Chapter XIV: A Position in Readiness

A position in readiness is one where troops are held close together and under cover if possible, so that they can be readily deployed for attack or defense or marched in any desired direction.

It is a maneuver of frequent application, especially in defensive operations such as those of covering detachments, flank and rear guards.

A position in readiness is generally assumed when the information concerning the enemy is too meagre or the knowledge of his strength, position or intentions too uncertain to form a basis for more definite operations. It is usually preliminary to the occupation of a defensive position, but may develop into an attack (as in the case of an advance guard awaiting reinforcements from the main body on encountering the enemy in force) a forward or a flank march, a retreat, or a succession of two or more of these. Hence a position in readiness may grade imperceptibly into a true defensive position, or on the other hand may be in effect a delayed march, as when a force gradually withdraws, delaying the enemy in successive positions.

An example of this last case would be one where a detachment intending ultimately to retreat, takes a position in readiness, prepared to retreat, to reinforce its outpost, or to cover the withdrawal of the latter, as the situation may demand. In such a case a true march order for a retreat cannot be issued in advance of developments. Only the first position in readiness can be designated in the first order, as subsequent measures necessary cannot usually be foreseen. (See orders, post, and “Rear and Flank Guards.”)

In deciding on a position in readiness the following points should be considered:

(a) The mission. What is to be accomplished?

(b) The strength of our troops, their position, etc.

(c) The strength and position of our supporting troops, and
the plans or intentions of the superior commander. Are
reinforcements expected?

(d) The strength and position of the enemy as last reported,
and his probable movements since.

(e) The probable intentions of the enemy. What will he probably
wish to do, and what lines of action are open to him under
the given conditions?

(f) How can the various possible moves of the enemy best be
met, or what action will be ultimately taken against him?

(g) Consider the terrain--roads available for our movements
and those of the enemy, bridges, obstacles, defensive positions,
artillery positions, cover, lines of retreat, etc.

(h) Calculations of time, distance, etc.

(i) From what position can we best meet the enemy’s most
probable move, while making allowance for his other possible
moves?

A position in readiness should generally be near an important crossroads, as this facilitates movement in any direction. If in addition this crossroads is one through which the enemy must pass to accomplish his mission, so much the better. Cover, under which the troops may be massed out of view of the enemy, is very important. This might be a covering ridge, a wood or large orchard. A good line of retreat is also desirable. The troops other than covering detachments or those engaged in special work (such as intrenching, etc.) should be held at a central point, in a convenient assembly formation.

Since a defensive position should seldom be occupied until the nature and direction of the enemy’s attack is known, all lines of approach that enemy may use must be closely watched and early knowledge of enemy’s strength, position, movements and intentions, is essential.

Parts of the line which are sure to be occupied in any case may be intrenched and otherwise prepared for defense. In a detachment action (reinforced brigade) where a defense is contemplated, usually a battalion or two battalions should be assigned to intrench any one continuous section. The engineers may aid in this work, or perform any special task, after which they usually take station in the central position.

It is usually a mistake to do a large amount of intrenching in advance. Trenches may betray the position and intentions to the enemy. They may also exercise a bad influence on the commander’s plans, and to be forced to leave intrenchments which they have constructed in order to take an exposed position is discouraging to the troops.

The intrenched portions of the line together with the artillery positions, form what is called the “framework” of the position.

The artillery should be placed, if possible, where it will command all lines of approach which may be used by the enemy, as well as all his probable artillery positions. The artillery will be posted, in observation, or in readiness, depending on circumstances. The artillery combat trains are, unless otherwise ordered, at the disposal of the artillery commander, even when separated from the firing batteries, and placed at tail of infantry. Firing data may be obtained covering all the probable lines of the enemy’s advance, possible hostile artillery positions, etc.

It is generally best to unite the entire force in one position. To hold an advanced line and then fall back to one in rear is risky. It necessitates a division of the force either before or during the action, and the troops driven from the first position are apt to retire in confusion, probably involving those in rear. In any case the moral effect is bad. It is better to hold one good main position only.

Advanced posts which have great natural strength and are not beyond effective rifle range of the main position may be occupied to delay the enemy and prevent him as long as possible from gaining possession of them. They should not be held so long that the enemy can closely pursue the retiring defenders, thus masking the fire of the main position. Advanced posts should be avoided if possible.

An obstacle extending along the entire front of the position at suitable range is an advantage if offensive operations or a counter-attack are not contemplated. But consider that in such case the enemy may not attack the position at all, but attempt to turn it.

Consider carefully where enemy’s attack may or can fall. It is unlikely that he will divide his force and make a turning movement in attacking the position unless he is greatly superior in strength, as this would cause him, otherwise, to lose time and expose himself to a counter-attack.

The cavalry is sent to the front to gain contact with the enemy and develop his position, strength, and intentions as this information is of the greatest importance. It then falls back, uncovering the front of the position by withdrawing to a flank, and delaying the enemy’s advance. All possible lines of approach must be reconnoitered, and information of the enemy promptly reported. The cavalry should not be given too detailed instructions. The orders may direct the cavalry (a) Delay or continue to delay the enemy, (b) Make special reconnaissance to designated localities. (c) Early information of enemy’s movements essential. (d) Fall back on _such_ flank, covering that flank. The cavalry as a rule should not be divided in the orders of the supreme commander. This should be left to the judgment of the cavalry commander. The enemy should, if possible, be denied a superiority in cavalry on either flank.

In addition to the security provided by the cavalry one regiment may be directed to provide security to the front, another “for our right flank,” etc. This may be done by use of the mounted men of the regiment and such infantry patrols as the situation seems to require. Or standing patrols of mounted men, under command of officers may be sent to certain localities to cover the flanks and front. There should always be such patrols on both flanks, unless they rest on impassable obstacles, and to the front when needed. The mounted patrols may be instructed to remove planking of bridges to prevent turning movements of enemy, etc. They are instructed to “cover (such) flank, observing south and west,” etc. This should be provided for in orders. Infantry patrols may also be sent to the flanks and front if this is necessary in the judgment of the commander.

The cavalry hunts for the enemy. Other patrols watch for him.

The infantry not assigned to intrenching is in a convenient assembly formation under cover nearby. The order should generally prescribe the position of each organization.

Small arms ammunition is not issued on taking a position in readiness unless there be special orders to that effect.

The field trains remain, or are sent, well to the rear, or in the direction of retreat, out of danger. The sanitary troops may be sent or remain to the rear, there to await orders, or they may be brought to a more advanced position, depending on the probabilities of an early retreat, or of their services being required in the care of the wounded. A dressing station is not established in orders for a position in readiness.

The security of the line of retreat is provided for by keeping open roads, guarding bridges, etc. This may be covered by verbal instructions and omitted from orders, as reference to such matters has a bad moral effect.

In marching from camp a short distance to a position in readiness the order partakes to some extent of the nature of a regular march order, the various organizations being routed to their position, etc., by as many roads as are available (if this would save time over a march on one road.) No regular advance guard is established if the distance is short and danger slight, but each organization is directed to “provide for its own security” during the march.

If the march is a long one a regular march order should be issued--the order for the position in readiness being issued later.

These examples are mentioned to show that the circumstances under which a position in readiness may be assumed are many and various. The orders must be varied to suit the particular case and the examples given must not be considered as rigid forms to cover all cases. It is usually practicable however, to follow the 5-paragraph form.

ORDER FOR A POSITION IN READINESS WHILE ON THE MARCH.

Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
Crossroads near BRUSH RUN S. H., PA.,
Field Orders, } 13 Dec., '16, 8:30 a. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.

1. A hostile division weak in cavalry is advancing from the southwest in two columns. Heads of columns at 7:50 a. m. were at GERMANTOWN and TWO TAVERNS.

Our cavalry has driven back the hostile cavalry to ST. LUKE’S CHURCH.

Our division will be across the LITTLE CONEWAGO CREEK by 11:00 a. m.

2. This detachment will take a position in readiness near this place to cover the movement of the division. Former march conditions now cease.

3. (a) The cavalry will delay the enemy’s advance, reconnoitering to ______ and ______. When compelled to fall back the cavalry will retire to HILL 612 and cover our right. Early information of the enemy’s movements is desired.

Strong patrols under officers will be sent at once to the vicinity of HILL 612 and STORE to cover the flanks and observe the terrain to the front and flanks.

(b) The artillery will take position in readiness near FLICKENDER F. H.

(c) The 1st Inf. (less 1 bn.) will intrench and occupy a line from the farmhouse 300 yds. northwest of 606, extending southwest along the edge of the orchard for 800 yds.

The remainder of the infantry will mass in the woods north of the road 606--555, facing south, 1st Inf. on the right, 2nd Inf. center, 3d Inf. left.

The 1st Inf. will provide for the security of the command to the front. Six mounted orderlies of this regt. will report to me.

(d) Co. A, 1st Engrs. will take station near FLICKENDER F. H., and will examine and provide for the security of the crossings of the LITTLE CONEWAGO CREEK at AIKENRODE F. H. and DIEHL’S MILL. The mtd. section will be sent to disable the bridge 492W.

4. The 1st Amb. Co. will proceed to the vicinity of KOHLER S. H. and there await orders.

5. Messages to the farmhouse near crossroads 606.

A,
Brigadier General.

(How and to whom transmitted.)

(Report to C. G., 1st Division.)

_Notes_: The instructions to the artillery commander to take a “position in readiness” cover all the measures that he should take, such as selecting places for his batteries, obtaining firing data, reconnoitering alternative positions, etc. He knows all that is yet reported of the enemy, so he is aware what his target will probably be. General A will see that any additional information bearing on his duties which may be received later is transmitted to him, and will tell him when to unlimber and go into action.

The terms “the cavalry” and “the artillery” are used because it is evident that the complete squadron and battalion are referred to, and hence there is no ambiguity.

Troops intrenching would ordinarily provide for _their own_ security without special orders. But in this case it is desired that the 1st Infantry provide for the security of the entire command.

General A takes measures for the security of his line of retreat by directing the engineers to watch the bridges at Aikenrode and Diehl’s Mill, and destroy the one at 492W. He is careful however, not to give prominence to such provisions in his orders. The engineer company is placed where it can also act as a guard for the artillery.

FIRST ORDER FOR A RETREAT, DELAYING THE ENEMY.

Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
BRIDGEPORT, PA.,
15 Sept., '16, 10:30 p. m.
Field Orders, }
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.

1. A hostile division has halted 3 miles west of the MONOCACY RIVER. Its outpost is in touch with ours along the line of that stream from PALMER’S to road junction 433.

Our division will reach the vicinity of PIPE CREEK before 11:00 a. m. tomorrow, where we are ordered to join.

2. This detachment will tomorrow the 16th inst. march provisionally on TANEYTOWN, delaying the enemy’s advance.

Troops:

(a) Leading Troops: 3. (a) The leading troops will clear the
Major M, 3d Inf. PINEY CREEK crossing at ____, at
3d Bn., 3d Inf. 5:10 a. m., and proceed via ____ road to
6 Mtd. Orderlies, TANEYTOWN. The bridges along the
3d Inf. route will be prepared for destruction.
Co. A, 1st Engrs.
(Less mtd. section)

(b) The main body will start from its
camp at 5:30 a. m., and take position in
mass facing west near crossroads 476 as
follows:

(b) Main Body: (in The 2d Inf. in the northeast angle of the
order of march) crossroads.
Col. B, 2d Inf.
2d Inf. The 3d Inf. (less detachments) in the
3d Inf. (less 3d Bn. southeast angle of the crossroads.
& 6 mtd. orderlies)
C. Tn., 1st Bn., 1st Amb. Co., north of the road just
1st L. A. east of PINEY CREEK.
1st Amb. Co.
Arty. Combat trains, south of the road
opposite 1st Amb. Co.

Each organization in the main body will
provide for its own security during the
march.

The 2d Inf. will provide for security to
the front and flanks after the occupation
of the position.

(c) Rear Guard: (c) The rear guard will occupy a position
Col. A, 1st Inf. on the line ---- for the purpose
1st Inf. of delaying the enemy.
1st Sq., 1st Cav.
1st Bn., 1st L. A.
(less C. Tn.)
Mtd. Sec., Co. A,
1st Engrs.

(d) The outpost will remain in position
until further orders. The troops on outpost
will be under the rear guard commander
after 4:00 a. m.

4. The field train will clear the PINEY CREEK crossing at 4:30 a. m., and will proceed via TANEYTOWN to WEISHAARS MILL, reporting its arrival at that place to the Chief of Staff of the Division.

5. Messages to ______.

A,
Brigadier General.

Dictated to Staff and representatives of:
1st Bn., 1st L. A.
Co. A, 1st Engrs.
1st Inf.
2d Inf.
3d Inf.
1st Amb. Co.
F. Tn.
Outpost.

Telegram.
Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
BRIDGEPORT, PA.,
15 Sept., '16, 10:85 p. m.

C. G., 1st Div.,
WESTMINSTER, MD.

Hostile division 3 miles west of MONOCACY, outpost on west
bank. Detch. marches at 5 a. m., Sept. 16, provisionally on
TANEYTOWN delaying enemy’s advance. Field trains to
WEISHAARS MILL.

Messages to TANEYTOWN.

A,
Brig. Gen.

_Notes_: It cannot be foreseen what route will be adopted after reaching Taneytown as this will depend on developments. Hence the command is directed _provisionally_ to that place.

The leading troops may proceed at once to Taneytown, preparing the bridges for destruction. General A personally instructs the commander of the leading troops as to the details of his duties. The preparation of the bridges is mentioned in the order so that other subordinates may take notice. The demolition will be completed by the mounted engineers with the rear guard upon the latter’s withdrawal.

As it is part of the duty of the detachment to delay the enemy long enough for the division to take up a defensive position near Pipe Creek without being interfered with while so doing, General A should not withdraw prematurely from the excellent delaying position just east of the Monocacy River. He therefore directs the rear guard commander to occupy this position. General A (who will be with the rear guard) will give orders for the withdrawal from this position at the proper time. The artillery and cavalry are placed with the rear guard to assist in delaying the enemy.

As it might be necessary (although exceptional) for the main body to reinforce the rear guard in the first delaying position, or cover its withdrawal therefrom it must not be withdrawn prematurely. It is therefore placed in a convenient position in readiness either to reinforce the rear guard or continue its march on Taneytown. The measures for the security of the main body during its march to the position in readiness and after occupying same might have been left to Colonel B, who is placed in command since General A will be with the rear guard. But as these measures are very important General A deems it advisable to give orders about them. (If they had not been mentioned, Colonel B would take the necessary measures without special orders.)

The artillery combat trains and the ambulance company are held with the main body as they may be needed.

During the night the security of the camp should be left to the outpost commander. But as the outpost troops will necessarily take part in the delaying action at the river line they should be placed under the rear guard commander (who is charged with the duty of delaying the enemy) before the delaying action begins--that is before daybreak, as the enemy is not likely to make a _serious_ attack during the night.

As the field train will not be needed during the day it is sent to a safe place in rear, well ahead of all troops. It is already in charge of the senior Quartermaster present. It requires no escort other than its regular personnel and a few footsore and slightly wounded men who are riding on the wagons.

General A will report his dispositions to the Division Commander by telegraph or telephone tonight if this be practicable. Otherwise he will send an aide. The aide can explain the situation to the Division commander and answer his questions, which an enlisted man with a written message could not do.

General A’s subsequent movements will depend on developments, and will be made the subject of future orders. In view of the uncertainty as to the course of events in the morning it is not wise to issue orders covering _possible_ future movements, as it might be necessary to countermand them--which is very undesirable.

(See also “Rear Guards.”)