Chapter C: Clotterbooke." (9)

The Treaty and Convention are both closed, or at least an authentic copy of each. If the copy should arrive before the original, which I shall reserve to be sent by the safest opportunity I can find, it will be a sufficient foundation for the ratification of Congress. I hope the treaty will be satisfactory to Congress. It has taken up much time to obtain the remarks and the consent of all the members of this complicated sovereignty. Very little of this time has been taken up by me, as Congress will see by the resolution of their High Mightinesses, containing the power to the Deputies to conclude the treaty; for although all communications were made to me in Dutch, a language in which I was not sufficiently skilled to depend upon my own knowledge, M. Dumas was ever at hand, and ever ready to interpret to me everything in French, by which means I was always able to give my answers without loss of time. The papers, in which the whole progress of this negotiation is contained in Dutch, French, and English, make a large bundle, and after all, they contain nothing worth transmitting to Congress. To copy them would be an immense labor, to no purpose, and to send the originals, at once would expose them to loss.

Several propositions were made to me, which I could not agree to, and several were made on my part, which could not be admitted by the States. The final result contained in the treaty, is as near the spirit of my instructions as I could obtain, and I think it is nothing materially variant from them. The Lords, the Deputies, proposed to me to make the convention a part of the treaty. My answer was, that I thought the convention, which is nearly conformable with that lately made with France, would be advantageous on both sides; but as I had no special instructions concerning it, and as Congress might have objections, that I could not foresee, it would be more agreeable to have the convention separate; so that Congress, if they should find any difficulty, might ratify the treaty without it. This was accordingly agreed to. It seemed at first to be insisted on, that we should be confined to the Dutch ports in Europe, but my friend, M. Van Berckel, and the merchants of Amsterdam, came in aid of me, in convincing all, that it was their interest to treat us upon the footing _gentis-amicissimae_, in all parts of the world.

Friesland proposed, that a right should be stipulated for the subjects of this Republic to purchase lands in any of our States; but such reasons were urged as convinced them, that this was too extensive an object for me to agree to; 1st. It was not even stipulated for France. 2dly. If it should be now introduced into this treaty, all other nations would expect the same, and although at present it might not be impolitic to admit of this, yet nobody would think it wise to bind ourselves to it forever. 3dly. What rendered all other considerations unnecessary, was, that Congress had not authority to do this, it being a matter of the interior policy of the separate States. This was given up. A more extensive liberty of engaging seamen in this country was a favorite object; but it could not be obtained. The _refraction_, as they call it, upon tobacco, in the weigh-houses, is a thing, that enters so deeply into their commercial policy, that I could not obtain anything, more particular or more explicit, than what is found in the treaty. Upon the whole, I think the treaty is conformable to the principles of perfect reciprocity, and contains nothing, that can possibly be hurtful to America, or offensive to our allies, or to any other nation, except Great Britain, to whom it is indeed, without a speedy peace, a mortal blow.

The rights of France and Spain are sufficiently secured by the twentysecond article; although it is not in the very words of the project, transmitted me by Congress, it is the same in substance and effect. The Duc de la Vauguyon was very well contented with it, and the States were so jealous of unforeseen consequences from the words of the article as sent me by Congress, and as first proposed by me, that I saw it would delay the conclusion without end. After several conferences, and many proposals, we finally agreed upon the article as it stands, to the satisfaction of all parties.

The clause reserving to the Dutch their rights in the East and West Indies, is unnecessary, and I was averse to it, as implying a jealousy of us. But as it implies too a compliment to our power and importance, was much insisted on, and amounted to no more than we should have been bound to without it, I withdrew my objection.

The proviso of conforming to the laws of the country, respecting the external show of public worship, I wished to have excluded; because I am an enemy to every appearance of restraint in a matter so delicate and sacred as the liberty of conscience; but the laws here do not permit Roman Catholics to have steeples to their churches, and these laws could not be altered. I shall be impatient to receive the ratification of Congress, which I hope may be transmitted within the time limited.[11]

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, October 12th, 1782.

Sir,

Yesterday afternoon M. Van der Burg Van Spieringshock, the Agent of their High Mightinesses, brought me the enclosed resolution, relative to a vessel of M. Dubbledemuts. I promised to enclose it to Congress. I would have it translated here, but I have not time. I presume Congress has, or will have, an interpreter for the Low Dutch.

It is much to be desired, that Congress would take some measures to inquire into this matter. The cause for my being so pressed for time, is, that I am preparing to set off for Paris, and have not only all my despatches to make up, to send the treaty, but have obligations to sign respecting the loan, that so essential a business may not stand still in my absence.

Mr Jay writes me, that Mr Oswald has received a commission to treat of peace with the Commissioners of the United States of America. I shall set off for Paris next week.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[11] The Treaty mentioned in this letter, and the Convention respecting vessels recaptured, were ratified by Congress, on the 23d of January, 1783. The Treaty and Convention are printed at large, together with the form of ratification, in the Journal of Congress under this date.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, October 31st, 1782.

Sir,

Having executed the treaty of commerce at the Hague, and despatched four copies of it, by four different vessels bound to America from the Texel, and having signed a sufficient number of obligations to leave in the hands of Messrs Willinks, Van Staphorsts, and de la Lande and Fynje, and having received information from Mr Jay, that Mr Oswald had received a commission from the King his master, under the Great Seal of Great Britain, to treat with the Commissioners of the United States of America, I set off for Paris, where I arrived on Saturday, the 26th of this month, after a tedious journey; the roads being, on account of long continued rains, in the worst condition I ever knew them.

I waited forthwith on Mr Jay, and from him learned the state of the conferences. It is not possible, at present, to enter into details. All I can say is in general, that I had the utmost satisfaction in finding, that he had been all along acting here upon the same principles upon which I had ventured to act in Holland, and that we were perfectly agreed in our sentiments and systems. I cannot express it better than in his own words; "to be honest and grateful to our allies, but to think for ourselves." I find a construction put upon one article of our instructions by some persons, which I confess I never put upon it myself. It is represented by some, as subjecting us to the French Ministry, as taking away from us all right of judging for ourselves, and obliging us to agree to whatever the French Ministers shall advise us to, and to do nothing without their consent. I never supposed this to be the intention of Congress; if I had, I never would have accepted the commission, and if I now thought it their intention, I could not continue in it. I cannot think it possible to be the design of Congress; if it is, I hereby resign my place in the commission, and request that another person may be immediately appointed in my stead.

Yesterday we met Mr Oswald at his lodgings; Mr Jay, Dr Franklin, and myself, on one side, and Mr Oswald, assisted by Mr Strachey, a gentleman whom I had the honor to meet in company with Lord Howe upon Staten Island in the year 1776, and assisted also by a Mr Roberts, a clerk in some of the public offices, with books, maps, and papers, relative to the boundaries.

I arrived in a lucky moment for the boundary of the Massachusetts, because I brought with me all the essential documents relative to that object, which are this day to be laid before my colleagues in conference at my house, and afterwards before Mr Oswald.

It is now apparent, at least to Mr Jay and myself, that, in order to obtain the western lands, the navigation of the Mississippi, and the fisheries, or any of them, we must act with firmness and independence, as well as prudence and delicacy. With these, there is little doubt we may obtain them all.

Yesterday I visited M. Brantzen, the Dutch Minister, and was by him very frankly and candidly informed of the whole progress of the negotiation on their part. It is very shortly told. They have exchanged full powers with Mr Fitzherbert, and communicated to him their preliminaries, according to their instructions, which I have heretofore transmitted to Congress. Mr Fitzherbert has sent them to London and received an answer, but has communicated to them no more of this answer than this, that those preliminaries are not relished at St James'. He excused his not having seen them for six or seven days, by pretence of indisposition, but they are informed that he has made frequent visits to Versailles during these days, and sent off and received several couriers.

How the negotiation advances between Mr Fitzherbert, and the Count de Vergennes, and the Count d'Aranda, we know not.

The object of M. de Rayneval's journey to London, is not yet discovered by any of us. It is given out, that he was sent to see whether the British Ministry were in earnest.[12] But this is too general. It is suspected that he went to insinuate something relative to the fisheries and the boundaries, but it is probable he did not succeed respecting the former, and perhaps not entirely, with respect to the latter.

With great respect, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[12] See Franklin's Correspondence, Vol. IV. p. 48. Also the North American Review for January, 1830, p. 21.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, November 6th, 1782.

Sir,

Two days ago arrived by Captain Barney, the letters you did me the honor to write me, the 22d, 29th, 30th, triplicate of May, 4th of July, 29th of August, and 15th of September.

I was unconditionally received in Holland, and promised upon record conferences and audiences, whenever I should demand them, before I entered into any treaty, and without this I should never have entered into any; and full powers were given to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, before I entered into any conferences with them. I have ventured upon the same principle in the affair of peace, and uniformly refused to come to Paris, until our independence was unconditionally acknowledged by the King of Great Britain. Mr Jay has acted on the same principle with Spain, and with Great Britain. The dignity of the United States, being thus supported, has prevailed in Holland and Great Britain; not indeed as yet in Spain, but we are in a better situation in relation to her, than we should have been if the principle had been departed from. The advice of the Count de Vergennes has been contrary; but however great a Minister he may be in his own department, his knowledge is insufficient and his judgment too often erroneous in our affairs, to be an American Minister.

Intelligence from Holland is impossible through France. Events in Holland can seldom be foreseen one day. When they happen, they are inserted in the gazettes, transferred to the _Courier de l'Europe_, the English and French gazettes, and get to America before it is possible for me to transmit them directly. Besides, Sir, I have sometimes thought, that my time was better employed in doing business, that might produce other events, than in multiplying copies and conveyances of despatches, which would contain nothing, but what I knew the newspapers would announce as soon; my reputation may not be so well husbanded by this method, but the cause of my country is served. I am not insensible to reputation; but I hope it has not been a principal object. Perhaps it has not been enough an object. I see so much of the omnipotence of reputation, that I begin to think so. I know very well, however, that if mine cannot be supported by facts, it will not be by trumpeters.

If it were in my power to do anything for the honor of the department or Minister of Foreign Affairs, I would cheerfully do it, because I am a friend to both; and to this end, you will, I am sure, not take it amiss if I say, that it is indispensably necessary for the service of Congress, and the honor of the office, that it be kept impenetrably secret from the French Minister in many things. The office will be an engine for the ruin of the reputation of your Ministers abroad, and for injuring our cause in material points, the fishery, the western lands, and the Mississippi, &c. if it is not.

I thank you, Sir, for the hint about the English language. I think with you, that we ought to make a point of it, and after some time, I hope it will be an instruction from Congress to all their Ministers.

As to the negotiations for peace, we have been night and day employed in them ever since my arrival on the 26th of October. Doctor Franklin, without saying anything to me, obtained of Mr Jay a promise of his vote[13] for Mr W. T. Franklin, to be Secretary to the commission for peace; and as the Doctor and his Secretary are in the same house, and there are other clerks enough, I suppose he will transmit to Congress details of the negotiations. I shall be ready to lend them any assistance in my power; and I will endeavor as soon as I can to transmit them myself; but after spending forenoon, afternoon, and evening, in discussions, it is impossible to transmit all the particulars. No man's constitution is equal to it.

The English have sent Mr Oswald, who is a wise and good man, and, if untrammelled, would soon settle all, and Mr Strachey, who is a keen and subtle one, although not deeply versed in such things; and a Mr Roberts, who is a clerk in the Board of Trade, and Mr Whithead, who is private Secretary to Mr Oswald. These gentlemen are very profuse in their professions of national friendship; of earnest desires to obliterate the remembrance of all unkindnesses, and to restore peace, harmony, friendship, and make them perpetual, by removing every seed of future discord. All this, on the part of Mr Oswald personally, is very sincere. On the part of the nation, it may be so in some sense at present; but I have my doubts, whether it is a national disposition, upon which we can have much dependence, and still more, whether it is the sincere intention of the Earl of Shelburne.

He has been compelled to acknowledge American independence, because the Rockingham Administration had resolved upon it, and Carleton and Digby's letter to General Washington, had made known that resolution to the world; because the nation demanded that negotiations should be opened with the American Ministers, and they refused to speak or hear, until their independence was acknowledged unequivocally and without conditions, because Messrs Fox and Burke had resigned their offices, pointedly, on account of the refusal of the King, and my Lord Shelburne, to make such an acknowledgment; and these eloquent senators were waiting only for the session of Parliament to attack his Lordship on this point; it was, therefore, inevitable to acknowledge our independence, and no Minister could have stood his ground without it. But still I doubt, whether his Lordship means to make a general peace. To express myself more clearly, I fully believe he intends to try another campaign, and that he will finally refuse to come to any definitive agreement with us, upon articles to be inserted in the general peace.

We have gone the utmost lengths to favor the peace. We have at last agreed to boundaries with the greatest moderation. We have offered them the choice of a line through the middle of all the great lakes, or the line of 45 degrees of latitude, the Mississippi, with a free navigation of it at one end, and the river St Croix at the other. We have agreed, that the courts of justice be opened for the recovery of British debts due before the war, to a general amnesty for all the royalists, against whom there is no judgment rendered, or prosecution commenced. We have agreed, that all the royalists, who may remain at the evacuation of the States, shall have six months to sell their estates, and to remove with them.

These are such immense advantages to the Minister, that one would think he could not refuse them. The agreement to pay British debts, will silence the clamors of all the body of creditors, and separate them from the tories, with whom they have hitherto made common cause. The amnesty and the term of six months will silence all the tories, except those who have been condemned, banished, and whose property has been confiscated; yet I do not believe they will be accepted.

I fear they will insist a little longer upon a complete indemnification to all the refugees, a point, which, without express instructions from all the States, neither we nor Congress can give up; and how the States can ever agree to it, I know not, as it seems an implicit concession of all the religion and morality of the war. They will also insist upon Penobscot as the eastern boundary. I am not sure that the tories, and the Ministry, and the nation, are not secretly stimulated by French emisaries, to insist upon Penobscot, and a full indemnification to the tories. It is easy to see, that the French Minister, the Spanish and the Dutch Ministers would not be very fond of having it known through the world, that all points for a general peace were settled between Great Britain and America, before all parties are ready. It is easy to comprehend, how French, Spanish, and Dutch emisaries, in London, in Paris, and Versailles, may insinuate, that the support of the tories is a point of national and royal honor, and propagate so many popular arguments in favor of it, as to embarrass the British Minister. It is easy to see, that the French may naturally revive their old assertions, that Penobscot and Kennebec are the boundary of Nova Scotia, although against the whole stream of British authorities, and the most authentic acts of the Governors, Shirley, Pownal, Bernard, and Hutchinson. Mr Fitzherbert, who is constantly at Versailles, is very sanguine for the refugees. Nevertheless, if my Lord Shelburne should not agree with us, these will be only ostensible points. He cares little for either. It will be to avoid giving any certain weapons against himself, to the friends of Lord North, and the old Ministry.

The negotiations at Versailles between the Count de Vergennes and Mr Fitzherbert, are kept secret, not only from us, but from the Dutch Ministers, and we hear nothing about Spain. In general, I learn, that the French insist upon a great many fish. I dined yesterday with M. Berkenrode, the Dutch Ambassador, and M. Brantzen, his colleague. They were both very frank and familiar, and confessed to me, that nothing had been said to them, and that they could learn nothing as yet of the progress of the negotiation. Berkenrode told me, as an honest man, that he had no faith in the sincerity of the English for peace as yet; on the contrary, he thought that a part of Lord Howe's fleet had gone to America, and that there was something meditated against the French West India Islands. I doubt this, however; but we shall soon know where my Lord Howe is. That something is meditating against the French or Spaniards, and that they think of evacuating New York for that end, I believe. Berkenrode seemed to fear the English, and said, like a good man, that in case any severe stroke should be struck against France, it would be necessary for Holland and America to discover a firmness. This observation had my heart on its side; but without an evacuation of New York, they can strike no blow at all, nor any very great one with it.

Mr Oswald has made very striking overtures to us; to agree to the evacuation of New York, to write a letter to General Washington, and another to Congress, advising them to permit this evacuation, to agree, that neither the people nor the army should oppose this evacuation, or molest the British army in attempting it; nay, further, that we should agree, that the Americans should afford them all sorts of aid, and even supplies of provisions. These propositions he made to us, in obedience to an instruction from the Minister, and he told us their army were going against West Florida, to reconquer that from the Spaniards. Our answer was, that we could agree to no such things; that General Washington could enter into a convention with them, for the terms upon which they should surrender the city of New York, and all its dependencies, as Long Island, Staten Island, &c. to the arms of the United States. All that we could agree to was, that the effects and persons of those, who should stay behind, should have six months to go off, nor could we agree to this, unless as an article to be inserted in the general peace.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[13] This proved to be an error. Mr Jay wrote to Doctor Franklin, on the 26th of January, 1783, as follows, "It having been suspected, that I concurred in the appointment of your grandson to the place of Secretary to the American Commission for Peace, _at your instance_, I think it right thus unsolicited to put it in your power to correct the mistake, &c." See the whole letter in _Franklin's Correspondence_, Vol. IV. p. 73.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN ADAMS.

Philadelphia, November 6th, 1782.

Sir,

The scene of action is so entirely transferred to your side of the Atlantic, that scarce any occurrence among us at present is sufficiently interesting to furnish matter for a public letter.

The resolutions, which have from time to time evinced the steady determination of Congress, in no event to relinquish the great object of the war, or think of peace but in connexion with their allies, have been already transmitted to you. The military force on both sides is perfectly inactive. By the enclosed extracts from General Carleton's, and General Washington's letters, you will see that the first is so bent on peace, that, notwithstanding the opinion of his superiors, he does not see that the war has any longer an object. It is high time that he disavows them, for their conduct is a direct disavowal of him.

The clauses of the commission to Mr Fitzherbert, which are designed to include us, are strong indications of the extreme reluctance of the British to give up their supposed dominion over this country. You have great credit with me for the judgment you have formed, from time to time, of the Court of Great Britain; though your opinions sometimes run counter to those generally received.

Nothing can be more conformable to our wishes, than the instructions you have transmitted; keep up that spirit in ---- and we have nothing to fear from that quarter, but lengthy negotiations, even after they shall commence in earnest.

We have yet no accounts of the evacuation of Charleston, and that event begins daily to grow more uncertain. Such is the inconstancy of the enemy, that one may as well predict what appearances a cloud will put on two hours hence, by our knowledge of the wind, as reduce their conduct to any settled shape, by knowing their professions. Our troops have gone into winter quarters at West Point.

The French have marched to the eastward to be nearer their fleet, which lies at Boston. Part of the British fleet, consisting of fourteen sail of the line, and eight frigates, including a ship of forty guns, sailed from New York the 26th ultimo. They have such a decided superiority in the American seas, that if they had correspondent land forces, or even knew how to apply those they keep cooped up in America, they might render themselves very formidable in the West Indies. This however is, I hope, an evil, which will be ere long remedied.

Bills for the amount of your salary from January last have been regularly transmitted to Dr Franklin. You will receive with this the amount of the last quarter, ending the first of October. Mr Morris, my Secretary, will enclose you a state of your accounts. I should be glad if you would acknowledge the receipt of these moneys, as they come to hand, since I stand charged with them in the Treasury books.

The enclosed resolution will show you, that Mr Boudinott has succeeded Mr Hanson, as President of Congress.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, November 8th, 1782.

Sir,

In one of your letters you suppose, that I have an open avowed contempt of all rank. Give me leave to say, you are much mistaken in my sentiments. There are times, and I have often seen such, when a man's duty to his country demands of him the sacrifice of his rank, as well as his fortune and life, but this must be an epoch, and for an object worthy of the sacrifice. In ordinary times, the same duty to his country obliges him to contend for his rank, as the only means indeed, sometimes, by which he can do service, and the sacrifice would injure his country more than himself. When the world sees a man reduced to the necessity of giving up his rank, merely to serve the public, they will respect him, and his opinions will have the more weight for it; but when the same world sees a man yield his rank for the sake of holding a place, he becomes ridiculous. This, you may depend upon it, will not be my case.

Ranks, titles, and etiquettes, and every species of punctilios, even down to the visits of cards, are of infinitely more importance in Europe, than in America, and therefore Congress cannot be too tender of disgracing their Ministers abroad in any of these things, nor too determined not to disgrace themselves. Congress will, sooner or later, find it necessary to adjust the ranks of all their servants, with relation to another, as well as to the magistrates and officers of the separate governments.

For example, if, when Congress abolished my commission to the king of Great Britain, and my commission for peace, and issued a new commission for peace, in which they associated four other gentlemen with me, they had placed any other at the head of the commission, they would have thrown a disgrace and ridicule upon me in Europe, that I could not have withstood. It would have injured me in the minds of friends and enemies, the French and Dutch, as well as the English.

It is the same thing with the States. If Mr Jay and I had yielded the punctilio of rank, and taken the advice of the Count de Vergennes and Dr Franklin, by treating with the English or Spaniards, before we were put upon the equal footing, that our rank demanded, we should have sunk in the minds of the English, French, Spaniards, Dutch, and all the neutral powers. The Count de Vergennes certainly knows this; if he does not, he is not even an European statesman; if he does know it, what inference can we draw, but that he means to keep us down if he can; to keep his hand under our chin to prevent us from drowning, but not to lift our heads out of water?

The injunctions upon us to communicate, and to follow the advice that is given us, seem to be too strong, and too universal. Understood with reasonable limitations and restrictions, they may do very well. For example, I wrote a speculation, and caused it to be printed in the _Courier du Bas Rhine_, showing the interest, policy, and humanity of the neutral confederation's acknowledging American independence, and admitting the United States to subscribe to the principles of their Marine Treaty. This was reprinted in the Gazette of Leyden, the _Politique Hollandais_, the _Courier de l'Europe_, and all the Dutch gazettes. At the same time I caused to be transmitted to England some pieces on the same subject, and further showing the probability, that the neutral powers might adopt this measure, and the impolicy of Great Britain, in permitting all the powers of Europe to get the start of her, and having more merit with America than she, by acknowledging her independence first. These pieces were printed in the English papers, in the form of letters to the Earl of Shelburne, and can never be controverted, because they are in writing, and in print, with their dates. These fears thus excited, added to our refusal to treat on an unequal footing, probably produced his Lordship's resolution, to advise the King to issue the commission, under the great seal, to Mr Oswald; by which Great Britain has got the start, and gone to the windward of the other European powers. No man living, but myself, knew, that all these speculations, in various parts of Europe, came from me. Would it do for me to communicate all this to the French Ministers? Is it possible for me to communicate all these things to Congress? Believe me it is not, and give me leave to say it will not do to communicate them to my friend, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, nor my friend, M. Marbois. If they should be, long letters will lay all open to the Count de Vergennes, who, I assure you, I do not believe will assist me, or anybody else, in such measures of serving our country. When the French Ministers in America, or Europe, communicate everything to us, we may venture to be equally communicative with them. But when everything is concealed from us, more cautiously than it is from England, we shall do ourselves injustice, if we are not upon our guard.

If we conduct ourselves with caution, prudence, moderation, and firmness, we shall succeed in every great point; but if Congress, or their Ministers abroad suffer themselves to be intimidated by threats, slanders, or insinuations, we shall be duped out of the fishery, the Mississippi, much of the western lands, compensation to the tories, and Penobscot at least, if not Kennebec. This is my solemn opinion, and I will never be answerable to my country, posterity, or my own mind, for the consequences, that might happen from concealing it.

It is for the determinate purpose of carrying these points, that one man, who is submission itself, is puffed up to the top of Jacob's ladder in the clouds, and every other man depressed to the bottom of it in the dust. This is my opinion, let me be punished for it, for assuredly I am guilty.

With great respect, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, November 11th, 1782.

Sir,

On my first arrival at Paris, I found my colleagues engaged in conferences with Mr Oswald. They had been before chiefly conducted by Mr Jay, Dr Franklin having been mostly confined for three months, by a long and painful illness. At this time, however, he was so much better, although still weak and lame, as to join us in most of our subsequent conferences, and we were so constantly engaged forenoon, afternoon, and evening, that I had not been out to Versailles, nor anywhere else.

On Saturday last, the Marquis de Lafayette called upon me, and told me he had been to Versailles, and the Count de Vergennes had said to him, that he had been informed by the returns of the Police, that I was in Paris, but not officially, and he should take it well if I would come to see him.

I went out to dine with Dr Franklin the same day, who had just returned from delivering his memorial, and repeated to me the same message. I said to both, I would go the next morning, and, accordingly, on Sunday, the 9th, I went to make my court to his Excellency. He received me politely, and asked me questions about our progress. I answered him, that the English Minister appeared to me to divide with us upon ostensible points; that I still doubted his intentions to make a universal peace; that the cry of the nation was for something to be done or said with the American Ministers; and to satisfy this, the King of Great Britain had been advised to be the third power in Europe to acknowledge our independence. As this was a royal act, and under the great seal of his kingdom, it would never be denied or revoked; but still it did not render the nation unanimous, and to avoid, finally, disgusting any great party, the Minister would still pursue his usual studied obscurity of policy. Points must be conceded to the Americans, before a complete agreement could be made with them, even on terms to be inserted in the universal peace, which would open the full cry of a powerful party upon him, among which were the refugees. It could not be supposed, that the refugees and Penobscot were such points with the nation or Minister, that they would continue the war for them only, if they were ready to strike with France, Spain, and Holland.

The Count then asked me some questions respecting Sagadehock, which I answered, by showing him the records, which I had in my pocket, particularly that of Governor Pownal's solemn act of possession in 1759; the grants and settlements of Mount Desert, Machias, and all the other townships east of Penobscot river; the original grant of James the First, to Sir William Alexander of Nova Scotia, in which it is bounded on St Croix river; (this grant I had in Latin, French, and English) the dissertations of Governor Shirley, and Governor Hutchinson, and the authority of Governor Bernard, all showing the right of Massachusetts to this tract to be incontestable. I added, that I did not think any British Minister would ever put his hand to a written claim of that tract of land, their own national acts were so numerous, and so clear against them. The Count said, Mr Fitzherbert had told him, that it was for the masts, that a point was made of that tract. But the Count said, Canada was an immense resource for masts. I said, there were few masts there; that this could not be the motive; that the refugees were still at the bottom of this; several of them had pretensions to lands in Sagadehock, and the rest hoped for grants there.

The Count said, it was not at all surprising, that the British Ministry should insist upon compensation to the tories, for that all the precedents were in their favor; in the case of the United Provinces with Spain, all were restored to their possessions, and that there never had been an example of such an affair terminated by treaty, but all were restored. He said, it was a point well settled by precedents. I begged his Excellency's pardon for this, and thought there was no precedent in point. A restitution of an estate not alienated, although confiscated to a Crown or State, could not be a precedent in point, because, in our case, these estates had not only been confiscated, but alienated by the State, so that it was no longer in the power of the State to restore them. And when you come to the question of compensation, there is every argument of national honor, dignity of the State, public and private justice and humanity, for us to insist upon a compensation for all the plate, negroes, rice, and tobacco stolen, and houses and substance consumed, as there is for them to demand compensation to the tories; and this was so much the stronger in our favor, as our sufferers were innocent people, and theirs guilty ones.

M. Rayneval, who was present, said something about the King and nation being bound to support their adherents. I answered, that I could not comprehend this doctrine. Here was a set of people, whose bad faith and misrepresentations had deceived the King and deluded the nation, to follow their all-devouring ambition, until they had totally failed of their object; had brought an indelible reproach on the British name, and almost irretrievable ruin on the nation, and yet that nation is bound to support their deceivers and ruiners. If the national honor was bound at all, it was bound still to follow their ambition, to conquer America, and plant the refugees there in pomp and power, and in such case, we all know whose estates would be confiscated, and what compensation would be obtained. All this M. Rayneval said was very true.

The Count asked me to dine, which I accepted, and was treated with more attention and complaisance than ever, both by him and the Countess. As it is our duty to penetrate, if we can, the motives and views of our allies, as well as our enemies, it is worth while for Congress to consider what may be the true motives of these intimations in favor of the tories. History shows, that nations have generally had as much difficulty to arrange their affairs with their allies as with their enemies. France has had as much this war with Spain as with England. Holland and England, whenever they have been allies, have always found many difficulties, and from the nature of things, it must ever be an intricate task, to reconcile the notions, prejudices, principles, &c. of two nations in one concert of councils and operations.

We may well think, that the French would be very glad to have the Americans join with them in a future war. Suppose, for example, they should think the tories men of monarchical principles, or men of more ambition than principle, or men corrupted and of no principle, and should, therefore, think them more easily seduced to their purposes than virtuous Republicans, is it not easy to see the policy of a French Minister in wishing them amnesty and compensation? Suppose that a French Minister foresees, that the presence of the tories in America will keep up perpetually two parties, a French and an English party, and that this will compel the patriotic and independent men to join the French side, is it not natural for him to wish them restored? Is it not easy too to see, that a French Minister cannot wish to have the English and Americans perfectly agreed upon all points, before they themselves, the Spanish and the Dutch are agreed too? Can they be sorry then to see us split upon such a point as the tories? What can be their motives to become the advocates of the tories? It seems the French Minister, at Philadelphia, has made some representations to Congress, in favor of a compensation to the royalists, and that the Count de Vergennes' conversation with me was much in favor of it. The Count probably knows, that we are instructed against it, or rather, have not a constitutional authority to make it; that we can only write about it to Congress, and they to the States, who may, and probably will, deliberate upon it a year or eighteen months before they all decide, and then every one of them will determine against it. In this way, there is an insuperable obstacle to any agreement between the English and Americans, even upon terms to be inserted in the general peace, before all are ready, and, indeed, after. It has been upon former occasions the constant practice of the French, to have some of their subjects in London, and the English some of theirs in Paris, during conferences for peace, in order to propagate such sentiments as they wished to prevail. I doubt not there are such there now. M. Rayneval has certainly been there. It is reported, I know not how truly, that M. Gerard has been there, and probably others are there, who can easily prompt the tories to clamor, and to cry that the King's dignity and nation's honor are compromised, to support their demands.

America has been long enough involved in the wars of Europe. She has been a football between contending nations from the beginning, and it is easy to foresee, that France and England both will endeavor to involve us in their future wars. It is our interest and duty to avoid them as much as possible, and to be completely independent, and to have nothing to do with either of them, but in commerce. My poor thoughts and feeble efforts, have been from the beginning constantly employed to arrange all our European connexions to this end, and will continue to be so employed, whether they succeed or not. My hopes of success are stronger now than they ever have been, because I find Mr Jay precisely in the same sentiments, after all the observations and reflections he has made in Europe, and Dr Franklin at last, at least appears to coincide with us. We are all three perfectly united in the affair of the tories, and of the Sagadehock, the only points in which the British Minister pretends to differ from us.

The enclosed papers will show Congress the substance of the negotiation. The treaty, as first projected between Mr Oswald on one side, and Dr Franklin and Mr Jay on the other before my arrival; the treaty as projected after my arrival, between Mr Oswald and the three American Ministers, my Lord Shelburne having disagreed to the first; Mr Oswald's letter and our answer; Mr Strachey's letter and our answer.[14] Mr Strachey has gone to London with the whole, and we are waiting his return, or the arrival of some other, with further instructions.

If Congress should wish to know my conjecture, it is, that the Ministry will still insist upon compensation to the tories, and thus involve the nation every month of the war in an expense sufficient to make a full compensation to all the tories in question. They would not do this, however, if they were ready with France and Spain.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

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ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN ADAMS.

Philadelphia, November 18th, 1782.

Sir,

Since my letter of the 6th, Congress have been pleased to appoint Mr Jefferson one of their Ministers Plenipotentiary for negotiating peace. I have not yet received an answer to my letter informing him of this event, though I have some reason to believe he will accept the appointment.

I believe I mentioned to you, that Congress had refused to accept Mr Laurens' resignation. Many members have since seen with great pain, the petition published in the Parliamentary debates as his. I sincerely wish, that it may prove to be a forgery, since the language it speaks does not consist with the dignified character he holds. He has since informed Congress, that he purposes to return to England, and come out to this country by the way of New York. I hope the determination of Congress will reach him before he leaves France, as it will have an awkward appearance to send to England for an American Minister.

All the contracts we have received from you, have been sent back with the ratification endorsed. Some of them have, I hope, reached you before this. So that the last hand may be put to the important business of the loan.

So much has been said of Captain Asgill, upon whom, as you have been informed, the lot fell, when it was determined to avenge the death of Captain Huddy, that I should let you know the issue of this business, which you may in part collect, from the enclosed resolve, though you may be ignorant of the reasons which induced Congress to pass it, and again render abortive their determination to punish the unexampled cruelty of the enemy. Mrs Asgill, the mother of this unfortunate young man, had sufficient influence at the Court of France to obtain its interposition in his favor; a letter was written on the subject by Count de Vergennes to General Washington, enclosing one from Mrs Asgill to the Count, which was extremely pathetic. The Minister of France had orders from his master to support this application. It was thought advisable, that this should not be formally done, but that the discharge of Asgill, should be grounded upon the reasons expressed in the preamble of the resolution. Congress the more readily acquiesced in this measure, as there is ground to hope, from the late conduct of the enemy, that they have determined to adopt a more civilized mode of carrying on the war in future. They have called off the savages, and a large number of prisoners have returned on parole from Canada.

We have yet no certain account of the evacuation of Charleston, though we know that the first division of the troops, and a considerable number of the inhabitants sailed on the 19th ultimo, as is said, for Augustine; it is probably evacuated by this time.

It would give me pleasure to receive from you an accurate account of the differences, which have arisen between the Court of Denmark and the United Provinces, and the effects they may probably produce. We are imperfectly acquainted with facts here, and still less with the politics of the Northern Courts; you will sometimes extend your observations to them.

I confide too much in the wisdom of the States-General to believe, that they will omit any honorable means to prevent an accession of strength to Great Britain, at this critical moment.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

FOOTNOTE:

[14] These papers will be found in the Correspondence of the Ministers for negotiating a peace.

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TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, November 18th, 1782.

Sir,

The instructions from Congress, which direct us to pay so strict an attention to the French Ministry, and to follow their advice, are conceived in terms so universal and unlimited, as to give a great deal of anxiety to my mind.

There is no man more impressed with the obligation of obedience to instructions; but, in ordinary cases, the principal is so near the Deputy, as to be able to attend to the whole progress of the business, and to be informed of every new fact, and every sudden thought. Ambassadors in Europe can send expresses to their Courts, and give and receive intelligence in a few days, with the utmost certainty. In such cases there is no room for mistake, misunderstanding, or surprise. But, in our case, it is very different. We are at an immense distance. Despatches are liable to foul play, and vessels are subject to accidents. New scenes open, the time presses, various nations are in suspense, and necessity forces us to act.

What can we do? If a French Minister advises us to cede to the Spaniards the whole river of the Mississippi, and five hundred miles of territory to the eastward of it, are we bound by our instructions to put our signature to the cession, when the English themselves are willing we should extend to the river, and enjoy our natural right to its navigation? If we should be counselled to relinquish our right to the fishery on the Grand Bank of Newfoundland, when the British Ministry are ready, by treaty, to acknowledge our right to it, are we obliged to relinquish it? If we are advised to restore and compensate the tories, are we to comply? If we know, or have reasons to believe, that things, which will have weight upon the minds of the British Ministry against us upon some points, will be communicated to them in some way or other, secret or open, if we communicate it to this Court, are we bound to do it?

I cannot think, that a construction, so literal and severe, was ever intended to be put upon it; and, therefore, I see no way of doing my duty to Congress, but to interpret the instruction, as we do all general precepts and maxims, by such restrictions and limitations, as reason, necessity, and the nature of things demand.

It may sometimes be known to a deputy, that an instruction from his principal was given upon information of mistaken facts, what is he to do? When he knows, that if the truth had been known, his principal would have given a directly contrary order, is he to follow that, which issued upon mistake? When he knows, or has only good reason to believe, that, if his principal were on the spot, and fully informed of the present state of facts, he would give contrary directions, is he bound by such as were given before? It cannot be denied, that instructions are binding, that it is a duty to obey them, and that a departure from them cannot be justified; but I think it cannot be denied on the other hand, that in our peculiar situation, cases may happen, in which it might become our duty to depend upon being excused, (or, if you will, pardoned) for presuming, that if Congress were upon the spot, they would judge as we do.

I presume not to dictate, nor to advise, but I may venture to give my opinion, as I do freely, and with much real concern for the public, that it would be better, if every instruction in being were totally repealed, which enjoins upon any American Minister to follow, or ask the advice, or even to communicate with any French, or other Minister, or Ambassador in the world. It is an inextricable embarrassment everywhere. Advice would not be more seldom asked, nor communication less frequent. It would be more freely given. A communication of information, or a request of council would then be received as a compliment, and a mark of respect; it is now considered as a duty and a right. Your Ministers would have more weight, and be the more respected through the world. Congress cannot do too much to give weight to their own Ministers, for, they may depend upon it, great and unjustifiable pains are taken to prevent them from acquiring reputation, and even to prevent an idea taking root in any part of Europe, that anything has been, or can be done by them. And there is nothing, that humbles and depresses, nothing that shackles and confines, in short, nothing that renders totally useless all your Ministers in Europe, so much as these positive instructions, to consult and communicate with French Ministers, upon all occasions, and follow their advice. And I really think it would be better to constitute the Count de Vergennes, our sole Minister, and give him full powers to make peace and treat with all Europe, than to continue any of us in the service, under the instructions in being, if they are to be understood in that unlimited sense, which some persons contend for.

I hope, that nothing indecent has escaped me upon this occasion. If any expressions appear too strong, the great importance of the subject, and the deep impression it has made on my mind and heart, must be my apology.

I am, Sir, your humble servant,

JOHN ADAMS.

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TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, November 24th, 1782.

Sir,