Chapter C: Clotterbooke." (10)

We live in critical moments. Parliament is to meet, and the King's speech will be delivered on the 26th. If the speech announces Mr Oswald's commission, and the two Houses in their answers thank him for issuing it, and there should be no change in the Ministry, the prospect of peace will be flattering. Or if there should be a change in the Ministry, and the Duke of Portland, with Mr Fox and Mr Burke, should come in, it will be still more so. But if Richmond, Cambden, Keppel, and Townshend should retire, and my Lord North and company come in, with or without the Earl of Shelburne, the appearances of peace will be very unpromising. My Lord North, indeed, cannot revoke the acknowledgment of our independence, and would not probably renounce the negotiations for peace, but ill will to us is so habitual to him and his master, that he would fall in earnestly with the wing-clipping system; join in attempts to deprive us of the fisheries and the Mississippi, and to fasten upon us the tories, and in every other measure to cramp, stint, impoverish and enfeeble us. Shelburne is not so orthodox as he should be, but North is a much greater heretic in American politics.

It deserves much consideration what course we should take, in case the old Ministry should come in wholly, or in part. It is certain, at present, that to be obnoxious to the Americans, and their Ministers, is a very formidable popular cry against any Minister or candidate for the Ministry in England, for the nation is more generally for recovering the good will of the Americans than they ever have been. Nothing would strike such a blow to any Ministry, as to break off the negotiations for peace; if the old Ministry come in, they will demand terms of us, at first, probably, that we can never agree to.

It is now eleven or twelve days, since the last result of our conferences were laid before the Ministry in London. Mr Vaughan went off on Sunday noon, the 17th. So that he is, no doubt, before this time with my Lord Shelburne. He is possessed of an ample budget of arguments to convince his Lordship, that he ought to give up all the remaining points between us. Mr Oswald's letters will suggest the same arguments in a different light, and Mr Strachey, if he is disposed to do it, is able to enlarge upon them all in conversation.

The fundamental point of the sovereignty of the United States being settled in England, the only question now is, whether they shall pursue a contracted, or a liberal, a good natured, or an ill natured plan towards us. If they are generous, and allow us all we ask, it will be the better for them; if stingy, the worse. That France does not wish them to be very noble to us, may be true. But we should be dupes indeed, if we did not make use of every argument with them, to show them that it is their interest to be so. And they will be the greatest bubbles of all, if they should suffer themselves to be deceived by their passions, or by any arts, to adopt an opposite tenor of conduct.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, December 4th, 1782.

Sir,

It is with much pleasure, that I transmit you the preliminary treaty between the King of Great Britain and the United States of America. The Mississippi, the western lands, Sagadehock, and the fisheries, are secured as well as we could, and I hope what is done for the refugees will be pardoned.

As the objects, for which I ever consented to leave my family and country, are thus far accomplished, I now beg leave to resign all my employments in Europe. They are soon enumerated; the first, is my commission to borrow money in Holland, and the second, is my credence to their High Mightinesses. These two should be filled up immediately, and as Mr Laurens was originally designed to that country, and my mission there was merely owing to his misfortune, I hope that Congress will send him a full power for that Court.

The commission for peace I hope will be fully executed before this reaches you. But, if it should not, as the terms are fixed, I should not choose to stay in Europe, merely for the honor of affixing my signature to the definitive treaty, and I see no necessity of filling up my place; but if Congress should think otherwise, I hope they will think Mr Dana the best entitled to it.

With great esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

EXTRACTS FROM A JOURNAL.

_Saturday, November 2d, 1782._--Almost every moment of this week has been employed in negotiation with the English gentlemen, concerning peace. We have two propositions, one, the line of fortyfive degrees, the other, a line through the middle of the Lakes. And for the boundary between Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, a line from the mouth of St Croix to its source, and from its source to the Highlands.

_Sunday, November 3d._--In my first conversation with Dr Franklin, on Tuesday last, he told me of Mr Oswald's demand of the payment of debts, and compensation to the tories; he said their answer had been, that we had not power, nor had Congress. I told him, I had no notion of cheating anybody. The question of paying debts, and compensating tories, were two. I had made the same observation that forenoon to Mr Oswald and Mr Strachey, in company with Mr Jay, at his house. I saw it struck Mr Strachey with peculiar pleasure; I saw it instantly smiling in every line of his face. Mr Oswald was apparently pleased with it too. In a subsequent conversation with my colleagues, I proposed to them, that we should agree that Congress should recommend it to the States, to open their courts of justice for the recovery of all just debts. They gradually fell into this opinion, and we all expressed these sentiments to the English gentlemen, who were much pleased with it, and with reason; because it silences the clamors of all the British creditors against the peace, and prevents them from making common cause with the refugees. Mr Jay came in and spent two hours in conversation upon our affairs, and we attempted an answer to Mr Oswald's letter. He is perfectly of my opinion, or I am of his, respecting Mr Dana's true line of conduct, as well as his with Spain, and ours with France, Spain, and England.

Vergennes has endeavored to persuade him to treat with d'Aranda, without exchanging powers. He refuses. Vergennes also pronounced Oswald's first commission sufficient, and was for making the acknowledgment of American independence, the first article of the treaty. Jay would not treat; the consequence was, a complete acknowledgment of our independence by Oswald's new commission, under the great seal of Great Britain, to treat with the Commissioners of the United States of America. Thus a temperate firmness has succeeded everywhere, but the base system nowhere.

D'Estaing has set off for Madrid and Cadiz; _reste a savoir_ what his object is, whether to take the command of a squadron, and in that case, where to go, whether to Rhode Island, to join Vaudreuil, and go against New York, or to the West Indies. Will they take New York, or only prevent the English from evacuating it? Oswald proposed solemnly to all three of us yesterday, at his house, to agree not to molest the British troops in the evacuation; but we did not. This, however, shows they have it in contemplation. Suppose they are going against West Florida. How far are we bound to favor the Spaniards? Our treaty with France must, and shall be sacredly fulfilled, and we must admit Spain to accede when she will; but until she does, our treaty does not bind us to France to assist Spain.

The present conduct of England and America, resembles that of the eagle and cat. An eagle, scaling over a farmer's yard, espied a creature that he thought a hare. He pounced upon and took him up in the air, the cat seized him by the neck with her teeth, and round the body with her fore and hind claws. The eagle, finding himself scratched and pressed, bids the cat let go, and fall down. No, says the cat, I will not let go and fall, you shall stoop and set me down.

_Monday, November 4th._--All the forenoon, from eleven till three, at Mr Oswald's, Mr Jay and I. In the evening there again, until near eleven. Strachey is as artful and insinuating a man as they could send; he pushes and presses every point as far as it can possibly go; he has a most eager, earnest, pointed spirit.

_Tuesday, November 5th._ Mr Jay told me our allies did not play fair. They were endeavoring to deprive us of the fishery, the western lands, and the navigation of the Mississippi. They would even bargain with the English, to deprive us of them. They want to lay the western lands, Mississippi, and the whole Gulf of Mexico into the hands of Spain.

Oswald talks of Pultney, and a plot to divide America between France and England. France to have New England. They tell a story about Vergennes, and his agreeing that the English might propose such a division, but reserving a right to deny it all. These whispers ought not to be credited by us.

_Saturday, November 9th._--M. de Lafayette came in, and told me he had been at Versailles, and in consultation about the affair of money, as he and I agreed he should. He said he found, that the Count de Vergennes and their Ministry were of the same opinion with me, that the English were determined to evacuate New York. After some time, he told me, in a great air of confidence, that he was afraid the Count took it amiss, that I had not been to Versailles to see him. The Count told him, that he had not been officially informed of my arrival, he had only learned it from the returns of the police. I went out to Passy to dine with Dr Franklin, who had been to Versailles, and presented his Memorial, and the papers accompanying it. The Count said he would have the papers translated to lay them before the King, but the affair would meet with many difficulties. Franklin brought the same message to me from the Count, and said he believed it would be taken kindly if I went. I told both the Marquis and the Doctor, that I would go tomorrow morning.

_Sunday, November 10th._--Accordingly, at eight this morning, I went and waited on the Count. He asked me how we went on with the English. I told him we divided upon two points, the tories and Penobscot, two ostensible points; for it was impossible to believe, that my Lord Shelburne, or the nation, cared much about such points. I took out of my pocket, and showed him, the record of Governor Pownal's solemn act of burying a leaden plate, with this inscription; 'May 23d, 1759. Province of Massachusetts Bay. Penobscot dominions of Great Britain. Possession confirmed by Thomas Pownal, Governor.' This was planted on the east side of the river of Penobscot, three miles above marine navigation. I showed him also all the other records, the laying out of Mount Desert, Machias, and all the other towns to the east of Penobscot river, and told him, that the grant of Nova Scotia, by James the First, to Sir William Alexander, bounded it on the river St Croix, and that I was possessed of the authorities of four of the greatest Governors the King of England ever had, Shirley, Pownal, Bernard, and Hutchinson, in favor of our claim, and of learned writings of Shirley and Hutchinson in support of it. The Count said, that Mr Fitzherbert told him they wanted it for the masts. But the Count said, that Canada had an immense quantity. I told him I thought there were few masts there, but, that I fancied it was _not masts, but tories_, that again made the difficulty. Some of them claimed lands in that territory, and others hoped for grants there.

The Count said, it was not astonishing, that the British Ministry should insist upon compensation to them, for that all the precedents were in favor of it; that there had been no example of an affair like this terminated by a treaty, without re-establishing those who had adhered to the old government, in all their possessions. I begged his pardon in this, and said, that in Ireland at least there had been a multitude of confiscations without restitution. Here we ran into some conversation concerning Ireland, &c. M. Rayneval, who was present, talked about the national honor, and the obligation they were under to support their adherents. Here I thought I might indulge a little more latitude of expression, than I had done with Oswald and Strachey, and I answered, if the nation thought itself bound in honor to compensate these people, it might easily do it, for it cost the nation more money to carry on this war one month, than it would cost it to compensate them all. But I could not comprehend this doctrine of national honor. Those people, by their misrepresentations had deceived the nation, who had followed the impulsion of their devouring ambition, until it had brought an indelible stain on the British name, and almost irretrievable ruin on the nation, and now that very nation was thought to be bound in honor to compensate its dishonorers and destroyers. Rayneval said it was very true.

The Count invited me to dine; I accepted. When I came, I found M. de Lafayette in conference with him. When they came out, the Marquis took me aside, and told me he had been talking with the Count upon the affair of money. He had represented to him Mr Morris's arguments, and the things I had said to him, as from himself, &c. That he feared the arts of the English, that our army would disband, and our governments relax, &c. That the Count feared many difficulties; that France had expended two hundred and fifty millions in this war, &c. That he talked of allowing six millions, and my going to Holland with the scheme I had projected, and having the King's warranty, &c. to get the rest; that he had already spoken to some of M. de Fleury's friends, and intended to speak to him, &c.

We went up to dinner. I went up with the Count alone. He showed me into the room where were the ladies and the company. I singled out the Countess, and went up to her to make her my compliment. The Countess, and all the ladies rose up. I made my respects to them all, and turned and bowed to the rest of the company. The Count, who came in after me, made his bows to the ladies, and to the Countess last. When he came to her, he turned round and called out, _Mons. Adams, venez ici, voila la Comtesse de Vergennes_. A nobleman in company said, Mr Adams has already made his court to Madame la Comtesse. I went up again, however, and spoke again to the Countess, and she to me. When dinner was served, the Count led Madame de Montmorin, and left me to conduct the Countess, who gave me her hand with extraordinary condescension, and I conducted her to table. She made me sit next to her, on her right hand, and was remarkably attentive to me the whole time. The Count, who sat opposite, was constantly calling out to me, to know what I would eat, and to offer me _petits gateaux_, claret, and Madeira, &c. &c. In short, I was never treated with half the respect at Versailles in my life. In the antichamber, before dinner, some French gentlemen came to me, and said they had seen me two years ago, and that I had shown in Holland, that the Americans understood negotiation, as well as war.

_Monday, November 11th._ Mr Whiteford the Secretary of Mr Oswald, came a second time, not having found me at home yesterday, when he left a card, with a copy of Mr Oswald's commission, attested by himself (Mr Oswald). He delivered the copy, and said Mr Oswald was ready to compare it with the original with me. I said Mr Oswald's attestation was sufficient, as he had already shown me the original. He sat down, and we fell into conversation about the weather, and the vapors and exhalations from Tartary, which had been brought here last spring by the winds, and given us all the influenza. Thence to French fashions and the punctuality, with which they insist upon people's wearing thin clothes in spring and fall, though the weather is ever so cold, &c. I said it was often carried to ridiculous lengths, but that it was at bottom an admirable policy, as it rendered all Europe tributary to the city of Paris, for its manufactures.

We fell soon into politics. I told him, that there was something in the minds of the English and French, which impelled them irresistibly to war every ten or fifteen years. He said the ensuing peace would, he believed, be a long one. I said it would, provided it was well made, and nothing left in it to give future discontents. But if anything was done, which the Americans should think hard or unjust, both the English and French would be continually blowing it up, and inflaming the American minds with it, in order to make them join one side or the other in a future war. Suppose for example, they should think the tories men of monarchical principles, or men of more ambition than principle, or men corrupted and of no principle, and should therefore think them more easily seduced to their purposes, than virtuous republicans, is it not easy to see the policy of a French Minister in wishing them amnesty and compensation? Suppose a French Minister foresees, that the presence of the tories in America will keep up perpetually two parties, a French party, and an English party, and that this will compel the patriotic and independent party to join the French party, is it not natural for him to wish them restored? Is it not easy to see, that a French Minister cannot wish to have the English and Americans perfectly agreed upon all points before they themselves, the Spaniards and the Dutch are agreed too? Can they be sorry then to see us split upon such a point as the tories? What can be their motives to become the advocates of the tories?

The French Minister at Philadelphia has made some representations to Congress, in favor of a compensation to the royalists, and the Count de Vergennes no longer than yesterday said much to me in their favor. The Count probably knows, that we are instructed against it, that Congress are instructed against it, or rather have not constitutional authority to do it; that we can only write about it to Congress, and they to the States, who may, and probably will, deliberate upon it eighteen months before they all decide, and then every one of them will determine against it. In this way there is an insuperable obstacle to any agreement between the English and Americans, even upon terms to be inserted in the general peace, before all are ready. It was the constant practice of the French to have some of their subjects in London during the conferences for peace in order to propagate such sentiments there as they wished to prevail. I doubted not such were there now; M. Rayneval had been there. M. Gerard, I had heard, is there now, and probably others. They can easily persuade the tories to set up their demands, and tell them and the Ministers, that the King's dignity and nation's honor are compromised in it.

For my own part, I thought America had been long enough involved in the wars of Europe. She had been a football between contending nations from the beginning, and it was easy to foresee, that France and England both would endeavor to involve us in their future wars. I thought it our interest and duty, to avoid them as much as possible, and to be completely independent, and have nothing to do but in commerce with either of them; that my thoughts had been from the beginning to arrange all our European connexions to this end, and that they would continue to be so employed. And I thought it so important to us, that if my poor labors, my little estate, or (smiling) sizy blood, could effect it, it should be done. But I had many fears.

I said, the King of France might think it consistent with his station to favor people, who had contended for a Crown, though it was the Crown of his enemy. Whiteford said, they seem to be through the whole of their course, fighting for reputation. I said, they had acquired it, and more, they had raised themselves high from a low estate by it, and they were our good friends and allies, and had conducted generously, and nobly, and we should be just and grateful, but they might have political wishes, which we were not bound by treaty, nor in justice or gratitude to favor, and these we ought to be cautious of. He agreed that they had raised themselves very suddenly and surprisingly by it.

_Tuesday, November 12th._--The compliment of "_Monsieur, vous etes le Washington de la negotiation_," was repeated to me, by more than one person. I answered, "_Monsieur, vous me faites le plus grand honneur, et le compliment le plus sublime possible_." "_Eh! Monsieur, en verite, vous l'avez bien merite._"

_Friday, November 15th._--Mr Oswald came to visit me, and entered with some freedom, into conversation. I said many things to him to convince him, that it was the policy of my Lord Shelburne, and the interest of the nation, to agree with us upon the advantageous terms, which Mr Strachey carried away on the 5th; showed him the advantages of the boundary, the vast extent of land, and the equitable provision for the payment of debts, and even the great benefits stipulated for the tories.

He said he had been reading Mr Paine's answer to the Abbe Raynal, and had found there an excellent argument in favor of the tories. Mr Paine says, that before the battle of Lexington, we were so blindly prejudiced in favor of the English, and so closely attached to them, that we went to war at any time, and for any object, when they bid us. Now this being habitual to the Americans, it was excusable in the tories to behave on this occasion, as all of us had ever done upon all others. He said, if he were a member of Congress, he would show a magnanimity upon this occasion, and would say to the refugees, take your property, we scorn to make any use of it in building up our system.

I replied, that we had no power, and Congress had no power, and, therefore, we must consider how it would be reasoned upon in the several Legislatures of the separate States, if, after being sent by us to Congress, and by them to the several States, in the course of twelve or fifteen months, it should be there debated. You must carry on the war six or nine months certainly, for this compensation; and consequently spend, in the prosecution of it, six or nine times the sum necessary to make the compensation; for I presume this war costs every month to Great Britain, a larger sum than would be necessary to pay for the forfeited estates.

"How," said I, "will an independent man in one of our Assemblies consider this? We will take a man, who is no partisan of England or France, one who wishes to do justice to both, and to all nations, but is the partisan only of his own." "Have you seen," said he, "a certain letter written to the Count de Vergennes, wherein Mr Samuel Adams is treated pretty freely?" "Yes," said I, "and several other papers, in which Mr John Adams has been treated so too. I do not know what you may have heard in England of Mr Samuel Adams. You may have been taught to believe, for what I know, that he eats little children. But I assure you, he is a man of humanity and candor, as well as integrity; and further, that he is devoted to the interest of his country, and, I believe, wishes never to be, after a peace, the partisan to France or England, but to do justice and all the good he can to both. I thank you for mentioning him, for I will make him my orator. What will he say, when the question of amnesty and compensation to the tories comes before the Senate of Massachusetts, and when he is informed, that England makes a point of it, and that France favors her? He will say, here are two old sagacious Courts, both endeavoring to sow the seeds of discord among us, each endeavoring to keep us in hot water; to keep up continual broils between an English party and a French party, in hopes of obliging the independent and patriotic party to lean to its side. England wishes them here, and compensated, not merely to get rid of them, and to save herself the money, but to plant among us instruments of her own, to make divisions among us, and between us and France, to be continually crying down the religion, the government, the manners of France, and crying up the language, the fashions, the blood, &c. of England. England also means, by insisting on our compensating these worst of enemies, to obtain from us a tacit acknowledgment of the right of the war, an implicit acknowledgment, that the tories have been justifiable, or at least excusable, and that we, only by a fortunate coincidence of events, have carried a wicked rebellion into a complete revolution. At the very time, when Britain professes to desire peace, reconciliation, perpetual oblivion of all past unkindnesses, can she wish to send in among us a number of persons, whose very countenances will bring fresh to our remembrance the whole history of the rise and progress of the war, and of all its atrocities? Can she think it conciliatory, to oblige us to lay taxes upon those, whose habitations have been consumed, to reward those who have burned them? Upon those, whose relations have been cruelly destroyed, to compensate the murderers? What can be the design of France, on the other hand, by espousing the cause of those men? Indeed, her motives may be guessed at. She may wish to keep up in our minds a terror of England, and a fresh remembrance of all we have suffered. Or she may wish to prevent our Ministers in Europe from agreeing with the British Ministers, until she shall say, that she and Spain are satisfied in all points."

I entered largely with Mr Oswald into the consideration of the influence this question would have upon the councils of the British cabinet, and the debates in Parliament. The King and the old Ministry might think their personal reputations concerned, in supporting men who had gone such lengths, and suffered so much in their attachment to them. The King may say, "I have other dominions abroad, Canada, Nova Scotia, Florida, the West India Islands, the East Indies, Ireland. It will be a bad example to abandon these men. Others will lose their encouragement to adhere to my government." But the shortest answer to this is the best, let the King by a message recommend it to Parliament to compensate them.

But how will my Lord Shelburne sustain the shock of opposition, when Mr Fox and Mr Burke shall demand a reason, why the essential interests of the nation are sacrificed to the unreasonable demands of those very men, who have done this great mischief to the empire? Should these orators indulge themselves in Philippics against the refugees, show their false representations, their outrageous cruelties, their innumerable demerits against the nation, and then attack the First Lord of the Treasury for continuing to spend the blood and treasure of the nation for their sakes?

_Sunday, November 17th._--Mr Vaughan came to me yesterday, and said, that Mr Oswald had that morning called upon Mr Jay, and told him, if he had known as much the day before, as he had since learned, he would have written to go home. Mr Vaughan said, Mr Fitzherbert had received a letter from Mr Townshend, that the compensation would be insisted on. Mr Oswald wanted Mr Jay to go to England; thought he could convince the Ministry. Mr Jay said, he must go with or without the knowledge and advice of the Court, and, in either case, it would give rise to jealousies. He could not go. Mr Vaughan said, he had determined to go, on account of the critical state of his family, his wife being probably abed. He should be glad to converse freely with me, and obtain from me all the lights and arguments against the tories, even the history of their worst actions. That, in case it should be necessary to run them down, it might be done, or at least expose them, for their true history was little known in England. I told him, I must be excused, it was a subject that I had never been desirous of obtaining information upon; that I pitied those people too much, to be willing to aggravate the sorrows and sufferings, even of those who had deserved the worst. It might not be amiss to reprint the letters of Bernard, Hutchinson, and Oliver, to show their rise. It might not be amiss to read the history of Wyoming, in the annual register for 1778 or 9, to recollect the prison ships, and the churches at New York, where the garrison of Fort Washington were starved, in order to make them enlist in refugee corps, it might not be amiss to recollect the burning of cities, and the thefts of plate, negroes, and tobacco.

I entered into the same arguments with him that I had used with Mr Oswald, to show that we could do nothing; Congress nothing; the time it would take to consult the States, and the reason to believe, that all of them would at last decide against it. I showed him, that it would be a religious question with some; a moral one with others; and a political one with more; an economical one with very few. I shewed him the ill effect which would be produced upon the American mind by this measure; how much it would contribute to perpetuate alienation against England, and how French emissaries might, by means of these men, blow up the flames of animosity and war. I showed him how the whig interest, and the opposition, might avail themselves of this subject in Parliament, and how they might embarrass the Minister.

He went out to Passy for a passport, and in the evening called upon me again; he said he found Dr Franklin's sentiments to be the same with Mr Jay's and mine, and hoped he should be able to convince Lord Shelburne. He was pretty confident it would work right. The Ministry and nation were not informed upon the subject. Lord Shelburne had told him, that no part of his office gave him so much pain, as the levee he held for these people, and hearing their stories of their families and estates, their losses, sufferings, and distresses. Mr Vaughan said, he had picked up here a good deal of information about these people from Mr Allen, and other Americans.

In the evening, M. de Lafayette came in and told me he had been to see M. de Fleury on the subject of a loan. He told him, he must afford America this year a subsidy of twenty millions. M. de Fleury said, France had already spent two hundred and fifty millions in the American war, and that they could not allow any more money to her; that there was a great deal of money in America; that the King's troops had been paid and subsisted there; that the British army had been subsisted and paid there, &c. The Marquis said, that little of the subsistence or pay of the British had gone into any hands, but those of the tories within the lines. I said, that more money went in for their goods, than came out for provisions, or anything. The Marquis added to M. de Fleury, that Mr Adams had a plan for going to the States-General for a loan, or a subsidy. M. de Fleury said, he did not want the assistance of Mr Adams, to get money in Holland, he could have what he would. The Marquis said, Mr Adams would be glad of it, he did not want to go, but was willing to take the trouble, if necessary.

The Marquis said, that he should dine with the Queen tomorrow, and would give her a hint to favor us, that he should take leave in a few days, and should go in the fleet that was to sail from Brest; that he wanted the advice of Dr Franklin, Mr Jay, and me, before he went, &c. said that there was a report, that M. Gerard had been in England, and that M. de Rayneval was gone. I told him, I saw M. Gerard at Mr Jay's a few evenings ago. He said, he did not believe M. Gerard had been; that he had mentioned it to Count de Vergennes, and he did not appear confused at all, but said M. Gerard was here about the limits of Alsace. The Marquis said, that he believed the reason why Count de Vergennes said so little about the progress of Mr Fitzherbert with him was, because the difficulty about peace was made by the Spaniards, and he was afraid of making the Americans still more angry with Spain. He knew the Americans were very angry with the Spaniards.

_Monday, November 18th._--Returned Mr Oswald's visit. He says, Mr. Strachey, who sat out the 5th, did not reach London until the 10th. Couriers are three, four, or five days in going, according as the winds are.

We went over the old ground concerning the tories. He began to use arguments with me to relax. I told him, he must not think of that; but must bend all his thoughts to convince and persuade his Court to give it up; that if the terms now before his Court were not accepted, the whole negotiation would be broken off, and this Court would probably be so angry with Mr Jay and me, that they would set their engines to work upon Congress, get us recalled, and some others sent, who would do exactly as this Court would have them. He said, he thought that very probable. In another part of his conversation he said, we should all have gold snuff boxes, set with diamonds; you will certainly have the picture. I told him no, I had dealt too freely with this Court, I had not concealed from them any useful and necessary truth, although it was disagreeable. Indeed, I neither expected, or desired any favors from them, nor would I accept any; I should not refuse any customary compliment of that sort, but it never had been, or would be offered to me. My fixed principle, never to be the tool of any man, nor the partisan of any nation, would forever exclude me from the smiles and favors of Courts.

In another part of the conversation I said, that when I was young and addicted to reading, I had heard about dancing upon the points of metaphysical needles; but, by mixing in the world, I had found the points of political needles finer and sharper than the metaphysical ones. I told him the story of Josiah Quincy's conversation with Lord Shelburne, in 1774, in which he pointed out to him the plan of carrying on the war, which has been pursued this year, by remaining inactive on land, and cruising upon the coast to distress our trade.

He said he had been contriving an artificial truce, since he found we were bound by treaty not to agree to a separate truce. He had proposed to the Ministry, to give orders to their men-of-war, and privateers, not to take any unarmed American vessels.

I said to him, supposing the armed neutrality should acknowledge American independence, by admitting Mr Dana, who is now at Petersburg with a commission in his pocket for that purpose, to subscribe to the principles of their marine treaty; the King of Great Britain could find no fault with it; he could never hereafter say it was an affront or hostility; he had done it himself. Would not all neutral vessels have a right to go to America? And could not all American trade be carried on in neutral bottoms? I said to him, that England would always be a country, which would deserve much of the attention of America, independently of all consideration of blood, origin, language, morals, &c.; merely as a commercial people, she would forever claim the respect of America, because a great part of her commerce would be with her, provided she came to her senses, and made peace with us, without any points in the treaty, that should ferment in the minds of the people. If the people should think themselves unjustly treated, they would never be easy, and they are so situated as to be able to hurt any power. The fisheries, the Mississippi, the tories, were points that would rankle, and that nation that should offend our people in any of them, would sooner or later feel the consequences.

Mr Jay, M. Couteulx, and Mr Grand, came in. Mr Grand says there is a great fermentation in England, and that they talk of uniting Lord North and Mr Fox in administration; the Duke of Portland to come in, and Keppel to go out. But this is wild.

You are afraid, said Mr Oswald today, of being made the tools of the powers of Europe. Indeed I am, said I. What powers, said he? All of them, said I. It is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be continually manoeuvring with us, to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. They will all wish to make of us a makeweight candle, when they are making out their pounds. Indeed it is not surprising; for we shall very often, if not always be able to turn the scale. But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle, and that of all the powers of Europe, not to desire us, or perhaps even to permit us to interfere, if they can help it. I beg of you, said he, to get out of your head the idea, that we shall disturb you. What, said I, do you yourself believe, that your Ministers, Governors, and even nation, will not wish to get us of your side in any future war? As for the Governors, said he, we will take off their heads if they do an improper thing towards you. Thank you for your good will, said I, which I feel to be sincere. But nations do not feel as you and I do. And your nation, when it gets a little refreshed from the fatigues of the war; when men and money are become plenty, and allies at hand, will not feel as it does now. We never can be such sots, said he, as to think of differing again with you. Why, said I, in truth I have never been able to comprehend the reason, why you ever thought of differing with us.

_Monday, November 25th._ Doctor Franklin, Mr Jay, and myself, at 11 o'clock, met at Mr Oswald's lodgings. Mr Strachey told us, he had been to London, and waited personally on every one of the King's cabinet council, and had communicated the last propositions to them. They every one of them unanimously condemned that respecting the tories, so that that unhappy affair stuck, as he foresaw and foretold it would.

The affair of the fishery too was somewhat altered. They could not admit us to dry on the shores of Nova Scotia, nor to fish within three leagues of the coast of Cape Breton. The boundary they did not approve. They thought it too extended, too vast a country; but they would not make a difficulty. That if these terms were not admitted, the whole affair must be thrown into Parliament, where every man would be for insisting on restitution to the refugees. He talked about excepting a few, by name, of the most obnoxious of the refugees.

I could not help observing, that the ideas respecting the fishery appeared to me to come piping hot from Versailles. I quoted to them the words of our treaty with France, in which the indefinite and exclusive right to the fishery on the western side of Newfoundland was secured against us, according to the true construction of the treaties of Utrecht and Paris. I showed them the 12th and 13th articles of the treaty of Utrecht, by which the French were admitted to fish from Cape Bonavista to Point Riche. I related to them the manner in which the cod and haddock came into the rivers, harbors, creeks, and up to the very wharves, on all the northern coasts of America, in the spring, in the month of April, so that you have nothing to do, but step into a boat, and bring in a parcel of fish in a few hours. But that in May they began to withdraw. We have a saying in Boston that, "when the blossoms fall, the haddock begin to crawl," i.e. to move into deep water; so that in summer you must go out some distance to fish; at Newfoundland it was the same. The fish in March and April were in shore, in all the creeks, bays, and harbors, i.e. within three leagues of the coasts or shores of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia; that neither French nor English, could go from Europe and arrive early enough for the first fare; that our vessels could, being so much nearer, an advantage which God and nature had put into our hands; but this advantage of ours had been an advantage to England; because our fish had been sold in Spain and Portugal for gold and silver, and that gold and silver sent to London for manufactures; that this would be the course again; that France foresaw it, and wished to deprive England of it, by persuading her to deprive us of it; that it would be a master stroke of policy if she could succeed; but England must be completely the dupe before she could succeed.

There were three lights in which it might be viewed. 1st. As a nursery for seamen. 2d. As a source of profit. 3d. As a source of contention. As a nursery of seamen, did England consider us as worse enemies than France? Had she rather France should have the seamen than America? The French marine was nearer and more menacing than ours. As a source of profit, had England rather France should supply the markets of Lisbon and Cadiz with fish, and take the gold and silver, than we? France would never spend any of that money in London. We should spend it all there, very nearly. As a source of contention, how could we restrain our fishermen (the boldest men alive) from fishing in prohibited places? How could our men see the French admitted to fish, and themselves excluded by the English? It would then be a cause of disputes, and such seeds France might wish to sow. That I wished for two hours' conversation on the subject with one of the King's council. If I did not convince him he was undesignedly betraying the interest of his Sovereign; I was mistaken. Strachey said, perhaps I would put down some observations in writing upon it; I said, with all my heart, provided I had the approbation of my colleagues; but I could do nothing of the kind without submitting it to their judgments; and, that whatever I had said or should say, upon the subject, however strongly I might express myself was always to be understood, with submission to my colleagues. I showed them Captain Coffin's letter, and gave them his character. His words are;

"Our fishermen from Boston, Salem, Newbury, Marblehead, Cape Ann, Cape Cod, and Nantucket, have frequently gone out on the fisheries to the Straits of Belleisle, north part of Newfoundland, and the banks adjacent thereto, there to continue the whole season, and have made use of the north part of Newfoundland, the Labrador coast, in the Straits of Belleisle, to cure their fish, which they have taken in and about those coasts. I have known several instances of vessels going there to load in the fall of the year, with the fish taken and cured at these places, for Spain, Portugal, &c. I was once concerned in a voyage of that kind myself, and speak from my own knowledge.

"From Cape Sables, to the Isle of Sables, and so on to the Banks of Newfoundland, are a chain of banks, extending all along the coast, and almost adjoining each other, and those banks are where our fishermen go for the first fare, in the early part of the season. Their second fare is on the Banks of Newfoundland, where they continue to fish, till prevented by the tempestuous and boisterous winds, which prevail in the fall of the year on that coast. Their third and last fare is generally made near the coast of Cape Sables, or banks adjoining thereto, where they are not only relieved from those boisterous gales, but have an asylum to fly to in case of emergency, as that coast is lined, from the head of Cape Sables to Halifax, with most excellent harbors. The sea-cow fishery was, before the present war, carried on to great advantage, particularly from Nantucket and Cape Cod, in and about the river St Lawrence, at the Island St Johns and Anticosti, Bay of Chaleurs, and the Magdalen Islands, which were the most noted of all for that fishery. This oil has the preference to all others, except spermaceti."

Mr Jay desired to know whether Mr Oswald had now power to conclude and sign with us. Strachey said he had, absolutely. Mr Jay desired to know if the propositions now delivered us, were their ultimatum. Strachey seemed loath to answer, but at last said, no. We agreed these were good signs of sincerity. Bancroft came in this evening, and said, it was reported, that a courier had arrived from M. Rayneval, in London, and that after it, the Count de Vergennes told the King, that he had the peace in his pocket, that he was now master of the peace.

_Tuesday, November 26th._ Breakfasted at Mr Jay's, with Dr Franklin, in consultation upon the propositions made to us yesterday, by Mr Oswald. We agreed unanimously, to answer him, that we could not consent to the article respecting the refugees, as it now stands. Dr Franklin read a letter upon the subject, which he had prepared to Mr Oswald, upon the subject of the tories, which we had agreed with him, that he should read, as containing his private sentiments. We had a vast deal of conversation upon the subject. My colleagues opened themselves, and made many observations concerning the conduct, crimes, and demerits of those people. Before dinner Mr Fitzherbert came in, whom I had never seen before, a gentleman of about thirtythree; seems pretty discreet and judicious, and did not discover those airs of vanity, which are imputed to him. He came in consequence of the desire I expressed yesterday, of knowing the state of the negotiation between him and the Count de Vergennes, respecting the fishery. He told us, that the Count was for fixing the boundaries where each nation should fish; he must confess he thought the idea plausible, for that there had been great dissensions among the fishermen of the two nations; that the French Marine Office had an apartment full of complaints and representations of disputes; that the French pretended, that Cape Ray was the Point Riche.

I asked him, if the French demanded of him an exclusive right to fish and dry between Cape Bonavista and the Point Riche. He said they had not expressly, and he intended to follow the words of the Treaty of Utrecht and Paris, without stirring the point. I showed him an extract of a letter from the Earl of Egremoot, to the Duke of Bedford, of March the 1st, 1763, in which it is said, that, by the 13th article of the Treaty of Utrecht, a liberty was left to the French to fish, and to dry their fish on shore; and for that purpose to erect the necessary stages and buildings, but with an express stipulation, "_de ne pas sejourner dans la dite Isle, au dela du dit tems necessaire pour pecher et secher les poissons_." That it is a received law among the fishermen, that whoever arrives first shall have his choice of the stations; that the Duc de Nivernois insisted, that by the Treaty of Utrecht, the French had an exclusive right to the fishery, from Cape Bonavista to Point Riche; that the King gave to his Grace, the Duke of Bedford, express instructions to come to an eclaircissement upon the point with the French Ministry, and to refuse the exclusive construction of the Treaty of Utrecht. I also showed him a letter from Sir Stamier Porteen, Lord Weymouth's Secretary, to Lord Weymouth, enclosing an extract of Lord Egremont's letter to the Duke of Bedford, by which it appears, that the Duc de Nivernois insisted "that the French had an exclusive right to the fishery, from Cape Bonavista to point Riche, and that they had, on ceding the island of Newfoundland to Great Britain, by the thirteenth article of the Treaty of Utrecht, expressly reserved to themselves such an exclusive right, which they had constantly been in possession of till they were entirely driven from North America, in the last war."

For these papers I am obliged to Mr Izard. Mr Fitzherbert said it was the same thing now, word for word; but he should endeavor to have the treaty conformable to those of Utrecht and Paris. But he said we had given it up by admitting the word "_exclusive_" into our treaty. I said, perhaps not; for the whole was to be conformable to the true construction of the treaties of Utrecht and Paris, and that if the English did not now admit the exclusive construction, they could not contend for it against us. We had only contracted not to disturb them, &c. I said it was the opinion of all the fishermen in America, that England could not prevent our catching a fish, without preventing themselves from getting a dollar; that the first fare was our only advantage; that neither the English nor French could have it; it must be lost if we had it not. He said, he did not think much of the fishery, as a source of profit, but as a nursery of seamen. I told him, the English could not catch a fish the more, or make a sailor the more, for restraining us; even the French would rival them in the markets of Spain and Portugal. It was our fish they ought to call their own; because we should spend the profit with them; that the Southern States had staple commodities; but New England had no other remittances than the fishery, no other way to pay for their clothing; that it entered into our distilleries and West India trade, as well as our European trade, in such a manner, that it could not be taken out or diminished without tearing and rending; that, if it should be left to its natural course, we could hire or purchase spots of ground, on which to erect stages and buildings; but if we were straitened by treaty, that treaty would be given in instructions to Governors and Commodores, whose duty it would be to execute it; that it would be very difficult to restrain our fishermen, they would be frequently transgressing and making disputes and troubles.

He said, his principal object was to avoid sowing seeds of future wars. I said, it was equally my object, and that I was persuaded, that if the germ of a war was left anywhere, there was the greatest danger of its being left in the article respecting the fishery. The rest of the day was spent in endless discussions about the tories. Dr. Franklin is very staunch against them, more decided a great deal on this point, than Mr. Jay or myself.