Infantry regiment | 160 by 180 | 6.2
Cavalry regiment | 200 by 200 | 8.2
Field artillery, light, | |
regiment | 240 by 300 | 14.7
Field artillery, horse, | |
regiment | 240 by 400 | 19.6
Field artillery, heavy, | |
regiment | 260 by 300 | 16.0
Field artillery, mountain, | |
regiment | 80 by 380 | 6.2
Engineers, pioneer battalion| 50 by 200 | 2.0
Engineers, pioneer | |
battalion (mounted) | 50 by 260 | 2.6
Engineers, ponton | |
battalion | 160 by 315 | 10.0
Signal troops, field | |
battalion | 30 by 240 | 1.7
Signal troops, field cavalry| |
battalion | 30 by 210 | 1.3
Signal troops, aero | |
squadron (including | |
landing place 150 | |
yards by 350 yards) | 175 by 350 | 12.5
Trains: | |
Infantry division-- | |
Ammunition | 75 by 380 | 5.8
Supply | 80 by 380 | 6.2
Sanitary[5] | 100 by 260 | 5.3
Engineer | 20 by 140 | .6
Cavalry division-- | |
Ammunition | 30 by 200 | 1.2
Supply | 80 by 280 | 4.6
Sanitary | 50 by 260 | 2.7
----------------------------------+------------+-----------

[Footnote 2: This table is based upon the road spaces occupied by troops at war strength, infantry in column of squads, cavalry in column of fours, artillery and trains in single column.

The spaces differ but little from the requirements of drill regulations. On the march, after a command is straightened out on the road, elongation always takes place. In calculating the length of a column further allowance must, therefore, be made in accordance with circumstances--sometimes as much as 25 per cent.

The contracted camping spaces afford sufficient room for a one-night halt. They require that the animals and vehicles of a single troop, battery, or company be placed on the same line with the men where practicable to do so within the camp lengths above given; that the men be in double shelter tents (or in double row of shelter tents), and that the lines on which adjacent companies are established be separated by distances not exceeding 11 yards for infantry and other dismounted organizations, double carriage length for field artillery (except mountain), and 12 yards for cavalry and remaining mounted organizations. Latrines are placed on the opposite side of camp from company kitchens and at a minimum distance of 50 yards from the men.

The camp areas given represent minimum requirements under favorable conditions of terrain and should be increased whenever practicable, particularly for sanitary reasons in those cases where a camp is to be occupied for more than one day.

For approximate calculations, assume 1,600 meters = 1 mile; 5 miles = 8 kilometers; the number of acres in a rectangular tract = the product of one-seventieth of the length in yards by one-seventieth of the width in yards.]

[Footnote 3: Combat train 1 mile long.]

[Footnote 4: Combat train 840 yards long.]

[Footnote 5: Combat train 840 yards long.]

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE SOLUTION OF TERRAIN EXERCISES,
MAP MANEUVERS, AND MAP PROBLEMS.

ESTIMATE OF SITUATION
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you understand it clearly?
Mission Has it changed at time considered?
In order to accomplish it must you temporarily adopt
another mission?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Strength (Is he deficient in any particular arm?)
Position (Has he probably moved or is he likely to?)
Enemy Probable intentions?
Is he likely to be reinforced?
Is he deficient in training or morale or other quality?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Strength (Are you deficient in any arm?)
Your Own Position of your troops (Are they in hand or scattered?)
Forces Are you likely to be reinforced?
Can you send for help?
(Do not ask for help unless you need it.)
Are your troops deficient in morale or training or
other quality?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Conditions Favorable and unfavorable.

In good weather.
When covered with snow.
Condition of roads When frozen.
When muddy and rainy (slippery).
When thawing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Bridges.
Rivers--depth--fordable.
Hills.
Terrain Mountains.
Forests.
Is soil difficult to entrench?
What is your line of retreat? (Have you more than one?)
What is enemy’s line of retreat? (Has he more than one?)
Where is your base?
If enemy is in position which is his weak flank?
Which will endanger his retreat?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Comparison Different courses open;
of Plans for Roads by which you may advance (retreat).
Accomplishing Roads by which enemy may advance (retreat).
Your Mission Defensive positions, if mission requires it.
Positions in readiness, if mission requires it.
Best plan for attack, if mission requires it.
Make your plan simple.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Rain and its effects.
Drouth--is water for drinking scarce?
Effect of floods.
Dust--Will it disclose your movements?
Weather Snow and its effects.
Are roads frozen?
Are roads thawing?
What is phase of moon? Does it favor night movements?
Are fogs or high winds likely to occur?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Decision Clear and concise statement of what you propose to do.
Clear and concise statement of how you propose to do it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Make it simple.
Avoid dispersion.
Send away no detachments unless considered absolutely
necessary.
Look out for your flanks.
Plan for Provide for ample reserves properly distributed.
Carrying Do not commit too many men at the start until situation
Out Your is sized up.
Decision Take advantage of ground.
Do not neglect your reconnaissance.
Beware of half measures.
You must obtain fire superiority to win.
You can obtain fire superiority easier by an enveloping
attack,
other things being equal.
Give each element of your command a task.
---------------------------------------------------------------------