Chapter XI: Combat--Attack and Defense (2)

After the issue of the extra ammunition the battalion ammunition wagons are collected at some convenient point in rear.

The supreme commander should take station at some good lookout point from which he can watch the progress of the action, and should generally remain there. If possible this point should be near the general reserve so that the commander can readily direct its employment. The station must not be too exposed nor too near the artillery.

Every fraction of the command must be accounted for in orders. Every subordinate who has a special mission to perform must receive definite orders concerning same.

_Remarks concerning advance guard action._ An advance guard action does not, in its detail differ particularly from any other combat of all arms, except that an advance guard has less independence of action than a separate detachment.

It may result from:

a. Guarding main body against surprise.

b. Reconnoitering.

c. Pushing back reconnoitering forces of the enemy.

d. Pressing upon delaying forces of the enemy.

e. Pursuit of a defeated or retiring enemy.

f. Checking the enemy’s advance to give the main body time to
prepare for action.

g. Seizing and holding a position to cover the passage of the
main body through a defile or across a bridge. (In this
case the enemy must be kept well beyond artillery range
of the outlet of the defile.)

h. When the enemy is encountered in force on the defensive,
holding him in position and reconnoitering his lines (in
force, if necessary) while awaiting the arrival of the main
body.

In deciding what action to take on meeting the enemy the advance guard must consider (a) Its mission, and also that of the main body, whether aggressive or not. (b) The comparative strength of the enemy and his apparent intentions. (c) The relative positions of the enemy, the advance guard and the main body, as well as other hostile or friendly troops. (d) Provisions for the security of the main body. This in general means that its front must not be uncovered, except in pursuit of a badly demoralized enemy.

In selecting flank to attack consider tactical success first and strategical advantages second.

An advance guard, while usually acting aggressively, must not engage in very doubtful enterprises, jeopardizing the safety of main body or committing it to action against its will. The mission of the whole command must be considered.

The advance guard by deploying for a frontal attack along the line of advance keeps the main body covered, leaves the supreme commander free to decide on which flank he will extend, and holds the enemy until he can come up. Frontal attacks are therefore of frequent occurrence in advance guard actions.

In pursuing a defeated enemy even if advance guard encounters him in force a prompt attack, usually frontal, is advisable. It is not necessary to drive it home if this does not seem advisable; and there is usually little risk of a counter attack. But if enemy is still in good morale and there is reason for caution, an advance guard may take a position in readiness. If in doubt an attack is usually best, but the advance guard must not risk the defeat of the entire force in detail by a too impetuous attack on a greatly superior enemy. Good judgment is required in handling an advance guard in such situations, and for this reason it is advisable that the supreme commander be with the advance guard on the march. It is the proper duty of the cavalry to clear up the situation in advance. (See “Advance guards,” Chap. IV and “Rencontre engagement,” Chap. XIII.)

_The occupation of a defensive position._ In selecting a defensive position the following should be considered:

1. Is it necessary to take a defensive position, and has the time arrived to do so? (See “Position in Readiness.”)

2. Must the enemy attack the position or can he march around it?

3. Are there good positions with clear field of fire for infantry and artillery? (For delaying actions a good field of fire at long and mid ranges is a prime requisite.)

4. Natural protection for both?

5. Line or lines of retreat secure and accessible to all parts of the force? If there is but one line of retreat it should be central. Several lines of retreat are often an advantage to the retiring force if it is a large one, but on the other hand they may also favor the enemy by allowing parallel pursuit. Good rallying points in rear?

6. Flanks secure?

7. Communications good to front, rear and flanks?

8. Ground favorable for cavalry action?

9. Good locations for attacker’s artillery within effective range, if so are they registered?

10. Line enfiladed anywhere?

11. Obstacles to enemy’s advance, front and flanks? How do they bear upon possible assumption of offensive if such is contemplated?

12. Any rallying points or dead spaces for enemy within effective range?

13. Has position been improved as much as possible? Are ranges to important points known?

14. Where is the main attack most likely to fall?

15. Are there good stations for the supports and reserves at proper distance? Can reserves be held in safe place favorable for counter attack?

16. Should the line be divided into sections? If so can the sections support each other, and if there are any intervals are they well covered?

17. Is the extent of the front suitable to the size of the command? Is it approximately perpendicular to the line of retreat? To the line of enemy’s advance?

18. Is the view good to the front and in the position itself?

19. Is the position well concealed from enemy’s view?

20. Are there any weak salients in the line?

21. Are there any advanced posts which should be occupied to prevent the enemy from doing so, or to cause his early deployment, etc? Can the troops be withdrawn from them in safety without masking fire of main position? (Advanced posts should, as a rule, be avoided.)

A single position giving a favorable answer to _all_ these questions will never be found. They indicate, however, the desiderata.

A defensive position should be occupied only when general direction of enemy’s advance is known, and it is evident about where his attack will fall. Otherwise take a position in readiness, from which a defensive position may later be evolved.

Consider whether the mission is best accomplished by taking a position farther to the front or one to the rear. Frequently there will be time only to make the best of what is near at hand. It is to be remembered in this connection, that a rencontre engagement usually favors the stronger and more aggressive combatant. A weaker force should generally therefore allow itself ample time to occupy and prepare a defensive position, rather than risk a rencontre or at least a premature engagement by pushing too far to the front. The time that a smaller force can delay a larger one depends on the terrain, the time available for preparation, and the absolute and relative strengths of the combatants. To give a rough idea of the times that smaller bodies can maintain themselves against larger ones it may be said that a reinforced brigade in a hastily prepared position should ordinarily be able to hold a division for some 2 to 3 hours; and that in similar circumstances, a division should hope to maintain itself against a corps for some 6 to 9 hours. Where the situation specially favors the defender, he may, of course, be able to hold very much longer. Each case is special and can hardly be said to have precedents.

The recent improvements in weapons have conferred greatly increased powers of resistance upon the defense. Except small forces, which cannot adequately secure their flanks nor block turning movements, troops on the defensive in a prepared position can be driven therefrom only with the greatest difficulty and, usually, a considerable expenditure of ammunition.

Must the enemy attack the position selected, or can he turn it? If delay only is the object this may be accomplished if enemy has to turn the position. But if it is desired to bar his advance and court an attack he should be both forced and enticed to attack. In such case do not take a position which _appears_ impregnable or enemy may be discouraged from attacking.

The artillery should not be posted so close to the infantry line that it will draw fire upon it--five hundred yards or so behind the line is best.

Obstacles in front of the entire position are seldom of advantage to the defense. Obstacles which delay the enemy without concealing him, such as marshy ground, are a strong element of defense. There must be passages for the counter attack if such is contemplated, and in general the bearing of obstacles upon the conduct of an active defense must be carefully considered.

Consider which flank the enemy will probably attack and post the main reserves behind that flank. If there is some doubt seek a central position for the reserve from which it can reach either flank, or consider the advisability of dividing the reserve.

If the force be a regiment assign sections of the line to battalions; if a brigade, to regiments. Machine guns are not usually assigned to a battalion section. Their proper function is for surprise of the enemy at effective ranges, reinforcing weak portions of the line, etc. They are usually left under the orders of the regimental commanders, but may be assigned by orders of the supreme commander for flank defense or for fire of position if the enemy has no artillery. (See “Machine guns,” Chap. XIII.)

Openings in the line are sometimes permissible, provided they are covered by the fire of adjacent organizations, or protected by reserves. In fact slight openings all along the line will be the rule, as it will seldom be practicable to occupy the entire front continuously, unless the force be a very small one. In the order of the supreme commander however, the assigned sectors will generally be contiguous, the detailed organization of each being left to the sector commander.

The density of the firing line in defense is seldom uniform. Some parts of the line may be lightly held to allow more men where a greater volume of fire is required. Obstacles in the front may also have an influence on the density of the firing line. Hence the fronts assigned to two regiments need not always be equal in extent.

In the early stages of a combat the defense, by reasons of its intrenchments, concealment, superior fire discipline, and smaller losses, may economize on men in the firing line and local supports _in order to have larger general reserves_ to throw in at the decisive point in the later stages of the action, or for a counter attack.

If ammunition is plentiful, long range fire, to force the attacker to an early deployment, is permissible and often advantageous on the defense. The limiting range of such fire, under good conditions, is about 1,800 yards.

If a delaying action only is contemplated, the intention being merely to force the attacker to deploy, the line may be very lightly held and greatly extended with few local supports, or none at all, and small reserves. Such tactics of course, may be risky. The position should be promptly evacuated as soon as the attacker has completed his dispositions for the attack, since it is very difficult to withdraw infantry from a position after it is committed to action. Cavalry, by reason of its superior mobility is better than infantry for delaying actions. If there is a good line of retreat and cover for the led horses close in rear, cavalry may allow the enemy to approach within 700 yards or less, before withdrawing. (See “Cavalry tactics,” Chap. IX.)

Ranges to important points in the foreground should be determined (and marked) if there is time. The field of fire is cleared and the position intrenched to the extent that time allows, or conditions require.

The instructions to “prepare the line for defense” cover the construction of intrenchments and obstacles and the necessary clearing. In this the engineers assist at the most difficult places. The intrenching proper should usually be done by the troops who are to occupy the trenches, but this rule is not rigid.

The supreme commander will direct in orders that the empty ammunition wagons be assembled at a point (or points) in rear. Subsequently they refill at designated point from the ammunition train, one or more companies of which are ordered up for this purpose or, in a smaller action, the combat wagons may be assembled and marched back to a depot to refill. Empty wagons of all kinds moving to the rear may be utilized for the evacuation of the wounded.

If the fight is to be to decision the artillery should if possible be so located that it can be run up to a crest for direct fire in the later stages of the defense.

When contact is established the cavalry uncovers the front and transfers its activities to the flanks, reconnoitering those of the enemy, and operating to his rear to observe the approach of possible hostile reinforcements. In retiring to a flank the movements of the hostile cavalry must be considered, and the enemy should be denied a superiority in this arm on either flank if the strength of the cavalry permits it. It is therefore inadvisable, unless greatly superior in strength to the enemy, to disperse the cavalry. The bulk of it should be kept in hand to oppose that of the enemy. A small detachment of the cavalry may be used for observation on the other flank.

The advance guard regiment may be directed to provide for the security of the command to the front until the position is occupied. Former march conditions cease (if command has been on the march). In retiring to its position the advance guard regiment must not mask the fire of troops already on the line, or allow the enemy to follow it too closely, and possibly gain an advantageous position.

Machine guns should be preferably near the flanks. If especially desirable positions for dagger batteries are available they may be used. (A dagger battery is one so situated as to be protected from frontal fire and able to surprise the attacker by flanking or oblique fire from a position at short range, such as a saddle in front of and perpendicular to the line. See “Machine Guns”--post.)

Flank patrols (inf.) are sent out by the regiment on the flank without special orders. But if special measures such as a strong flank guard with a machine gun platoon, are required, the supreme commander should order flank organization (or reserve) to provide for this. In general it will be the duty of flank organizations to provide for security to the flanks.

The reserve should provide for the security of the lines of retreat, especially the bridges. They may be used to assist in preparing the position for defense--preferably clearing rather than intrenching. They will assemble at their designated post in rear on cessation of the work. Same for engineers, who join the reserve when work ceases.

Dressing station will be established by order or the location of dressing station may be announced later.

A usual formation for a brigade in defense is two regiments on the line and one in reserve. If any departure from this is made it should be in the way of a _larger reserve_ (except in delaying actions). (See “Counter attack”--post.)

A defensive position should not be too strongly garrisoned at the opening of the attack. The line should be held lightly with strong general reserves until the attacker has shown his intentions. The reserves are thrown in at the threatened point and used to deliver a counter attack.

It is sometimes advisable to defend advanced posts (but not advanced positions as a rule) to prevent enemy from seizing them too early. They cannot be held to a decision. One determined stand is better than several half-hearted ones. Especially is this the case if troops retreating out of one position under cover of fire from another, mask part of this fire, and arrive in disorder on the front. Also this means a dispersion of troops, and a diminution of the defender’s fighting strength at the very beginning of the action. One good prepared position to be defended by all troops is preferable to a succession of positions, in a decisive action.

An independent detachment is seldom justified in sacrificing itself. A covering detachment must do so when necessary for the protection of its main body.

_The Counter attack._ Every active defense should contemplate an eventual assumption of the offensive. The defense, being intrenched, not subject to losses nor exhaustion to such an extent as the attacker, and being more easily supplied with ammunition and better able to maintain an accurate, continuous fire, can use fewer men in its firing line and supports. Hence the defense is characterized by large general reserves. This feature should be developed to the utmost possible, the defensive line being held with the least practicable number, in order that the general reserves may be as strong as possible.

The general reserve is employed in three ways: (a) To extend the flanks in order to meet the enemy’s enveloping attack. When the terrain allows, the troops on the flank should be so disposed as to bring oblique or enfilade fire to bear upon the enveloping attack. (b) To reinforce critical points of the line, against which the enemy has concentrated his force. (c) For counter attacks.

Counter attacks are perhaps less subject to rule than any other tactical operation. They vary in size from small local counter attacks to a general reversal of the situation and an assumption of the offensive by the entire force of the defender.

The troops for the counter attack are kept well in hand and _concealed_ near the position from which it is proposed to launch the attack.

The proper time and manner of delivering a counter attack require good judgment on the part of the commander. A counter attack to be successful should be sprung as a surprise on the enemy.

The counter attack may be delivered just as the enemy has carried the position and is disorganized and in confusion. It may be delivered before his assault and while he is closely held within effective range by the fire of the defense. A counter attack is naturally most effective, when delivered from a flank. The attacker’s reserves will, of course, be on the lookout for counter attacks, hence the defense must hold out reserves to protect the counter attack. The most favorable time, then, to make a counter attack, is when the enemy is known to have thrown in his last reserve. He then has nothing to oppose to the defender’s counter attack.

Supporting points in rear of the main line of defense aid in breaking up an assault and contribute to the success of a counter attack.

The attacker’s artillery, after supporting the infantry to the last practicable moment will probably switch its fire to search the ground occupied by the defender’s reserves, or that over which they must approach in delivering the counter attack. The artillery of the defense should be posted and handled to meet this contingency.

If the attacker fails to establish fire superiority and his advance is checked the defender increases the volume of his fire, reinforcing his firing line if necessary. As the attacker wavers or starts to withdraw, the defender assumes the offensive and advances against him. If at the same time a strong counter-stroke can be launched against the attacker’s flank, his repulse or even his utter rout is probable. The nature of the terrain should, of course, be such as to favor the assumption of the offensive, and the position should be selected with this in view.

The commander of the defense should study the terrain and carefully watch the progress of the action with a view to taking the offensive at the proper moment.

From the foregoing considerations it is possible to draw the following suggestions as to the conduct of an ideal active defense.

(a) Select a position whose front is such as to favor the assumption of the offensive.

(b) Cover, concealment and good communications for the reserves are essential.

(c) The position should be artificially strengthened to as great an extent as time allows, or as conditions appear to demand.

(d) The defensive position should not be too greatly extended nor too strongly garrisoned at the outset, and before the enemy’s intentions have become manifest. The line may be extended and strengthened during the course of the action, as the developments thereof may require. At the opening of an engagement, however, a line lightly held, with _strong reserves_, is characteristic of an _active_ defense.

(e) Compel the attack to deploy at long range.

(f) Meet the attacker’s envelopment by an extension of the line.

(g) Prevent the enemy from gaining fire superiority, reinforcing the firing line if necessary. Cause him to throw in his supports and reserves.

(h) Check the enemy’s advance in a position favorable for a counter attack.

(i) Launch a strong counter attack against one of his flanks, holding out some reserves to meet those of the enemy.

(k) As the counter attack rolls back the enemy, advance against him along the whole line, the artillery following up the infantry.

It will not often be possible for the defender to regulate the course of the action, unless he be nearly equal in strength to the attacker or exceptionally favored by the terrain.

It will be usually a question of taking advantage of such opportunities as may in the course of events be presented. The only rule that can be given is that the defender should have large reserves and be constantly on the lookout for a favorable opportunity to make aggressive use of them. The most favorable opportunities for a counter stroke will _usually_ be presented on that flank which the enemy is endeavoring to envelop.

(For the use of auxiliary arms in combat see also “Artillery Tactics,” and “Cavalry Tactics,” Chaps. VIII and IX.)

ORDER FOR A FRONTAL ATTACK BY AN ADVANCE GUARD.

Advance Guard, 1st Division, 1st Blue Army Corps,
ASH GROVE S. H., PA.,
Field Orders, } 1 July, '12, 9:05 a. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.

1. A hostile detachment consisting of 3 or 4 regiments of cavalry and 1 or 2 batteries of horse artillery occupies a defensive line across the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE just east of GERMANTOWN. The left of the line rests on the wood southeast of MEYER F. H., the right on the small wood northeast of the B. D. SNYDER F. H. Our main body halts at LITTLESTOWN until 10:30 a. m.

2. This advance guard will make a frontal attack on the hostile force near GERMANTOWN at once, and clear the road to GETTYSBURG. Former march conditions now cease.

3. (a) The 1st Battalion, 1st Light Artillery, will move at a trot under cover to a position in the vicinity of Hill 607 and at once open fire on the enemy and support the attack.

(b) The 1st Infantry will move north of the turnpike under cover to the vicinity of road junction 584, deploying perpendicular to the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE with its left resting thereon and, in conjunction with the 2d Infantry, will advance and attack that portion of the enemy’s line north of the turnpike.

(c) The 2d Infantry will move south of the turnpike under cover to the vicinity of GOUKER F. H., deploying perpendicular to the turnpike with its right resting thereon, and will advance and attack that portion of the enemy’s line south of the turnpike.

(d) The 3rd Infantry, in reserve, will follow the 1st Infantry to the vicinity of road junction 584, and there await orders. 8 mounted orderlies of this regiment will report to me at once.

(e) The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, on withdrawing from the front will cover our right, operating against the enemy’s left and rear. A half troop under an officer will be sent to cover our left.

(f) Co. A, 1st Engineers, will repair the bridge on the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE east of GIDD F. H., making it safe for the passage of artillery, and construct two additional crossings for foot troops only over ALLOWAY CREEK, one north of the turnpike the other south of same. Upon the completion of this work the engineers will join the reserve.

4. The 1st Ambulance Co. will take a position in readiness off the road just east of Hill 607. Location of dressing station will be announced later.

When extra ammunition has been issued the empty battalion ammunition wagons will assemble off the road opposite the 1st Amb. Co.

5. Messages to GIDD F. H.

A,
Brigadier General.

Verbally to Staff and C. O. of:

1st Inf.
2d Inf.
3d Inf.
1st Bn., 1st L. A.
Co. A, 1st Engrs.
Copy by aide to C. O., 1st Sq., 1st Cav.
Copy by mtd. messenger to C. O., 1st Amb. Co.

By mtd. officer:
Adv. Gd., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
1 July, '12, 9:08 a. m.

C. G., 1st Div.:

3 or 4 regts. Red Cavalry with 1 or 2 btrys. H. A. across BALTIMORE PIKE, just east of GERMANTOWN, left near MEYER F. H., right near B. D. SNYDER F. H. Am making frontal attack at once, 3d inf. in reserve, cav. covering our right. Messages to GIDD F. H.

A,
Brig. Gen.

_Notes_: Considerable latitude has been allowed the artillery commander.

He is not told to reconnoiter advanced positions for the reason that he always does this as a matter of course. Gen. A will consult him when the time arrives to move the artillery forward.

The exact routes to their deploying positions are not prescribed for the infantry regiments. Gen. A has no time to make a deep study of the matter of cover. There is no danger of the regiments getting lost or interfering with each other, and their colonels may be trusted to lead them to their positions with as little exposure as possible, reconnoitering in advance with mounted men as they proceed.

General A considers no special measures necessary for the protection of his flanks, beyond those provided for in the orders to the cavalry. In the absence of any special instructions the Colonels of the 1st and 2nd Infantry will take such measures as they deem necessary for flank protection, using mounted and infantry patrols.

Very general instructions only, are given to the cavalry. Major A is an experienced cavalry officer. He understands that he is dealing with a large cavalry force which, while fighting a dismounted action, undoubtedly has strong mounted reserves in hand. He therefore appreciates the need for caution. He also understands that the enemy’s most vulnerable parts are his groups of led horses.

All the bridges over Alloway Creek have been destroyed or injured by flood and the creek is flowing bank full. The engineer commander will at once despatch his mounted section with the necessary tools to prepare crossings north and south of the turnpike for the 1st and 2d Infantry. He will do this by repairing the old crossings if practicable; and endeavor to finish the work promptly so as not to delay the attacking troops in getting into position. Later the foot section of the engineer company will improve these crossings (for the use of the Division should it have to take part in the attack) and will put the bridge near Gidd F. H. in good order.

The ammunition wagons are assembled in one place in order to have them at hand when wanted. Without such orders they might be scattered all along the road, interfering also with the movements of troops. General A may use them later to transport wounded to Littlestown, at which time also they would proceed to the division trains to refill.

The references given in this order (such as “the woods S. of MEYER F. H.”) might not be readily understood at the time by General A’s subordinates, who are not provided with 3" maps. At the time of giving his orders General A would point out the various localities mentioned to his subordinates (who are with him on Hill 607). Then by the aid of their Geological (1”) Maps they can easily identify the places referred to. The brigade adjutant in later writing up the order, would ascertain the names of the various farm houses as far as practicable, as this is the easiest and surest means of identifying them.

Following is the foregoing order reduced to smaller compass:

Adv. Gd., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
ASH GROVE S. H., PA.,
Field Orders, } 1 July, '13, 9:05 a. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.

1. A hostile detachment of 3 or 4 regiments of cavalry and 1 or 2 batteries of horse artillery is in position just east of GERMANTOWN; right at small wood northeast of B. D. SNYDER, left at wood southeast of MEYER.

Our main body halts at LITTLESTOWN until 10:30 a. m.

2. We attack at once.

3. (a) Artillery takes position near Hill 607 and supports attack.

(b) 1st Inf. moves north of turnpike to near road jct. 584, thence in conjunction with 2d Inf. attacks enemy line north of turnpike.

(c) 2d Inf. moves south of turnpike to near GOUKER, thence at once attacks enemy line south of turnpike.

(d) 3d Inf., reserve, follows 2d to near road jct. 584 and awaits orders.

(e) Cavalry on withdrawing from front covers right and operates against enemy’s left and rear. A half troop covers our left.

(f) Engineers make bridge east of GIDD passable for artillery, construct two crossings for foot troops over ALLOWAY CREEK, north and south of turnpike, join reserve.

4. Ambulance Co., and empty ammunition wagons east of Hill 607.

5. Messages to GIDD.

A,
Brig. Gen.

How and to whom transmitted, etc., etc.

The body of the order in this second example contains but half as many words as the first and yet conveys all the instructions necessary in this case. Thus for instance the guiding directions for the infantry regiments in attack are omitted as it will be perfectly apparent that they will use the turnpike which separates the enemy’s line into the sectors assigned to each attack. A comparison of these two orders will indicate how unnecessary verbiage may often be eliminated. It is to be noted, however, that clearness is more important than brevity.

ORDER FOR AN ENVELOPING ATTACK.

Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
Hill 636 (1 mi. southeast of HUNTERSTOWN, PA.)
Field Orders, } 1 October, '12, 10:20 a. m.
No. -- }

Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.

1. A hostile detachment of 2 regts. of infantry, one or two btrys. of field artillery, and a troop of cavalry, has taken up a defensive position on the heights west of HUNTERSTOWN. Its right flank rests on Hill 603, its left near HENDERSON MEETING HOUSE.

Our cavalry has driven in the hostile cavalry which retreated to the north of HUNTERSTOWN.

2. This detachment will attack the enemy in its front at once, enveloping his right flank. Former march conditions now cease.

3. (a) The 1st Bn., 1st Light Arty. will take a position near Hill 636 and support the attack.

(b) The 1st Inf. will proceed along main road to the edge of the wood near road junction 585, deploying perpendicular to the road with its left about 250 yds. south thereof. From here it will advance and attack the enemy’s line north of Hill 603, directing its left on the hill and moving to the attack in conjunction with the 2d Inf.

A half company will be sent to the vicinity of the orchard on Hill 592 to cover our right.

(c) The 2d Inf. will leave the main road near 606 and move via the 632--600--585 road, thence under cover to the small wood ½ mile east of 572. From there, it will advance and attack the enemy’s line south and west of Hill 603, directing its right on the eastern corner of the orchard southwest of HUNTERSTOWN.

A half company will be sent to the orchard at 572 to cover our left.

(d) The 3d Inf. in reserve, will follow in rear of the right flank of the 2d Inf.

(e) The cavalry will withdraw to and cover our right flank, operating against the enemy’s left and rear. A half troop will be sent well to our left. Reconnaissance to GOLDENVILLE and TABLE ROCK.

(f) The engineers will open up two trails through the thicket northeast of HUNTERSTOWN, and then take station at the eastern edge of same.

(g) The signal troops will connect me with the 1st Inf. and the artillery.

4. The 1st Amb. Co. will establish a dressing station south of the main road at the stream crossing ⅓ mile west of 632.

When the issue of extra ammunition is completed the empty ammunition wagons will join 1st Amb. Co. where they will be at the disposal of the Chief Surgeon until further orders.

The field trains will halt off the road at place of receipt of this order.

5. Messages to the reserve.

A,
Brig. Gen.

Verbally to Staff and C. O.:

1st Bn., 1st L. A.
Signal troops.
Co. A, 1st Engrs.
1st Inf.
2d Inf.
3d Inf.

Copy by aide to C. O., 1st Sq., 1st Cav.
Copy by mtd. messenger to C. O., 1st Amb. Co., F. Tn.
(Report of dispositions to C. G., 1st Div.--see ante.)

_Notes_: General A considers special measures necessary for the protection of his flanks. The engineers are so placed as to guard against a counter attack on the Blue right.

The cavalry amongst other duties watches for the approach of hostile reinforcements.

As General A will be with the reserve regiment he does not need any orderlies other than those of that regiment.

ORDER FOR THE OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.

Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
Road Junction 616, South of PLAINVIEW, PA.,
Field Orders, } 20 Sept., '12, 10:00 a. m.
No. -- }
Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.

1. A hostile force of all arms is moving northward on the GETTYSBURG--HARRISBURG ROAD, advance party at the COUNTY ALMSHOUSE, just outside of GETTYSBURG, at 9:00 a. m.

Our cavalry defeated the hostile cavalry near this point this morning and is now engaged in delaying the enemy’s advance.

2. This detachment will take up a defensive position across the HARRISBURG ROAD near road junction 561 to cover the crossings of the CONEWAGO CREEK for our division. Former march conditions now cease.

3. (a) The artillery will take a position in observation on the north slope of the ridge near Hill 707.

(b) The 1st Inf. will occupy the section from a point on the 666-576 road about 400 yds. southwest of 666 thence westward to the farm road leading southwest from Hill 712. This regiment will provide for the security of the entire command to the front until the position is occupied.

The 2d Inf. will occupy the section from the left of the 1st Inf. to a point on the nose about 200 yds. northeast of 561. A company with a machine gun platoon will be sent to the woods about 700 yds. south of PLAINVIEW and a half company to the woods about 1,500 yds. southeast of PLAINVIEW.

The entire position will be prepared for defense.

(c) The 3d Infantry in reserve, will take position in mass near 605. This regiment will provide for the security of the bridges 502W and near HERSHEY MILL. 10 mtd. orderlies of this regiment will report to me at once.

(d) The cavalry will continue to delay the enemy and when obliged to fall back will cover our right. A half troop will be sent to cover our left.

(e) The engineers will start work at once on the section assigned to the 1st Infantry, assisting that regiment, and joining the reserve when work ceases.

4. The 1st Amb Co. will take a position in readiness north of the bridge 502W.

The field trains will park east of the HARRISBURG ROAD north of WERMAN F. H.

The bn. combat trains and the caissons of the artillery when empty will be sent to YORK SPRINGS to refill.

5. Messages to Hill 712.

A,
Brigadier General.

Dictated to Staff and C. O.:
1st Inf.
2d Inf.
3d Inf.
1st Bn., 1st L. A.
Co. A, 1st Engrs.

Copies by mtd. messengers to C. O., 1st Amb. Co. and Tns.

Telegram.

Detch. 1st Div.,
PLAINVIEW, PA.,
1 Oct. '12--10:05 a. m.
C. G., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
YORK SPRINGS, PA.

Red force all arms weak in cavalry, probably 2d Div., 1st Red Corps, moved north from GETTYSBURG, starting 9:00 a. m. Detch. takes position across HARRISBURG ROAD near 561 (GETTYSBURG-ANTIETAM map) to delay advance. Cavalry covers right. Will guard bridges 502W and at HERSHEY MILL for div. Telegrams to PLAINVIEW.

A,
Brig. Gen.

_Notes_: General A considers it unnecessary to mention to his own troops, the enemy’s great superiority of strength, although it is essential that he advise his superior. The fact that he is taking up a defensive position is sufficiently suggestive.

The position is described in general terms only in Par. 2, and more precisely in Par 3.

The Col. of the 1st Inf., without orders, will place a small combat patrol to the right. General A has made special provisions (outside the sphere of the Col. of the 2d Inf.) for the security of his left.

The expression “prepared for defense” includes (besides intrenching) clearing foreground, measuring ranges, constructing obstacles, etc., all so far as time allows. The infantry will do the intrenching--the engineers (if present) the special work. (See “Organization of a defensive position.”)

The message contains all the information which the division commander requires at this time. Upon approaching the position he will receive personal advices as to the latest developments in the situation.