Chapter C: Clotterbooke." (3)

I congratulate you, Sir, on the glorious news contained in these despatches; but I cannot be of your opinion, that, great as it is, it will defeat every hope that Britain entertains of conquering a country so defended. Vanity, Sir, is a passion capable of inspiring illusions, which astonish all other men; and the Britons are, without exception, the vainest people upon earth. By examining such a witness as Arnold, the Ministry can draw from him evidence, which will fully satisfy the people of England, that the conquest of America is still practicable. Sensible men see the error; but they have seen it these twenty years, and lamented it till their hearts are broken. The intention of government seems to be to break the spirit of the nation, and to bring affairs into so wretched a situation, that all men shall see that they cannot be made better by new Ministers, or by the punishment of the old ones.

It is suggested, that some plan of conciliation will be brought into Parliament; but it will be only as deceitful as all the former ones. They begin to talk big, and threaten to send Arnold with seventeen thousand men to burn and destroy in the northern States; but this will prove but an annual vapor. I rejoice the more in Colonel Willet's glorious services, for a personal knowledge and esteem I have for that officer. Zoutman's battle on Doggerbank shows what the nation could do. But ... It is somewhat dangerous to write with perfect freedom concerning the views and principles of each party, as you desire. Indeed, the views of all parties are enveloped in clouds and darkness. There are unerring indications, that all parties agree secretly in this principle, that the Americans are right if they have power. There is here and there an individual who says the Americans are wrong; but these are very few. The English party are suspected to have it in view to engage the Republic to join the English in the war against France, Spain, and America.

The Prince is supposed to wish that this were practicable, but to despair of it. Some of the great proprietors of English stocks, several great mercantile houses in the service of the British Ministry, are thought to wish it too; but if they are guilty of wishes so injurious to their country and humanity, none of them dares openly avow them. The Stadtholder is of opinion, that his house has been supported by England; that his office was created, and is preserved by her. But I do not see why his office would not be as safe in an alliance with France as with England, unless he apprehends that the republican party would in that case change sides, connect itself with England, and by her means overthrow him. There are jealousies that the Stadtholder aspires to be a sovereign; but these are the ordinary jealousies of liberty, and I should think, in this case, groundless. The opposite, which is called the republican party, is suspected of desires and designs of introducing innovations. Some are supposed to aim at the demolition of the Stadtholdership; others, of introducing the people to the right of choosing the Regencies; but I think these are very few in number, and very inconsiderable in power, though some of them may have wit and genius.

There is another party, at the head of which is Amsterdam, who think the Stadtholdership necessary, but wish to have some further restraints or check upon it. Hence the proposition for a committee to assist his Highness. But there is no appearance that the project will succeed. All the divisions of the Republican party are thought to think well of America, and to wish a connexion with her and France. The opposite party do not openly declare themselves against this; but peace is the only thing in which all sides agree. No party dares say anything against peace; yet there are individuals very respectable, who think that it is not for the public interest to make peace.

As to Congress' adapting measures to the views and interest of both parties, they have already done it in the most admirable manner. They could not have done better if they had been all present here, and I know of nothing to be added. They have a Plenipotentiary here, with instructions; they have given power to invite the Republic to accede to the alliance between France and America, with a power to admit Spain. All this is communicated to the Count de Vergennes and the Duc de la Vauguyon, and I wait only their advice for the time of making the proposition. I have endeavored to have the good graces of the leaders, and I have no reason to suspect that I do not enjoy their esteem, and I have received from the Prince repeatedly, and in strong terms by his Secretary the Baron de Larray, assurances of his personal esteem.

I wrote, Sir, on the 3d and 7th of May, as full an account of my presenting my credentials, as it was proper to write, and am astonished that neither duplicates nor triplicates have arrived. I will venture a secret. I had the secret advice of our best friends in the Republic to take the step I did, though the French Ambassador thought the time a little too early. My situation would have been ridiculous and deplorable indeed, if I had not done it, and the success of the measure, as far as universal applause could be called success, has justified it. Those who detested the measure, Sir, were obliged to applaud it in words. I am surprised, to see you think it places us in a humiliating light. I am sure it raised me out of a very humiliating position, such as I never felt before, and shall never feel again, I believe. I have lately by the express advice of all our best friends, added to that of the Duc de la Vauguyon and the Count de Vergennes, demanded a categorical answer. I knew very well I should not have it; but it has placed the United States and their Minister in a glorious light, demanding candidly an answer, and the Republic has not yet equal dignity to give it.

In this manner we may remain with perfect safety to the dignity of the United States, and the reputation of her Minister, until their High Mightinesses shall think fit to answer, or until we shall think it necessary to repeat the demand, or make a new one, which I shall not do without the advice of the French Ambassador, with whom I shall consult with perfect confidence.

My motives for printing the Memorial were, that I had no other way to communicate my proposition to the Sovereign of the country. The gentlemen at the Hague, who are called their High Mightinesses, are not the Sovereign, they are only Deputies of the States-General, who compose the Sovereignty. These joint Deputies form only a diplomatic body, not a legislative nor an executive one. The States-General are the Regencies of cities and bodies of nobles. The Regencies of cities are the Burgomasters and Schepins, or Judges and Counsellors, composing in the whole a number of four or five thousand men, scattered all over the Republic. I had no way to come at them but by the press, because the President refused to receive my memorial. If he had received it, it would have been transmitted of course to all the Regencies; but in that case it would have been printed; for there is no memorial of a public Minister in this Republic, but what is printed.

When the President said, "Sir, we have no authority to receive your memorial until your title and character are acknowledged by our constituents and sovereigns; we are not the sovereign;" I answered, "In that case, Sir, it will be my duty to make the memorial public in print, because I have no other possible way of addressing myself to the sovereign, your constituents."

The President made no objection, and there has been no objection to this day. Those who dreaded the consequence to the cause of Anglomany, have never ventured to hint a word against it. The Anglomanes would have had a triumph if it had not been printed, and I should before this day have met with many disagreeable scenes, if not public affronts. This openness has protected me. To conciliate the affections of the people, to place our cause in an advantageous light, to remove the prejudices that Great Britain and her votaries excite, to discover the views of the different parties, to watch the motives that lead to peace between England and Holland, have been my constant aim since I have resided here. The secret aid of government in obtaining a loan, I have endeavored to procure, but it can never be obtained until there is a treaty. I have hitherto kept a friendly connexion with the French Ambassador, and that without interruption. The new commission for peace, and the revocation of that for a treaty of commerce with Great Britain I have received.

My language and conduct are those of a private gentleman; but those members of Congress who think this proper, know that I have held public places in Europe, too public and conspicuous for me to be able to remain incognito in this country, nor is it for the interest of the public that I should attempt it.

I should be extremely obliged to you, Sir, if you would let me know the dates of all the letters that have been received from me, since I have been in Holland, that I may send further copies of such as have miscarried. The States of Holland have accepted the mediation of Russia, on condition of saving the rights of the armed neutrality. There has been a balancing between a treaty with France, and the acceptance of this mediation. Amsterdam said nothing. The mediation was accepted; but several provinces have declared for a treaty with France. People of the best intentions are jealous of a peace with England upon dishonorable terms; but France will prevent this, though she does not choose to prevent the acceptance of the mediation, as she might have done by consenting to my making the proposition of a triple or quadruple alliance. Her Ambassador says, the King must not oppose the Empress of Russia, who will be of importance in the final settlement of peace.

France has never discovered much inclination to a treaty with the Republic. The demolition of the barrier towns may explain this, as well as the Ambassador's opinion against presenting my memorial at the time it was done. I believe that France too can explain the reason of the delay of Spain, where we make a less respectable appearance than in this Republic. The delay of Spain is fatal to our affairs. Yet I know the American Minister there to be equal to any service, which makes me regret the more the delay of that kingdom. The constant cry is, why is Spain silent? We must wait for Spain. Nothing gives greater advantage to the English party.

The nature of the government in an absolute monarchy, would render it improper to make any application or memorial public. The nature of this government rendered it indispensably necessary. The business must begin in the public, that is in all the Regencies. De Witt and Temple it is true, made a treaty in five days; but De Witt risked his head by it, upon the pardon and confirmation of the Regencies. But it was a time and a measure, which he knew to be universally wished for. The case at present is different. M. Van Bleiswick, though he told me he thought favorably of my first application, would not have dared to take a single step without the previous orders of his masters, as he told me.

It is the United States of America, which must save this Republic from ruin. It is the only power that is externally respected by all parties, although no party dares as yet declare openly for it. One half the Republic nearly declares every day very indecently against France, the other against England; but neither one nor the other declares against America, which is more beloved and esteemed than any other nation of the world.

We must wait, however, with patience. After oscillating a little longer, and grasping at peace, finding it unattainable, I think they will seek an alliance with America, if not with France. I had a week ago a visit from one of the first personages in Friesland, who promised me that in three weeks I should have an answer from that Province.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Amsterdam, February 21st, 1782.

Sir,

I know very well the name of the family where I spent the evening with my worthy friend Mr ---- before we set off, and have made my alphabet accordingly; but I am, on this occasion, as on all others hitherto, utterly unable to comprehend the sense of the passages in cypher. The cypher is certainly not taken regularly under the two first letters of that name. I have been able sometimes to decypher words enough to show that I have the letters right; but, upon the whole, I can make nothing of it, which I regret very much upon this occasion, as I suppose the cyphers are a very material part of the letter.

The friendly and patriotic anxiety with which you inquire after my motives and reasons for making the proposition of the 4th of May, and for printing the memorial, has put me upon recollecting the circumstances. If the series of my letters had arrived, I think the reasons would have appeared, but not with that force in which they existed at the time. I have never expressed in writing those reasons so strongly as I felt them. The hopes have never been strong in anybody of inducing the Republic to a sudden alliance with France and America. The utmost expectation, that many of the well intentioned have entertained has been to prevent the government from joining England. I am sorry to be obliged to say it, and if it ever should be made public, it might be ill taken. But there is no manner of doubt, that the most earnest wish of the cabinet has been to induce the nation to furnish the ships and troops to the English according to their interpretation of the treaty. Amsterdam distinguished itself, and its ancient and venerable Burgomaster, Temmink, and its eldest Pensionary, Van Berckel, have distinguished themselves in Amsterdam.

When Mr Laurens's papers were discovered, they were sent forthwith to the Hague. The Prince, in person, laid them before the States. Sir Joseph Yorke thundered with his memorials against Amsterdam, her Burgomasters, and Pensionary. The nation was seized with amazement, and flew to the armed neutrality for shelter against the fierce wrath of the King. Instantly Sir Joseph Yorke is recalled, and a declaration of war appears, levelled against the city, against the Burgomasters, and M. Van Berckel. Sir George Rodney, in his despatches pursues the same partiality and personality against Amsterdam. What was the drift of all this? Manifestly to excite seditions against Temmink and Van Berckel. Here then, is a base and scandalous system of policy, in which the King of Great Britain, and his Ministry and Admiral, all condescended to engage, manifestly concerted by Sir Joseph Yorke, at the Hague; and I am sorry to add, too much favored by the cabinet, and even openly by the Prince, by his presenting Laurens's papers to the States, to sacrifice Temmink and Van Berckel to the fury of an enraged populace.

This plan was so daringly supported by writers of the first fame on the side of the Court, that multitudes of writings appeared, attempting to show that what Temmink and Van Berckel had done was high treason. All this had such an effect, that all the best men seemed to shudder with fear. I should scarcely find credit in America, if I were to relate anecdotes. It would be ungenerous to mention names, as well as unnecessary. I need only say, that I was avoided like a pestilence by every man in government. Those gentlemen of the rank of Burgomasters, Schepins, Pensionaries, and even lawyers, who had treated me with great kindness and sociability, and even familiarity before, dared not see me, dared not be at home when I visited at their houses; dared not return my visit; dared not answer in writing, even a card that I wrote them. I had several messages in a roundabout way, and in confidence, that they were extremely sorry they could not answer my cards and letters in writing, because "_on fait tout son possible pour me sacrifier aux Anglomanes_."

"Not long after, arrived the news of the capture of St Eustatia, &c. This filled up the measure. You can have no idea, Sir; no man, who was not upon the spot, can have any idea of the gloom and terror that was spread by this event. The creatures of the Court openly rejoiced in this, and threatened some of them in the most impudent terms. I had certain information, that some of them talked high of their expectations of popular insurrections against the Burgomasters of Amsterdam, and M. Van Berckel, and did Mr Adams the honor to mention him as one, that was to be hanged by the mob in such company.

In the midst of this confusion and terror, my credentials arrived from Paris, through a hundred accidents and chances of being finally lost. As soon as I read my despatches, and heard the history of their escape by post, diligence and treck-schoots, it seemed to me as if the hand of Providence had sent them on purpose to dissipate all these vapors.

With my despatches, arrived from Paris intimations of their contents, for there are no secrets kept at Paris. The people, who are generally eager for a connexion with America, began to talk, and paragraphs appeared in all the gazettes in Dutch, and French, and German, containing a thousand ridiculous conjectures about the American Ambassador and his errand. One of my children could scarcely go to school without some pompous account of it in the Dutch papers. I had been long enough in this country to see tolerably well where the balance lay, and to know that America was so much respected by all parties, that no one would dare to offer any insult to her Minister, as soon as he should be known. I wrote my memorial and presented it, and printed it in English, Dutch, and French. There was immediately the most universal and unanimous approbation of it expressed in all companies, pamphlets and newspapers, and no criticism ever appeared against it. Six or seven months afterwards a pamphlet appeared in Dutch, which was afterwards translated into French, called _Considerations on the Memorial_; but it has been read by very few, and is indeed not worth reading.

The proposition to the President being taken _ad referendum_, it became a subject of the deliberation of the sovereignty. The Prince, therefore, and the whole Court, are legally bound to treat it with respect, and me with decency, at least it would be criminal in them to treat me or the subject with indecency. If it had not been presented and printed, I am very sure I could not long have resided in the Republic, and what would have been the consequence to the friends of liberty, I know not. They were so disheartened and intimidated, and the Anglomanes were so insolent, that no man can say, that a sudden frenzy might not have been excited among the soldiery and people, to demand a junction with England, as there was in the year 1748. Such a revolution would have injured America and her allies, have prolonged the war, and have been the total loss and ruin of the Republic.

Immediately upon the presentation of my memorial, M. Van Berckel ventured to present his _requete_ and demand for a trial. This contributed still further to raise the spirits of the good people, and soon after the Burgomasters of Amsterdam appeared with their proposition for giving the Prince a committee for a council, and in course their attack upon the Duke; all which together excited such an enthusiasm in the nation, and among the officers of the navy, as produced the battle of the Doggerbank, which never would have happened, in all probability, but would have been eluded by secret orders and various artifices, if the spirit raised in the nation by the chain of proceedings, of which the American memorial was the first and an essential link, had not rendered a display of the national bravery indispensable for the honor of the navy, and perhaps for the safety of the Court.

The memorial as a composition, has very little merit; yet almost every gazette in Europe has inserted it, and most of them with a compliment, none without any criticism. When I was in Paris and Versailles afterwards, no man ever expressed to me the smallest disapprobation of it, or the least apprehension that it could do any harm. On the contrary, several gentlemen of letters expressed higher compliments upon it than it deserved. The King of Sweden has done it a most illustrious honor, by quoting one of the most material sentiments in it, in a public answer to the King of Great Britain; and the Emperor of Germany has since done the author of it the honor to desire in the character of Count Falkenstein to see him, and what is more remarkable, has adopted the sentiments of it concerning religious liberty into a code of laws for his dominions; the greatest effort in favor of humanity, next to the American revolution, which has been produced in the eighteenth century.

As my mission to this Republic was wisely communicated to the Court of Versailles, who can say that this transaction of Congress had not some influence in bringing De Grasse into the Chesapeake Bay? Another thing I ought to mention; I have a letter from Mr Jay, informing me that in the month of June last M. Del Campo was appointed by the Court of Madrid to treat with him; the exact time when my memorial appeared at Madrid. You may possibly say, that my imagination and self-love carry me extraordinary lengths; but when one is called upon to justify an action, one should look all round. All I contend for is, that the memorial has certainly done no harm; that it is probable it has done some good, and that it is possible it has done much more than can be proved. A man always makes an awkward figure when he is justifying himself and his own actions, and I hope I shall be pardoned. It is easy to say, "_il abonde trop dans son sens; il est vain et glorieux; il est plein de lui-meme; il ne voit que lui_;" and other modest things of that sort, with which even your Malesherbes, your Turgots, and Neckers, are sometimes sacrificed to very small intrigues.

Your veterans in diplomacy and in affairs of State, consider us as a kind of militia, and hold us, perhaps, as is natural, in some degree of contempt; but wise men know that militia sometimes gain victories over regular troops, even by departing from the rules. Soon after I had presented the memorial, I wrote to the Duc de la Vauguyon upon the subject of inviting or admitting in concert, the Republic to accede to the alliance between France and America. The Duke transmitted that letter to the Count de Vergennes, which produced the offer to Congress from the King, to assist us in forming a connexion with the Republic, and the instructions upon the subject, which I shall execute as soon as the French Ambassador thinks proper. With him it now lies, and with him, thank God, I have hitherto preserved a perfectly good understanding, although I differed from him in opinion concerning the point of time to make the former proposition.

The evacuation of the barrier towns has produced an important commentary upon the conversation I had with the Duke, and his opinion upon that occasion. How few weeks was it, after the publication of my memorial, that the Roman Emperor made that memorable visit to Brussels, Ostend, Bruges, Antwerp, and all the considerable maritime towns in his Provinces of Brabant and Flanders? How soon afterwards his memorable journies to Holland and to Paris? Was not the American memorial full of matter for the Emperor's contemplation, when he was at Ostend, Antwerp, and Bruges? Was it not full of matter, calculated to stimulate him to hasten his negotiations with France concerning the abolition of the barrier towns? Was not the same matter equally calculated to stimulate France to finish such an agreement with him, as we have seen the evidence of in the actual evacuation of those towns? If this evacuation is an advantage to France and to America, as it undoubtedly is, by putting this Republic more in the power of France, and more out of a possibility of pursuing the system of Orange by joining England, and my memorial is supposed to have contributed anything towards it, surely it was worth the while.

The period since the 4th of May, 1781, has been thick sown with good events, all springing out of the American revolution, and connected with the matter contained in my memorial. The memorial of M. Van Berckel, the proposition of the Burgomasters of Amsterdam, their attack upon the Duke of Brunswick, and the battle of Doggerbank, the appointment of Senor del Campo, to treat with Mr Jay; the success of Colonel Laurens, in obtaining orders for the French fleet to go upon the coast of America; their victory over Graves, and the capture of Cornwallis; the Emperor's journey to his maritime towns, to Holland, and to Paris; his new regulations for encouraging the trade of his maritime towns; his demolition of the barrier fortifications; and his most liberal and sublime ecclesiastical reformation; and the King of Sweden's reproach to the King of England for continuing the war, in the very words of my memorial; these traits are all subsequent to that memorial, and they are too sublime and decisive proofs of the prosperity and glory of the American cause, to admit the belief, that the memorial has done it any material harm.

By comparing facts and events, and dates, it is impossible not to believe, that the memorial had some influence in producing some of them. When Courts, Princes, and nations, have been long contemplating a great system of affairs, and their judgments begin to ripen, and they begin to see how things ought to go, and are going, a small publication, holding up these objects in a clear point of view, sometimes sets a vast machine in motion at once like the springing of a mine. What a dust we raise, said the fly upon the chariot wheel? It is impossible to prove, that this whole letter is not a similar delusion to that of the fly. The Councils of Princes are enveloped in impenetrable secrecy. The true motives and causes, which govern their actions, little or great, are carefully concealed. But I desire only that these events may be all combined together, and then, that an impartial judge may say, if he can, that he believes that that homely, harmless memorial had no share in producing any part of this great complication of good.

But be all these speculations and conjectures as they will, the foresight of which could not have been sufficiently clear to have justified the measure, it is sufficient for me to say, that the measure was absolutely necessary and unavoidable. I should have been contemptible and ridiculous without it. By it I have secured to myself and my mission universal decency and respect, though no open acknowledgment or avowal. I write this to you in confidence. You may entirely suppress it, or communicate it in confidence, as you judge, for the public good.

I might have added, that many gentlemen of letters, of various nations, have expressed their approbation of this measure, I will mention only two. M. d'Alembert and M. Raynal, I am well informed, have expressed their sense of it in terms too flattering for me to repeat. I might add the opinion of many men of letters in this Republic.

The charge of vanity is the last resource of little wits and mercenary quacks, the vainest men alive, against men and measures, that they can find no other objection to. I doubt not but letters have gone to America, containing their weighty charge against me; but this charge, if supported only by the opinion of those who make it, may be brought against any man or thing. It may be said, that this memorial did not reach the Court of Versailles, until after Colonel Laurens had procured the promise of men and ships. But let it be considered, Colonel Laurens brought with him my credentials to their High Mightinesses, and instructions to Dr Franklin, to acquaint the Court of Versailles with it, and request their countenance and aid to me. Colonel Laurens arrived in March. On the 16th of April, I acquainted the Duc de la Vauguyon at the Hague, that I had received such credentials, and the next day waited on him in person, and had that day and the next two hours' conversation with him each day upon the subject, in which I informed him of my intention to go to their High Mightinesses. All this he transmitted to the Count de Vergennes; and though it might procure me the reputation of vanity and obstinacy, I shall forever believe, that it contributed to second and accelerate Colonel Laurens's negotiations, who succeeded to a marvel, though Dr Franklin says he gave great offence.[6]

The earnest opposition made by the Duc de la Vauguyon, only served to give me a more full and ample persuasion and assurance of the utility and necessity of the measure. His zeal convinced me, that he had a stronger apprehension, that I should make a great impression somewhere, than I had myself. "Sir," says he, "the King and the United Slates are upon very intimate terms of friendship. Had not you better wait until we can make the proposition in concert?" "God grant they may ever continue in perfect friendship," said I; "but this friendship does not prevent your Excellency from conducting your negotiations without consulting me. Why then am I obliged, in proposing a simple treaty of commerce, which the United States have reserved the entire right of proposing, to consult your Excellency? If I were about to propose an alliance, or to invite or admit the Dutch to accede to the alliance between the King and the States, I should think myself obliged to consult your Excellency." "But," said he, "there is a loan talked of, to be opened by the United States here, under the warranty of the King. How will it look for you to go to the States without my concurrence?" "Of this I know nothing," said I, "but one thing I know, that if such a loan should be proposed, the proposition I design to make to the States, instead of obstructing, will facilitate it, and your proposal of a loan will rather countenance me."

"Is there not danger," said he, "that the Empress of Russia, and the other northern powers, will take offence at your going to the States-General before them?" "Impossible," said I; "they all know, that the Dutch have been our old friends and allies, that we shall have more immediate connexions of commerce with Holland than with them. But what is decisive in this matter is, America and Holland have now a common enemy in England at open war, which is not the case with the northern powers."

"Had you not better wait, until I can write to the Count de Vergennes, and have his opinion?" "I know already beforehand," said I, "what his opinion will be." "Aye, what?" "Why, directly against it." "For what reason?" "Because the Count de Vergennes will not commit the dignity of the King, or his own regulation, by advising me to apply until he is sure of success; and in this he may be right; but the United States stand in a different predicament. They have nothing to lose by such a measure, and may gain a great deal."

"But," said he, "if Holland should join England in the war, it will be unfortunate." "If there was danger of this," said I, "a proposition from the United States would be one of the surest means of preventing it; but the situation of Holland is such, that I am persuaded they dare not join England. It is against their consciences, and they are in bodily fear of a hundred thousand men from France." "True," said he, "you have used an argument now, that you ought to speak out boldly, and repeat, peremptorily in all companies, for this people are governed very much by fear." "I have, however, spoken upon this subject with delicacy, upon all occasions, and shall continue to do so," said I, "but shall make no secret, that I am sensible of it."

After turning the subject in all the lights it could bear I told him, that I believed he had urged every objection against the measure, that could be thought of, but that I was still clear in my former opinion. "Are you decided to go to the States?" "Yes, Sir. I must think it my duty." "Very well; in that case," said he, "you may depend upon it, I will do all in my power, as a man, to countenance and promote your application."

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[6] See Dr Franklin's letters to Major Jackson, on this subject, in Franklin's Correspondence, Vol. III. pp. 227, 229.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Amsterdam, February 27th, 1782.

Sir,

Friesland has at last taken the provincial resolution to acknowledge the independence, of which United America is in full possession. It is thought that several cities of Holland will soon follow this example, and some say it will be followed forthwith by the whole Republic. The first Burgomaster of this city has said, within a few days past, that in six weeks at farthest the independence of America would be acknowledged by all seven of the United Provinces; but I have no expectation of such haste. This government does nothing with such celerity.

By what I hear and read of their speculations, it seems to me, that the general sense is at present not to shackle themselves with any treaties either with France or Spain, nor to make any treaty of alliance with America, nor to make even a treaty of commerce with America, as yet for a considerable time, but for the several members of the Sovereignty, one after another, to acknowledge the Independence of America in the manner that Friesland has done; and for the States, the Prince and the Admiralties to exert themselves in preparing a fleet to command the North Sea, and wash out some of the stains in their character, which the English have so unjustly thrown upon it in their blood. There is a loud cry for vengeance, a stern demand of a fleet and battle with the English; and if the Court contrive to elude it, the Stadtholder will run a great risk of his power.

Sensible and candid men tell me, "we wait for Spain, and we wait for Russia. We will not make any treaty with you. It is of no great importance to us or to you. We see there is a tremendous power arising in the West. We cannot meddle much; but we will at all events be your good friends. Whoever quarrels with you, we will not."

In short I expect no treaty. I do not expect that our independence will be acknowledged by all the Provinces for a long time. Nevertheless, it appears to me of indispensable importance that a Minister should reside constantly here, vested with the same powers from Congress, with which they have honored me; for which reason, having the offer of a large and elegant house in a fine situation, on a noble spot of ground at the Hague, at a very reasonable rate, I have, in pursuance of the advice of Mr Barclay, M. Dumas, and other friends, purchased it and shall remove into it on or before the first of May. In case I should be recalled, or obliged to go away upon other services, any Minister that Congress may appoint here in my room, will find a house furnished at the Hague ready for him.

The negotiation for the purchase was conducted secretly, but when it came to be known, I am informed, it gave a great deal of satisfaction in general.

To pay for it, I have applied all the money I had of M. de Neufville's loan, and some cash of my own, which I brought with me from America; and for the second payment, I must borrow of a friend, if Dr Franklin cannot furnish the money, for which indeed I do not love to ask him, he has so many demands upon him from every quarter. The house, including purchase charges, &c. will amount to about sixteen thousand guilders, ten thousand of which I paid yesterday. I have been obliged to take the title in my own name, but shall transfer it to the United States as soon as they are acknowledged and the account settled, provided Congress approve of the transaction; otherwise I shall take the risk upon myself, and sell it again. I shall live hereafter at a smaller rent than I ever did before, though in a house much superior.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

THE DUC DE LA VAUGUYON TO JOHN ADAMS.

Translation.

The Hague, March 4th, 1782.

Sir,

I have received the letter you did me the honor to address to me from Amsterdam, the 1st instant. I cannot answer it officially, in the capacity of King's Minister, not having any ulterior instructions on the subject to which it relates; but as you request my private opinion, I will give it to you with the greatest sincerity.

"After having seriously reflected on the views, which you have communicated to me, whatever inclination I may have to adopt your opinions, I cannot conceal from myself the inconveniences attending the plan, which you appear disposed to follow. I think and I believe, that I have sufficient reason to lead me to the conclusion, that it will retard rather than accelerate the ultimate success. I shall have the honor of explaining myself more fully by word of mouth, if, as M. Dumas gives me to hope, you visit the Hague in the course of a few days.

Receive, Sir, my renewed assurances of inviolable attachment, and profound respect, &c.

DE LA VAUGUYON.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN ADAMS.

Philadelphia, March 6th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I have now before me your letters of the 15th, 17th, and 18th of October last. I am sorry to find that your health has suffered by the climate, but hope that the setting in of the winter has ere this re-established it. I am not directed to return any answer to your request to come home. Should I obtain the sense of Congress upon it before this is closed, it will be transmitted by this conveyance.

The success of the allied arms in America, the recovery of the Dutch Islands, and the avowed superiority of the French in the West Indies, have so changed the face of affairs, that there is strong reason to believe negotiations will be set on foot this winter. Whether Britain is yet sufficiently humbled to desire peace is still doubtful; but whether she is or is not, she will probably negotiate, in which case your presence in Europe will be necessary; so that I believe you cannot at the most flatter yourself with anything more than a conditional leave to return.

Your statement of the decline of commerce in the United Provinces, agrees exactly with that which we have received from other hands. I lament that a nation, which has such important reasons for exertion, and such means in their power, should want vigor to call them forth. They must and will, however, sooner or later, be brought to it. A separate peace with England is now impossible, without degrading the character of the nation, and exposing it to greater evils than they are threatened with from England. Besides, what advantages are to be derived from such a peace? Can Britain restore her conquests, now in the hands of the French? Can she give back the plunder of St Eustatia, or the cargoes of the Indiamen divided among the captors? Can she afford them a compensation for the loss of last year's commerce? Or can she draw from her exhausted purse sufficient sums to defend the barrier against the troops of France, who would certainly avenge herself for such ingratitude?

The distress of the nation, then, must in the end force them to exertions, and however reluctantly they may go into the war, they must still go into it with vigor. But, Sir, though your letters detail the politics of the country, though they very ably explain the nature and general principles of the government, they leave us in the dark with respect to more important facts. They have not led us into the dock yards or arsenals; they have not told us what ships are prepared for sea, what are preparing, what the naval force will be this spring, or how it is to be applied. You have not yet introduced us to any of the leading members of the great council; you have not repeated your private conversations with them from which infinitely more is to be collected, than from all the pamphlets scattered about the streets of Amsterdam.

If they avoid your company and conversation, it is a more unfavorable symptom than any you have mentioned; and shows clearly that your public character should have been concealed till your address had paved the way for its being acknowledged. If you have formed connexions with any of these people, and I cannot but presume that you have attended to so important a point, it will be very interesting to us to have their most striking features delineated, their sentiments with respect to us and to our opponents detailed, and the influence of each in the Assembly of the States. This will best acquaint us with the principles of the government, and direct our course towards them.

Among other things, I wish to know in what light they view our cause, as just or unjust? What influence they imagine our independence will have upon the general system of Europe, or their own States? What expectations they form from our commerce; whether the apprehension of its being altogether thrown into another channel, if infused with address, would not awaken them into action? What are their ideas of the comparative power of France and Britain, so far as it may affect them? Whether they have entered into any treaty with France since the war; if they have, what are its objects? If they have not, whether any such thing is in contemplation?

None of your letters takes the least notice of the French Ambassador at the Hague; is there no intercourse between you? If not, to what is it to be attributed? It appears to me, that our interests in Holland are similar to those of France. They are interested with us in forwarding our loans; in procuring a public acknowledgment of our independence; in urging the States to exertion. They have considerable influence on the government, as appears from the success that the loan, opened under their guarantee met with.

I must again, therefore, request you to spend much of your time at the Hague, that great centre of politics, to cultivate the acquaintance and friendship of the French Ambassador, to confer with him freely and candidly upon the state of our affairs; and by his means, to extend your acquaintance to the other representatives of crowned heads at the Hague. Your having no public character, together with our avowed contempt for rank and idle ceremony, will greatly facilitate your intercourse with them, and enable you to efface the ill impressions they daily receive of us from our enemies.

You see, Sir, I rely so much upon your good sense, as to write with freedom to you, and to mark out that line, which I conceive will best tend to render your mission useful. Should I suggest anything, which you may not approve, I should be happy to be informed of it, and the reasons upon which you act; so that I may be able fully to justify your measures, if, at any time, they should not be entirely approved on this side of the water. I communicated to Congress the letter of Dr Franklin, relative to your salary, in consequence of which, they have directed the superintendent of the finances to make provision for it in future.

We have no intelligence of importance at this time, but have our eyes fixed with anxious expectation on the West Indies, whence we hourly expect to hear the particulars of the engagement between the Count de Grasse and Hood; and the issue of the attack upon St Christopher's.

To the southward, things remain in the state they were, though we have some reason to believe the enemy entertain serious thoughts of withdrawing their troops from Charleston. Thirty empty transports have sailed from New York, with a view, as is said, to fetch them to that place, which will be the last they quit on the Continent. This we ought not to lament, since there is no situation better adapted to concentre our force, and no part of America so easily defended with inferior force, as the ridge of hills which shut it in, at the same time that it is totally indefensible against a combined attack by land and water. So that we may reasonably hope, that York will again be fatal to the British arms. Every preparation is making to render it so.

I write nothing to you on the subject of a negotiation, conveyances to Dr Franklin being more easily obtained, as well as more secure. Every instruction on that head is sent to him, and will, of course, be communicated to you by the time you need it.

Nothing can be more pleasing, after the chaos into which our affairs were plunged, than the order which begins now to be established in every department. Paper ceases to be a medium, except the bank paper, which is in equal credit with specie; gold and silver have found their passage into the country; restrictions on commerce are removed; it flows in a thousand new channels, and has introduced the greatest plenty of every necessary, and even every luxury of life. Our harvests have been so abundant, that provisions are in the utmost plenty. All the supplies of the army are procured by contracts, and the heavy load of purchasing and issuing commissaries is discharged. In short, our affairs wear such a face here, at present, that if we are only supported this year by foreign loans, we shall not be under the necessity of calling for them again. Would to heaven, that the present aspect of affairs might render your endeavors on this head successful. The use it would be of to the community, would amply compensate you for all the pain and distress, which your fruitless endeavors have occasioned you.

Among other articles of intelligence, I ought to inform you, that Burgoyne is exchanged, and that an exchange is now on foot for Cornwallis, in which it is designed that Mr Laurens shall be included. The British seem extremely anxious to have him, and to give him the command of their army in America. We, who know him best, have no objection to the measure. If they wish to carry on an active war, his precipitation will lead them into new difficulties. If to defend particular posts, they cannot put them into the hands of a man who knows less about the matter. His defence of York was a most contemptible series of blunders. We shall, besides these, derive two decisive advantages from his command; while a detestation of his cruelty has united the whigs, the tenth article of the capitulation at York has destroyed the confidence of the tories.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Amsterdam, March 10th, 1782.

Sir,

By the address of the House of Commons to the King, his Majesty's answer, and the resolution of the House in consequence of it, "that he would be highly criminal and an enemy to his country, who should attempt to carry on an offensive war in America against the sense of the House;" by the surrender of Minorca, and the disastrous face of British affairs in Ireland, as well as in the East and West Indies, and by the uncommon difficulties which my Lord North finds in raising the loan, I think we may fairly conclude that the United States are not to expect those horrid scenes of fire and sword in future, which they have so often seen heretofore.

Among the causes, which have operated to this effect, may be reckoned the late ordinance of Congress against British manufactures, and the prospect which has been opened to them, in Holland, of a sudden revival of the Dutch manufactures of Delft, Leyden, Utrecht, and indeed all the other cities of the Republic. The English have found all their artifices to raise mobs in their favor, in the Republic, to be vain; they found that there began to be an appearance of danger of popular tumults against them; they have seen their friends in this country driven out of all their strong holds, and forced to combat on the retreat; they have found that the American cause gained ground upon them every day, and that serious indications were given of a disposition to acknowledge our independence, for the sake of reviving their manufactures and extending their commerce, all which together has raised a kind of panic in the nation, and such a fermentation in Parliament, as has produced a formal renunciation of the principles of the American war.

The question now arises, what measures will the Cabinet of St James pursue? Will they agree to the Congress at Vienna? I believe not. Will they treat with the American peace Ministers now in Europe? I fancy not. They will more probably send agents to America, to propose some bad plan of American viceroys, and American nobility, and what not, except common sense and common utility.

I presume, with submission, however, that Congress will enter into no treaty or conference with them, but refer them to their Ministers in Europe.

France and Spain, I think, cannot mistake their interest and duty upon this occasion, which is, to strike the most decided strokes, to take the British armies in New York and Charleston prisoners. Without this, in all probability, before another revolution of the seasons, all the United States will be evacuated, the British forces sent to Quebec, Halifax and the West India Islands, where it will cost France and Spain more time, blood, and treasure to dispose of them than it will this campaign to capture them in New York and Charleston.

With the greatest respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Amsterdam, March 11th, 1782.

Sir,

The promise, which was made me by M. Bergsma, that I should have an answer from the Province of Friesland in three weeks, has been literally fulfilled. This gentleman, who, as well as his Province, deserves to be remembered in America, sent me a copy of the resolution in Dutch as soon as it passed. It is now public in all the gazettes, and is conceived in these terms;

"The requisition of Mr Adams, for presenting his letters of credence from the United States of North America to their High Mightinesses, having been brought into the Assembly and put into deliberation, as also the ulterior Address to the same purpose, with a demand of a categorical answer made by him, as is more amply mentioned in the minutes of their High Mightinesses of the 4th of May, 1781, and the 9th of January, 1782, whereupon, it having been taken into consideration, that the said Mr Adams would probably have some propositions to make to their High Mightinesses, and to present to them the principal articles and foundations upon which the Congress, on their part, would enter into a treaty of commerce and friendship, or other affairs to propose, in regard to which despatch would be requisite;